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
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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA
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NO. XIII

FEBRUARY, 1847.

ARTICLE I.

THE CANONS OF THE APOSTLES.

A Dissertation, Historical and Critical, Translated from the Latin, by Iraha Chase, D. D.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

[THE author of this Dissertation *De Codice Canonum, qui Apostolorum nomine circumferuntur*, is Dr. O. C. Krabbe, now a Professor in the University of Kiel. To say nothing of his other highly valuable productions, his work in German on the Origin and Contents of the Apostolical Constitutions ought to be mentioned here, as being akin to the small Latin work now presented in an English dress. It was a Prize Essay at the University of Bonn. It forms an octavo volume of about three hundred pages. It introduces the reader to a dark but deeply interesting period of Ecclesiastical History; and to all who are prepared to enter on a fundamental investigation, it furnishes important aid in solving one of the most difficult problems, and in understanding the state of the ancient church. It is already translated from the German; and, probably, it will soon be published in connection with an English version of the so called Apostolical constitutions and canons of the Apostles. Indeed, from the evidence of manuscripts, the canons of the Apostles seem once to have constituted a concluding chapter (47th) of the Eighth and last Book of the Apostolical Constitutions. But, in the present Article, they are treated as a distinct collection.

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It is unnecessary here to speak of the mighty influence which these canons have had, or of their importance in shedding light on the history of Christendom. And it would be wrong to detain the reader by apologies, or criticisms, or commendations. In the few instances in which it has seemed desirable to add anything, it has been added by the translator, and included in brackets.—
[TE.]

FROM the time of the Lutheran Reformation, a new and bright-day shone on Ecclesiastical History, as well as on all the departments of Theology. For there have been men now mentioned among theologians with merited praise, who, when they had received the liberty of thinking and speaking, applied the torch as it were, of criticism to the thick darkness of errors, and summoned to a more accurate examination various statements which, although commonly admitted, were yet not placed beyond doubt. They felt themselves under special obligations to go back to the earlier ages of the Christian church, and inspect carefully the foundation on which the Romish church had been resting. But the more they penetrated into the most interior recesses of Ecclesiastical History, and explored critically the sources themselves, the better they have understood that many things by which the Romish church has assumed her authority, and sustained herself for so many ages, are nothing else than inventions destitute of all firm and stable foundation. When those reformers, therefore, applied themselves zealously to draw from the fountains of history the means of combating the theologians of Rome, it could not but occur that they should not only reject many vain and absurd notions, but even refute and annihilate them. In breaking the supports of the Papal domination, what immortal glory they acquired to themselves by proving the falsity of the Decretal Epistles, to say nothing of anything else, no one needs to be informed.

But among the ancient writings which in former times, were advanced to great power and authority, and which helped to sustain the Popes in establishing some of their institutes and decrees, have been also the canons, which were circulated in the name of the holy apostles.¹ Nor have there been wanting in the

¹ *Κανόνες εκκλησιαστικοὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων.* Thus the book in the French king's library, 1326, is entitled: *In Dionysius Exiguus: Regulæ Ecclesiasticæ sanctorum Apostolorum, prolatae per Clementem ecclesiæ Romanæ pontificem.* And in the king's Greek collection of canons, 2430: *Κανόνες*

catholic church those who against all appearance of truth would dare to palm these canons on the apostles, and not hesitate to set them forth as apostolical. Before the Reformation, therefore, these canons had great authority, and were even received into the body of the canon law; nor did popes omit to quote them in settling contests and in promulgating laws.

But their authority was shaken and diminished, when the greatest distrust was awakened respecting all writings which served to perpetuate and sustain the papal domination. At last, their whole force and influence were destroyed, when it was proved by the gravest reasons, that these canons are not a work of the apostles, and can rightfully be ascribed neither to the apostles nor to Clement of Rome. This became the united and harmonious voice of all the intelligent, including even theologians of the catholic church. But respecting the origin of the canons there were among theologians various opinions. No one was presented that united all suffrages. Though most agreed in denying that the canons are of apostolic origin, yet in forming a judgment how they arose, and to what age they are to be adjudged, there was much diversity. But at what time they came into existence, where they first appeared, who collected them, and why they bear the name of the apostles, all will readily perceive to be inquiries of no small importance.

And to me, as I approach this question to be solved concerning the origin of the canons, it seems requisite, that, after narrating as briefly as possible the opinions of learned men respecting this matter, and examining diligently the testimonies of the ancients, I should institute a discussion concerning the number and authority of the canons. Then we must proceed to consider whether they have one author, or are a collection of separate canons which arose in the early Christian church. Finally, if on this point we arrive at any certainty, we must inquire whether, by examining the canons themselves more carefully, and taking into view external considerations, it may be possible to determine more exactly the time in which they arose.

I Let us present the most important opinions of the authors who have written concerning the canons.

οι λεγόμενοι τῶν ἀποστόλων, διὰ Κλήμεντος. But in the Latin Ms. 1203: *Apostolorum Canones, qui pro Clementem Romanum pontificem de Graeco in Latinum, sicut quidam asserunt, dicuntur esse translati, sunt quinquaginta.* Compare Cotelierii *Patr. Apost. Opera*, Tom. I. p. 442;—also C. J. Can. ed. Böhm-er, and C. J. Civ. ed. Gothsfred.

The first were the well known Magdeburg centuriators,¹ who vehemently impugned their apostolic authority, and proved clearly that the work is spurious, and not to be ascribed to the apostles. Turrianus,² Binius,³ and others undertook the defence of the canons, affirming that they were made by the apostles themselves. Influenced by zeal for the order of things as established around them, they were led into this opinion, that, by the aid of those ancient regulations, they might, at their pleasure, commend and confirm certain ecclesiastical rites and various institutes of ecclesiastical discipline. But the attempt was made in vain. For even among the theologians of their own church, this opinion has not prevailed.

But along with others who descended into the arena against those papists, was John Duillé, far the most learned man of his age, and one of the most acute; who in his third book *De Pseudepigraphis Apostolicis*, entirely overthrew the insane opinion. He put forth his vigorous efforts to impugn and refute also the opinion of Alaspinaeus, bishop of Baden, who had contended that this ancient collection of canons was nothing else than a summary and abridgment of local councils and of matters sanctioned by individual bishops of the Greek churches before the Nicene council.⁴ Then, having exploded the opinions of his adversaries, Duillé proposes his own, namely, that this apocryphal collection of canons, completed, did not become known before the fifth century, and now about the end of the fifth century made its appearance, and began to be published.⁵

Among the catholic theologians, *Bellarmin*⁶ and *Baronius*⁷ admit only the first fifty canons to be legitimate; the rest, which Dionysius Exiguus had omitted in his collection, they do not think to be of legal authority, although they are received by the Greeks.

But although *Natalis Alexander*,⁸ *Antonius Pagi*,⁹ *Cabassutius*¹⁰

¹ Ceritus. Magdeb. I. Lib. II. c. VII. p. 544.

² In Tract. pro Canonibus Apostolorum et Decretalibus Epistolis contra Magd. Lib. I. Florent. 1572, 1612.

³ Praefat. ad canon. Apost. Tom. I. concil. p. 14; where he acknowledges all as genuine and apostolical, except the 65th canon and the 84th, which he would have expunged.

⁴ De Antiq. Eccles. Ritib. Lib. I. Obs. 13.

⁵ De Pseudepigr. Apost. Lib. III.

⁶ De Script. Eccles. p. 40, 41. ed. Colon. 1657.

⁷ Annales ad A. 102. n. XII.

⁸ Dissert. 17. seculi I. p. 195.

⁹ Ad A. C. 56. p. 46.

¹⁰ In Notit. Ecclesiast. Histor. concil. p. 7.

and others, embrace the opinion of Daillé, yet many have taken a middle course ; who would contend that all those canons are indeed fictitious and spurious, but that their origin is very ancient.

Nearest to Daillé comes Peter de Marcia,¹ who, because Firmilianus and Cyprian, disputing with Stephen, bishop of Rome, concerning the baptism of heretics, made not the least mention of the canons, conjectures that these canons were collected and honored with the name of the apostles, A. D. 250, and that this was done at a certain council in Iconium. For if the canons had been known before this, it cannot be explained why those men did not appeal to them, when in canons XLVI, XLVII, and XLVIII, the baptism of heretics is disapproved. I confess that this conjecture seems to me very reasonable. And to this one argument other reasons could be added, and other canons called into the discussion.

But here we must by no means omit to mention that most learned man, William Beveridge,² who has written concerning the apostolical canons with so much acuteness and excellence that his opinion is approved by almost all. Although he has not dared to affirm either that they were written by the apostles themselves, or that they were dictated to Clement of Rome as an amanuensis, yet he endeavors to prove that they are the most ancient canons of the primitive church. That canons framed by apostolic men in *the end of the second century and the beginning of the third*, everywhere began to be known, nay, that the collector both of the canons and of the constitutions, was not Clement of Rome, but Clement of Alexandria, he has suspected from the last canon. There are indeed many things in which I rejoice that I agree with Beveridge, but nevertheless, in a subsequent part of this essay, where I exhibit my opinion respecting the age of the canons, reasons are given why in the main point I dissent from him. Here it will be sufficient to remark that I cannot dissent from the opinion of the learned men who contend that the whole of the last canon was inserted afterwards by another hand, and, therefore, that testimony cannot be drawn from it for settling the question respecting the author of the canons.

We must now come to more recent ecclesiastical historians ; most of whom, however, may be passed over in silence. For although they and persons occupied with ecclesiastical law had

¹ *Petrus de Marca, De Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii, Lib. III. c. 2.*

² *Codex Canonum Ecclesiae Primitivae Vindicatus et Illustratus. Lond. 1678. 4.*

most frequent occasion to refer to the canons, and settle their age by solid arguments, yet most of them, I know not by what accident, have been silent on the subject. They have seemed to have answered sufficiently the demands of criticism, if they have not assumed that the canons came from the apostolic age, and have made certain conjectures respecting their origin. But among the ecclesiastical writers who flourished towards the close of the last century, I must not neglect to commend one, whose opinion I have appropriated to my own use, and have set forth more copiously, as it was incumbent on me to do. It is *Spittler*,¹ whose merits in historical erudition connected with theology are very distinguished; and who has treated concerning the antiquity of the collection of canons, but not concerning the antiquity of the particular canons; and has stated it as being fully ascertained that these canons, in the earlier ages, arose in individual churches, which claimed to themselves apostolical origin; and that for this cause, and not because apostles were the authors of the canons, any precept of an apostolic church, being conformable to the doctrine of the apostles, was honored with the name of an apostolical canon. Finally, he thought that the separate canons, everywhere scattered in the apostolic churches, were brought into a collection; but afterwards were variously modified.

This opinion has also prevailed among more recent writers on law.² Most of them have judged that the origin of the canons is to be placed in the second century and in the third; and that they, nevertheless, contain vestiges, from which it may justly be concluded that they were afterwards increased.

From this brief survey of the judgments which have been pronounced respecting the canons, it will sufficiently appear that learned men have not all received the same number, but have followed various and conflicting opinions concerning this matter. In order, therefore, to show what has been proposed correctly, and what otherwise, the only thing to be done seems to be to institute a discussion *concerning the number and authority of the canons*. In this, it is of primary importance to examine diligently and estimate the testimonies of the ancients, that, having surveyed these, we may discover certain common principles, as it were, from which, in conjunction with internal evidences, the origin of the canons can, with probability, be made to appear.

¹ *Geschichte des Kanonischen Rechts bis auf die Zeiten des falschen Isidor*. Halle, 1778.

² Compare *Walter*, in his *Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts*, § 39. s. 96. 3rd Ed.

II. It is clear that among all the ancient authors, John of Antioch was the first who mentioned the apostolic canons, and these, the whole *eighty-five*, as belonging to the volume of sacred writings. And, the Trullan council, in their second canon, having passed a favorable decree concerning these canons,¹ and afterwards John of Damascus having received them into the catalogue of holy Scriptures,² very few of the Greeks have called in question their apostolic origin and authority.

The first to be mentioned, who, among the Greeks, has hesitated to ascribe the canons to the apostles, seems to be Photius.³ But the Greeks, as they never disputed concerning the number of the canons, always retained as sacred the *eighty-five*. Among the Latins it was different. About the year 500, Dionysius Exiguus, (who introduced our reckoning from the birth of Christ,) by translating fifty canons from Greek into Latin, presented them to the Latin church. And, to this time, it is not known why he did not translate into Latin the whole *eighty-five* canons, and give them all to the Latin church; whether he happened to have only *fifty* canons in his perhaps mutilated manuscript, or thought he ought to exclude from his version the latter *thirty-five*, as having been added after the collection was made. Be that matter as it may, it is certain that the Latin church received only the first fifty, and held them sacred.

Nor has the usage of the church been changed in later times. But canons, advanced to greater authority as having come from the apostles, have in many things been made arbiters. And, be it remembered, it was in a time when criticism had not yet been applied to ecclesiastical history, that no one opposed their claims. In the sixth century they are often brought forward by the popes to promote the papal interests. Their power and authority increased more and more; yet no more than the fifty came into use. This is easily ascertained from the controversy of Cardinal Humbert, who, when he contended at all points against Nicetas Pectoratus concerning the Sabbath, loudly asserted that all the ca-

¹ Ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τῇ ἁγίᾳ ταύτῃ συνόδῳ κάλλιστα καὶ σπουδαιότατα, ὥστε μένειν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν βεβαίως καὶ ἠσφαλεῖς . . . τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν ἁγίων καὶ ἐκδόξων ἀποστόλων ὁρῶσθοντα πέντε κανόνες.

² De Fide Orthod. Lib. IV. c. 28.

³ In his Bibliotheca, Cod. 112; in his Preface to the Nomocanon, and in Matthæi Blastaris Προθεωρία: Οὐ μὴν ἁλλὰ καὶ τοὺς λεγομένους τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων, εἰ καὶ τινες αὐτοὺς ἀμφιβάλλουσιν διὰ τινὰς αἰτίας ἠγῆσαντο.

nons, except the fifty, were apocryphal. It appears from many passages that Gratian (A. D. 1145) thought the same.¹

Having now briefly stated the testimonies concerning the collection of the canons, we proceed to consider the origin of each.

All who have diligently examined the work, must have discovered that the canons have not proceeded from one author. The testimonies of the ancients, indeed, prove this. For often in the councils of the fourth and of the fifth century, reference is made to most ancient canons to which various names are given. Let us, therefore, trace those vestiges which may yet be found in the early ages, and bring them to light, that the origin of the canons may become more manifest.

III. The council of Chalcedon (A. D. 451), when, in their twenty-second canon, they decreed it unlawful for the clergy after the death of a bishop to seize the property which belonged to him, sanctioned as it were and fortified their canon by adding, *as also it is interdicted in the ancient canons*, (*καθὼς καὶ τοῖς παλαιαῖς κανόσι ἀπηγορεύεται*). But observe how wonderful it is, if we inspect the matter more thoroughly. Let us look around and examine whether there is any such prohibition in the canons of former councils. We find no canon except our fortieth apostolic canon which expressly orders that the property of the bishop be not lost, nor cease to be at his disposal, but that he have the power of leaving it to whomsoever he may please.² In view of these facts, who can doubt that the council of Chalcedon, in the words quoted, pointed to our canons? In passing, let us here remark, that ancient regulations were first cited under the name of apostolical canons in the council of Constantinople, A. D. 394. (See Zonaras, p. 527, and Balsamon, p. 768.)³ At that council there were present, besides many other bishops, Theophilus of Alexandria, Flavius of Antioch, Gregory of Nyssa, and Theodorus of Mopsuestia,—men of great eminence. No one will deny that the regulation presented in our canon LXVI, [otherwise numbered LXXIII and LXXIV,] is similar to the one which

¹ Gratian. Distinct. 16. Pref. and Urban II. apud Gratianum, Dist. 32, c. 6.

² Can. XL. Ἐστω φανερὰ τὰ ἴδια τοῦ ἐπισκόπου πράγματα, εἴγε καὶ ἴδια ἔχει, καὶ φανερὰ τὰ κυριακά, ἐν' ἐφουσίαν ἔχη, τῶν ἰδίων τελευτῶν ὁ ἐπίσκοπος οἷς βούλεται καὶ ὡς βούλεται καταλείψαι, καὶ μὴ προφάσει τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν πραγμάτων διαπίπτειν τὰ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου.

³ Μὴ χρῆναι πρὸς τὸ ἐξῆς μήτε παρὰ τριῶν, μὴ τί γε παρὰ δύο τὸν ὑπεύθυνον δοκιμαζόμενον καθαιρεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ γὰρ πλείονος συνέδου ψήφῳ καὶ τῶν τῆς ἐπαρχίας, καθὼς καὶ οἱ ἀποστολικοὶ κανόνες διωρίσαντο.

we have inserted at the bottom of the page as having been decreed by that council.¹

It should be further remarked, that the Fathers in this general council, A. D. 381, sent epistles to Damasus, Ambrose, and other bishops then assembled at Rome, in which from an ancient canon, (*Παλαιός τε ὡς ἴσται θεσμός κεκράτηκε, καὶ τῶν ἁγίων ἐν Νικαίᾳ πατέρων ὄρος,*) they contended it ought to be established that bishops in their own parishes, and there only, with the assistance, if they think proper, of other neighboring bishops, should give ordination to those who become clerical persons. Nor is there any law more ancient than the Nicene council, except canons XIV. and XV, which forbid a bishop's leaving his own parish, and pervading that of another, unless a reasonable cause constrain him.²

And about that time Evagrius occupied the episcopal chair at Antioch, having been ordained by no one except his predecessor Paulinus; which Theodoret, in his Ecclesiastical History, B. V. c. 23, affirms to have been done *contrary to the ecclesiastical law*, (*παρὰ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν θεσμόν,*)—nay, *contrary to many canons*, (*παρὰ πόλλους κανόνας.*)• But manifestly his affirmation is in harmony with the canon which expressly enjoins, Let a bishop be ordained by two bishops or by three, (*Επίσκοπος χειροτονέσθω ἐπὶ ἐπισκόπων δύο ἢ τριῶν*). May we not reasonably infer that Theodoret had in his mind our first canon, from which he judged the ordination of Evagrius to be unlawful? But if we thoroughly examine the other canons, the seventy-sixth presents itself to us, which establishes in almost so many words the judgment of

¹ Can. LXVI. 'Επίσκοπον κατηγορηθέντα ἐπὶ τινι παρὰ ἀξιοπίστων καὶ πιστῶν προσώπων, καλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπισκόπων κἂν μὲν ἀπαντήσῃ καὶ ἀπολογία ἢ ἐλεγχθεῖ, ὀρίσεσθαι τὸ ἐπιτίμιον· εἰ δὲ καλούμενος μὴ ὑπακούσῃ, καλεῖσθαι καὶ δεύτερον, ἀποστελλομένων ἐπ' αὐτὸν δύο ἐπισκόπων· εὖν δὲ καὶ οὕτω καταφρονήσας μὴ ἀπαντήσῃ, ἢ σύνοδος ἀποφαινέσθω κατ' αὐτοῦ τὰ δοκοῦντα, ὅπως μὴ δόξῃ κερδαίνειν φυγοδικῶν.

² We here insert the two canons entire, to avoid the necessity of repetition hereafter.—Can. XIV. 'Επίσκοπον μὴ ἐξεῖναι καταλείψαντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παροικίαν ἑτέρα ἐπιπεδῶν, κἂν ὑπὸ πλείονων ἀναγκάσῃται, εἰ μὴ τις εὐλογος αἰτία ἢ τοῦτο βιαζομένη αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, ὥς πλέον τι κέρθος δυναμένου αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐκεῖσε λόγῳ εὐσεβείας συμβύλλεσθαι· καὶ τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κρίσει πολλῶν ἐπισκόπων καὶ παρακλήσει μεγίστη. Can. XV. Εἰ τις προεζύτερος ἢ διάκονος ἢ ὄλως τοῦ κατελέγου τῶν κληρικῶν ἀπολείψας τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παροικίαν εἰς ἑτέραν ἀπέλθῃ, καὶ παντελῶς μεταστὰς διατρίβῃ ἐν ἄλλῃ παροικίᾳ παρὰ γνώμην τοῦ ἰδίου ἐπισκόπου· τοῦτον κεινόμενον μηκέτι λειτουργεῖν, μάλιστα εἰ προσκαλοσθέντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου αὐτοῦ ἐπανελθεῖν σὺν ἐπήκουσεν ἐπιμένων τῇ ὑταξίᾳ· ὥς λαϊκοὶ μέντοι ἐκείσε κοινωνεῖτω.

Theodoret: A bishop must not gratify his brother, or his son, or any other kinsman with the episcopal dignity, or ordain whom he pleases. . . . But if any one shall do so, let the ordination be invalid.¹ Most clearly, if we do not greatly err, Theodoret had this canon also in his mind.

If now we go back to the earlier time of the Christian church, we find such vestiges of the canons that it will appear that they were even then known. Nor will any one deny that most probably the Nicene council not only had regard to these canons, but also confirmed and more amply described them. We shall not deny that the canons were in use before this council.

Thus Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, when, in an epistle to Alexander, bishop of Constantinople, he mentions it as scandalous in many bishops that they received into the communion of the church several persons excommunicated by himself, sustains his opinion by these words, τῷ μήτε ἀποστολικὸν κανόνα τοῦτο συγκαταίει.² Who, indeed, is there whom it can escape, that canons XII and XIII are opposed to this abuse?³ And by this epistle, as it was written before the Nicene council, it is necessarily shown even that the whole council were acquainted with these canons.

The Nicene Fathers, when they had in mind to propose and sanction certain canons concerning eunuchs, referred to earlier canons, in which, they said, the same precepts were contained. Now our canons exhibit to us certain precepts concerning eunuchs;⁴ so that it can be affirmed, without any doubtfulness, that the Nicene Fathers had regard to these. For if this be not admitted, where can be found any other canons which establish the same rules concerning eunuchs? Wherever we may search, we find nowhere anything similar, except in our canons.

But there is another argument which confirms our conjecture.

¹ Ὅτι οὐ χρή ἐπίσκοπον τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἢ υἱῷ ἢ ἐτέρῳ συγγενεὶ χαρίζεσθαι τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς, χειροτονεῖν οὗς αὐτὸς βούλεται εἰ δέ τις τοῦτο ποιήσει, ἄκυρος μένει καὶ χειρτονία . . .

² Theodoret, Hist. Eccles. Lib. I. c. 3.

³ Can. XIII. Εἰ τις κληρικὸς ἢ λαϊκὸς ἀφορισμένος ᾔητοι ἀδελφός, ἀπελθὼν ἐν ἐτέρᾳ πόλει δεχθῇ ἀνεὺ γραμμάτων συστατικῶν, ἀφοριζέσθω καὶ ὁ δεξάμενος καὶ ὁ δεχθεὶς.

⁴ Can. XXI. Εὐνοῦχος εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἐπηρείας ἀνθρώπων ἐγενετο τις, ἢ ἐν διαγμῷ ἀφαιρεθῇ τὰ ἀνδρῶν, ἢ οὕτως ἐβν, καὶ ἐστὶν ἄξιος, ἐπίσκοπος γινέσθω.—Can. XXII. Ὁ ἀκρωτηριάσας ἑαυτὸν, μὴ γινέσθω κληρικὸς· ἀτοφονευτὴς γάρ ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργίας ἐκθρόος. Can. XXIII. Εἰ τις κληρικὸς ὢν ἑαυτὸν ἀκρωτηριάσει, καθαιρείσθω, φονευτὴς γάρ ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ.

The sixty-second apostolical canon¹ expressly commands that a clerical person be deposed, if he deny his clerical character through fear of a Jew, or of a gentile, or of a heretic; but it gives no direction what shall be done to him who, before being ordained, may have denied Christ. Now the Nicene Fathers assign to such a man the same punishment that is assigned in our apostolical canon.

And it is evident that our canons, under various names indeed, were known also to other councils. Thus I would not deny that the council at Antioch, (A. D. 341,) allude to our canons when they mention *θεσμοὶ ἐκκλησιαστικοὶ καὶ ἀρχαιότατον κρατήσαντα ἐν πατέρων ἡμῶν κανόνα*. Nor may we at all conjecture that the author of our canons reduced his canons, as being spurious and fictitious, into harmony with the canons of the council at Antioch, when the Fathers of the council affirm them to be *κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον κανόνα*.

But let us produce another testimony, which is extant, concerning the canons. For I hold it to be certain that our canons were known to Athanasius. He refers to them for the purpose of proving that his being deposed, which the Arians had effected, was unlawful. He informs us that he was removed from his ecclesiastical office, without being summoned to trial before a council of bishops, and without being convicted by his opponents, but being accused by Arians, his enemies, unworthy of confidence. All which, he contends, was done contrary to a constant and abiding canon of the church. This compels us to think that Athanasius had in view our canon LXXIV,² which directs that a bishop be summoned to trial by bishops, and if he meet them, and be convicted, that he be punished by the council.

This opinion is confirmed by the fact that Athanasius has often quoted ecclesiastical canons in such a manner that it is obvious they accord with those of which we are treating.

But let us call into discussion those passages which are extant in Eusebius concerning our canons. Eusebius, called by the suffrages of the clergy and of the people to the office of bishop at Antioch, declined this dignity, because he thought that his ac-

¹ Εἰ τις κληρικὸς διὰ φόβον ἀνθρώπινον Ἰουδαίου ἢ Ἑλλήνου ἢ αἰρετικοῦ ἀρνήσῃται, εἰ μὲν ὄνομα Χριστοῦ, ἀποβαλλέσθω, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κληρικοῦ, καθαιρεῖσθω· μετανόησας δὲ, ὡς λαϊκὸς δεχθήτω.

² Ἐπίσκοπον κατηγορηθέντα ἐπὶ τινι παρὰ ἁγιοπρίστων ἀνθρώπων, καλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν ὡς γκαῖον ἐκ τῶν ἐπισκόπων κἢ μὲν ἀπαντήσῃ καὶ ὁμολογήσῃ ἢ ἐλεγχθεὶς, ἀρῶνται τὸ ἐπιτίμιον . . .

ceptance of it would be contrary to an apostolical canon, (ἀποστολικὸν κανόνα.) In his life of Constantine, B. III. c. 61, he presents us an epistle of the emperor, in which he very much commends Eusebius for this; and affirms to him that he now understands that Eusebius had rightly observed the ecclesiastical canon, and had acted in accordance with apostolic tradition.¹ It will now appear to be placed beyond a doubt that both Eusebius and Constantine referred to our canon XIV.²

It remains that we inspect and weigh the testimonies of the Latin church. We have already mentioned that at first the Latin church knew nothing at all of the canons; but that afterwards she attributed great power and authority to a part of them. The first who in the Roman church has made mention of them is Julius, bishop of Rome, who referred to these canons, when, in an epistle to the Oriental bishops, he reproached them with certain things connected with the deposing of Athanasius. From this, however, we cannot conclude that the canons were then of force in the Western church. For, probably, Athanasius had informed Julius concerning this canon; and urged upon him that, relying on this canon, which the Oriental church had acknowledged, he might demonstrate to the Greek bishops that their proceeding had been unlawful.

At length, the decree of Gelasius ascribed our canons to the class of apocryphal books. Concerning this decree there have been the most diverse opinions. Indeed, some have gone so far as to contend that no council was ever held at Rome, A. D. 494, by the bishop Gelasius.³ Others think it altogether uncertain whether this decree was ever put forth by Gelasius, since no one mentions it till three hundred years afterwards. But others (we need mention only Beveridge)⁴ are of the opinion that, even if Gelasius issued a decree concerning books to be received and to be rejected, it is, nevertheless, uncertain whether those words, *the apocryphal book of the canons of the apostles*, (liber canonum

¹ Euseb. Vita Constant. Lib. III. c. 61. . . Τὸν κανόνα τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ἐπιστομῆς εἰς ἀκριβεῖαν φυλαχθέντα . . . ἐμμενεῖν γούν τούτοις ὑπερ ὡρεστά τε τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῇ ἀποστολικῇ παραδόσει σύμφωνα φαίνεται, εὐαγές.

² Ἐπίσκοπον μὴ ἐξεῖναι καταλείψαντα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παροικίαν, ἐτέρᾳ ἐπιτηδῶν, κὰν ὑπὸ πλειόνων ἀναγκάζεται, εἰ μὴ τις εὐλογος αἰτία ἢ τοῦτο βιαζομένη αὐτὸν ποιεῖν. . . .

³ Jo. Pearson, in his Vindiciæ Epistolæ Ignatii, P. I. c. 4.

⁴ Beveridge, Codex Canonum Ecclesiæ Primitivæ Vindicatus, Lib. I. c. IX. §3.

Apostolorum apocryphus,) proceeded from Gelasius himself. This opinion becomes probable, when we consider that, in the manuscript of Justell and in other manuscripts, these words are manifestly wanting. Besides, Hincmar, bishop of Rheims, contends that the canons of the apostles are not recounted by Gelasius in this decree. However this may be, we understand sufficiently from Isidore of Seville¹ that the Latin church rejected them entirely, and ascribed to them not even the least authority. This being made clear, we easily see why these canons have been excluded from later collections of canons; as has been done by Martin of Braga,² by Ferrand, deacon of Carthage,³ and by others. At least, by the Pseudo-Isidore, they were given out to be truly apostolical canons; and, therefore, they were received into the canonical Law. But although in the seventh century, and in later centuries also, they were called in question, yet at length they claimed for themselves ecclesiastical authority and power.

But it is now sufficiently evident, that the canons of the apostles did not derive their origin from the apostles themselves, and that, not from this but from some other cause, they were honored with the name of the apostles. In this our age men have indulged their ingenuity and their imagination; and the more novel their conjectures, the more gratifying they have been to many. But in proposing and amplifying my conjecture, I refer to Spittler, who, if there is need, can give it support.⁴

From our survey of the testimonies of the ancients, it seems evident that, in the early church, single canons were circulated under the name of ancient canons, apostolical canons, ecclesiastical regulations, and ancient law, (*πάλαι κανόνες ἀποστολικοὶ κανόνες, ἐκκλησιαστικοὶ θεσμοὶ, παλαιὸς νόμος.*) Each of these canons, although made and sanctioned by later persons, has been ascribed to the apostles, if it has seemed to accord with their doctrine. These canons, therefore, were called apostolical, not [at first] from any supposed apostolical authorship, but from the nature of the doctrine inculcated in them. There were in the early ages

¹ Isidor. Hisp. ap. Anton. Augustin. Lib. I. de emendat. Gratiani Dial. VI. Gratiani Digest XVI. c. 1. Canones qui dicuntur Apostolorum, sed quia nec sedes apostolica eos recepit, nec S. S. Patres illis assensum præbuerunt, pro eo, quod ab hæreticis sub nomine apostolorum compositi dignoscantur, quamvis in iis utilia inveniantur.

² Compare Du Pin, Nov. Bibl. Auct. Eccles. Tom. I. p. 23.

³ Breviatio Canonum. Comp. Justelli Bibl. Juris Can. Vet. Tom. I. p. 419.

⁴ See Spittler's Geschichte des Kanonischen Rechts, p. 12.

many churches or parishes to which there were ascribed, as it were, a preëminence and a superior authority, because they derived their origin from apostles; whence there was given to them the name of apostolical churches.

After having diligently examined all the testimonies, I would now, without any hesitancy, contend that all the canons arose, one after another, in single churches of the first centuries, until, instead of being dispersed here and there, they were brought into one collection.

IV. Let us now see *at what time* the single canons first appeared. To guard against transgressing the proposed limits of this dissertation, it will doubtless be best to place together several canons and exhibit our judgment concerning them.

As to the first two canons, they order expressly that a bishop be ordained by two or three bishops; but a presbyter, a deacon and any other clerical person, by one bishop.¹ But how alien this rule is from the apostolic times! This we sufficiently perceive from the terms employed. For who does not know that, in the apostolic age, there was no distinction between presbyter and bishop? And since in our canons a bishop and a presbyter are distinguished in authority, in office and even in rank, it is evident that this distinction is most unsuitable to the apostolic age, in which these names were used promiscuously. To what age do we assign these canons? Certainly to one in which there was a distinction between the words bishop and presbyter, and a new signification had come into use. Besides, we find an indication of the time of their origin in the mention of *the other clerical persons*, (*οἱ λοιποὶ κληρικοί*.) So far as I can judge, it is right to conclude that these canons were framed at that time when the inferior clerical orders in the church were constituted. Now since Tertullian, in his work *De Prescriptione Haereticorum*, c. 41. mentions the inferior orders, and is the first ecclesiastical writer that has mentioned them, it follows that these canons are to be adjudged to the concluding part of the second century.

In canons III, IV. and V, certain regulations are presented in respect to the first fruits which were to be offered. As it is self-evident that the origin of these was not apostolical, I forbear to enlarge on the subject. But no one who has carefully considered the matter, will deny that these canons pertain to the Mosaic law,

¹ Can. I. Ἐπίσκοπος χειροτονείσθω ἐπὶ ἐπισκόπων δύο ἢ τριῶν, and Can. II. Προσβύτερος ἐφ' ἐνὸς ἐπισκόπου χειροτονείσθω, καὶ διάκονος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ κληρικοί.

in the abrogation of which all, in the apostolic age, were agreed. This ancient observance of the Jewish church, towards the close of the third century, when bishops arrogated to themselves increased authority, prevailed so much that fruits were not only offered by the faithful, but were distributed by the bishops to all others who were needy. Of this Origen is a most substantial witness; from whose testimony it is abundantly evident, that the custom of offering first fruits was already in his time exceedingly common.¹

The *fifth* canon, a most dangerous rock to the Roman church, exhibits the regulation that no bishop, presbyter, or deacon, put away his wife under pretext of religion; and the *seventh* inculcates that no one of the clergy undertake secular cares.² Each of these canons is so consentaneous with the apostolic age, that nothing hinders our supposing it to be sanctioned by apostolic men. The subject of the *sixth* canon sufficiently explains why, in the Western church where celibacy was held in great honor, our canons, of which those just now quoted are unfavorable to celibacy, were received so tardily.

Then in the *eighth* canon it is forbidden that any bishop, or presbyter, or deacon, celebrate the sacred day of the Passover [Easter] before the vernal equinox, with the Jews, under penalty of being deposed.³ But it will not appear wonderful to any one, that I most confidently adjudge this canon to the end of the second century, if I present briefly the reasons of this judgment. What! Is any canon sanctioned, unless there be some cause requiring its promulgation? No, most certainly. Now let us inspect the canon. From what cause was it possible to decree that the Passover be not kept before the vernal equinox, with the Jews? Doubtless from the cause that, at the time of passing the decree, there had arisen many and vehement contentions respecting the day on which the Passover was to be celebrated. The canon, therefore, fits precisely the end of the second century,

¹ Origen contra Celsum, Lib. VIII. p. 400, ed. Cantabrig. Κέλσος μὲν δαιμονίους ἀνατιθέναι βόβλεται· ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ εἰπόντι, βλαστησάτω ἡ γῆ βοτάνην χόρτου . . . ὧ δὲ τὰς ἀπαρχὰς ἀποδίδωμεν, τοῦτω καὶ τὰς εἰχίους ἀναπέμπομεν, ἔχοντες ἀρχιερεῖα μέγαν, διεληλυθότα τοὺς οὐρανοὺς, Ἰησοῦν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ.

² Can. VI. Ἐπίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος ἢ διάκονος τὴν ἐαυτοῦ γυναῖκα μὴ ἐκβαλέτω προφάσει εὐλαβείας· ἐν δὲ ἐκβάλη ὑφορίζεσθω· ἐπιμένων δὲ, καθαιρεῖσθω. Can. VII. Ἐπίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος ἢ διάκονος κοσμικὰς φροντίδας μὴ ἀναλαμβάνεσθω· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καθαιρεῖσθω.

³ Can. VIII. Εἰ τις ἐπίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος ἢ διάκονος τὴν ἁγίαν τοῦ πάσχα ἡμέραν πρὸ τῆς ἑαρινῆς ἰσημερίας μετὰ Ἰουδαίων ἐπιτελέσει, καθαιρεῖσθω.

when this question was most vehemently agitated between Victor, bishop of Rome, and Polycrates, bishop of Smyrna.

The next two canons, (IX. and X,) treat concerning the holy communion to be received by all the faithful, both clergy and laity, whenever they enter the church.¹ It is with good reason that Beveridge refutes the opinion of Daillé, who, because adherents of the Roman church leave the place of worship without partaking of the host, and thus she does not observe those canons, confidently infers that she did not acknowledge their apostolic origin. But what to us is the Roman church? It belongs to herself to see why she follows another fashion. Her usage and custom can bring nothing against the antiquity of our canons. So far are these canons from being at variance with the observances of the second century, that they fit them exactly. Let us consult the Fathers of that century. Justin Martyr at once presents himself, and can vouch for the correctness of our statement. In his Apology, when he describes the eucharist to Antoninus Pius, he says expressly of the Christians that they all assembled on Sunday, and listened to the reading of the sacred Scriptures and to an address from the bishop. Then all arose together to pray; and, when prayers were ended, there was an offering of bread and wine. The bishop gave thanks. The people responded, Amen. Distribution was made, and each partook.² It is obvious, therefore, that in this century the eucharist was celebrated by all Christians, as often as they came together. It is not, then, alien from the observances of the second century, if our canons threaten excommunication to clerical and lay persons who do not partake of the communion, when an offering is made.

¹ Can. IX. Εἰ τις ἐπίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος ἢ διάκονος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ κατολόγου τοῦ ἱερατικοῦ προσφορᾷς γενομένης μὴ μεταλύσῃ, τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπάτω· καὶ ἐὰν εὐλογος ᾖ, συγγνώμης τυγχανέτω· εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγῃ, ἀφορίζεσθω, ὡς αἰτίως βλάβης γενόμενος τῷ λαῷ καὶ ὑπόνοιαν ἐμποίησας κατὰ τοῦ προσενέγκαντος. Can. X. Πάντας τοὺς εἰσιόντας πιστοὺς καὶ τῶν γραφῶν ἀκούοντας, μὴ παραμένοντας δὲ τῇ προσευχῇ καὶ τῇ ἀγίᾳ μεταλήψει, ὡς ἀτάξιαν ἐμποιοῦντας τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἀφορίζεσθαι χρῆ.

² [Apol. I. c. 67. Καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου λεγομένη ἡμέρᾳ πάντων κατὰ πόλεις ἢ ἀγροὺς μενόντων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέλευσις γίνεται, καὶ τὰ ἀπονημονεῖματα τῶν ἀποστόλων, ἢ τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν προφητῶν ἀναγινώσκεται μέχρις ἐγχωρεῖ. Εἰτα παυσάμενον τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος, ὁ προεστὼς διὰ λόγου τὴν νονηστίαν καὶ πρόκλησιν τῆς τῶν καλῶν τούτων μιμήσεως ποιεῖται. Ἐπειτα ἀνιστάμεθα κοινῇ πάντες, καὶ εὐχὰς πέμπομεν· καὶ, ὡς προέφημεν, παυσάμενων ἡμῶν τῆς εὐχῆς, ἄρτος προσφέρεται καὶ οἶνος καὶ ὕδωρ; καὶ ὁ προεστὼς εὐχὰς ὁμοίως καὶ εὐχαριστίας, δοσὴ δύναμις αὐτῷ, ἀναπέμπει, καὶ ὁ λαὸς ἀπευφημεῖ λέγων τὸ ἀμήν· καὶ ἡ διὰδοσις καὶ ἡ μετέληψις ἀπὸ τῶν εὐχαρίστη θέντων ἐκίστω γίνεται.]

In the next two canons, (XI and XII,) there is nothing to prevent their being adjudged to the apostolic age. That they who are guilty of a want of rectitude or of truth, be kept from the communion, agrees most fully with the first times of the Christian church.

To the *thirteenth* canon another time must be assigned. Here commendatory letters are mentioned. The ecclesiastical custom of giving such letters to those who were sent from another vicinity, arose in the third century, when, in the time of persecutions, the several churches were obliged to use the utmost caution, lest they should receive a secret Heathen or heretic; [or rather, the custom which very naturally began in the time of the apostles, then became specially important.]

Concerning canons XIV. and XV. we have already treated, and shown that regard was had to these canons in subsequent times. It remains that we here remark, in passing, that canons XIV, XV. and XVI, contain nothing which departs from the apostolic age; and therefore, although perhaps they were framed at a later time, we cannot deny that they may have belonged to the apostolic period, if we judge merely from the subjects of which they treat. [But surely the author would not contend that, in the time of the apostles, such absolute control over Presbyters was given to a bishop, as is assumed in canon XV.; nor that the inferior orders swelling 'the catalogue of clerical persons,' had already been introduced.]

Let us now proceed to the following canons, namely, XVII, XVIII, XIX. and XX, concerning which the same judgment is to be pronounced. Nothing can be found in them that does not accord with the primitive church. [But here we would make the same remark which we made on the preceding paragraph. Besides, the misinterpretation of 1 Tim. 3: 2, (a consequence and a cause of much error,) the mention of 'the sacerdotal catalogue,' and perhaps some other things in these canons, seem to betray an ascetic, hierarchical and Judaizing spirit and tendency.]

The four canons which follow, (XXI, XXII, XXIII and XXIV,) decree that he who has mutilated himself, never be made a clergyman; and that if a clergyman has mutilated himself, he be deposed; but if a layman, that he be separated from communion three years. Daillé has, I think, correctly remarked that canons have not been established and promulgated in the church before some fact gave occasion for their being introduced. But if we examine the history of the primitive church whether there

may be any example which might have given occasion for these canons, we do not search long in vain. From the preceding part of our discussion it followed, that our canons were at least more ancient than the Nicene council. Epiphanius, that most grave reprovcr of heretics, describes at large the heresy of the Valcsians, who mutilated themselves. (Hæres. Vales, 58. *Εἰςὶ δὲ πάντες ἀπόκοπται.*) But let us recollect that bloody act which, as all know, the most celebrated teacher of the early church performed upon himself; Origen I mean, who, borne away by insane and perverse juvenile ardor, perpetrated against himself such a crime. It is in the highest degree probable that these canons were not in existence when this deed was performed by Origen; and it is not improbable that the deed of Origen occasioned the establishing of these canons, so that it was forbidden, under penalty of being deposed or separated, that any similar act be done under the semblance of piety.

Although we assign also to this time canons XXV. and XXVI, as being consonant with apostolic doctrine, yet we do not assign to it canon XXVII, because there is in it a mention of the minor orders; about which circumstance we have already spoken.

Nor can we in any manner accede to the opinion of Daillé, who, with arguments that are not valid, impugns the antiquity even of canon XXVIII. This canon commands that a bishop, presbyter, or deacon striking believers who sin, or unbelievers who do an injury, be deposed. I do not see how any one can deny that in 1 Tim. 3: 2, and in Tit. 1: 7, the foundation is contained on which this canon rests. That apostolic men, therefore, could have sanctioned this canon, will be manifest to all who consider the matter without partiality.

Let us now proceed to discuss the question concerning the canons from XXX. to XXXIV.; all which I think to have been framed in the middle of the third century. Let us more accurately inspect their contents. Do they not place the image of the third century before our eyes? Now there was provision to be made by a canon lest any one obtain the office of a bishop by means of the secular powers. How abhorrent this is from the apostolic age we need not say. But afterwards, in the third century, audacious men, to the detriment of the church, obtained the episcopate in an unworthy manner. Other canons very much favor the dignity of that office. In these precepts we see the beginnings of the hierarchy.¹ And any one most easily understands

¹ Can. XXXI. *Εἰ τις ἐπίσκοπος κοσμικοῖς ἄρχουσι χρησάμενος δι' αὐτῶν ἐγ-*

that several of these canons were written to exalt the dignity of the Bishop, and increase his power.

In canons XXXIX, XL and XLI, there are similar efforts to commend the episcopal honor and dignity. In canon XXXIX, it is authoritatively declared that the bishop shall have care of the ecclesiastical revenues, and administer them as in the presence of God, (*καὶ διοικεῖται ἀντὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐφορῶντος*.) Nay, canon XL directs that presbyters and deacons perform nothing without the bishop. These are the beginnings and foundations from which the hierarchy was elevated to its highest eminence. In view of these facts, who does not acknowledge that these canons were not only well known and spread abroad in the third century, but also that there were in them the germs of regulations, which the Papal church in later times has used as the basis of her system?

Moreover, they decide another thing pertaining to ecclesiastical discipline, concerning which, in the third century, there had arisen great discord; namely, concerning the revenues which were to be paid to the bishops. Although the priests often imposed on the laymen a greater tribute than was proper, yet they often endeavored in vain to collect it. Our *forty-first* canon deduced from the religion of the Jews the layman's duty of paying to the priest; since they who wait at the altar (Deut. 18), are also maintained by the altar.¹ And this also accords with the habits of the third century; when it was believed that the Christian church is to be formed and regulated after the model of the Jewish church, and the priesthood of the Christians, after the model of the Levitical priesthood.

Concerning the antiquity of canon XXXV, in which the authority of Metropolitan bishops is established, we find a contest still undecided. Daillé vehemently assails the canon, and denies its antiquity. But although in the true and undoubted monuments of the apostles we readily concede to Daillé that there appears no vestige of the Metropolitans, yet we must oppose him in respect to this canon. Great force and great influence, in our opinion, ought to be attributed to the fact that the Nicene council

κρατὴς ἐκκλησίας γίνεσθαι, καθαιρεῖσθαι καὶ ὀφιορῖσθαι, καὶ οἱ κοινωνοῦντες αὐτῷ πάντες. Can. XXXIX. Πάντων τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν πραγμάτων ὁ ἐπίσκοπος ἐχέτω τὴν φροντίδα, καὶ διοικεῖται ἀντὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐφορῶντος. . . . Can. XL. οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διάκονοι ἀνευ γνώμης τοῦ ἐπισκόπου μηδὲν ἐπιτελείωσαν. . . . Can. XLI. Προστάσσομεν τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τῶν τῆς ἐκκλησίας πραγμάτων. . . . ὥστε κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐξουσίαν πάντα διοικεῖσθαι. . . .

¹ . . . Ὁ γὰρ νόμος τοῦ θεοῦ διετάξατο, τοὺς τῷ θυσιαστηρίῳ ἵηρητοῦντας ἐκ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου τρέφεσθαι.

called the privileges of the Metropolitans, *the ancient customs*, (*τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἔθνη*.) And indeed the Nicene council establishes nothing on this subject as a new arrangement; but, rather, directs that the ancient usages continue. As the testimony in this case can in no way be weakened, it is right to conclude that the privileges of the Metropolitans were in use long before the Nicene council.

All agree in acknowledging the antiquity of canons XXXVI. and XXXVII; nor have I anything which I might bring forward against the origin of them in the apostolic age. [But still we ought to bear in mind the following considerations: 1. That here the distinction between a bishop and a presbyter is such as is no where found in the genuine writings of the apostles. 2. That here *cities* and *countries* are spoken of as being subject (*ἐνομόμεναι*) to a bishop; and bishops are spoken of as holding, possessing, or governing those *cities* or *countries*, (*κατέχοντες τὰς πόλεις ἐκείνας ἢ τὰς χώρας*),—whereas, in the Acts of the Apostles, 20: 17—28, a very different style is used in reference to the elders or presbyters (*πρεσβυτέρους*) of the church at Ephesus, whom the apostle Paul charged to take heed to themselves and to all the flock over which the Holy Ghost had made them overseers or bishops, (*ἐπισκόπους*). In the age of the apostles, the pastor took oversight of the flock, and was bishop of the church in this or that place. In the age of these canons, he claimed jurisdiction over the whole place. 3. That the arrogant and lordly tone with which the thirty-seventh canon closes, indicates not the apostolic but later times]. Indeed, I can say nothing against canon XXXVIII, although there is in it a mention of Pentecost.¹ For in ancient ecclesiastical writers, Pentecost is found in a double sense. Besides one festive day, it signifies also the whole interval of fifty days between the Passover and Pentecost; and in this more extended sense there is sometimes mention of Pentecost in the ecclesiastical writers of the second century.

Concerning the canons which follow next we have already given an opinion. Here it will be sufficient to remark that even in canons XLIV. and XLV, there is nothing dissonant from apostolic doctrine; [but in respect to all these canons, (from the forty-second to the forty-fifth, inclusive,) and to others where

¹ Can. XXXVIII. Δεύτερον τοῦ ἔτους σύνοδος γινέσθω τῶν ἐπισκόπων, καὶ ἀνακρινέντωσαν ἀλλήλους τὰ δόγματα τῆς εὐσεβείας καὶ τὰς ἐμπικτούσας ἐκκλησιαστικὰς ἀντιλογίας διαλύέντων· ἅπαξ μὲν τῇ τετάρτῃ ἐβδομαδί τῆς πεντηκοστῆς, δεύτερον δὲ ὑπερβερεταίου δωδεκάτῃ.

bishops are introduced as belonging to an order entirely distinct from that of presbyters, and where sub-deacons, readers, and others of the minor clerical orders are mentioned, we must be permitted to doubt their having come from the apostolic age, until some proof be adduced.]

In canons XLVI, XLVII and XLVIII, the baptism of heretics is represented as a defilement by which every one who participates with them becomes exposed to damnation; and, under penalty of being deposed, a Bishop or Presbyter is forbidden to re-baptize one who has been truly baptized.¹ To what age, then, would we adjudge these canons? We refer them, most confidently, to the end of the third century, there having arisen, at length, in the third century, controversies respecting the baptism of heretics. Nor did any controversy on this subject arise before the two councils at Carthage had confirmed the ancient custom of baptizing heretics, and Stephen, bishop of Rome, had rejected their decrees. It would here be out of place to expatiate on this discord concerning the baptism of heretics. But every one will understand that our canons could not have been written at any other time than about the end of the third century, when there was enkindled on this subject a most bitter controversy.

We must now speak concerning canons XLIX. and L. Canon XLIX. inculcates that baptism be administered in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit; and canon L. forbids that any bishop or presbyter, under penalty of being deposed, perform merely one immersion given in reference to the death of the Lord, instead of three immersions pertaining to one initiation.² All must acknowledge it to have been a very ancient custom to immerse three times those who were baptized. But nevertheless, we deny the apostolic origin of these canons. For, without any doubt, they are directed against that kind of heretics, who, instead of the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, used this formula in baptizing: 'I baptize thee into the death of Christ.' Eunomius, an Arian, as he denied the divinity of the

¹ Can. XLVII. 'Επίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος τὸν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἔχοντα βάπτισμα ἂν ὥσθεν βαπτίσῃ, ἢ τὸν μεμολυσμένον παρὰ τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἐν μὴ βαπτίσῃ, καθαιρείσθω, ὡς γελῶν τὸν σταυρὸν καὶ τὸν τοῦ κυρίου θάνατον, καὶ μὴ διακρίσιν ἱερᾶς τῶν ψευδιερῶν.

² Can. L. Εἰ τις ἐπίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος, μὴ τρία βαπτίσματα μᾶς μνήσκεις ἐπιτελέσῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν βάπτισμα τὸ εἰς τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου διδόμενον, καθαιρείσθω. οὐ γὰρ εἶπεν ὁ κύριος, Εἰς τὸν θάνατόν μου βαπτίσατε, ἀλλὰ κορευθέντες μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος.

Son and of the Holy Spirit, wished not to baptize by trine immersion, but only into the death of Christ. Of this fact Socrates informs us in his Ecclesiastical History, B. V. c. 24. From this account, therefore, it is exceedingly clear when these canons were brought into existence. For they were framed for the purpose of abolishing the perverse practice of those heretics.

Let us now pass to the second part of the canons, which, for a long time, was not received at all in the Latin church, but obtained among the Greeks the same authority which they accorded to the first part.

It has seemed to me right to agree with the learned men who have treated concerning them, that in canons LI, LIII and the eight next following, nothing opposes our referring their origin to the apostolic age. For they exhibit certain general regulations which can be promulgated at almost any time. But the case is different with canons LII and LXII, which are expressly opposed to those who affirm that a returning penitent ought not to be re-admitted.¹ They examine this error, and direct that those who had fallen away, be received. We know very well, that, in the third century, this rigor against the lapsed arose from the Novatian controversies. To this time, therefore, we assign both these canons.

Several of the other canons (LXIII, LXV, LVI, LXVII, LXX, LXXI, and LXXII,) no one has assailed; but all allow them a very high antiquity. . . .

But our canon LXIV. must be subjected to a more careful examination. It forbids that any one fast on the Lord's day or on the Sabbath except one only, to wit, the great or ante-Paschal,—[the Saturday before Easter.]² Although the observance which our canon exhibits in respect to fasting, is not so ancient as to reach the apostolic age, yet we cannot refer it to so late a time as Daillé assigns to it. For Tertullian, (De coron. Milit. c. 3.) assures us that, in his time, the observance prevailed which our canon commends. And also from Epiphanius and other writers of the fourth century, it can easily be seen that not only among the Montanists but also among the orthodox, this custom was very common in the third century. Canon LXIX. enjoins, under the hea-

¹ Can. LII. *Εἰ τις ἐπίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος τὸν ἐπιστρέφοντα ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας οὐ προσδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἀποβάλλεται, καθαιρεῖσθω, ὅτι λυπεῖ χριστὸν τὸν εἰπόντα, χαρὰ γίνεται ἐν ὁρατῷ ἐπὶ ἐνὶ ἁμαρτωλῷ μετανοοῦντα.*

² Can. LXIV. *Εἰ τις κληρικὸς εὐρεθῇ τὴν κυριακὴν ἡμέραν νηστεύων ἢ τὸ σάββατον πλὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς μόνου, καθαιρεῖσθω· εἰ δὲ λαϊκὸς, ἀφοριεῖσθω.*

riest penalty, the fast of Lent, commencing the fortieth day (Quadragesima) before Easter, and the fasts on Wednesday and Friday, (the fourth day of the week, and the day of the Preparation). Besides, in this canon itself, the inferior clerical orders are mentioned, which not obscurely indicates the time of its origin; and the rest of its contents, indeed, confirms this indication. I am fully convinced that the ecclesiastical law, here presented, was not received earlier than in the third century. There are, however, among the learned, some who endeavor to vindicate the apostolic origin of this Fast of Lent, appealing to passages of Jerome and Augustin, who derive this custom from apostolic tradition. But with these Fathers, the expressions used in those passages are general forms of speaking, which are by no means to be perverted. It is evident, on the contrary, from the concurring statements of writers in the third century and in the fourth, that the Fast, as here regulated, was not observed till in the third century.¹

Against the antiquity of canon LXXIII, learned men have mentioned well founded objections. For when, in this canon, it is forbidden that any one appropriate to his own use a vessel of silver or of gold, or a curtain, that has been consecrated, it follows that at the time when the canon was framed, the Christians had sacred edifices and precious vessels.² . . . We therefore place this canon in the beginning of the third century, when it is most certain that spacious and costly buildings for Christian worship were erected.

But we readily acknowledge the very high antiquity of the next following canons, as far as to the eighty-fourth; since, [in most points,] they do not depart from the simplicity of the apostolic age. Only this it seems proper to remark against canon LXXXII, that in the words *as our Onesimus appeared*, (οἷος Ὀνήσιμος, ὁ ἡμέτερος ἀνεφάνη,) it endeavors to impose on the reader a false author. This, although it does not pertain to the subject of which the canon treats, throws upon it an unfavorable suspicion; [which is not a little increased by the apparent assumption of unlimited power for councils of bishops in canon LXXIV,

¹ Can. LXX. Εἰ τις ἐπίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος ἢ διάκονος ἢ ἀναγνώστης ἢ ψάλτης τὴν ἁγίαν τεσσαρακοστὴν τοῦ πύσχα ἢ τετράδα ἢ παρασκευὴν οὐ νηστεύει, καθαιρεῖσθω, ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ δι' ἀσθένειαν σωματικὴν ἐμποδίζοιτο· εἰ δὲ λαϊκὸς εἴη, ἐφορᾷσθω.

² Can. LXXIII. Σκεδὸς χρυσὸν ἢ ἀργυροῦν ἁγιασθὲν ἢ ὑδὸν ἢ μὲλεις ἐπὶ εἰς ἐκείαν χρῆσιν σφετερίζεσθω· παράνομον γὰρ· εἰ δὲ τις φωραθῇ, ἐπιτιμᾶσθω ἐφορισμῷ.

and by the mention of 'the *sacerdotal* administration' in canon LXXXIII].

The eighty-third canon rejects the practice of those who obtain at the same time an office in the Roman government and in the church.¹ In this, regard is probably had to the proceeding in the council at Antioch, which deposed Paul of Samosata, because, among other offences, he was occupied as a secular magistrate.

It remains that we speak concerning the last of these canons. Scarcely any one of them bears upon itself more openly than this the vestiges of a later time. It is therefore easy to fix the time of its origin. This canon presents a catalogue of the sacred books of the New Testament, enumerating all those which it deems canonical Even the two epistles of Clement, and the constitutions are set forth in our canon as being apostolical. If now we institute a comparison between this canon and the catalogue of canonical books which Eusebius, in his Ecclesiastical History, B. III. c. 26, has given us, we readily perceive that our canon was not made up till in the end of the fourth century, when the books just now mentioned, which it proclaims to be canonical, were brought into the canon of the sacred Scriptures. And if we inquire why this last canon was framed, the answer is easy and prompt,—that by its aid spurious books might be commended.

In view of this discussion, who is there that will not maintain with us, that our canons were formed *at different times* in the churches denominated apostolical as having been planted by apostles, and that they were afterwards gathered into the collection which we now possess?

¹ Can. LXXXIII. 'Επίσκοπος ἢ πρεσβύτερος ἢ διάκονος στρατεῖα σχολάζων καὶ βουλόμενος ὑμφοτέρα κατέχειν, Ῥωμαϊκὴν ὑρχὴν καὶ ἱερατικὴν διοίκησιν, καθαιρεῖσθω· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ καίσαρος καίσαρι, καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τῷ θεῷ.

ARTICLE II.

THE TRINITY.

[Translated from the Theological Lectures of Dr. A. D. C. Twisten, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin, by Rev. H. B. Smith, West Amesbury, Mass. Concluded from No. XII. p. 774.]

† 6. *Character hypostaticus.* (1) *Notae internae.*

Now that we have considered the doctrine of the Trinity as a whole, and have become acquainted with the doctrinal formulas of the church upon the relation of the divine essence to the three Persons of the Godhead, it still remains for us to examine more closely the relations of the Persons to one another, and the peculiar attributes or characteristics belonging to them individually, the sum of which we call their *hypostatic* or *personal character*. These are, as we have already signified,¹ of two kinds: they have reference, partly, to the internal relations of the Persons in their mode of subsistence (*τρόπος υπάρξεως*), and, partly, to the mode in which the Father, the Son and the Spirit are revealed in the world (*τρόπος ἀποκαλύψεως*). Accordingly, we distinguish the internal and external characteristics (*notae internae et externae*), or the internal and external character (*character ad intra et ad extra*), of the three Persons. The first of these, the internal characteristics, we will consider in this section; and the external characteristics, in the following.

Under *internal characteristics* we comprise both the order and the manner of subsistence (*ordo subsistendi, ratio subsistendi*). By the former is meant that the Father is unchangeably the first, the Son the second, and the Holy Spirit the third Person in the Godhead; by the manner of subsistence, which is the necessary condition of the order, is meant that the second Person has the ground of its subsistence in the first, and the third in the first and second. This last rests upon two acts immanent in the divine essence (*opera ad intra, actus personales*), from which we derive, on the one hand, those three peculiar properties which constitute the notion of the three Persons (*proprietaes personales*); and, on the other hand, some other characteristics (called *notiones personales*), which also serve to distinguish them. We will then proceed to consider the internal characteristics of the Persons of

¹ Conf. Bibl. Sacra, Aug. 1846, p. 520.

the Trinity under these four heads : personal acts, personal attributes, personal conceptions, and order of subsistence. Since our later divines are not wholly agreed in their application of this terminology, we will hold fast to the older and stricter usage, from which it will be easier to understand the deviations, and without regard to which we shall hardly be able to appreciate the sense and purport of this whole mode of exhibiting the subject.¹

1. *The personal acts.* Since God is pure action and life (*actus purissimus*), since, in virtue of his absolute self-causation and spontaneity, there is in him nothing dead, nothing independent of his action, nothing produced by an external necessity ; it follows, also, that those relations, by which the divine Persons are distinguished, are to be referred to the divine efficiency. To speak more definitely, they are to be referred to the two *absolutely immanent acts of generation and of procession*, which are called *opera ad intra*, because they have nothing else than God himself for their object ; and they are called *personal acts*, because the divine nature is conceived of as the author of them, not so far as it is common to the three Persons, but so far as it subsists in each one of them under peculiar modifications. From this it of course results, that they are not to be looked upon as actions common to all three, but as the actions of particular persons, as the Father or the Son, or both, (*opera ad intra esse divisa*).² More important, however, than these generic statements would it be, if we were able to make clear to ourselves in what these two actions consist, and how they are connected with the nature of God. Those theologians who believed that they might, after the precedence

¹ Bretschneider (*Entwicklung d. dogm. Begr.* § 68. S. 408 ; *Handb.* § 66. S. 461), Wegscheider (*institut.* § 77), and Hase (Hutterus rediv.), would have us believe that the distinction between the personal acts, properties and notions rests only upon this, that the internal relations of the persons are considered either as acts, or as attributes, or as abstract notions ; if this were so, then the distinction would be really only a grammatical, hardly a logical one, and would be scarcely worth the trouble of a moment's consideration. But whoever compares the development of this doctrine among the Scholastics, (whom, and especially Aquinas, our Evangelical theologians have, for substance, followed,) will see, that it is to this very point that the scientific deduction of the whole doctrine of the Trinity is attached.

² Conf. Quenstedt, P. I. cp. X. Sect. 1. *§* 1-4. But it is to be considered that all *opera interna* are not *opera ad intra*, nor all *opera ad intra* also *actus personales* : e. g. the divine purpose to redeem the world by Christ is, as a purpose, an internal act, but it has the world as its object, and is so far not *absolutely immanent* ; the omniscience and will of God are, referred to himself, *opera ad intra*, but they belong to the essence of God, and hence must be designated as *essentialia*.

of the Scholastics, develop the doctrine in a speculative way, answered: Since we attribute to God, as the highest intelligence, the immanent powers of understanding and of will, and since these do not act upon the world alone, but also upon God himself as their object, and hence must be conceived of as true *opera ad intra*; and, further, since they must be conceived as operations by means of which, in consequence of their reflexive character, certain distinctions are established in God himself; there would result from this a twofold procession (emanatio, *προβολή*, by which is understood nothing else than the establishment of certain distinctions in the mode of subsistence of the divine nature); viz. *per modum intellectus*, the procession of the Word, which is called generation,—and, *per modum voluntatis*, the procession of love, which is called *spiratio*, or procession in the narrower sense. To such a deduction it were a sufficient objection, that the divine knowledge and will are essential, and not personal operations, and hence cannot be classed among the *opera divisa*.¹ The Fathers of the church, for the most part, insist repeatedly and pressingly upon the unfathomableness of these divine acts.² The greater portion of our Evangelical theologians, considered such a

¹ Other objections are not so pertinent; e. g. when it is said that on the same grounds, since the Son and Spirit are also intelligent beings, we must also make in them a distinction of three persons, and so on to infinity; it may be replied, that the intelligence of the Son and Spirit is not a separate one from that of the Father, but the same numerical divine intelligence, only represented under the hypostatic character of the Son and Spirit. The meaning, too, is not, that the personal acts of generation and procession are identical with the essential acts of knowing and willing, but only that they are connected with one another.

² E. g. *Athanasius*; (Orat. III. contr. Arian.) "It is not fitting to seek to know how the Logos is from God . . . and what is the mode of the generation of God; any one daring this were mad; because it is an ineffable act, and peculiar to the nature of God, known to him alone and to the Son." *Gregory of Naz.* (Orat. 35); "let the generation of God be revered in silence: for you, it is a great thing to learn that there is a generation; but the how, it is not permitted to angels, much less to you to comprehend." *Rufinus*, in his Exposition of the Creed, warns against the curiosity which would scan these profound mysteries, "lest while one attempts to scrutinize the brightness of inaccessible light, he lose the little vision which divine goodness has granted to mortals." *Hilary* (l. II. de Trin.) declares, "the archangels knew it not, the angels have not heard it, the ages do not hold it, prophets perceived it not, apostles did not inquire, the Son himself did not reveal it." *Augustine* (in Joh. tr. 99) says, "it would be a long work to discuss the difference between procession and generation, and a rash thing, after all discussion, to define it:" and contr. Max. III. 14, "I know not, I avail not, I suffice not to distinguish between that generation and this procession."

derivation as objectionable or inadmissible, and appealed to the constantly acknowledged unfathomableness of the acts. There remained, then, nothing for them, but to make out the reality and the difference of these processes, as facts, revealed by the Holy Scriptures, and to be adopted on their testimony; and then, to restrict themselves in the explanation of them, to mere definitions of the terms, considered as indicating certain relations, and as compared with other relations.

Accordingly, they distinguish the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost, on the one hand, from creation, and on the other hand, from each other. In creation the divine essence is the *cause* of something different from itself, which is made from nothing; but in the generation of the Son, the Father is the *ground*, and in the procession of the Spirit, the Father and Son are the *ground* (*ratio*),¹ of the subsistence of the divine essence in another *τρόπος υπάρξεως*: hence, it is said, the Son and Spirit are not created or made from nothing, but generated and proceeding from the substance of the Father, as God from God, light from light.² These two processes, now, are distinguished from one another, *ratione principii*, since the generation is from the Father alone, but the procession is from the Father and Son; *ratione termini*, since it is said of the Son only that he is generated, while the Spirit is breathed forth (*spiratio*); *ratione ordinis*, since the generation is the first internal personal act, which is preceded by no other but is necessarily followed by a second, while the procession of the Spirit is the second act, which is preceded by the generation, but followed by no third process. Such dis-

¹ The words *ratio* and *principium*, rather than the word *causa*, are used to designate these acts; for the effect is a something distinct from its cause, while the *ground* of anything is not separated from that of which it is the ground, but is in it.

² In the concrete notion of a divine person there are two elements, the notion of the divine essence and also of a particular mode of its subsistence; these personal acts, then, must be referred to both. Hence it is equally erroneous to speak of generation as the production of a second divine nature, or of a second subsistence not having the same nature. In the usual definitions of *generatio* and *spiratio*, sufficient care has not always been used to express both points equally: we have e. g. the definition "a communication of the divine essence," which would be easily misunderstood as conveying the meaning, that the communication of the divine attributes was the chief thing, whence we have almost inevitably an incorrect conception of the personal subsistence. It were better to define generation, as that act of the Father by which he is the ground of the subsistence of the divine nature under the hypostatic character of the Son; and to define procession in an analogous way.

inctions as these have been urged, but it need not be shown that they are merely external ones, and necessarily must be so, if, for want of an adequate philosophical view, we cannot or will not make the analogy of our own self-consciousness the basis of our illustrations. Since these distinctions were so formal, one would think that there was the less need of so zealous a discussion of the question, whether the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and the Son, or from the Father alone, as we find in the controversies of the Greek and Roman churches.

The motives which originally led the Greek church to hold with exactitude to the Nicene formula, "*who proceeded from the Father,*" and the Western church, particularly the Spanish, to add "*and the Son,*" were not at all opposite to one another; and neither could justly reproach the other with molesting the truth. The Greeks were led to their view, partly by the way in which they were accustomed to maintain the divine monarchy in consistence with the triplicity, since the Father was regarded as "*the original, the root and the fountain of divinity,*" (*ἀρχή, ῥίζα καὶ πηγή τῆς θεότητος*); partly by their opposition to the Pneumatomachists, since the latter seemed to exhibit the Spirit as created by the Son and subordinate to him. On the other hand, the Western church, in respect to the divine unity were satisfied by the notion of one identical divine nature in the three Persons; and sought to counteract the Arian subordination of the Son to the Father, by making him equal with the Father also in his relation to the Holy Ghost.¹ Assuredly, neither could the Occidental church accuse the Greeks of not sufficiently acknowledging the consubstantiality and the divinity of the Son; nor on the other hand could the Eastern church accuse the Western of not holding to the monarchy, and to the divinity of the Spirit.² Upon a question, therefore, which, however it might be answered, would endanger no article of faith, and which was decided by no direct

¹ Conf. Neander's Kirchengesch. Bd. II. Abth. II. S. 896—901.

² That the Father is the fountain and original of the whole of deity is a formula always recognized in the Western church: conf. the *decretum unionis* of the Florentine council, A. D. 1439, in the introduction: "The Latins affirm that they do not say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son with the design of excluding the Father from being the fountain and original (*fons ac principium*) of the whole of deity, even of the Son and Holy Spirit." On the other hand no one will doubt the perfect congruity of the Greek view with that given in the Athanasian creed, which was originally more occidental, if he but read the passages bearing upon it in the *ἰσχυρί* of John of Damascus (L. I. cp. 8 seq.).

assertion of the Scripture, there was the less necessity of division in the church, in proportion as the parties were agreed, that these relations are inscrutable to man's understanding: and it would of course follow, that any speculative grounds of decision, if such there were, even if they should be more favorable to one hypothesis than to another, ought still to be regarded as of subordinate weight.¹ As to the Scriptures, the Greek church could urge, that in the only passage in which the procession (*ἐκπόρευσις*) of the Spirit is spoken of, (John 15: 26—we will not inquire whether this be its doctrinal sense,) it is derived "*from the Father*;" while the Latin church could say, that the Spirit is not only sent by the Father, but also by the Son (John 15: 26. 16: 7), and that he is called the Spirit of Christ and of the Son (Rom. 8: 9. Gal. 4: 6), which would allow the inference of a similar relation in respect of his subsistence also. But as the Greeks denied the validity of this inference, since it was not confirmed by the testimony of Scripture, so might the Latins maintain, that the procession from the Son was as little excluded by the procession from the Father, as is the fact that the Spirit is sent by the Son, (which is elsewhere proved,) excluded, because he is in one place (John 14: 26) described as sent only by the Father. In this state of the contest, how desirable that the parties should have been satisfied with the mediating formula,—that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *through* the Son.² This, although it would not have prevented any one from making additional statements, would not have excluded any view compatible with the formula; but this is just what theological disputants have seldom been able to conclude upon. The Greeks protest against every interpretation which would make the Son the ground, not merely of the giving but also of the subsistence of the Spirit; they grant that the gene-

¹ This is the position maintained by the Archbishop *Theophanes Prokopovics* in his *Tractatus de processione Spiritus Sancti* (Gotha 1771), with great thoroughness and acuteness. His chief argument against the Western doctrine is, that it is not based upon Scripture; yet he also applies theological principles. "Vain is the argumentation," he says, "the Son is knowledge, the Holy Spirit is love, therefore the latter is produced by the former. If anything can hence be inferred it is only, that the Son is first in order, and is presupposed by the Holy Spirit, as knowledge is presupposed in order to love." And this is no more than what we concede, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father by (per) the Son, that is, the Son being presupposed.

² John of Damasc. *de fide orth.* l. 1, 12—not ἐξ αὐτοῦ but δι' αὐτοῦ. More full is Gregory Nyss. c. Eunom. L. 1. The same formula is found among the Latins, with the needful explanation. Conf. Thos. Aquin. *Summ.* 1, qu. 36, art. 3—who follows Hilarius de Trin. L. XII. fin.

tion of the Son may be regarded as the condition of the procession of the Spirit,¹ but they say, that the Father alone is the ground or cause (*αἰτία*) of his divinity.² The Latin church, on the other hand, agreed with this formula only in the sense, that as the Son has from the Father his subsistence and his divine nature, so too he has this from him, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from him;³ but they do not concede any difference in the mode in which the Father and the Son are the source of the Spirit who proceeds from them. And even the statement in the Florentine formula of union, which has the air of being made to set aside the chief objection of the Greek church—that the Latin church seemed to hold to two principles or sources of the procession; even this statement, which is, that in the procession of the Spirit the Father and the Son are to be regarded as one principle, and that the act itself is one identical act,—is in fact most opposite to the real views of the Greek church; one cannot, therefore, wonder that they indignantly repelled the decree of union.

The Lutheran theologians have remained true in this respect to the doctrinal type of the occidental church; with even more strictness than many of the Scholastics⁴ they maintained the theorem, that the Holy Spirit proceeds (*spiratus est*) from the Father and the Son, as from one principle, in one indivisible act. We cannot blame them for this; since this position was so interwoven with the mode of exhibiting the doctrine of the Trinity, that whoever kept the latter could not well depart from the former. Nor can we see, that the inference from the relation in which both the Father and the Son stand to the sending of the Spirit, to that of his like procession from both, is as groundless as it seemed to the Greek church—according to the maxim, princi-

¹ This is the meaning of Prokopovicz—when he says (pp. 337—349 of his tractates)—that the Fathers here use *per*, not for *ex* but for *post*; not for indicating the cause but the order—an order not of time, but of conditionality.

² John of Damasc. expressly says: *μόνος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ὁ πατήρ*; in his interpretation of the Homily de sancto sabbatho (II. p. 815, ed. of Lequien) he says: the Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son, because he is by him revealed and imparted to men; not because he had his subsistence from him.

³ Decret. Unionis concil. Florent.—the essential parts are cited in Gieseler's Chh. Hist. Vol. 2. Pt. 4. p. 541-3: "Since all things which belong to the Father he has given by generation to his only begotten Son, except that he is the Father; this thing also, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, the Son has eternally from the Father." Conf. Aquinas, ubi supra. The idea belongs to Augustin, de Trin. XV. 17. Conf. Petri Lomb. Sentent. I. dist. XII.

⁴ Quenstedt rejects the expression "*processio per filium*," which even Aquinas concedes in a certain sense.

pium missionis in tempore est principium originis in aeterno.¹ Yet the theologians of Tübingen, when this subject was discussed in their correspondence with the Patriarch Jeremias,² might have been more forbearing towards the view of the Greek church, since, as has been remarked, the Scriptures do not decide directly against it, and the rational grounds for the opposite doctrine are not free from objections; while all that the Christian consciousness demands would be satisfied, if it were conceded, that we cannot conceive of the imparting of the Spirit except through the Son. Yet, since that time, the contesting of the Greek doctrine has become a standing article of Protestant polemics.

2. Let us turn now from the personal acts to the *personal properties or qualities*. The latter flow from the former. As no complete act can be conceived of without subject and object,³ so the personal acts of generation and procession cannot be otherwise represented. Since it is a universal law of language, that wherever the logical subject is also the grammatical subject, (e. g. the Father generates,) the *active* is used, and wherever the logical object is the grammatical subject, (e. g. the Son is generated,) the *passive* is employed; so here, too, as these acts are referred either to their subject or their object, we make a distinction into *generatio et spiratio activa et passiva*, (thus, Pater generat, Filius generatur;—Pater et Filius spirant, Spiritus S. spiratur); although it should be remarked, that this designation is to be regarded only as a grammatical one, since there cannot be actual passivity in God. (On this account it were perhaps better, instead of the expression *generatio et spiratio passiva*, to adopt another, often used, *generatio et spiratio terminative spectata*). The *generatio activa*, now, is also called *paternity*, and this is the personal property of the Father; the *generatio passiva* is called *sonship*, and is the personal property of the Son; the *spiratio passiva* is also called *procession*, and is the personal property of the Holy Spirit; for, it is these very relations which make it necessary to distinguish the persons of the Godhead, and which constitute the idea of these persons. We must make this distinction, because, although God himself is the generating and the generated, although he is both

¹ Quenstedt ubi supra. Compare what is said in the fourth section upon the relation of the essential and revealed Trinity.

² Acta theologor. Wirtemberg. et patriarchae Constantinop. (1584); p. 159—162 and p. 270—296.

³ To prove this, and especially to show that the apparent exception of *intransitive* actions is not really such, must be reserved to the logical or metaphysical investigation of these categories.

the cause and the object of the procession, yet we must still say, that so far as he is to be conceived of as generating he cannot also be generated, so far forth as he is the source he is not also the object of the act of procession, and the converse; but yet the Father is nothing other than God represented as generating—the divine essence with the personal property of paternity; the Son is nothing other than God as generated, and the Holy Ghost is nothing other than God represented as proceeding—the divine essence with the personal properties of sonship and procession. This we have already stated in the previous section.¹

But since the three personal acts involve four relations, it is a natural inquiry, why only three of these are represented as personal properties, and the fourth, the *spiratio activa*, omitted? The answer is, because this act belongs to both the Father and the Son, not so far as they are personally distinguished, but so far as they are one.² We might regard this as made out purely by the testimony of the Scriptures, as the Western church interprets them; for these do not speak of a special *principium spirationis* besides the Father and the Son, but they say expressly of the former, and let us infer of the latter, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from them; but if this be something common to both of them, it cannot be something which goes to constitute their differences as persons, it cannot be considered as a personal property. But it has also been attempted to show by deduction that this is necessary. It is said, that we are warranted in distinguishing several persons in the divine nature, only because the relations which are embraced in the personal acts are so opposed to or contrasted with each other, that one person cannot be the subject of them; in virtue of this opposition the Father can only be Father and not Son, the Son can only be Son—the subject and the object of the generation cannot but be distinguished from each

¹ Conf. Basil. ep. 391: "We must make confession of our faith by conjoining the peculiar and the common: the deity is common, the paternity is peculiar; we must then say, uniting the two, I believe in God the Father: and, again, in the confession of the Son we must do the like, join what is peculiar to him with what is common, and say, in God the Son; in like manner with the Holy Ghost. . . . Thus is the unity saved by the confession of the one divinity, and what is peculiar to the persons is confessed in the statement of the properties ascribed to each."

² Since Augustine the canon has been universally received that the difference of the persons is constituted solely by their mutual and opposite relations (*per id, quod ad alterum dicitur, per σχέσιν, relationem s. habitudinem mutuan*). Conf. Petavius theolog. Dogmat. de Trin. L. IV. ep. 10. § 5 sq.

other; and so, too, the *principium spirans* must be distinguished from the *principium spiratum* or *procedens*. But where no such opposition or contrast exists, there the general canon holds good, that in God all is one, which we, on account of the limitations of our knowledge, are obliged to look at from different sides or in different relations, and hence to regard as distinct.¹ Since, now, the procession and generation have no such mutual relation, cannot be set over against each other, it follows that the *principium* or *subjectum spirationis* from which the Holy Ghost proceeds, though not indeed identical with the Holy Ghost itself as the *objectum spirationis*, (for here there is a relation of opposition,) can and must be one with the *subjectum* as well as the *objectum generationis*, with that which generates and that which is generated. Indeed, the Scholastics have derived from this an argument for the position, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son also; for if, say they, the Spirit is to be really distinguished from the Son, there must be an *oppositio relationis* between them; this is so, if the Son is conceived of as the subject, and the Spirit as the object of the *spiratio*, if the former is *spirans* as the latter is *spiratus*: but if the Son were not, together with the Father, *principium spirationis*, since the Father is represented as both *generans* and *spirans*, there is nothing to hinder the Son from being both *generatus* and *spiratus*, that is, from being conceived of as identical with the Spirit; and, according to the above canon this must be so.² But from this it also follows, that the Father and the Son

¹ *In divinis omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio*. Calov. Syst. tom. III. p. 836; Baier, P. I. cp. 1. § 42 not. b. Conf. Petav. l. c. lib. IX. cp. 7. § 7. In conformity with this Aquinas (Summ. P. I. qu. 30. art. 2.) in answering the question: *Utrum in Deo sint plures personae quam tres?* arrives at this conclusion: *Ostensum est, quod plures personae sunt plures relationes subsistentes ad invicem, realiter distinctae; realis autem distinctio inter relationes divinas non est nisi ratione oppositionis relativae; ergo oportet duas relationes oppositas ad duas personas pertinere: si quae autem relationes oppositae non sunt, ad eandem personam necesse est eas pertinere*; but this holds of the *spiratio activa* in relation to the *generatio activa et passiva*.

² Conf. Aquinas in Summ. P. I. qu. 36. art. 2. *Spiritus S. ita necessario procedit a Filio, quod, si non procederet, non distingueretur ab eo personaliter; for, si in Filio et Spiritu S. non esset invenire nisi duas relationes, quibus uterque refertur ad patrem, illae relationes non essent ad invicem oppositae, sicut neque duae relationes, quibus Pater refertur ad illos; unde, sicut persona patris est una, ita sequeretur, quod persona Filii et Spiritus S. esset una, habens duas relationes oppositas duabus relationibus Patris*. Anselm, in his work *de Spiritus S. processione contra Graecos*, led the way in this argumentation. This work had very great influence upon the mode of exhibiting the doctrine of Trinity among the Scholastics, and, through them, in the whole Western

are not to be considered as two, but as one *principium spirationis*; or, as above stated, that it is one indivisible act which is the ground of the subsistence of the Holy Ghost; for in all things in which they are not distinguished by opposite relations, they are to be considered as one.¹ Accordingly, the *spiratio activa* cannot be looked upon as a proper *personal attribute*.

3. If not to be included among the personal attributes, it must have its place among the *notiones personales*. Thus are called those internal traits, which, though they do not constitute the notion of personality, (as do the *relationes personalitatis constitutivæ*.) do yet serve for the recognition and distinguishing of the Persons of the Trinity.² Besides the *communis spiratio*, which is the *notio personalis* of the Father and the Son, the elder theologians are accustomed to reckon here the *innascibilitas*, *ἀγενεσία*, as the *notio personalis* of the Father. By this is meant, that while the Son has the ground of his subsistence in the Father, and the Holy Ghost in the Father and Son, the Father has it in himself, he himself is the *principium personalitatis* for himself. If to these, now, we add the three personal attributes, (which is

church. Anselm however grants that the Son and Spirit are distinguished by the *modus procedendi*, (viz. generatio and spiratio). Here the Greeks stand, not granting, what Aquinas, in order to weaken the concession of Anselm, asserts, that the mode of procession is distinguished only by the one being referred to the Father alone, and the other to both Father and Son. Conf. *Procopius* libr. cit. Cap. XVIII. § 304.

¹ *Aquinas*, Summ. I. qu. 36. art. 4. Thus, too, *Augustin* (de Trin. V. 14) declares, "As the Father and the Son are one God, and relatively to the creature one creator and Lord, so relatively to the Spirit they are one principle." *Anselm* (de proces. Sp. S. cp. 9.) uses, among other things, this illustration; as a lake made by a fountain and a stream, is not produced by them so far as they are different, but by the water in which they are one; so the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son so far as they are distinguished, but from the divine essence, in which they are one. Thus, too, the Lutheran theologians, e. g. *Quenstedt*, de Trin. Sect. I. thes. 30: Sect. II. qu. 12; who give special prominence to the unity of the *ἐνπεγμία*, or the *una et indivulsa spiratio*.

² Conf. *Hutteri* loc. p. 103: Per notionem nihil intelligunt Scholastici hoc loco aliud quam propriam rationem cognoscendi divinam personam, uti definit Cajetanus. Aliae enim sunt proprietates personales relativæ, personam ipsam constituentes, quæ nimirum relationem ad aliam personam habent, et ordinem producentium et productorum constituunt; quales proprietates sunt tantum tres, *figere, gigni, procedere*; aliae sunt proprietates personales, quæ non sunt relativæ constituentes, h. e. non relationem habent ad alteram personam respectu productionis; neque enim personam, qualis ratione productionis sit sed tantum, qualis in se et ex se sit, h. e. quatenus aliquid ab altera persona distinctam obtineat, definiunt.

done when the *notiones personales* are taken in a wider sense,) we shall have five of them, and this is the number reckoned by Aquinas, and several of our Lutheran theologians.¹ Duns Scotus was of opinion that a sixth should be added, viz. *inspirabilitas*, as a *notio personalis* of the Son.² But if in this way, a beginning is once made, of converting the mere negation of personal relations into special internal characteristics, the number of them might easily be increased to twelve, as in the following table :

<i>Pater.</i>	<i>Filius.</i>	<i>Spiritus S.</i>
generat,	non generat,	non generat,
non generatur ;	sed generatur ;	neque generatur ;
spirat,	spirat,	neque spirat,
non spiratur ;	non spiratur ;	sed spiratur ;

which would seem to be recommended, not only by its completeness, but also because each person has an equal number of internal notes. But such symmetry and completeness belong only to that false scholastic tendency, in which one gets mere names instead of real conceptions. This is most strikingly manifest in the fact, that thus the same characteristic of *ἀγεννησία* is attributed both to the Father and the Holy Spirit, although with a wholly different meaning.³

But if we affirm this of the Father alone, if he alone subsists through himself, and the Son and the Spirit through him, does it not then follow, that he alone is *absolute*, and that the other persons are relative and dependent ? In spite of all our pains, does not Arianism show itself here ? Is there not an inequality in the persons, if the power to generate dwells in the Father alone, and not in the Son and Spirit, and if the Spirit is represented merely as proceeding, without any *actus transitivus* peculiar to himself ?

The orthodox doctrine may concede a certain inequality ; and

¹ Aquinas Summ. P. I. qu. 32. art. 3. (utrum sint quinque notiones?) Baier theol. pos. P. I. cp. 1. § 42.

² Lib. I. dist. 28. qu. 1. art. 3: Sicut in Patre innascibilitas, quae est negatio processionis, est quaedam nota distincta a paternitate et spiratione ; ita inspirabilitas est quaedam notio in Filio distincta a filiatione et spiratione, quae significat negationem spirationis passivae, sicut innascibilitas in Patre significat omnem negationem processionis passivae.

³ Conf. Hutter. loc. p. 104. When Augustine (de Trin. XV, 26) says that the Father alone is *ingenitus*, he means that he alone is not produced in any manner by any other—and in this sense (in libro ad Orosium) he denies that the Holy Spirit can be called *ingenitus*. When Jerome and others say that the Holy Spirit is *ingenitus*, the meaning is, that he is not begotten, as is the Son. And this is the sense in which this note is predicated of both the Father and the Spirit. In the Latin fathers the word has this double sense.

why not? Can it not repudiate Arianism, without denying that there is in it, as in all error, an element of truth? Its office cannot be to get as far as possible from everything which any body can call Arianism, but to come as near as possible to the truth.¹ We may still and ever say, that the Father is greater than the Son (John 14: 28), not merely so far as we consider the humanity of the latter, but also, as many orthodox theologians² have taught, in his divine nature; the only question is, in what respect?

4. *Ordo subsistendi.* Since now, it is clear, that any inequality of nature or essence is utterly out of the question, because the essence in all three persons is one and the same; the difference which exists can relate only to the subsistence, and, not to the notion or the necessity of the subsistence, but only to the order thereof, (*ordo subsistendi*). By virtue of this, as was remarked at the beginning, the Father is the first, the Son the second, the Holy Ghost the third person; not in the order of time (*ratione temporis*), for in God all is alike eternal; not in their nature (*ratione naturae*), for this is coincident with the essence which is identical in all; but in view of the origin or emanation of one person from another, in their relations as generating, generated and proceeding, upon which alone the distinction of the persons reposes. In this sense, then, the Athanasian creed can maintain, that, "in this Trinity none is afore, or after other," (that is, in time,) "none is greater, or less than another," (that is, in nature,) "but the whole three Persons are co-eternal together and co-equal," (that is, on account of their consubstantiality or sameness of substance); and yet an inequality can be conceded, if thereby nothing else is meant, than that the Father is the principle of the subsistence of the divine essence in the Son, and that the per-

¹ It is an incontestable advance in the way of looking at doctrinal differences, when we consider not merely the formulas maintained, but also the general tendencies from which these differences have resulted. The angle of divergence may be very small, and the ultimate separation very wide. But with this is often connected an objectionable mode of disputation, when, in order to avoid an opinion which is seen to be extreme, we are warned against everything which seems to look that way; for error is for the most part only an exaggeration of the truth. Certain words as Arianism, Pelagianism, Gnosticism, Dualism, are often mere bug-bears, by which many a one, in seeking to avoid one extreme, is forced into errors on the opposite side, from which, if he had kept the matter itself before him, he would have been saved by a sound sense for truth.

² Conf. Petavius, Theol. Dogm. de Trin. Lib. II. cp. 2. § 1.

sonality of the Spirit has its ground in the Father and the Son ; for the doctrine of the church is so far from denying this, that it is, on the contrary, wholly based upon it.¹

But does it follow from this that the Father alone is *absolute*, and the other Persons not so? If this be so, then indeed the Father alone is God ; for to be absolute, and to be of divine nature, are interchangeable notions. But for this very reason, since it is a definition of the divine nature identical in all three persons, we say that they are all absolute. One thing we should especially guard against, and that is substituting the notion of three divine natures, instead of the true doctrine of the church, of one absolute essence, subsisting in a threefold mode (*τρόπος υπάρξεως*) as begetting, begotten and proceeding ; in this case, indeed, only one of them, that which is unbegotten and begets the others, could be considered as absolute. Here, and not in the former view, is Arianism not yet conquered. We may derive an illustration for this from our own personality. I make my own self an object of thought ; here is *I* as subject and *I* as object ; in the object, now, the *I* is no less really present than in the subject ; and yet this objective *I* is produced by the subjective ; or, here is a personal subject, determining itself to action, to activity in the most general form conceivable ;² now, in this activity to which this person, this *I*, determines itself, the person himself, the *I* is also present ; it is present in the action determined upon, no less really than in the act of determining. Thus we may say, that because all which is the Father's is also the Son's (John 16: 15), because he is the perfect image of his nature (Heb. 1: 3), because he is God of God ; so, too, this also is given to the Son by the

¹ In the language of the church this is indeed not called inequality, and we may say, justly so ; for what is equal in quality, we are not wont, on account of a difference in relations, to call unequal ; e. g. two men of like qualities and excellences, we do not call unequal because they may be father and son. But since many persons take offence just here, because they cannot bring into agreement with the assumed equality of the persons their relation as *principium* and *principiatum* (as the Scholastics express it) ; it would perhaps be better, considering that it is not the word but the thing with which we are concerned, in order to set aside this objection, at once to concede a certain inequality, only not of the nature, but in the relation of subsistence. [Conf. Pearson on the Creed, p. 48 seq. Waterland on the Athanasian Creed. Bull. Defens. Fid. Nic. Lect. IV. c. 1. § 1. c. 2. § 1. c. 4. § 1. Also Faber, Apostolicity of Trinitarianism, Bk. 2. ch. 9.]

² This is perhaps a better illustration because here the *I* has in a certain sense an absolute character—an absolute tendency to the absolute, according to Fichte, Sittenlehre, p. 23.

Father, in begetting him, to have life in himself, even as the Father has life in himself (John 5: 26); that is, to him also belongs the absolute and independent existence, which is contained in the very essence of the Godhead. "As the Father," says Anselm,¹ "has essence and wisdom and life in himself, exists not by another's, but by his own essence, is wise by his own wisdom, and lives by his own life: so too in begetting the Son, he gives to him to have essence, and wisdom and life in himself, so that not by another's, but by his own essence and wisdom and life, he subsists, is wise and lives; otherwise the Son would not have the same attributes as the Father." Much as Calvin was blamed for calling the Son, considered in his essence, *αὐτοθεός*, still he was in the right, and moreover is supported in it by Lutheran theologians.² In another point of view, that is, considered in his personal subsistence, the Son cannot be called *αὐτοθεός*, but only the Father, since he alone is *ἀγέννητος*; but the *ἀγέννησία* of the person is not to be confounded with the absoluteness of the essence.³ Or, if one should say that the former is something abso-

¹ *Anselm*, monolog. cap. 43.

² *Calvin*, instit. L. I. cp; XIII. § 25: "We say that Deity is absolutely self-existent; hence we confess that the Son, as far as he is God, independently of the consideration of Person, is self-existent; but so far as he is Son we say that he is of the Father; that his essence is not from any originating principle, but the originating principle of the person is God himself." He brings this out more fully in his polemic upon Valentinus Gentilis. Calvin's view was strongly contested by several Catholic theologians, although Bellarmine blames his expression more than his meaning, (*Controvers. de Christo*, Lib. II. cp. 19. With all his polemical prejudice and bitterness, Bellarmine is yet so straightforward and upright, that it were much to be wished that the polemics of our days would take him in these respects for a pattern). The Lutheran theologians, too, were not satisfied with Calvin's mode of expression; the Calvinistic formula: *Christum esse a se ipso secundum essentiam, a Patre secundum personam*, seemed to them to separate essence and person too much, and not to hold sufficiently fast the concrete notion of person as being the essence itself represented under a certain relation; but still they defended the *αὐτοθεότης* of Christ against the Catholics as well as other opponents. Conf. *Gerhard* Loc. de Deo Patre, § 179; *Exeges*. Loc. IV. de pers. Chr. § 67; *Quenstedt* de Trin. Lect. II. qu. VII. The latter cites *Danhauer's* words as almost classical: "The *αὐτοθεότης* may be opposed either to dependence or to communication; if to the former, then Christ is *αὐτοθεός*, because he is an entity equally independent with the Father; if to the latter, then he is not *αὐτοθεός* because his essence is communicated to him by the Father. The divine essence which is in the Son is from itself (*a se*), although the Son himself is not from himself, but God from God, light from light."

³ *John of Damascus* distinguishes in this respect between *ἀγέννητος* and *ἀγέννητος*; using the former word, written with one ν, to signify that which is not

lute, and that what is begotten or what proceeds, is, in distinction from this, something relative; yet we are not obliged to give to this terminology any other sense, than we do when we speak of God in his absolute independence, and in his relation to the world, or when we distinguish the absolute and relative attributes of God, by which we do not imply that the latter conflict with the idea that God is an unconditional and infinite being. What Keckermann says¹ of the notion of the infinite, may be perfectly applied to the notion of the absolute in this connection. He cites the objection: "Person, in God, is either finite or infinite; if finite, then it is not God; if infinite, then there are three infinities, because three persons;" and to this he replies: "Person is to be considered in a twofold way; 1. In respect to the essence, and so it is infinite but is not triple; 2. In respect to the relation, or mode of existence, and so is neither finite nor infinite, because finitude and infinitude are properties of an entity or thing; but a person, so far as person, that is in respect to the mode of its existence, is not an entity, but the mode of an entity; modes, however, are neither finite nor infinite."

It is also, if not against the letter, yet contrary to the sense of the orthodox doctrine, to exhibit the difference in the relation of the Father and the Son, to the immanent act of generation, or the relation of both these and the Holy Spirit, to the act of procession, as a relation of ability on the one side, and inability on the other, of capacity and incapacity. But when we say that the person, the *I*, is both the subject and the object of its own thinking and willing, shall we say that this relation implies, that in the one, the *I* as subject, there is a power, which is wanting in the other, the *I* as object? Equally unjust would it be, even if we call the relation of the Persons a relation of dependence, (the orthodox doctrine prefers to call it a relation of communication, and it is at any rate wholly different from that relation of dependence in which the world stands to God,) to describe it as a partial or one-sided relation, in which the Son alone is dependent upon the Father, and to assert that there is no relation of the Father to the Son which can be brought as an equipoise.² Even according to the letter of the doctrine of the church we should be

created, and the latter, that which is not begotten or produced. The three Persons of the Trinity are *ἀγέννητοι*; the Father only is *ἀγέννητος*. Vide, his *ἐκδοσις*, 1, 9.

¹ Syst. theol. L. I. p. 81.

² Conf. Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, Th. II. S. 582 of the second edition; 702 of the first.

obliged to say, that just as little as the Son can be conceived of, as Son, without the Father, just so little can the Father be conceived of, as Father, without the Son; the paternity and the sonship, the *spiratio activa* and the *processio* presuppose each other.¹ If we concede to the speculative view, the value only of a mere illustration, we shall still find it conceivable, that just as we become self-conscious persons only as we view ourselves objectively as well as subjectively (to speak with Leibnitz, as the soul from being merely a passively percipient monad, comes to a clear apprehension); so too in God, the subsistence of the eternal omnipotence, wisdom and love, under the clearly defined relations of generation and procession, is a more perfect view of the Godhead than when we conceive of it as without any such relations, having as its only characteristic that it is unbegotten.²

§ 7. *Character hypostaticus. (2) Notae externae.*

Under the *external characteristics or notes* of the three Persons, we comprise those works, by which they are revealed to the

¹ This is the meaning of Aquinas when he says: *Quendam in divinis naturae ordinem esse, secundum quod ibi quoddam originis principium sit absque prioritate.* (P. 1. qu. 42. art. 3.) That De Wette unjustly calls this a contradiction in adjecto, is clear from the explanation which Aquinas himself gives of it (in II.): *In rebus creatis, etiam cum id, quod est a principio, sit suo principio coevum secundum durationem, tamen principium est prius secundum naturam et intellectum, si consideretur id quod est principium; sed si considerentur ipsae relationes causae et causati, et principii et principati, manifestum est quod relativa sunt simul naturae et intellectu, in quantum unum est in definitione alterius.* Sed in divinis ipsae relationes sunt subsistentes personae in una natura; unde neque ex parte naturae neque ex parte relationum una persona protest esse prior alia, neque etiam secundum naturam et intellectum. The Father, nevertheless, always remains the one, a quo procedit Filius, and the Son the one, qui procedit a Patre: thence is the Father principium originis, although not prius originato or principiato suo.

² Schleiermacher, (Glaubensl. § 171, 5 of the 2d ed.) finds an evidence that this doctrine is treated as though there were an inequality in the three Persons, in the fact, that it is found necessary to prove in so special a manner that the divine attributes and works belong to the Son and the Spirit, while it is taken for granted the Father has all of them. But the aim of these proofs is not to show that the Son and Spirit, considered as the second and third Persons in the Godhead, have these attributes; but to show that he who has redeemed us, and the Spirit who sanctifies us are to be considered not as created but as divine, because divine attributes and works are ascribed to them. And as to the Father himself, such proof lies in all the arguments by which we show that the existence of the world supposes a creator of infinite power, wisdom and love.

world (*opera ad extra*). The most prominent among them are, the work of *creation*, which, in accordance with the apostolic creed, together with preservation and providence, is ascribed to the *Father*; the work of *redemption*, whose centre is the incarnation, and which is ascribed to the *Son*; the work of *sanctification*, which is attributed to the *Holy Ghost*, and of which we may regard the indwelling of God in believers, that began at the first Christian Pentecost, as the central point. For the religious consciousness, this aspect of the Trinity is the most important; De Wette justly calls it the true basis of the doctrine; yet it is usually kept very much in the back-ground in dogmatical treatises. This disregard of it is to be explained, not only from the position which is almost universally assigned to our doctrine in systems of theology;¹ but also from certain special difficulties which we encounter in respect to these external notes themselves, when we reflect upon them in connection with other doctrines.

For, the Holy Scriptures do not ascribe creation to the Father only, nor redemption and sanctification to the Son or Spirit alone. It is also said of the Son, that by him all things were created (Col. 1: 16), and that he upholds all things by his powerful word (Heb. 1: 3); the name of Saviour (*σωτήρ*) by which we are accustomed to reverence Christ, is also given to the Father (1 Tim. 1: 1. 2: 3. 4: 10. Tit. 1: 3. 3: 4); the Son himself prays to the Father that he would sanctify his disciples (John 17: 17). In like manner, also, certain individual acts comprised in the total work of redemption and sanctification are ascribed, now to one, and now to another of the divine persons; e. g. it is usually said that the Father raised up Jesus from the dead (Acts 3: 15); but Christ, also, declares that he has power to lay down his life and to take it again (John 10: 18); it is God the Father who judgeth without respect of persons (1 Pet. 1: 17); and yet the judgment is committed to the Son (John 5: 22). When those gifts, offices and powers are spoken of, by which the church is made the temple of the indwelling Spirit (1 Cor. 3: 16); not only is the Holy Spirit named as the author of them, but one Lord and one God are also mentioned, through whom, whatever is demanded for the common good, is imparted to every member (1 Cor. 12: 4—7). In short, there seems to be no divine work from which any one person of the Godhead can be excluded.

And in fact it could not be otherwise if the doctrinal principles, above developed, are correct. For the divine essence, with all the absolute and relative attributes belonging to the idea of it, is not

¹ Conf. Bib. Sacra, Aug. 1846, p. 515, note 1.

merely common to the three Persons, but it is one and the same in them all. And if we are to hold fast to this unity, wherever the opposition of the relations inseparably connected with the notions of generation and procession, does not demand a distinguishing of the Persons (*ubi non obviat relationis oppositio*); then, too, we must also conceive of all action of God in and upon the world as one and indivisible,¹ and must concede the truth of the canon of Augustin, which is received by all our Lutheran theologians, as well as by the Scholastics—*opera Dei ad extra indivisa esse*. But if this be so, how can we, then, attribute individual *opera ad extra* to the individual persons, and make such works a means of distinguishing them?

There are two grounds on which this may be vindicated. In the first place it must be remarked, that as the oneness of essence and being does not exclude a difference in the order and mode of subsistence (*ordo et modus subsistendi*), so the unity of action does not exclude a corresponding difference in the order and mode in which the actions may be referred to individual persons (that is in the *ordo et modus agendi*). Indeed, since it is certain that in God being and action cannot be separated, we should rather say that those very relations under which we represent the being of God (as an essence existing through, from and in itself), would also necessarily be mirrored in the divine manifestations. But from this it follows, in the second place, that what, considered in itself, is common to all the persons, may likewise be ascribed to a single one of them, not merely so far as this one is a participant in all the attributes of the divine nature, but also because this action has a closer connection with that mode of subsistence (*σφραγὶς ἐνάρξεως*) which we ascribe to this particular person, either in the very notion of it, or because it is exhibited in a manifestation in which we recognize a revelation of just this person. Hence, the above-mentioned canon—*opera Dei ad extra tribus personis communia esse*, is further defined by the addition—*salvo tamen eorum ordine et discrimine*. This definition has a two-fold sense. It means, that when an action is attributed to the Father, to the Son, or to the Holy Spirit, the Father is to be considered as acting (as well as subsisting) from or of himself, the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.² It also

¹ In respect to the stress which even the Fathers of the Church laid upon this unity of the divine *ἐνέργεια*, may be compared the passages cited and explained by *Petavius*, Theologicor. Dogm. de Trin. L. IV. cp. XV. § 1—8.

² Quenst. P. 1. cp. IX. Sect. I. thes. 21, note 3; "Because the Father has

means, that when we speak of an operation of God upon the world, this can or must be attributed not merely to God in a general way, but also to the Father, Son and Spirit; and it may be thus referred, either *attributive*, *per appropriationem*, or *terminative*.¹

The reference by *appropriation* (*per appropriationem*) is made, when attributes which are essential to the divine nature are assigned to one of the persons of the Godhead, or when one of these persons reveals himself by attributes of the divine nature.² This is especially the case when such an attribute stands in closer connection with the hypostatic character of the person; which is seen in this, that, although we cannot deny it to any one of the persons, we yet find it to be especially appropriate to the one or the other; (this may be called *appropriation* in the more limited sense, while the other cases may be designated by the more general word, *attributio*). Thus, for example, power, wisdom and love are attributes of the divine nature in general; but, *per appropriationem*, power is assigned to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and

his essence from himself, he therefore acts from himself; the Son acts and works from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both." Keckermann *Syst.* I. IV. p. 71: "As is the order of existence, so is the order of action in the persons of the sacred Trinity; the Father acts from himself, the Son from the Father, the Holy Spirit from both."—The most of the theologians for ages, find this relation expressed in the passage John 5: 19. The unity of action is seen in the words, *ὁ ἑκείνος (ὁ πατήρ) ποιεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ*; ταῦτα, says Quenstedt, not by imitating the like, but by effecting the same things at the same time; for these words imply an identity, not an imitation and parity in the mode of action. The order of action is seen in the words: *ὅτι ὁράται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ὡς ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν, ἐὰν μὴ τι βλέπη τὸν πατέρα ποιῶντα*; that is, says Quenstedt, the Son does not do these things from himself as does the Father, since he is not from himself but from the Father, from whom as he has his essence, so also his omnipotence;—but the Son sees what the Father does, not after the operation, but because he is the wisdom of the Father by means of which the works are done. In like manner, in John 16: 13—15, it is said of the Holy Ghost, that he does not speak from himself (*ὡς ἑαυτοῦ*), but that what he announces to the apostles he takes from that which belongs at once to Christ and the Father.

¹ These expressions are not usually so carefully distinguished as they are here and in what follows; yet it might easily be shown that there is a ground for these distinctions, not only in the thing itself but also in the doctrinal *usus loquendi*.

² Aquinas *Summ.* I. qu. 39. art. 7; "The manifestation of the persons by means of essential attributes is called *appropriation*." Gerhard *in loc. de Trin.* § 53: "Certain essential attributes are *appropriated* to each person by ecclesiastical writers, although essential attributes, on account of the identity of essence, are common to the three persons."

love to the Holy Ghost. So, too, it is said of God, without special designation of the persons, that of (from) him, through him and to him (sic *ἐκ* *ἐν* *εἰς*) are all things (Rom. 11: 36); and even of the Father¹ (Eph. 4: 6), that he is above all, through all, and in all; but, per appropriationem, the *from* is ascribed to the Father, the *through* to the Son, the *in* to the Holy Spirit.² That this is not arbitrary, will be apparent to every one who has a clear view of the distinction of the persons, in accordance with the declarations of the Scriptures, and the doctrinal development of this distinction; although it is not easy to carry out the proof of it, since we have here to do with attributes of the divine nature which are common to all the persons; and it is especially difficult if, with the majority of the evangelical theologians, we have doubts about taking our point of departure from any speculative views of the Trinity. The most important point here is the appropriation of the *particulæ diacriticae* *ἐκ*, *διὰ* and *ἐν*, which may be directly and sufficiently justified from the Holy Scriptures themselves (conf. 1 Cor. 8: 6. Eph. 2: 18. John 1: 3); for this appropriation is made in view of the relation of the Persons to the divine works, and points, on the one hand, to the difference in the order and mode of action,³ and, on the other hand, to the unity which still exists in the action itself; for, when the Father works through the Son

¹ Some theologians do indeed assume that the name *πατήρ* in this passage is not to be understood *προσωπικῶς* but *οὐσιωδῶς* (as designating not the First Person but the divine nature); e. g. Quenstedt, *de Trin. Sect. I. thes. 22. not. 2*; yet there is here no ground for this assumption, although it cannot be denied that elsewhere "Father" is used as a predicate of the divine nature; e. g. Matt. 6: 9.

² Aquinas *Summ. I. qu. 39. art. 8*, treats expressly of the *appropriatio* in this sense, and adduces the following chief species thereof: In consideratione Dei, qua Deus absolute secundum esse suum consideratur, Patri aeternitas, Filio species, unus vero Spiritui sancto: in consideratione vero Dei, qua unus consideratur, Patri unitas, Filio aequalitas, Spiritui S. concordia vel connexio: in consideratione vero Dei secundum rationem causalitatis Patri potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui S. bonitas attribuitur; in consideratione vero Dei, ut suos respicit effectus, appropriatur Patri a quo, Filio per quem, Spiritui S. in quo.

³ Quenstedt *de Trin. S. I. th. 19*: The order of operations is insinuated in the Scripture by the diacritical particles *from*, *through* and *in*, Rom. 11: 3; according to the holy Fathers, the particle *ἐκ* is attributed to the Father, *διὰ* to the Son, *εἰς* to the Holy Spirit.—But as the natural order of the divine persons is not always employed in the Scriptures,—so these particles are changed;—by which very permutation the *ὁμοουσία* and *ἰσότης* of the divine persons is preserved, and inequality in dignity is excluded.

in the Holy Spirit, the action is one, and yet it is defined in a three-fold way in reference to the three Persons.¹

From the *attributio* and *appropriatio*, we distinguish the cases in which something is ascribed *terminative* to a divine person. This occurs, when anything which proceeds from a common efficiency of all the three Persons ends in a manifestation, which we cannot avoid viewing as a revelation of one distinct Person. The *theophany* at the baptism of Jesus may serve as an example (Matt. 3: 16, 17).² In the voice: This is my Son, we must manifestly recognize the Father; in Jesus who received the baptism, the Son; in the descending dove, the Holy Spirit. Although, then, the bringing about this manifestation is to be referred back to the invisible efficiency of the triune God, yet, in that which proceeded from it, in its *terminus*, there is so definite a reference to the three persons, that we (and without being able to exchange the subjects as in *appropriation*), must say of the Father, that he declared Jesus to be his beloved Son, of the Holy Spirit, that he descended upon him, and of the Son, that, coming out of the water, he saw the heavens opened, and the Holy Spirit descending.³ In applying this, now, to the individual *opera ad extra*, we must distinguish those works which express the general dependence of the world upon God, from those which have reference to the Christian life. The former are comprised under the rubrics of creation, preservation, coöperation, providence and government, of which we may take creation as the most prominent, in place of the others; the latter, the *opera oeconomica*, we will not attempt to enumerate completely, but will comprise them all under the head of redemption and sanctification as the most essential.

The former would not lead us of themselves to distinguish three persons in the one divine nature; on this account, after this distinction of persons has been made known to us from other sources, we cannot look upon them as three coördinate causes

¹ Athanasius *ep. ad. Scrap.* "The efficiency is like in itself and indivisible as to the nature, and one; for the Father does all things through the Son in the Holy Ghost; and thus the unity of the holy Triad is preserved; and thus in the church is preached one God, who is over all and through all and in all."

² Our older theologians lay great weight upon this as being a kind of visible manifestation of the Trinity. Gerhard devotes to it a whole chapter: *Exeges. loc. III. cap. IV. § 75—81*. Quenstedt, too, gives an extended interpretation—*de Trin. thes. 14 of Sect. 1*, and *Vindication, in VII. of the ἐκδικαίς to quæst. I. of Sect. II.*

³ Augustin. *de Trin. II. 10*; and in more general terms in the work *de trinitate et unitate Dei*, op. 9.

(causae sociae),¹ of creation, preservation, etc.; these acts are to be ascribed to them, not so far as they are three different persons, but so far as they are of one essence; they are *opera essentialia*, and therefore *communissima*, since the distinction of persons recedes the most in these acts. Yet they can be referred to the individual persons *attributive* (whence, in Baumgarten and others, the name, *opera attributiva*); and so, in accordance with the canon adduced in respect to the *ordo et modus operandi*, we may say, that all things are created, preserved and governed by the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Ghost.² But creation is attributed to the Father in an especial manner *per appropriationem*. Creation, as *opus ad extra*, manifestly corresponds with generation as *opus ad intra*; as in the latter the Father is seen as the original and fountain of divinity (*ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος*), so in the former, he is recognized as the ground and source of all created existence. And, in the strictest sense, we cannot so well consider that person as the creator, *through* whom or *in* whom all things are, as that one *from* and *out of* whom all things are, or, who by absolute omnipotence is the first cause of their existence; the *αὐτὸς*, however, and the omnipotence belong, as we know, to the attributes appropriated to the Father.³ Yet the Son and the Spirit

¹ Quenstedt *de creatione* Sect. II. qu. III. *θέσις*: "One is the creator of the heaven and the earth, Father, Son and Spirit; and these three persons of the Godhead are not rightly called coördinate causes (*causae sociae*) of creation." — *βελαιώσεις*, 2: "That which acts is the one Deity common to the three persons, says Nazianzen, Orat. II. de theol. As there is therefore one divine essence and one power, there is also one creative energy equally common to these three persons, and consequently, only one creator; but where there is only one creator, there distinct causes of creation cannot be established."

² It is of course understood that these particles here also do not declare any separable efficiency of the three persons. "Gregory of Nazianzen says correctly that these particles do not divide the nature, nor lead to an inequality of the persons; but only express peculiar personal properties in the one and unconfounded nature; Quenstedt l. c. *διάλυσις*, I. Aquinas holds still more strictly to the unity of the act of creation; Summ. I. qu. 45. art. 6: "To create is common to the whole Trinity, and is ascribable to the divine persons only as they include essential attributes." (That is, *Deus est causa rerum per suum intellectum et voluntatem, sicut artifex rerum artificiarum; artifex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum et per amorem suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum operatur; unde et Deus Pater operatus est creaturam per suum verbum, quod est Filius, et per suum amorem, qui est Spiritus S.; et secundum hoc processionem personarum sunt relationes productionis creaturarum, inquantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et voluntas*).

³ The mode in which this appropriation is exhibited by our older divines is not wholly satisfactory; probably because it appeared to them more important

should not only not be excluded from the work of creation, but their relation to it should not even be considered as subordinate; they should not, for example, be regarded as mere instruments or organs of the Father, since this would conflict with the consubstantiality and the essential unity of their *εὐαγγέλιον*.¹

In the *opera oeconomica* the distinction of the persons is much more apparent. The restitution of the human race is indeed a work of the whole Trinity, which is achieved by the Father through the Son ~~in~~ the Holy Spirit—according to the principle of the order and mode of the operation of the Persons, which is here, too, of valid application. But since, to the execution of this work through the Son, that is, to our redemption, the incarnation of God is necessary, which can be attributed *terminative* only to the Son; and, to the completion of this work in the Holy Spirit, that is, to our sanctification, the indwelling of God in believers is necessary, which can be attributed *terminative* only to the Spirit; to which elements, then, as a third, the eternal purpose of the Father from which the whole work of redemption proceeds, is to be coördinated;² it is clear from this, that the participation of the three per-

to maintain the equal participation of the Son and the Spirit in the work of creation, than to prove that it is to be attributed to the Father. Conf. Quenst. l. c. *διάλ.* VI.

¹ Quenst. de Trin. Sect. I. thes. 32: "The work of creation is attributed to the Father, not exclusively, nor *ἐξουκὼς*, nor as proper to him alone, much less as to one originating cause, so that the Son can only be an instrument; but on account of the order in the persons of the Trinity." He considers it as an *ἀκρολογία*, or a popular mode of speech, when some of the Fathers of the church designate the Father as *causam creationis προκαταρκτικὴν*, the Son as *causam δημιουργικὴν*, the Holy Ghost as *causam τελειωτικὴν*; or when Luther, in the interpretation of Genesis, calls the Son the instrument of the Father in creation; at least, he thinks, he is to be considered only as a conjoint or integral instrument, somewhat as the hand may be called an instrument of the man; but, properly speaking, the Father created all things by the Son, not as by an instrument, "*sed tanquam per suam sapientiam et virtutem ὑποστατικὴν*", Prov. 8: 30." Quenst. de creat. s. II. qu. III. *διάλ.* 2—5.

² These constitute the three *principia salutis* according to which, in the analytical method of treating theology, the first half of the doctrine respecting salvation was divided. This division shows a correct feeling of the importance of these principles for the Christian consciousness, and of the right connection of Christian doctrines. Conf. Hollaz, P. III. cp. I. qu. 2: "The principles of salvation are three; first, there is the benevolence of God the Father in his purpose to restore and bless a fallen world; secondly, there is the paternal redemption of us by Christ from sin and its penalty; thirdly, there is the gracious and, through certain media, efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, by which the salvation obtained by Christ is offered and conferred."

sons in this work of restitution, which is designated by the prepositions *from*, *through* and *in*, expresses a wholly different relation from that of their participation in the work of creation, which is also designated by the same prepositions. On this account, the *opera oeconomica* are called *personalia* and *minus communia*; but yet *only* minus communia, (not as the internal works, *divisa*,) and *personalia* only *secundum quid*, (not absolutely personal, as are generation and procession); for it is not so much the efficiency itself as its result, its terminus, in which the separation of the persons is revealed.¹ And even *terminative* we cannot make this separation valid, without taking precautions for again holding fast the union of the persons in some other manner; this is done, as we shall see, by means of the conception of the *sending* (the *missio*) of the Son.

In the application of these principles we find no entire agreement, even among our older divines; the ideas of redemption and sanctification are too general; and all depends upon this, what elements of them are made prominent, or especially regarded,² and also in distinguishing the points which are to be referred to the whole Trinity or to some one person, there may be a difference in the degree of acuteness and precision; but these differences are of no detriment to the validity of the principles themselves.

For illustration let us take the *opus oeconomicum* of the second person, that is, the redemption of the human race. One who has no occasion or call to enter into more exact investigation will simply hold to this, that the Son has redeemed the world from sin and death; and, as to the relation of this to the Trinity, will say that it was brought about according to a divine purpose, and that for this end the Son was sent by the Father into the world. Another, who feels himself compelled to discuss with more precision the leading elements of redemption, and its relation to the divine nature, or to the individual persons, will perhaps say with Quenstedt: "That redemption is a work of the whole Trinity, partly in view of the divine ordering of it, partly in view of the acceptance of the ransom paid by Christ; but that it is a work of

¹ According to a rule which Calovius gives: *Communia sunt ratione efficientiae s. principii et inchoative, personalia vero s. propria uni alicui personae ratione termini s. terminative, quia in certa persona terminantur.*

² The most exact and complete division is to be found in Baumgarten, Th. I. S. 477 sq. S. 491 sq. S. 499 sq.

the second person alone in respect of merit and attainment." But, properly speaking, it is the assumption of human nature made in behalf of redemption, which is to be specially attributed to the Son; yet even from this, the Father and Spirit are not to be absolutely excluded. The Son alone became flesh, but God prepared for him the body (Heb. 10: 6), and he was conceived by the Holy Ghost (Luke 1: 35). Considered as an act, according to Thomas Aquinas,² the incarnation is the work of the whole Trinity; but in respect to its *terminus*, that is the personal union of the divine and human nature, it belongs only to the Son; since, according to the doctrine of the church, it is first and properly not the nature but a person, and that the second person, which has assumed humanity.³ But that which is ascribed, *terminative*, to the Son must at the same time be also ascribed in another way to the Father: the Word became flesh, and the Son of God assumed the form of a servant, because he was *sent* by the Father into the world, born of a woman, born under the law, to redeem us from the curse of the law, and make us the children of God. And so, too, God has *sent* his Spirit into our hearts, to make us perfect in childlike obedience and trust in him (Gal. 6: 4—6).

The notion of the *Sending* is, thus, that by which the separation of the persons in reference to the *opera ad extra* is done away with, although, at the same time, it is that by which this separation is also reestablished; that is, he who sends and he who is sent must be conceived of as two, no less than he who begets and

¹ Quenstedt *de Trin.* Sect. I. *thés.* 53. not.

² Summae P. III. qu. 3. art. 4: Tres enim personae fecerunt, ut humana natura uniretur uni personae Filii. Conf. Quenstedt *de Christi persona et naturis*, Sect. I. thes. 24: Causa efficiens unitio est tota S. S. Trinitas, *inchoative* scil. s. ratione initii et effectiois s. productionis humanae naturae; *terminative* vero solus *lógos* est, utpote qui solus incarnatus est.

³ According to the Confession of Faith of the eleventh council at Toledo (anno 675): "The whole Trinity effected the incarnation, yet the Son alone received the form of a servant in the singleness of his person, not in the unity of the divine nature, in that, which is peculiar to the Son, not what is common to the Trinity; which form is conjoined with him in a unity of person, that is, so that the Son of God and the Son of man are one Christ." Conf. Petav. theol. Dogm. de Incarn. L. II. ep. 4. § 7. Quenst. l. c. thes. 26.—But why just the second person? This is a question which the church doctrine does not venture to answer, and even the Scholastic theology answers it only timidly; as is natural, since, according to the opinion of the most esteemed Scholastics, the Father also or the Holy Spirit might have assumed humanity. Conf. Thomae Aq. Summ. III. qu. 3. art. 5 and 8.

he who is begotten.¹ Thus this separation of the persons is done away with in all that concerns the unity of the efficiency (*ἐνέργεια*) in the work of redemption (*opera oeconomica*); the separation holds in reference to the relation of this work to the different modes of subsistence (*modi subsistendi*) of the divine nature. That the Father sent the Son, and that the Father and Son have sent and send the Holy Spirit, is expressly taught in the Holy Scriptures (John 14: 24, 26. 16: 5, 7). The further statements which the Evangelical theology has here made, are rather of a negative than positive character; for example, that the sending does not involve any separation in space, or any inequality.² We may say that there is in the very notion of sending a twofold relation, one to that which sends, and another to that to which the sending is made.³ In the last respect the sending of the Son and the Spirit consists in this, that, although they were present with men from the beginning, yet in the fulness of time they entered into a new and closer fellowship with them, the Son by a personal union with Jesus, the Holy Spirit by his indwelling in the Christian church, which was the result of the incarnation. In respect to the first of these relations, the *sending* expresses nothing else but an order of operations (*ordo operandi*) in the divine persons, corresponding with their order of subsistence (*ordo subsistendi*), a *ῥόπος ἀποκαλύψεως* analogous to their *ῥόπος ἐνάρξεως*; the sending is the consequent (*consequens*) of the generation and procession, and is the manifestation or revelation of these internal relations of the Godhead in time, or in the world.⁴ We may even say that the *sending* thus viewed, is the same relation as that expressed by generation and procession; only the former is this relation viewed in its temporal aspect, the latter is

¹ Qui enim ut mittens et missus distinguuntur, illi ut personae differunt. Calov. III. p. 194.

² Quenst. de Trin. sect. thes. 50. not.: "The sending of the Son of God, 1. is not a banishment and separation in respect to space, as though he had been banished from the highest heavens, and separated from his celestial Father; for this would be repugnant to the infinite and intimate identity of the persons of the Father and the Son; 2. The mission is not of command, but of free consent, and therefore argues no inequality of him that sends and him that is sent, —but only supposes an order of origination; 3. the sending is not coerced but spontaneous, John 4: 34. 5: 30."

³ Thomas in Summ. I. qu. 43. art.

⁴ So everywhere where the *sending* is spoken of; e. g. Quenstedt l. c. thes. 2, 31, 50, 52, 62. Quenst. distinguishes the sending, as the consequent and manifestation of the opera ad intra, from the proper opera ad extra, redemption and sanctification. Hollaz. de myst. Trin. qu. 30 and 52.

the relation comprehended as an eternal act. Thus is the conception of the *sending* (*missio*) the bond between the internal and the external characteristics of the persons of the Trinity, between the opera ad intra and extra, and forms the fitting conclusion of the doctrine, since it brings back the end to the beginning.

The statement as to the coincidence of the *processio* and *missio* which we have above made is the view which Petavius maintains (De Trin. Lib. VIII. cp. 1. § 1—10), after Manuel Kalekas, to whom it gave a firm foundation for his polemics against the Greek church in his books, de processione Spiritus S. Petavius declares (l. c. § 10): *Mitti a patre Filium, est gigni naturam hominis assumpturum et suo tempore assumptum; mitti Spiritum Sanctum, est procedere externum opus aliquod efficientem.* Calov indeed contests this (tom. III. p. 196), yet without reason, and because he gives Petavius' meaning incorrectly, as if he held that the *missio* was the *aeterna processio* itself. In the sense of Petavius only this can be said, that the *missio* considered in its eternal relation to God as the one who *sends*, coincides with the *processio*, viewed in its relation to the manifestation in time of him who *proceeds*. But just here may perhaps lie the highest tension, and the possibility of an adjustment, of the antagonism between the Orthodox and the Sabellian view of the Trinity. Here is the highest variance, so far as we can call it a tendency of Sabellianism, that it knows nothing of any other *processio* than that which exists in the *missio*, while according to Petavius the *missio* coincides with the *processio*. Here, too, may be the possibility of an adjustment of the difference, because, if the *missio* and *processio* are comprehended in their unity, the whole conflict ceases. The difference between the two, according to Schleiermacher,¹ runs out into this, "that Sabellius maintains that the *threeness* is something which has relation only to the different modes and spheres of action of the Deity,—considered as governing the world, in its general action upon all finite existence, it is the Father,—considered as redeeming, however, and in its special action in the person of Christ, and through him, it is the Son,—but, viewed as sanctifying, in its likewise special action in the body of believers, and as the unity of the same, it is the Spirit:

¹ Schleiermacher on the Contrast between the Sabellian and Athanasian view of the Trinity—translated by Professor Stuart in the Biblical Repository, vols. 5 and 6.

while, on the other hand, the doctrinal view prevalent in the church maintains, that the *threeness* is something purely internal, and originally separate in the Godhead, even when viewed apart from these different modes of action; and that the Godhead would have been Father, Son and Spirit in itself, in an eternal manner, if it had never created anything, never been united with an individual man and never dwelt in the community of believers." Now, although the latter is the orthodox view, yet if we adopt the expression of Petavius—*gigni carnem assumpturum*, we may set aside the question whether a generation is to be assumed without regard to the incarnation, as one that rests upon a needless, not to say, an empty abstraction. And thus the first hint which Schleiermacher, at the close of his System of Theology (§. 707 of the first, 592 of the second edition) gives towards a new elaboration of the doctrine of the Trinity, will be found in fact to lie nearer to the prevalent view than he himself seems to believe.

There is an objection of Schleiermacher's, bearing upon the points discussed in this section, to which we will just refer in closing it.¹ In reference to the divine causality, which according to our doctrine is to be viewed as undivided, he puts two cases. Either the divine causality belongs wholly to the one Godhead as such, to the Persons, however, only so far as they are in the Godhead, and not so far as they are distinguished from each other; or, this causality belongs to the three persons as such, and to the unity of nature only so far as it consists of these persons. The first view, now, Schleiermacher thinks has never been able to gain currency, because in it the *threeness* recedes more than the prevalent tendency allowed; hence the other has been generally adopted, but yet not without some secret opposition; for, properly speaking, according to this view the whole divine causality must be considered as threefold; but since, in that case, the divine unity would become merely nominalistic, it has been assumed, that every act in all three is also one and the same, not that in every one there is its own act; in so saying, however, we do not refer the act to the persons but to the divine nature in its unity.—Most certainly! but what follows from this? Nothing else, but that Schleiermacher is not correct in saying, that of these two views the first has never been able to gain currency, and that the second has been generally espoused. In respect to the ope-

¹ *Glaubenslehre* § 180, 3. S. 699 of the first ed. § 171, 4. S. 585 of the second.

ra attributiva, the expression chosen by Schleiermacher is almost word for word the received formula ; and this is also clear in the very name of the opera essentialia. In respect to the opera oeconomica, this formula, especially in its second part, is not wholly applicable ; but yet that which Schleiermacher gives as the second view is still less applicable to these operations. But, between these two views, there is a third, viz. that the divine causality is to be ascribed to the one Deity, and to the Persons *ratione ordinis et patefactionis* (conf. Hutter's locc. p. 112). When Schleiermacher adduces, now, as proof that, with the first view, the *threeness* is really maintained *almost* only in reference to the special act of the persons, such points as these ; that the Son himself became man, while the justifying agency is attributed to the one and undistinguished divine nature ; that the Holy Spirit as such is poured out upon believers, while that divine agency which guides and vivifies the Christian community, is attributed to the one and undistinguished divine nature ;¹ all this, with some enlargement of the conceded *almost*, the doctrinal theology of the church will recognize as being its own position, in accordance with the above intermediate view.

§ 8. Concluding Reflections.

We have endeavored to explain the doctrinal formulas and positions of the church with more than usual care, and to fortify them with the declarations of the most esteemed theologians, because among their opponents as well as friends, we not seldom see the want of that more exact acquaintance with them, without which they can neither be justly judged, nor fittingly defended. Indeed, it often happens, that it is something wholly different from the real doctrine of the Trinity, as held by the church, which the one attacks, and the other tries to establish. But perhaps, as we have gone along, the question has forced itself upon some, whether such prolonged and subtle investigations are in any correct proportion with the importance of the doctrine for religion and Christianity ? whether the chief thing, the proper religious element, is not rather kept out of sight, than made clear and impressive by all this pains-taking ? For it is not to be denied, that not only the formulas, which are the residuum of the discussions upon this doctrine, but also the discussions themselves, and the

¹ Glaubenslehre S. 700 of the first ed. which is here more clear than the second.

endless works which have been devoted to them in all ages of the church, are better fitted to awaken and nourish every other kind of emotions and reflections, than those of a religious nature. How then can we justify the importance which our Evangelical theology has always assigned to these doctrinal positions, if not from their bearings upon Christian piety? Shall we do it because these positions are decisively revealed in the Holy Scriptures? But it has been often repeated and conceded, that the principal notions around which this doctrine revolves, are either foreign to the Bible,—as *οὐσία* and *υπόστασις*, *τρόπος υπάρξεως* and *μεταλήψεως*, *τρίας* and *ὁμοουσία*; or that they do not seem to have the same significancy in the Bible as in doctrinal theology —e. g. *γεννηθῆναι*, *ἐκπορευθῆναι*, *πέμψαι*, and even *Ἰατῆρ* and *υἱὸς θεοῦ*. Shall we do it on speculative grounds? Speculation may decide for itself, what importance this doctrine has for it in its own sphere, but so far as a system of doctrines is concerned, especially the Evangelical, the speculative elements have never been the chief thing; and on this account we have all along held fast to the position, that we can consider them of value, only so far as they help to illustrate what is elsewhere established. Many a one might then be inclined to agree with De Wette's¹ conclusion: "That this doctrine, since it is said to be established only upon the Bible, but is not there contained in the form in which the church receives it, had better be looked upon as antiquated, and be exchanged for the doctrine of the Bible, historically and scientifically defined and illustrated."

It is with good reason that De Wette here says, "the doctrine of the Bible *scientifically defined and illustrated*." For, many as are those, who, in later times, have brought the doctrine of the Bible into contrast with that of the church, there are still very few among them, who would be taken seriously at their word, and would receive the doctrine precisely as it stands in the Bible, as expressing the full truth. And even he who sees in it a divine revelation will hardly be able, as a theologian, to abide by the mere letter of the Scriptures, without further examination. For, apart from the difficulty of determining what the exact doctrine of the Bible is in all its relations, in consequence of the great variety of modes in which the subject in all its bearings, is presented by the different Biblical writers; it contains in itself too

¹ In his *Dogmatik der Lutherischen Kirche*. De Wette is so frequently referred to in this Article, because this work is used by Dr. Twisten as his textbook in these Lectures.

many references to notions, whose exact meaning and authority may seem doubtful, and there remain so many questions to be answered, so many by-ways to be avoided, that it would not be possible to stand by the letter alone, without further investigation.

We have indeed, as everywhere else, so here, to wonder at the wisdom with which the Scripture imparts those truths which no understanding of the wise can fathom, in a form which is intelligible even to the unlearned ; since it presents the divine mysteries in that aspect, in which they are manifestly and most adapted to our religious wants ; so that we may rather experience their power in the heart, than speak about them in lofty words (*καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας*, 1 Cor. 2: 1). The Scriptures do not speak of the perplexing union of the *threeness* with the oneness ; nor of a divine essence which is common to three persons, and numerically one ; nor of the three persons which subsist in the Godhead, and yet do not divide it. Manifold as have been the attempts to make such things a part of the experience of the Christian church, by means of formulas impressed upon the memory, and images presented to the imagination, by speculative categories or in mystic vision ; every one must still feel the broad difference between all this and the clearness of the Scriptural statements, so simple in their depth and fulness. In the centre is placed Christ, in whom the Word has become flesh, and the fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily ; and so near does he stand to us, being made like us, so easily grasped in our conceptions, by our feelings, and even by our senses (1 John 1: 1), that the personality of the Son of God, which is thus brought before us in clear vision, does not seem to present to us any difficulty. And when we also read that the same Christ, thus evidently set forth before our eyes (Gal. 3: 1), so that we see and hear him, came from heaven, was with God, and equal with God, is the light and life of the world, without whom nothing was created ; or that he has been again received to heaven, and sits at the right hand of God, guarding and guiding his followers with divine power, judging the living and the dead ; all this is no stumbling-block, because we have here presented perfectly clear and definite conceptions, which by these predicates are only extended as it were, in two opposite directions, and brought into connection with the infinite. In connection and contrast with him, the Father is described as the being who sent his only begotten Son into the world. In him we see the eternal power and Godhead, which,

from the creation of the world, are understood from the things that are made (Rom. 1: 20); the one true God (John 17: 3), who did not leave himself without a witness, even when he suffered all nations to walk in their own ways (Acts 14: 15—17), but who now commandeth all men everywhere to repent, and to believe in him whom he has raised from the dead (Acts 17: 24—31). And here again the distinction between the two persons does not seem to us obscure, neither does the union of the Father with him who is the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, who is in the Father, as the Father is in him (John 14: 9—11). The Holy Ghost, finally, whom we receive from the Father, through the Son, is described as the being whose operations we may discern in our own minds; for it is he who witnesses to our spirits that we are the children of God (Rom. 8: 16); who intercedes for us, with groanings which cannot be uttered (Rom. 8: 26); of whom we are told that he is the Spirit of God (1 Cor. 2: 12), and the Spirit of Christ (Rom. 8: 9), therefore one with them, and yet different, as is that which is given from him who gives; as is the one that is sent from him who sends (Rom. 5: 5. Gal. 3: 5. 1 Thess. 4: 8. John 14: 26. 15: 26. 20: 22. 1 John 4: 13). If, in the apostolic times, there is to be found no trace that the confession of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, in this mode of viewing it, created any difficulty or opposition, this is something easy to be understood; and we may also see in it an example and norm for our times and for all times, as to the mode in which this doctrine is to be presented in ordinary discourse.¹ Whatever makes it weighty and edifying in Christian experience, we may easily attach to this mode of representation; whatever gives employment only to the understanding, and involves it, as many believe, in inextricable problems, is here left in the back-ground.

But as theologians we cannot avoid reflecting upon these difficult points; for, on the one hand, so far as faith is concerned, we must seek to unite biblical conceptions with biblical words, in order to guard against doubt, and confirm belief; and, on the other hand, our intellect, although it may not presume to penetrate the

¹ According to the oldest and most universally received Confession, not merely in its Occidental or Roman form, which we are accustomed to call the Apostolical, but also as it was handed down in the Oriental churches, and recognized and more clearly defined at Nice. Very different is the character of the so-called Athanasian Creed, or the Symbolum Quicunque, which, however, on that very account, is less adapted to general use.

mysteries of the divine nature, does yet always desire to be assured that there is nothing contradictory or self-destructive in the articles of faith which we receive. Hence arises the necessity, in the first place, for historical investigations, in order to answer such questions as these ; whether the conceptions of Spirit and of the Logos, which were current in the times of Christ and his apostles, and not invented by them, were received in the way of accommodation, or whether they are essential to the Christian system, and what is their Christian significance, valid for all times : in the second place, for philosophical definitions, in order to determine whether those principles designated as the Logos and the Spirit, which are connected with facts or phenomena of the Christian life, be natural or supernatural, created or divine, personal or impersonal ; and what is their relation to one another, to the divine nature, and to their revelation in time ? If, now, we are convinced that the three positions from which we started¹ are actually contained in the Scripture ; that is, that no view of the subject is Christian and Scriptural, which, either does not see anything truly divine in Christ or in the Spirit who dwells in believers ; or, does not truly distinguish the one from the other, and both from the divinity of the Father ; or, which would set aside the unity of the divine nature ; and if we find it necessary in expressing all this, to employ conceptions and formulas, by which the errors may be avoided, and the truths maintained ; then, we say, that the results of such investigations, though they may be given in a terminology not contained in the Scriptures, cannot be said to be opposed to the doctrine of the Bible. It is the doctrine of the Bible itself, philosophically illustrated and defined ; and, though it may be best in popular instruction to abide by the biblical mode of presenting the doctrine, yet the philosophical mode will still be a *regulative and corrective* for any untenable and erroneous notions, which might be connected with the former. The connection of such investigations, with our religious and Christian experience is indeed more indirect than direct. A false standard is applied, when it is asked how far these conceptions and theorems, these termini and formulas are valuable as an expression of Christian views and feelings. In their indirect relations, as precautions for preserving the purity of Christian experience, and the correctness of its transference into the form of intellectual apprehension, from all disfigurement, error and misunderstanding, they might, nevertheless, be of the greatest impor-

¹ Bib. Sacra, No. XI. p. 507—8.

tance, and, under some circumstances, indispensable. In itself considered, for example, faith, in order to see in Christ the divine ground of our redemption, would need no other expression than that which the Scriptures give, when they call Christ the Son of God, or the Word manifest in the flesh. If, however, any one should advance the notion that this was to be understood only as the designation of a divinely exalted man, or of a Spirit, elevated indeed above all things, yet created; by the doctrine of the Consubstantiality he would have to be reminded, that even the highest of created beings could not be a partaker of such a union with God as that upon which our redemption rests; but only a being who from all eternity was, not created, but begotten, by the Father (God of God), and who, in the fulness of time, became man. And although the doctrine in this form is not contained in the Scripture, yet it is not foreign to the Scripture, but the doctrine of the Bible philosophically defined; nor can it be regarded as antiquated so long as there is danger of such a misunderstanding.

That this is in point of fact the true connection of the doctrine of the Trinity, as held by the church, with the biblical doctrine, may, we believe, be shown, with all the historical and exegetical evidence, which in such a case is possible. This is the position of our older divines,¹ and must, we think, be conceded by all who are agreed with them in principle; that is, who believe firmly in the absolute truth of the Scriptural declarations, and in the necessity and reality of a redemption and atonement, effected and applied only by God. We believe it to be true, that if we follow the development of the doctrine of the Trinity in a historical and genetic manner, that the antagonisms and points of contest, which must come up and be discussed, one after another, could not be

¹ These do indeed believe that they can prove the ecclesiastical formulas more directly from the Scriptures, not only of the New, but even of the Old Testament, than we find to be possible. For in the latter, only through the mediation of the N. Testament, can we find the germs; and, even in the N. Testament, it will be hard to find the form of the doctrine of the Trinity as it is received in the church, in any other way than as we interpret it in view of the elements of its historical development, and of the conflicts through which it passed; for even the questions to which we seek an answer in the Scriptures, *as, for the most part, given to us only in subsequent history.* Yet even our older divines concede that the termini introduced into the church (without which, however, the doctrine itself cannot be maintained), are derived only by inference from the Scripture, in order to set aside erroneous conceptions; and that, outside of the theological sphere, the truth can and should be communicated only in the words of the Bible. Conf. Hollaz de Trin. myster. qu. II. et LVIII.

otherwise adjusted or decided than they have been, in order to be in accordance with the results of a true interpretation of Scripture, as guided by a vital Christian experience; consequently, that the dogma itself could not take any other form than that it has taken. It will be enough here to call to mind the general outlines of its history.

In the primitive church we find a simple and untroubled agreement with what the Scriptures declare respecting the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. And when the reflections of the early Christians were specially directed to the subject, as was the case, partly from inward necessity, and partly for apologetic and polemic reasons,—in order to guard against the opinions of the Gnostics and Ebionites, or to remove all suspicion of an approximation to heathen notions; they connect all their speculations with that germ of a Christian philosophy (*γνώσις*), which is given us in Scripture in the doctrine of the *Logos*. Since the distinction between the Son and the Father seemed clear, as long as they remained upon biblical grounds, the chief problem with which they were first concerned was to show the unity of the Father and the Son; and this, too, did not seem to be of difficult solution, whether they took their departure from the notion of the close union and agreement, that is, of the equality or, at least, similarity of the Son with the Father, or from the conception of his dependence from him, that is, of his emanation or procession; both of which are contained in the idea of the creative wisdom (*σοφία*), or of the reason (*νοῦς*), which is the medium of the divine revelation. But, since these two points were not kept distinctly separate, they did not, on the one hand, arrive at the conception of the identity of the nature, while, on the other hand, they were in danger of disregarding the difference of subsistence; hence the fluctuations between Subordinationism and a Unitarian Monarchianism, which were the two co-existent forms, the one the complement of the other, in which this truth found its imperfect expression in the first centuries. It was, however, Monarchianism which was first condemned by the church, since it stood in contradiction with the Holy Scriptures; in the form in which some held it (Theodotus, Artemon, Paul of Samosata), by its approximation to the heresy of the Ebionites, which denies the divine in Christ; in the form in which others held it (Praxeas, Novatus, Sabellius), by the denial of the pre-existence of the *Logos*, as a truly subsisting *περιγραφή τῆς θείας οὐσίας*, even independently of its manifestation in the world. The Subordination

theory, however, was itself necessarily soon condemned, when, after being freed from the restraint which Monarchianism had hitherto exercised, and not merely encouraged, but apparently justified in the most decided opposition to it, it was hurried forward, in the form of Arianism, to an extreme, more at variance than even the other, with the Scriptures, and with Christian experience, by declaring that the Logos is only the first of creatures. Many, (as the Eusebians and other so-called Semi-Arians,) did indeed now at first attempt to hold fast to the more ancient scheme of Subordination; but this was impossible, now that the earlier simple and undoubting faith was lost, and that the opposing views, which were at first limited and restrained by one another, had become freely developed, and were seen in their mutual opposition. The discussions upon this doctrine could be brought to a close, only by seeing and declaring, that both the elements, the equality and the subordination, had equal rights, and were compatible with one another; the former being defined as consisting in the unity of essence, which does not exclude a difference of subsistence; and the latter, in the order of subsistence of the persons, which does not exclude their consubstantiality. This was the result of the conflicts of the fourth century, and it left to the following ages nothing to be done,¹ excepting to give the doctrine that more definite form, in respect to the mode of expressing and establishing it, and of stating the consequences flowing from it, which has passed over into dogmatic systems since the times of John of Damascus. Along with this, however, we do indeed find a constantly increasing divergence (e. g. in the Athanasian creed more than in the Constantinopolitan,) from the biblical doctrine, not merely in the mode of expression, but also in the type; since the Scriptures have an appearance of favoring Subordination, while the doctrine of the church receded from this more and more.² Yet this involved no contradiction, but was only a change in the point of view, brought about by the course which constant reflection upon the subject would necessarily take. The Holy Scriptures, when they speak of the Son of God, direct our gaze chiefly to the Incarnate Word, the man Christ Jesus, who is indeed, although, or we may even say, because, the Word was manifest in him, absolutely subordinate and subject to the Father; and, in contrast with this, they bring before our eyes the essence of God, as seen in its majesty and glory in the Father. The doctrine of

¹ Baumgarten-Crusius, *Dogmengeschichte*, S. 1016. § 40.

² *Conf. Bib. Sacra*, No. XI. p. 508.

the church must answer the query, what we are to think of the Logos, that was united with Jesus, when viewed by itself and apart from this union; what is its personality in its eternal relation to the Father and to the nature of God? And if this were a question which could not be passed by, neither could those distinctions which are necessary to answering it, e. g. of the Person of the Father from the divine essence; nor those propositions which the nature of the case demands, as that the Son has the same essence with the Father, in spite of the difference in the *ordo subsistendi et agendi*. But still it must be granted, that the church doctrine, even in what pertains to the mode of presenting it, has attached itself closely to the Scriptural statements; thus, for example, it has not allowed itself to separate the idea of the divine nature from the conception of the first person;¹ on the contrary, in the language of the church, as well as of the Scriptures, the name of the Father is usually employed to designate both the nature and the person (*ὁὐρανός* and *ἡσυχία*). With so much the more assurance, then, may it be maintained, that if it were possible wholly to forget the church doctrine of the Trinity, and to go back to an earlier stage in its development, or even to the simple statements of the Bible; still, when we came to reflect closely upon the doctrine, we should be carried forward by the inward necessity of the case, through essentially the same conflicts, to the same results.

This is confirmed by the mode in which the Reformers treated

¹ In fact there was a strong temptation to do this in the general tendencies of the church doctrine. That is, the unity may, so to speak, be construed with the *threeness* in one of two ways; either by finding it in the idea of the one identical essence in the three persons, or by finding it in the Father considered as the *principium divinitatis*, from whom the Son was begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeded; the second of these modes would be nearest to the Subordination system, which holds that the Father is the one true God who has revealed himself in the Son and the Holy Ghost. Hence, it would have been very natural for the orthodox doctrine, after it had freed itself from Subordinationism, to have decidedly attached itself to that other mode of constructing the doctrine, and, consequently, to have subordinated the idea of the Father, as well as of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the idea of the one true God (after the analogy of the relation of specific to generic notions); and thus, at the same time, to have avoided the reproach of being illogical in making the Son and the Holy Spirit both equal with and subordinate to the Father. A certain tendency "to this separation of the Father's name from the Monas," (as Baumgarten-Crusius calls it, *Dogmengesch.* S. 1028,) is apparent in many representations of the doctrine of the church; but it has never been able to gain exclusive authority, and that because the Scriptures stand in the way.

the doctrine. It has been said that they retained it, only because they were still unconsciously fettered by the Catholic subserviency to authority; and that they would have given it up, if they had been excited to a full discussion of the subject. But as to their being embarrassed by mere authority, this was not the case at first; they did not deny the doctrine, but laid no stress upon it; Melanchthon, in the first editions of his *Loci*, passed it by altogether, and spoke with depreciation of the labors which the Scholastics bestowed upon it. Nor can it be said that there was no polemic inducement to abandon the doctrine; for it is well known, that at the time of the Reformation there were many who doubted, and many who attacked it, and that there were several attempts to give it another form. And yet we see Melanchthon himself, by occasion of these doubts and attacks, in the later editions of the *Loci* again returning into the path which he had left; we see him with increasing earnestness interpreting, proving and defending the doctrinal positions of the church, with more and more thoroughness; with a zeal in which he seems almost to forget his natural mildness, we see him contending against the opponents of the doctrine, in special controversial treatises. And why all this, if he had not become more and more convinced, that, with the doctrine of the Trinity, the very foundation of our Evangelical faith would be undermined, and that if we followed the Holy Scriptures, we could come to no other result than that already attained by the church? That he was ignorant of the objections that might be brought against it, cannot be assumed, when we see how frequently he speaks of the severe struggles which he foresaw it would encounter; nor can it have been mere authority by which he silenced these objections in his own mind, since he constantly refers his readers to the declarations of Scripture, which, he says, must be received with all simplicity. Or, can we perhaps say, that the polemical inducement did not come from the right quarter? That would be to make the convictions on which our church is based too much dependent upon accidental circumstances! And from what quarter should it have come? From whatever quarter it might have come, we may be assured that it would have found the Reformers firm in their faith in Christ as the only ground of all justification and redemption; and on this account also, firm in their conviction of the divinity of Christ; for, if they abhorred even the opinion that any one could do something of himself for his own justification, as casting dishonor upon Christ, how could they have been satisfied with an opinion, by which his

dignity was directly lowered?¹ But with the Consubstantiality of the Son, the whole church doctrine of the Trinity is virtually given to every one, who holds so firmly to the word of the Bible as not to be satisfied with a Sabellian interpretation of it; especially if he allows as little weight as did Luther² to those objec-

¹ Luther especially expresses so deep a feeling of the connection of the whole of Christianity with the doctrine of Christ's person, and of this with the Trinity, that it is impossible to suppose that he was merely led by circumstances to hold it fast. Conf. his *Remarks upon the Three Confessions* (Works, Walch's edition, Th. 10. S. 1198 sq.) published in 1533: "I have remarked in all the histories of the whole of Christendom, that all those who have rightly had and held that chief article about Jesus Christ, have remained good and true in the right Christian faith; and though they may have erred and sinned in other things, yet they have held out to the last. For whoever stands right and firm in this, that Jesus Christ is true God and man, died for us and is risen, will agree to and stand by all the other articles; thus it is most true, what St. Paul says, that Christ is the chief good, ground, soil, and the whole sum, to whom and under whom all the rest is gathered together;—for thus it is determined, says St. Paul, that in Jesus Christ the whole perfect divinity shall dwell bodily or personally; hence, he who does not find or get God in Christ, shall never more, and no where, be able to find God out of Christ, though he go above heaven, under hell and beyond the world; for here will I dwell, says God, in this man, born of Mary the virgin, etc.—Again I have also remarked that all error, heresies, idolatry, scandals, abuses and evil in the churches, have come originally from this, that this article about faith in Jesus Christ has been despised or lost; and when one looks at them in the light and rightly, he sees that all heresies fight against this dear article about Jesus Christ, as Simeon says of him, that he is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel, and for a sign which shall be spoken against." Similar to this, in his *Commentary upon Galatians* (1535) chapter 3: 13. Conf. also his *Auslegung der andern Artikels*, preached in the castle at Torgau, 1533; Sermon upon John xiv.—xvi, 1538 (specially John 14: 13); and, *von den letzten Worten Davids*, 1543.

² Luther speaks against all intermixture of reason, even to lessen the apparent hardness and difficulty of this doctrine, and to make it more comprehensible, in a way which might seem objectionable, were it not made honorable by the strength of faith which he expresses. Conf. among other things his, *disputatio de anno 1539, d. XI. Jan.*, and the *disputatio de unitate essentialis et de distinct. personar. d. a. 1545*, in the *Opera Latina Jenens. tom. I.* (S. 528 and 534 of the edition of 1564). "When logic objects to this doctrine, that it does not square with its rules, we must say, *Mulier taceat in ecclesia.*" "By reason and philosophy nothing can be said about these majestic things; but by faith all things may be rightly said and believed." "Reason is like a line which touches the whole sphere, but only at one point, and does not grasp the whole." "He who wishes not to wander in his inquiries, and not to be oppressed by the glory of the majesty, let him by faith touch and lay hold of the Son of God manifest in the flesh; for this brightness of the Father's glory touches an object and becomes a reflex ray, illuminating every man that comes into the world."—Since we shall not probably soon have a

tions which are said to be taken from reason, and which have really operated much more strongly against the doctrine than all the arguments drawn from Biblical Theology. But we would not be understood to deny, what a bare inspection shows, that our theologians took the doctrine, after they had become convinced that it was Scriptural, into their systems of theology almost in the very shape which the Scholastics had given to it. And why should they not do this? Is it in Doctrinal Theology alone, that we can never look upon a labor as already completed? And even when Gerhard¹ confesses, that the doctrine of the primitive church, the consent of the most esteemed ecclesiastical writers, and the decisions of the most famous councils have had a certain weight in confirming us in our conviction of the correctness of our interpretation of Scripture, and thus giving us vantage-ground against the opponents of the doctrine; no one can find this unreasonable, who believes that the truth, under the coöperation of the Spirit of truth, must approve itself as true in history also; at any rate, this is something wholly different from receiving a doctrine on mere authority, and without personal conviction.

But if the doctrine of the Trinity seemed to those who composed and defined our doctrinal systems, to be a necessary result of Scriptural interpretation, and to have its foundation in Christian consciousness, how shall we then account for the opposition, which, in later time, has been raised against hardly any dogma so loudly as against this? In part, unquestionably, from this, that there are many, who neither have a conscious experience of the redemption which is effected only by the Son of God, or of the sanctification which is applied only by the Spirit of God; and who are not inclined, on the bare testimony of Scripture, to adopt mysteries which seem inaccessible to natural reason. But there are also many, to whom the biblical and religious basis of the doctrine is sure and dear above everything else, and who are yet not satisfied, but rather restrained and repelled, by the form in which the doctrine is held in the church. Even where they do not entirely misunderstand it, they yet see in it a dead and dry formula, in which they cannot take any interest, since the original occasions and aims of the formula have long since passed

complete edition of Luther's Latin Works, it were much to be wished that the theses which he put up at different times in Wittenberg, and in which he has expressed most precisely his views upon the most important doctrines, might be made more accessible by a special reprint.

¹ Gerhard, *Exeg.* III. 1. 15 sq.

away. The very character of these formulas, they say, which are rather negative than positive, which ward off error rather than promote clear insight, is such that they find nothing explained by them, no difficulties solved, no truth disclosed. While on the other hand, these same formulas are hindrances and disturbances in the way of one's own attempts to get a clear view of the biblical system, by means of his own free reflections, or to adapt them to his other ideas and convictions, according to his own wants and way of thinking. And, certainly, it may easily become a consequence of such definite doctrinal propositions, that while they guard against error, they also restrain the free movements of mind, and establish a dead uniformity in the place of a living and manifold development; and, on this account, even for historical treatment, those times in which men were endeavoring to approach the truth in different ways, though they may have been sometimes by-ways and false ways, seem more attractive than those in which they believed that they had attained the goal, and must keep precisely to the levelled track. And if any one now longs for a return of this earlier freedom and mobility, in the belief, that then the interest in our doctrine would be far more fresh and living than it is with the constant repetition of the same traditional forms of speech; if he believes that he must seek after, or has found, another mode of exhibiting it, which corresponds as well or better with the Scriptures and with Christian experience, which is less exposed to misapprehension, which is more free from doubt and objections, which ensures more profound disclosures, or at any rate, is more simple; shall we then put him off, by merely holding up in opposition the doctrine of the church? This would be to act neither in the spirit of our church, which never puts the inferences and deductions of men on a line with the words of Scripture;¹ nor in a truly philosophical spirit, which cannot give the same authority to that which is the result only of our reflections with that which forms a part of our direct religious experience. Consequently, one might have much to say against the doctrine of the Trinity, in the form in which it is held by the

¹ On this account Luther, in his admirable *Confutatio rationis Latomianae* (Opp. Lat. Jenens. tom. II. p. 430, translated in Walch Th. XVIII. S. 1455), will not have even the word *δοκίμιος* forced upon him; (*Si anima mea odit vocem δοκίμιος, et nolim ea uti, non ero haereticus, quis enim me coget. uti, modo rem teneam, quae in concilio per scripturas definita est?*) although in other places (e. g. in his work upon Councils and Churches, where he treats of the Nicene council) he shows that he sees the necessity of it in setting aside erroneous views.

church, and yet we might find him agreeing with us in essentials; but whether and how far the latter, would in the end be decided by his relation to the former. This form of the doctrine, then, must be held fast, so far as it expresses, on the one hand, what must always be considered by the Christian consciousness, as the chief element, the relation of the Persons to the *opera ad extra*, especially the *oeconomica*; on the other hand, so far as it expresses the general tendencies, from which our reflections should not deviate, either on the side of Modalism or of Trithism, if we would not put ourselves into opposition with the Bible.¹ So far as this, the church doctrine remains, as we said above, *the regulative and corrective*, not only of the popular, but also of the philosophical mode of presenting the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. And that very thing, which in other respects might be an objection to it, its negative rather than positive character, makes it so much the more adapted to such a use; since, within the assigned boundaries, it leaves room for a diversity of methods of explaining the doctrine, according to the wants of different minds, especially, if in doing so, they proceed with that liberality, which keeps in view the thing itself rather than the letter. Presupposing such a regulating statement, we gladly grant a relative degree of truth and value to the varied attempts which have been made to illustrate this doctrine.² And

¹ The very least, according to our view, which should be conceded to the doctrine as held by the church is, "that the views to which it stands opposed are also," according to the Bible, "actual misapprehensions," (Steudel's *Glaubensl.* S. 43v). When, on the other hand, Baumgarten-Crusius (*Bibl. Theol.* § 41. S. 408), maintains, "that the New Testament conjunction of Father, Son and Spirit has no connection with the higher Christology, and with that higher idea of Spirit which views it as a person;" and when v. Cölln (*Bibl. Theol.* § 205. Th. II. S. 282), asserts, "that the names Father, Son and Spirit are not to be taken as distinguishing three subjects (persons), but that the one true God is called *πατήρ, υἱός* and *πνεῦμα* in different relations;" this seems to me to be only a new evidence, how little honest intentions and a philosophical fitness for a so-called purely historical view of things, can ensure one against the influence of dogmatic prejudices, rationalistic no less than ecclesiastical.

² As when Daub (*Einleit. in d. Dogmatik*, S. 65, 66), finds in the doctrine of the Trinity an expression of the knowledge of God as the revealer (i. e. one who can reveal), the revealed and the self-revealing; or Nitzsch (*System d. Christl. Lehre*), that relation of our Christian experience (considered both as a state and a process) to the divine nature, according to which we pay homage, in the Son, to the divine love as speaking and mediating; in the Spirit, to that love as imparting itself to us and giving life; and, in the Father, to that love both as original and also as the result of the mediation; or Steudel (*Glaubensl.* S. 432), the idea of God, actualized as the ground and condition of all being, as the most intimate alliance of God with all being, and as the imparting of God

this is doubtless what has commended them to the minds of thoughtful theologians. And this, too, is an illustration of that fulness of grace and truth (John 1: 16, 17), which has come to us, not merely in Christianity as a whole, but also in its separate confessions and doctrines; that every one can look at them in the point of view which best corresponds with his wants and peculiarities; and that error usually first enters in, when one considers that aspect of the truth, in which it is first presented to his own mind, as the only one under which it can be viewed, and denies everything which does not come within his own sphere of vision.

ARTICLE III.

THE MOOD IN LANGUAGE.

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LANGUAGE is the body of thought. It is something more than the mere dress of thought. It has an internal, vital connection with it. As the living spirit, in assuming to itself a body, penetrates what was before inert, dead matter with its own peculiar life, fashions, organizes and animates it according to its own proper nature, so thought enters sounds in speech with a vital, determining, organizing power. It exists before language in order of nature. It makes language what it is. In order to determine the properties and laws of language, the nature and uses of its various functions or members, we must accordingly, first go to the thought which is the organic principle of speech, and ascertain what are the actual or possible characters of thought which may be incorporated and expressed in speech. It is in this view of the relations of language to thought that the follow-

to all being; or Hase (*Lehrbuch d. Dogmatik*, S. 527), the doctrine of God the Father over all, with whom humanity was united in new love through the Son of Man, who became (rather, was) a Son of God, so that all men might become sons through the Holy Spirit that binds together the church; or Wegscheider (*Institut.* S. 93), that God as Father, through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, has revealed himself to man, so that he, being redeemed from the bondage of sin, might become holy and blessed.

ing theory of mood has been conceived and developed; and from this view it must derive, to some extent at least, its justification and support.

We shall present our views under the following heads: The proper function of the mood in speech; The possible kinds of moods as determined by this view of their functions; The forms of moods in their proper import in actual use in speech; The abnormal use of moods.

1. *The proper Function of the Mood.*

Thought never properly appears in speech but as an expressed judgment; and logic teaches us that a judgment necessarily contains three members, the subject, the predicate and the copula. In every thought expressed in speech, there must necessarily be these three members. If each of these essential members have not an actual form appropriated to itself in every uttered sentence, it must be ever implied. It was to be expected that in expressing itself, thought would ever seek to secure for each of these independent and yet essential members its appropriate form; and that we should find in language the proper sign and expression of each. *The mood is the proper expression of the copula.* This is its distinctive office.

The copula has no other proper expression. If it may sometimes express its peculiar character through the use of other functions of speech, of adverbs, tenses, by periphrastic expressions, it does this only as other specific functions sometimes borrow help of their fellows to do their own work. There is no form of periphrastic expression appropriated to the expression of the copula. Adverbs and tenses have their own office-work.

The mood, further, actually expresses the copula. The indicative mood as truly expresses that form of the copula which appears in a *real* judgment, as truly expresses the *reality* of the judgment, and the *potential* mood the *possible* in the judgment, as the preterite tense expresses past time. All the uses of the mood to express anything else than the form of the copula, may be clearly explained as abnormal and derived uses. The copula, for the most part, for reasons which will hereafter appear, except when the speaker would throw an emphasis on the copula or assertion rather than on the subject or predicate, is found in combination with the predicate in the form of the verb. In almost all principal sentences, where a judgment is enounced, the verb

combines in itself the expression of the copula and also of an activity.

The various relations *of the activity*, are indicated by means of the other inflections of the verb. The voice indicates the direction of the activity as to or from the subject or the object; the tense the time of the activity; the personal inflections, the relations to the speaker, person addressed, or person or thing spoken of; the gender, these latter relations more specifically; and number, the repetition of the activity. The mood expresses no relation of the activity on the one hand; and the copula, on the other, has no other inflection through which its modifications can be expressed.

The proper and distinctive function of the mood, then, is to indicate the modifications of the copula.

If this be received as settled, then we should expect that the words actually occurring in speech would correspond to the diverse forms of the copula or modes of the judgment. Further, if this be true, then the normal use of the word is confined to such sentences as express a complete judgment, to what in other words, are called principal sentences. The occurrence of modal inflections of verbs in dependent clauses, must then be explained as derived from the proper functions of the mood; and such use of the mood must be regarded as an abnormal use.

2. *The possible Kinds of Moods.*

If the mood is the proper expression of the copula, then the possible modes of the judgment will determine the possible moods in language. The modes of the judgment are all reducible to three classes,

viz: *those of existence and non-existence;*
of possibility and impossibility; and
of necessity and contingency.

As the modes of necessity and contingency cannot always be distinguished from each other by a mere negative, there seems to be a ground furnished in the very nature of the case, for a distinction of moods in this last class, which does not exist in the two former. Hence there can be but four proper moods in language. If in any particular dialect more are in use, we should expect that two or more would be reducible to one class, or perhaps be specifically but not generically distinct.

3. *The Moods in actual use.*

Before considering the various kinds of modal expression in actual use in speech, a preparatory remark or two seems to be needful in explanation. In the first place, the modal relation is a purely intellectual relation. In this respect it differs from all the other inflections of the verb. All the others originally indicate relations in time or space, or in both. Assuming, what will probably be questioned by no one, that the verb originally expresses a sensible activity, that is, motion in space, it may be easily shown, that voice, tense, number and the other inflections of the verb all denote relations of the activity or motion which lie in time or space. As such they are more easily reducible to forms of language. But the modifications of the judgment or the copula, as real, possible, necessary or contingent, are in their own nature entirely independent of time and space. They have no direct relation to any thing outward. They are pure intellectual abstractions. Hence it is with some difficulty that they are introduced into language at all. In some early languages, we find but two moods, as in the Hebrew. Hence, too, the copula is easily omitted even in more fully developed languages; as "Happy the man," instead of "Happy is the man." "Nulla salus bello." Hence, moreover, a wide diversity in the forms and varieties of modal expression introduced into particular languages. Even when introduced in full, the modal inflection is, sometimes as in the Greek, indicated only by a vowel, the most slippery and unstable of letters, which itself easily vanishes away when euphony will allow, as in the conjugation of Greek verbs in $-\mu$.

In the next place, it should be remarked that the modifications of the copula are expressed in language in various ways, as by adverbs, by proper tense-forms, by periphrastic expressions, as by auxiliaries and inflections.

We find in the Greek language the most philosophically complete and accurate modal system. For the expression of the real and its opposite we have the indicative;—for that of the possible, the subjunctive, as $\epsilon\iota\ \pi\omicron\iota\omega$; quid faciam? what can I do?—for that of the necessary, the imperative;—and for the contingent, the optative, as $\eta\delta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\ \epsilon\iota\pi\omicron\iota\mu\epsilon\upsilon$. The infinitive, as it expresses no copula, has no proper modal force. It is used in dependent clauses to express a mere conception of an activity.

The subjunctive is so named from its more common use, as it occurs most frequently in dependent clauses, although that use

is, strictly, abnormal. The proper denomination of this mood is, the potential. The potential judgment, however, as compared with the real or indicative, needs but rarely to be expressed in speech. The different shades of possibility which it is necessary to express, have readily led to a periphrastic manner of expressing this form of the judgment.

As the potential is closely allied with the future, a possible event being in its nature ever future, absolutely or relatively, we find that the form approaches to that of the future tense, as is still more strikingly the case in the Latin. We discover, moreover, in this view of the subjunctive, the explanation of the fact, that while the subjunctive is used in the first person in exhortation and incitation, in the second and third persons, the optative is preferred in such cases.

The optative is likewise so named from its more frequent use. Yet desire is but a species of the conditional. In the Sanscrit, a still more subordinate species of the conditional judgment, has a particular mood for its expression—the precativē. The optative mood in Greek expresses various conditional judgments besides the strictly optative.

As the potential is naturally allied to the future, so the conditional bears a close affinity to the past in time. Thus the optative in Greek takes the inflections of the historical tenses; and in other languages which have no proper conditional, the tense-forms denoting past time are used; as in Latin, “at fuerat melius, si te puer iste tenebat;” in English, “it would have been better,” etc.

The imperative, on the other hand, as expressing a necessary judgment, looks more to the future; and its inflections and uses indicate this. It affirms the connection between the subject and the activity of the verb as necessary. In the second person, such a judgment would generally convey a command. In the third person, it is used not only to communicate an order, but, also, to predict a future event with emphatic affirmation. It is likewise used in certain kinds of concession, as οὕτως ἔχεται, ὡς οὐ λέγεις. This is much stronger than the indicative or the potential mood would express. It carries the will with the expression as the cause of the effect, which hence must necessarily follow.

The Latin language has no peculiar form for the conditional. The subjunctive is used for the most part to express this as well as the potential form of the judgment. “Quid faciat?” what can he do? “Facerem, si possem,” I would do it, if I could. The

former is a potential, the latter, a conditional judgment. In modern European languages, for the most part, these words are formed by auxiliaries.

4. *The abnormal Use of Moods.*

If the theory we have proposed be correct, then, as before intimated, the use of moods in dependent clauses or in such sentences as make no assertion, must be regarded as abnormal and irregular. A dependent clause expresses no judgment but merely a conception. As the proper function of the verb is to express an activity, while the noun is the proper form for the designation of a being or substance, and as we may have a conception of an activity without affirming anything respecting it, it would be easy and natural, to employ the verb in its own proper form, even where there was no judgment but merely a conception of an activity to be expressed. The infinitive is the proper form for this expression of the activity of the verb, viewed merely as such or as a conception. It is, accordingly, in strict propriety to be regarded as the substantive form of the verb, as the participle is the proper form for the attributive use of the verb.

But, it is obvious, that conceptions of activities may be characterized as to their mode as real, potential, necessary or contingent, as well as judgments. As neither the infinitive nor the participle of itself can express this modality of the conception, resort must be had in language either to periphrastic expressions, as to the use of particles or adverbial clauses, or to a borrowed use of forms originally appropriated to other purposes. Nothing could be more natural than to employ forms which properly denoted modes of judgment, in order to express analogous modes of conceptions. It is in this way, we conceive, that the verb with modal inflections, appears in dependent clauses. It appears in them with these inflections only, as a substitute for the infinitive and participle, combined with such particles or adverbial clauses as might be necessary to express the modality of the conception. As being more brief and therefore possessing more energy, it would readily be used far more frequently than the infinitive or participle, in those languages in which the moods were expressed by mere inflections, or in which the participial forms were defective. Besides, as the representation of a concrete has ever more force in speech than that of a pure abstract, the proper modal forms which always imply a concrete are even preferred to the infinitive or par-

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ticiples which represent mere abstractions. "The man who loves," every body feels to be more energetic than, "The man loving."

It should be remarked here, that sometimes two distinct assertions are contained in the same period. The illative, causal and some adversative conjunctions, thus, often connect phrases or clauses which are both assertive in their character, and of course admit the mood in its proper function. In all such cases, the mood has its proper significance, and is used in accordance with the laws that regulate the use of it in all principal sentences. As some of these conjunctions in the Latin language sometimes show a relation between a conception and an assertion or another conception, as well as between proper assertions, the form of the mood will often determine whether the clause is assertive or not.

In all strictly dependent clauses, then, that is, in such as contain no expressed judgment, the modal form of the verb indicates the modality of the conception as real, potential, necessary or contingent. We have thus the general principle for the use of the mood in such clauses. According as the conception of the activity expressed in the verb is regarded as real, potential, necessary or contingent, the verb in the given case takes the mood which would properly be employed to express a judgment of that particular character.

In illustrating the application of this principle, it will be convenient to distinguish the various purposes for which the verb may be employed in dependent clauses. There are four very distinct purposes for which the verb is so employed; and these several uses of the verb may be denominated, respectively, *the attributive, the substantive, the adverbial and the objective use*.

It is to be remarked, generally, that the Latin language, more than most others, inclines to regard mere conceptions as only possible and not as real. The use of the subjunctive in dependent clauses is thus to be regarded as the law in that language, and the use of the indicative the exception. Hence in the *oratio obliqua* and all similar cases, subordinate clauses depending on other dependent clauses, incline to appear in the subjunctive mood. For all such conceptions are removed farther from the field of reality. When the conception, if entertained by the speaker, might take the indicative, it takes the subjunctive when entertained or supposed to be entertained by others. Here is the explanation of such cases as the following: "*mater irata est mihi, quia non redierim domum.*"—*Plautus*.

As contrasted with the use of the Greek and English tongues,

this principle may be stated thus : The conception of an activity expressed by a verb, is regarded as a *potential* in Latin, and takes the subjunctive unless a reality is clearly to be implied ; in Greek and in English it is regarded as a *real* and takes the indicative, unless a potential or conditional is to be implied. The German follows nearly the analogy of the Latin.

1. *The attributive use of the verb in dependent clauses.* In this use of the verb, the indicative generally prevails even in the Latin, for the conception is generally a real one : " Hannibal male fecit, qui Capuæ hiemavit." In the following sentence, however, the conception not necessarily being regarded as real, the subjunctive is preferred : " Sunt qui censeant una animum et corpus occidere." In the English language, the indicative is used in such cases, unless necessity, potentiality, or contingency is clearly requisite ; as " The Tarquin, who *might have retained* the consulship, but for the jealousy of a people just tasting their new liberty, was the last," etc.

2. *The substantive use.* Instead of the noun we often find the conception of an activity expressed in the form of the verb and constituting the subject or predicate of a sentence. The infinitive is the more proper form for this use ; but the modal inflections frequently occur, not only because modality can be expressed simply only by these, but, also, because the inflected forms are more energetic. In this use, the subjunctive is preferred in the Latin, unless the reality of the conception is to be made prominent : " Non est verisimile, ut Chrysogonus horum literas *adamarit*." Where, however, the verb occurs in a proper case of apposition, we should expect the indicative as in the attributive use of the verb : " Hoc me ipse consolabar, quod non *dubitabam*."

3. *The adverbial use.* Here two specific uses of the verb are to be distinguished. The first is where the verb is employed to modify the copula of the principal verb. In this case, the Latin often takes the subjunctive where the Greek has the indicative, as *εἰ τι εἴχομεν, εἰδόμεν ἄν* ; si quid habuissimus, dedissemus. Indeed, the Latin always take the subjunctive, unless there is a clear implication of the reality of the conception expressed in the dependent verb. If the indicative occurs, it throws at once an emphasis on the *existence* of the conception ; as " si *est* ut dicat velle se, redde." Accordingly, where the principal verb is in the future tense, if the condition on which the truth of its assertion depends, can be separated as a preceding event from the activity of the principal verb, the subjunctive is used ; if however the con-

dition is involved in the main assertion so as to partake of its reality, the indicative is used. Thus, "expectationem facillius vinces, si hoc statueris," but "nunquam labere, si te audies."

The other adverbial use of the verb in a dependent clause is to modify the activity expressed in the verb. These modifications may be distinguished into those of time, place and manner. In all, however, the indicative or subjunctive is used according as the reality or only the possibility or contingency of the activity expressed by the dependent verb is fully to be implied or not. As, "Dum singuli *pugnant*, universi *vincuntur*." "Donec, spectante Vitellio, *interfectus est*." "Sed arma sumere non ante cuiquam moris quam civitas suffecturum *probaverit*." In the sentence, "Male fecit Hannibal qui Capuae *hiemarit*," the subjunctive is used because the fact of Hannibal's having wintered at Capua is intended to be entirely hidden behind the adverbial use of the verb. The expression is equivalent to this: *in so far as he wintered at Capua*. Where, thus, the mere adverbial use of the verb is intended, the subjunctive is always to be preferred.

4. *The objective use of the verb.* As the result of an activity is necessarily conceived of as future, the subjunctive mood as the proper expression of possibility and contingency, is employed in denoting the object of the verb. Here the Latin language always carefully distinguishes the objective from the attributive force of the verb. Where the indicative would be employed in the latter case, the subjunctive is found in the former; and the use of the one or the other determines the intention of the writer. As in the sentence, "praemisit in urbem edictum, quo vocabulum Augusti differeret, Caesaris non reciperet," etc., the use of the subjunctive shows that the edict not merely contained the intelligence of the fact that the title of Augustus was spread abroad, but that it was sent for that very purpose. The use of the indicative would intimate nothing as to the intent or object of the edict; but merely that the delay to take the title was incidentally communicated in it.

Sometimes the verb when it is used to modify a noun, or is attributive, yet takes the objective form, and is then put in the subjunctive; as "neque sum in hac opinione, ut credam." The adverbial form, sometimes, cloaks an objective sense, and accordingly takes the subjunctive: "Nam se quoque moveri interim finget, ut pro Rabirio Postumo Cicero, dum aditum sibi ad aures *faciat*, et auctoritatem *induat* vera sentientis," etc.; where "dum faciat" is to be rendered "in order to make."

The reason for the use of the subjunctive in the objective clause obviously does not exist after verbs of affirming and the like, as *Dicam quod sentio*. This may, indeed, be regarded as an attributive use of the verb.

The foregoing illustrations will suffice to explain the meaning and application of the principle we have proposed. This is our object in adducing them, and not to extend the induction, so far as might be thought necessary in order to establish, beyond doubt, the correctness of the view we have taken.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CONSISTENCY OF THE ETERNAL PURPOSES OF GOD WITH THE FREE AGENCY OF MEN.

By Rev. J. W. Ward, Abington, Mass.

ONE of the most plausible objections ever urged against the doctrine of God's eternal purposes, is its alleged inconsistency with man's freedom of action. As this objection is, probably, more frequently advanced and more sensibly felt than any other, it may not be amiss to give it a careful examination. And it may be proper to remark at the outset, that the objection lies with as much force against the government and overruling agency of God, as against the doctrine of his eternal purposes. I would then ask those who object to the doctrine of the divine decrees on the supposed ground, that it is inconsistent with the free agency of man: do you believe that God reigns in the natural and moral world—that he does all his pleasure in the armies of heaven above and among the inhabitants of this lower world? If not, you have dethroned the monarch of the universe. You have taken from him his sceptre and driven him from his kingdom. You are, to all intents and purposes, an atheist. You do not believe in the existence of a perfect moral Governor of the world. And the first question to be discussed with you must be,—not, has God from eternity formed a perfect plan of government? has he foreordained whatsoever comes to pass?—but, is there a perfect God who reigns on the throne of the universe? But if, on the other hand, you admit this truth, if you admit that God does

reign and govern the universe, doing his pleasure in heaven and upon the earth, then I would ask: do you believe that this government of God is consistent with man's free moral agency? If you say, "No," then you cannot believe in man's free moral agency. You have therefore no right to offer, as an objection to the divine decrees, the supposed fact that they are inconsistent with man's free moral agency. You do not believe that man is a free moral agent. And if he is not, then the doctrine of the divine decrees may be true, even though it be inconsistent with the free agency of man. It is only inconsistent with a falsehood (i. e. with what you believe to be a falsehood), and may therefore well be true, for truth is inconsistent with falsehood. Instead therefore of bringing objections against the doctrine of the divine decrees, you ought to receive it as truth. But if, on the other hand, you say, "Yes," then I would ask you to reconcile your belief in God's universal government and overruling agency with your belief in man's free moral agency. And when you have gone through with the work and wrought out the problem, you may, by the very same process, demonstrate the consistency of God's decrees with man's freedom of action. If God governs the world he certainly *chooses* to do it. He chooses to perform what he does perform. And now, if you suppose this choice to have been *eternal*, you have the doctrine of the divine purposes or decrees, for all that is meant by this doctrine is, that God in eternity purposed to perform all that he actually does perform in time. And if God may *perform* what he does perform and man still be free, then he may *purpose*—and he may *eternally* purpose to perform what he does perform, and man still be free. The great difficulty, in fact the whole difficulty on this subject, lies in the work of reconciling God's agency with man's agency. And you admit that God rules throughout the universe and does all his pleasure. And you admit, too, man's freedom of action. You must therefore, and you do, admit the consistency of God's agency with man's free agency. If the two things are facts, as you believe, they must, of course, be consistent with each other. And when you have shown *how* they are consistent, you have solved the problem of the consistency of God's purposes with human freedom; for man's freedom, if infringed on in any way, is infringed on, not by what God *purposes*, but by what he *does*. If then you have relieved your own system from embarrassment on this point, you have relieved ours also. If you have ascertained how God may *do* all that he does do and man still be free, you have also ascertained

how he may purpose—and *eternally* purpose to do all he does do and man still be free. If you have not as yet seen *how* these two parts of your own system harmonize with each other,—if you say they are both truths, but still there is something dark about them, something a little mysterious, something which you do not fully understand, that you believe they *are* consistent, though you cannot precisely see *how* they are so, then I say, you ought not to ask us to do your work for you, and relieve your system from a difficulty which you are not able yourselves to remove, or to shed light on a point in your system which you admit is enveloped in darkness. Yet in asking us to remove the darkness which you think rests on this point in our system, you do ask us also to remove that which you admit rests on the same point in your own. Is this reasonable? Is it reasonable to bring against the doctrine of the divine purposes an objection which lies with equal or greater force against the truth of the divine government, a truth which you fully admit? If, notwithstanding this objection, you believe in the fact of the divine government, may you not also believe in the doctrine of the divine decrees? If the darkness which rests on one point in your own system is no bar to your believing your system, then surely the same darkness—for the darkness is no denser in our system than in yours—the same darkness, on the same point in our system, can be no bar to your believing our system. Is it not thus plainly evident, that those who believe in the government and overruling agency of God, cannot consistently object to the doctrine of the divine decrees on the ground that the doctrine is inconsistent with the free moral agency of man?

But though they cannot *consistently* make this objection, still they and others *do* make it. It may be well therefore to ask whether they have any good reason for making it. If they say that the doctrine of the divine decrees is inconsistent with man's free moral agency, it would seem as though they must have some good evidence of this inconsistency. It has been so long and so often asserted that an inconsistency does exist between the two, that it would seem as though somebody must have ascertained precisely where this inconsistency lies and be able to point it out to others. Yet, strange as it may appear, this has never been done. The existence of an inconsistency somewhere between the two, has been reiterated again and again, but when the inquiry has been made: "*where* is the inconsistency? let us see it, point it out to us and show us precisely where it lies;" no one has been able to put his finger on it or tell exactly where it is to

be found. All the answer we can get from the objector is, "Why, there must be an inconsistency somewhere, I *feel* that there is one. If God has foreordained man's actions, man *cannot* be free." But *why*, we ask, can he not be free? And the answer is, "I cannot exactly tell *why*, but I feel that he cannot be free. It is a dark metaphysical subject, and I cannot tell precisely *where* the inconsistency is, but I have no more doubt that there is one than I have that I am alive." Now is it not a very strange, a very suspicious circumstance, that no one has ever been able to tell where this inconsistency lies and point it out to others? When its existence has been so often and so long asserted, does not the fact that no one has yet been able to ferret it out of its secret lurking place and bring it clearly into view, cast ominous conjecture on its reality of being? What should we think of the man who should tell us he was troubled with a severe pain, but he could not say precisely where the pain was. He rather thought it was in his head, but still it might be in his feet. At any rate he was certain that he had a severe pain somewhere, though he could not always really feel it, or tell precisely where it was. Should we in such a case be very unreasonable if we had some faint doubts whether there might not, after all, be a mistake as to the real existence of the pain. And when no one can tell where the inconsistency between God's purposes and man's freedom lies, have we not some reason to question whether there be any? A *man* may purpose to regulate in various particulars the conduct of a child, and may actually do it; and still, as all will admit, the child may act freely in what he does. The influences employed by the man may be such that all will concede that the child acts freely. No inconsistency can be seen, none will be affirmed to exist between the guiding agency of the man and the freedom of the child. But when *God* purposes to direct in certain particulars the conduct of a man and actually does it, it is thought that the case is different, and that there is an inconsistency between God's purposes and agency and man's freedom of action. But when you ask the objector why there is any more inconsistency in the one case than in the other, or where the inconsistency is, he is utterly unable to inform you. He feels that there is an inconsistency, but he cannot tell *where* it is. He feels that the decrees of God do lay him under a necessity of action, but he can't tell *how* they do it. There is a necessity, he feels that there is, but he does not exactly *feel* *necessitated* to act, and he cannot say precisely *where* a necessity is on him, but he fully

believes there is one somewhere. He is in the same predicament with the man who did not really feel the pain, nor could he tell in what part of his body it was, but he had no doubt of its existence. Now when this is the state of the case, have we not some reason to doubt whether there is any inconsistency between God's purposes and man's free agency? Is it not reasonable that we insist on having it pointed out to us before we are required to remove it; as reasonable as it would be for a physician to demand that the locality of a pain should be designated before he were required to prescribe for its removal? It certainly is not enough that we be pointed to a dark spot in the doctrine and told, "why, there it is, covered up in that darkness." We ask, "has any body ever seen it there?" And in reply it is said, "why, no indeed, how could you expect any body should see it when it is in a dark place." We ask, and it is but right that we insist on an answer, "how then do you know it is there?" And when no good reason is given for the belief that it really exists there, have we not as much reason to question its existence as the parent has when his child says, "I do not wish to go out of doors in the dark, there is a lion there," to doubt whether the lion exists anywhere else than in the child's imagination? And may we not justly demand that the lion be shown us before we are required to attack and destroy it? Still we will waive this right and proceed to enquire whether there is any inconsistency between God's purposes and the free agency of his moral subjects.

I presume it will be admitted, that if the purposes of God interfere with man's freedom of action, they do it in one of the following ways: first, by an efficacious power in the purposes themselves necessitating their accomplishment; or secondly, by an agency which, in consequence of his purposes, God employs in bringing such a *special* influence on the minds of men as necessarily and irresistibly secures the fulfilment of his purposes; or thirdly, by an agency he employs, in so ordering the circumstances and condition of men and the motives or *common* influences which operate on their minds, as to necessitate them to act in accordance with his purposes; or finally, by producing a *certainty* that the actions of men will correspond with the purposes of God, a certainty which leaves men no liberty of choice, no freedom of action. Let us inquire, then, if man's freedom is destroyed in any of these ways.

1. Do the mere purposes of God possess any inherent power to accomplish themselves? Do they by an immediate energy

efficiently produce all the acts of men and matter necessary to their accomplishment? This is not our view of the mode in which God executes his decrees. We suppose he does it partly by his own immediate action, partly by the action of the powers or properties he has given to matter, and partly by the voluntary conduct of his moral subjects performed in the unfettered use of those powers of free agency with which he has endowed them; i. e. he executes them by his "works of creation and providence." And we suppose the work of providence to differ from that of creation. This objection then does not touch our system. There are indeed those who adopt the theory that the purposes of God do by an immediate energy cause or *create* all the moral actions of men, and as they believe the doctrine of the divine purposes, they must meet and answer this objection as they best can. We have no such theory, and, of course, have nothing to do in removing an objection drawn from a theory which we do not adopt. Is it said that whether we adopt the theory or not, it is true, and we ought to adopt it and meet the objections that lie against it? What then is the evidence of its truth? Is it drawn from *analogy*? But when a man forms a purpose to build a house, does the mere purpose accomplish the work? does it build the house? It may lie for months or years inactive in his bosom. It is not till he puts forth an active energy and engages in the work, that the house is reared. And may it not be so with the divine purposes? Are they not eternal? Did they not lie for countless ages inactive in the mind of God? And was not something more than the mere purpose, some active energy accompanying the dormant purpose, necessary in order to the production of results? Can any one show that there was not? If not, then it cannot be proved that the purposes of God by any inherent and immediate power, effect their accomplishment and necessitate human action. It may be that God has created moral agents who will, without any compelling influence from his purposes, fulfil his decrees of their own free will. It is not absolutely denied here that the volitions of God do, at times, act as causes producing their appropriate effects. It may have been so in the creation of matter, though even this cannot be proved. But, supposing it so, does the Deity thus accomplish *all* his purposes? Look at analogy again. How does man effect his purposes? Sometimes by his own immediate action. Sometimes through the medium of the laws of nature. And sometimes by the voluntary agency of other beings. So is it with the merchant and manufacturer. And may not God

accomplish his purposes in the same way? Analogy then surely affords no evidence that the purposes of God by a power inherent in themselves effect their own accomplishment. Can any evidence of the truth of this theory be found in *human experience*? Has any one felt a resistless creative force from the purposes of God pressing on his will and necessitating his volitions? Has even one of all the multitudes of the human species ever said that he had consciously experienced it? Has a single instance of this kind ever been found among the millions who now live and act on the earth, or in all the generations of the past? But if all have experienced it, could not some one have been conscious of it? And if instead of feeling a compelling or restraining influence from the purposes of God, mankind have, on the other hand, universally felt free, must we not believe that no such influence exists, and that they are in reality free? Must we not just as fully believe it as we believe that men are not destitute of the power of memory, but really possess that faculty? We have the same evidence in the one case as in the other. We have felt, we have used,—*all* have felt and used their power of memory, and all have felt and used their power of choice, their freedom of will. There is no evidence then, from analogy or human experience, that the voluntary acts of men are necessitated by an inherent energy of the divine purposes, but the very best evidence to the contrary. And therefore we cannot believe that the purposes of God do, by their own productive energy, compel human action. Notwithstanding any inherent power of production which they may possess, man is still free. His voluntary acts are all his own, and his own by his own free choice. He has the same evidence of it that he has of the existence of any of his mental powers or acts. And being thus his own, thus wholly his own, he may be justly, and he will be held responsible for them. They are not God's acts, caused or necessitated by God. They are wholly man's. God's purposes are his own, and the honor of them and of all their influence he is ready to take on himself. He claims it all to himself. And man's volitions are as free as God's, and his voluntary conduct is entirely his own. And the glory or the shame of it all must attach and inseparably cleave to *himself alone* forever.

2. Does God, in consequence of his purposes, employ a *special influence on men* to secure the accomplishment of his purposes, *an influence which destroys or impairs their freedom of will*? He doubtless exerts an influence on the minds of men. So one

man is continually exerting an influence on the minds of his fellow men. And if liberty of choice is compatible with the latter influence (which all will admit), it may be also with the former. And God may indeed sometimes exert what may be termed a *special* influence on the human mind. But the question is, does this special divine influence subvert human freedom? And certainly there is no evidence that it does. The Bible declares no such thing. Human consciousness teaches no such thing. Reason intimates no such thing. And many of those who deny the doctrine of the divine decrees, admit that a *special* divine influence by the Holy Spirit is consistent with free agency. There is no evidence then that any special divine influence ever impairs human freedom. But there is, as we have already seen, evidence that it does not; for every human being has in himself an abiding consciousness of his own freedom. He has in himself the surest evidence that he is free. And the Bible always recognizes the fact that he is so. And God, *as far as we can see*, always deals with men as with free agents. And if he uses any *special* influence upon them, we may analogically conclude that, in using it, he deals with them, as he does in all other cases, in perfect consistency with their freedom of choice and action. This conclusion we are bound to form, unless we have some evidence that, in this particular case, he deviates from his usual method of dealing with his moral creatures. But there is no such evidence, not a particle of it. We have no reason to suppose then, that he uses any special influence on men which destroys their freedom. For aught any one can affirm to the contrary, his decrees may all be fulfilled without his being shut up to the necessity of employing, in order to secure their accomplishment, special and necessitating influence on the human will. He may, through the agency of the Holy Spirit, use a special influence on men, and it may secure the fulfilment of his purposes by securing human action; but it secures only *right* action. And it leaves them free to act right or not. It cannot be shown to possess any *irresistible* force. It may be *unresisted*. It may convert the soul. It may lead the subject of it in the ways of piety and religion. It may do this in perfect consistency with his freedom of will. He may choose the service of God, he may choose the ways of piety just as freely as he would if prompted by any common influences, just as freely as he would if no special divine influence were on him. There is no possible evidence that he may not. He is free to choose and competent to choose the ways of duty either with or without

this influence. Without it indeed he never *will* make this choice. So inspiration teaches. But, if given, it necessitates no action. It infringes on none of his powers of free action. It may secure right action. And so, with holy beings, may *common* influences. It is a boon for which he cannot be too grateful. If cherished and followed it will renew and sanctify and save the soul. If resisted, as it may be, and expelled from his mind, it will aggravate his doom and sink him to the lowest depths of perdition. But the work of resistance will be all his own, the guilt will be his own, and the awful consequences, the dire results, in unmitigated and unremitted agony, must be his own forever.

3. Does God, in consequence of his purposes, employ an agency in so ordering the circumstances and condition of men, and the motives or *common* influences which operate on their minds, as to necessitate them to act in accordance with his purposes? He does order the lot of men. He brings them into being. He appoints the time and place and circumstances of their birth. He provides the influences which fall on their minds and tend to form their characters. But this agency it is, from the nature of the case, necessary for him to employ. And not only so, but it leaves man's freedom wholly unimpaired. It does not resistlessly secure human volition. True, man does not order the circumstances of his own birth and life. But it is not requisite to freedom of choice, that a person himself provide the influences which affect or secure his volitions. The motives to choice may be presented by others in perfect consistency with his freedom. All that is requisite is, that when these influences or motives are upon him, he have full power to choose contrary to their impulsion. If he only possess this power he is perfectly free. These influences and motives he *cannot* always provide for himself. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that he should do it. He cannot order the circumstances of his own birth. He cannot say who his parents shall be, or what their character. These things must all be determined before his existence, and therefore it is impossible for *him* to do it. God or some other being must do it for him. God or some other being must order the circumstances and motives which lead to the *first* choice of every human being. He cannot order them himself without *choosing* to do it. And to suppose him to choose to do it, would be to suppose him to have a choice *before* his *first* choice, which is absurd. And besides, he could not choose to do it unless there were some motives prompting to the choice. And these motives he could not provide without again

choosing to do it. And he would need motives again for this choice, and so on *ad infinitum*. The influences then which lead to the *first* choice of every human being must be ordered by some other one than himself. And in the case of the first created being they must have been ordered by God. If then God may not order the circumstances and influences which lead to choice, and man still be free, then free moral action in created beings is in the nature of things utterly impossible. The *first* free act can never be performed. It would thus be put out of the power of Omnipotence to create a free moral agent; for that agent must necessarily be influenced in his first choice by motives, and those motives could not be of his own providing, they must have been provided by God. But we must admit that God can make a free agent, or else the objection against the divine decrees, that they destroy man's free agency, is utterly absurd. It asserts that the decrees destroy what does not exist and what cannot be brought into existence even by Omnipotence itself. But if free moral agency is a possible thing, if free moral agents can be created by God, then they may be free and yet the influences that lead to their first choice may be provided by God. The fact that he, in this case, provides these influences, does not then destroy their freedom of will. And if God may provide the influences that lead to the *first* choice and man still be free, he may also provide those that lead to the second and third and all the choices, and man still be free. If God's agency and man's free agency are consistent in the first case, they are in the second and in all subsequent cases. God may then *always* supply the influences and *all* the influences which prompt to choice; he may order all the circumstances of his moral subjects and the motives which guide their conduct; he may reign supreme in the armies of heaven above and among the inhabitants of the earth, and yet their freedom of action remain wholly unimpaired and unmolested.

Men *may* then be free notwithstanding God orders all the circumstances and motives that influence their conduct. *Are* they thus free? They surely are unless these motives possess a causative power which necessarily produces human action. Do they possess any such power? Do the *purposes* of God impart to them any such power? There is no evidence that they do. There is none from *the nature* of the divine purposes. A purpose is a mere mental act. But a mental act does not necessarily change the character of an object without the mind, or impart to it any new quality. The thought of fire does not change the character of

fire. Nor can we find in the nature of the divine purposes anything which must exert such an influence on human motives, as to alter their original character, and give them a necessitating power over the will. Is there then any evidence from *analogy* that the purposes of God impart any causative power to motives? The purpose of a master mechanic to direct the conduct of his operatives, communicates no new power to the motives he employs to effect his purpose. That power all existed in the motives previous to his forming the purpose. So is it in all other cases where one man forms purposes which respect the voluntary actions of others. And surely no one has *experienced* in himself a change in the motives which were pressing on his own mind, a change by which they acquired a necessitating force, and a change which he could distinctly trace to the divine decrees as its cause. And no one has ever *observed* any such event. And the *Scriptures* nowhere teach that the purposes of God effect a change in the native character of motives, imparting to them a power of necessitating human volition. There is then no shadow of evidence that they ever do it. Does God then, in order to the fulfilment of his purposes, impart any such power to motives? He nowhere tells us that he does. And no one has ever seen him do it, or known of his doing it. Do motives then possess *in themselves* a causative energy? Have they any inherent power of compelling human action? But what if they have? In that case it surely is not the decrees of God, but the nature of motives, that destroys human freedom. If, then, motives possess inherently any necessitating energy, even supposing that God has formed no purposes, mankind are utterly divested of the attribute of free agency, and are all subject to the iron dominion of motives. By the unyielding force of motives they are all driven along the pathway of human life, with as little power of effectual resistance, as the dust of the street when swept by the wind. But motives possess in themselves no such compelling force. If they do, there is no such thing as free agency in the universe, and there can be none. It is vain, therefore, to object to the decrees of God, that they are inconsistent with free agency, for there is no such fact as the free agency of man.

We find, then, no evidence that motives possess a resistless, causative power, but rather the reverse. In an inferior sense, viz. that of prompting influences, not that of necessitating powers, they may be called causes. They are in truth only the *prerequisites*, not the *compulsory causes* of choice. They are

necessary to all choices, but they never necessitate any choice. They afford an opportunity of choosing one way or another, but do not compel a man to choose one way rather than another, or to choose at all. They are necessary to free agency or free action, but they do not force any action. The agent, notwithstanding he feels the full power of motives, is left perfectly free to choose or not to choose, and to choose one way or its opposite. God always treats men as if it were so. They always treat each other as if it were so. They always act in laying out their own plans as if it were so. They know by their own consciousness that it is so. And if it is so, mankind are free, though God does order their circumstances and condition and provide the motives which prompt their volitions and actions. The agency of God leaves their free agency wholly unmolested. He acts freely in his department of action, and they as freely in theirs. He is free in so ordering their life and lot that such and such motives fall on their minds, and they as free in choosing in coincidence with or in opposition to these motives. God's agency in bringing motives to bear on the human mind, no more compels choice than the agency of one man in presenting motives to others to prompt them to a specific course of action, forces their action. Men act just as free under those common influences which the agency or providence of God presents before them, and through which they are led to fulfil his purposes, as they would under any prompting influence which the agency of a fellow man might supply. The one is no more compulsory than the other. If men are free when persuaded to action by a fellow man, (and they know they are,) they are also free when excited to action by the influences which God has thrown around and upon them. God's agency, then, in executing his decrees by ordering the circumstances of their lot and bringing motives to bear on their minds, leaves them perfectly free in their choices and actions. Notwithstanding this agency, they, as we have seen, may be and are entirely free. When, therefore, by their voluntary conduct, they bring evil on themselves, they cannot complain of the circumstances in which they are placed or the influences which urged them to action and over which they had no control. They cannot say that these must bear the blame of their sins. The providence of God has never forced any man to commit a single sin. The agency of God in presenting motives before him has never done it. The whole black catalogue of his sins was his *own* work, his *freely-chosen* work, his much-loved work. In eve-

ry act of sin, no matter what the influence upon him, he felt that he was free. He knew that he was free. And therefore it was, that conscience laid the charge of guilt on his soul. She never allowed it to be cast upon the circumstances in which he was placed, or the influences upon him, or the agency of others, men, angels or God. She laid it on his own soul and fastened it inseparably there. She did it because he was free in his guilty conduct, and because he knew he was free. Had he not been free, she neither would nor could have done it. But there she has laid it, and there it will lie, an amply sufficient, an abiding, ever present, and painful proof that, notwithstanding any influence which the agency or providence of God may throw upon the minds of men, all their choices and actions are perfectly free and wholly their own.

4. Do the divine purposes produce a *certainty* that the actions of men will correspond with those purposes, a *certainty* which leaves men no liberty of choice, no freedom of action? Do the purposes of God deprive men of their freedom, by rendering it certain that they will so act as to fulfil his purposes?

Is it said that men *always* choose in accordance with the divine purposes, that they *never* deviate from them and that therefore they cannot be free to do it? But does it follow because a person always acts in a particular way, that he has no power to act otherwise, or that he is compelled to act as he does? Here is a man who has *always* lived in his native State. Does this fact prove that he has been compelled to live there, that he has had no power to go out of it? Angels have always practised holiness. Does this prove that they are compelled to do it? that they have no natural power to sin? Uniformity of conduct only proves stability of character, not compulsion of action. And suppose men should act *contrary* to the purposes of God. You must admit that, in such a case, they would be free. But they would be no freer than they are in acting in accordance with his purposes. If so, in what respect? Not in having more ability of choice. Not in having less or more motive to choice. Not in *having* more power to choose contrary to God's purposes, but simply in *using* this power. But freedom does not consist in *using* our powers of choice but in *possessing* them. Freedom is not the *actual* choosing or the power of choosing in one way *rather* than another, (e. g. of choosing in opposition to, rather than in accordance with the divine purposes,) but the power to choose at all. The being that *CAN choose*, that can make an election, that can take one

course or its opposite, or neither, where the nature of the case admits of his taking neither, that being is free. He is just as free if he chooses and acts as another being wishes him to do, as he is if he chooses and acts contrary to that other being's wishes or purposes. And man is just as free, if his volitions and conduct correspond with the purposes of God, as he would be if they all ran counter to the divine purposes. He *has* the power to choose contrary to these purposes.¹ And whether he *uses* this power or not, makes no difference in respect to his being free. He *has* the power, and the possession of it gives him all the freedom of choice that any being can justly ask for, or possibly conceive of or obtain.

Is it said that if all events are decreed, they are *certain* to be, and that they therefore must be and cannot be avoided, and so man is not free to leave them undone? This form of the objection assumes, that certainty destroys freedom, that the certainty of an event necessitates the event. But is it so? If so, how? Certainty has reference to knowledge. That which is fully *known*, is certain. Certainty may relate to *past* events as well as to *future* ones. I may say, "It is certain that he *has* done it," as well as, "It is certain that he *will* do it." But though the word *certainly* refers mainly to knowledge, yet it also implies the *reality* of an event. It implies, when used in reference to a future event, that the event will without fail come to pass. It implies, in other words, that the event *will* be, for that evidently will be which it is known or it is certain will be. Now if the certainty of a future event is inconsistent with human freedom in the production of that event, it must be so, it would seem, either because foreknowledge and human freedom are inconsistent, or because the fact that an event will really be, is inconsistent with human freedom in producing it. Does foreknowledge then interfere with human liberty? Not at all. Every man in as far as is possible, foreknows his own purposes and conduct. He foreknows what he shall, under particular circumstances, purpose and perform. But this foreknowledge does not interfere with his freedom. It does not compel his choices or actions. And a man may, in certain particulars, foreknow the conduct of his neighbor, he may be informed of it, or he may ascertain it from circumstances, and yet that neighbor's conduct be perfectly free. The foreknowledge of the one does not produce the action, nor necessitate the action, nor

¹ Men always have natural power to frustrate those divine decrees which they are appointed to fulfil."—*Emmons's Works*, Vol. IV. 304.

have any influence at all upon the action of the other. Just so it is in respect to God's foreknowledge. It leaves men free, perfectly free, free to choose and free to act. They are just as free as they would be, if he were perfectly ignorant how they would act. His foreknowledge no more necessitates their action or causes it to be as it is, than man's foreknowledge of an eclipse necessitates or causes the eclipse. The eclipse would occur whether men foreknew it or not. So, in as far as any productive influence from the mere foreknowledge of God is concerned, their conduct would be the same whether foreknown by God or not. His foreknowledge has no influence whatever in producing their conduct. It would be just what it is, all other influences remaining the same, even if he had not foreknown it. God's foreknowledge then is not inconsistent with the freedom of men. They are precisely as free with it, as they would be without it. It is an act of God's own mind, and unless revealed, exerts no influence on any one but himself. It leaves them just where it finds them, in the full and unrestrained use of their powers of volition and action.

Is then the fact that an event will really be, inconsistent with human freedom in producing it? No; for foreknowledge implies that it will really be; and if foreknowledge does not interfere with free agency, then what is implied in foreknowledge cannot. The mere fact that an event will be, has no influence on the production of that event. It does not determine how the event is to be brought to pass, whether by compulsory or free agency. It has no reference whatever to the manner in which the event is to be produced. And yet, if human freedom is impaired, it must be done by the manner in which events are produced, not by the fact, that they come to pass or will come to pass; for future events *will* come to pass whether they are compulsory or free. It must be done by some influence on the will, necessitating its action. But the mere fact that an event will be, does not exert any such influence. It exerts no influence at all. It is perfectly inefficient. The fact that the universe was to be created, evidently did not create it, nor in any way necessitate its creation, nor exert any influence in creating it. But for the creative energy of God, exerted at the appointed time, the world never would have had an existence. And that energy was freely put forth. The fact that the work of creation was to be done, did not compel God to do it. No more does the fact that events are to take place through human instrumentality, necessitate their existence or compel

men to produce them. It leaves the manner in which they are to be brought about wholly untouched and undetermined. And if so, the certainty of future events is perfectly compatible with human freedom in their production. And though the purposed conduct of men is certain, still mankind are free and accountable in what they do. Their conduct is their own. It is freely performed. They might have refused to perform it. Notwithstanding the certainty of its occurrence, they had the ability to make the refusal. But they chose to perform it. They did it freely. And if the conduct is wrong they must bear the guilt of it. They cannot lay it upon the purposes of God. It does not belong there. It will not lie there. It slides off when put there, and falls back upon their own heads; and there it must lie as a heavy burden, as long as the consciousness and the fact of their freedom remains; there it must lie, unless the God they provoke, by changing the guilt of their conduct on his decrees, takes off the burden and nails it to the cross of Christ.

Let us look at the objection, that God's decrees produce certainty and that certainty implies necessity, in the light of facts, and we shall find that it lies as much against prophecy as against the doctrine of the divine purposes. Whatever is foretold is certain. It is *foreknown*, and it also will *really come* to pass. Both these circumstances then, the *foreknowledge* of the event and the reality of its future occurrence, lie in the way of prophecy. And yet the conduct of men in a multitude of instances has been foretold. Take for examples, the conduct of Pharaoh in refusing to let Israel go, of the Jews in rejecting and crucifying Christ, and of Peter in denying him. Now it was certain that these individuals would act just as they did act. And if certainty necessitates human conduct, then their conduct was necessary and could not have been avoided. But God treated them as free. He called their conduct wicked. He blamed them for it, and punished them for it. But he could not justly have done this and he would not have done it, had they not been free. Just as surely then as God is a God of justice, certainty is compatible with human freedom. Besides, this objection is adduced to disprove the doctrine of the divine decrees. It runs thus, "men's actions, if decreed, are certain and therefore necessary, hence it cannot be that they are decreed." But this argument proves too much. Apply it to prophecy and it is, "men's actions if foretold are certain and therefore necessary; hence it cannot be that they ever are foretold." But we know well that they are foretold. We find them often fore-

told in the Bible. The certainty of the occurrence of an event is then no objection to the divine decrees. It lies no more heavily against God's decrees than against his prophetic announcements. If it disproves the doctrine of decrees, it also disproves the fact of prophecy. If it destroys the free agency of moral beings in one case, it does so in the other also. But in truth it does so in neither case. The fact that events are certain, that they are foreknown and really to be, leaves the question *how* they are to be brought into existence, whether by free agency or by necessitating causes, wholly undetermined. They are certain whether produced in one way or the other. If they are *voluntary* acts, then they are certain, i. e. foreknown and really to be, as *free* acts. And if their certainty, i. e. their being foreknown and really to be, necessitates their existence (which it does *not*), it also necessitates their existence as *free* acts, or it in other words necessitates their freedom. The certainty of an event then is not inconsistent with its freedom. It may be certain and yet be brought to pass by the perfectly free action of perfectly free agents.

Again, if certainty does destroy human freedom, then human freedom would be destroyed whether God has formed any purposes or not. If he has formed no purposes, still he either foresees all that actually takes place or he does not foresee it. If he *does* foresee it, then it is all certain. Whatever he foresees, will certainly come to pass. So then the objection does not lie against the doctrine of the divine decrees. It exists whether that doctrine be true or not. Its whole weight bears rather on the prescience than on the purposes of God.

But if to escape this horn of the dilemma it should be maintained, that God would not foresee future events unless he first decreed them, still the events that were to be, would as *truly* be, as if he had decreed and foreseen them. They would as *really* be, they would as *truly* come to pass, as when decreed and foreseen; they would *certainly* take place. In the one case they would certainly, in the other they would really or truly come to pass. The difference between the two cases surely cannot be great. It cannot be so great but that if the certainty in the one case would necessitate the events and destroy the agency, the *fact* that particular events were future and would really come to pass, would necessitate their occurrence and destroy free agency in the other case. And as there was a point in eternity when *all* events were *future*, as, in fact, they are all future till they actually occur, it follows, on this supposition that all events are ne-

cessary, and there is no freedom in the universe and can be none. In short, if certainty implies necessity, then it follows, first, that no free agents can possibly be created; for God foresees all events and so they are all certain, or at least all future events will truly and really come to pass. And these events which are really to occur, might be seen to be future before they occur, as well as they can be known to be past after they have occurred, i. e. they might be foreseen and therefore certain, if any being only had the means of foreseeing them. But it can in no way be shown that the non-existence of these means secures a freedom of choice to men, which would be destroyed if these means were in being. The fact that these events are really to come to pass, that they truly will be, it is this fact (if anything) which destroys human freedom. And if certainty precludes free agency, this fact precludes it too. But it is a fact that all future events will really and truly occur; it always has been a fact; it always will be a fact. And if this fact precludes free agency, then free agency is in the nature of things impossible. A free agent is necessarily excluded from the catalogue of beings that Omnipotence *can* create. And if certainty implies necessity, it follows, secondly, that God himself is not a free agent, for he foresees all his own future actions and so they are certain; or, if he does not foresee them, still they will *really* be just *as* they will be, and this fact, it must be allowed, as much destroys his freedom as his foreseeing his future actions would do it. So then there is, on this supposition, no such thing as freedom for men, angels, or God; there can be none, but relentless iron fate reigns triumphant throughout the universe. Such are some of the formidable consequences of supposing that the certainty of future actions is inconsistent with free agency in performing them. Who would willingly, and who could reasonably admit these consequences for a moment? If none, then all must allow that the certainty of events and the free agency of men in producing them, are perfectly compatible with each other.

We have thus endeavored to exhaust the methods in which the divine decrees may be supposed to destroy the free agency of men. We have seen, that in neither of the four ways contemplated, (and we know of no others supposable,) can they be shown to accomplish this bad work. We cannot then believe that they do it. We see no conceivable way in which they can do it. Mankind then must be regarded as free and treated as free, notwithstanding their conduct is all included in the purposes

of God. His purposes in no supposable way contravene their freedom. The grand difficulty in regard to this whole matter is, that mankind too generally confound the meaning of the words "certainty" and "necessity." They will not distinguish between an event which is only certain and one which is necessary; in other words, between an event which will be or which it is known will be, and one which must be. The confusion which prevails in many minds on this one point is the ground of nearly all their mistakes and difficulties respecting human freedom. God's purposes imply only the certainty not the necessity of future events. There is a plain difference between what is necessary and what is only certain, and this difference ought to be seen and remembered. That is necessary which must be; that is certain which will be or rather which some being knows will be. Now there is a difference, as every one can easily see, between my saying that "I must do a thing," and saying that "I will do it" or that "it is known that I will do it." "I must do it," implies that there may be some force compelling my action. I might say, "I must go," if I were dragged along by superior force. "I will do it," may imply great freedom, a consciousness of that freedom, and a use of that freedom, perhaps even in overcoming resistances which lie in the way of doing the thing purposed. I might say, "I will go, whatever may be said to the contrary." There is a difference between saying of an event, "it must be," and saying merely "it will be," or "it is known that it will be." "It must be," implies that there are causes at work which will necessarily and resistlessly bring the event to pass. "It will be" or "it is known that it will be," implies no such compulsion. It leaves the manner in which the future event is to be brought about wholly undetermined. It asserts simply and solely, that the event is future, is known to be so, and will take place. It may take place by the action of a necessitating cause, or it may take place by the free agency of God or of some of his creatures. Let this distinction between necessity and certainty, this distinction between what has sometimes been called natural and moral necessity, be clearly apprehended and always kept in sight, and the difficulties with which this subject has been embarrassed, would nearly all be removed. And let the heart cheerfully submit to the great truth, that God reigns throughout the universe according to his own good pleasure, and the remaining darkness would soon flee away. The illuminated mind would then see men not as trees walking, but walking and acting as *men* in the full, free, and unfettered use of all their bodily, mental and moral powers.

ARTICLE V.

POWER IN THE PULPIT.

By Edwards A. Park, Bartlet Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary.

THERE are some who dislike the phrase, 'power in the pulpit.' They think that it derogates from the honor of him who saith, "not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit." The sacred Scriptures, however, attribute an efficacy to the whole word of God, and in a special degree to his gospel; why then may not we ascribe a like efficacy to this word, to this gospel, when *preached*, or which is the same thing, a kind of power to the pulpit? This is indeed a secondary power, one which worketh upon hearers while God worketh in them; but although subordinate to the influences of the Holy Ghost, although dependent upon them for all its success, it is still an energy, an effective instrument, or an instrumental efficiency. That absolute Sovereign who hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, hath chosen, (and who shall resist his will?) to bless such methods of preaching his word as are in themselves most wisely fitted to improve our moral nature. In the depth of our conviction that the renewal of the soul requires a direct agency of the great First Cause, we should not overlook the influence of those second causes which are also, under the Spirit's operation, and in a subordinate way, effective in elevating the character of men.

If then there is an instrumental power in certain methods of preaching the gospel, the question arises, what are these methods, or what are the elements of this power? When we call to mind the tens of thousands of ministers who are exerting an influence Sabbath after Sabbath on hundreds of thousands of laymen; when we consider that the effectiveness of the pulpit has, in comparison with other efficiencies, declined among us to an alarming extent within the last fifty years, and that an extensive religious apathy is one result of this decline; when we see that our intellectual and moral growth, our social order and even our civil freedom are under God dependent on the preacher's instrumentality, and that the popular wants, if not the popular wish, demand a soul-reviving dispensation of the word, we feel constrained to say, that the question, what are the most efficient modes of preaching the gospel, is the great question of the present age.

Various measures of moral reform have been proposed, but we have reason to believe that the chief and radical reformation of men will be the effect of the divine word orally delivered, and accompanied with the influences of divine grace. This is a question, therefore, which concerns not the minister only, but laymen also; for as a minister ought to preach, so ought his people to hear; they are bound to encourage him in the path which he is obligated to pursue, and they should never condemn but always defend that style of discourse which is, in its own nature, the most effective. By sustaining an efficient ministry they become the benefactors not of the church alone, but of the nation and world also. To specify a few of the elements of power in the pulpit, will be the design of the present essay; not those elements which are insisted on most frequently, but those which are mentioned more seldom, and of which at the present day there is the greatest need.

In the first place, then, preaching, in order to be powerful, must often be argumentative. It is thought by some that a minister should assume the correctness of what he declares, and should expend his energy in applying, not in proving the truth. They who attend the sanctuary, it is said, profess by their very attendance, that they believe the doctrines which are there advanced. But the mere fact of being present in the house of God, does not imply a faith in the teachings of the pulpit. Many will ostensibly unite in a worship which they deem unreasonable. They must be convinced by argument, that the minister's assertions are solemn verities, or they will remain merely ostensible worshippers.

Nor is the argumentative discourse needful for the positive unbelievers alone. It is also requisite for that large class of men who yield a formal assent to the truth, but still have no vivid nor well defined conceptions of it; no strongly fortified confidence in it. Such men demand a new, a more distinct impression of religious doctrine upon their intellect. When they have worked their way through a process of argument, they begin to feel that the objects of their vague belief are momentous realities. Their previously dull assent is brightened up into a luminous conviction. Their cold and weak belief is warmed and strengthened into an energetic faith.

Nor is it merely for the purpose of freshening men's confidence in propositions which they had before idly believed, that argument is useful. It is also a means of moral excitement. It wakes up the intellect, and when the mind is enlivened, the heart is the more

easily aroused. Besides, there is an alternation in the soul ; and when the reasoning powers have *been* tasked, there rises a predisposition to indulge in feeling. The hearer is inclined to relieve himself from the tension of the mental faculties by the play of the affections. As when the mind is sluggish the heart will be stupid, so when the intellect is in vigorous activity, it will stir up the fountains of feeling ; it will in time become wearied with its reasoning processes, and then the soul will refresh itself in a change from thought to emotion. Nor is this all. The heart is not to be taken by direct assault. It must be carried captive ere it is aware. If we forewarn the hearer of our intended appeal to his sensibilities, he will brace himself against us. He must be intellectually interested in the subject, before he will be morally affected by it. Now there is no better way of engaging the intellect of man than the way of argument. Talk of his idleness as you will, he loves to reason. Speak of proofs as cold and hard, they do quicken his powers. He was made for discussing the truth and for living conformably with it. And when we have once allured him to a rational investigation of a theme, we may easily direct his thoughts to the moral influence of it ; and the affections will often steal out unnoticed, when they could not be forced out by an imperative summons, nor begged out by soft entreaties. An abrupt exhortation will repel ; a mere exhortation will satiate and disgust the inquisitive hearer ; but when a principle has been demonstrated by absorbing argument, there will be sidelong influences of it, insinuating themselves upon his heart ; and he who thought to be a mere philosophical examiner, finds himself a weeping child of the truth. Further, the use of argument gives a prominence to religious doctrine. The reasons are like pillars on which the truth is seen to rest ; and on the summit of which it lies, attracting the attention of all men to itself. It is this conspicuous position, this prominence of truth which adds dignity and power to the pulpit. Moreover, that which is reasoned out is, therefore, highly valued and revered. Costing labor, and that of a manly kind, it is so much the better esteemed. Deduced from fundamental principles, it seems impregnable and commands deference. It is proved to be not an individual opinion, but a truth founded in the nature of things, or expressly revealed from heaven. Audiences may look down upon their preacher as a man, but, entirely depraved though they are, they will in some way defer to the authority of Jehovah and the eternal laws of being. The minister is shorn of his strength, when

he seems to be uttering his own notions, or the dogmas of his sect. He must appear to be enforcing those immutable verities which are not so truly said to be made for our race, as the race was made for them. He must conceal himself behind his subject; the doctrine must stand out foremost, not as his doctrine, but as God's. It must speak, rather than the man himself. But for this end, it must be proved; be urged forward by strong reasonings. Projecting out into full view, it must be propped up by massive buttresses; and thus it strikes the eye and fills the mind with an impression of strength which no *man, as such*, can make. Let the vanity of a preacher induce him to hold up a doctrine in his own hands, and claim obeisance to it because he asserts it, and he will lose the very regard which he aims to secure; but let him show that the doctrine is self-sustained and is unassailable on its own foundations, that it is a principle which God has revealed and for which Christ died, and it will have authority over men; it will command their homage, involuntary perhaps, but still homage; it will excite feeling, wrong it may be, but yet feeling. "My word shall not return unto me void," saith the Holy One.

Accordingly we find that the ablest ministers of the gospel have been those who "applied their hearts to seek out wisdom and the reason of things." In reading the sermons of the elder Edwards, we stand in awe; for he speaks not as one who sings a pleasant song, but in the name of him who says, "Preach the preaching that I bid thee." There is something in his discourses that presses us, crowds upon us, follows hard after us; and if we flee from it, it is close upon our footsteps; and there is no sense in our trying to escape it. It is the power of God's word, shown to be God's word, identified as such, and therefore we cannot stay in its onward urging. Overcome by his argument we fall a prey at once to his appeal. His discussion interests us; we are first surprised, then taken captive, and afterward borne along "whithersoever the governor listeth." So was it with Paul. "He reasoned in the synagogue every Sabbath," and as he once "reasoned of righteousness, temperance and judgment, Felix trembled." He was not afraid of abstruse preaching, nor of metaphysical preaching, but he uttered words hard to be understood and liable to be wrested by the unlearned and unstable; still he enforced them by such compressed ratiocination as to make his hearers feel, that in striving against him they were striving against God. The direct tendency of strong argument is, to transfer the reasoner's appeal from the sphere of his own opinions to the sphere of

divine inspiration ; and he who braces himself against this appeal, strikes and presses against a brazen wall. Hence it is characteristic of every preacher who fortifies his words by giving the reason for them, to speak as with authority. " My words are not my own," he seems to declare, " but I have proved them ; and you know them to be true. He that receiveth them receiveth not me alone but him who sent me. He that despiseth them poureth contempt not upon me alone, but upon his own mind, and upon his Maker, and shall at last wonder and perish."

In the second place, the preaching of divine truth in order to be powerful must have a *positive element*. Firmness, decision, independence, courage, we all admire ; but we despise pusillanimity, cowardice, a timorous, irresolute, fluctuating mind. As a man will not be respected unless he respect himself, so a doctrine will not be efficacious unless it be seen to stand erect, to be itself a *something*, to have claims of its own, and to insist upon controlling the life of men.

The positive style of preaching is opposed to all superabundance of qualifying remark. It is needful to modify our statements, just so far as the truth requires ; but it is wise to adopt such a phraseology as calls for the least qualification possible. It is a weakening process to recal our words ; to advance and instantly recede, to propound a truth and then explain so disproportionately as to explain it away. There is a kind of shrinking back from masculine thought, which leads some men to overlook the main principle, in their anxiety about the minor qualifications of it. These men may be cautious guides *from* certain forms of error, but they are not successful leaders *into* the truth. We must qualify remarks which are too bold, if we have been inconsiderate enough to make them ; but when we would impress the popular mind we must speak the truth outright ; not covering it up with modifications, nor seeming to take back the words which we have just given out. We must be wary in our statements, but should not have that diseased caution, that feebleness of mental grasp, which prevents our going *straight forward* from the Bible to the consciences of men.

The positive style of preaching is also opposed to an excess of liberalism in religious doctrine. We are strong while we are just as liberal as the truth will allow, but we only enfeeble ourselves when we become latitudinarian and indifferent. There are some doctrines which are important and a belief in which is salutary ; but they are not essential to our future life, and if we

insist on them *as such*, we are chargeable with the vice of exclusiveness.¹ By this exclusiveness we may overawe the imbecile, but we lose the respect of the judicious. We should preach on these subordinate truths occasionally, but if we preach on them too often, our ministrations become only insipid. There are other doctrines, not only important but necessary for salvation. The deliberate, wilful rejection of them is death. They cannot be compromised. They must be lifted up and rallied around as the standards of our faith; they must be enforced strongly, rarely, sternly, if need be. The preaching of *these* doctrines should be our great aim, for in them is the hiding of our power, and the genius of them is manliness and strength. These doctrines have a right to be heard, and it is in their very nature to insist on all their claims and remit not one jot or tittle. They are suasive indeed, but imperative; not only imperative but aggressive also. Upon every form of moral evil they make an attack. They *have a work to do* and therefore lie not idle. They assail the conscience, they go forward against a perverse will; there is movement in them, progress, swift, sure, and therefore forcible. When we appear to *patronize* the things that we preach, and notwithstanding our good feeling toward them, yet acknowledge that they may be disbelieved without serious harm; when we recommend a love to them and still confess that the want of love may not endanger the soul; when we *advise* to the doing of right as more judicious than the doing of wrong, but take it nothing amiss if our advice be unheeded, then we miscall ourselves, if we take the name of preachers of that gospel which is the power of God and the wisdom of God unto salvation. There is command, there is penalty; there is a strict condition; there is a "believe and be saved;" "a disbelieve and be lost;" and if we waver in enforcing this positive law, we cut the sinews of our strength. *It is impossible* for men who deny the reality of future rewards and punishments, to have as great power in the pulpit as if they enforced this truth. They may urge their negative creed, but they cannot make it appear really worth while for others to agree with them. It may seem well enough to acquiesce in their negation, for eternal life will follow such an acquiescence; but so will eternal life ensue from the opposite belief, and on their own principles it is about as well to affirm what they deny, as it is to sanc-

¹ I *my* the vice of *exclusiveness*; for there is a virtue bearing the same name, *an exclusiveness* that insists on the difference between the spirit of the Bible and the genius of irreligion.

tion their denial. Either creed is safe, and there need be no outlay of strength in exhorting to one or the other. But there is power in a strict alternative; obey *or* be lost. There is power in a dividing line, if it be wisely drawn; and "thus far but no further" seizes the heart with a strong grasp. It is impressive to look at the door that opens, *but* also *shuts*, and no man can remove the bar that closes it. There is a narrow way, and the thought of it makes men agonize to struggle into it; because it is a narrow way and few there be that find it. There is a broad road that leadeth downward; and men who hear of it quicken their footsteps to escape from its easy descent; because it is the broad road, and many there be that go down thereon. If we even invert the proportions of truth, and represent the *wide* gate as the entrance into *heaven*, and the *narrow* path as the way to *death*, we are more latitudinarian than the gospel sanctions, or the efficiency of the pulpit allows. There may be difficulties around this doctrine as around every other, but the force of our teaching is to press the doctrine through its difficulties and move onward with an unflinching step, in a right line.

The positive mode of preaching the gospel is opposed to a merely controversial method. We have no right to banish controversy from the pulpit. It sharpens the attention of hearers and animates their zeal for the truth. It enlivens the monotony of discourses, and monotony is the evil to which our ministrations are peculiarly exposed. The controversial style appeals to a distinct principle of our natures, a principle which cannot be neglected without harm, which is innocent and useful enough to be addressed repeatedly by prophets and apostles. Indeed the preaching of our Saviour, the mildest of men, is, oftener than we seem to be aware, enlivened by an encounter with spiritual antagonists. As false doctrine naturally leads to wrong practice, we are no more forbidden to resist the former as a cause, than the latter as an effect. The positive style of preaching being in its nature decisive, has been stated to be aggressive upon sin, and must therefore be controversial against the errors by which sin is fostered. "I was born," says Luther, "to fight with devils and factions. This is the reason that my books are so boisterous and stormy. It is my business to remove obstructions, to cut down thorns, to fill up quagmires, to open and make straight the paths."—"Philip has a different nature; he advances silently and softly; he builds, he plants, he waters in peace and joy of heart." If all preaching, however, were like that of Melancthon, it would lose

at least one element of power. For the highest influence on a large class of minds, there must be severe, indignant reprimand, bold commination against sin. Our discourses are emasculated when they include none but soft and pleasant words.

Still the controversial element, even when employed against practical evil, must not be the predominant one in the pulpit. Much less can it be thus prominent when armed against mere theoretical mistakes. It will not suffice to beat down all error under our feet. We must build up some truth. What though we convince our auditors that this or that heresy is ruinous; we have not thereby edified them in the faith. We have administered to them a medicine which may counteract the poison of falsehood, but have not fed them with strong meat or even with milk, that they may grow thereby. If the Reformers had confined their labors to a mere protesting against the Romish creed, they had failed. The world would have defended the church against all her assailants, had not a positive faith been held up as the only sure refuge from ecclesiastical misrule. In our own day we see that taste and learning and genius are insufficient to give vitality to that creed which prominently insists on "not believing." A preacher may not believe in the divinity of Christ, he may not believe in the atonement, he may not believe in our entire depravity, he may not believe in regeneration, he may not believe in the final judgment. And what of all this? What good ever comes of a mere want of faith, which is a bare nothing? What man was ever awaked from his slumbers by simply not rousing him? What family were ever alarmed in their midnight danger, by simply repeating to them that their house was not on fire? Man was never made for a mere denial of what is FALSE even, but for the direct affirmation of what is true. He has cravings which must be met with something more than a proof that they cannot be satisfied in this or that specific form. They are cravings which are met precisely by the pure gospel. This is in its nature positive, self-sustained, independent, and adapted wondrously therein to our constitution. It teaches not that man is partly good and partly evil, *half and half*, but totally depraved; not that Jehovah is somewhat indifferent with regard to us, and somewhat inclined to be influenced by us, but that he is a sovereign, and keeps in his own hand the power and the dominion, and overturneth and overturneth as he pleases, and giveth no account of his matters to us, his servants. It does not affirm that our salvation depends upon gradually cultivating our native good principles until they have gained some-

what of a predominance over our evil propensities ; but it does affirm that our future life depends on crossing one plainly marked line ; on taking one positive step ; except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of heaven ; and if he have faith even as a grain of mustard-seed, he shall be a king and priest unto God. The truth of the gospel is thus definite, open, firm, striking, pointed, and therefore effective ; and hence when set forth in its due prominence, it makes the pulpit "mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds ;" it causes the kingdom of heaven to suffer violence, and the violent to take it by force.

Thirdly, the power of the pulpit requires that the truths of the gospel be often presented singly. One doctrine will often suffice for one sermon ; it is ample enough, momentous enough ; nor can it within a smaller compass be faithfully analyzed and enforced. It must be made to stand out, unobstructed like the Parthenon at Athens, exposing all its symmetry and majesty to the free, full vision. By thus making a single doctrine the prominent theme of one sermon, the way is prepared to introduce a new truth as the chief attraction of another discourse. We may thus impart to every address its own distinctive peculiarity, and may invest the whole series of our ministrations with that various interest, that freshness, that copiousness which comes from unity in each individual part of the series. Often when several topics are crowded into a single discourse, no one of them can be radically discussed, and all of them in a half-developed form will be again and again introduced into succeeding homilies ; so that every sermon will appear to be a stale repetition of others which preceded it, and the whole course of preaching will be superficial, undiversified, wearisome, and therefore powerless. When a single doctrine is held out steadily to our gaze, we may view it with distinctness, its lineaments are not confused with the lines of other truths, nor distorted into a space too narrow for it. Thus open to our undistracted examination, it penetrates deep into our feelings. The intellect is affected by general views, but the heart requires particulars. It is a single thought, now condensed and now expanded, here proved and there illustrated, portrayed in its details, pressed home upon the conscience ; it is this which calls out emotion. Vague generalities are like moon-beams. Monotonous reiterations of commingled truths are like the successive strokes of a bell ; but one doctrine coming upon the soul drop by drop, wears away the hardness of the sensibility. Paul in his letters to the Romans and Galatians, has a single impres-

sion to make, "the just shall live by faith;" and no one who has studied those epistles can ever forget this central point to which all parts of them converge. James has a different aim in his Epistle, that of commending an obedient life, and he fills the mind of his reader with the one idea, that faith without works is dead. A man of merely scientific associations, unused to impressive statements, may condemn each of these apostles as making an incomplete representation. But they knew where was the secret of their power. They knew that he who could gain too much at once with the common mind, loses all; that *one* thing is needful; and when this one is secured, a second and a third will follow in its train.

Among the successors of the apostles, there is no man who has made a deeper impression on the church than Martin Luther. He is in a civil and religious aspect a father to his native land. His memory is still preserved fresh and green among his countrymen as if he had died but the last year. It has been a great query, whence came his power? How was he enabled to disenthral a church from its iron bondage? The answer of some is, that he broke the benumbing spell of the schoolmen and restored the taste for classical learning. The reply of others is, that he combined the chivalry of the knight-errant with the benevolence of a Christian, and that his manly onsets upon the foe awakened the sympathies of high minded men. The solution of one is that he gave a new language to his countrymen and plied them with a vocabulary before unwritten, but yet genial to their natures. "He grasped," it is said by another, "the iron trumpet of his mother tongue, the good old Saxon from which our own is descended, the language of noble thought and high resolve, and he blew a blast that shook the nations from Rome to the Orkneys." But all these elements of power, vigorous as they are, would have availed but little were it not for a single influence which is overlooked by the world. He held forth and held up high and broad and distinct and bright one stirring truth, "Without faith it is impossible to please God." Morning and evening, from the towers of Erfurt and before the Diet at Worms, from the castle of Wartburg, in the church and in the palaces at Eisleben, and from his still retreat at Wittenberg, it was faith in Christ that he preached and urged home, until he absolved men from their penances, and emptied the confessional and broke down the walls of the monastery. It was this one idea that concentrated upon itself all his energies, and worked with indivisible force upon

him and his hearers and his readers, and at last redeemed the nations. There never was a great object secured without this identical oneness of view, that elicits a simplicity of feeling and a singleness of aim. Whether the evil to be resisted be intemperance or slavery, sabbath-breaking or war, it is the one evil which must for a season engross the mind and loom up as the prominent thing to be dreaded, or men will not be aroused for its extirpation. This is the teaching of history. It is corroborated by the analogies of all the fine arts, by the simplicity of painting and sculpture and architecture. It is to be inferred from the very structure of our own minds.

When we thus insulate a doctrine, and waive for the present some collateral truth which we mean to dilate upon in the future, we must guard against appearing to deny that which we merely defer. Can we not pass over a dogma for a time without nullifying it in the popular apprehension? Of two principles, can we not raise the first into a prominence above the second, without severing the cord which binds the two together, and without hiding the fact that both of them are truths combined? If the range of the human soul were not a contracted one, we might impart a vivid idea of a complicated system without first analyzing it into its constituent members, and without protruding one of them at a time into a bolder relief than the others. But so narrow is the avenue to the heart, that we must often pass our doctrines through it *one by one*. It is to be remembered, however, that what we should *often* do, we need not do *always*. As we may now insist upon *this* isolated truth, and then upon *another*, so may we afterwards develop the relation between the two; and this correlation of distinct principles may be itself a single and an impressive subject of a discourse. It is therefore perfectly consistent for me to add as my *fourth* remark, that a minister, in order to preach with power must frequently exhibit the proper combination of related doctrines. As he should often but not always present them in their insulated beauty, so he should often though not always present them in their reciprocal harmony, their interdependence. We must sometimes collect all the scattered rays of light upon one bright focus. Union, combination is strength. The ancient writers are fond of exhibiting the duality that pervades the universe. "All things," says Ecclesiasticus, "are double one against another."—"Good is set against evil and life against death; so is the godly against the sinner and the sinner against the godly. So look upon all the

works of the Most High and there are two and two, one against another."¹ "Omnium verum," says Pythagoras, "initia esse bina; ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem."² If there be light, then there is darkness; if cold, then heat; if height, depth also; if solid, then fluid; hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, calm and tempest, prosperity and adversity, life and death. In fine, says Harris, "the periods of nature and of human affairs are maintained by a reciprocal succession of contraries."³ As in the human body there are antagonist muscles, one for moving the arm forward, another for moving it backward, one for turning the eye up, another for rolling it down, so in the spirit hope finds its opposite in despair, joy in sorrow, confidence in fear; in short every emotion has its correlate, and one cannot be fully understood apart from its connection with the other. As there is always a correspondence between truth and the soul, we find a duality among doctrines, like that among our mental principles, and one theory must be weighed by its counterpoise. We may alternate from a single member of a duplicate truth to another, but the very idea of this alternation implies that the two members are preserved to alternate from, and that the same eye which temporarily confines itself to one branch of the comprehensive doctrine may afterwards extend itself to the union of the two branches. We may insist to-day on the humanity of Christ alone, and to-morrow on his divinity alone, each for the sake of a vivid impression; but if we permanently separate the two truths, we do injustice to both of them. We then "split the ray of light," as Southey says, in order to see one of the prismatic colors, but we shall never live in the clear day unless we at length unite the rays in the proper compound. Sometimes the doctrine of natural ability may have been down-trodden and our usefulness may demand a special care to raise it up from its obscure hiding place. At other times the doctrine of moral inability may have been overlooked, and we may be required to summon up all our energies in pressing it forward into conspicuous notice. But if we preach unintermittingly and exclusively on free will, our audiences will become too restless for a patient submission to the will of God; and if we dwell disproportionately on human dependence, we shall leave our people waiting to be moved, and rejoicing that they are unable to move

¹ *Ecclesiasticus*, 42: 24 and 33: 14, 15.

² See Varro, *De Ling. Lat.* L. IV, also Arist. *Metaph.* L. I. c. 5.

³ *Hermes*. Book I. ch. VII.

themselves. The doctrine of human inability is in one respect a kind of centripetal force, which, if it act alone for a long time, will draw truth out of its orbit on one side; the doctrine of human ability has some likeness to a centrifugal power which, if it act without its antagonist, will propel the truth far away on the other side of its orbit; but when the two agencies are combined, the whole truth will hold on in its appropriate path, with more uniform velocity, with a doubled momentum.

A similar remark may be made with regard to other principles. The insignificance of man is an important truth; but if we only convince him that he is nothing and less than nothing, then he will infer that nothing can be expected of him, nothing required; he will lose that regard for his own worth, without which he cannot fully adore his Maker. The dignity of man is another valuable truth; but if we *only* convince him that he was made little lower than the angels, he will debase his original power with a pride which is one of his most humiliating faults, and his self-respect will degenerate into vanity. If we teach man nothing more than the entire perverseness of his will, we shall hide from him that vileness of sin which contaminates even the amiable sentiments of his nature. If, again, we teach man nothing more than the innocence of this or that animal or natural emotion, we shall conceal from him the most winning evidences of divine love, that love which gave an only son to die for those who never keep their innocence when they have the power of sinning, and who never put forth a choice but in disobedience to God's law. There is a bone, and there is a muscle in the system of truth; we may have wise reasons for occasionally severing the one from the other, but if we never exhibit the union of the two, we shall disgust men by constantly showing them a skeleton instead of a full body. Truth exerts its whole influence when it is sooner or later set forth as *many-sided*, as living in all its sides; but if we benumb one limb of it with a paralysis, if we lame any member of it, we make it at last unsightly, unattractive to the view, slow and halting in its movement. For a time, indeed, men will be stimulated by the continuous pressure of a doctrine which they had previously neglected; but after a certain time they will become wearied by it, annoyed by it, driven perhaps into heresy by it; for their sensibilities are never relieved by a view of the symmetry and the grace with which this doctrine is combined into a system. Whatever may be the efficiency of a single appeal aimed at one point, the whole course of our ministrations must affect all points; must

to group doctrines together as to disclose the exquisite beauty with which they are affiliated. They must be seen to supply and balance one another, or they will not be viewed as a panoply. If one part of them be selected as the exclusive matter of our consideration, then will our ministry be like the car that has lost its wheels from one side, and if it move at all, will grate upon the earth and drag. It will be like the eagle that is shorn of one wing, and flutters and moves round and round in a circle, but never takes its flight to the sun. "As the beauty of truth," says Robert Hall, "consists chiefly in the harmony and perfection of its several parts, it is as impossible to display it to advantage" (by never displaying it except) "in fragments, as to give a just idea of a noble and majestic structure by exhibiting a single brick. By detaching particular portions from the system to which it belongs, we break the continuity of truth, we interrupt that vital communication between its respective parts, on which its life and vigor depend, and thus we corrupt the few doctrines which we may happen to possess, and consign others of equal importance to contempt and oblivion."

In the fifth place, the preaching of the Gospel, in order to be powerful, must be free. It is impossible for a minister to exert the highest influence over his fellow-men, unless he utter his own ideas in his own way. "We are all knit together by a strange tie of sympathy," and if we think out and speak out what seems good and true to ourselves, we shall find a response in the mind of others; for as face answereth to face in water, so doth the heart of man to man. Nature will sooner or later interest its beholders, and he who represses the spontaneous outgoings of his soul, only cuts off thereby his communication with his race.

Here and there a preacher puts a constraint upon himself, through fear of being deemed theatrical. He knows that frigidity of expression and of mien characterizes the inhabitants of our cold northern climes, and that a certain stiffness and staidness seem to be in unison with the canons of our pulpit. He dislikes the cramping influence of our provincial habits, and yet he fears that unless he smother a fervid emotion he will be despised for a love of display. He dares not light up his countenance with a kindling sentiment, lest he be rebuked by the chilling gaze of a hearer who mistakes the apathy of our ungenial manners for real nature. But nature is not rigid and straight laced. It is living, moving, glowing, rushing, outpouring. Listlessness in discourse is affectation; stupidity is the *artificial vice*; and he who restrains

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the ardor of his soul for the sake of avoiding a theatrical appearance, sacrifices himself as God made him, to the awkwardnesses of a conventional taste. It is disagreeable for him to manifest his own excitement before an audience who look with cold unmeaning eyes upon the spectacle; but let him disregard the repulsive stare, and heed the mandate, "be not afraid of their faces." If he will not, as he should not, yield to the critical and derisive lip of the multitude, the multitude will yield to him. Nature will conquer in the end; life will prevail over deadness; and men who came to scoff will, through grace, remain to pray.

Here and there also the fear of being thought fanatical, puts a check upon the freedom of the minister. If he allow an unobstructed egress to the feelings of his soul, he expects to lose cast with *orderly* men, and to be regarded as an effervescing, but not as a solid or edifying preacher. Now the term fanaticism, although often used as including the malignant principle, is employed in this objection simply to denote a higher degree of excitement than is required by the objects calling it forth. This superfluity is an evil, but no worse than the opposite deficiency. Redundance of feeling is unnatural and so is coldness. That man is sure to fail, who preaches with the main design of avoiding excess of emotion. Higher, nobler, freer should be his aim, that of speaking as the *Spirit giveth him utterance*, and not as his reputation demands. No man can preach with power, unless he regulate his feelings by the nature of his theme, resigning himself to the influences of truth, and letting his emotions well upward and outward, according to their own sweet will. A minister must be childlike in the unveiling of his heart, if he would bring the hearts of his people into unison with his own. He should smile or weep as his subject constrains him; and if he suppress his feelings or his tears through fear of attracting observation and provoking criticism, then he contendeth with himself; and 'no man goeth to a warfare' against his nature, 'except at his own charges;' then he steels his sensibilities against the truth, and 'no man ever hardened himself against God' or the divine word, 'and prospered.'

Here and there also a minister abridges the freedom of his pulpit through fear of opposing the doctrinal views of his audience. When hearers have been long inured to one unvaried style of presenting truth, they are inclined to associate the very substance of truth with that specific form of statement. Any deviation from the popular phrase, is suspected of being a want of reverence to a fundamental doctrine. The preacher, therefore, who desires to

win golden opinions for himself, is induced to melt down his natural style into the mould of some fashionable theory. He shrinks from expressing his true, spontaneous feelings, lest they should not fit precisely what is looked upon as the standard measure. But this will never do. It is a good omen for men to be watchful over their pastor's doctrine, his spirit and his style; but they should never make him an offender for a word, and he should never stifle his hearty faith from the vain love of being called by them Rabbi. His soul should be a *fountain* of living water springing up within himself, and flowing on from its own resources; and should never be a mere *reservoir* of foreign streams, walled around and dammed up, pinched in time of drought, and stagnant when full. 'He must speak with a free heart what his Bible bids him.' If his people will hear, let him speak it; if they will not hear, *let him speak it*, in the hope of aid from on high. He may incur their dislike for a time. No minister ever moved his people with strong impulses by his theological discussions, without sometimes going athwart their previously cherished theories, and being suspected of harboring some false doctrine. It was so with Augustin and Calvin, Luther and Zwingli. It was so with John Owen and Richard Baxter. It was so with Andrew Fuller and Robert Hall. It was so with the two Edwardses, with Bellamy and Hopkins. It will be so while truth continues to be viewed as narrow and steelbound; while its various phases, its multiform relations, its diversified modes of exhibition are lightly esteemed; while the copious and affluent, ever old and ever new phraseology of the Bible is sacrificed to the shibboleths of contracted partizans. But our laymen are too generous to insist for a long time, on their pastor's surrendering his individuality and becoming a slave to their own habits of speculation. They choose that he utter forth with a good conscience, what his soul is penetrated with and stirred up with in its deep recesses. Thought has a spring in it which must not be coiled up too severely. When its elastic force is gone, it ceases to impel men, and for practical effect all is gone. If therefore there be an idea in the preacher's mind, which he regards as essential to the full and free expression of his own doctrine, let it come out. It may seem unwonted to his hearers, but *let it come*. It may cost him some trouble, some jealousy, perhaps some reproof; still *let it come*. A living opinion, even if it be a suspected one, is better than a dead formula. A word that gushes out of an honest heart, even if it give offence, has a vitality in it which gives it power. Every sermon

should be a transcript of the writer's own mind, should be free from guile, from all manoeuvres to gain the applause of a party, should never crook for a by-end, but simply and sincerely should move straight onward; and if this pure minded sermon be instinct with the spirit and the truth of Jesus, it will, so fully do we trust his good promises and his grace, it will 'be quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing through the philosophies of gainsaying men, even to the dividing asunder of the joints and the marrow.'

Passing by several other elements of power in the pulpit, I will only mention in the sixth and last place, an affectionateness, a simplicity and an humbleness of Christian feeling. Better were it for the preacher to have no kind of freedom if he fail of that "liberty wherewith Christ maketh free." He may violate all other rules with comparative harmlessness, but if he violate this first, second and third rule, that all his reasonings and all his exhortations be conceived in the spirit of a servant and son of God, it is in vain to prescribe for him anything further. He cannot have power, unless his discourses be radiant with evangelical truth; and piety is needful to guide him into the truth. He cannot have power, unless he compose his sermon with a hearty interest in its moral bearings; and piety is essential to the liveliness of such an interest. He cannot have power unless he utter his words with pathos and unction, nor can he attain this appropriate utterance without a depth, and a tenderness of Christian sympathy. The theologian, then, the rhetorician and the elocutionist all unite in requiring, that the preacher be enthusiastic in his religious love at all times, but in a special degree at the precise time of his addressing an auditory. The man of plain common sense, will urge the same requirement, perceiving at a single view, that if ministers would make religion attractive to others, they must be delighted with it themselves; if they would awaken a pious sympathy, they must have piety to be sympathized with, and must not say, "*Go to the Redeemer,*" but "*Come to him,—come with us.*"

I have said that the spirit of the minister should be affectionate. Aristotle and Quintilian and Cicero demand, that an orator manifest a kindly feeling to his audience. Had they written for the pulpit, they would have required that a preacher exhibit an earnest love to the souls of his people; that he feel and display an interest in their welfare for this world, much more for the world to come. It is very easy to translate the prescriptions of heathen rhetoricians into a virtual demand that the sacred orator,

aiming to persuade men to a holy life, shall exhibit a fellow-feeling with those whom he addresses, and win their confidence in his personal regard for them. The winds may blow, the lightning may strike, the tempest may beat upon an ice-mountain, but it remains a mountain of ice. Only the heat of the sun melts it away. It is the warmth of love that subdues the soul "which laugheth at the shaking of a spear." When the heathen poets feigned that Amphion moved the stones and raised the walls of Thebes by the sound of his lyre, and that Orpheus subdued the ferocity of beasts and attracted to him the mountains by the sweetness of his music, they meant to describe the attractiveness, the persuasiveness of a refined benevolence expressed in its own alluring way. The cross of Christ is eloquent; for it shines upon our hearts with the warm radiance of his love. It is the goodness of God that *does*, as well as *should* lead us to repentance; much more than his grace; and therefore the minister must infuse into his discourses this same element which works in the heart, as the heat of the sun operates on the plant, and gives life and beauty, the blossom and the fruit. His benevolence must flow downward to his hearers and upward to God, and thus with one hand at the hearts of his people, and the other upon the throne of the eternal, he must be the medium for the transmission of those influences which are conducted softly and silently from heaven to the bosom of the church. In a psychological view of Christian oratory it seems to be a fixed law, that 'although a minister have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; though he speak with the tongue of men and of angels, and yet have no real charity toward his hearers, and manifest no affectionate interest in them, he is become as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal.'

I have said that the religion of the minister should be simple. There is a kind of piety which is exercised in agreement with human standards; it conforms to the practical rules of commentaries, and is governed by the example of certain good men. It always appears respectable, because it has the authority of church-worthies in its favor; but it is not so graceful nor winning as it is correct and safe. There is another kind of piety which is not harbored because other men have done the same, but is indulged because it *will* rise in view of its appropriate objects. It is the simple-hearted love which comes forth at the fresh opening of *one's own heart* to the influences of one's own meditations. It *does not learn from books* whether and how it ought to be exer-

cised, but it springs up without a calculating process and without a tasking of the imitative faculty. It is like the music of the *Æolian harp*, not hampered by rules, but sweeter than all the artificial symphonies of human contrivance. The religion of our Saviour is a winning specimen of that simplicity with which the feelings of a minister ought to flow out into a spontaneous expression. It was original, artless, unforced, ever new, always becoming. He did not borrow from the men whom he respected, but felt, as well as thought, for himself. He did not wait for a set formula of devotion before he could adore the Providence of God, but it was enough for him to see a field-flower, and that was a rich expression of a biblical truth. He did not enquire for the example of his predecessors, or for the probable opinion of the world, before he gave vent to his feelings in regard to the beloved city; but he looked upon it from the opposite hill, and wept over it, and cried, "Oh Jerusalem, how often would I,—even as a hen her chickens,—but you would not." He never consulted his own dignity by allying his kingdom with venerable priests, or the sacredness of local scenes; but he took little children in his arms, and ate with publicans, and extended his feet to be wiped by the hair of the head of a woman that was a sinner, and all not because he calculated that such things would work well, but because his simple piety was gratified by such unostentatious benevolence. Hence came his power. What he says we feel, because we know that he felt it. His tones were rich with earnest conviction, and were all his own, and therefore they linger and linger still and ever linger in our ears, making a strange melody. When we turn from his melting yet stimulating, his softened yet authoritative words, to the pages of his ministers, we feel that they are unlike him; they speak for effect, they speak so as to be esteemed, they are punctilious about rules of Rhetoric and of Logic, they copy after great men, they are faithful to a party, they are like each other, and therefore monotonous, they are constrained, frigid, inept, formal, we soon tire of reading them, there is little of nature in them, they are ashamed to be simple, they wish to have everything manly, and are afraid to be childlike, they are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable, *in the comparison* with him who spake as never man spake, because he felt as never man felt.

And as the preacher's piety should be simple, so, as I have said, should it be humble. He must feel his dependence on the sanctifying Spirit of God, or he is powerless. If he rely upon his

own strength, if he aim to convert men by his learning or eloquence, if he stand up as one who can reason well, or write well, or speak well, and can thereby vanquish the enemies of the cross, *there is more hope of a fool than of him.* All his power is lost, if he confide in it for subduing his hearers. He takes the attitude of a man hoping to overcome a host of his fellow men, while they are behind the barricade of an habitual, a natural, a total selfishness, impervious to his spear, impregnable to his battle-axe; and *they laugh him to scorn.* They are fully set to do evil, and he is but partially inclined to do well; their name is legion, and he is but one man, possibly in some respects an inferior man, and he comes out single-handed, breathing defiance sometimes against the intellect and always against the will of a multitude, an exceeding great army, who have never yet for one moment succumbed, either to their own consciences or to God. Such an attempt is chargeable, on the Christian system, with the same fault which Cicero so often condemns on the Pagan system, with immodesty, inconsiderateness, presumption. It must therefore be powerless, for such qualities are at war with all the principles of persuasion. These principles, while they recognize an effectiveness in the pulpit, require that it be secondary to the special operation of divine grace. The power of the minister presupposes the feeling of his dependence on God, and the felt doctrine of this dependence is the chief element of his power. There is a wheel rolling within a wheel; and he who thinks himself able to transform the hearts of his people, is disabled by that very thought, while he who confesses his inability derives from that confession, if an honest and devout one, the true force of the gospel. When a preacher is weak then is he strong; for then he sues for aid from heaven, and associates his words with the omnipotence of Jehovah. If he saves his power he will lose it, but if he lose his power he will save it; for when he banishes from the heart all pride and self-confidence then and then only "he is filled with all the fulness of God." Fearing to put himself forward he lets the Deity speak for him, and men listen to him not as to an independent declaimer, but as to one who has a commission, who stands as a vicegerent, the acknowledged representative of the Head of the Church. Hiding his own effort in the effectual working of the divine Spirit, he is above the reach of criticism. Men will be disarmed of their opposition to one who is so unassuming, but will be awed down by the presence of that dread Being who dwelleth in the humble and contrite preach-

or. Feeling his dependence, he "does all things through Christ that strengtheneth him," and he speaks eloquently because "it is not he that speaks, but the grace of God which is with him." It is this felt and manifested reliance on the life-giving Spirit which transforms a bodily presence that is comparatively weak, and a speech that is relatively contemptible, and a preaching that is in one sense foolishness, "into the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation." It is no paradox, but the soberness of experience to say, that he who fulfils his ministry "in weakness and fear and in much trembling," clothes himself thereby "with the exceeding greatness of that power which worketh mightily" both in and by its ministers, and he who glories as a wise man will "glory in infirmity." A self-sufficient bearing in a speaker, makes his hearers jealous and pugnacious, and so much the more stubborn in their resistance to him as he urges them in his own strength to a good life. But when he feels that he is inadequate of himself to convert them, they feel that they are wrestling with another being than himself, that his sufficiency is of God, and thus having his resources in heaven, he speaks "with the demonstration of the Spirit and with power." So soon as a revival of religion seems to be the work of men, it loses its dignity and becomes a mere fanatical excitement, and in a few weeks dies away like a crackling of thorns upon a cold hearth. And so soon as a sermon either appears to be, or in reality is, the unaided effort of a man, that moment it ceases to be a sermon, and degenerates into any essay or an harangue. It is *the truth* which exhibits power, and the truth is that we are dependent on the special interposition of the Holy One for every wise use of that power. This part of truth, this doctrine of dependence must be believed, must be felt, must be manifested by the preacher, or he will not be a preacher of the whole truth; he will keep back one essential agency, and so doing he must expect that like Ananias, who held back part of the price, he will fall down spiritually dead before the elders.

If in these particulars and in others which might be specified, a minister would be like Apollos, that "eloquent man who mightily convinced the Jews that Jesus was the Christ," then also like Apollos must he be "mighty in the Scriptures," having an intellect well disciplined to understand them, not merely in their letter, but in their general scope and their connection with the principles of science. He must be a laborious and self-denying man, immersing himself in a toil from which he will rest in heaven only. It is not enough for him that he be acquainted with religious

doctrine; he must be familiar with it; familiar not simply with its general principles but also with its details, with its arguments, its controversies, its remote relations. He must have such a mastery over its recondite problems as will give him a power of writing *down* upon them, instead of making an ever confused and confusing effort to write *up* to them. He must live in the truth as Uriel stood in the sun, and must diffuse its radiance around him in ever diverging lines. He must draw the gospel out into his life, and be an impersonation of the duties which he abstractly commends. He must be fascinated with his work, must watch with eagerness and patient hope for the right times and the right modes of influence, must live as a stranger in the world from which he is to keep himself unspotted and for which he is to give himself up to prayer and fasting. He must not forbear to enrich his mind, through fear that his heart will be impoverished, but he should aim to make his intellectual wealth a mere tributary to his spirit of devotion. Above all he should never so misapprehend his nature as to neglect the cultivation of his piety through fear of weakening his mental powers, but should know that *bene orasse est bene studuisse*, that "*greater is he who ruleth his spirit than he who taketh a city,*" and that a sound and healthy moral growth, as it may be a consequent, should also be and will and must be an antecedent of the most vigorous intellectual development. As the body without the spirit is dead, so the intellect without the heart is destitute of its highest life.

ARTICLE VI.

COLERIDGE AND HIS AMERICAN DISCIPLES.

By Rev. Noah Porter, Jr. Professor in Yale College.

THE name of Coleridge is already splendid and world-renowned. Wherever English Literature is known, there Coleridge is known as a poet, critic, scholar, philosopher, and theologian. As a poet, he has not merely attained the highest fame among those with whom he has measured himself in the accustomed orbs of the poet's flight; but he has created for himself new

circles in which to fly, and borne himself through them with a strength and grace, that compels applause. Indeed there are single poems of his, which for splendid yet appropriate imagery, for purity of sentiment refined almost above the attainment of the holiest mortal, for the use of language at once as hard and polished as the sculptured gem and as liquid as flowing oil, and for their sustained and consistent perfection to one harmonious and strong impression, are unsurpassed by any productions of the sons of song. As a critic, Coleridge benefited his own generation, and has left his impress on English literature, by introducing to notice a class of writers who had been strangely neglected and forgotten. He has given to the study of literature a high and a peculiar interest, by showing its relations to all the noblest interests of man, and its capacity to serve in his culture for this life, and to his training for heaven. Above all, by applying powers such as his, capable of *creating*, to the humble office of interpreting the works of others, he has left behind him critiques which are as wonderful as his own poems, and which combine the peculiar interest which pertains to two minds, the original creator and his no less gifted commentator. As a scholar, Coleridge is remarkable for the extent, the thoroughness and the variety of his studies in so many departments of human knowledge, and perhaps more than all else for the high moral aims, and the exciting, invigorating influence of his various productions. Animated by his example and labors, thousands of youthful scholars have widened their range of study, have been inspired to a more laborious and yet more cheerful diligence, have turned their studies to a genial and purifying influence upon their own souls, and have brought with willing steps, the first and the choicest fruits of their toils as an offering for the altar of God.

In respect to the merits of Coleridge as a theologian and philosopher, there is a diversity of judgment among those in whose opinion, on such subjects, men are accustomed to confide. None, it is believed, deny that force and acuteness of intellect, are displayed in his writings on these subjects. Much less, would any be so daring as to deny, that these writings have exerted a decisive and lasting influence in England and in this country. But as to whether these writings are to be sought or should be avoided, and whether their actual influence has been good or bad, opinions are various and warmly opposed to each other.

A writer who proposes to himself as a theme, "Coleridge's Theology and Metaphysics," may with reason consider himself

committed to a somewhat formidable undertaking. His position becomes not a little more unpleasant, when he considers the various receptions which his views must meet with, whatever they may be. Of Coleridge's philosophy one party can say nothing too laudatory and good. Another party can say nothing too bad. Another party will say nothing definite, but are content to use it when it is convenient for their party-purposes. As to his influence on theology and philosophy, in the views of some, it has been wholly healthful; in the judgment of others, altogether deleterious and deadly. Some will doubtless judge that the theme should never again be broached in a theological journal, because "Coleridgism" has worked itself through already. Others will think that the time has not yet come, for it has not worked itself far enough to its results. Some will think that the essay comes too soon, others that it is too late, others that it had best not come at all.

One advantage however comes from this peculiar position of things in the religious and theological world. It lays upon the adventurer in this turbid and unquiet sea, the necessity of being considerate and fair, an obligation which is too rarely heeded in theological discussion. The sacredness of this obligation the writer of this essay is happy to recognize. If he shall succeed in being mindful of it, he will satisfy himself, better than he expects to satisfy the retailer of religious gossip or the prejudiced theological partizan.

To do justice to Coleridge as a philosopher, it is necessary to study Coleridge as a man. To appreciate the merits and the defects of his theological system, one needs to acquaint himself intimately, with his living and personal self, and to know both his personal and mental history. We can always understand a man's writings and opinions better, for having seen and known him. Much more can we do this to better advantage if his system seems dark or peculiar, or if its merits have been involved in sharp dispute.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge¹ was born at Ottery St. Mary, Devonshire, Oct. 21, 1772, and died at Highgate, July 25th, 1834. His father was a clergyman of great learning and purity of mind, but of little worldly wisdom. His mother possessed an affectionate disposition, and more knowledge of the affairs of this life than

¹ See *Life of S. T. Coleridge* by James Gilman, London, 1838, of which one volume only has been published. See also *Recollections, etc. of S. T. Coleridge* by Joseph Cottle.

her husband. Their son gave tokens from the earliest childhood, of a singular precocity, abstractedness and force of intellect, of an imagination so absorbing as to make him a day-dreamer, and of a most gentle and affectionate disposition. He says of himself "I was in earliest childhood huffed away from the enjoyments of muscular activity in play, to take refuge at my mother's side, on my little stool, to read my little book, and to listen to the talk of my elders. I never played except by myself, and then only acting over what I had been reading or fancying, or half one, half the other, with a stick cutting down weeds and nettles, as one of the seven champions of Christendom. Alas, I had all the simplicity, all the docility of the little child, but none of the child's habits. I never thought as a child, never had the language of a child." Soon after the death of his father, Coleridge was sent to Christ's Hospital in London, being then only seven years of age. Concerning this he exclaims, "Oh the cruelty of separating a poor lad from his early homestead! How in my dreams would my native town come back, with its churches and trees and faces!" Here "he was depressed, moping, friendless, a poor orphan half-starved." His constitution was originally delicate, and by excess in bathing, a foundation was laid for "those bodily sufferings which embittered his life and rendered it little else than one of continued sickness and suffering."¹ From eight to fourteen, in addition to his school studies, in which he might have been passed off for as "pretty a juvenile prodigy as was ever emasculated and ruined by fond and idle wonderments," he indulged his appetite for reading to an enormous extent. Before he went to the university, he earnestly sought to be apprenticed to a neighboring shoemaker, for whom he had contracted a liking, and had been very soundly flogged for setting himself up as an infidel, on the reading of Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary*. At the age of nineteen he was entered at Jesus' College, Cambridge. "He left school with great anticipations of success from all who knew him, for his character for scholarship and extraordinary accounts of his genius had preceded him." "His first step was to involve himself in much misery, which followed him in after life." Being ignorant of university customs, he trusted the furnishing of his lodgings to a private upholsterer, who involved him at a stroke,

¹ "Sickness 'tis true

Whole years of weary days, besieged him close

Even to the gates and inlets of his life."

A Tombless Epitaph by S. T. C.

all without means as he was, in a debt of a hundred pounds. It was the vexation from his college debts, and the despair of obtaining a Fellowship and of attaining to the honors and ease of a university life, through his distaste for the mathematics, that drove him from Cambridge in agony and desperation, in 1793, after a career brilliant in the studies and pursuits which were congenial to his taste. He went to London and enlisted in a regiment of dragoons, under the name of Comberbacke. The story is well known of his being restored to his friends, and of his return to Cambridge. Here he did not remain long, but left the university without a degree. While at the university he became a Unitarian in religion, and a Hartleian in philosophy, by the influence of a fellow collegian by the name of Freud, and as it would seem, under the same impulses by which college students so readily become anything that is antagonistic to the influences about them. This effectually prevented his taking orders in the church of England, and he resolved upon literature as his profession for life.

He associated himself with Southey, and their joint residence was in Bristol and its neighborhood, from 1794 to 1798. It was at Bristol that his dream of Pantisocracy, or a millennial social State on the banks of the Susquehanna, was matured and shattered. It was here that his zeal for the new era which the French revolution promised, was most ardent, and was then dashed forever by the bitter disappointment in which thousands of the generous youth of England sympathized. It was here that he was known as a political lecturer and a Unitarian preacher. It was here too, that his political powers revived and brought forth buds and flowers of so glorious promise. It was here also, at the foot of the Quantock,¹ that his philosophical and religious opinions underwent so entire a revolution, and the foundations were laid of his new views in theology and metaphysical science.

In 1798 he went to Germany with Wordsworth, where he resided fourteen months. He returned with a knowledge of German and of the Kantian philosophy. After his return he was

¹ "I retired to a cottage in Somersetshire at the foot of the Quantock, and devoted my thoughts and studies to the foundations of religion and morals. Here I found myself all afloat. Doubts rushed in; broke upon me 'from the fountains of the great deep' and fell 'from the windows of heaven.' The fountal truths of natural religion and the books of Revelation alike contribute to the flood; and it was long ere my ark touched on an Ararat, and rested."—*Literary Life*, 2d Am. ed. p. 117.

employed with Southey and others to write for the *Morning Chronicle*, and resided awhile at Keswick and Grasmere. His health requiring the change, he set sail for Malta in 1802, from whence he returned to England in 1806. From this time till 1816 he had no fixed home. During this interval he published the first edition of *The Friend*, and in 1816 the *Biographia Literaria*.

It was not far from the time of his return from Germany, 1799, that he was led to the habit of using opium to excess. He began it with entire ignorance that it was opium which he took, and remained for some months in the simplicity of this ignorance. His constant ill-health was the continued occasion, arising from a complication of internal maladies, "the cause of which was the organic change slowly and gradually taking place in the structure of the heart itself." To the evil of this practice he became terrifically alive before he broke himself from its bonds. He confessed its sin and its shame, in letters written during the period of indulging it, and by a deliberate record in the review after his emancipation.¹

It was as a patient laboring under this infirmity that he came to the residence of Dr. Gilman, Highgate, in the year 1816. Here he remained till his death, a cherished inmate, with friends in every way fitted to appreciate and soothe him. His efforts at self conquest were effectual, and Coleridge gained an entire victory over the appetite, which to a man whose frame was disease itself, must have presented the strongest and the most plausible solicitations to be gratified.

We shall not stay to speak of the genius of Coleridge. The extent of his reading, the ease with which he saw the secret of every subject, the splendor of his imagination, the force and fire of his language, are most obvious to every reader. There was one feature, however, which deserves a distinct recognition, as the key to the marked idiosyncrasy of his intellect and character. This was his entire inability to comprehend or adapt himself to the minds of other men. The richness and force of his own mind, seemed to absorb him altogether, and to shed itself like a bewildering glare over every man and thing which came near him. He imagined, or seemed to imagine, that the intellectual world of other minds moved in unison and harmony with his own; that they saw with his insight, and read with his reading, and were transferred so entirely into his consciousness, that what was to

¹ Gilman's *Life*, pp. 246—251.

him method and demonstration, was method and demonstration to them. This intellectual characteristic always pertains in a degree to every great mind, which is so borne forward by the strong stream of its own native force, or is so occupied with its own movements, as to misjudge in respect to the impression which it makes on others. But in Coleridge its development was out of all reasonable proportions; it was in very deed *monstrous*. First of all, his disposition was childlike, nay it was almost infantine, gentle, affectionate and confiding; he never dreamed of instructing others by authority, but would as soon sit at their feet to learn of them, as to place them at his own. It was only by slow experience, learned by numberless painful lessons, that he came at last to know, that all men were not like himself either in capacity or in teachableness. Then, too, Coleridge was never forced, by the routine of any profession or employment, to adapt his own mind to the workings of other minds. He was never, so to speak, interlocked and caught into the movements of the intellectual world around him.¹ In the school and the university, the ebullient and rejoicing tide of his own strong spirit, broke over all the barriers, which were fitted to guide and regulate its flowing. Domestic life, for whose fault we know not, failed to lead him by its gentler and more gradual guidance, into the ways and habits of the social world. He hardly assumed, and if he assumed, he never could fulfil the responsibilities of any regular engagement or service.

This is not all. He had good reason to be careless of the opinions of other men, and even to despise the works and ways of the generation with which he lived, especially during the earlier period of his literary life. No one who knows anything of the degeneracy of the true life of England, during the first twenty-

¹ Coleridge, in early manhood, was intimate with Mr. afterwards Sir Humphry Davy. Perhaps at that moment there were no two young minds in England, more alike in their original endowments for poetry and science, than these two young men, who were perhaps gifted with a more splendid genius than any two men of their age. This is proved by the entireness of their sympathy with each other. Their later history as we follow them in their wide divergence from each other, in respect to the movement of their minds and the positive results of each to science, is a fine comment on the difference between a man who makes his impulses his law, or in other words is a lawless rover in the intellectual world, and one who attaches himself to the minds of others, and by bending to their wants and sympathies, yields and commands his generation. In the dialogues entitled "Consolations in Travel," by Davy, there is hardly a page that does not suggest the thoughts of Coleridge, both by similarity and contrast.

five years after Coleridge appeared, can doubt, that much of his impatient contempt of his contemporaries, was honorable and only honorable to himself. His own fervent and indignant words fitly describe this condition of things, and his own feelings in respect to it. "Oh holy Paul! Oh beloved John! full of light and love, whose books are full of intuitions, as those of Paul are books of energies. O Luther! Calvin! Fox with Penn and Barclay! O Zinzendorf! and ye too, Francis of Sales and Fenelon; yea, even Aquinas and Scotus! With what astoundment would ye, if ye were alive, with your merely human perfections, listen to the creed of our, so called, rational religionists! Rational! They, who in the very outset deny all reason and leave us nothing but degrees to distinguish us from brutes;" [who apply figurative interpretation "to rot away the very pillars, yea, to fret away and dissolve the very corner stones of the temple of religion"]. "Oh place before your eyes the island of Britain, in the reign of Alfred, its unpierced woods, its wide morasses and dreary heaths, its blood-stained and desolated shores, its untaught and scanty population; behold the monarch listening now to Bede, and now to John Erigena; and then see the same realm, a mighty empire, full of motion, full of books, where the cotter's son, twelve years old, has read more than archbishops of yore, and possesses the opportunity of reading more than our Alfred himself;—and then, finally, behold this mighty nation, its rulers and its wise men, listening to—Paley, and to—Malthus! It is mournful! mournful!"¹

Nor was it for a superficial philosophy and a shallow religionism alone, that Coleridge had reason to be offended with the men of his time. In literature, too, as we should expect, their tastes were wholly at variance with his. With the exception of Burke and Cowper, how vapid and unsatisfying was the literature of England till the Lake school of poets, with their associate prose writers, fought themselves into popularity and changed for the better the current of English thought and feeling. Let any one compare the best writers in England, at the present moment, with what they were fifty years since, and how vast is the change for the better in respect to the worthiness of their themes and the manner in which they are treated.

In effecting this change Coleridge was most active. In order to effect it, he was obliged to contend against fixed habits, inveterate prejudices, acute and masterly criticism, and savage satire

¹ Southey's *Omniana*, 1812.

which gave no quarter to his own vulnerable points, and these were not a few. It is not surprising that the necessities of this contest aggravated his indifference and contempt for his contemporaries. Besides, he was treated with manifest, and it would seem, with malicious injustice, where his real excellencies demanded high praise. His mystical and extravagant metaphysics might justly have been criticised as out of place; the *strain* so often to be seen in his eloquence and poetry and the want of adaptation to the minds of others, might both have received strong and deserved rebuke, if there had been a disposition to do him homage as one of the greatest men of his own or of any age. But this was not shown. The Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews, then the sole administrators of public justice in the literary world, showed by their treatment of Coleridge, that it was their function to obey the public taste, quite as much as to command and control it. The one honored him with a vulgar and savage ridicule. The other 'damned with its faint praise,' his noblest works.¹ Let this be remembered, as a palliation that his sensitive and wronged spirit, kept itself apart from the minds of his time.

We have dwelt upon this peculiarity in the man Coleridge, because, without being distinctly aware of it and without keeping it strongly before the mind, it is impossible to do justice to the merits or the defects of his philosophy and theology.

When we open the prose writings of Coleridge and search after his opinions, we are attracted and repelled by their peculiarities of thought and of language. The glow, the freshness and force of detached passages, surprise and delight us. While the endless digressions, the remote allusions and the wild strangeness of the whole, half bewilder and distract us. Here a fairy grotto half intoxicates with its wondrous revelation, glittering with gems, and illuminated by an enchanted light, as we look in upon its long withdrawn recesses. Then a yawning cavern opens wide upon us its dark and damp mouth, into whose metaphysical recesses, frightful and bewildering, the eye seeks in vain to penetrate, and the foot fears to follow.

The fact is that these writings are, with few exceptions, strictly and literally *improvisations*. Coleridge was the greatest talker of his day, and he talked as he wrote, and wrote as he talked.

¹ It is an amusing and instructive study to follow through these Reviews, the notices, and neglect too, of Coleridge's several works, as these notices appeared or did not appear from time to time, and to contrast them with the high respect and perhaps the eulogy of these journals, when Coleridge's name is now adverted to.

He once asked Charles Lamb, whether he ever heard him preach. "I never heard you do anything else," stammered out the poet, half unconscious of the tremendous truth he uttered. When we read the writings of Coleridge, we are to take them, as coming directly and suddenly from his mind, without elaboration into method and without revision. Hence we should not be surprised to find, here a principle on which he had reflected for years, matured and ready to be plucked from the tree, and there, a mere guess or fancy that had struck him for the first time as possibly true. Nor should we be offended that his writing all seems to be framed on the basis of his own reading, so that provided a principle appears to his mind to be true, he asks not whether the argument by which he sustains it, will be understood by the recipient, and whether the illustration will or will not shed darkness and bewilderment rather than light. We must look for long and impassioned digressions, in which the mind of the *improvisateur* is given up to the passion of the moment, and sometimes for a wandering so far from the starting post that when he bethinks himself, it is too late even for the inspired one himself to find his way back.

It is allowed on all hands to be especially unfortunate for a teacher of anything, to take it for granted, that his pupil knows all that he does about the subject; especially is it unfortunate, if he also seems to think, that this knowledge lies before your mind in the same method in which it lies in his own; that it has been gathered from the same writers, and illustrated by the same facts, and is interesting from the same associations; more especially is it unfortunate, if the subject matter be subtle metaphysics or deep theology; and most especially, if the metaphysics be new, the theology novel, and the nomenclature Kantian, Platonic, Scholastic and Coleridgian. But all these *infortunissima* are to be encountered by the student of Coleridge.

One thing more and we shall have done with our premising. Coleridge is a poet and an orator as well as a metaphysician. Far be it from us to object this against him. A vivid imagination with its elastic force, and its warm glow, and its perpetual fount of striking illustrations, is no mean appendage to the theologian and philosopher. It is only inconvenient, when instead of argument we are served with a striking simile, and when after being conducted through a course of subtle distinctions and refined analysis; after having been convinced *ad nauseam* that the old dogmas are superficial and hollow, and all things are brought to

converge on the revelation of some great truth, and we are just about to spring forward to grasp it, we find in its place a *stop-gap* of some eloquent apostrophe, one fourth eloquence, one fourth poetry, one fourth philosophy and one fourth *opium*! But all this we find in the writings of Coleridge. In saying this, we do not abate in the least from the honest homage which we render him as a philosopher and theologian, but rather yield the higher homage which we owe to the truth. When we speak of the elated exhilaration, which was natural enough to an imagination so wondrous as his, as having been aggravated by the use of this drug, we do but confess our conviction of its permanent influence on the mind of one, whom we believe strove against and overcame, its unlawful dominion. There are more men than there ought to be, about whose goodness and greatness the world are less divided in opinion, than they are in respect to Coleridge, who have suffered in the soundness and reliability of their intellects from the same cause.¹

In attempting to criticise Coleridge as a Christian philosopher, it has seemed to us that his merits may be best considered under the three divisions of his general influence upon the science and study of theology, his scheme of positive opinions and his transcendental metaphysics.

First we shall consider his general services. Under this head we name first of all, the assertion to theology of its true dignity. Lord Bacon speaks of Christian theology "as the haven and sabbath of all man's contemplations;" and there have been times in the history of England when theology held this place in the estimation of her educated men. Carlyle speaks the literal truth of the times of king James I, when to be learned in theology "was not then ridiculous but glorious to be. More glorious than the monarchy of what we now call literature would be; glorious as the faculty of a Goethe holding visibly of heaven; supreme skill in theology then meant that. To know God, *Θεός*, the MAKER, to know the divine laws and *inner* harmonies of this universe, must always be the highest glory for a man! And not

¹ We must confess our surprise, that when Coleridge is arraigned before the public on his religious and his theological character, it is deemed sufficient to procure his condemnation to say, that he used opium, with no inquiry on the part of the writer, too often, and apparently with neither knowledge nor disposition to know whether there was any disease to make it necessary, as was the case with Robert Hall, who used enormous quantities; or whether he did or did not abandon the habit, or whether the triumph might not have been itself the noblest testimony to the excellence of the man and the resource of his faith.

to know them, always the highest disgrace for a man, however common it be."¹

Such was the estimation in which theology was once held in England's literature. But it had sadly fallen from this high place, especially when Coleridge began to write. Theology had not only been degraded from her position at the head of the ranks in respect to human science, but seemed to have been turned out of the ranks of science altogether. This was partly the consequence of the reigning infidelity and shallow religionism, which had infected England to its very core, in the church and out of it. It was partly owing to the impotency and cowardice of many who called themselves theologians, partly to the spirit of the cloister which has ever made her abode in the English church, and which stands ready to turn the revived intellect and zeal of that church into the monkish spirit, in order, as it would seem, to do the largest and most effectual service to prevailing unbelief.² With the decline of theology, as must of necessity be the case, mental and metaphysical science had also declined, and in their place appeared too often the acute pettifogger in the service of infidelity, or the simpering waiting-maid in the service of what ought to have been the science of Christianity. And some of the theologians who did appear for the defence of the truth in a manly armor, cut themselves off from the world of literature by their clownish and unmannerly style, their narrow and unscientific spirit, their technical formality, their scholastic distinctions, the cast-off clothes of another generation; or were repressed in their better aspirations by the frown of church authority, and the sanctionious horror of learned but monkish bigots. Theological sci-

¹ Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, Introd. Chap. IV.

² "Of the English divines in general, this was his [Dr. Arnold's] deliberate opinion; 'Why is it,' he said, 'that there are so few great works in theology compared with any other subject? Is it that all other books on the subject appear insignificant by the side of the Scriptures? There appears to me in all the English divines a want of believing or disbelieving anything, because it is true or false. Butler is indeed a noble exception.' As he excepted Butler among the divines of a later period, so among those of the earlier period, he excepted Hooker, whose Ecclesiastical Polity, as a whole, he regarded with great admiration, though with great dislike of parts of it. 'I long to see something which should solve what is to me the great problem of Hooker's mind. He is the only man that I know, who, holding with his whole mind and soul the idea of the eternal distinction between moral and positive laws, holds with it the love for a priestly and ceremonial religion, such as appears in the Fifth Book.'"—Life and Cor. of Dr. Arnold, Chap. VIII. p. 296 1st Am. ed. See also Arnold's Misc. Works, 'The Oxford Malignants.'

ence was avoided as a dry technicality, or rejected as a stupid mystery, or mocked at for its conscious impotence and its whining solicitations for the public regard.¹

It was no slight service that Coleridge rendered to theology when he stepped into this arena, to restore to her proper place on the highest throne of human science, the honored mistress of his heart. He himself having explored all the departments of

¹ We are aware that to many these remarks may, at first sight, seem to be disrespectful of worthy men, and able writers, as well as in their general tone exaggerated and sweeping. We yield to no one in the fervor of our regard, for those eminent men in the church and among the dissenters, who labored as preachers and writers, against the infidelity, the rationalism, and latitudinarianism of their time, and who left their impress upon their generation. It is not in the order of nature, however, when a great reform in the religious life of a people occurs, after so great a degeneracy, as that which prevailed in England during the 18th century, that it should commence in the high places of literature and theology. The intellect of a people declines with its piety, and piety must first be enkindled before the intellect is invigorated. Able preachers and practical writers will appear before eminent Christian writers and thinkers.

It would however be more than affectation to conceal the opinion we hold, that owing to the fatal genius of the English church, blighting and misdirecting the highest gifts of piety and talent within its pale, and starving and overawing the dissenters out of it, that scientific theology, or manly and earnest thinking on the great themes of revelation, has been discountenanced and discouraged on English soil. In consequence, English literature and English theology have suffered and continue to suffer, in spite of all the ability which is active at this moment, to bring it back to its allegiance to God.

We add also that we speak not of this or that sect, but of the whole of England, and of necessity of that large body of thinking and cultivated men who are trained in the universities, and nurtured in the church, and to whom English theology so long owed a fearful debt through her apathy and negligence. We speak with the ideal in mind, of what the literature of a Christian nation ought to be, so rich in culture and so abundant in genius; how reverent towards the word of God, how believing and fervent in its spirit, how elevated and purifying in its tone, while yet it should not in the least for all this, fail to fill its appropriate place as literature. This ideal we contrast with the *reality* forced upon our convictions, in the actual state of English literature, during the period in question. We speak with the standard in our eye, of what ought to have been the place which Christian theology should hold in the literature of a great Christian empire like England; of what ought to have been the manliness and severity of the discipline of its youth in mental and moral science at its universities; and of what ought to have been the intellectual power and the commanding sway of its theologians whom it trained in its cathedrals and cloistered halls, and whom it sustained by princely revenues. But enough; we began in the tone of apology, remembering a Horsley and a Hall, Warburton, a Berkeley and Campbell, whose memory we would not dishonor; we check ourselves, lest our apology become a sharper invective, excited by the evil in the case.

human knowledge, having shown himself a master of the highest culture in literature, exalts theology as the end of all study, the Bible as the noblest of all books, and an earnest and even passionate devotion as the proper inspiration and aim of every thinking man. In doing this, Coleridge may have said many things gratuitously obscure, he may have made himself ridiculously brave and contemptuous, through his devotion to the truth, but he certainly spoke to the intellect and wants and hearts of his generation, and gained a hearing and a homage for Christian philosophy. Coleridge had too strong a hold on the literary world to be denied a hearing. He compelled that world to listen, notwithstanding the long and fierce outcry of his opposers, and the foolish occasion which he too often gave for that outcry. He spoke with words so charmed and powerful that they could not but listen, and as they listened they felt, that the words were not the words of a priest and a bigot, but of a man and a thinker. It is sad that professed theologians have not more carefully studied the minds of the men of their day, and sought to be heard for the truth by the mass of the educated, in a language which is common to the republic of letters, instead of talking always like preachers and in the technics of the pulpit.¹ Channing knew and did better; and hence his reputation and his influence; a reputation which must decline, when at a review, the world becomes aware of the poverty and fewness of his ideas, the impotence of his logic, with his want of severe science and of a satisfying theology.

Another service which Coleridge rendered theology, was the assertion of the indispensable importance to the theologian of a sound and scientific philosophy of man. Indeed it is on the field of mental and moral science that Christian theology joins herself to the world of thinking men, and commands their attention and secures their homage. It was by awakening their dissatisfaction with the narrow range of the philosophy current in England and its superficial spirit, and by seeking to introduce a better system, that he rested his hopes for a thorough vindication of Christian truth. We can hardly credit or do justice to the low state of the-

¹ Of living theologians, Chalmers may be named as the most illustrious exception to these remarks, and hence his power and usefulness. We lament that the career of the truly great Edward Irving, did not fulfil his early aims and brilliant promise, not so much in respect to severe theology, as to the eloquent and powerful enforcement of Christian truth on the cultivated men of his time.

logical science in the English church, at this period. Its natural theology might be comprehended in the proposition, "design proves a designer." Its defence of the Christian revelation, in the assertion, "men supernaturally commissioned have wrought miracles," and its dogmatic theology might be summed up in a few hackneyed common-places, and proof-texts slavishly transmitted from other generations, with hardly a scrutiny of the justness of their interpretation.

In opposition to this dead sea of heartless and lazy belief, Coleridge boldly and truly asserted, that Christianity was its own best evidence, and for this he gained the reputation of being a sad infidel. But without greatly regarding this, he declared likewise that Christianity to be seen to be true, must be thoroughly scanned as a system of truth and of provisions for the wants of men. But in order to be seen as such, man must be known in his nature, his capacities, his guilt, and certain great truths concerning God which are known to man by the reason and assumed by him as the basis of all his moral judgments and of his religious faith. These are to be studied, earnestly and in the spirit of true science, in order to prepare the way for a vindication of Christian truth. When, too, we proceed to inquire what are the particular doctrines of this revelation, we are to carry into the investigation the most acute analysis, the most rigid adherence to logic in definition and argument, and the purest love of scientific truth. Theology pursued on such principles, he rightly judged, would first of all be respected, and instead of uttering apologies to the learned classes, would give to them laws. The thoroughness of its processes would invigorate the intellect and give tone to the moral sentiment of the educated, while the startling truths which are revealed in man's being, and the solemn verities which a scientific philosophy unveils, would quicken and convict the conscience and prepare it to greet the revelations and assistances of the Christian faith.

That this view of the subject is correct, we have not the least doubt. Still there has existed a strong fear of all scientific or philosophical theology as hostile to the simplicity of the truth as it is in Jesus. Many grave cautions have been uttered on this subject. We would that every one who utters them could feel *not* merely that they are anile, for then they would be harmless, but that they do a positive mischief, and are the direct producers of a contemptuous infidelity. For first, it is the plainest of all facts, that these declaimers against philosophy in

religion, do in the same breath hug the remnants of an old philosophy in the shape of definitions or arguments. Secondly, the true way to cut off theology from its hold upon thinking men, is to deny its connection with and its allegiance to science at large; and thirdly, the attempt to do without science, is suicidal and vain. The very arguments against its use will be found to be scientific. The attempt to define your opinions, to frame your definitions and to construct your arguments, will lead you at once to philosophizing, so that the only alternative is either not to think at all, or to think strongly and boldly. It is but too evident that some of the declaimers against philosophy give themselves up to the former alternative, with a very meek submissiveness.

But theology to be scientific must be bold and free. In imposing upon it the obligation to be philosophical, Coleridge asserted for theology the privilege to be free. He did not encourage it to be rash or irreverent or libertine, but he demanded for it the right to derive from every premise the conclusions which were involved in that premise, and to make reasoning in theology follow the laws of reasoning in anything beside. He could not but despise the hollow subterfuges, the unfair expedients, the reasoning to the ear rather than the mind, and the special pleading by which the theology of the *routine* fills up so many deep gulfs and dodges the force of so many cogent arguments.

But while his theology was free, it was eminently conservative, or because it was conservative, it could afford to be free. It was conservative, in laying broadly and deeply its premises in the moral nature of man, or as he would call it, the practical reason, by asserting the degeneracy and ruin of this nature, not indeed by propounding absurdities, but by probing deeply into the wound. On this basis with his grand and worthy justification, on grounds of reason, of the moral glory of a reigning God, he could not but provide for a Christian theology, which in its practical essentials was true. Having done this he could afford to leave non-essentials which were questioned, to be thoroughly discussed, and could afford also to do justice to the difficulties of every such matter. It is such theologians as seem not to recognize the difference between a cobweb and a corner-stone, who cry:

"Touch not a cobweb in St. Paul's,
Lest the whole dome should fall."

It was conservative and liberal, too, from the principle asserted so often by him, that "Christianity is not a scheme of philosophy

but a life ; that it is not a philosophy of life, but a life and living process." While the student is to be instructed, in the schools, in all that pertains to the science of theology, he is sent out of the schools to learn what Christianity is as a practical system. The bread of life may be analyzed in the laboratory, but it is to be eaten at the table. So the novice in theology is not suffered to content himself with the highest attainments or the most dexterous mastery of logic, but is sent to another school for the highest and best of learning. How many zealous defenders of orthodoxy are slow to adopt this distinction. To admit it would be to lower the estimate of their favorite opinions, would be to admit that these forms of words are not the very gist and essence of the inspired word. How carefully do such make the existence of piety to depend upon the reception of their *formula*, and make the rejection of their theory a test and evidence of depravity. While then for the appropriate objects and ends of theology proper, Coleridge made theology scientific and free, he made her secondary to the greatest and the immediate object of the Christian revelation. Not only did he do this, but he made the living experience of the Christian to be a most important source of instruction as the material of theology, giving reality to its speculations, presenting things in place of theories, and causing the living and present joys and sorrows, hopes and fears of the man himself to contribute interest and materials to his reasonings. Thus did he make the piety of the Christian subservient to the highest accomplishments of the student.

This distinction between the speculative and practical views of the theologian, while it was congenial to the growth and culture of ardent piety, was also used by him as the basis of a charitable toleration. It enabled him to conceive that a man's speculative system might be sadly deficient and false, while yet his practical views might be just and safe. It was a favorite saying of his, that "Unitarianism could not be Christianity, but Unitarians might be Christians;" for no man can tell what view of religious truth another might take when he applied it to his own use, nor under what ignorance or prejudice or unhappy associations an important doctrine of the creed might be so clouded, as to be rejected without moral depravity as the cause.

This distinction is very different from that liberalism, which rather deserves the name of libertinism,¹ which makes all forms

¹ His protest against the indifference to religious opinions which was so prevalent in the higher literary circles, and which was fostered with a daring

of faith indifferent, because it is equally heartless towards all. It provides for the most earnest vigilance against every false statement and insufficient explanation, as being, if not an immediate, yet a slow poison to the life of the church. It inculcates the most earnest zeal and the most active energy in the propagation of our own opinions, while it forbids us to judge unfavorably of the character of the man who differs from us. The adoption of it by the differing theologians of the day, would give them new zeal and diligence in the discovery and propagation of what they believe to be the truth, while it would secure to them all a sweeter temper towards their neighbors.

We name another service which Coleridge has rendered to theological science, the assertion of the following principle, which we give in his own language. "The following may, I think, be taken as a safe and useful rule in religious inquiries. Ideas that derive their origin and substance from the *moral* being, and to the reception of which as true *objectively*, (i. e. as corresponding to a reality out of the human mind,) we are determined by a *practical* interest exclusively, may not like theoretical or speculative positions be pressed into all their possible *logical* consequences."—*Aids to Reflection*, pp. 108, 9. The same principle is differently applied by him in the following words. "From these premises I proceeded to draw the following conclusions. First, that having once fully admitted the existence of an infinite yet self-conscious Creator, we are not allowed to ground the irrationality of any other article of faith on arguments, which would equally prove that to be irrational, which we had allowed to be *real*. Secondly, that whatever is deducible from the admission of a *self-comprehending* and *creative* spirit may be legitimately used in proof of the *possibility* of any further mystery concerning the divine nature."—*Lit. Life*, p. 120, 2nd Am. ed. We should express the principle thus: That when we are fully possessed of the pre-

that to a man, familiar with things as they are now, might seem almost incredible, was earnest and passionate, so earnest and passionate, as to have been one of the principal causes of his great unpopularity. Of himself and his position he says:

" 'Tis true that passionate for ancient truths
And honoring with religious love the great
Of elder times, he hated to excess,
With an unquiet and intolerant scorn,
The hollow puppets of an hollow age,
Ever idolatrous, and changing ever
Its worthless idols."—*Tombless Epitaph*.

mises in regard to any point, we may push those premises to their legitimate and logical conclusion. There is no danger in logic, then, but it is to be followed wherever it may lead us. But wherever we are not masters of the premises, we may reason only from what we know. If what we know is determined by a moral necessity and is an act of faith, we may not push that of which we are not masters to any conclusion, nor may we admit objections which are directed against what we do not thoroughly know. This principle would silence every objection against the doctrine of the Trinity, on the ground that we are perfectly aware that in regard to the subject matter, about which we reason, i. e. Deity, there are difficulties, yea, so-called contradictions as great as any which this doctrine presents, but which we are forced to set aside, by a higher necessity of evidence. We believe in God because we must be true to evidence in spite of these objections and almost impossibilities. On sufficient evidence then we may affirm of the same existence, Tri-unity. This principle would rule out of court all *metaphysical* objections against the sovereignty and electing purpose of God, if it were needed for this service. So also it would greatly limit the freedom and range of our speculation in respect to the origin of evil, and make them, as they ought to be, negative and hypothetical. Its operation might be unfortunate in its influence on some New England speculations, and might dissipate some fears of fatal error in respect to points which are placed forever out of the reach of positive science.¹

¹ The quotations which we have given, must be seen in their place and read in their connection, to be appreciated. The first relates to metaphysical reasonings in respect to election, the second to the doctrine of the Trinity. The fact is not often sufficiently heeded by theologians, that in regard to the grounds of our faith and the fundamental truths of all religion, there is never evidence strictly demonstrative, but it is always moral. Indeed, to one who understands logic in its largest sense, it is clear it must be so. Demonstrative reason presupposes a premise, and is deductive from that premise. Demonstration in theology, is possible in reasoning to its *dependent* and *secondary* truths. But in proving its first truths, we are as it were, seeking our premises, and of course our reasoning is *inductive*. Of most of these religious truths, it is found to be true that they are attended by difficulties, and in resting upon them we make as it were our choice of evils. We are Theists, rather than Atheists or Pantheists, strictly speaking, not because there are no arguments for Atheism and Pantheism, but because there are more and higher for Theism. Hence the possibility and the duty of faith.

When we rest on the conclusion that there is a God, we find on reflection, that we have received a truth which it is utterly impossible for us to conceive

It should be observed, however, that it gives no license to theology to be inconsistent with itself, to affirm one thing in the premise and to deny it in the conclusion. In respect to all subjects, on which consciousness furnishes the facts, as in respect to the nature of sin, the competence of man to do all that God requires of him, and the fact of human freedom, definitions are to be respected, and a rigid logic is to be enforced, because the definitions are complete and logic is appropriate. Sin and duty and freedom are quite within the reach of human reasoning, and here reasoning should hold to a strict account those who would transgress her rules and dodge her influences.

We refer this distinction to Coleridge, not because it has not been acted on by other philosophers, but because we have nowhere seen it so clearly stated, and so strongly conceived, as by him. Were it rigidly enforced; could its lines be drawn deep and inefaceable through the whole domain of metaphysical theology, it would bring to pass most healthful and far-reaching consequences. The mysteries of this theology would cease to perplex us, not because we should have mastered them, nor because we should have been forced to retire in disgust and disappointment after many a trial, but because we should know *why* and

of in all its parts, nay, the instant we attempt to reason on the parts of the conception, and neglect to keep in mind that there are parts of it which we cannot compass, we are led to conclusions which destroy and render impossible the existence about which we reason. Existence in all our knowledge of it and notions of it, involves the beginning to exist. If we reason in respect to existence, as predicated of the Deity as involving this conception, as we shall be likely to do, if we reason at all, we can in an instant prove that there not only does not, but that there cannot exist such a being as God, i. e. a God existing without beginning to exist. It is with the highest reason, then, that we conclude that a being whose *existence* contradicts and shocks all our previous conceptions of existence, may have that existence in a Tri-unity, even if existence in this peculiar way, does also contradict and shock our previous conceptions; that the God in respect to whom we understand not, how *he exists*, may also exist in a way which we do not understand. And if the poverty of human language, or rather the poverty of human conception, as the stuff out of which language is made, forces God to reveal this doctrine, and man to speak of it in propositions which in one way may be shown to be contradictory,—is that man a philosopher who asks, whether three can be one and one can be three, and makes that the beginning, middle and end of his argument against the Trinity? Why does he not ask as well, whether a being can exist, and not begin to exist? If for the difficulties of the case he is an *Anti-Trinitarian*, why not for the difficulties in the case be an *Anti-Theist*? We suppose that the positive proof is sufficient, and that our objector says, as is so often said, the doctrine is *impossible* under any amount of evidence.

how far they were beyond our reach. On the other hand, those truths which we can compass would be boldly canvassed and strongly affirmed.

Coleridge again deserves high credit for having seized the right method in theological inquiry, especially in conducting the argument for the truth and divine origin of the Christian revelation. We have already hinted at this method. It seeks to vindicate Christianity from its very nature and essential principles, as adapted to man. Of course it first learns what that nature is, what are its relations to God, what is its guilt and what are its wants. In raising these questions, it supposes that they are capable of being answered, of being answered satisfactorily, of being strongly and urgently answered. Then it supposes, that that which claims to be Christianity, is capable of being clearly understood, as a practical system, in the living realities which it declares, in the premises which it proffers, and in the mere experiencing its consolations and its power, whose words it records and whose hearts it opens to view. It would first settle the question whether it meets these wants of man, and steps in to supply his need before it would raise any other. The other questions in respect to its historic truth, the credibility of its miracles and the nature and proof of Scriptural inspiration, it would leave alone, for the time, or rather it would gather light and aid to all these, from what Christianity is proved to be in itself. These questions depend for their strongest evidence upon the nature of the truth about which they are concerned. This truth gives them their interest and adjusts their claims.

Coleridge had learned this from his own experiences. He himself had struggled through the "reign of chaos and old night," oppressed by its darkness and stifled by its thin and deadly air. From an irreligious and almost atheistic Socialism, through a vapid Humanitarianism, and a still more dreary metaphysic Pantheism, he had become reconciled to the truth as it is in Jesus, and embraced it with the total energy of his soul. This truth he had justified to himself by the method described, and having threaded and cut this path for himself through the snare of thorny speculation, he commended it to others with impassioned fervor. "Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the *want* of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his *need* of it; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence, remembering only the express declaration of Christ: No man cometh to me unless the Father leadeth him."

The justice of this reproach, and the earnestness with which Coleridge strove in the defence of this method of proof, can be appreciated by those only who understand the views then current in the church of England.

Two parties then divided the church, the Old Churchman, to whose mind the final cause of the revelation of the Old and New Testament, was the establishment of the church of England and the three orders of the ministry, and who limited the moral revelation of the New Testament, to the assertion of the doctrine of a future state, which was confirmed by miracles, and a title to which was to be attained by baptismal regeneration, and assured in the eucharist. This class of men holding in their Christianity views of morality and religion, which a Platonist or Stoic would have rejected for their contemptible shallowness, would of course reject those views of natural religion, which Coleridge propounded, as being more than they believed revelation to include. They branded him as a mystic, for his piety, and as an infidel, for denying that the Bible did not reveal, but presupposed the doctrines of immortality, and that of man's responsibility. On the other hand were the evangelical school, men faithful and true in their place, but many of them too busy to make a thorough examination of the difficulties of infidelity, or too contemptuous of infidels as a "graceless crew," to do justice to their wants, or too unscientific to care for method and science in theology. Both together were a degenerate race, when compared with the heroes of the days of Elizabeth and of James.

In our own country the degeneracy was not so great. A better theology was with us. Other views of the nature of Christianity here prevailed, and far higher and more thorough methods of defending Christian truth. But even here, there was too little knowledge of the true method of defending the gospel. We have not depended on Coleridge for all that has been learned on this subject. Our own New-England theology is in its nature metaphysical and scientific, and has never forgotten that a thing to stand, must have something to stand upon; that Christianity supposes a conscience and a moral nature. But even with us, while a fearful rationalism is eating away at the very heart of society, accomplished in its culture, extensive in its reading, acute in its detection of fallacies and prompt to expose them, and laying hold of much of the literary taste and talent among us, it is mournful to think how few who call themselves theologians, know or care anything about it. They will not care, be-

cause it is easier to cry infidel, than it is to vanquish the infidel. They will not know, because it would make their heads ache to study Spinoza and Strauss. And so they easily resign the whole affair to the interposition of heavenly grace; forgetting that when this grace overthrew the Pharisaism of the Jew, and the philosophism of the Greek, it was by the logic of Paul, as he argued with both, and overcame them too.

The actual influence of Coleridge against the infidelity of his day, was greatly impeded by the studied neglect, the bitter contempt, and the ignorant prejudices which were arrayed against him in the church and out of it. But that it wrought a good work, we do not doubt. He records himself as hearing, that an eminent man who had read his views of the argument for miracles, leaped up in ecstasy, exclaiming: "Thank God, I am forced to be an infidel no longer." He speaks also of his intensely painful regrets, on hearing that Shelly in the last months of his life, when troubled with conflicting thoughts and fears, had expressed the belief that no man but Coleridge could resolve his doubts, and guide his mind aright. To the influence of Coleridge's conversations and his writings, may be traced much of the dawn and progress of a better theology and philosophy, among the educated classes of England.

Indeed, with all the drawbacks to his influence from circumstances and from his own modes of thinking and writing, he could not but be felt. He was a man of commanding genius, a poet of splendid fame, and eloquent as a writer of prose. He was a layman, with no preferment to covet or to win, and writing as a man to his fellow man, with whom he would cherish the strongest sympathy, as with a fellow inquirer concerning God and eternity. He had that peculiar charm, and power in these reasonings which he so often lacked in others, of putting himself in the place of those with whom he reasoned, of understanding their difficulties and sympathizing with their feelings. He showed the spirit of a philosopher, fair, open, conceding, boldly facing all real difficulties and taking no *theological* advantages, and yet the ardor of a seraph asserting the dignity of holiness, the emptiness of sin, the weakness and guilt of man, the hollowness of his self-wrought system of righteousness, and the divine fitness of Christianity as a gift worthy of God, and a blessed boon to man.¹

¹ Dr. Arnold writes thus to Coleridge's nephew: "I have just got the fourth volume of your uncle's literary remains, which makes me regard him with

We might specify other general services rendered by Coleridge to theology. Here we think was his great strength. But we must proceed to the next division of our inquiries.

• We are now to consider Coleridge as a theologian, properly so called; i. e. as an expounder and defender of the doctrines of the Christian Scriptures. Here we might anticipate that he would fail; at least we might expect that he would not fulfil the high anticipations, raised from his splendid and various genius. We have already remarked of him, that he never produced finished works, that all his products are *improvisatory*, with a mixture of genius and guessing, of thoughts comprehensive, striking and true, and of fancies, wild, unfounded and capricious. What he *might* have produced, had he given himself time, and subdued his power to the yoke of self-suspecting patience, of a scrutinizing analysis and of an elaborate revision, is quite another matter.

• The aim of Coleridge as a theologian was noble. It was to justify the ways of God to man. It was to show that "the Christian faith is the perfection of human reason," or in other words that all its truths fall in with reason, as far as she is competent to judge, and that when Christianity presents new truths, it is only when reason is at loss, and feels her wants and rejoices in the assistance of a guide and helper. He would approach Christianity as a philosophical inquirer, recognizing all the facts in man's condition—his moral nature in the rigor and severity of its demands, his guilt, his conscious weakness, all as justified by and enforced upon his convicted reason, and by this means would lead philosophy to find herself, before she should know it, "hanging out signals of distress as she approached the borders of a continuous theology." This last was all that Coleridge proposed to attempt in the "Aids to Reflection," his only strictly theological work. He had proposed to do more before he should die—to prepare an elaborate work, in which Christianity should be positively affirmed rather than defended negatively; but the comple-

greater admiration than ever. He seems to hold that point which I have never yet been able to find in any of our English divines, and the want of which so mars my pleasure in reading them. His mind is at once rich and vigorous and comprehensive and critical; while the *θεος* is so pure and so lively all the while. He seems to me to love truth really, and therefore truth presented herself to him not negatively, as she does to many minds, who can see that the objections against her are unfounded and therefore that she is to be received; but she filled him, as it were heart and mind, imbuing him with her very self, so that all his being comprehended her fully and loved her ardently; and that seems to me to be true wisdom."—*Life and Correspondence*, Chap. IX.

tion of this work was one of the many things which he never achieved.

The error of Coleridge as a theologian, which we first name, was that of seeking in the Scriptures truth strictly and appropriately philosophical. It is one thing to seek to express and to justify philosophically the truths which the Scriptures reveal, and quite another thing to maintain that the Scriptures use certain terms in the same strict and scientific sense in which you employ them. No man can take the first step in the study of theology without doing the former. Every scheme of theology proposes it. Every theological professor makes the attempt. However much he may decry philosophy in theology, and however unskillfully he may mingle reasoning and assertion, science and proof-texts, he does yet attempt to be a philosopher. This philosophy must progress. For as the knowledge of man advances, so will the truths of Christianity receive new light and illustration. As the nomenclature of moral and mental science is widened and made more precise, so will scriptural truths be translated into these technical terms. But on the other hand, the carrying philosophy into the Scriptures, by foisting scientific terms into the place of figurative and popular language, or by dexterously or violently thrusting under a word which is spelled with the same letters, a term strictly metaphysical, this is to spoil the Scriptures, if it is not to spoil the man through "philosophy and vain deceit." This was done by Coleridge in a singular inconsistency with certain maxims of his own to the contrary. This was done by President Edwards not a little. We crave the pardon, while we say this, of those zealous Edwardians who never read Edwards, and who of course will think that we do him injustice. So did Emmons with a high hand. It is almost impossible that any metaphysician should wholly avoid it. Through his familiarity with abstract phraseology, it seems to him as plain as a popular language, so that he unconsciously interchanges the one for the other. When a philosopher reads the Scriptures he can hardly avoid doing it through his metaphysical eye-glass.

We contend as earnestly as Coleridge ever did, for a most thorough philosophical training, in order to form an accomplished theologian.¹ We respond most heartily to all that the accom-

¹ This necessity would arise if from no other cause, from the fact, that every thinker will endeavor to make all his knowledge consistent with itself, and to justify his religious belief, whatever it may be, with his belief in respect to mental and physical phenomena. If perchance he should adopt views in re-

plished editor of Coleridge has said on this subject in his Preliminary Essay. But when he says that "the apostles John and Paul were, in the view of this system of philosophy, the most rational of all writers, and the New Testament the most philosophical of all books" we must deny the truth of his statement, in the sense in which he and Coleridge would understand it. The New Testament, so far from being a philosophical book, has not, so far as form and style are concerned, a particle of philosophy in it. This is its glory, its beauty, its adaptation to universal man, and one of the most convincing evidences of its divine origin; that uttering truths the most profound, and in such wonderful profusion, every one of which has been for ages and is still a problem for science and a study for a life, it has revealed them in popular phraseology, and addressed them to the popular mind.¹ There is hardly a

spect to man or nature, which render it impossible that the Scriptures should be true and these views also; or which forbid him to receive certain doctrines of the Scriptures, he will be strongly inclined to reject the Scriptures; much more strongly than to review and correct his philosophy. The most effectual and often the only possible way, to prepare him to weigh again the revealed truths to which you would gain his faith, is to show him that his philosophy is deficient and false. In this way in all ages and especially in the present age, the saying of Tucker is illustrated, that "the science of abstruse learning, when completely attained, is like Achilles' spear, that healeth the wounds it had made before; so this knowledge serves to repair the damage itself had occasioned." To one who has had any actual experience by conversing with infidels of philosophic minds, and who has observed how inveterately their fondly cherished systems become intertwined with their entire intellectual being, or to one who has noticed what a fearfully cold shadow, a shallow and animal philosophy, and a mysterious metaphysic Pantheism, are now casting over large sections of Christendom, this negative service of philosophy would not be lightly esteemed. To one, however, who believes that all truth is harmonious, and consistent as God is, and that the effort to understand all truth scientifically, is not merely the dignity but is the duty of the reflecting believer, all argument on such a subject is "a grand impertinence."

¹ We think the distinction here made sufficiently obvious, yet to avoid the possibility of being misunderstood, we add: the Scriptures use the words conscience and heart, spirit, to choose, to will, and other terms which philosophers also use, though it is to be observed that just in proportion as the term is abstract, just in that proportion is it sparingly employed. But they use these terms in that breadth and "generalness" of meaning which a child can comprehend, and yet utter truths in respect to these things, which a philosopher after analyzing and comparing to his utmost power, finds something remaining to be done on the morrow. But when the philosopher, instead of regarding the fact that these terms are used in the popular sense, after defining conscience and heart in metaphysic phrase, dexterously or by a blunder finds these terms in the Scriptures as he defines them, then does he make the Scriptures philosophical.

philosophical term or expression in the New Testament, while the majority of its terms are so far from being scientific that they are strongly and vividly figurative. But the disciple of Coleridge or any other philosopher guilty of his error, will say: 'Does it teach no philosophical truth? Does it teach nothing? Will you evaporate from it all its meaning by turning it into a series of strained hyperboles or of oriental imaginations?' To this we reply: The New Testament teaches much truth, and truth the most positive, relating to matters, too, in respect to which philosophy concerns herself; but it reveals no truth in a philosophical shape and method, and to justify the fact that this may be so, and yet the Scriptures be still most true, we have only to avail ourselves of the most excellent distinction drawn by your great master, between Christianity and the philosophy of Christianity. The one is a life nourished by a belief in Christian truth, as it is revealed to universal man; the other a justification of this truth to reflecting man. Thus much on this point. The instances in which Coleridge has committed this error, we shall adduce in their place.

A prominent aim with Coleridge was, to justify the peculiar truths of Christianity. It was not to give a body of divinity, nor to consider at length the subordinate topics in the Christian system; nor was it merely to prepare the way for the topics of Christian theology, by an orderly discussion of the truths of natural theology; but it was to vindicate what he considered the truths which make Christianity a peculiar system, to vindicate them from objections, and to excite in them positive interest and hearty faith by reflection. In doing this he desired to shake off the dead weights that had been hung upon its neck by two classes of theologians, the low Arminian and the ultra Calvinist. The one degraded man by a sensual and shallow philosophy, in order to justify its miserably formal and meaningless Christianity. It would hardly allow him the anticipation of a future state, or the possession of a conscience, that it might provide something for Christianity to reveal. The other shocked the reason of man by its iron fatalism, and offended his conscience by making him so wicked as not to have the capacity of being guilty. Against the one Coleridge contended, that man's nature was of a far nobler capacity than he would allow, and that his spiritual wants were far deeper; and of consequence, Christianity was given for a different purpose, than to make a church establishment possible as a means of keeping the people in order. Against the other, that man in his deepest guilt was still himself the offender and the

guilty; that this was possible because his nature was spiritual and therefore *free*; and that the interposition of God for man was in the line of that high nature and in consistency with all its faculties. Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection* is not in form controversial, but it is so *in fact*; intensely and earnestly controversial, and against the systems already named, the Infidel, the Arminian and the ultra Calvinistic. Unless a man keeps in mind that it was in a community possessed by these schemes and submerged by them that Coleridge wrote, he cannot understand him. Unless he reads his writings from this point of view, he cannot read them aright.

The ground of these three erroneous systems was in his view one and the same; low views of man as capable of spiritual knowledge and a spiritual life, and low views of the universe both physical and intellectual as a vast structure of dead forces, rather than a glorious world of life animated by living laws. As introductory to his views of Christianity, he contends for higher views of man as capable of science and of faith, by the endowment of reason, speculative and practical; and as capable of spiritual influences, by having a will, which must be the spiritual in man, if there be any such thing. And as the active forces of nature act conjointly, yet in secret, to develop and sustain the mysterious life of the plant, so may the spiritual force of the higher universe act in and by and with the spirit in man. Had it been the object of Coleridge to argue in this way against one class of objectors, or that system of philosophy common to all of them which would exclude the doctrine of spiritual influences, a doctrine so plainly revealed in the Christian system, the object would have been good and the argument, as a popular argument, legitimate. But when he makes this assertion of the Spirit to be the peculiar doctrine of Christianity, and indeed to be the whole of Christianity, he takes a ground which is unauthorized by the Scriptures, and which vitiates his whole scheme of Christian doctrine.

But the provision of the Spirit's influences for man with its effects and operation on the believer, Coleridge makes to be Christianity, as far as it is a peculiar system. To make these influences possible to man, was the object of the sufferings and death and resurrection of Christ; "these all were essential and effective parts of the great redemptive act, whereby also the obstacle from the corruption of our nature is rendered no longer insurmountable."—*Aids to Reflection*, pp. 127, 128 1st, Am. Ed. The writings of John are the books in the New Testament in which

Christianity is nakedly and strongly stated, without figure or imagery. "He used to say," says Gilman, "in St. John is the philosophy of Christianity, in St. Paul the moral reflex."—*Life*, p. 317. v. 1. We call the attention of our readers distinctly and strongly to the fact that this, in the view of Coleridge, is the central or rather the one doctrine of Christianity. We do not make quotations, or multiply references. There is no need that we should. But it is necessary that the fact should be kept in mind by the man who would understand the Christian theology of Coleridge.

We assert again, that this view is wholly unauthorized by the Scriptures. First and foremost of all, there is no passage in the Scriptures where this is said to be the great, much less the sole object of the incarnation, etc. Of this more anon. Secondly, Coleridge has no right to confine himself to John as the philosopher of Christianity rather than Paul. If either is to be preferred as the philosopher, Paul should have the preference, from all the habits of his mind. Then, they are neither of them philosophers in the sense in which Coleridge would make John to be, that is, they neither of them assert scientific truth, much less in scientific phrase. John does indeed give greater prominence to the doctrine of the Spirit, his influence and his effects, though no greater than does Paul in parts of his writings. But to find in the various and figurative language of the 6th, 14th, 15th, and 16th chapters of his Gospel and in the whole of his Epistles, the terms life, spirit, etc., used in the precise and determinate sense in which Coleridge uses them, or to contend that here is the philosophy of Christianity, when the Epistles to the Romans and the Hebrews are set aside as such, is contrary to the laws of interpretation.

We would add, also, that there is an oversight in respect to the attitude in which Christianity finds man, and in which it ministers aid to him. Christianity finds man a guilty being, actively and personally guilty, not merely in single acts and by separate and individual offences, but guilty in his heart, guilty in his character. As such it deals with him, by the revelation of an incarnate God, to move him by this display of love, to provide for a way of pardon consistent with the holiness of Jehovah. It reveals an influence divine and spiritual, which leads him to repentance, and sustains and aids him in his struggles with his sinful self. It is in its moral relations to man that the doctrine of the Spirit is revealed. Not as bringing back a part of man necessary to any moral life, nor as sustaining it with him, as the vital air invigorates and gives life to the inspiring lungs. With those who choose to af-

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firm, that these influences are essential to any holiness or moral perfection, we will not contend. But it is not in this office or this relation that the doctrine of the Spirit is revealed, but as a remedial agent to a sinful being.

To one who would still argue that without this spiritual *substratum* or ground, as the condition of acceptable holiness, religion is nothing more than morality,¹ there being nothing peculiar to religion; we reply, that a being like man, under a commanding and supreme purpose to be all and to do all to God and man of which he is capable, to love God with all his soul, might, strength, and his neighbor as himself, would have both religion and morality enough to satisfy the ideal of a reasonable philosopher. Whether there is needed a spiritual influence or not, as the physical or moral condition of such a character, is a question of fact, to be argued in its proper place and by its proper evidence. It is not required to find a place for religion as a commanding principle. The commanding force of religion comes from the commanding character of the truths, or rather the Being, which religion reveals, and of the affections which these truths inspire.

It ought not to be surprising that Coleridge, with these views of the Scriptures as teaching metaphysical truth, and of the revelation of the spirit as the central doctrine of Christianity, should have proved himself strangely weak and unworthy of confidence as an interpreter of particular passages of the Scriptures. Strange it is indeed that one with a mind so gifted, able to enter into the spirit of the sacred writers as a critic, as he manifestly was, and so acute and masterly as he showed himself to be in many of his criticisms on the false interpretation of others, and with so much of the knowledge requisite, should have failed so entirely when he came to the service of directly discerning the sense of the sacred writers and of drawing from them the leading truths which they reveal. A Platonizing father of the third or fourth century could hardly make worse mistakes, than Coleridge has done in many instances. With all the sense and acuteness, which he shows often in single comments, it is most surprising that he should have originated and sustained so deliberate and apparently so honest a subjection of the Scriptures to his notion of the spiritual, pressing the term into his metaphysical notion of it, as being free-will and the reason, and making it swallow and absorb that which is the main doctrine of the New Testament.

We come now to consider particularly Coleridge's views of the

¹ Coleridge asserts and implies this throughout the *Aids to Reflection*.

doctrine of redemption. We must keep in mind the theologians whom Coleridge had in his eye, and from whom he would defend his own views. First, the Church Arminian, who believed that Christ died to rise again, in order that all baptized persons might have a comfortable belief of their own immortality. Against these he argued, that the truth was believed already, and to make this the only end of the incarnation, the sufferings and death of the Redeemer, was to do the most shocking injustice to the solemnity of the transaction itself, and to the scriptural descriptions of it; that its import was immensely higher and more sacred than this.¹ Secondly, he argues against the ultra Calvinists, or rather against one view held by such, that the redemptive act consisted in payment of a debt due to the divine justice. This is the only theory of the atonement against which he argues in form, and he demolishes it effectually, if indeed it needed to be thus "thrice slain."² But he advances principles in respect to the interpretation of the Scripture passages, which are very sweeping, and which if received in all their length and breadth, would destroy every doctrine of the atonement, properly so called. "Now the article of redemption may be considered in a twofold relation; in relation to the antecedent, i. e. the Redeemer's act as the efficient cause and condition of redemption; and in relation to the consequent, i. e. the effects in and for the redeemed. Now it is the latter relation in which the subject is treated of, set forth, expanded and enforced by St. Paul. The mysterious act, the operative cause is *transcendent*, FACTUM EST; and beyond the information contained in the enunciation of the FACT, it can be characterized only by the *consequences*." "The learned Apostle has drawn four principal metaphors, by which he illustrates the blessed *consequences* of Christ's redemption of mankind. These are: 1. Sin-offerings, sacrificial expiation. 2. Reconciliation, atonement, *καταλλαγή*. 3. Ransom from slavery, redemption,

¹ "Yes, fervently do I contend, that to satisfy the understanding that there is a future state, was not the *specific* object of the Christian dispensation; and that neither the belief of a future state, nor the *rationality* of this belief, is the *exclusive* attribute of the Christian religion. An *essential*, a *fundamental* article of *all* religion it is, and therefore of the Christian; but otherwise than as in connection with the salvation of mankind from the terrors of that state, among the *essential* articles peculiar to the Gospel creed, (those, for instance, by which it is *contra-distinguished* from the creed of a religious Jew), I do not place it."—*Aids to Reflection*, pp. 207, 208. See also the entire note from which this passage is taken.

² *Aids to Reflection*, pp. 195—200.

the buying back again, or being bought back, from *re* and *ema*. 4. Satisfaction of a creditor's claims by a payment of the debt. To one or other of these four heads, all the numerous forms and exponents of Christ's mediation in St. Paul's writings may be referred."—*Aids*, pp. 192, 193. If the reader will remember that the central truth of Christianity, according to Coleridge, is the revelation of the Spirit, he will not be surprised to hear him affirm that this *transcendent fact*, about which nothing is known, relates to the providing of the Spirit. Or in his words: "Now John, the beloved disciple, who leaned on the Lord's bosom, the Evangelist, *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, i. e. according to the *Spirit*, the inner and substantial truth of the Christian creed—John, recording the Redeemer's own words, enunciates the fact itself, to the full extent in which it is enunciable for the human mind, simply *and without any metaphor*, etc. In the redeemed it is a *regeneration*, a *birth*, a spiritual seed, impregnated and evolved, the germinal principle of a higher and enduring life, of a *spiritual life*."—*Aids*, pp. 193, 194.

This is the doctrine of redemption according to Coleridge, and this his argument in his own words. In regard to it we observe, first: It is true, that this work of Christ and its relations to man are described, under several terms taken from objects already familiar. It is equally obvious, that as several different methods are used to reveal and apply this work, they cannot all be literally true. If various methods of representation are used, *all* certainly cannot be equally literal and exact. *One* may be the thing, while all besides are *metaphors*; but *all* cannot be. He who selects any one of them for the exact and naked truth, is bound to show, why it receives this pre-eminence. The man who adopts the cleansing blood, the reconciling efficacy, the buying off from evil, the satisfaction of a debt, or the imputation of righteousness, as the thing mainly designed and effected in the redemptive work, is bound to show why it is adopted as the literal explanation in preference to the others as only figurative. This is just and legitimate, and as far as Coleridge's argument tends to this result, it is forcible and to the point. Coleridge, as we have seen, sets them all aside, as metaphorical, because he finds another explanation, or "rather the fact itself" enunciated, "simply and without any metaphor." That fact is, "the *re-generation*, a *birth*, a spiritual seed impregnated and evolved," etc. We ask, by what authority? What good reason does he give, why this term *re-generation* is a fact and not a metaphor, describing a truth indeed, but still a *metaphor*. How is it shown that when a man is

said to be born again and to partake of a new life, more *literalness* of expression is employed, than when he is said to be cleansed by the blood of Christ, or ransomed or translated from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of God's dear Son? It may be true, but Coleridge has not shown it to be true. But we ask again, admitting this enunciation to be invested with an importance purely and decisively oracular, where is the authority, in reason or the Scriptures, for making this fact the great and only end of the redemptive work of Christ? Is it said that the new birth of man must certainly be the object of this work, as its final end? Very true; but there may be many steps to the process, and the part borne by the sufferings and death of Christ, may be only at one of these points, and to satisfy but one of these conditions. But where is the testimony of the Scriptures that connects this efficiency with the redemptive work particularly? Coleridge does not adduce this testimony; he does not even indicate the way to it; he does indeed quote the passage, "the last Adam was made a quickening spirit," but if this quotation, utterly irrelevant as it is, and only admissible by the widest liberty or laxness of accommodation, is a specimen of his proof-texts, it is well for his own credit that Coleridge quoted no more. Indeed, it seems to us palpable, as has already been remarked, that Coleridge is most unhappy in his interpretation of particular passages of the Scriptures. His general views are often striking and magnificent and true; but in the solution of individual passages, the place where the accomplished theologian should be the strongest, there is Coleridge the weakest. His injustice to the scriptural representations of the atonement is obvious. He confines himself mainly to the argument in the Epistle to the Hebrews, a book which, as he justly says, was written to show the superiority of Christianity, and in which of course the redemptive office of Christ would be illustrated in accommodation to views already familiar; and he leaves out of view the epistle to the Romans, which he also says was written to prove the necessity of Christianity, and where we should expect, if any where, a literal exposition of the redemptive act. This is the more remarkable, when we find in this very epistle to the Romans an argument in respect to Christ as the *regenerator* and *sanctifier*, and then another argument strictly literal and without metaphor—if there be any part of the Scriptures such—and *severely* philosophical, (we speak relatively); and this argument professing to explain the death of Christ, and giving to it an additional service and object to that

contemplated by Coleridge. This argument declares that it was to provide for the justification of man, and asserts that it was because it provided for this, that it is "the power of God unto salvation." This argument, it deserves to be noticed, occurs in the former part of the epistle, as an exposition of the need of the gospel. What must be the carelessness or the hardihood of the interpreter, who finding the object which he claims to be the great and only object of Christ's death, fairly recognized and fully set forth, and side by side another object asserted and reasoned out, should say that the one object which he assigns to it, is the only one?

To this it may be replied, that Coleridge would not interpret the five first chapters of the epistle to the Romans, as the objector does. Very possibly he would not. But as an expounder of the doctrine he was bound to notice the argument in them, to interpret them in some fashion, and to justify his interpretation. Especially when they are without metaphor and are naked, straightforward reasoning. He has argued, it is true, against the view, that justification is the payment of a debt; but this is not the only view which can possibly be given. It may be said, too, that he has dismissed all the possible methods of defending a forensic justification, by the principle that analysis drawn from human law-courts, and "the coarse but bungling contrivances" of judicial procedure, can be but the merest analogies, and can have no relation to the ways of the Eternal. This is all the recognition or argument in respect to that view of the death of Christ which represents it as an awful but affecting declaration of the holiness of the Eternal, and as thus providing the way by which God can be just and yet justify the believer. This is not to be dismissed by a remark such as the one we have quoted. Coleridge himself has furnished too many noble views of the capacity of man to be under law, and of the sacred majesty of law as adapted to man, to allow us to forget the truth, or to esteem it as of little value in explaining the object of the death of Jesus. We have looked with care through the writings of Coleridge, but have nowhere been able to discover the justification, as contemplated in the incarnation, or any notice of it, except in the way described; that as the sinner was justified by the law of Moses, so this, by a metaphor, well and strikingly describes the *greatness*, not the *nature* of the deliverance wrought by Christ. The term is rarely used by him, and only in an incidental way. To the fact he gives no distinct recognition, and much less does he dwell upon it to defend, illustrate and enforce it.

"But it is inconsistent with the distinction between a person and a thing." "How could that be demanded by justice, whose very first principle is, that the guilty should bear his own iniquity?" This principle holds against the notion of a literal transfer of righteousness. But none but a denier of the incarnation can urge it against the apostolic view of justification. The Socinian, when he urges it and triumphantly asks, how can the sufferings of the innocent Jesus vindicate the holiness of God, which by their very nature they dishonor and disgrace, forgets who this Jesus is, in the view of his opponent, and *argues* as though he were a meek and unoffending martyr, and not "God manifest in the flesh," laying down the life which he had the power to take again. The objection is furnished by his view of Jesus as extraneous and objective to God, a *receiver* of suffering as a created being, rather than an *assumer* of it, as one who could assume it by the mystery of his incarnation. So hard is it for men to do justice to the arguments of their opponents, or to look at religious truth from their point of view.

We offer another remark on Coleridge's scriptural argument. He loses sight in it of the truth, that the sacrificial system of the Jews had a high moral significance, dim and imperfect, but still real to those rude men and to the heart of universal man, and thus foreshadowing the reality of which it was but the symbol. This is of course fatal to his argument, when he classes illustrations drawn from debt, etc., with those derived from justification by sacrifice. For if there is more than a metaphor here, if, according to his own distinction, there be a *symbol*, i. e. a showing forth not merely of the *consequences* but the *nature* of the redemptive act, then his entire argument, as far as analogies drawn from these sacrifices is concerned, falls to the ground. Coleridge considers these sacrifices as being sacred in the eyes of the Jews, and as thus furnishing the basis of a striking and strong illustration of the consequences of the redemptive act. But whence their power to furnish this illustration, if in themselves there was nothing expressed? Whence, above all, their power to hold the conscience of a guilty race for centuries, and to speak peace to the burdened soul of the devout, except that they spoke to that conscience and had a voice for that heart? The guilty Jew, when he laid his hand upon the unoffending lamb, that was to suffer because he had sinned, could not fail to feel that sin was a *serious thing* in the judgment of him who had ordained that without the shedding of blood there should be no remission. When

he heard the death-groan of that innocent victim, and saw the flesh quivering in agony and convulsed in the last spasm, he could not fail to feel that God spoke to him. And when a nobler victim suffers and groans and dies, and nature is convulsed in sympathy, and he knows that all this is that he, the sinner, may be pardoned, the reality utters the same truth in accents louder, more distinct and more impressive indeed, but still the same truth that had been speaking for centuries, day unto day, when the smoke of the morning and evening sacrifice was seen to ascend from the brazen altar and slowly to go up from over the courts of the temple.

From these views we cannot but conclude that Coleridge's theory of the atonement is defective and unscriptural. His practical estimate of Christ, the high place which he gives to his sufferings and death, as efficient in man's salvation, and the ardor and totality with which he would have him hold the affections of the believer,¹ strikingly illustrate his own maxim, that a man may have a defective theology concerning a religious doctrine, and yet practically receive it. His own reception of the truth does not, however, render his theory concerning it at all less false or less fraught with evil consequences.

We come next to consider Coleridge's views of Original Sin. We recognize here the presence of the two classes of theologians, of whom we have spoken, the Arminian and the ultra-Calvinistic. The one makes sin to be a very superficial matter, hardly predicating it of the character at all, but only of single and separate acts; and the other shocks man's convictions of right, by making the corruption of the will, a fatal necessity to sin, entailed upon him by the act of an ancestor, thousands of years ago. Coleridge's view of it is this:² First, man has a re-

¹ For satisfaction on this point, see as one instance among many, the note entitled *Stedfast by Faith.—Aids to Reflection*, pp. 188—190.

² "We call an individual a *bad* man, not because an action is contrary to the law, but because it has led us to conclude from it some *principle* opposed to the law, some private maxim or by-law in the will, contrary to the universal law of right reason in the conscience, as the *ground* of the action. But this evil principle again must be grounded in some other principle, which has been made determinant of the will by the will's over self-determination."—*Aids to Reflection*, pp. 172, 173.

"Sin, therefore, is spiritual evil; but the spiritual in man is the will. Now when we do not refer to any particular sins, but to that state and constitution of the will, which is the ground, condition and common cause of all sins; and when we would further express the truth, that this corrupt nature of the will

sponsible will, and all the sin of which he is guilty, originates singly and solely within himself. Secondly, man is a sinner, not in this or that bad action, but in character, in that constant state of the will, which makes a man a good or bad man. He has received a nature into his will, he has subjected his will to a perpetual state of corruption. Thirdly, this is true of every man, and must have some common ground. But this ground cannot be any external circumstances as a cause. It is not inflicted on him, it is not implanted in his nature. It does not pass over to him by his descent from Adam, but to be sin, it must be his own.¹ "This evil ground cannot originate in the divine will; it must therefore be referred to the will of man. And this evil ground, we call original sin. It is a mystery, that is, a fact which we see, but cannot explain; and the doctrine, a truth which we apprehend, but can neither comprehend nor communicate. And such by the quality of the subject, viz: a responsible will, it must be, if it be truth at all." In respect to the sin of the primeval pair, and its relations to the sinfulness of the race, he hardly takes the pains to deny that it is imputed to them, for he had excluded the possibility of this, by his definition of sin. He affirms it as his opinion, that the prevalent notions of their quasi angelic nature before they fell, and of their superhuman knowledge and capacities, is wholly gratuitous. He affirms also, but without going into the argument, that they were the introducers of sin, only as they were the representations or symbols of the race, so that what was true of them, was, and is true of universal man, and suggests that the story of the fall is more likely to be a mythus, than a veritable record of fact.²

As Coleridge has not argued much in asserting his view of original sin, there is no argument for us to criticise. We will affirm, however, that any theory of depravity which fails to se-

must, in some sense or other, be considered as its own act, that the corruption must have been self-originated; in this case and for this purpose we may, with no less propriety than force, entitle this dire spiritual evil and source of all evil, that is absolutely such, original sin."—*Aids*, p. 163.

¹ "Nor the origin of evil, nor the *chronology* of sin, or the chronicles of the original sinner; but sin originant, underived from without, and no passive link in the adamant chain of effects, each of which is in its turn an instrument of causation, but no one of them a cause! nor with sin inflicted, which would be a calamity! nor with sin (i. e. an evil tendency) implanted, for which let the planter be responsible! but I begin with original sin."—*Aids*, pp. 158, 159.

² *Aids to Reflection*, Note 66, p. 343, 6.

- cure a response to its truth in the honest conscience, or that does not awaken a strong and awful conviction, that man himself is wholly in *fault*, is a millstone on the neck of Christian theology. So too we add, that any theory concerning the sin of Adam, which does not effectually guard against the impression, that our connection with him was designed to work mischief to the race; any theory that does not strongly and earnestly assert that whatever this connection was, it was designed to be fraught with blessings, fails to do justice to plain declarations of the apostle Paul, and loads down Christianity with an awful and terrible weight. On the other hand, we add, that any theory of sin, as voluntary, which does not provide for sin as pertaining to the character, and running with its dreadful under current through the moral life of the soul, does no justice to the facts of man's consciousness, and the plain assertions of the Scriptures.

We would say also, that Coleridge has done a noble service to the truth, in declaring so explicitly and repeatedly, that the mystery concerning the fact or the origin of man's sinfulness, remains a mystery, whatever be true of Christianity.¹ The disease is just as deeply seated, and just as deadly, and just as real, whether the remedy be good, or whether it be a vile imposture. The fact of man's sinfulness, and of his sinful character too, is attested by every man's consciousness of what is in his own bosom, and is confirmed by observation. Christianity in asserting the fact, does but speak the whispers of every man's bosom. The origin, too, is just as dark and inexplicable; it is just as great a mystery how sin could be permitted under the reign of a benevolent God, whether the God of nature be or be not the God of the Scriptures. Its permission, too, is just as inconsistent with

¹ "And here the first thing to be considered, and which will at once remove a world of error, is, that this is no tenet first introduced or imposed by Christianity, and which, should a man see reason to disclaim the authority of the gospel, would no longer have any claim on his attention. It is no perplexity that a man may get rid of by ceasing to be a Christian, and which has no existence for a philosophic Deist. It is a FACT, affirmed, indeed, in the Christian Scriptures alone with the force and frequency proportioned to its consummate importance; but a fact acknowledged in every religion that retains the least glimmering of the patriarchal faith in a God infinite yet *personal*," etc.—*Aids*, pp. 170, 171. "I conclude with this remark. The doctrine of original sin concerns all men. But it concerns Christians in *particular*, no otherwise than by its connection with the doctrine of redemption, and with the divinity and divine humanity of the Redeemer, as a corollary or necessary inference from both mysteries. Beware of arguments against Christianity which cannot stop there and consequently ought not to have commenced there."—pp. 176, 177.

the desire of the God of nature to deter from it, as it is with the earnestness and oaths of the God of the Scriptures. Let this truth be realized as it deserves to be, let it be urged home as it might be, and if it would not accomplish good results for religious philosophy, we are greatly mistaken.

The views of Coleridge in respect to the inspiration of the Scriptures demand some notice. These are presented in form in the posthumous work, "The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," if indeed it be right to call that a formal statement of opinion which is put forth as a *tentative* theory, like a wooden bastion, thrown up in the haste and heat of a conflict, against the time when a permanent wall of stone may be constructed. The views of Coleridge are aimed against that high estimate of the mere letter of the Bible, which he has called by the expressive term *bibliolatry*; an idolatry, which is the occasion of much of the infidelity of protestant countries. The Bible itself it robs of more than half of its usefulness and power over the minds of the believers themselves, who, instead of consulting it as the sage counsellor who sits by their fireside and gives them the lessons of inspired wisdom, turn it into a stiff mummy, which they keep in their houses, as the Egyptians used to preserve for worship the embalmed bodies of their ancestors. We do not think it at all extravagant to say, that the round assertions in the general, in regard to this kind of inspiration, which are taken back in the detail, or bolstered up by arguments unworthy of a special pleader, are the cause of that lukewarm belief of the truth, which chills true ardor and spiritual energy, and of that frightful rationalism, which has swung off to so dreadful a length in the opposite direction. There are many we know, who reason to precisely the contrary conclusion of our own; who say, men are so prone to disrespect the Scriptures, that we must tie them very strong; and the more awful we make the divine oracles to be, the more likely are they to be honored. To all such arguments there is one answer: "Will you speak deceitfully for God?" Who committed to you the fearful trust of uttering any species of falsehood to support his cause? Nay more, this very course of extravagant statement, is of itself the direct parent of unbelief. The man that feels the hand laid upon his conscience, to tie his conviction by a double knot, one tie of which is added to a divine sanction, in order to hold him secure, will be very likely to break from both.

We do not approve of all the statements made by Coleridge. This work, like his other productions, is partly well elaborated

and partly ill finished, and it is capable of a sad perversion to evil; but we are bound to assert for it, *fairly interpreted*, a reverential spirit towards the sacred volume, and a tendency to leave the mind with a more earnest conviction of the supreme authority and priceless value of this gift of God. The questions involved in these Letters, are the great questions of the day. The whispers of thousands and tens of thousands of "inquiring spirits" plead with earnest intreaties, that they shall be fairly considered and fairly answered. The word of God itself lifts up its own voice, demanding of those to whom is committed the trust of defending and explaining it, that they should defend it from the enemy that rushes in like a flood. Let no man undertake this work in haste or rashly. Let no one do it with an unbelieving and irreverent or self-inflated spirit. But it needs to be undertaken and put at rest.

These are all the theological opinions of Coleridge which it seems necessary or proper to consider. Many hasty and some foolish things which he has written, might be made the themes of extended strictures. Our limits and our taste forbid us to touch upon these, or indeed upon anything except his prominent and marked peculiarities.

The third division of our inquiries now presents itself, under the title of the transcendental metaphysics of Coleridge. We shall but follow the example of many illustrious predecessors, if on this point, where most light is needed, we shall be able to shed the least. It is as a metaphysical philosopher, that Coleridge's merits and defects are most conspicuous. Here his strength and weakness have met together.

To his pleas for a more fundamental study of these sciences we give our heartiest response. We assent to his critiques on the superficial character of much of what is called metaphysics in England, though we think these critiques need not have been so scornful or indiscriminate. To the admiration of the older philosophers and theologians, so fervently expressed by him and echoed by Dr. Marsh, we also respond, though the assertion that they used his terms in the scientific sense in which he employed them, or held the metaphysics which he taught, is almost as idle as the fancy that the writers of the Scriptures employed his theological metaphysics.

What are called transcendental metaphysics relate to two subjects of inquiry. First, there is the criticism of the powers

of man in respect to their essential nature, their original action, the origin of our knowledge, the laws of perception, the way in which we are led to believe in an external world, and the steps by which we ascend to the belief of God and of spiritual truth. Secondly, the philosophy of the absolute and the infinite, concerning the possibility of which there is a wide diversity of opinion. Those who believe it possible and real, contend that the infinite is directly revealed to the reason in *ideas*, which are the base and stuff of all *conceptions*. Some go further, and contend that the true method of philosophy is to begin with the absolute and to reason from that both ways to infinite and finite existence.

The question in respect to the difference between the reason and the understanding as managed by Coleridge, includes both these points. As far as it relates to the first of the two, i. e. as far as it is a critique upon the origin and reliability of human knowledge and of the office of the several faculties in securing this knowledge, so far is it a legitimate subject of inquiry in the view of all philosophers. It is in fact the question which Locke and Berkeley and Hume and Reid and Kant have each attempted to adjust. It is a most important question also. It lies at the foundation of all those other questions involved in man's moral responsibility, and his capacity for and obligation to religion.

Is there then a faculty in man correspondent to Coleridge's speculative reason? That there is in man a faculty by which he is capable of science, no one will doubt, nor that brutes are incapable of science. Nor will one doubt who has reasoned at all on these subjects, that the whole basis of scientific reasoning rests on the nature and laws of the mind itself, that this furnishes all the material out of which science is made in its first principles and general laws. In reasoning to the laws of nature, their existence, their uniformity, their unity, the mind rests on what is to it reasonable, i. e. it is so constituted that it can come to no other conclusions. It invariably takes it for granted that other minds reason in the same way; hence the possibility of a common knowledge, and of universal science. It must also assume that such is the mind of God; that this constructs and sustains the universe both material and spiritual on the same principles. The human mind cannot conceive of the existence of mind, except as thus reasoning, nor of any existence objective to itself except as answering to these principles. In this sense of the word, the *mind*, or the reasoning or the reasonable man appeals to itself.

These principles can be abstracted and generalized and named

and reflected on. It may be proper to call them universal and necessary truths, or the ideas of the reason, in distinction from conceptions of particular existences or of species of existences. And as they are derived from the mind itself, it may be true enough to say that they are revealed to the reason.

But on the other hand, the assertion, that the reason "has the same relation to the intelligible or spiritual, as sense has to the material and phenomenal," or the description of the reason as an inner sense, which beholds ideas, as the senses do the living world, is a mere fiction and fancy. So also, the description of these ideas as objective to the reason, in any other way than the conceptions are, i. e. by being reflected on, is tolerable only as a highly figurative method of speaking, but is intolerable in the cool and exact language of science.

Still more do we reject the view that the reason acquaints the mind with things without itself, as that, in the contemplation of the finite, there is involved the idea of the infinite, (not as a conception but as a reality, an idea,) or as that in the soul's view of its own existence, it involves necessarily the existence of an infinite soul. We reject it because there is no proof of it in fact, and more than all, because the mind can come to this knowledge by inference, by reasoning on the principles by which alone it can exist or act as a mind. If it can come to this knowledge by inference, it has no occasion for a direct revelation. If the mind is so constituted when it sees two events connected under certain circumstances, that it must conclude that the one has caused the other, however rapid the processes may be by which it has come to the result, or numerous the train of associations, it has no need that, in addition to this inference, the *idea* of a cause should reveal itself at this critical moment, in the majesty of a universal and necessary truth.

- The term practical reason was borrowed by Coleridge directly from Kant, by whom it was invented and introduced to save his system from being carried by a logical necessity, to a system of complete moral and religious skepticism. It is employed by Coleridge, in a sense sufficiently loose and lacking in scientific precision, just as is its correspondent the speculative reason. For it is described as "comprehending the will, the conscience, the moral being with its inseparable interests and affections." This is all well enough. No man can object to the term as a popular definition of the moral in man, provided it be understood that it is a *general* and unscientific term, that it includes several distinct

faculties and does not raise the question as to how these faculties derive their moral ideas and the sanction for them, and as to how many are the elements into which they may be analyzed. But we object to the term when it is so used as to stand but for one faculty, and the ideas which it reveals, are spoken of as directly revealed without the possibility of being analyzed or explained, and are made to say to every attempt thus to deal with them "procul o procul este, profani." But Coleridge does *thus* use this term and most frequently. Even in the very sentence which we have quoted above, as being a very satisfactory and rational attempt to give us the reality in the case, he goes on to say, "that reason, namely, which is the organ of wisdom and (as far as man is concerned) the source of living and actual truths." In the "Friend," speaking of this same thing after naming its constituents, he describes the conscience thus, "which in the power and as the indwelling word of an holy and omnipotent legislator *commands* us,—from among the numerous IDEAS, mathematical and philosophical, which the reason by the necessity of its own excellence creates for itself,—unconditionally *commands* us to attribute *reality* and actual *existence*, to those ideas and to those only, without which the conscience itself would be baseless and contradictory, to the ideas of soul and of free-will, of immortality and of God." This is all very true and very eloquent, but if a man would have us believe that it is philosophically true, and that no analysis has a right to go further, we beg to be excused for differing from him. So, too, if the soul, free-will, immortality and God, are to be all classed together as ideas, revealed to the practical reason in their ethereal essence, uncompounded and indecomposable, and a man must be forced to take them as such, without dispute and without digestion, under penalty of being banished forever from the fellowship of the spiritual and ideal philosophy—why then, we cheerfully accept the penalty.

This ideal philosophy has a grave aspect, however, which may not be overlooked. Let a man admit that spiritual truth is thus revealed to the reason in the perfection and purity of ideas, and the next thing which he will naturally do, will be to ask what need have I of any other revelation, and indeed how can I be made the subject of any other revelation? A revelation in human conceptions and by human language is utterly useless, and indeed quite a poor affair compared with the perpetual revelation of ideas within me. It must either use the ideas which I have already, and in that case it can tell me nothing new, but can only use the knowledge which I already possess, or it must be an in-

dividual revelation acting by inspiration on my own reason ; but a supernatural revelation, in the common acceptance of the term, it cannot be.

Such has been the actual result of the transcendental philosophy, or more properly speaking of the transcendental *phraseology*. No sooner had the Kantian system been thoroughly received and established in Germany, than the philosophical world were startled by the appearance of a work entitled "A Critique of all Revelation," in which these principles are carried forward to this result. It was anonymous, but it was so consistent and thorough that it was at first attributed to Kant, though afterwards claimed by Fichte. No one needs to be told that this argument is the basis of the philosophical anti-supernaturalism of Germany, or that it has been extensively carried to this conclusion in this country. We do not deny that Coleridge held it back from this result, by asserting as he does the moral depravity and ruin of the race as the occasion for a revelation. Nor do we deny that he and other ideal philosophers can so define their terms as to escape this conclusion ; but the charge we make is, that they use these terms so loosely, and press them with such confidence, that taken on their own saying, it is the easiest thing to lead them to this conclusion of anti-supernaturalism. The German philosopher does not define. It is below his dignity to do it, and so his adversary takes up his proposition and putting it into the iron enginery of his logic, turns it out upon him in all its frightful consequences. And as far as Coleridge or his admirers adhere to this method of solemnly asseverating without condescending to explain, or if they do explain, yet forgetting it, the next time they propound, they must bear the responsibility of furthering the conclusions of which their propositions are capable. This spiritual philosophy may be and is the fruitful parent of atheism and unbelief, and it yet remains to be seen, whether its harvest shall not be a harvest of deeper and more enduring woe, than that which sprung up from the seed sown by the sensual school.

And now having followed our friends fairly up to the line that separates the philosophy of the finite and that of the infinite, we must shake hands with them, if they will go further. For we have no belief in the reality or the possibility of such a philosophy. We are willing to remain along the border line as long as they may choose. We believe in the attempt to answer all the questions which relate to the region on this side. We think, too, that the line itself between the finite and the infinite, between

the knowable and the unknowable, should be drawn, definite and ineffaceable, and that its monumental stones should be fixed deep and unshaken; but as to going over it at present after them, their own success is not so flattering as to encourage us in the least. We should as soon think of following the dog which is shown off in the Grotto del Cane of which we used to read in our school days.

Coleridge has occasionally attempted a flight of this kind. He is quite confident for instance that he can demonstrate a Trinity as necessary to the idea of God, and has besides favored us with sundry disquisitions upon substance and the absolute; but his speculations are not sufficiently wrought out to render it fair to criticise them, even if we were disposed to attempt it. We will use all the efforts to see the star to which the astronomer directs our attention in the remotest heaven; we will gladly employ his best instruments, and follow obediently his minutest directions; but as to receiving a blow on the forehead, so that we may make our own stars, that is a little too much to ask of us. There is so much in the lawful metaphysics to strain and confuse the mind, that we have no present intention to submit ourselves to any voluntary bewilderment.

The American disciples of Coleridge have been numerous, and in the variety of uses to which they have applied his principles and his name, they have certainly been sufficiently diversified. Indeed, his influence in this country has been wider, and his reputation more sudden than in England. Certainly his principles have been more thoroughly adopted and tested, and the extravagance of his devotees has been more ridiculous. Among many other services which America renders to the Old World, one of the most conspicuous is that of furnishing a field and room for all sorts of principles to be received and tested, and to be carried out to practical results. The American people and not a few of the American scholars, perform the same service to the European philosophers and theologians, which certain unfortunate rabbits and *cuniculæ* do to chemists and physicians, in receiving a dose or two of every newly invented potion. If the potion be innocent or healthful, we are the gainers; but if not, we must take it notwithstanding. In Europe, old laws, old creeds, old customs, and old prejudices stand greatly in the way of the general and rapid adoption of new principles and systems; but in young America,

which sometimes means *L'Amérique verte*, there is so little respect for the past, and so much hope for the future, that we are ready to hail every new prophet, as the harbinger of a new era, and to give ourselves up to his experimenting. Carlyle here gets his greatest reputation, and the echo of the plaudits of thousands sounds louder across the seas, than the whisper of his fame slowly waxing at home, and quickens the sale of his heavy-going editions. Fourier here can find "Communities" ready to gather themselves in his name, and Strauss, when forbidden to lecture in the universities of Germany, can preach in our churches. All this as we have already remarked, is both well and ill. In Coleridge's influence the good and evil have both been conspicuous.

His general influence upon our literary men has been in some respects salutary. It were quite impossible indeed, that anything good could be glorified by so splendid a genius, and enforced by so fiery an eloquence, and not obtain a deep and rooted lodgment in the mind. Then, too, Coleridge was not a preacher, or a trader in religion or morals in any sense, and of course was unsuspected of sectarian bigotry or party zeal. When he sternly rebuked the shallowness of modern scholarship and the want of thorough principles in morals, and brought up new fields of honorable enterprise, resplendent as the field of the cloth of gold, he did a good service. When he brought to the illustration of writers unknown and neglected, his own glowing criticism, and contended against the undeserved reputation of infidel philosophers and historians, and in commanding words as those of a prophet, called us again to the consecration of all genius and of all learning to the highest service in the honor of God and the advancement of spiritual religion, he did a great and a good work. There are many hundreds now living, on whose minds his writings dawned like a new light, and on whose ears his words fell like the trumpet note, to stir all their better nature, and to strengthen and confirm their holier purposes. The infusion of his influence into our literature, and indeed into our literary atmosphere, is yet to be traced and will long be felt for good. We bless its presence, and rejoice in its healthful promise.

Coleridge had the advantage of being introduced to our theological arena, by one of the most worthy and distinguished of our scholars. The lamented President Marsh will not be soon forgotten by any who had the happiness to know him. His modest demeanor, his amiable disposition, his freedom from craft and cunning, his obvious and ardent love of truth, wherever it was to be

found, the thoroughness of his scholarship, his iron diligence, his warm susceptibility to the good and the noble, and his disposition to master every subject in its principles, were such as to merit for him a reputation and an earthly reward far higher than he in fact received. His essay preliminary to the *Aids to Reflection* and his criticism on *Stuart's Commentary on the Hebrews*, are among the first specimens of writing in their kind. He was no parasite or dependent, in his nature, on the *dicta* of any man. The fragment on *Psychology*, which he left behind him, shows conclusively that he would take no man's system without examination; that it was his aim and effort to work out for himself and express in his own language, the philosophical truths on which he rested. And yet his reverence for Coleridge sometimes shows itself to be excessive, especially in his theology. There is in his sermons, a more strict and subservient adoption of Coleridge's phraseology, and a closer imitation of his style of thought than we should like to see, and than we were prepared to expect. We were surprised, too, to see in all his *Remains*, that he adopted Coleridge's theory of the atonement, and threw aside the Pauline doctrine of a forensic justification. We must own our surprise, that an interpreter so able as he, should have failed to detect the careless unfairness of Coleridge's expositions, and to supply from Coleridge himself, the refutation of his own reasonings.

The influence of Coleridge on the philosophy and theology of New England, has been in some respects, what President Marsh desired it should be. It has opened new fields of inquiry, and put us in possession of other modes of viewing religious truth. It has brought within our notice, writers which used to be unknown in our libraries. It has rendered our theology tolerant, by showing that the same faith may be held under different formulas of expression. At the same time it has made it free, by giving to the freest inquirer, strong principles of faith and piety, holding to which, he might be sure that he would not make shipwreck of the faith. It may have served to abate the harsh spirit that had grown out of our controversies, and to depress the tendency to low arts, and whispering cunning, and to break down all that wire-pulling apparatus, which is too often present in the religious as well as in the political world. Above all, it has contended for a wakeful, thorough, and scientific theology, in which, let alarmists and incapables say what they will, rests the hope of the church. We should say no more than we believe, if we add,

that it has deepened the channel of our psychological inquiries, and started new questions in our schools of mental and moral science.

This certainly forms no objection to it in our view. For our New England theology has for its genius and aim, to acquaint itself with mental and moral science as it is, during the current generation, in order to correct its errors if it have any, and to avail itself of its better analysis, and above all, to influence the philosophical world for good. So did Edwards, who was a most assiduous student of the philosophy of his day. His correspondence shows that he eagerly sought for every new book from Europe. Some of his leading works were written against evil principles in philosophy. There are those who think, that it is more Edwardean to do the same thing in their own day, than it is to put his writings on their book shelves, and leave them there, and then ejaculate : "there were giants in the earth in those days."

• As far as Coleridge has had influence to create a taste for psychological studies and to send our theologians to a thorough study of the philosophy of the day, so far has it done us good.

• And yet this Coleridgism, if we may use so barbarous a term, has a foreign look in our New England theology. Geologists tell us that in a uniform and homogeneous stratum, one often meets with a *dyke* or a rock formation, which was violently thrust up in a liquid state, across the level strata, disturbing all its ancient arrangements, and introducing into all the interstices a new substance. Such has been this new system in its relations to all the old principles and methods of the New England theology. Ours is a Puritan theology. This is more or less of a church theology, invigorated and guarded indeed, but still adapted to the feelings of a devout reader of the liturgy. Ours is severe in its simplicity, plain in its nomenclature, and sternly logical in all its arrangements. This is gorgeous in its ornaments, ambitious in its terminology and imagination, as well as philosophical in its addresses to the mind. The New England theology is stern in its love of the truth, and rigid in its scrutiny of evidence. This is an avowed devotee of beauty as well as of truth, and easily believes what suits its taste. Above all, the eloquence of the New England theology is founded on convictions, and warmly and frequently addresses the conscience, which it carries by its solemn appeals and its awful earnestness. That nurtured by the system of Coleridge is less severe, more calm, and appeals less to the conscience. The one system is more earnest, direct and practical; the other

is more graceful and speculative and literary. The one was formed in the pulpit and for the pulpit. The other was framed in the closet of the school, and better suits the closet. We are far from denying that our theology, our preaching and our practical views are exposed to some defects. We are willing that these defects should be corrected, and care not from whence the correction comes. Our theology may have been too unrefined and scholastic, and our preaching too often hard and metaphysical. Our worship may have been too often rude and ungraceful. Our practical views may have led us to sin against taste and propriety, as well as to commit worse mistakes. But we would hold fast the staple of our New England system. For the world has no other like it, and the excellences which we lack can be easily taken up by a truth-loving and truth-serving church.

It seems worth while to ask distinctly the question, what is the one distinctive feature of the New England theology, by which it differs from every other? It certainly is far enough from the ecclesiastical theology of the English church, and very far also, if the testimony of its opponents is to be received, from the scholastic Calvinism of the Synod of Dort. Its peculiarity seems to be, that it is an intensely rational and moral system. It addresses the conscience and it aims to move it by reasoning. Thus does it vindicate the moral government of God, by declaring the need of moral rule, to a being who understands his fitness for law, and the sacred obligations of law. Having thus prepared the way, it unveils the mount of God, from whose "right hand went a fiery law," and it wrings the willing or the reluctant amen from the sinful being whom this law condemns. It shows, too, the need of the sacrifice on the cross as a moral necessity, and while it displays the necessity it vindicates the love that did not shrink from giving it full satisfaction. It shows man his deep, his damning guilt, guilt pertaining to a deliberate purpose, and rooted in the very lowest springs of his moral life, a willing depravity. It summons him, thus alienated and refusing to repent himself, to be reconciled to God, and holds over him the awful fact of his dependence on sovereign grace, as the grand argument against delay. Thus is it a perpetual argument with the reason and conscience, an earnest striving with men capable of being thus addressed; vindicating the truths which it urges, and holding them perpetually home to the mind. How different this from the diluted weakness of the theology of regeneration by baptism, and of sanctification by the sacraments; of growth in grace by the ma-

gic influence of symbols, rather than by the manly diet of prayer and preaching. How different also from the unthinking and formal reiteration of stereotyped dogmas, in old scholastic phrase. Whether it be not the nearest to the theology of the apostle of the Gentiles, let all men judge. Whether its preaching be not the most akin to apostolic preaching, and its results to those of apostolic power, let candid men decide. That it has defects we own, but that its genius and aim is better than that of all others which the world now beholds, we do most earnestly contend.

Wherever, then, the influence of Coleridge has caused a dislike of this system and a longing after a splendid ritual and formal observances; wherever it has induced the feeling that the glory of a church was to be found in its organization, rather than in its moral life; and that this moral life depends more on its usages than on its faith; there has it induced a sad degeneracy. That it has caused this degeneracy we know. Much of this morbid dissatisfaction with our own system which has recently prevailed, this longing after something perfect in the outward to satisfy our dreamy ideal, rather than the resolute purpose to make a better church by making better Christians, has come from the perverted study of Coleridge.

Its influence upon the power of the pulpit has been not a little disastrous. Some preach the better for it. More, we fear, preach the worse. To preach with earnestness and power, one must have something to say and must care to say it. There is and there can be no commanding and continued power in any pulpit where theology is not preached. But it must be a theology which the people can understand, and which the preacher must feel that he can make level to their apprehensions and by which he can hold their consciences. But *this* theology must be translated into another dialect to be received by the people, and the misfortune is too often that the preacher, instead of translating his theology into the language of his hearers, corrupts the language of the pulpit by its own barbarous and grotesque phraseology. Hence disgust with the people because they cannot understand him, then disgust with theology in the pulpit and the betaking of one's self to what is vulgarly called popular preaching, and last of all disgust with the pulpit itself.

We feel bound to notice a perversion of Coleridge, seriously unfavorable to moral and religious life. A love of the clear in thought and of the simple in expression, is akin to moral simplicity and to singleness of religious character. An earnest man for

duty has little to say of great and eternal principles, and a man who longs for communion with God, loses sight of ideas, that he may find the living Jehovah. It is quite possible to be so rapt with an imaginative philosophy, as to despise the simplicity of practical ethics, and to be so devoted to an imaginative theology, as to forget the sublime simplicity of God as revealed in Jesus. Far distant be the day when our philosophy and theology shall spoil the simplicity of our trusting faith, or give us a morbid distaste for the realities of a struggling and humble piety.

To pass from the abstract to the concrete, from the general to the particular; the American disciples of Coleridge, to our eye, group themselves into the following classes: First are the genuine scholars and thinkers. These are the men who adopt the Kantian principles and nomenclature from study and conviction, who receive no system without digestion, who can translate their own principles into tolerable English, and can use them in the solution of other questions, with the ease and air of men who understand their own views and can explain them. All honor be rendered to those men, whether they be few or many. All respect be given to their claims and to their reasonings. They are not to be disposed of by a name, nor will they be affected by a sneer. We may reject fewer or more of their opinions. We may think we detect their errors and can show the weak points of their reasonings; but for their independent and scholar-like spirit, for their actual services to mental and moral science, for their free and tolerant spirit, for their elevation above the petty squabbles of party, they merit the respect of the whole commonwealth of letters.

Next come the discriminating or eclectic students of Coleridge. These are the men who reject his terminology and some of his peculiar principles in philosophy, and who start back in utter amazement, from the main peculiarity of his theological system, as also from his rash and capricious interpretations of Scripture, but have an eye to see and a heart to feel his other high excellences. And yet Coleridge is to them a favorite author from his wakeful and wakening spirit, from his intense earnestness, from his vigorous criticism, for his tact in comprehending the bearings of a writer and a principle, and for his point and power in uttering what he thinks. So also, for all that variety of merit comprehended under the term *suggestion*, for the stores of his powerful, his ready, eloquent mind, bursting out in every direction from the profuse and overstocked richness of his intellectual wealth. His

works are those which they would be very unwilling to spare from their library or their table. Of this class, the writer would of course be likely to think and to speak well, as he would count himself in their number, and if the epithets which he has affixed to them be too flattering, they may be ascribed to a very natural cause.

The next are the parasites of Coleridge, the undigesting recipients of all that he says, without the attempt to explain or to understand it, except by repeating his own praises and confounding you with his terminology. A parasite of any man is always offensive, especially an unthinking retainer of any metaphysician, but most of all of such a philosopher as Coleridge. The pretensions are so magnificent, the learning so imposing, the terminology so appalling, that when it comes up in the form of an "ass's load of lumber," the contrast between the bulk of the burden and the sorry figure of the bearer, is striking and ludicrous.

Another class may be called the figurative philosophers, or more precisely those who philosophize by illustrations rather than by reasoning. Coleridge is not the only philosopher who has introduced this intellectual fashion, but he is greatly responsible for it. It consists in propounding a theory or speculation or course of argument, which may be true or may be false, which may be original or which may be borrowed, which may be sense or which may be nonsense, but which shall be imposing by its mysterious way of announcement and which is sure to be arrayed in the lively and piquant air of pointed illustrations or in the gorgeous robes of splendid imagery. When you look for the truth in the midst of these magnificent appendages, it is possible that there is no truth to be found, and that the substance and accidents, the body and its dressing, are but empty air; or if you do find it, it may prove not to be worth finding. There is a strong tendency in the public mind to call this philosophy. Our educated men who ought to know better will shout, "this is original, this is philosophy;" and the students of some of our literary institutions have been known to be strangely bitten with a mania for this kind of philosophizing. There are two reasons for this. Our national aptness for guessing with our disposition to praise the successful guesser, and the absence of a thoroughly learned class who are able and ready to discriminate between scholarship and pretension. If we do not read Plato and Aristotle and Lord Bacon and Cudworth, we can *talk* about them, and with the help of quickness and tact we can often guess aright; or if we do not, Cole-

ridge and such as he can tell us what to say, and then how magnificently we can say it!

Even when the philosophizing is of a higher character, and the merit more real, it is an ill sign in a man who sets up for a philosopher, always to speak in figures, never to face a syllogism and to dread the precise avowal of his opinion, in severe and well-defined statements. And it is a sadder sign, for the commonwealth of letters, if this is to pass as genuine and profound philosophy. It is one thing, to be able to shed various and pleasant lights around an old truth or a happy suggestion, and quite another, to go down into the depth of the mine and bring up the heavy ore. It may seem to be a strange charge but we believe it is true, that the tendency of the so-called spiritual philosophy has been to render superficial and to popularize our science. Its contrary influence has been urged in its favor. This is no philosophy for boarding-school misses, say its friends, and yet more zealous Coleridgites than sundry misses of sixteen or thereabouts we have never seen. Guessing and pretension, mystery and splendor, go well with the people on this side the water. Itinerant ministers will exhaust all their reading about Plato and Aristotle on the immortality of the soul, before an audience of a dozen in a log school-house, and they shall pass for very learned men. That this philosophy gives facility for similar operations on a larger scale and before a more respectable audience, we need not stay to argue.

So too it has begotten in many a sad and almost savage intolerance. There are sundry defenders of the faith and of right principles against infidelity and error, who planting themselves upon the eternal principles of the spiritual philosophy, treat their antagonists with no stinted measure of contempt, if not of railing. The appellations, utilitarian, priestly, infidel, principles of the sensual school, are distributed in every variety of combination, and with labored efforts to overwhelm their antagonists beneath a storm of contemptuous expression and of violent language. Where there is so much violence we may always suspect some confusion of thought. When the words are so bitter, though the direction of a man may be right in the main, yet there appears to be less conscious strength in the argument. But these men of the spiritual school, do not analyze; they affirm; they will not argue, but they will overwhelm you with a hail-storm of contempt. The cause of truth owes but little to such defenders.

The next variety which we name, are the voluntary mystics.

These are the men who in order to believe enough, will believe more than enough, who are not content with interpretations that are at once logical and scriptural, but delight in supposing some additional meaning, they know not what. Faith and the union of the soul with Christ, and the indwelling of the spirit and the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, these and other truths give them ready opportunity to exercise the believing, or more properly the imaginary faculty, to their heart's content, and for it all they have the sanction of their master and the spirit of the school. This in the view of many is a harmless tendency, and tends to orthodoxy and spirituality. We do not think so. The man who will believe *more* than by the laws of sound interpretation he feels bound to, would under other circumstances believe *less*. Besides, the imagination is as likely to have as much to do with this mystical faith, as the conscience has; the fancy, as the conscious wants of the soul.

Next come "the artful dodgers" in theology. The name we own is not very dignified, nor is the occupation. These are the men who take advantage of the many-sidedness of Coleridge's theology to be on no side of any disputed point, or who by a strange and most inconsistent eclecticism, merge into their own faith ingredients the most opposite, and materials the most irreconcilable. They are High Churchmen, and yet Congregationalists, bigotedly conservative, and laxly libertine. Strongly Calvinistic, and yet grossly Pelagian. Stoically rigid in their practical views, and loosely Epicurean. Or if pressed to any logical conclusion, they find their refuge in some Coleridgian term, and hide themselves from their pursuers in a convenient mist.

We name next the Prelatic or Episcopal variety, the men who from reading Coleridge have contracted a strange sympathy with the English church, and whose heads have been turned by his allusions to his mother the church of England. This has been carried so far by not a few that they have disowned their Puritan ancestry and their Puritan baptism, forgetting that Coleridge blessed the Puritans in his heart, and rendered to them the high meed of his worthy praise. Men are indeed to be pitied, who could so pervert the lessons of such a master, on such a subject.

Last of all we name the Coleridgians, *par excellence*, who show their zeal for their master, by their Babylonish dialect. Who with hardly a thought that can be precisely expressed, can yet pile up mountains of barbarously compounded words into sentences of complicated construction, and can so go forward, page after page, and

perhaps volume after volume. The wonder is, by what magic of patient labor, by what mystery of intellectual toil, these sentences are ever written. It is no matter of wonder, how they can ever be read, for we are sure that they are never subjected to this operation.

If there are other varieties than these which we have named we know them not. With this enumeration, we conclude our remarks. We have spoken freely, but we hope not unkindly, plainly and perhaps pointedly, but we trust not inconsiderately nor unfairly.

ARTICLE VII.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE HEBREW SENTENCE.

THE subject named at the head of this Article should not be left wholly out of view, in a course of Hebrew instruction. Every biblical student should endeavor to ascertain and classify the principles which regulated the expressions of thought among the Hebrews. Without this, there can be no radical acquaintance with Hebrew syntax in general; and without it, even the meaning of the sacred writers cannot always be fully apprehended. If any one supposes that the Hebrew sentence is so simple as to afford no opportunity to exercise his powers of analysis; or that it is so stereotyped in form as to exclude any very striking exhibition of variety, he entertains probably the common opinion on the subject, but one which is not correct. As compared with those languages which carry the system of inflection to such an extent, for example, as do the Latin and the Greek, the Hebrew moves in this respect, it must be confessed, in a restricted sphere; its sentence is, certainly, both uniform and simple. But without possessing so much flexibility as we see there, it has still left to it a wide range of movement. The inquisitive scholar has opened to him here an interesting field of study; and, after performing the necessary preparatory work, he should advance to it and add to his other knowledge that which may be gained from extending his inquiries in this direction. In truth, the greater the uniformity which may distinguish a language in the construction of its sentences, the more important and significant must be any departure

from it, which may at any time appear. The cause of such a virtual resistance to the prevailing spirit of the language, must lie deeper in the thoughts and feelings of the writer, than where such variations belong rather to the outward forms of speech, and may be taken up by him, therefore, as a matter of accident or habit, and so be entirely unmeaning. This remark is specially true of the Hebrew. When a writer or speaker here deviates from the ordinary mode of expression which the laws of the language impose so rigidly upon him, it is because he is urged by a special impulse; he breaks over the external restraint in the impetuosity of his feelings; he makes not only his words but the very order of them expressive of the state of his mind; and, in order to enter into this, to sympathize with him, to catch the exact reflection of his thoughts, we must know the difference between the ordinary Hebrew style and that of earnest, impassioned discourse; we must be able to see what new meaning belongs to the new position; we must understand the laws of that subtle, mental emphasis which prescribed to the words their unwonted order, so that as we read we may fill our ears, as it were, with the very tones with which the old prophets spoke, and bring back again the looks and gestures which gave to their language such power over those whom they originally addressed.

Perhaps no writer has treated the subject adverted to above, so well as Ewald in the last edition of his *Hebrew Grammar*.¹ He has there allotted much more than the usual space to the consideration of this topic. His remarks extend over 130 pages of his work; and they deserve the careful and reiterated perusal of every one who would be master of this important branch of Hebrew syntax. The view also which Nordheimer has given of this subject in his *Grammar*, is replete with instruction. No system of rules, however, which another may compile, can supersede the necessity of personal observation and study. They may be of service, especially at first, in giving direction to inquiry; but will not answer even this purpose, unless constantly verified by the student for himself. In this way, possibly, the following summary of the principles which are to be observed in the construction of the simple Hebrew sentence, may not be without value to those who take an interest in such studies. It is drawn up chiefly in conformity with the views of Ewald, and rests, therefore, essen-

¹ Ausführliches Lehrbuch der Hebräischen Sprache des alten Bundes, von Heinrich Ewald. Fünfte Ausgabe, 1844.

tially on his authority. It is *the simple sentence alone*, which is here the subject of consideration. The construction of the compound sentence with its various constituent parts, its modes of connection, its hypothetical and relative clauses, etc., forms a separate topic by itself, and is not here to be brought into view. We confine ourselves to the ground which lies before the student, on his first entrance into this general field of investigation.

The Hebrew language is inferior to the Arabic, in regard to susceptibility of inflexion; but it is not a little remarkable, that, with this inferiority, it exhibits a far greater freedom and facility of movement in the structure of its sentences. The order which words naturally assume in calm, unimpassioned discourse, the Hebrew also has in common with the Arabic; but it admits likewise of numerous deviations from this order, resulting from the excitement of strong emotion in the mind of the writer; and in the degree in which it possesses this quality, the Hebrew is distinguished above not only the Arabic, but all the other Semitic languages.

We will consider the Hebrew sentence, in the first place, in its ordinary form, where the words arrange themselves in conformity with the laws of dispassionate discourse.

Here we find that the affirmative or predicative term precedes the subject, because in most cases it contains the new or more important idea which the speaker would present. Thus, the affirmative stands first when it consists of an adjective, as צדיק יהוה¹ *righteous (is) Jehovah*; and still more, if it consist of a verb, since a subject is in reality already involved in all the personal forms of the verb, especially the third; so that the more definitive substantive which follows, stands originally in apposition merely with this third person; as, שם יהוה אלהינו (there) *spake Jehovah*. Where however in some infrequent cases, the predicate as well as the subject, is contained in a substantive, the former stands always after the subject, that this may not be doubtful; as, יהוה אלהינו הוא האלהים *Jehovah thy God is God*. See Deut. 4: 35, 39. 10: 17.

Another very common variety, even in the structure of simple sentences, is the position of the subject first, instead of the predicate;

¹ So Ewald punctuates the word, and writes *Jakve*. This singularity it is unnecessary to retain.

which is adopted particularly in the narrative or descriptive style, when the person or actor is held up as the principal figure, while the act itself and the progress of its development, fall more into the back ground of the picture. This occurs, especially if the act or state which is attributed to the person, be an abiding one; and hence, since the participle in Hebrew expresses so often the idea of permanence, this arrangement will be found employed very uniformly in connection with the participle. Thus in Ex. 12: 11, where the condition described is introduced with the words—*so shall ye eat the Passover*; מְחַנְּתֶם חֲגִירֵיכֶם, *your loins girded*. See Judg. 15: 2. 1 Sam. 12: 17. 2 Sam. 3: 14. Hence עוֹד *still* and אֵין *it is not*, also הֵא *it is* (the latter much more rarely), are specially appropriate to such sentences; Ex. 3: 2. 5: 16. 9: 2. In the construction of compound and relative sentences, the principle becomes still more important.

This position acquires special significance when the participle so placed, serves at the same time to mark definite relations of time. Thus, it may stand for the *relative present*, expressing an act which continues at the present moment, as, הִנֵּה אֲחִיךָ מְחַרֵּם, *behold thy brother is angry with thee*, Gen. 27: 42. Jer. 16: 12; or, for the *relative future*, which the speaker contemplating as very near or as altogether certain, views as actually present, as; אֲנִי הֵא אַתָּה אֵלֶיךָ *thou art about to die*, Jer. 28: 16. הִנֵּה אֲנִי בָּרִיא *behold I am about to bring*, Gen. 6: 17. It may represent also the *relative praeter*, though in a simple sentence this is less common, in cases where the hearer is admonished by something in the connection, to transfer himself to some definite situation in the past, as in the relation of a dream: הִנֵּה אֲנִי עֹמֵד *behold I (was) standing*, Gen. 41: 17, i. e. thought myself to be so during the dream narrated; or, in answer to an inquiry, what a person has done during some period. See Jer. 38: 26.

In this signification of the participle as a definite tense, the הִנֵּה *behold*, is placed before it merely for the sake of greater animation, especially at the commencement of a new clause. This particle has a tendency to draw the subject into close connection with itself; and where this is not expressed in a definite form, will even supply its place by the suffix pronoun. Yet this law is not so strict as not to be sometimes relaxed. It may occur without any subject, provided that this is suggested with sufficient distinctness by the context; as, הִנֵּה הָיָה יֵצֵר *behold he (Jehovah already mentioned) formed*, Am. 7: 1, comp. v. 7. But when הִנֵּה does not form part of the expression, and the participle stands

It is from a different principle, not that of an effort to secure smoothness of style, of which we have just spoken, but of conformity with the natural order of expression, that the adjective or

pronoun, when it has a qualificative force, must follow the substantive to which it belongs. In this case, as is well known, the article connects itself with the adjective or pronoun, if the noun have the article, or be rendered definite by any equivalent construction. The only proper exception to this usage, so far as regards the pronoun, is that of the simple demonstrative *זֶה*, which is sometimes placed before the definite noun; as *זֶה הָעָם* *this people*, *זֶה מֹשֶׁה* *this Moses*, (in the way of contempt, like *iste*,) Ex. 32: 1. Jos. 9: 12. Is. 23: 13. In the Arabic and Aramaean, however, this is the ordinary arrangement. Of the adjectives, *גָּדוֹל* is not unfrequently placed first (Ps. 32: 10); and some instances of this occur in regard to *עַלְיוֹן* (Prov. 29: 6), and also *שָׁלוֹם* (Jer. 30: 15), which are to be considered undoubtedly as poetic, rather than as sanctioned by common practice.

The case is entirely different when an adjective acquires the signification of a noun. The substantive which controlled the position of the adjective, must now itself give place to the adjective in its character as a noun. This latter, as the more important word, claims the first position; and at the same time a forcible expression arises, which was properly at home only in the poetry of the language. Thus *כֹּחַ אֲדָמָה* *the strong of power*, *τὸ κράτος τῆς ἰσχύος*, i. e. very strong power, Is. 40: 26; *קִדּוּשׁ אֲבוֹדוֹתָי* *the holy of thy abodes*, i. e. thy most holy abodes, Ps. 46: 5.

An adverb stands in like manner, according to the general rule, after its adjective; as *גָּדוֹל מְאֹד* *very great*. It has, however, on the whole, much greater freedom of position, and can easily precede the verb; as *נִשְׁבָּח מְאֹד* *greatly is he exalted*. This latter remark applies almost universally to the adverb of negation.

The question constantly presents itself, in framing a sentence in Hebrew, whether the article should be inserted or not in connection with nouns and other words which occupy the place of nouns. The decision of such questions depends obviously upon a proper view of the nature of this part of speech; and the topic is one, therefore, which belongs more appropriately to another branch of Hebrew Syntax. Two or three remarks merely, supplemental to the usual statements on the subject, will be sufficient for this place. In the poets the article is less frequent than elsewhere, since they express themselves with greater brevity than other writers. Yet they too differ among themselves in this respect, since they do not all affect the same abruptness of style. Such passages as Micah 7: 11 sq. show how far this peculiarity might be carried, in striving to secure boldness and compression of

speech by the omission of the article. Even out of poetry the same phenomena occasionally meets us, particularly in some of the later writers, who appear to have aimed at a studied brevity of expression. See Dan. 8: 13. 10: 1. Neh. 6: 10. Whether the article should be prefixed to proper names or not, will depend on their signification. If this be of the nature of an adjective, e. g. the *Jebusite*, the *Syrian*, the *Roman*, it would generally be employed. Yet here the Hebrew exhibits some fluctuation. It will be found perhaps that the older the term was in the language, the more liable it was to dispense with the article. So, too, proper names, which on their first appropriation to this use required the article, in order to make them specific, dropped it by degrees as the original import of such terms passed more and more out of view.

Closely allied to the article in its nature, is the definitive particle כִּי , the correct application of which is not wholly free from difficulty in the formation of the Hebrew sentence. The general usage may be stated as follows. It is to be connected with the personal pronoun when this forms the object of a verb, but is hindered by some external difficulty from being attached as a suffix to the verb itself. Thus when emphasis requires the accusative of the pronoun before the verb, or in a separate form after it; as $\text{וַיַּחַדְךָ אֱלֹהִים$ *thee I slew*, Num. 22: 33. Jer. 7: 19. Again, this would occur when a verb has two objects, both of which are personal pronouns, since only one of them can be expressed by the suffix; as $\text{וַיַּחַדְךָ אֱלֹהִים$ *he caused me to see him*. So also with the Infinitive $\text{וַיַּחַדְךָ אֱלֹהִים}$ *in their seeing him*. As to the connection of this particle with substantives, it may be remarked that they take it more especially if they precede the verb; but if they follow it, no certain rule can be prescribed. If the sign of the accusative be attached to them in this latter situation, however, it must be under the known condition that they are definite either from the nature of their meaning, or because they have the article or a following genitive or suffix pronoun. It may be added, that nouns which designate persons are much more prone to assume this particle, than those which refer to things. Hence certain words which are somewhat kindred in their character to the pronouns, as לֵב , רוּחַ , שֵׁן and some others, take כִּי under the circumstances in which the pronouns would receive it. But here too the usual distinction must be made between poetry and prose. The use of this particle is much less common in the former than in the latter; and, in prose, some of the fluctuation which exists, is to be attributed, no doubt, to individual diversities of style.

The omission of the copula in many instances where it would be expressed in other languages by the verb of existence, is a peculiarity which must be observed in the construction of the Hebrew sentence. The verb *הָיָה*, in a strict point of view, is required only when the idea, of *becoming* or of *existing* in some definite past or future, as distinguished from the present, is intended to be conveyed. The statement of Gesenius (Gr. † 141) suggests too limited a view of its omission.

We have considered the elements of the Hebrew sentence in its ordinary state of repose. We will now examine it in the more unequal, disturbed condition into which it is thrown, when it represents the mind in its endeavors to express itself with emphasis and force. The degree in which the sentence deviates in this case from the ordinary arrangement, depends in part on the mental state of the individual himself, in part on the words which he employs.

If it be a slight emphasis which is intended, it is sufficient to change the ordinary position, merely so far as to place the subject or object first, in which case the verb then stands properly in the middle; as, *לֹא שָׁחֲכֵנוּ דָם, עֵינֵינוּ* *our hands shed not blood, our eyes saw it not*, Deut. 21: 7. *אֲבָנִים שָׁחֲקוּ מַיִם* *stones (even) the water wears away*, Job 14: 19. Infrequent and more poetic are the positions—object, subject, verb, 2 Kings 5: 13; subject, object, verb, Is. 13: 18. Zech. 10: 2. A substantive thus placed at the beginning is often repeated by means of its pronoun, whereby it is rendered still more emphatic; as, *בֵּרַכְתָּ יְהוָה וַיַּעַשׂ רַחֲמָיו* *the blessing of Jehovah, it makes rich*, Prov. 10: 22, 24. Is. 8: 14.

The principal noun, of which something is to be affirmed, stands often isolated at the beginning of the clause, inasmuch as the speaker views it as the most prominent word, and then afterwards repeats it in the place which it would regularly occupy in the sentence, by using the personal pronoun; as, *יְהוָהוּ יֹשֵׁב בְּשָׁמַיִם בָּרָא, יְהוָה* *Jehovah—in heaven (not upon earth) is his throne*, Ps. 11: 4. Very seldom does such a substantive remain without such a resumption. To warrant this, the sequel of the sentence must give a complete sense by itself, and the connection be perfectly clear from the context. This happens only in the most excited discourse; as, *הַיּוֹם הַהוּא—* *far remote shall the day remove its limit*,¹ Micah 7: 11; *הַלֵּלִים—* *all pass away*, Is. 2: 15, etc.

A special mode of giving prominence to the noun in a sentence

¹ The point to be illustrated here remains in the passage whether this translation of it be adopted or some other one. There is a difference of opinion in regard to the meaning.

consists in first awakening attention to it by means of a personal pronoun, and then after such a preparation introducing the object itself to which the pronoun refers. In the Aramaean this is very common; but in Hebrew prose it appears very seldom, and is confined almost exclusively to the older writings; as, *when she saw him the boy*, Ex. 2: 6. comp. Josh. 1: 2. Is. 17: 6. The case is different when a pronoun stands entirely alone without any accompanying substantive, being omitted because the speaker supposes that it will suggest itself from the obvious nature of the connection. Examples of this, though comparatively uncommon, may be found in any part of a discourse, as at the beginning in Is. 13: 2, or in the progress of it, as Prov. 12: 6. 28: 2, etc.

The use of וְ , in order to render a noun in the sentence emphatic, requires notice here. This particle has the peculiar power of pointing out an object as something not to be overlooked; and performs this office in a manner which we can scarcely represent in our language. We translate indeed in such cases by *in reference to, as regards*, Lat. *quoad*; but its force is to be given in the tone, rather than by words. Thus in the antique style of the decalogue, at the end of the sentence when nothing further is necessary to the completion of the sense, we have the expression appended וְעַתָּה *as relates to those who hate me*, Ex. 20: 6. Its object is to bring distinctly into view the class of persons against whom the threatening just uttered stands, as a summary and pointed repetition of the statement which has already been made. Comp. Deut. 34: 11 sq. וְ may be placed in like manner at the beginning of a sentence with the same effect. Is. 32: 1. Ps. 16: 3. 17: 4. The later writers employ this construction with still more frequency, so as in fact to weaken the import of its original use. The emphatic application of this particle, therefore, should be distinguished from its office when it serves merely to denote the loose connection which we ordinarily express by our phrase *in relation to*, etc.

One of the strongest modes of giving emphasis to thought in Hebrew consists in the repetition of words. This is practised in various ways. It is very frequent, for example, in the case of the pronoun, which from its abbreviated form for the most part in the language, admits less easily of being distinguished by mere position. Thus the person of the verb is often made prominent by its repetition in the form of the pronoun; as, $\text{וְאֶנִּי נִצַּחְתִּי וְאֶנִּי נִצַּחְתִּי}$ *and I only am escaped*, Job 1: 16. This idiom however, has been weakened in the later writers, who expand their sentences often to a

greater length, and use the pronoun for the sake of clearness rather than emphasis. Again, the pronominal suffixes may be attached to a noun which is followed at the same time, by the separate personal pronoun, on the same principle of making the specification more exact; as, *אָזְנוֹ וְלִבּוֹ* lit. *his his soul*, i. e. *his own soul*, Micah 7: 3. See Num. 14: 32. Neh. 5: 2. Less frequent and in imitation rather of the Aramaean is the repetition of the pronoun in the dative; *לִי אֹיְבָיִם* *my own enemies*, Ps. 27: 2.

A substantive or adjective can be so easily distinguished by position, that this object is very seldom secured by repeating them, at the most only in discourse characterized by intense feeling. Indeclinable words, however, which were originally substantives, since their position in the sentence is less free, may acquire significance in this way; as, *יְדֵן וְיִדְּעֵן, בְּקֹדֶשׁ קָדֹשׁ*, etc. *very much, entirely because*, etc. Perhaps in a more strict analysis of such expressions as the above, the effect of the repetition should be considered as intensive rather than emphatic. It enlarges the idea, instead of merely fixing the mind upon it as one to be specially contemplated.

The verb, it has been already stated, may stand at the commencement of the sentence, even in its ordinary arrangement. Hence when the idea of this part of speech is to be made prominent, some other method must be employed. The one most commonly adopted is that of a repetition of the verb, not however in the same form, but in the *Inf. absol.* The emphasis to be expressed in this way may be various, according to the particular aspect under which the act of the verb is presented. It may be that of contrast, as when one mode of procedure is opposed to another; and hence this construction is common after adversative terms and particles. Thus the Hebrew said, *thou shalt not give it to me, but* *קָנוֹתִי אֶקְנֶה* *I will buy it*, 2 Sam. 24: 24. It may occur also without the adversative particle, as Ezek. 16: 4. Again, we find it often where some limitation is intended to be suggested, hence after *אֵל, כִּי* *only, as he was only gone out* (nothing but merely this), Gen. 27: 30. 44: 28. Judg. 7: 19; and even after *וְ* *and*, when the sense demands such a restriction, as Amos 3: 5. Further, in connection with questions when the act forms the principal point of the inquiry; as, *הֲיִשְׁלָטְהוּ הַמִּלִּיכִים* *shalt thou (even) rule?* Gen. 37: 8; and, in general, when an act is viewed as entirely certain; as, *I know that* *הֲיִשְׁלָטְהוּ הַמִּלִּיכִים* *thou shalt reign*, 1 Sam. 24: 21. Amos 6: 5; also of things past, Joel 1: 7. Jer. 20: 15, or even of opinions which one entertains with confidence; as, *I thought* *אָמַנְתִּי* *he*

will go forth, 2 Kings 6: 11. This construction occurs at the beginning of a narrative, in order to affirm the thing narrated with emphasis and certainty; as, *וַיֵּרְאוּ אֶת הָאֵל* *we have seen*, Gen. 26: 28, and often in the utterance of *earnest* commands and threatenings, for which expression the *Inf. absol.* alone is frequently employed. The participle as well as the finite verb, whether it have an active or intransitive sense, may acquire emphasis in the manner which has been described. The proper place for the Infinitive when thus used is at the commencement of the clause; and this right it asserts so tenaciously that even the negative adverb must recede and come in as an attendant of the finite verb, as *לֹא נִרְאֶה אֶת הָאֵל* *we will not say thee*, Judg. 15: 13. The exceptions to this remark are very few.

From such rhetorical repetitions of a word we are to distinguish the cases in which the repetition serves for the expression of a new idea, because the language has no other more concise or intelligible phraseology for such a purpose. An instance of this would be *וַיֵּלֶךְ וַיֵּלֶךְ* *upon the way, upon the way*, i. e. *ever on the way*, Deut. 2: 27, *שָׁנָה שָׁנָה* *year year*, i. e. *yearly*, etc.

The correct use of the negative particles is specially important in the formation of the Hebrew sentence. The general distinction between *לֹא* and *בִּלְבָד* is well known. Besides these, we have also *אֵין*, *אֵינָהּ*, *אֵינֶהוּ*, *עוֹלָם*, and still other negatives, which are not to be loosely interchanged for one another. Of these *אֵין* denies properly some simple word or idea of a proposition, and thus distinguishes itself from *לֹא* which denies the entire sentence. As it expresses no definite time, it may represent the verb of existence in any form. *אֵינָהּ* *besides, except*, resembles *לֹא* in its general character as qualificatory of an entire clause (*אֵינָהּ* attaches itself rather to a single word), but admits also of being connected with nouns and prepositions in a manner in which *לֹא* does not; and hence may occupy positions in the sentence from which that is excluded. *בִּלְבָד*, a contracted form of this particle, is confined to poetry and used in the same general way. *עוֹלָם*, expresses a general limitation and places itself naturally at the head of the clause which it qualifies. To suppose an entirely arbitrary, indiscriminate interchange of these and similar terms in Hebrew, would be contrary to the universal analogies of language; but the feeling which is to guide one practically in marking such distinctions, can be formed only by the long continued study of the Hebrew writers; and by such study, as the masters in this kind of learning assure us, it may certainly be formed.

ARTICLE VIII.

ALSCHESFSKI'S LIVY.

*Titii Livii Rerum Romanarum ab urbe condita libri ad codicum manu scriptorum fidem emendati ab C. F. S. Alschevski. Vol. I. primae decadis partem priorem continens, 1841. Vol. II. prim. dec. part. alt. continens,*¹ 1843.

By Prof. John L. Lincoln of Brown University.

THE publication of the first two volumes of this new critical edition of Livy, has awakened the greatest interest in Germany, and is understood to mark a new era in the history of the text of Livy's works. It is now somewhat more than a hundred years since the first appearance of the well-known edition of Arnold Drakenborch. That great work, bearing upon every page evidences of the learning and industry and mature scholarship of its author, embodying all the results of the labors of preceding editors, and embracing a vast apparatus of critical and exegetical material, has till within a comparatively short period continued to maintain its ascendancy as the standard edition of Livy. Most of the editors who followed Drakenborch, either unacquainted with the imperfections of a work containing so much that is good, or shrinking from the formidable task of working over and producing anew and in a better form such a cumbrous mass of material, have for the most part followed his critical authority, and been content to gather, according to their wants, from the immense stores of annotation which he accumulated. Yet the extreme confusion in which Drakenborch has thrown together the valuable results of his researches, can hardly have failed to perplex even those most familiar with learned commentary; and certainly from many a practical teacher, condemned to grope his way through those piles of annotation in search of a clue to some critical or philological difficulty, has often escaped the very reasonable wish, that some kindly spirit of order had once been present in the midst of the chaotic mass, and fashioned it into some known and recognized proportions of form and symmetry. The text of Drakenborch, though superior to that of earlier editors, and in many important

¹ We learn from recent foreign Journals, that Vol. III. has also appeared. It probably contains the first five books of the third decade.

particulars to that of Gronovius, which he assumed as the basis of his own edition, has yet entirely failed to meet the demands of the better principles of criticism which prevail at the present time. Indeed, that celebrated editor of Livy, though he constantly consulted the best editions, and had at his command a numerous and to some extent valuable collection of manuscripts, yet seems not to have had any clear and certain opinion of the real value of separate Mss., nor to have established for himself any uniform principles of criticism; and hence he frequently followed in silence some older edition, and in many passages adopted or rejected readings, in accordance with the suffrages of inferior manuscripts, simply because they formed a majority in his collection. Many German scholars since the beginning of the present century, and among the first Walch¹ and Büttner,² have drawn attention to the defects of the edition of Drakenborch; and in their satisfactory emendations of numerous passages prepared the way for others, who have undertaken the task of thoroughly revising the text of the entire work of Livy. Of the more recent editors who have preceded Alschefski in attempting to discharge this responsible office, only two here require particular mention, Kreyssig and Immanuel Bekker. Kreyssig, by a careful examination of the Bamberg Ms., introduced many important corrections into the fourth decade, and especially the thirty-third book, and by a new collation of the Vienna Ms. emended many passages in the first half of the fifth decade.

The result of his labors appear in the neat stereotype edition of Tauchnitz, in six volumes duodecimo, 1829; and the new readings adopted are conveniently given along with the readings of Drakenborch, at the end of each volume. In the remaining decades, the first and the third, Bekker first commenced the work of revision on a correct method, by adopting for his guidance in the former the excellent Florentine Ms. and for the latter the no less celebrated Putean Ms. The text of these two portions of Livy, appeared accordingly in a greatly improved form in his edition. Yet, notwithstanding the acknowledged merit of Bekker's edition, it labored under serious imperfections, and left much still to be done in the work of revising the text of Livy. In the judgment of two of his reviewers, well qualified to judge, Oselli³ and Weissenborn,⁴ his labors were only partially successful; the com-

¹ G. C. Walch, *Emendationes Livianae*.

² Fr. Büttner, *Observationes Livianae*, 1819.

³ See Jahn's *Jahrbücher*, 1831, Bd. I. ⁴ See *ib.* Bd. 31, 1841, p. 156.

mon readings were frequently retained without sufficient reason, in opposition to the testimony of the best Mss., and the method which he had proposed to pursue was not followed with the requisite consistency and thoroughness.

These two editions of Kreyssig and Bekker, at once by their merits and their faults, by the real good which they effected as well as by that which they failed to effect, opened the way for the labors of Alschefski, with whose work we are now more particularly concerned. To correct what they had done imperfectly, and to do what they had left undone, and by a new and careful study of the oldest and the best Mss. to restore so far as possible the text of Livy's works, and place it at length upon a secure and permanent basis, was the task proposed to himself by this editor. Dr. Alschefski, whose name seems destined to be for a long time associated in the learned world with the works of Livy, was born in Berlin, and educated in the Joachimsthal gymnasium and the university in that city; and soon after leaving the university, commenced his career as a classical teacher in the *Gray Cloister* gymnasium, one of the oldest institutions of learning in Berlin, and indeed in Germany. With this gymnasium he still continues to be connected. By his experience as a teacher, and especially by a long course of critical studies and investigations, he had well prepared himself for the business of editing the writings of Livy; and had proved himself well qualified for his task in two minor works, which exhibited most satisfactory results of his preparatory labors. The first of these was a Gymnasium Program, published in 1839—entitled, *Ueber die kritische Behandlung der Geschichtsbücher des Titus Livius*—in which the author displayed a familiar acquaintance with the literature of Livy, gave a clear historical view of the fate which the text of his works underwent during the middle ages, and pointed out the true method to be observed in consulting and using the various Mss. together with an estimate of their respective value. This was followed by a critical edition of the thirtieth book of Livy, which at once gained him an enviable distinction in Germany, and awakened the most eager expectations for the appearance of his edition of the entire work. The first two volumes of this work, mentioned at the head of this notice, embrace as their title indicates, the books of the first decade. In the preface to the first volume, the author states the principles of criticism by which he has been guided, and classifies according to their age and worth, the manuscripts which he has consulted in preparing his edition. First of all, the Floren-

time or Medicean Ms. preserved in the Laurentian library at Florence, which had been already used by Bekker with so much advantage, was subjected to a new and thorough examination. Yet mindful of the fact that this excellent book, ancient as it is, belongs to the eleventh century, a period when the transcribers already began to take liberties with the text, and determined, in conformity with the principle observed by Phenanus to lay at the basis of his revision two ancient and trustworthy manuscripts, he next sought for a second one worthy of taking rank with the Medicean. In this search the editor was successful, far beyond his expectations.¹ In the royal library at Paris, he found in the Colbertine collection a manuscript of the first decade, which on examination, was found to belong to the tenth century, and on a close comparison with the Medicean, not only coincided with it in all essential points, but was even superior to it in some respects. These two books, the Medicean and the Paris, with the Worms Ms. used by Phenanus, which does not extend beyond the sixth book, form in the judgment of Alschevski the first class of Mss. of the first decade, and contain the text of Livy in its purest form. The readings of the first two he has given in foot-notes in his edition with the utmost faithfulness, extending even to every orthographical peculiarity, and has thus put every one in possession of the means of judging of their worth. In a second class, the author ranks the Harleian Mss. 1, which extends only to the end of the eighth book, and the Leyden 1, both of which show traces of arbitrary alterations by the transcribers. Among the remaining Mss. Alschevski regards as the best the Klockian, the Palatine 1 and 3, the Portugal and the Vossian 2. From this account of the method on which Dr. Alschevski has proceeded in the preparation of his work, it will be at once manifest to every one at all acquainted with the subject, what invaluable service he has done to the text of this portion of Livy's writings. He has carried out this method with such fidelity and consistency, that we may regard the text now printed in his edition, as restored to the same form, certainly in everything that is essential, in which it existed as early as the fifth century, in the original copy of Nicomachus Dexter, from which the Paris and the Medicean Mss., and as Niebuhr thinks, all the manuscripts of the first decade were prepared.

It is a circumstance justly regarded by Dr. Alschevski himself,

¹ Compare with the preface, an article by Alschevski, in Jahn's Jahrbücher, Bd. 40, 1844, p. 287.

as a singular good fortune, that his critical labors have been reviewed by one abundantly qualified to do him the fullest justice, Prof. Weissenborn of Eisenach; who, in two articles in Jahn's *Jahrbücher*, Nos. 35 and 39, has discussed them with the ability of a master and the candor and impartiality of a true scholar; and while he has borne the most unequivocal testimony to their excellence, has suggested to the author numerous changes and improvements for a future edition. These articles from their extent and great value, deserve from all who are professionally interested in the subject, and especially from all future editors of Livy, a scarcely less attentive perusal and study than the work itself, which they review. It seems to us, indeed, that in many passages, which from the disagreement of the best Mss. require for their settlement a nice balancing of considerations, and in which the author seems to have been guided by a certain personal preference for the one or the other Ms., the sound and mature judgment of his reviewer has suggested the better reading, and maintained it upon the most satisfactory grounds. There is much reason too for believing that Weissenborn is correct in ascribing some of the readings adopted by Alschefski upon the authority sometimes of the Paris Ms. and sometimes of the Medicean, to the mistakes of transcribers, and rejecting them for other and more probable readings. But it would lead us too far from our present design to mention more particularly the points on which Prof. Weissenborn has enlarged; and we must content ourselves with these allusions to his very valuable observations.

Although it was the chief purpose of Dr. Alschefski to furnish a critical edition, yet he has not entirely neglected the work of interpretation; in both these volumes, and particularly in the second, he has devoted considerable attention to the explanation of difficult passages, and has discussed at some length various grammatical points. Yet as Weissenborn has well remarked, some of the notes of this character are not of the greatest importance, and the space which they occupy, might with more advantage have been given to passages of greater difficulty, which have never been satisfactorily explained. Some of the translations, too, which are given of certain passages, seem quite too free; and the sense which they convey, cannot by any just principles of interpretation, be legitimately educed from the words in the text. This remark is particularly applicable to the translations which the author gives of two passages, which have occasioned much discussion, viz. B. 2. 6, of *eminente animo patrio*, and B. 1.

17, of *patrum—a singulis—pervenerat : factionibus*, etc. Though Alschefski's reading of the latter of these passages must be received upon the authority of the best Mss., yet the translation which is given, is too wide of the text, and after all, fails to clear up the singular difficulties of the passage.¹ At the same time, it is readily conceded, that in this portion of his labors, Dr. Alschefski has handled the points in question with clearness and skill, and has furnished many valuable contributions to the exegetical commentary of Livy. In respect to orthography, the author has also closely followed his manuscripts, and while in pursuing this course, he has presented numberless words in a form that will seem quite strange to most readers, has well executed an important purpose of a critical edition of an ancient work. In the punctuation, he has been singularly sparing, and in this respect, indeed, has in comparison with Drakenborch, gone to the very opposite extreme, giving sometimes whole sentences of very considerable length, scarcely broken by a single point. In concluding this notice of Dr. Alschefski's work, we must not omit to mention, that in its mechanical execution, it is far superior to most German editions of the classics, and will bear honorable comparison with the productions of the press of any country.

It is proper also here to mention that Dr. Alschefski has already published two volumes of a smaller edition of his work, in a form adapted to the use of schools, and of general readers. We have not yet received these volumes; but from the favorable manner in which they have been noticed in the German journals, we may confidently expect to find in them a valuable book for the practical purposes of instruction. The author has endeavored to attain the object proposed in this edition, by omitting the critical apparatus, by furnishing only notes of an explanatory character, and by adopting, with some modifications, the usual orthography. The text is represented as even superior to that of the larger edition, as the author has carefully reviewed his former labors, and introduced many improvements. At the end of each volume is attached an *adnotatio critica*, embracing the particular passages, in regard to which the author has abandoned his earlier critical opinions.

¹ See the remarks of Weissenborn, in the second of the articles above referred to, p. 280. Compare the discussion of Schadelera, *Archiv für Phil. u. Päd. Bd. 1. p. 439.*

ARTICLE IX.

THE GREEK VERSION OF THE PENTATEUCH.

De Pentateuchâ Versione Alexandrina Libri tres. Scripsit Henr. Guil. Jos. Thierschius,¹ Phil. Dr., Theol. Lic. Erlangen, 1841.

By Prof. H. B. Hackett, Newton Theol. Institution.

HABES, lector, opusculum de ea re elaboratum, quam pauci hodie curant, plurimi ne curandum quidem a quopiam judicant. So says the author in laying his work even before the critical public of his own country. We trust, however, that of the few who take an interest in such labors, some are to be found also among us. The production here noticed relates to an important circle of study, and one that affords room for a much more extended investigation than it has yet received. There are various aspects and phenomena of the Hellenistic Greek as contained in the Septuagint, which remain still to be examined. Some of the obscurity which rests upon certain portions of Hebrew syntax, is destined to be cleared up, if ever, by light that shall be derived from this source. A just treatment of the New Testament idiom depends still more, both lexically and grammatically, upon a full acquaintance with the usage of the Septuagint Greek. An advance in this direction may be regarded as one of the most urgent wants, for which provision needs to be made, at the present time, in this branch of biblical study. In the work of Thiersch now before us, we have a favorable specimen of what is required, in order to supply this deficiency. In the last edition of his *Grammar of the New Testament*, Winer pronounces it beyond comparison the best treatise on the linguistic element of the Seventy, which has as yet appeared. It is confined to an examination of the five books of Moses. It consists of three parts; the first of which treats of the principles which the Seventy have observed in their translation of the Pentateuch; the second, of the Greek dialect in which they have written; and the third, of the Hebraisms which are to be found in their version.

In his prefatory remarks, the author speaks of the occasion

¹ The author is at present Professor in the theological Faculty of the University at Marburg, and is a son of the well known Greek grammarian of the same name.

which led him to undertake this labor. It was in consequence of suspicions with which he found his mind assailed, in reference to the purity of the generally received Hebrew text. He had observed that the Seventy frequently depart from it in their translation, and often in such a manner as to give an essentially different sense. He was anxious, therefore, to ascertain the ground of such deviation, and especially whether it was of such a nature as to warrant the belief that it could have originated from competent *Ms.* authority. For the purpose of obtaining satisfaction on this point, he devoted himself for two years together to the careful study of the Hebrew and Greek Pentateuch. The book under consideration is made up almost entirely of the results of this examination. All unsifted, traditionary material has been excluded; and, for a German performance, much less than the ordinary space has been allotted to the history of preceding opinions and labors.

In the first division of the treatise, it is shown that the Alexandrian translators proceeded evidently in making their version on principles which allowed them an almost arbitrary latitude, and that in the exercise of this they can reasonably be supposed to have made the changes which appear in their version, without seeking the origin of them in a different Hebrew text. Whatever may be true of other books of the Old Testament, it is clear that those who put the Pentateuch into Greek, could not have designed to furnish an exact copy of the original. They have departed from it sometimes for the sake of what perspicuity seemed to them to require. They have asserted everywhere the right of making what they translate intelligible to their readers, according to their own ideas of the meaning to be conveyed. They have not only adhered to this law in justifiable cases, but in some passages which they found it difficult to understand, have ventured boldly upon a single view of the sense, instead of leaving the language so as to suggest the possibility of other expositions or conjectures. Expressions and ideas which they regarded as wanting in proper reverence for the Deity, they took the liberty to alter without scruple; and narrations of any kind which they thought would not be entirely honorary to them in the eyes of other nations, they softened and put in a milder light. Instances also occur, in which they have substituted their own sentiments for those of the sacred writers, and especially in which they have obtruded upon the text various peculiar dogmas of the Alexandrian philosophy. The changes of a rhetorical character, which they have admitted, are innumera-

ble. They vary the form and phraseology of the Hebrew almost at pleasure, for the purpose of securing a more elegant Greek diction; they avoid the bolder figures of the oriental style and, though they seek to retain as far as possible the graces which belong to the poetic language of the Hebrews, they express for the most part entirely in the Greek way those idiomatic phrases of daily life, which are so important to a just conception of the character and genius of a foreign people. The requisite examples for supporting these positions, are presented in the proper connection. The conclusion under this head naturally is, that changes should not be hastily made in the Hebrew text on the authority of the Septuagint. There is no occasion for emending it or having our confidence in it disturbed, on account of the manner in which the Greek version differs from it. The rules which the authors of it followed in the performance of their labor, account sufficiently for most of this diversity, and evince the necessity of the utmost caution in the adoption of new readings, recommended merely by their agreement with the Greek translation. The author's own language is: *Hac dissertatione videmur demonstrasse, eam esse versionis Pentateuchi Alexandrinae indolem, ut ad explicandum quidem textum Masorethicum non parum conferat, ad mutandum vero nisi magna cum temeritate adhiberi nequeat.*

In the second division of the treatise, the author considers the characteristics of the Greek dialect employed by the Seventy. The inquiry here relates to the Greek basis of this dialect, as distinguished from its Hebrew coloring. With the exception of some additional examples, and a proposed modification of some minor statements, the author adopts the views already sanctioned by such men as Salmasius, Sturtz, Buttmann, Winer, and others. The Greek which the translators of the Septuagint employed, was that current at Alexandria among those for whom they wrote, without any of that striving for *Attic* purity, which is apparent, even in some of the later Greek authors. In addition to its other properties which are well known, this form of the Greek language was distinguished for occasional Alexandrianisms, i. e. terms having a signification peculiar to northern Africa, as well as some examples of words *graecised* from the old Egyptian. Of the orthography which prevailed in the Alexandrian dialect, that is, the manner of representing the pronunciation of particular words, where the Greek language furnished different signs for the same sound, the insertion or omission of the breathings, the elision or insertion of letters for the sake of euphony, etc., a much

more exact account is given than is contained in the older work of Sturtz. The recent discovery of so many ancient inscriptions, of papyrus rolls and other similar documents, has illustrated the usage in these respects in a manner unknown to the earlier writers. The grammatical idioms which are mentioned, are, for the most part, the same that others have noticed. The dual number, as in modern Greek, has entirely vanished. The optative is used with much less frequency and with less precision, than in the earlier Greek. Irregularities occur in the contraction both of nouns and verbs. Some verbs which are intransitive in regular Greek, have acquired here an active sense. One instance at least of the ecclastic use of *ἴνα* must be admitted, viz. Gen. 22: 14. The negatives *οὐ* and *μή* are employed almost without exception in accordance with the strictest Attic usage. In reference to syntactical arrangement and construction, the style of the Pentateuch presents comparatively little which is anomalous.

The third and last part of the book presents to us its most valuable contents. The Alexandrian translators were Jews by birth; and the manner in which they employed the Greek language, must have been influenced by this circumstance. It is the object of our author to consider here the nature and extent of this influence, so far as it is developed in the Pentateuch. The Hebraisms which occur in the New Testament have been distinguished by critics as perfect and imperfect—the former being those which are peculiar to the Hebrew, the latter those which are common to it with the Greek. Mr. Thiersch applies this distinction to the style of the Septuagint, and, as might be expected, finds there exemplifications of it in both ways. The instances however of pure or perfect Hebraism are those naturally which receive most attention; and the results here are not only of general interest to the philologist, but capable of being applied to the study of the New Testament Greek. Some of the statements which are presented in connection with this branch of the subject, are the following.

The general coincidence in the laws which regulate the use of the article in Greek and Hebrew, left no occasion for any great departure from the proper Greek idiom in the manner in which the Seventy have employed this part of speech. One exception however must be made to this remark, in a case which does not appear to have been duly noticed. It is a well known principle in Hebrew, that the article is not prefixed to substantives which are made definite by a following genitive or by a suffix pronoun.

In imitation of this, the article is sometimes omitted under the same circumstances in the Pentateuch, where the genuine Greek construction would have required it.¹ It is not improbable, that this peculiarity of the Hebrew has occasioned the singular omission of the article in Acts 2: 36, though Winer has proposed there a different explanation. Again, the influence of the Hebrew may be traced in the use of the personal pronouns, which is the more important to be remarked, inasmuch as the style of the New Testament has been affected in a similar manner. In strict Greek usage, the pronouns of the first and second persons are not accustomed to be expressed, unless they mark a special emphasis; and the same is true in Hebrew, with one extensive exception. The Hebrew language has a great fondness for the participle; and since the participle has no means like the proper verb, of indicating its relation to its subject by a change of termination, it became necessary to connect with it the pronoun, especially when it was of the first or second person, for the sake of distinctness. In translating such constructions, the Seventy have not always kept in view this object of the pronoun, but have sometimes expressed it in instances where the Greek would have dispensed with it.² Even the still more idiomatic use of the relative in connection with a personal pronoun so as to form a single relative expression, has been retained in some passages. This construction, so entirely foreign to the pure Greek idiom, is not unknown to the New Testament.³

The Hebraizing tendency of the Seventy appears further in the manner in which they employ the noun in all its various cases. Thus the nominative absolute, at the commencement of a proposition, though by no means unused in Greek, occurs in the Pentateuch both with a frequency and a boldness of position, which can be explained only as an effect of that similar license practised in the Hebrew, with which the translators were so familiar.⁴ There is another species of independent nominative

¹ The examples of this adduced are Deut. 16: 15, *ἐν δὲ εὐλογίᾳ σε κύριος ἐν πῶσι γενήμασί σου καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ σου*; ib. 28: 25, *ἐν πάσαις βασιλείαις τῆς γῆς*; Lev. 23: 31, *ἐν πάσαις κατοικίαις ὑμῶν*; ib. 25: 24, *κατὰ πᾶσαν γῆν κατασχέσεως ὑμῶν*.

² Thus Gen. 30: 1, *δός μοι τέκνα, εἰ δὲ μὴ τελειήσω ἐγὼ* for אֲבִיךָ מֵיָדִי. So also Ex. 2: 14: 13: 15, etc.

³ In the Pentateuch, see Gen. 28: 13. Deut. 9: 28, etc. In the New Testament, see Acts 15: 17 in a citation from Amos, Rev. 7: 2: 12: 14, etc.

⁴ An example of this is Ex. 32: 1—*ὁ γὰρ Μωϋσῆς οὕτως ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἐξῆγαγεν ἡμῶς ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου—οὐκ οἶδαμεν, τί γέγονεν αὐτῷ*.

which they often use, which is placed not at the beginning of the sentence but after other nouns—a construction which John in the Apocalypse has imitated, but perhaps no other New Testament writer.¹ In such instances, an oblique case would naturally be employed in Greek, or the subsequent part of the sentence be re-ast in some way; but the Hebrew having no declension, properly so called, and adhering more rigidly to an unbroken, uniform structure, would be very apt to lead a Hellenistic writer to express himself in this irregular manner. The wide range of signification to which the genitive construction was appropriated in Hebrew, has occasioned an almost corresponding latitude in the application of the genitive in the Greek style of the Seventy. The dialect of the New Testament, it is well known, abounds in illustrations of the tendency of the Hellenistic Greek to assimilate itself to the Hebrew in this respect. The relation of the Greek dative the Hebrews represented, for the most part, by making use of Lamedh; and on the whole, the Greek translators have confined themselves to the legitimate province of this case. Their use of the accusative, on the contrary, deviates widely from its office in the classic Greek writers. It expresses often, after the manner of the Hebrews, the material out of which a thing is made or the manner in which it is done, where the Greeks would have employed a preposition or some different phraseology.² The double accusative which the Greek and Latin languages so often place after verbs of a certain signification, the Seventy sometimes employ correctly in their version, but sometimes they *hebraize*, by translating the preposition which it was customary to insert under such circumstances in Hebrew.³ Some other verbs they construed, not with the accusative as the Greek custom demanded, but with prepositions in conformity with the Hebrew practice.⁴

In comparing the use which the authors of the Greek version have made, of the verb in its various forms, with that of the Hebrew verb, we have opened to us a wide field of observation,

¹ This may be illustrated by Deut. 4: 11—*καὶ τὸ ὄρος ἐκαίετο πυρὶ ἕως τοῦ οὐρανοῦ· σκότος, γνόφος, θνέλλα*. There are many bolder examples. Comp. Numb. 20: 5, Deut. 7: 8, 10: 7, etc.

² Thus Ex. 24: 39—*τάλαντον χρυσίου καθαροῦ ποιήσεις πάντα τὰ σκεύη ταῦτα*. Comp. Gen. 6: 1. Ex. 26: 1, etc.

³ For example, *ποίησω σε εἰς ἔθνος μέγα*, Ex. 44: 18, and often where *εἰς* stands for *ἐκ*.

⁴ The Hebrew said *קָרָא וְקָרָא* and the Hebrew translator in accordance with it, *ἐκεκλήσατο ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματι*. The accusative in regular Greek would follow as the direct object of the verb.

which has not yet been fully explored. It may be remarked in general as the result of our author's study, that the different voices or conjugations of the Hebrew verb are in the main correctly represented in the Pentateuch, by the corresponding separate verbs in which the Greek language is so rich. The praeterite tenses in Greek they employed with propriety; but the use of the future like the New Testament writers, they extended to the expression of ideas for which the instinct of the native Grecian would have dictated a different form. This is seen particularly when there is occasion to speak of a thing as something that is wont to be done, that ought to be done or ought not to be, that may be done or cannot be, and the like. Such conceptions the Greeks seldom present in the future tenses, but avail themselves rather of the present, of auxiliary verbs, or of the optative and imperative modes. In the Hebrew on the contrary, the future or imperfect form of the verb is the prevailing one for such purposes. It is worthy of notice also that where in Hebrew the past tense follows an imperative to which it is joined by Vav consecutive, our translators turn the former often into a future.¹ The periphrasis of the participle with the verb of existence will scarcely ever be found to occur, unless it be justified by the nature of the thought which is to be conveyed. The infinitive absolute which is employed in so peculiar way as a qualifying or emphatic accompaniment of the simple verb, the Alexandrian interpreters express often by prefixing to such verb a participle of the same meaning in such tense as the point of time to be designated requires.² Several of the leading grammarians, as Matthiae, Kühner, Winer, have regarded this as a legitimate Greek construction; and in this point of view, it would be the frequency of it only in the Septuagint, which is singular. But from this opinion Thiersch dissents; and goes into an examination of the examples upon which these scholars have relied for the correctness of their statement. He maintains that in all the passages of this kind which have been brought forward, the participle performs in reality its ordinary office in Greek, and that in no case does it qualify the verb which it accompanies in a manner corresponding to that of the infinitive absolute in Hebrew. His conclusion is that this mode of representing the Hebrew idiom in question was peculiar to the Seventy, and was originated by them for this purpose. To this partic-

¹ Thus is the oft recurring formula—*ἀλλήσων τοῖς υἱοῖς Ἰσραὴλ καὶ ἐρεῖς αὐτοῖς* = *וְהָיָה לְבָנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ*.

² As *βλέποντες βλέπετε*.

ular mode of representation, however, they did not restrict themselves. The other most common method was that of connecting with the verb a noun of the same signification in the dative, as equivalent in Greek to the Hebrew infinitive.¹ This mode of expressing intensity has its frequent parallels in Greek and could not properly be represented as a Hebraism. The infinitive with Lamedh prefixed which has so extensive an application in Hebrew, could not fail to have an influence on the use of the Greek infinitive in writers who had accustomed themselves to such different habits of expression. This effect proceeded so far that there was in fact scarcely any relation of one verb to another, which they did not sometimes express in the infinitive. It was appended to the verb with such latitude as to be epexegetical of it, whatever might be the logical relation which it sustained to it. The genitive of the article was usually prefixed as the sign of this connection. The article thus used denoted not only design, purpose, as in the classic Greek writers, but consequence, result; so that the infinitive with the article as employed in the Septuagint and the New Testament, occupies almost the entire province of the Hebrew infinitive. This extension of the same form of speech to represent such different relations of thought, will not appear on reflection to be so very surprising. The transition from the idea of intending a thing to that of doing it, from the object of an action to its performance, is one that is easily made, and in another form has been exemplified in the Greek language itself. In all the earlier writers *ἵνα* was employed in a strict telic sense, but in the course of time it receded more and more from this rigid use and became at length ecclastic in its import.

On the whole, few traces of the manner in which the Hebrews employed the preposition, appear in the style of the Alexandrian translators. Into one violation of Greek purity, however, they have been led through the force of their Hebrew associations in regard to the mode of expressing the comparative degree. This was done by means of the positive degree of the adjective and the preposition *ἤ*. To this idiom they have virtually adhered in using *ἤ, ἤτοι, καὶ*, in cases of comparison where the Greek language requires *μᾶλλον* or the comparative degree. We meet with the same peculiarity in the New Testament. A few instances occur, in which by a Hebraism *εἰ* stands elliptically in the language, of oaths as equivalent to a strong negative declaration, precisely like *אין*. Winer has pointed out three or four examples of

¹ Thus *ἐπιθυμία ἐπεθύμησα*.

the same usage in the New Testament. It was inevitable that the multiform uses of η in binding together thoughts related to each other by every variety of logical connection, should not have led to applications of the Greek particle most nearly corresponding to it, which were unknown to regular Greek writers. Hence *καὶ* is found often where the obvious requisition of the context shows that the clauses which it unites, are not in any proper sense of the word, consecutive in their character, and where a writer, imbued fully with the spirit of the language, would have put some term of greater logical precision, instead of so vague a connective.

The work of Prof. Thiersch, of which we have given this general sketch, places before us the most important facts in relation to the linguistic character of the Greek Pentateuch. There is some reason to hope¹ that he or M. Lipsius who has long occupied himself with this study, may soon communicate to the public the results of a similar investigation, extended to the remainder of this version.

ARTICLE X.

PICKERING'S GREEK LEXICON.

By Samuel H. Taylor, M. A., Principal of Phillips Academy, Andover.

THE progress in the study of the Greek language in our country within the last twenty years, may be estimated with some degree of correctness, by the improvement in Greek lexicography during that period. Twenty years ago, almost the only Greek lexicon used in our schools, was that of Schrevelius, the definitions of which were in Latin, and the limited number of words which it contained, made it suitable for only a small circle of authors. In 1826, the same year that Donnegan's Greek lexicon appeared in England, the translation of Schrevelius by Messrs. Pickering and Oliver, was published in this country, with the addition of upwards of 2000 articles. The publication of this lexicon at once relieved the student of the awkward and wearisome process of studying one dead language through the medium

¹ So we venture to understand the wish to this effect, which Winer has expressed in a note to the last edition of his New Testament Grammar.

of another; and we well recollect with what pleasure we first looked upon its pages, containing definitions in our good mother tongue. In 1829, the second edition of the same work appeared, with the addition of more than 10,000 entire articles, and other improvements by Mr. Pickering. About this time, Donnegan's Greek lexicon was published in this country. Although this work was sufficiently extensive for general use, yet the great want of order in the arrangement of the definitions, the almost entire absence of any logical connection between the primary and secondary or metaphorical meanings, rendered it a very unsafe guide to be put into the hands of students. But notwithstanding the acknowledged defects of Donnegan, it was used more generally than any other lexicon, from the time it was first published in this country until the present year, the small lexicon of Grove, republished from the English edition, being the only other one readily accessible.

But in speaking of the progress of Greek lexicography in our country, mention should be made of the two New Testament lexicons of Dr. Robinson. The first of these, published in 1826, was mainly a translation of the *Clavis Philologica* of Wahl; the second published in 1836, was a wholly independent work, upon which he had spent several years of unwearied effort, and which reflects high honor on the literature of our country.

The third edition of Mr. Pickering's Greek lexicon, the recent appearance of which has suggested these remarks, may be considered in many respects as an entirely new work. Mr. Pickering's attention was directed to the subject of Greek lexicography as early as the year 1814. Since that time until his death in May last, he was constantly increasing his knowledge of the Greek language, both by his own investigations and by the careful study of the best authors on Greek Philology. In addition to his accurate knowledge of the Greek, Mr. Pickering had a more or less extensive acquaintance with at least twenty other languages, four of which, besides his native tongue, he was able to speak. These he did not study as distinct and independent languages, having no analogies or resemblances to each other; he looked upon them rather as branches springing from a common stock, with affinities more or less obvious. This study of comparative Philology is of invaluable service to the lexicographer. The true meaning of a word may be correctly traced only through another language, or the changes which take place, in its formation, may be best understood by the changes in similar words of different

languages. And the scholar who has accustomed himself to trace the minute resemblances between different languages, is thereby better prepared to see and exhibit the different significations of the same word. Such were the qualifications which Mr. Pickering brought to the preparation of his Greek Lexicon; and the work has not disappointed the expectations which had been formed respecting it. The work is sufficiently extensive for all ordinary purposes, containing 1456 closely printed octavo pages, and upwards of twenty-two thousand articles more than the first edition. We have compared it in several places with the special lexicons for Homer, Herodotus, Sophocles, Plato and Xenophon, and have found it more complete than we had anticipated. It is particularly valuable for the reading of the Attic orators, the author having studied these with special care.

One of the most serious defects in all the Greek lexicons hitherto used in our schools, has been a want of proper arrangement of the definitions. If the student were called upon to give the primary meaning of a word, he had no means of ascertaining this with certainty, for in many instances the secondary meaning was placed first, and the primary one among the last. Consequently the student had no means of tracing correctly the relation between the primitive and derivative senses of a word, an exercise to which he should be accustomed from the first. This evil is, to a great extent, remedied in the new lexicon of Mr. Pickering. He has generally arranged his definitions in the logical order, giving the primary meaning first, then the metaphorical or more remote ones, each new signification being distinguished from the preceding by a semicolon. The improvement of the new edition over the first, both in the fulness and happy arrangement of its definitions, may be seen by comparing a few of the more difficult articles of each edition with each other. In the first edition, λέγω is defined: "to say, tell, speak; to mention, recite or recount; to number, reckon; to command; to collect, gather; to choose; to call; to name; to read; to cause to lie down;"—in the third edition: "originally, to lay (German, legen), and in pass. to lie (German, liegen), whence all its significations may be derived; (1) to lay asleep, to lull to sleep, to put to bed; pass. or mid., to lie down, which signification only occurs in the earliest poets, nor is the pres. ever so used; (2) to lay in order, arrange, and hence, to gather, pick up; mid. to choose, pick out; pass. pres. to be chosen; in this signification the Attics use the perf. εἰ-λογα, pass. εἰλεγμαι, aor. pass. ἐλέγην, but only in compounds; (3)

to lay among, and so, to count or reckon up; (4) to recount, relate, tell; hence, to speak, say, utter; to describe, state; to mention; to recite; to read; to call, to name; to import (signify). So in the first edition *στέλλω* is defined: "to send; to prepare, procure, equip; to restrain, repress;"—in the second: "The primary idea seems to be, to set or arrange in a certain order, to arrange, *Il. IV. 294*; to get in readiness, to prepare, equip; to get ready to send out, *Od. II. 287*; to prepare an expedition; to send; to send for, to bring; to put in order; hence, to dress, array, clothe; to unfurl or take in a sail; *mid.* to prepare one's self for a journey or expedition." These words are sufficient to show how great an advance the author has made since the publication of the first edition. We have noticed some few instances, however, in which the primary signification is placed after the secondary, e. g. *τίθημι* and *ἀφθονία*; the first meaning given to the former is, "to cause or make," which we suppose to be the secondary sense; the latter word is defined "abundance," "plenty;" "also exemption from envy," the last definition being the primary one. But such instances are comparatively rare. It would have been better if each new definition had been indicated by a numeral, as in the case of *λέγω* above, which the author has not usually done, except in the prepositions and some of the particles. Had this rule been observed throughout the work, the eye of the student would more readily have detected each new signification. The author has given some attention to what may be called the biography or history of words. He often mentions the period in which a word was used; whether it belonged to the earlier or later period of the language; also the kind of composition in which it was employed, as prose or poetry, or the particular writers to whom it was confined. Thus, "*κηρώεις* is only found as an Homeric epithet of Lacedaemon;" "*κέκτημαι*, a perf. more used by the Attics, *ἐκτεμαι* by the Ionics;" "*ἄγκυρα* (anchor) occurs first in Pindar; in Homer *εὔναι* is used for anchors;" "*ὄφρα* is not used by any prose writer except Plato, and by him from Homer;" "*ὄχθη*, used in the plural only by the Attic writers; Homer has it in the singular;" "*παλαίτατος* used by Thucydides and the poets." While we are glad that this subject is not wholly overlooked, the work would have been much more valuable, if this department of lexicography had received still more attention. The student ought to have the means of knowing whether a word belongs exclusively to a particular author or a particular age, that, in his Greek exercises, he may not be lia-

ble to use words of very rare occurrence, or such as belonged only to the earlier or later age, or to some one species of composition. In the Latin lexicon of Freund this work has been done with a degree of research which no previous lexicographer has brought to the subject.

The value of this lexicon would have been increased, if the construction of words had been more fully given, particularly the cases which they govern. The constructions are given in the case of very many words, while in others they are omitted. It is true, that the grammar is expected to give the general rules of construction; but then they can be only general rules. It would be impossible for a grammar, suitable for use in our schools and colleges, to examine the construction of every word. It can only group together words of a common signification, and say that words of this or that signification have a particular construction. The student learns from his grammar, that "verbs of *hearing* govern the genitive. The first meaning of ἀκούομαι is *to hear*; he will of course place a genitive after it. But the third meaning is *to obey*, and the rule of the grammar is that verbs of this signification govern the dative; accordingly he would be most likely to use the dative with the verb in this sense, which would be incorrect. The same difficulty could be illustrated by many other words, all of which would go to show how desirable it is that the lexicon indicate the construction of all words in regard to which there can be any doubt. A good illustration of what we would desire to find more frequently, may be seen in the articles ἡγέομαι, θαυμάζω, πυνθάνομαι and κοιρανέω. The construction of κοιρανέω is thus stated: "Homer does not join it immediately with a case, but either uses it absolutely, or more frequently with κατά and the accusative; Hesiod joins it with the genitive case, Pindar with the accusative, Ap. Rhod. with the dative." This is well, and we wish the same valuable service had been done to such words as ἀγαμαι, ἀγαπάω, μαρθάνω, μελετάω, πειράομαι, etc.

Mr. Pickering had evidently studied with much care the antiquities of the Greeks. Of this he gives valuable proofs in almost every part of his lexicon. In connection with the definition of a word, he often explains some usage or custom with which the word is associated, or gives the fashion of some implement, article of dress and the like, all of which enable the student to become more of a Greek, and consequently to understand his author better. See the articles βῆμα, γάστρη, δελφίν, ἱππαναί, ἴστος, κἀνδύς, κλητήρ, κόθυρος, κόραξ, and the articles on weights and measures, which are full and accurate.

The prepositions and particles have received special attention, and the articles on these will be found to meet all the ordinary wants of the student ; see *ἀνά* and *κατά*, to the last of which thirty-one different significations or relations are given ; also *εἰ* and *μή*.

The force of prepositions in composition also, are generally well indicated in the definitions, so far as it is possible to express their force by any corresponding English term. We have noticed a few instances, however, where the force of the preposition is not given as it should be. The diminutive force of *ἐνός* in *ἐνάγως* is not observed ; besides the meanings given, it signifies, "to lead slowly." *Ἀνοθύω* is defined, "to sacrifice," "to offer to the gods a part of the spoil." This word never signifies merely *to sacrifice*, but has always connected with it the collateral idea of performing a sacrifice which had been previously vowed or promised, hence always *to pay a sacrifice*.

The oblique cases and principal dialectical or unusual forms of anomalous nouns, adjectives and pronouns, and the principal tenses of anomalous verbs, are given in alphabetical order. This is a very valuable assistance to the younger class of students, who, however thoroughly they may have been trained in the laws of grammatical changes, are often unable to find from what word some of the more irregular forms are derived. The quantity of the doubtful vowels, too, is generally marked, which is a great convenience.

It had been better, if in the Greek passages quoted, reference had not been so often made to the *Graeca Majora*, as that work is not used to any extent in our colleges, and will soon be entirely inaccessible. The lexicon is designed for the use of schools and colleges, and we know of no one better adapted to meet the wants of such institutions. It will be viewed at home and abroad as an honored legacy of one of the first of American scholars.

ARTICLE XI.

SELECT NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

CLASSICAL.—Recent German editions of *Horace*. Since the earlier labors of Mitscherlich, Doering and others, many valuable works on Horace have appeared in Germany. The first edition of Orelli, as our classical readers are aware, was published in 1838, and the new edition of Doer-

ing by Regel in 1839. The last volume of the work of Düntzner, entitled "The Criticism and Interpretation of Horace," appeared in December, 1845. The work is therefore now complete in five volumes, Vol. I. (1840) containing the Odes, Vol. II. the Satires (1841), Vol. III. the Epistles of the First Book (1843), Vol. IV. the Epistles of the Second Book, and the *Ars Poetica* (1844), Vol. V. containing Supplements and Corrections, and a complete Register. This work is *aesthetic* in its character, aiming, as the title-page itself declares, at a deeper understanding of the works of Horace. In the execution of a task so delicate and so difficult, requiring such important and various qualifications, the author has, in the judgment of such men as Jahn and Obbarius, been but partially successful. The first volume, on the odes, has suffered more from criticism than the succeeding ones. The author's arrangement of these celebrated lyric productions, according to general ideas, such as Temperance, Piety, Love, Friendship, etc., has been justly censured as entirely arbitrary, as well as hostile to the style and spirit of Horace and the whole character of the ancient classic poetry. At the same time are acknowledged the learning of the author, his zeal and his genial admiration of his poet, his lively and vigorous style, and his original views on particular points. The Introduction to Volume second, on the origin and spirit of the Roman Satire, furnishes a learned and instructive view of this subject.

Lübker's *Horace*, published in 1841, embraces only the first three books of the Odes. This author's purpose was not to give a complete commentary, but only to lend his aid in the solution of certain difficult points, with particular reference to Orelli and Regel, whose labors he aims partly to correct and partly to complete. For the grammatical interpretation, this work is of great value. A complete and most valuable Commentary on Horace is furnished in the second edition of Orelli, corrected and enlarged, in two volumes, the first published in 1843 and the second in 1844.

A smaller work, embracing all the works of Horace, and admirably adapted to the use of schools, by G. Dillenburger, now Director of the Gymnasium in Emmerich, was published in 1844. The notes are not numerous, but yet sufficient and of the right kind; brief and to the point, explaining obscure allusions, and containing references to the Grammar for all difficult points. We observe that this book is honorably mentioned by Orelli; who has also added to his second volume, the *Life of Horace*, written by Dillenburger, and published in his edition.

In the lists of German works recently published, we notice an edition of the *Epistola ad Pisones*, by Peerlkamp, and Fasc. 6. of Obbarius' learned work on the Epistles of Horace.

We have received Dr. Moritz Seyffert's edition of Cicero's *Laelius*, sive de *Amicitia* Dialogus, in two parts, the first published in 1844 and the second in 1845, forming, with the Text, Commentary and Index, a volume of 506 pp. 8vo. It will be perceived at once that so full a commentary is not designed for the use of schools. It is meant for the private study of the higher scholars in the Gymnasia, and of young philolo-

gists, just entering upon their professional labors as classical teachers. For such a purpose it may well be pronounced a model of interpretation, finishing with a carefully corrected text, a clear and consecutive view of Cicero's Argument on Friendship, an accurate and thorough examination of all grammatical points, and a full explanation of historical allusions. The detailed discussions in the notes render the work one of great value for the style and language of Cicero, and indeed for the whole subject of later Philology. It is just such a work as might have been anticipated from the author of the "*Palæstra Ciceroniana*."

In the *Zeitschrift für die Alterthumswissenschaft*, Nov. 7, 8, 1846, we find a review by Prof. Zeiss of Rupert's "*Manual of Roman Antiquities*." This work consists of two parts, each forming an octavo volume, the first devoted to the Roman Territory and the Roman People, aside from its relation to the State, and the second to the Roman State. The reviewer objects to the author's plan, which proposes to consider the Roman people, 1. *out of the State*, and 2. *in the State*, on the ground that the whole life of the Romans was so closely connected with the State, that it is quite impossible to discuss them in two separate parts of a work. To illustrate the practical inconvenience of the plan, the reviewer refers at great length to the numerous repetitions in the second part, of subjects discussed in the first.

With the appearance of the 2d Part of Vol. III, embracing the letters Pe-Q, Freund's Latin Lexicon is at length completed. The whole work now consists of 4 vols. large octavo. An abridgment has been published by the author, for the use of schools, in two volumes, octavo.

Kiepert's Atlas of Greece and of the Hellenic Colonies, referred to on p. 797, Vol. II. of this Journal, is now complete, the third part having just been published.

Prof. W. A. Becker has published a pamphlet on Roman Topography, in reply to Urlichs. See p. 584, Vol. II. of this Journal. In this connection we may mention that Prof. Preller of Jena has published a work on the Regions of the city of Rome, with an accompanying Introductory Essay and Commentary. Since his return from Italy, Prof. Preller seems to have resumed his archaeological labors with increased zeal and activity.

In the *Zeitschrift für die Alterthumswissenschaft*, Feb. 1846, we find an announcement of a new edition, by J. Casp. Orelli, of the works of Cicero. The work is to be in 4 vols. large octavo, and to be completed within three years. The first and third volumes are already finished.

Dr. Kühner has published a second edition of his *School Grammar* of the Latin language. This grammar is intended to succeed the Elementary Grammar, which has already been translated by Prof. Champlin, and it corresponds in character and the place which it occupies, to the Greek Grammar, translated by Messrs. Edwards and Taylor. We have not yet received the new edition, but we learn, by a private letter from the author, that the work has undergone a thorough revision, and indeed has assumed an entirely new form.

Of other works which have recently appeared on the continent, we mention the following: *Real-Encyclopædie d. class. Alterthumsw.* 65

and 66 Lief., *Lex-Livius*; *Stephani's Greek Thesaurus*, edited by Hase and the Dindorfs, Vol. V. fasc. IV—VI, (Paris); Vol. II. of *Walter's History of the Roman Law*; *Welcker's Opuscula*, Vol. II.; *Suidae Lexicon*, revised by Bernhardt, Vol. II. fasc. 7; an edition of *Xenophon's Anabasis*, by K. W. Krüger; *Huschke on the ancient Roman law of Debt*; and of the *Paris Bibl. Graeca.*, Vol. XXII, *Poetae Bucolici et Didactici*, and Vol. XXIII, *Isocratis Orationes et Epistolae*.

Among the works recently issued in England, we notice the following: Vol. II. of the new edition of *Thirlwall's History of Greece*; *Grote's History of Greece*, 2 vols. with maps; *Prof. Dahlmann's Life of Herodotus*, translated by G. F. Cox; *Lexilogus Scholasticus*, or *Greek and English Vocabulary*, by Dr. Bloomfield, 12mo.; *Dunbar's Elements of the Greek language*, 2d. edition; *Giles' English-Greek Lexicon*, Royal 8vo.; and Part 2d of *Eastwick's Translation of Bopp's Comparative Grammar*.

We have received No. 12 of the *Classical Museum*, to some of the earlier numbers of which we alluded in a former number of this *Journal*, (Vol. I. p. 610). It is a favorable and a grateful indication of the flourishing condition of classical studies in England, that a *Journal* of this character has become established on a firm basis, and has taken an independent place in the periodical literature of the country. The Editors of the *Museum* are Dr. Schnitz and Dr. W. Smith; among the contributors, we notice the names of Prof. Long, Prof. Malden, Mr. Liddell, Lord Francis Egerton, and of several German Professors, Zumpt, Welcker and Bergk. Perhaps the distinguishing features of this *Journal* is its intelligent and truly independent and original use of the productions of German scholars. Most of the articles which we have read, exhibit the marks of a style of scholarship, and of a philological training and education, which are thoroughly German in their character. At the same time, the vigor and clearness, and the sterling good sense of the English mind, are equally manifest. We have been particularly struck with the great merit of a series of articles, not yet complete, on the *Topography of Rome*. These articles promise to furnish a full and accurate view of this difficult and complicated subject. The writer has manifestly made himself familiar with the recent labors of the German writers, not omitting the minor controversial writings of Becker, Preller, etc., and after duly digesting them, has reproduced them for English use in a most admirable manner. The third article, on the *Fora of the Emperors*, appears in the last No. now before us. The same No. contains a *Review*, by Mr. F. W. Newman of *Kenrick's* and of *Stocker's Herodotus*, *The Religion of the Romans* by Zumpt, translated by C. K. Watson, and an account of the *Roman Agoualia*, by Dr. W. Smith, together with "*Miscellanies*," and "*Notices of Recent Publications*." Under the last head, we find a brief but very condemnatory critique of *Anthon's Horace* and of *Anthon's Homer*, both reprinted in England, under the editorial care of B. Davies, Ph. D. The writer accuses Prof. Anthon "on three counts:" 1, that "he borrows from accredited works, avowedly, but far beyond the fair bounds of such accommodation;" 2, that "he appropriates the critical remarks and the information furnished by others without acknowledgment, translating them into his own language;" 3, that "he steals the

remarks of others, without any change of language, and without any acknowledgment." The writer substantiates these charges: No 1, by referring to Anthon's Horace for pages upon pages borrowed from Dunlop's Roman Literature, and to his Homer for three Excursus from Jelt's Kühner; No. 2, by presenting in parallel columns several passages from Anthon's Horace and from Doering's Horace, the writer at the same time averring that "the proofs on this count are endless," that in Anthon's "almost all that is good is Doering's," and "that the translations, apart from their accuracy or inaccuracy, are a great drawback to the value of the book, whatever that may be;" No. 3, by proofs from Dunlop, and from Dr. Adam's Antiquities, and by presenting in parallel columns passages from Dymock's Caesar and from Anthon's Caesar. The writer also arraigns Prof. Anthon on some other points, though with less formality; and sums up a series of observations on the subject of the injudicious amount of aid given in the notes, by charging him with "crushing under the load of help,—judgment and taste and invention,—all but memory." We record this critique as an expression of English opinion, emanating from the highest classical authority, on a subject which has important practical bearings upon the interests of classical education in this country. We interpret the critique as indicating two things; first, that hitherto Prof. Anthon's works have been reprinted in England, and in some quarters have found favor, and second, that it is now beginning to be considered by the best classical scholars in England, that these works are vicious in their character and injurious to all real progress in classical education. We must confess, that with a deep conviction of the general correctness of the views maintained by the writer in the Museum, we cannot approve his tone of criticism. In some instances it seems intemperate, perhaps scarcely dignified. But after all, we can pardon much to an English classical scholar, and the editor of a classical journal, who finds in the Preface to an English re-print of one of Anthon's works, such words as these: "Professor Anthon's merits, as an editor of the classics for use in schools and colleges, are so well understood and appreciated in this country, as well as his own, that commendation would be superfluous and unbecoming!"

Mr. Owen has added the Cyropaedia of Xenophon to his excellent series of Greek classics. This is the first edition of the historical romance of Xenophon, which has appeared in our country. The work itself is one of much interest, and is worthy of the full and valuable apparatus, which Mr. Owen has furnished for the study of it. The text is that of Dindorf, which is probably nearer the true reading than any other. The work is printed with unusual accuracy, the few typographical errors which we have detected, being confined principally to the accents. The notes are judicious, and what cannot be often said, on just the passages where the student might find difficulty. They remind us, at every step, that the author is a practical teacher, well acquainted with what the student needs, neither begetting habits of indolence in him by affording too much assistance, nor leaving him in despair, by giving too little. The notes illustrate national customs, geography, grammatical usages, the

idioms of the language as well as the general connection of the thought. These editions of the Greek classics, prepared by Mr. Owen, have been received with high approbation by teachers in our schools and colleges; and we are pleased to learn that he is continuing his labors in this department, having already commenced the preparation of an edition of Thucydides, the first volume of which may be expected in about a year.

The Greek Lexicon of Liddell and Scott, based on the work of Francis Passow, a review of which appeared in the No. of this work for November, 1844, has recently been published by the Harpers, and we are happy to say, without the promised "additions and improvements from Donnegan." This edition was edited by Henry Drisler, M. A. of Columbia College, New York city, who has inserted, in alphabetical order, a very full vocabulary of proper names, taken principally from the German work of Pape. Mr. Drisler has labored with great diligence on this work, and the additions which he has made, so far as we have had time to examine, seem to be judicious and valuable. Some typographical errors will be noticed, but considering the great difficulty of entire accuracy in such a work, it is very correctly printed. It contains more than 1700 pages royal octavo. For the general merits of the lexicon, we refer our readers to the article above named.

HISTORICAL.—Karl Jürgens, *Luther's Leben*, published by Brockhaus in Leipsic, promises to be a very full biography. The *Erste Abtheilung* which extends only to 1517, or to the beginning of the Reformation, makes a substantial volume of 700 pages.

Prof. F. Rehm, author of the *History of the Middle Ages*, has completed his *Geschichte der beiden Hessen*, 2 Bände, Marburg, 1846.

The *Weimarisches Herder Album*, Jena, 1845, consisting of select letters which passed between Herder and Karl August and Amalie; two or three of Herder's best discourses and essays; Schwenck's characteristics of Herder; Herder's relation to modern theology by Prof. Müller, of Basle; Herder as preacher, by Prof. Schwartz, of Jena; Herder's views of church union, by Röhr; Herder's merits as a critic of ancient art, by Schöll; Herder as a classical scholar, by Gernhard; *der leidende Philoktet*, by Prof. Osann; Herder in respect to music, by Prof. Koferslein; Schmidt's lectures on popular songs, in which Herder is particularly noticed; letters of Schubert from Asia Minor; and some unpublished letters of Winckelmann, making a goodly octavo volume of 461 pages, is said to be "a valuable contribution to a knowledge of Herder's life and literary character."

Prof. J. Hildebrand's *Die deutsche Nationalliteratur seit dem Anfange des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, besonders seit Lessing bis auf die Gegenwart, historisch und ästhetisch kritisch dargestellt*, is now complete in three volumes. It is placed side by side with the great work of Gervinus, and is said to be as distinguished in its large philosophic and systematic views, and its acute criticisms, as the work of Gervinus is for its brilliancy and learning.

Of the new edition of Neander's church history, the third volume has

been published, and the fourth is in press and will soon be out. These four volumes cover the period occupied by Vol. I. parts 1, 2 and 3, and Vol. II. 1, 2 and 3, of the old edition, so that the fourth volume of the former, ends at the same point with the sixth of the latter. This new edition, it is well known, differs materially from the old one.

E. A. Schmidt's *Geschichte von Frankreich*, is continued in a third volume, to the year 1643. The fourth volume will reach to the period of the Revolution, where Wachsmuth begins. Thus only one volume is wanting, to finish this most complete and critical history of France, in eight volumes, by two distinguished German historians.

Henry, whose *Life of Calvin* in three volumes, was recently finished, has published an abridgment in one volume.

The new or third edition of Neander's *Denkwürdigkeiten*, is to be a very different work from the preceding editions. Tholuck's introductory article on the moral influence of heathenism is omitted, and the first volume of the new edition embraces the first and second of the old. A very important addition, is that of continuing the work from the apostolic age to the present.

Prof. Bruch, of Strassburg, author of a work on the Divine Attributes, is publishing a work in a series of letters, entitled: *Betrachtungen über Christenthum und christlichen Glauben*, designed to guide the intelligent reader—not the theologian by profession—to a clear view of theological truth, and particularly to solve the doubts raised in reflecting minds by the sceptical German writers on the one hand, and by the enthusiastic pietists on the other. The writer is regarded as evangelical, and is certainly a vigorous thinker. The letters owe their origin in their present form to an actual correspondence with a bewildered friend, who was a member of the church.

Winer has published the first part of the third, sehr vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage, of his *Realwörterbuch*; Redepenning, the second part of his *Origenes, eine Darstellung seines Lebens und seiner Lehre*; C. Ritter, the twelfth volume of his *Geography* including *West-Asien*; and Becker the 2 Theil, 2 Abtheilung of his *Handbuch der Römischen Alterthümer*.

Prof. W. Havemann's *Geschichte des Ausgangs des Tempelherrnordens*, in one volume, 1846; and A. Bürcck's *Ulrich von Hutten, der Ritter, der Gelehrte, der Dichter, der Kämpfer für die deutsche Freiheit*, also in one volume, 1846, are highly commended in the reviews. The former gives the history of the Knights Templars by way of introduction, to the account of their cruel destruction by Philip of France, while the latter, aims at unfolding a true representation both of Von Hutten and his times, without going into the critical discussions which are found in the works of preceding biographers.

BIBLICAL.—Prof. H. W. T. Thiersch has published a work: *Versuch zur Herstellung des historischen Standpunktes für die Kritik der neutestamentlichen Schriften*, 1845, which must be worthy of the attention of biblical scholars. A commendatory review of it written apparently by

the editor himself, appears in Tholuck's *Litterarischer Anzeiger* for December, 1845.

Several successive numbers of the same Journal for the past year contain an extended article of sterling value on the subject of the *Angel of Jehovah* in the Old Testament, by Prof. Kurtz of Milan. The generally received view that this Angel was the Logos of the New Testament, was ably defended by Dr. Hengstenberg in the first volume of his *Christology*. In support of the same view have appeared since that time, Sack, Ebrard, Delitzsch, Schröder, Heim, and still others. Several writers, however, particularly Steudel, Hoffmann, Oehler, have taken different ground and argued against the alleged identity of the Revealer of the Old Testament with the Logos of the New. It is the object of the writer of the article referred to, to examine the objections which these latter critics have urged, and to show that the view represented by Hengstenberg is essentially correct, the grounds on which it is assailed being untenable and the reasons which support it remaining still substantially unanswered.

The *Intelligenzblatt* of the February No. of the *Neue Jenaische Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* announces as soon to appear: *Acta Apostolorum ad fidem codicis Cantabrigiensis et reliquorum monumentorum denuo recensuit et interpretatus Fr. Aug. Bornemann*. It will consist of three parts, and proposes to embrace everything relating both to the text and the philological interpretation of the Acts which the present state of criticism can furnish.

We have from Dr. J. Fr. Röhr an enlarged edition of his *Palestine or Historisch-geographische Beschreibung des Jüdischen Landes zur Zeit Jesu*, embracing at the same time a particular account of the country as it now is. The present is the eighth edition of this popular work. The Researches of Dr. Robinson have been made to contribute to the greater completeness of this new edition.

J. G. Vaihinger has published a new *Commentar über die Psalmen*, on the plan pursued by him in his work on the Book of Job. It contains an extended introduction, aims at a rigid analysis of the course of thought, and translates the text in a metrical form, according to the parallelism of the Hebrew.

A work has been published in Holland but translated into German, entitled: *Geschichte der Apologetik, etc. or History of Writings in Defence of the Bible and Revelation from the earliest times to the present*, by G. H. van Senden, which promises to be of great interest both to the exegete and the theologian. It occupies two volumes. It is said to display profound learning together with skill and discrimination in the arrangement of the materials. A reviewer says that the land which has the honor of having produced in Hugo Grotius the ablest protestant apologist that has ever lived, will now have the honor of producing in this work of van Senden the ablest history of Apologetics, which the world has yet seen.

Dr. Fr. Delitzsch has just added to his other exegetical publications a new one which he entitles: *Symbolae ad Psalmos illustrandos isagogical*. Its contents are comprised under the following divisions: *Dissertur I. de Psalmorum indole partim Jehovica, partim Elohemica; II. de Psalmorum ordine quisque causis ac legibus*.

Prof. Umbreit has commenced a second edition of his *Practischer Commentar über die Propheten des alten Bundes*, with exegetical and critical remarks. The first volume of this republication contains Isaiah. The chief value of this work consists in the fidelity of the translation; the explanatory and critical material occupies but very little space. The favorable reception, however, which commentary of this character meets with in Germany, shows that it is adapted to supply an important want. In the earlier stages of exegetical study, such commentary is undoubtedly more useful as well as convenient, than the more exhaustive, copious exposition to which the German scholars generally have shown themselves so partial.

Prof. Engelhardt has finished in a third part, published last year, his *Anacolutorum Platoniorum Specimen*. Two previous numbers of the work had appeared. If executed in a proper manner, it must contain something which the critical student of the New Testament can turn to account.

Perhaps the best Bible-Atlas for practical use is that of Ackermann. This work which has been for some time before the public, has been remodeled and issued in a second edition. Its title is: *Bibel-Atlas, nach den neuesten und besten Hilfsmitteln gezeichnet von C. F. Weiland und erläutert von Dr. C. Ackermann*. It consists of thirteen charts, of which five present the land of Palestine at different periods, the others either the countries which were inhabited for a short time by the Israelites, or geographical sketches of important events in Scripture history, such as the march of the Israelites through the wilderness, the journeys of the Saviour and the Apostles.

MISCELLANEOUS.—Since the reception of the above, the following intelligence has been communicated by Prof. Edwards.

Dr. Winer of Leipsic is preparing a new *Lexicon of the New Testament*, which, it is thought, will supercede all others. The same industrious author is publishing a new edition of his *Biblical Dictionary*. Two *livraisons* have appeared.—The new English and German Dictionary of Dr. Flügel, American consul at Leipsic, in 2 vols. 8vo, is nearly out of press. Between 20,000 and 30,000 words are inserted which were not in the previous edition. These relate to phrases used in common life, colloquial terms, etc. Many of these are Anglicisms rather than Americanisms. It is to be hoped that the estimable author will be remunerated in this instance for his talent and unwearied labor. Hitherto he has been very unjustly defrauded of the fruits of his toil by the cupidity of some English publishers.—Dr. Ebrard, well known for his work on the Straussian controversy, has published an extended treatise on the doctrine of the Sacrament, in which he takes the Calvinistic ground. This has been reviewed at much length in the magazine conducted by Dr. Guericke and others at Halle. Dr. Ebrard, in consequence of his opinions, has left the Lutheran university at Erlangen, and gone to that at Zurich.—Dr. Piuner of Berlin is engaged on a new edition of the Talmud, with a German translation and interesting notes.—Dr. Neander has published a new edition of his *History of the Apostolic times*, and is carrying forward the

revision of his *General History*.—It is not known when the *Life of Schleiermacher* by Dr. Jonas of Berlin will appear, as difficulties are experienced in procuring the materials.—Prof. Lepsius of Berlin has been made professor ordinarius of the university there. His theory in relation to Mt. Sinai has been called in question by J. V. Kutscheit. The results of his investigations in Egypt are anxiously expected, though it is probable that they will not quite answer the anticipations at first cherished.—One of the valuable Orthodox journals of Germany is the "*Allgemeines Repertorium*" for theological literature, edited by Dr. Hermann Reuter of Berlin, assisted by sixty-three contributors, among whom are Hupfeld of Halle, Beck of Tübingen, Pelt and Liebner of Kiel, Dorner of Königsberg and Wieseler and Bertheau of Göttingen. The high Lutheran views in regard to the symbolic books are advocated in the *Journal for Protestantism and the Church*, edited by Dr. Harless of Leipsic and Prof. Höfling, Thomasius and Hofmann of Erlangen. Prof. Nitzsch and Sack of Bonn, exhibit their views in a "*Monatschrift*" published in that city. Two of the Roman Catholic professors in Bonn also conduct a periodical.—Dr. Delitzsch of Leipsic has accepted a call to Rostock as professor ordinarius of theology. In the course of this year, a commentary from his pen on the book of Zephaniah will appear.—The second part of Dr. Caspari's *Arabic Grammar*, including a *Chrestomathy*, is in press, and will soon be published. The same author is now engaged on some historical and critical investigations on the prophecies of Isaiah and Micah, preparatory to a commentary on those prophets which will appear in the course of the Spring. A second edition of Caspari's commentary on Obadiah is soon to appear, including two treatises on the geography of Idumea and the history of the Edomites. Drs. Delitzsch and Caspari are young men, distinguished for their evangelical views and orthodoxy in the interpretation of the Bible. Evangelical sentiments are also entertained by a number of the younger teachers in the university of Leipsic.—Prof. Julius Wiggers of Rostock has published a *History of Evangelical Missions* in two Vols. He is author of a statistical work on Christian sects, and son of the writer on Augustinism, and Pelagianism.—The new edition of Luther's works, under the charge of J. C. Irmscher, is advancing to its completion. The 8th vol. of the German Exegetical works and the 17th of the Latin, have appeared. The commemoration of the completion of the 3d century from Luther's death, brought out an almost innumerable number of sermons, pamphlets, biographies, etc. The love and reverence for his name in Germany suffers no diminution, however widely multitudes have deviated from his principles. Those who do not adopt his religious opinions venerate him for his hearty German spirit, and for the benefits which he conferred on the German language and literature. The judgment on Luther pronounced by the historian Hallam would be regarded in Germany as unworthy of refutation.—Another part of Ritter's great geographical work will soon appear. It will continue the geography of Arabia. The volumes on this peninsula are extremely interesting, containing an historical introduction and the geographical relations of the country at the present time. The publication price of the entire work of Dr. Ritter is

50 $\frac{1}{2}$ Thaler, on fine paper 61 Thal. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Grosch.—The great Latin Lexicon of Freund enjoys the highest consideration in Germany. A reviewer thus sums up the grounds of its merits; *a.* Its historico-genetic development of the significations. *b.* Exact exhibition of archaisms, ancient forms of writing, etc. *c.* Careful use of old glossaries, lately discovered papyrus-rolls, epigraphy, etc. *d.* Use of the best Mss. *e.* Full references to the ablest modern writers on Latin grammar, lexicography, etc. *e. g.* Döderlein, Hand, Rhein, Zumpt, etc.—The work of Dr. Siegel on Homiletics is not yet completed.—Tauchnitz's stereotyped edition of the Greek and Roman classics now amounts to 210 volumes, price 66 Thaler, about \$50. The sale has been very large, and by the accuracy and cheapness of the work much service has been rendered to classical learning by the excellent publisher. The second part of the Manual of Greek Antiquities by Prof. C. F. Hermann of Göttingen, exhibiting the sacred antiquities of the Greeks, has just been published. It is said to display an exact knowledge of language, comprehensive views, free and independent judgment, etc. The contents of the part now published have a special interest at the present time.

Professor Tholuck of Halle has just published an interesting work under the title, "Gespräche über die Vornehmsten Glaubensfragen der Zeit, zunächst für nachdenkende Laien, welche Verständigung suchen." The discussion is carried on in the form of a very animated dialogue, and is designed to meet the wants of reflecting laymen, some of whom have been drawn into the views of the so-called *friends of light*. There are many in Germany who have become dissatisfied with the dead orthodoxy which has long been prevalent in not a few of the pulpits of the land, who feel the want of something more spiritual and earnest and who are often inclined to plunge into skepticism. It is this class especially whom Prof. T. addresses, under the heads of Reason and Rationalism, Reason and Faith, Faith and the Scriptures, The latest Progress, Progress and the Symbols, and The newly awakened Faith. Prof. T. promises conditionally a second part, in answer to the question, Who was Christ? This work will be quite attractive to many in Germany and to some in other lands, as it is written in an earnest, impressive and conciliatory manner, and treats of questions which are more or less discussed in all Protestant countries.

The first volume of the English translation of Hagenbach's History of Christian doctrines has just been published by Mr. Clark of Edinburgh, and forms the third volume of his Foreign Theological Library. The translator is Charles W. Buch, who has lately closed his theological studies at the Lancashire Independent College at Manchester, and is now a resident at Halle. The work appears, from a cursory examination which we have made, to be very well translated, and by its pure and flowing English style, almost forms an exception to the so-called English versions of many German productions. The translator has added references to some of the more useful English and American works in theology. Of Hagenbach we have spoken in another place. A work from a divine so eminent and orthodox as Dr. H. is allowed to be, must be a valuable accession to our theological literature, which has no formal work on the subject.

We learn that the concluding number of Gesenius's Hebrew Thesaurus, under the care of Prof. Rödiger of Halle, is now ready for the press and will be published in April or May.—The 3d fasciculus of the Commentary of Beidhavius on the Koran, edited from the Mas. by Prof. Fleischer of Leipsic, is now published.—There have lately appeared at Leipsic a Persian Chrestomathy by F. Spiegel and a Manual on the subject of Eastern coins by Prof. Stickel; also vol. 4 of Hand's Tursellinus or Commentaries on the Latin particles; and the 16th part of the 2d edition of Wachsmuth's Grecian Antiquities, completing the work in two volumes.

Prof. Ross of Halle, after thirteen years' residence in Greece has published the first No. of a periodical work, in which he proposes to give from time to time the fruits of his travels in Greece and the results of his studies on her monuments, in the form of artistic, topographical and philological treatises, interspersed with *epigraphic* contributions. Prof. R. takes very decided ground in opposition to the skeptical theories of Wolf and Niebuhr, and contends that the monuments and written records and reason are all in favor of a conservative position on this subject, and that the course which those two leaders and their innumerable imitators have pursued, would destroy all faith in any past event and would land us in unlimited skepticism. "Nature had denied to Niebuhr that strength of character which knows how to employ his faculties in the right place, or education and circumstances had deprived him of this strength. He did not possess the conservative spirit of an historian, but was born to be a revolutionist." It is also gratifying to see that Bunsen, the pupil and secretary of Niebuhr, in his late work on Egypt, is very far from adopting the skeptical views of his master. "Already," he remarks "in the second dynasty of the Egyptian kings, the third of Manetho, the names of kings are indicated by the contemporary monuments. The Egyptians had writings and books in the earliest period in which we have monuments. The pen and the inkstand appear on the monuments of the fourth dynasty, the oldest in the world.

Died at Meissen in Saxony, Sept. 30, 1846, of consumption, after a long illness, W. A. Becker, professor of classical philology at Leipsic and one of the ornaments of the university, well known in England and the United States, for his works on Greek and Roman Antiquities. His very able manual of Roman Antiquities is left incomplete. His conclusions on the subject of the topography of the city of Rome, though fiercely contested, are regarded in Germany as the most satisfactory.—On the 26th of Sept. deceased at Berlin Dr. Francis Theremin, court preacher there and honorary professor in the university. He was esteemed as one of the most eloquent preachers in the Prussian church, and was the author of valuable treatises on Homiletics. His last work is on the Eloquence of Paul and Demosthenes. The University of Berlin lost another distinguished professor, last year, in Dr. Philip Marheinecke, well known for his attempts to reconcile Hegelianism to Orthodoxy, and for his very interesting history of the German Reformation. Ideler, the eminent writer on chronology, also died last year.

The following was the number of students in some of the German Universities in 1846.

University.	Theol.	Whole No.	University.	Theol.	Whole No.
Berlin	279	1608	Würzburg	81	464
Munich	228	1407	Jena	106	425
Tübingen	290	890	Königsberg	68	355
Heidelberg	38	839	Rostock	—	260
Leipzig	187	825	Marburg	60	227
Bonn	213	674	Kiel	67	205
Halle	457	742	Zurich	25	159
Giessen	—	489			

Berlin has the greatest number of students; Heidelberg, the largest number of students in law, 562; Halle, in theology, 457. There are 468 law students at Munich. Of the students in theology at Bonn, 68 are Catholics, and of those at Tübingen, 122 are Catholics. The Universities not enumerated above, are those of Basel, Göttingen, Freyberg in the Breisgau, Erlangen, Griefswalde, Breslau, Münster, Prague and Vienna. The following Universities are exclusively Catholic, Vienna, Munich, Würzburg, Freyburg, Prague and Münster. The academical year is divided into two terms or *semesters*, the first opening near the close of October, the last ending about the middle of July. The Universities are supported in part by annual grants from the respective governments under whose jurisdiction they are situated. Few of them are in the possession of any large amount of permanent property, except libraries, cabinets, etc. The University of Leipzig is an exception, which, besides other valuable real estate, owns an entire, large square, near the centre of the city of Leipzig.

The third Meeting of the German Oriental Society was held at Jena from Sept. 28 to Oct. 3. The first meeting of this association was held at Dresden in 1844, and the second at Darmstadt in 1845. The general object of the society is to promote and extend the knowledge of Asia and of the countries in immediate connection with it. It will thus be occupied not merely on oriental antiquities, but upon the modern history and present condition of the East. This general object will be attained by a collection of oriental books, MSS., coins, etc.; the editing and translating of oriental works; the publication of a periodical; the awakening and sustaining of all endeavors to promote the knowledge of the East; and by friendly correspondence with similar societies and learned individuals in Germany and elsewhere. The Oriental Journal formerly conducted by Ewald, Lassen and others, is now published at Leipzig, under the auspices of the society. The most prominent original founders of the society were Profs. Rödiger and Pott of Halle, Fleischer of Leipzig and Olshausen of Kiel. The objects of the association seem to have awakened a very general interest among the hosts of the German literati. About 300 members were present, including some of the most eminent scholars of the land. We may mention the names of Hermann of Leipzig, Böckh, Ranke and Lachmann of Berlin, Rost and Wüstemann of Gotha, Sintenis of Herbst, Grotefend and Kühner of Hanover, Fleischer, Brockhaus, Seyffarth and Wachsmuth of Leipzig, Döderlein of Erlangen, Rödiger and Ross of Halle, Neumann of Munich, Stäbelin, Vischer and Gerlach of Basel, Hand, Hoffmann, Götting and Stickel of Jena, Bernstein of

Breslau, Schneidewin of Göttingen, Bergk of Marburg, etc. The meetings were held in a large hall, which was entirely filled. At the upper end, on the left of the president, were some invited guests and thirty or forty ladies. Adjoining the hall, in a convenient apartment, the orientlists proper held their sessions, under the presidency of Prof. Hoffmann of Jena, author of the Syriac Grammar, the edition of the Book of Enoch, etc. The proceedings in this room were conducted simultaneously with those in the principal hall. The assembly in the latter consisted of philologists in the general sense, teachers of gymnasia, etc. The president was Professor Hand of Jena, a gentleman of a dignified and somewhat commanding appearance, apparently about sixty years of age, known by his able writings, especially on Latin grammar and lexicography. On the opening of the sessions of the second day Prof. Hand delivered an address. He said that meetings like that of the Oriental Society were not only useful but necessary. Philology was more and more attacked, and its circle circumscribed. Some would reject as useless all minute investigations in grammar, though they would advocate the most particular inquiries into plants and minerals. But philology is not confined to these critical inquiries. It would investigate and teach matters of the highest moment to man. He alluded several times with the marked applause of the audience to a printed letter addressed to the meeting by a teacher in a gymnasium, of the name of Matthiae, who following the late example of the Danish king, styled his communication an "open letter." In it he urged the emancipation of the Germans from their devotion to philological studies and an earnest attention to pursuits and inquiries more in conformity with the spirit of the age. Prof. Hand said he hoped that this letter would share the fate of other open letters. Emancipation was not a German word. The laws in relation to the education of the human mind, like the laws of nature, were unalterable. A passion for what was immediately useful was the disease of our times. This society should be a counterpoise against materialism, ignorance and a craving desire for knowing too much. A Latin Salutatory poem was then read by Candidate Tittmann of Jena. This was followed by an essay from Dr. Köchly, teacher of a gymnasium at Dresden, in which he attempted to show the unity of the Hecuba of Euripides. He characterized briefly the three great tragedians. In Euripides, the pathetic element predominates. He then dwelt on the main design of the Hecuba, the course of thought, the necessity of the prologue, and showed that the different parts were connected by a religious element, and that on the offering of Polyxena the return of the Greeks depended. Hecuba found in this event a moral benefit. At the conclusion some remarks were added by Prof. Müller of Naumburg.

Of the exercises on subsequent days, we may allude to the following. Prof. Piper of Berlin, read an essay on the classical element in Dante, and on his influence in the revival of learning. Prof. Lindner advocated the opinion, that languages should be studied successively rather than simultaneously. Prof. Fortlage of Jena read a very long and able dissertation on ancient Greek music. The author maintained that he had found in an ancient Greek poet, the true key which would reveal the

character of this music, and settle the long controverted question. The researches of the author will soon be published in a volume. Prof. Döderlein of Erlangen, read a very spirited and witty essay on the character of Thersites in Homer. He contended that the common view of Thersites was a mistake, resting on mistranslations of single words in the original. Not a little Attic salt was sprinkled over this performance, much to the amusement of the audience.

The Oriental Section was opened by Prof. Hoffmann, with a eulogy on Sir Wm. Jones, who was born exactly 100 years ago, i. e. Sept. 28th, 1746. He depicted his most happy classical culture, and his extraordinary knowledge of oriental languages. He was the founder of the first oriental society. Prof. Höfer of Griefswalde gave an account of a hitherto unknown epic poem in the Prakiish language. Prof. Kellgren of Helsingfors read a very interesting essay on the relation of the Finnish language to the Turkish, Mongolian, etc. Prof. Bergk of Marburg, on the "Jury" of the ancient Greeks; Prof. Preller, on the "Twelve-god" system of the ancients, particularly of the Athenians, quite instructive; and Prof. Schneidewin of Göttingen, on an alleged hymn to Apollo translated from Greek into Italian, which Profs. Prutz and Rauck endeavored to show to be spurious.

Among the other proceedings, was the taking up of a subscription to defray the expenses of the printing of the translation of the Arabic commentary of Caswini, edited by Wüstenfeld of Göttingen. The next meeting of the Oriental Society is to be held at Basel, about the 1st of Oct. 1847, Profs. Gerlach and Vischer to be presidents, and Dr. De Wette to preside over the Orientalists.

Much of the time of the members was devoted to social intercourse and enjoyment. The public meetings commenced at 9 o'clock A. M., and terminated at 1 P. M. The society then dined together in a large hall. The remainder of the afternoons and evenings was devoted to social calls, concerts, etc. Some of the members were entertained by examining a very fine collection of curiosities, which Prof. Koch of Jena has lately brought home from his travels in the countries bordering on the Black and Caspian seas.

The students of Jena, once characterized for their duelling propensities, are now, it is said, distinguished by their love of ease and social enjoyment. The list of the professors at the present time, contains some eminent names. Among these, in addition to Profs. Hoffmann and Hand already mentioned, are Carl Hase, author of the Church History, Life of Jesus, Hutterus Redivivus, etc., L. J. Rückert, who was made a professor in Jena in 1844, author of the able commentaries on Paul's Epistles, H. K. A. Eichstädt, professor of eloquence and poetry, author of a great number of publications and editor for many years of the *Jena Allgem. Lit. Zeit.*, H. Luden, the well-known historian, author of the History of the Germans and of many other works, C. W. Götting, the very distinguished philologist, editor of Hesiod, Varro, author of the History of the Roman constitution, etc. and J. G. Stickel, known by his writings on the book of Job. The whole number of teachers in the university is sixty. The university building is without any pretension. The number of

volumes in the library exceeds 150,000. There is also a valuable museum of oriental and other coins. In past times very celebrated men have taught for longer or shorter periods in this university; among whom may be mentioned Solomon Glass, John Gerhard, Schelling, the brothers Schlegel, Fries, Oken, Hufeland, Griesbach, Döderlein, Eichhorn, Feuerbach, etc.

Allen, Morrill and Wardwell have published a beautiful edition of *Select Treatises of Martin Luther*, in the original German, with Philological notes and an Essay on German and English etymology. The volume is edited by Dr. Sears of Newton, and contains a great amount of critical information, useful alike to the German and the English scholar. We are gratified with the intelligence that the work has already been introduced into some of our literary institutions, as an auxiliary to the study of the German language. It is an important work for clergymen, as it makes them familiar with the writings and the genius of one whose influence on the church has been great and increasing for three centuries, and whose eloquence has never been deservedly appreciated in our own land. We hope to insert a lengthened review of this volume in a future No. of the *Bib. Sacra*.

The same publishers have in press an edition of *Xenophon's Memorabilia*, with critical Notes on the basis of the editions of Kühner and Seiffert, by R. D. C. Robbins, Librarian, Andover Theol. Seminary.

The complete Works of the late Dr. Edward Payson have recently been issued from the press of Hyde, Lord and Duren, of Portland, in three volumes. They contain his Sermons, *Select Thoughts*, an excellent Introductory Notice by Dr. Stowe of Lane Theol. Sem., and the well known and highly valued Memoir of Dr. P. by Rev. Asa Cummings of Portland. No one can read this excellent memoir without feeling an interest in the sermons, and the perusal of the sermons excites a new interest in the memoir. The influence of Dr. Payson upon his hearers was so great and so good, so unlike to that of ordinary clergymen, and so much superior to that which we expect to see often exerted, that an exhibition of the means of his influence cannot fail to interest the religious and intellectual observer. Such an exhibition is given in these beautiful volumes, and we anticipate from them a highly important and a long continued influence upon our churches.

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ARTICLE I.

TRANSLATIONS FROM THE SERMONS OF PROFESSOR JULIUS
MÜLLER OF HALLE.

By Prof. B. B. Edwards.

[To the Englishman or American, no University in Germany has so many attractions as that at Halle. It is associated with the fervent zeal and indefatigable labors of the Pietists of the 18th century. It is also the continuation of the establishment at Wittenberg, so memorable in the annals of the Reformation, and which seems to impose a sacred obligation upon the professors at Halle to adhere to the doctrines of Luther and Melancthon. To this University the world is indebted, for the revival and extension of Hebrew learning in consequence of the studies and labors of Gesenius. Professor Tholuck's name has long been beloved and honored throughout the Christian world. To his fraternal love and unwearied kindness multitudes of Americans delight to bear testimony. To his instrumentality more than perhaps to that of any other man, Germany is indebted for the happy revival of evangelical religion which has prevailed during the last twenty years. His personal influence is great and is most happily coincident with the effect of his numerous writings. His position is the more important as the University at Halle is in fact the theological seminary of northern Germany. It numbers more theological students than any other University in the country, and the majority of its members belong to that department. Its present

corps of teachers enrolls many distinguished names ; e. g. Hupfeld, the successor of Gesenius, and perhaps the most eminent living Hebraist, Pott and Rödiger, well known for their profound and extensive researches in Oriental literature, Bernhardt, celebrated for his publications relating to Greek literature, Ross, who has lately returned from a long abode in Greece, full of zeal and knowledge, and others to whom we cannot now refer.

Professor Julius Müller, though less known abroad than some other German theologians, is greatly respected at Halle and throughout Germany. As a profound and scientific theologian he has probably no superior among his learned countrymen. Before he came to Halle, he had been connected with the Universities of Marburg and Breslau. His great work is on the Nature of Sin, and is characterized by profound investigation, accurate analysis, comprehensive survey of the entire field and a systematic arrangement of his materials truly German. A second edition of this work, anew investigated and greatly enlarged, was published not long since in two large octavo volumes. It has not yet found an English translator and perhaps will not. A competent version of it would imply in the translator an acquaintance with German theology and philosophy and modes of thinking, which very few Englishmen or Americans possess. An inadequate translation of such a work would be a matter of great regret to the author and his friends. The remaining publications of Prof. M., so far as we are informed, are confined to single sermons and miscellaneous articles and to two volumes of Discourses. The sermons, from which we now propose to translate a few extracts, were printed at Breslau in 1846, in a volume of 355 pages, and are entitled, "Zeugniß von Christo und von dem Wege zu ihm, für die Suchenden," (Testimony in relation to Christ and of the Way to Him, for Inquirers). It consists of a valuable Preface of thirty pages and of thirteen discourses on the following topics : The dignity of man ; It is only by regeneration that man can attain the object of his creation ; In the divine economy of man's salvation, the manifestation of wrath has its necessary place, but it is only to prepare the way for the revelation of love ; The feelings which Christ presupposes in those who would enter into communion with Him ; The holiness of Jesus is the proof of the truth of his testimony to his Divine dignity ; The atoning work of Christ as the manifestation of the holiness of God ; Christ as the fisher of men ; Love to Christ as springing from the consciousness of forgiven sin ; Three stages of the Christian life ; On what rests the

authority of a rule of faith which has always been rendered in the church to the New Testament? In what sense does Christ command us to confess Him before men? In what manner should we take part in existing religious controversies? And the relation between our duties to God and to civil society.

Before we present to our readers a few passages from these sermons, it may not be wholly irrelevant to offer one or two brief observations. Discourses from the pulpit in Germany are, for the most part, addressed to the feelings rather than to the reason. The theologian does not often discuss on the Sabbath the profounder mysteries of his faith. Such discussions are reserved for the lecture-room or the printed page. Discourses like those with which Drs. Hopkins and Emmons, or even Dr. Dwight, edified their auditories, if not quite unknown in Germany, are exceedingly rare. The sermon is often a mere homily, or a mere exposition of a passage of Scripture which occurs in the lessons of the day, or it is a popular illustration of some truth, interspersed or concluded with appeals to the hearers. It is generally level to the capacity of the great mass. It is likewise, for the most part, short. Nothing would be more appalling to a continental audience, or even to one in England, than those protracted discussions, once so common in New England and Scotland, and happily not now wholly discontinued. The length of the discourses, to which the writer of these lines has listened, has varied from twenty minutes to thirty-five. One reason of this brevity is the time which is occupied in singing. In this delightful exercise the whole congregation, without exception, unites. Those who might have been wearied with the sermon, now awake and join in the hymn with the whole heart. The writer can never forget a spectacle of this kind which he saw in one of the old churches in Nuremberg. The great edifice was crowded, one half of the auditors at least standing. The sermon had been delivered in a fervent manner and had apparently much interested the feelings of the audience. Immediately a powerful and well-toned organ sent its peals through all the corners and recesses of the cathedral, and in a moment every adult and child in the vast throng broke forth in praise to the Redeemer, in one of those old hymns, mellowed by time, and which breathe not of earth, but of heaven. The effect, at least upon a stranger, was overpowering. Nothing like it ever can be produced by a small choir, however scientifically trained. The performance of the latter must be comparatively dead, because, being so artistic or scientific, or so modern,

or it has been subjected to so many mutations, that few can join in it, if they were permitted so to do. The music for a popular audience must be simple, and then, especially if a great multitude unite, it will often be affecting and sublime. The singing in the German churches sometimes occupies an hour, or more than an hour. The number of the hymns and of the stanzas is affixed in large letters to the walls and pillars in various parts of the house, so that there is no confusion or delay in finding the page.

We will only add one more remark. Can the Christian sermon ever produce its legitimate effect in Germany, while the Sabbath is desecrated as it is, or rather where the Sabbath is both theoretically and practically regarded as scarcely more holy than the other days of the week? Is not the devotional observance of the entire Sabbath indispensable to anything like the full effect of the ordinances of worship? Are not meditation and prayer prerequisites to the right appreciation of the instructions of God's house? In other words, is a Sabbath possible when its observance is placed wholly on the ground of expediency, or where the sacred time is limited to the hours of public worship? To go from the market or the counting-room to the church, and from the church to the tea-garden, seems at least to be incongruous. Those, indeed, who are educated under the German system, may and doubtless do derive more benefit from a sermon, than would be possible in like circumstances to an American or a Scotchman. Still, in view of the tendencies of human nature, of man's strange aversion to religious duties, and in view, also, of the actual state of morals and religion in those continental nations, where the Sabbath is disregarded, we can come to no other conclusion than that a *day* of sacred rest is necessary for the preacher and his hearers, and we cannot but rejoice that in our country and extensively in Great Britain, the *entire* Sabbath is regarded as holy time. Is not the comparatively pure state of morals and of religion in these countries to be attributed in no small degree to the fact, that the Sabbath is observed, not as a matter of expediency merely, but of moral obligation? In no other countries can those delightful hymns be sung, which represent the day of rest as the best of all the seven, and as a foretaste of the nobler rest above.

Prof. Müller's object in publishing this series of discourses is thus indicated: "The point of view, in accordance with which the sermons now published, are collected, is shown sufficiently in the title and needs no elucidation. It may be merely remarked,

that by the term Inquirers, those are also included who seek Christ without being conscious of it. And in such, these deeply awakened times seem to be particularly rich;—men, who from inward disquiet, now grasp at this enjoyment and now at another, in order to find therein the light and peace and freedom, which they can find only by faith in Christ and obedience to his word. *Quærite quod quæritis, sed non est ubi quæritis.* My most earnest desire is, that the effect of these sermons may be, through God's blessing, to point here and there such an inquirer, who is serious in his investigations, the way to Him—open and yet so hidden—who is himself the Way and the Truth and the Life."

We ought to remark, that the sermons of Prof. Müller are longer and of a more argumentative character than is common with German preachers. In selecting passages from various discourses, we shall, doubtless, impair the effect which they would produce if presented as constituent and consecutive parts of a beautiful whole. Still, the course we have adopted may be more instructive to the American reader.—*Tr.*]

We extract the following from the sermon on the Dignity of Man.

"In every man, from the beginning, there is a peculiar, living germ, which strives to unfold itself; and the powers of nature and the influence of other men affect him no further than he yields himself to them; yea the more strenuously he unfolds this germ, the more able will he be himself to exert a determining and moulding influence on nature and the human race around him; the less his dependence, the greater his self-reliance. But above this relation to other created powers, in which dependence and independence are so wonderfully mingled, and conditioned one upon the other, there reigns an all-comprehending and commanding Power. It exerts not its primary influence on us after we have been endued with our own life, but it is that to which we owe our being itself, and the germ of our own life and every moment of our existence. This is the all-creating and sustaining power of God, who, according to the declaration of the apostle to the Athenians, 'made the world and all things therein, and needs not anything, seeing he has given to every man life and breath and all things.'

"Here we find ourselves in the same relation of dependence with all other creatures over which we have imagined ourselves to be so highly exalted; and, consequently, this consideration

seems to remind us of human dependence and weakness, rather than of our dignity. And still exists there not an immeasurable superiority of man over all these creatures, in the fact that we *find* ourselves to be dependent like them, that is, that we, in distinction from them, *are conscious* of the dependence that we have in common? With their eyes fettered to the earth, other creatures wander about; they know not whence they came nor whose power they fear; but this we know; to us alone it is permitted to lift up our head above the rushing floods of the Past to Him, in whose hand our being and that of the whole world rests. And it is this fact, that we are conscious that we have our life, and all from Him, that we are capable of feeling the warm breath of creative love, cherishing its creatures, as it flows all around us,—it is this, that raises us above all the other dwellers on the earth. Yea herein we possess a certain freedom from the world and its powers, that we know that we are dependent on God, the Governor of the universe.

“And can this consciousness of our dependence on Him exist without some recognition of God to whose power we find ourselves linked with invincible bonds? Does not our heart impel us to Him the invisible God, who dwells not in temples made with hands, who is Lord of heaven and earth, of uncreated riches, all-sufficient in himself, needing nothing, the wise, the holy and the righteous, who has appointed to men the bounds of their habitations, has made known to them his holy will, and will judge them in righteousness? O my friends, let us feel most deeply how highly God has exalted us, in that he has lodged in our bosom the idea of Him, that he has revealed himself in the lowest depths of our spirit, and that thereby only has he made it possible for us to understand for our good his further revelations. And it is this that the apostle means when he asserts that God is not very far from every one of us. Verily he is not a God who has thrust us away from himself at an infinite distance, but he is inexpressibly near. He is near in that we cannot be conscious of our own existence without being conscious of his. He is near in that he has written his holy will in our heart, as our conscience bears witness, so that our will cannot move without coming in contact with the will of God.”

“And if we inquire for the grounds of this holy nearness of God to our consciousness, the apostle answers, as he proceeds to say, that in Him we live and move and have our being, as some also of your own poets have said, ‘we are his offspring.’ And a

relation to God is not here affirmed which is common to man with all other creatures, but one which is peculiar to him. All creatures are entirely dependent on God, not merely in their origination, but in their continued existence; consequently they are wholly encircled and pervaded by his all-powerful agency. Yet one only of all the creatures known to us has he elevated to that dignity, that it can be affirmed of him, 'he lives and moves in Him;' he is a partaker of his nature. As now he himself is imperishable in his being, so has he communicated an imperishable existence to him who partakes of his nature.

"But in order to understand what is signified by this divine nature, we must recall the simple and yet profound narrative of the creation of man in the beginning of the Scriptures, 'God made man in his own image, in the image of God made he him.' Previously nothing is said of an image of God. When God would see a copy of himself in the world, he formed man. The creatures which are not self-conscious and therefore not conscious of God, and which, since they possess no free will, must be ignorant also of God's holy will, controlled by a blind, natural instinct, cannot bear in themselves the image of God. God is a spirit, and it is only in created spirits that his being can image itself. Nature is, indeed, as Paul teaches us, in the beginning of the epistle to the Romans, a revelation of God; yet it is not for itself; it knows nothing of the wisdom, power and goodness which it praises through its works; it reveals Him only so far as it gives an eye which can recognize in it the footsteps of God. And that there might be such an eye, God formed a being, man, who sees in himself an image and likeness of God. Therefore man, as he is the highest, so he is the last, in the series of God's creations, the expression for the problem of nature and at the same time the understanding which solves the problem; he it is in whom God's creating work rests and celebrates its Sabbath, so that man in his turn might rest in God and in Him keep its Sabbath in the midst of the pains and labors of life; it is in the sons of man, as Solomon says, in whom the creative wisdom of God has its delight, that thereby man again might have his delight in this wisdom. This is the great dignity of man, says a pious teacher of the church, that no less a good will satisfy him than the highest, namely, God."

"It belongs to the essential dignity of man that he unites in himself those things, which, viewed in themselves, are separated from each other by a wide interval,—dust and ashes and a shin-

ing spark of God, a sensuous nature with its impulses kindred to the beast, and a spirit allied to God. A being in whom are joined such diverse powers of action, is certainly one whose destiny in the Divine government can only be great."

In the second part of the discourse, the author considers the actual state of man, his fall from his original dignity.

"Man was destined to be like God in holy freedom and love; but when he assumes to be like God in breaking away from him and his holy precepts, then all things are changed into debasement and wretched bondage to sin. One may admire the art and cunning, the decision and perseverance which man often shows in sin; yet for him there is absolutely no true dignity but in his relation to God, the source of all power and glory and majesty. Now it is sin which has brought into this relation the deepest discord. Hence in sin, bad as it is in all its manifestations, this is still the worst that it disturbs and perverts in our heart itself the consciousness of God, so that man, with the increasing darkness of his mind, finally falls into the belief that the Godhead is like to images of gold, silver and stone, made by human art, or abandons himself to an utter forgetfulness of God. That consciousness, with its inseparable compassion, the conscience, is the salt of the inward life, but if the salt have lost its savor, wherewith shall it be salted? If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness! Where this darkness seizes the soul, there the enlightening sparks of great thoughts continually expire; the nobler feelings and efforts are turned into a horrid night, in which the wild beasts of unbridled desires and passions hunt their prey."

"It is only before a highly exalted creature that this fearful pit yawns; it is only one who partakes of the Divine nature that can fall from God; it is only that that lives and moves and exists in God, that can come to be at variance with Him. This is confirmed by what Paul declares to the Athenians of the consequences which the Divine justice has annexed to sin. He testifies of a day in which God will judge the world in righteousness. An unruly beast is killed; a child not able to foresee the consequences of his actions, when it begins a destructive course, is disciplined and prevented forcibly from accomplishing his designs. Yet not so does God test sinful man; but he judges him in righteousness, he rewards him according to his deeds. And this is something great, in that God makes man responsible for his actions; he recognizes in him a dignity of personal independence, as he does in no other creature on earth."

"But if the susceptibility for Christ attests the dignity of man, how much more the actual reception of him. Is there glory in seeking for God, how much greater is the glory of finding God in Christ. When we exercise that repentance which God requires, we judge ourselves; and when we truly appropriate the faith which God sets before us in the risen Redeemer, then he, by whom God will judge the world in righteousness, is no more our judge, but the finisher of our redemption; we are in him and he in us, and all things which he now possesses as the glorified Son of Man, he communicates to us, so that we, becoming like the image of the first born among many brethren, may possess with Him the kingdom that his Father has appointed. After this faith, my dear friends, let us strive with all the earnestness of our souls, in order that that on which the true dignity of man rests, communion with God, may be in us not merely a capability or a possibility, but may become more and more real. Even in our times and in the midst of Christendom, many still, like the Athenians, worship the unknown God, uncertain what they have in him and what they should expect from him, vacillating in their opinions and following every wind of doctrine. With them God is the name by which they denote a dark, indefinite feeling, as it occasionally reminds them of something above them who is higher and infinite. We would rejoice that this warning voice is not yet mute; but we would say to them that our God no more dwells in the darkness, as he once did for Israel, that the mystery is revealed in the word and the gospel, that the unknown God has made himself known in Christ."

In the sermon on regeneration, the author considers particularly what certain opponents of this doctrine allege as sufficient substitutes for it, namely, that man, without regeneration, can attain the end of his being, either by intellectual cultivation, by integrity and virtue, or by an indirect participation in the effects of Christianity. We quote one or two sentences under the first head.

"It is an inner world which man here opens to himself, and which he conquers, while he creates. The manifold problems which meet him as they require, his time for higher thoughts and efforts, must withdraw him from what is vulgar and low, and preserve him from sinking down into the defiling fens of life. There is something noble in that he employs himself in the earnest pursuit of the objects of knowledge, not for the sake of any personal use or advantage, but from mere curiosity. Such toil bears in it-

self a certain consecration ; for the moment, a purifying power ; man has now something elevated above the sensual world, which he seeks and loves, and to which he devotes himself. And besides, if the investigation leads to the ultimate grounds of all knowledge and existence, how great does our soul feel itself to be and how highly raised above the little things which else tempt one to sin ! And the same praise—dare we deny it to the cultivation of the beautiful in poetry and other fine arts ? Does not this stand in a relation not to be mistaken with striving for the good and the holy ? How often do its rules forbid the same things which the moral law does not allow ! How is such an employment fitted to give us an idea of the beauty of the perfect harmony in our life, which a sanctified will only can produce ! How it moderates the inclinations, softens the manners, represses all the rough outbreaks of nature !

“ Such then would be the intellectual cultivation which should lead individuals as well as nations most surely to the highest dignity of human life and guard them from destruction.—But were it actually the case, more than two thousand years since, mankind would have solved the problem. History informs us that there had then been a nation, the Greek, which had reached a height of cultivation in art and science, never seen before or since—to a summit from which by its works it could become the lawgiver of the most distant posterity. Where is this nation ? Vanished long ago from the earth. When therefore the apostle Paul stepped on the great seat of this cultivation, he delayed not a moment to summon the Athenians from the schools of their philosophers to the despised Galilean ; he called the whole great past of this people, with all their celebrated creations, times of ignorance. A time of ignorance it was, since in the midst of all their noble treasures of cultivation, they did not and could not possess the highest—the spirit of knowledge and of peace and of holiness in communion with the living God. And since they lacked this one thing, a poisonous breath arose from the splendid flowers of their cultivation, which infected the air and corroded the ground, which stunned the conscience and killed the moral sense, which blunted the feelings of the people in respect to the most shameless sins by daily familiarity and made their understanding only ingenious and creative in the arts of destruction, so that at length the most beautiful, the richest sown field, ever beheld in the garden of God, perished in a total putridity.”

“ Ye know well, for I speak to men of understanding, that this

cultivation could only be of a genuine kind and actually valuable, when it was the fruit of earnest labor and effort. Think you really that a cultivation which was effected like that of the Greeks could ever become the universal possession of man? Certainly it needs only a glance on the world as it actually is, to scare away this marvellous dream. It is not merely that an innumerable multitude were not called, according to the measure of their gifts to the enjoyment of this higher cultivation. The essential arrangements of the earthly life will always render it necessary that the greater part of mankind should be specially devoted to manual employments, which will not allow them time to acquire intellectual cultivation, and to whom the possession and care of it would only be an evil. And if we now praise this cultivation as the one thing needful, what follows? What else than that the highest good was not intended for all, but only for select, highly favored natures. O then let these high words in praise of human cultivation be dumb! For this haughty culture wants nothing so much as the warm breath of love, of genuine humanity, without which certainly no one can attain to the true destiny of man."

"You see how grievously we sin against our poor brethren when we put everything on the ground of mere intellectual education; it is not enough for us to care for ourselves only, unmindful of their true well-being; we thrust them down into the raging sea of sins and worldly cares, so that we only for ourselves may reach the shore. And would it were actually the shore that we attain. But on the heights of this cultivation, in all its grace and refinement, have not modern times shown us the deepest depravity of heart and life both in respect to nations and individuals? It is true that this culture cuts off the wilder shoots of the tree of sin; it represses the rougher sallies of selfish passion, and imparts to the manners in the common intercourse of life a virtuous appearance that looks like love, self-denial and humility; but as all its efforts in this respect are directed only to the outward show, it lets the poisonous root of that tree remain untouched. Intellectual cultivation, high as it may ever mount, never eradicates a single sinful tendency; it only refines the whole."

The following occurs under the second head,—the proposed substitution of honor and integrity for regeneration: "It is true that these men are moderate and honest and righteous in their dealings, so far as their view extends; but is there not a great defect in these children of duty and law, that their view ordina-

rily reaches not to the deep roots of the moral life? When, therefore, they meet with opposing principles which proceed from these deep roots, where the struggle for something higher than their boasted notion of duty meets them, when especially they are thrown into great currents of life, how rapidly they lose this just moderation and forget their integrity and justice!" "If we look now over the whole of such a life, what a rare mixture of righteousness and unrighteousness, of adherence to duty and heedlessness, of power of self-denial and inability to restrain even the smallest violent propensity, of insight into the most distant objects and total blindness in respect to the nearest, of effort for that which is virtuous, and of an inconceivably calm acquiescence in evil! How can these things actually harmonize into one living whole? And still it even now exists, and innumerable individuals go on in their accustomed manner, till death that divides all things, separates here also, making manifest what was concealed. But must ye not then allow us thus to conclude: when ye are too weak, or too easy or too blinded to resist sin, still ye are only indebted to the favor of circumstances, that ye have not already fallen off from your remaining duties. It only needs stronger temptations, directed in unfavorable moments on the weak side of your character, for you to apostatize here also. O dependent self-sufficiency and fragile, heroic virtue! Rich beggary! lofty nothingness! O proud adherence to duty, which in one hapless moment can change into bondage to sin!"

Under the last division, we translate the following: "Certain effects of the work of Christ, in the history of the human race, extend immeasurably further than the consciousness of communion with him, or the knowledge of his gospel. It flows around us like the air which man, without thinking of it, needs at every breath. Multitudes live under the institutions which Christianity has established and know it not. They enjoy every day its fruits and thank not the tree which bears them. The Christian religion has in all relations preserved and protected the dignity of man—the object of the redeeming love of God. It has procured the recognition of the true nature of marriage as the connection for life of one man with one woman, and, so far as its influence reaches, has removed the ancient degradation of the female sex. It has freed the slave, and taught us in love to respect human rights in servants. It has connected nations more intimately with each other and has secured, in their wars, the rights of mankind. It has taken up the poor, the weak and the suffering,

in all the departments of life, and placed them, as the helpless, under the special protection of the strong and rich. It has founded asylums for the orphan, the poor and the sick, caring for the instruction of the smallest, and establishing refuges for the depraved and deeply fallen to the saving of their souls. All this has it accomplished, and much more would it have attained, in all the departments of life, if it had not had to do with a race of stiff necks, of unbridled inclinations and of indolence hard to be overcome."

"And if they now enjoy the things which regeneration brings to man, does not this regeneration seem superfluous in attaining the end of our being before God? But it needs only a simple consideration to convince you, that there is no truth in this conclusion. If ye only partake in the general effects of the gospel, without truly appropriating to yourselves, its fundamental provisions, can ye say that ye are truly free and independent in your relation to the gospel? Certainly not; but it is a dark power which forces and bears you on, without your knowing the awakening force, the Divine power, to which you owe what is best and noblest in your life, and which still ever remains at a certain distance and in alienation from you, though it continues near you, in order to unite you wholly with it. In this your unconscious state, you are not free, but simply dependent; and think you that it is worthy of you, to remain voluntarily in this dark dependence, when ye could be truly free?"

"O then turn with all your heart to the source of the mighty stream on whose banks ye dwell, whose waters fertilize your land and moisten your seed and quench your thirst. Make ye only this thing clear to yourselves, that the entire form of the life to which ye belong, the essential institutions in which it moves, have their deepest ground in the appearance of Jesus Christ among men, while yet no feeling of your necessity leads you to him. This one thing must have already prostrated you in deep humility at his feet, to listen to his words, as he still speaks to us to-day in the gospel, and to learn fundamentally what he has to say to us of his Father, and of us, and of himself."

Some of these discourses are introduced or concluded with a brief prayer. This practice, which might appear constrained and formal in the printed discourses of an American clergyman, does not seem incongruous in the sermons of our German friends. This perhaps may be attributed in part to the greater simplicity and fervor of the latter. We translate one or two specimens:

"Thou knowest, All-wise God, that the present generation are in nothing so rich as in doubts and questions and denials at variance with thy holy truth. Thou knowest that in our hearts, also, these doubts often intrude; alas! how that they even proceed from our own bosoms, so that the ground on which we had stood, trembles beneath us; that thy word and thy promises seem to us dark and uncertain; and what we have already experienced of the operations of thy grace, appears to us like a dream; and that even in our prayers and cries to thee for help, conflicting thoughts are mingled, and our whole soul is placed in most sad perplexity. O send to us thy help and awaken us by the motions of thy Spirit, that we may with all earnestness seek for the steadfast ground of our faith, and when we have found it, hold it fast, though thousands should fall on our right hand and ten thousands on our left, yea though the waves of doubt rush over our own hearts and deep call unto deep."

Another discourse is concluded with the following words: "Seek no other Mediator than Jesus Christ, who from love to you came into the world; by whose precious blood ye have been redeemed; place your hopes wholly on the mercy which is offered to you through the revelation of Jesus Christ. O then let a warm, living breath of grateful love to Him, who first loved you, descend into your souls, and may the Spirit of holiness come upon you, and write henceforth in your hearts the law—the holy will of God. Yes, Thou art our only Mediator with God, who hast promised that when thou wast lifted up, thou wouldest draw all men to thee. O then open the eyes of those, who attempt to do the will of thy Father, that they may know and perceive that their salvation is in thy death on the cross, as it was the holiness of thy Father which was glorified in thy offering for sin on Golgotha."

The following passage describes the perfect moral excellence of our Lord: "To this consciousness of the universality of sin in the human race, which no one of us can deny, there is only a single exception which we are as little able to deny—Jesus Christ. This is the impression which the image of his life in the gospels makes upon the soul that is susceptible of moral purity and greatness,—the calm, ever-uniform elevation and silent majesty of perfect holiness which rises over every inward contest with evil, the intimate communion with God darkened by no shadow of sin, the complete resignation which sought nothing for itself, but only the things of God, and the overflowing love which

devoted itself wholly to the service of man. And the lustre of this holiness shines the clearest when humiliation and shame covered him most fully, when the Son of man met the bitterest pangs with Divine patience and submission, when great and free in bonds he encountered his foes and judges, when still and patient he bore the reproach and torture of the cross ; loved his own and blessed them with his last breath, and dying, interceded for his murderers. Christ on the cross—this is the holy image of perfect love and self-denial, to which, when children, we looked up with the trembling of reverential fear, which in the darkest tumult of the human heart still casts a beam of gentle warning to repentance and reformation, and before which only infernal boldness entirely loses its shame."

The two following passages are from a discourse, entitled, "Christ the fisher of men."

"There is a penitent recognition of one's own sin, which precedes faith in Christ, so far as it actually deserves this name, and without which this faith cannot originate in the soul. For how can we trust in Christ as our Redeemer if we do not think we need a Redeemer? But how can we feel the need of a Redeemer if we do not recognize our weakness and sinfulness? And the more vivid this knowledge is within us, the less will it remain in connection merely with single external deficiencies, but will penetrate to the inmost depths of our being and seek the worm which gnaws at its root ; the more deeply we are conscious of the value of redemption, the more vital and vigorous will be our faith in the Redeemer."

"O bethink you well, my dear friends, that you stand not alone either in good or evil, but curse or blessing, perdition or salvation for many of your brethren, lies in your hands. Ye are members with them of one body, and as is the state of one member, be it sound or diseased, so flows from it over the others the living spirit of health or the poisonous breath of sickness. An offence to the innocent and defenceless little ones who believe in Christ, a burden to the weak which completely prostrates them, a stone to those ready to fall—what a fearful load for your conscience and for the great day of Divine judgment. O it were better for you that a millstone were hanged about your neck and ye were cast into the depths of the sea. But what happiness to be a trusty guardian of the faith and innocence of the young, a support to the weak, to the erring a guide in the right way by word and action! So then care for our own personal salvation is not

sufficient ; in order to kindle within us true zeal, for the sake of the salvation of our brethren, let us leave all and follow Christ. May we honestly search our hearts before the face of the All-wise God. Is there any good to which custom, inclination, passion binds us more firmly than to those everlasting gifts which we receive from Christ, let us take the ship to land, forsake all and follow him. Without this ye will never be free from the pain of inward conflict ; he gives his peace only to the heart which resigns itself wholly to him."

The following extract is from a sermon on "confessing Christ before men." "When we glance at the history of mankind since the appearance of our Lord, we are struck, yea pained when we are compelled to see how the confession of Christ has been a two-edged sword, which has not merely pierced to the inward part, dividing the soul and spirit, the joints and marrow, but has very often sundered the most endeared connections of common life, the bands between father and son, mother and daughter, husband and wife, separating the human race into two divisions, introducing fearful wars between paganism and Christianity, and also arraying Christian nations in manifold ways against each other, and dividing them asunder. Thus the thought will naturally arise, whether mankind could not have secured the enjoyment of the Divine blessings, which Christianity proffers, without being exposed at the same time to these great evils. Certainly, some will reply, for the lofty views and principles which the Christian religion makes known, may be firmly held and propagated, while the confession of Christ, which has always caused the principal controversy, is avoided. Indeed it has been sufficiently shown that those views and principles have expanded themselves into general truths, which have been already universally unfolded in the human reason, while as certainly they will in that case possess nothing which will cause separations or divisions. In this way an eminent philosopher has judged, and many have accorded with him, namely, that Christ himself would be perfectly satisfied, if he should find that Christianity, that is, sentiments conformed to his views and principles, predominating in the souls of men, whether men valued or neglected his service. If we look more carefully at the idea from which this opinion springs, we shall see that it is manifestly this, that the essence of the Christian religion consists of views, principles, general conclusions. Were it so, why could not these continue to exist in the convictions of men, though he who first promul-

gated them, had been long forgotten? Thus it is possible to imagine that the remembrance of Moses might be lost among his people, while his laws were firmly retained. Or to select a more recent case, the recognition of the great truths which Luther placed in the light of day, and which became the soul of his reformation-work, does not depend essentially on the knowledge of Luther's person and life; it is not impossible that these principles might remain in the consciousness of Protestant Christians, were Luther's name to disappear.

"But with the Christian religion the case is wholly different. Here all things depend on the holy, divine, human personality of its founder and on the definite relations to this personality, and not merely on the fact that Christ was the author of this religion, that he announced in his teaching the loftiest truths; but it depends especially on the great facts of his incarnation, his death, his resurrection, his ascension, by which he, suffering and acting, accomplished the salvation of man. Since this is the case, his teachings as they are held up to us in the gospels, include especially his declarations regarding himself and an assertion of his personal claims on his hearers in ever-varying forms. And when the apostles, filled with his Spirit, went out into the world, to make known his kingdom, you see that they were principally employed in repeating and inculcating the lessons of their Master. Examine only the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles, and you will find that it was the person of their Lord, it was the importance of his advent for the world, which was prominently handled by them; that they declared their preaching itself to be a testimony of Christ crucified and risen again; that the grand theme of their verbal communications and their letters, the roots from which their teaching unfolded itself, was nothing else than the glory of Jesus Christ, the Son of God who became man, the only Sinless one among sinners—the great facts by which he secured the salvation of man. It is absolutely impossible in the Christian religion to separate doctrine from the person, to thrust out Christ and yet retain Christianity. Therefore is Christ so far from being satisfied when only certain general truths are acknowledged and received into the soul, while men possibly forget his name, that he on the contrary, in a long series of his declarations exhibits himself as the object of faith; immediately before his death he established the sacrament of the supper expressly in remembrance of himself; in various ways and in the strongest language he demanded that men should confess him as

the indispensable condition of partaking in his salvation ; whosoever denies me before men, him will I also deny before my Father who is in heaven."

Our closing extracts are taken from a discourse on "the three Stages of the Christian Life," founded on the passage respecting our Saviour's transfiguration.

"'Lord it is good to be here,' exclaimed Peter, with the expression of the highest rapture and the most childlike simplicity. 'Wilt thou that we make here three tabernacles, one for thee, one for Moses and one for Elias?' Here would they forever linger, build tabernacles for the heavenly forms, and, absorbed in their vision, forget all the strife and all the trouble of earth. What can they desire besides? What attraction can withdraw them from this holy place? Where Jesus Christ makes known to his friends his divine glory, there they partake of the deepest and holiest joy, such as the most costly goods of earth can never furnish. 'Peace I leave with you; my peace I give unto you; not as the world giveth, give I unto you.'

"It is the most sacred experience of the Christian life, it is the heights most resplendent, of which this narrative reminds us. It was in still retirement, when our soul was absorbed in musings on the wondrous way in which God had led us to his eternal salvation; or when in ardent prayer, we sought consolation and help from the disquiet of our heart and the troubles of life; it was in the circle of very dear friends, when in conversation on the holiest themes, in reciprocal interchange of our views and experiences, our hearts overflowed, and the glowing sparks of faith and love uniting, suddenly burst forth into a clear flame; it was in the public worship of God, when the message of the gospel in the hymn, the prayer, the sermon, powerfully impressed us; or it was when the highest festival of divine worship—the Supper of the Lord—poured over us the fulness of divine mercy;—how any one may have experienced these things, we know not; but this we know, that whoever has experienced one such holy hour, can never forget it again. Was it not as if heaven had been opened to the enraptured gaze; as if a higher, holy world would receive us into its eternal repose. We thought that a happier experience could never befall us in eternity, than that this feeling should evermore endure. All the pains and cares of earth were absorbed in the single emotion of the most childlike acquiescence. All sin appeared to us inexpressibly odious, contemptible and pitiful; we could not imagine how it should ever

have seduced and fettered us ; and it seemed to us impossible that it should hereafter gain power over us. Far below lay the world ; we were conscious of being citizens of the heavenly kingdom. On the eye of our mind beamed the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, who is the image of God ; we saw his glory as the glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. What had often seemed dark to us in the connexion of his works, now shone distinct and clear. What our thoughts had been wont to divide and scatter, now arranged itself into the most beautiful whole, as we recognized its soul to be the redeeming love of the Son of God to us poor and sinful men. Yes poor, if we looked only at ourselves, but immeasurably rich in eternal possessions, when we recognized ourselves as the property of our Lord and Saviour, when we knew ourselves to be in fellowship with Him, who is Lord of all heaven ; O in such holy knowledge, should we not forget the world with its pleasures and griefs ?”

“ Or does any one think that it was only Christ’s peculiar glory on which it was allowed the disciples to cast a longing gaze ? Whence have we the right to employ the event so directly for the happy perfecting of the Christian ? O how little do such queries and doubts know of the divine fulness of love in Jesus Christ ; love which thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but humbled itself and took the form of a servant and was found in fashion as a man ; love which led him to count as nothing his Divine form, but to become wholly and inseparably one with us ; love which rent the heavens and brought him down to us, in the deepest abyss of our misery, that he might raise us with himself to the throne of his divine majesty.

“ No, faith, in him and love to him cannot so inquire ; for these are assured that all which Christ has, his friends shall share with him. Will he then be solitary in his glory ? Was he alone on the mount of transfiguration ? When transfigured there appeared as partakers of his glory, in company with his disciples, Moses and Elias, who talked with him. Moses, the lawgiver of Israel, once the most harrassed of men, called to lead to the promised land the people of hardened heart and iron neck, finally gathered weary to his fathers, now enjoying the most enlivening repose in the participation of the glory of the Son of God. Elias, the greatest of the prophets, sent to Israel in a time of trouble and disorder, when Ahab and Jezebel seduced the people to the cruel service of Baal,—whose whole life was a con-

stant contest with the sins and idolatry of his countrymen, till God translated him to heaven, where his heritage is the happiest peace in communion with the Saviour. No, doubt not, disciples of the Lord; he will not only enjoy his own felicity; his loving heart will long to share it with you; 'because I live, ye shall live also, and where I am, there shall also my servants be.' 'Father, I will,' he prays in the night before his death, 'that where I am, that they whom thou hast given me, may be with me, and I will give unto them the glory that thou hast given me.' No! ye dare not doubt; his transfiguration is to you also the type of your own future perfection and glorification. 'In the world, ye shall have tribulation, but he of good cheer, I have overcome the world.' Here ye contend and are subjected to much toil and labor; but for you a time is coming, and who knows how near it is, when the dark shadows of the earthly life shall yield forever to celestial glory, when every conflict shall be swallowed up in victory, and all pains and toils shall end in the sweetest rest, when nothing more shall disturb your happiness in communion with the Redeemer."

ARTICLE II.

RELIGION IN GERMANY.

Translations from the recent work of Dr. Tholuck,—“Dialogues upon the principal questions of Faith of the present time, principally for reflecting Laymen who seek instruction.” Halle, 1846.

By J. B. Lyman, Andover Theol. Seminary, now in Europe.

[THE work from which the following extracts have been translated, was written by the author, as the title indicates, to furnish a book suited to afford instruction to inquiring laymen. Hence its style is in many parts colloquial and idiomatic, and thus calculated to bring home his thoughts upon the questions of faith to the hearts of the German people. It consists of six dialogues, with the titles: Reason and Rationalism; Reason and Faith; Faith and the Scriptures; The latest Progress; Progress and Confessions; and the Reawakened Faith. The speakers represent different religious parties of protestant Germany. Emil rep-

resents the friends of evangelical religion ; and in him the author has probably intended in a great measure to express his own opinions and feelings. Charles is the representative of rationalism, but of inquiring rationalism ; Julius, of modern unbelieving radicalism ; and Gerhard, of those who wish to abide by the old confessional standards. The present work is but the first part of the whole, and the author states in his preface, that, if he should perceive a call to it, a second part will appear in answer to the question, *Who was Christ?* alluding perhaps to an expression of Ulich, the leader of the "protestant friends," or "friends of light" as they are sometimes called, in which he says, "who Jesus properly was, I do not know, to that the answer is wanting to me." This question, What think ye of Christ? the author designates as "the question of all questions" at present in Germany.—Tr.]

Emil to Charles.—I see that we stand already at the place of contest, and our first pass is to be made. You ask for the rights of our faith, I for the privileges of your reason. For you the highest appeal, in all questions of religion and morality, is to your reason. Hence you can let no one give you a result ; not even him whom Christianity calls its own master. Independence of the word of Christ has become the fundamental article that now forms *free* churches ; only it is strange, that they at the same time wish still to be called Christian or evangelical churches, or churches at all. I presuppose, that you know in all its extent the greatness of the office, which has devolved upon your reason. Your reason has the problem to decide, how much, that the master of the Christian world has spoken upon divine things, can still be valid and how much not. Let us make it fully clear to ourselves, what is meant by this. You then, the landholder N. N., born on the confines of two centuries, baptized and brought up in one of the christian States, the Prussian, educated at the gymnasium in B, and at the universities of B. and H, are with full conviction, certain before God, that the judgment which your reason passes upon questions of religion and morality, is more to be relied upon and nearer to the truth, than that of him, who was born in Bethlehem, the founder of that religion, which, for about two thousand years, the Europeans and a great part of the inhabitants of other parts of the world have confessed, after whom they bear the name of Christians, and from whose birth they date their new era? If any irony offends you in this ques-

tion, you will confess to me, that I have not put it there, but that it is there the irony of the idea itself.

Emil to Charles.—I can assure you, that, so far as we can judge from public testimonies, among all the professors of theology, in all the German universities, not more than perhaps one single individual can be pointed out, who would undertake to declare all the Gospels not to be genuine. That I lay a stress upon the word *all* will be comprehensible to you, as far as expressions such as those that I have mentioned,¹ are found in *every one* of our Gospels; and if one of them or if one miracle remains, and must remain, unimpaired, this is as good for us and as bad for you, as if there were a hundred. You know as well as I what is requisite, before all the German professors harmonize in any one thing, and that, on many questions, it might be easier for one to bring all the German rivers into one bed, than all the German professors to agree. And now *all* these theological professors of Germany, that play in all colors, and in all other questions diverge towards all the thirty-two points of compass, and all, with perhaps no more than one exception, united in this, that if not in four, at least in three Gospels, eye-witnesses without deceit, or at least their nearest friends, have given account of Christ's work and word! What shall we say then, when we hear the great mass prating about the Gospels, as if they were all nothing but children's tales from ancient times, of which no one any longer knew certainly, whence they came or who invented them.

Emil to Charles.—Consider besides, that this idea, which is expressed in the words of Scripture "God has appeared in flesh," the idea of a human personality, in whose self-consciousness divinity and humanity unite themselves, that this idea has first come to full consciousness in the human race through Christianity. Judaism was affrighted at the preaching of this doctrine, when its sound was first heard, for the distance between God and man appeared to them too immense; the heathen were astonished, for they knew indeed of men, who had raised themselves to the circle of the gods, as, for example, a Hercules, but not of a Deity, who from condescension became man. And this most peculiar idea of Christianity, should even this be nothing but a flower-garland, which devout adorers of Jesus had hung up over his beautiful moral system?

Charles to Emil.—But why do you contend against me also, as

¹ All things are committed unto me of my Father,—I am the truth,—He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me.

if you had to do solely with the insufficient reason of the individual, that has the pleasure of standing before you? Is not my reason that of the entire cultivated and uncultivated present? Why do you make me weaker than I am? Have I not the voice of all Germany on my side? If presumption lies on one of the two sides, does it not lie rather on that of the little handful, which, in opposition to the whole mass of the cultivated and uncultivated contemporaries, maintains, that it alone is right?

Emil.—Do not lay hands upon the little band, for it stands not upon its own reason, but rather upon the word of Christ. But will you join yourself to those, who ask not what the best, but what the most say? For that you appear to me in fact too good. You talk of all Germany, but you speak, as it seems to me, only from the remembrance, still fresh to you, of the crowds of those that sound the alarm-bell, who pressed to the assemblies and protests, and of the daily renewed blasts of the trumpeting angel in the newspapers.

Charles to Emil.—Do you not also forget, that it was through fishermen, tent-makers and publicans, that the Lord once confounded the wisdom of the scribes?

Emil.—You can scarcely say that in earnest, or have you forgotten, what intervened between their occupation, as fishermen and publicans, and the apostolic office; a great Pentecost with tongues of fire!—"But tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem," therefore not go out as apostles, "until ye be endued with power from on high." Yes, if it were only children of Pentecost, that would lay well to the hearts of our people, who need so much to be reminded of the invisible world, the simple truths of God and eternity, and of the holiness of conscience, how would I then entreat the blessing of heaven upon their work! But have you not rather undertaken, and do not the laity, everywhere at present undertake to decree and ballot upon doctrines and confessions, and indeed those who, in matters of religion, have not advanced beyond the question of Pilate? And are these laymen not only in theology, but in the first elements of religion and of biblical knowledge, those who should have the decision on these subjects, and not rather the theologians? If there be one, who hates from his heart that priestly pride, that will not grant to the divinely enlightened layman, a voice in matters of spiritual experience, I am he. God is my witness, how gladly I receive instruction from every such layman. But there is a laical self-conceit, which forgets, that the *word* of God, like the *Son* of God, has taken ha-

man form, which must first be understood correctly in a human sense, if we will not misunderstand the divine kernel concealed within it.

Emil to Charles.—The strife between you and us does not in fact concern the essential nature of reason; at the bottom, that which separates us, consists alone in a different conviction of the power of sin. "The secret lies under the splinter," says the Arabian, "The art is only in raising the splinter." This splinter is the knowledge of the power of sin. In the Scriptures every declaration upon the glory of reason is followed by a "*but*," and this "*but*" those of your side do not understand. When Paul has spoken of the inner light in the hearts of the heathen, there follows directly, "*but* they have changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the creator." When John testifies that the eternal light ever shineth in the darkness, it is said directly after, "*but* the darkness hath not comprehended it." When Christ speaks of the inner light that can lighten the whole inner man, there follows immediately after the "*but*," namely, that the inner eye becomes so very easily an *evil* eye; and what then happens, when the inner eye becomes evil, you can observe in the outer eye; when it is no longer single but becomes double-sighted, it illudes us with mere phantoms. That was why I said, you may be zealous for the glory of *reason*, if you only willingly let *your* reason be ruled and commanded by the Scripture.

Charles to Emil.—The truths then of a Father in heaven, of a providence over all men and of a retribution, and that morality in which our reason recognizes its own laws, these truths are then after all the property of reason?

Emil.—I maintain by no means, that these truths do not lie in your reason, for if they did not how could they give you satisfaction in your inmost being? The spark lies too in the stone, but the truth is, every wisp of straw does not strike it out, but only the steel.

Neither can the plant grow without its own forming principle from within; but just as little, without the warming and life-giving sun-beam from without. One may surely wonder what an incapable child reason is, that she has not of herself, without the Bible, comprehended even the simplest truths, as for example, that there is but one God—*one* God; now what child would not see, that there can be but one God? Thus you say, but, ye masters of wisdom, when a thing is done, says the proverb, e'en

the simple understand it. Here too the saying is true, one drives the nail and the other hangs his coat upon it; the Bible has driven the nail and you have hung the coat of your wisdom upon it. How many among the great lords of the reason, in our days think of this, that, with the exception of those nations that have been taught by the Bible, on the whole globe, in ancient and modern times, not even a single people will be found that believed in one God? For in respect to the Mohammedans, it is acknowledged, that the founder of their religion received this belief only from the Jews and the Christians, as he also called his religion the religion of Abraham.

Charles to Julius.—Truly, there is a commotion in political things among the German people; but if the meaning of this movement were nothing but this, that they are going out to seek on earth the heavenly city of God, that has been abandoned, then indeed, I say for myself, it is a dear loaf of bread that costs a cake. I think, however, you have not rightly seen and heard: "What one himself has in mind, that is sounded by all the bells." I am convinced, that if our people observed that it was your design, to change that God, to whom they can pray when in distress, for the generic conception of the human race, and the kingdom of God in eternity, for the free citizenship in time; as soon as they observed this, they would hang you all at once as traitors. And if you have really betrayed the secret to me, if you make use of the old rationalists only as vanguard of your free corps, and if the young theologians, of whom you speak, have already sworn to your standard, although they still appear under quite other colors, then do I turn away with indignation from the jesuitical morality, which you wish to exalt to power in your new kingdom of humanity. You have not the face to wish to revile before the people the *old* Jesuits with their morality?

Emil to Charles.—You give me much to answer at once. You have called a great leader to your assistance against me in favor of the *vox populi, vox Dei*. I will begin by calling the same leader to assistance, and that too to give testimony against himself as against you: "To trust the momentary voice of the people, or regard as an oracle the shout of the multitude upon that which delights them just in the present hour, is folly. But that, which, in a large space, and through all classes, and still more through a course of long periods, has established itself in public opinion, as approved and without contradiction excellent, let that

be earnestly inquired into, and, in case of doubt, let us endeavour rather to seek a worth in it, than deny a worth to it." Which of us now is the one, that follows most that adviser in his better hour, when he speaks not as the advocate of a party, but as a man of science? "That which has approved itself through a large space, in all classes, and still more through a course of long periods." When I take the map of Europe in my hand, it does not appear to me precisely as if your wisdom could boast of being able to abide even the first proof, the last and chief one, certainly not.

My highest criterion for the spirit of different ages, I have not yet expressed in the words of that writer of profane history; it is contained in the words of that historian, who beside the spirit of the world and its ages, has made himself familiar with another spirit: "The spirit of the age is not the oracle of truth; it is in many cases too the mouth of falsehood, and the oracle of delusion. There are predominant errors and predominant truths, and we can receive the one as well as the other from the tradition of time; there is need of a higher criterion to distinguish them from each other."

Emil to Charles.—You will also make this requisition of him who claims to continue the building of a house according to the plan of the original architect, that at least he do not touch the foundations. You reject the foundations of the reformation. What these foundations or principles are, there is no dispute; they must without doubt be those truths, through which it was first called forth,—no authority but that of the Holy Scriptures! and no justification but alone through faith in Christ! That these are the two fundamental principles, from which the reformation has gone forth, is on no side contested. But you do not acknowledge these principles. Hence the difference in principle between your continuation in building and ours. You, because the Scripture is no longer your authority, wish to strike out from the confessions what stands in contradiction with your so-called common sense. But those among you, who still inconsequently appeal to the Scriptures as authority, are without the key to the right understanding of Scripture, because justification through faith in Christ is a fact foreign to their inner being.

Emil to Charles.—However well you mean with your wide confessions, an old proverb says: "a wide conscience and none at all are in the end the same thing." And would it be much other-

¹ Gervinus, *National Literature of the Germans*, II. page 411.

wise in this case? A confession, which embraces peacefully in one communion the worshippers of the Word, which was from eternity with the Father, and those, to whom this worship appears as idolatry; the deriders of the mystery of the Trinity and its adorers; those, who stand upon the word of man and those who stand upon the word of God! Pardon me, if I am reminded of that coat of arms, which was once proposed to a vain, new made nobleman,—three snow-balls in hot water. Yes, so long as it was not yet awakened from its rest, the peace, that slept its soft sleep with the sweet breath of childhood, in the cradle of the apostolic church, then the simple testimony might suffice, with which they testified more to themselves than to opponents and enemies, what is the revolving point of the inner life.

But when wide-spreading error began to disturb this sweet sleep of childhood, then also the necessity was soon felt of adding to that so simple primitive faith, points that were turned against error in its manifold forms. And now, after eighteen centuries, when so many *conscious* differences stand armed against each other, can that be the right help to weaken all contrasting colors into a feeble gray? Besides, are you the one, that to-day would allow the rationalist, to-morrow the Lutheran orthodox; and the next day the denier of a self-conscious God, to speak to the hearts of the congregation from the same holy place? or is here too the concord to be established by the gray color of the confession? and is the sermon and liturgy to be painted over with this peace-bringing gray? And is that still *Faith*? You know better what faith is than to be capable of such an enthusiasm for gray?

Gerhard to Emil.—What else is said in all that, than that a piece of armour like Dr. Luther and the rest, must after all go to school to you gentlemen of the quill? And in what do you think that you are more advanced than they? What does not suit you in their confessions? Perhaps some ideas are not split sufficiently hair-fine for you; a point is not correctly placed, or a dot is wanting over an i? For the sake of such arts of the pen will you look over their shoulders? You seem to me sometimes, just as much as the Friends of light, quite to forget, that it is no art to drive a coach with other people's horses and your own whip! For the sake of such trifles will you reject the confessions, assemble new councils and perplex the unlearned people in their faith? That is indeed gathering the ashes and scattering the meal.

Emil.—Dear friend, moderate yourself. To hit, it is necessary not only to have a sharp sword, but to see where you strike. I have not spoken about a false point in the confessions or a failing dot over an i. I have spoken in the first place of theological views and definitions of certain truths, which it is our office, as theologians, to establish, an office enjoined upon us of God; and then of the right, which the confessions themselves give to you laymen as to us theologians, to try them by the Scriptures.

* * * But what, I ask, gives you then the right, thus at the outset, with such confidence, to regard the confessions as free from error, and the men who composed them as infallible? And will you say, that you do not do it at the outset, but because you have become certain by a careful trying of their harmony throughout with the Scriptures? Can you, as protestant, dispute the possibility, that they could have erred, nay, that another eye than yours can in fact detect this and that error?

Gerhard.—The conclusion which I make is a quite simple one. Without certainty of the pure doctrine, no pure faith and no pure life; now this certainty our private judgment will give to us laymen ten times less, than that of your theologians. I need therefore a church, whose word I can follow, as the child its mother's. I will not be continually rocked upon your theological balance-board; and I know no other way of coming down from it on to the firm ground.

Emil.—My design in reference to you, believe me, extends to nothing else than to procure for your faith a divine bulwark, the Spirit of the Lord, and "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Only he can tremble thus in anxiety before the word of man, who like you has built his faith upon the word of man. That faith which no human authority and no human wisdom has built up, shall human wisdom be able so soon to overrun?

Gerhard.—That may be very well, yet one does hastily what he long repents. You will at least be obliged to grant me some time, in order to become more agreed with myself, than I am in fact at present, whether my former faith needs recasting or not. Should I find it so you will see me very soon again at your side.

Emil to Charles.—It is a matter of less importance, in what theoretical form, whether in that of a fantastical dreaming, or in that of common sense, the human spirit reacts against the word of revelation; where the spirit of man no longer humbles itself before the Spirit and word of Christ, but arrogates to itself the

decision upon them, there is always rationalism. But that modern rationalism too, in the form of common sense, you must not consider as a phenomenon so very new and peculiar to Germany. As early as Louis XIV, you can read in contemporary writers, delineations of the Parisian unbelief and scepticism, in which you fancy yourself transferred to the present.¹ In Germany also, long before the proper period of rationalism, there were at least individual rationalists of this description; and then in England rationalism, under the name of deism, was spread in extensive circles from the end of the seventeenth century, until towards the end of the last century; and precisely at the same time, that it had obtained dominion in protestant Germany—just as if there had been a universal miasma in that atmosphere at the end of the last century,—it appeared also in the protestant churches, of Scotland, Holland and France, and even in catholicism. It would then be difficult to look upon it as the child of German science.

Emil to Charles.—The fact is, that aside from this or that local commotion, and personal learned contest, this rationalistic theology, within not more than about one generation (from 1770 to 1800), without any scientific contest worthy of remark, and without any counter revolution, made speedy and complete conquest of almost all the church authorities, and almost all the pulpits and lecturing desks of Germany. I know of only one parallel to such an unopposed march of victory into the enemy's country, that of Napoleon in Prussia in 1806. And was it not in both cases nearly the same cause, which made the victory so easy to the enemy. If you had a still clearer impression of the almost total supremacy of rationalism at the beginning of this century in Germany, and not only in Germany, but, as was said above, in most parts of the protestant, and even the catholic church, what you see of newly awakened faith, in all confessions, at the present time, must appear to you much more as a miracle, than what it really is, a sign of that life-renewing and renovating power, which dwells inextinguishably in Christianity.

Emil to Charles.—For the veiled destiny of the future no one

¹ People talk only of reason and of good taste, of energy of spirit and of the advantage of those who know how to place themselves above the prejudices of the education of the society, in which they are born. Pyrrhonism is in fashion in many things. It is said too that honesty of spirit consists in not believing lightly, in knowing how to doubt on many occasions.—*Le Vassor, De la véritable Relig.* 1688.

can give security. I cannot therefore allay your apprehensions in this direction ; on the contrary I must awaken anew in you these apprehensions in another direction. If you find, and that too after all which has been said between us, the power of the times, that has the promise of victory, still on that side, where the clamouring multitude stands, then open your eyes to know, that far more serious apprehensions are brought home to you ! The more perseveringly you despise the still but living waters of Siloah, now that they are offered to you, the more certainly, believe me, will your descendents be obliged to content themselves with a new pouring of insipid water. But I wish that you could raise your eyes with me and many others, to a church of the future, as it has already begun to build itself, in which the truly pious men among you, will find that which the better part of you has hitherto striven after.

I see much on many sides, that permits us to look to the future with a hoping spirit. Let now a great event seizing all hearts with equal interest, come over the church of the immediate future ; let, for example, the hearts of men melt together in the fiery ordeal of a universal catastrophe, and the man will not be wanting, who will speak out that which is common to all, in such clearness and such power, that a confession will not need to be *made*, but will already exist, and the hearts of men will assent to it, as once to the Augsburg Confession, without balloting.

Charles.—That something new and great is preparing itself in church and State, is in all hearts ; only it appears to me improbable that it will bear the stamp that you think it will, as I must still judge, when I see all the religious striving of the present time tending towards another end.

Emil.—I must reply to you, that all religious striving tends to *this* end and to no other. You yourself will not designate as a religious striving, that zeal which likewise debates upon religious questions at present, only in order to keep religion, that has become a power of the age, as far away as possible ; but all *religious* striving must tend to that end. The pitiful issue of those church-forming endeavors, which rest upon another ground than that of biblical faith, might convince you, that now, as ever, the church-forming power is not in rationalism. When the English deist Williams applied to king Frederick II. for support for a deistical church, projected by him, that monarch, who knew at least what others needed, gave the answer that a church, which needed the support of potentates immediately in its beginning,

did not appear to stand on firm footing. And when his deistical friend the Marquis d'Argens in Potsdam wished to establish a deistical form of worship, the same monarch desired first to see the list of subscribers shown, for at least ten years. Never and nowhere, so far as history reaches and gives testimony, has pure rationalism, has religion having only human reason for its basis, shown a church-forming power, not even where, as in England and America, all room was left for it. A period of six years is the longest, that a large rationalistic church community, has hitherto been able to survive.¹ He who understands the holy word religion, who is conscious what man seeks in religion and through religion, communion with God, he has no other aim, and can have no other aim, than Christ, the Son of the living God. And you too, my friend, will attain to rest, only when you rest in him.

ARTICLE III.

THE AMERICAN PULPIT,—ITS ENDS, ITS MEANS, AND ITS MOTIVES.

By Rev. W. A. Stearns, Cambridge, Mass.

IN no part of the world is the business of preaching so arduous, or so powerful in its effects, as in the United States. We deal with shrewd, intelligent minds, with men who are not to be imposed upon by ceremony, sophistry, or mere declamation, with thinkers, free thinkers in a good sense of the term, whose understandings however are capable of being enlightened, and whose hearts can be moved to noble impulses, purposes and exertions. It cannot therefore be amiss to devote a few pages to a consideration of the American pulpit,—its ends, its means, and its motives.

Its ends are the highest present and eternal welfare of man.

Its means are truth eloquently enforced, or Christian eloquence,

Its motives are to be found in the truth, in its author and in its objects.

¹ The rationalistic religious society of Theophilanthropists in Paris subsisted from 1796—1802.

The first and last of these topics will be briefly discussed, but more time allowed to the consideration of the second.

We use the word American, because while most of our remarks will apply to the pulpit generally, they have reference emphatically, and some of them almost exclusively, to the pulpit in the United States. On such a subject, and for such readers, when one voluntarily selects excellence of speech for his theme, it is not necessarily false modesty which confesses some embarrassment. But let us bespeak indulgence, by the remark, that opinions may not be without their value nor suggestions wholly worthless, even when practical skill is unable to approximate the ideal which it conceives and attempts to shadow. We are also encouraged by the thought, that those whom we address have made sufficient attainments to appreciate the difficulty, the almost impossibility of speaking well, and because in the words of a distinguished French rhetorician, we know that mediocrity alone is severe while genius like virtue is indulgent. *Je sais que la médiocrité seule est sévère, et que la génie est indulgent comme la vertu.*¹

The ends of the pulpit are the highest present and eternal welfare of man. It is intended primarily to announce and enforce the doctrines of grace. It is the echo of inspiration; the voice of God which having reached a human heart is borne from it, with all the power of a living experience, into the hearts of other men.

The New Testament presupposes, while it declares, man fallen. It depicts human nature as radically corrupt, guilty, disabled, condemned, momentarily exposed to destruction. It describes and presents a Saviour, "the brightness of the Father's glory," absolute virtue impersonated, divinity incarnate, humanity deified. It presents him as man's brother, man's Lord, and man's redeemer. It presents him an expiatory victim for sin, Christ crucified, dead and buried, Christ resurgent, Christ ascendant. It offers spiritual resurrection to ruined humanity, through simple faith in the appointed redeemer. This is then the primary mission of the pulpit, and of every preacher of the Christian word. Man is lost, entirely, eternally, hopelessly. Utter it from the tops of the mountains, from the deck of every ship, from the watch-towers of Christendom; on the tomb of the false prophet, in the sanctuaries of heathen abomination cry aloud; roll the heavy thunders of this truth round the globe! Man is saved! There is a Saviour. Salvation, O salvation! sound out the tidings; with tears

¹ Panegyric De Saint Louis par la Cardinal Maury.

and tenderness, with demonstration and pungency, win the world to Christ.

But let us not suppose that the primary mission of the preacher is his only mission, or even the most arduous part of the work which he is appointed to perform. Society is to be regenerated; the immense multitudes of spiritually dead are to be resuscitated; and from the moment when the pulsations of spiritual life begin to be perceptible, they are to be cherished, strengthened, moulded into the image of Christ, sanctified, until the world presents its 800,000,000 of men, women and children, all disenthralled from the bondage of evil, all enlightened, all aspiring towards the perfection of their being; one vast fraternity of magnanimous, Christlike minds.

Hence for the accomplishment of this work, the author of our religion instituted churches which are to be the nurseries of excellence and the centres of all good influences. Every church has, or should have, its divinely commissioned leader whose office it is to attempt the formation of character after the highest model. He is to persevere and press on with the noble work, till the immortal objects of his charge are gradually transfigured, till their countenances shine with the majesty of goodness and their spiritual raiment becomes white as the light. The preacher is in this respect a Phidias who is to conceive, and, from stones taken rough out of the quarry, to fashion forms of superhuman dignity and beauty. He is to smooth down the roughnesses of character, develop true proportions and bring forth all possible expressions of strength and loveliness. He is to improve now the rounding of a limb, and now the power and grace of a feature, to hammer here and hammer there, year after year, hammer, hammer, hammer, often unapproved and alone, till perchance with the enthusiasm of an ancient sculptor, *just at the last*, he can strike the rock and bid it speak.

But his labors do not *end here*. His mission extends to the community in which he resides, to his country, and to the world. He is to secure as far as possible the moral elevation of man. Hence whatever subjects influence human improvement and happiness—these subjects have bearings and relations which demand the attention of the pulpit. Physical condition, as its healthfulness is affected by obedience to, or violation of the laws of the physical constitution, intellectual symmetry and enlargement, moral grandeur and beauty, harmony of spirit with the great central spirit of the universe, equality, fraternity among men, benevolence and mutuality in social organizations, in one word the just

development and perfection of all the human powers; elevating man from selfish individuality to a state of disinterested brotherhood with his kind, from the thralldom of low instincts and brutalizing passions, to a companionship with God—this is the province and end of the pulpit. It is to regenerate men, the masses, all men; to sanctify, to ennoble, to make them godlike.

Secondly. The means by which this work of difficulty may be accomplished, is truth eloquently enforced, or Christian eloquence. Neither the sword, nor governments, nor commercial intercourse, nor intrigue, nor the hope of wealth, nor even education, in the common sense of that term, can deliver man from the canker of evil which corrodes him, and elevate his spirit to the high rank for which it was originally created. Martial glory, dazzling virtues grounded in selfishness, splendid productions in literature and art often coëxist with imbruting sensuality among the refined, and with a deep and universal corruption of the masses. This remark is preëminently true of the cultivated nations of antiquity. A few tall trees present the appearance of a verdant forest in the distance; but when you approach, the undergrowth is a dark mass of mildew and rotteness, and the verdure which you admired is that of the deadly Upas, breathing destruction upon all who seek repose beneath its shades. The principles of Christianity, and nothing less, urged in their simplicity, and in their power, can rebuild down-fallen humanity, and make it, according to its original design, the temple of an indwelling God.

It is not however of the principles of Christianity, but of the manner of enforcing them that we would now speak.

We have said that the divinely-appointed means for the accomplishment of the proposed end is preaching, or Christian eloquence. But what is eloquence? How are we to define it? By what marks shall we recognize its presence? On what does its power depend?

A good definition was given by the prince of Roman orators, more than eighteen hundred years ago: *Is enim est eloquens qui et humilia subtiliter, et magna graviter, et mediocria temperate potest dicere*, (Orator 29.) He is the eloquent man who is able to speak upon small subjects wisely, upon great subjects sublimely, upon those of an intermediate character moderately; and, we may add, upon all subjects properly; and therefore, especially on those of great importance, earnestly. And what is this when applied to the orator, who is always supposed to have an object to gain, but *the art of persuasion by discourse*.

According to this definition, eloquence is not always passion, nor always ratiocination; nor always, though often, a combination of both. It does not consist in words; for words, though its usual medium, when too numerous or not well chosen, encumber and sometimes destroy it. It is not poetry; for poetry is designed to please, to elevate the sentiments, to influence the imagination, but not often to control the will. It is not taste; for the refinements of literature sometimes distract attention and diminish emotion. Least of all is it vociferation; for one may have the lungs of a Stentor and bellow like a bull, and produce no more effect upon us than the unmeaning wind. Nor is it gesticulation; for bodily exercise, without a forth-going soul, profiteth little. Rudeness, vulgarity, bombast, rant, are always, among the cultivated, antagonists of it. Nor does pedantry, nor extravagance, nor a lavish display of genius, nor anything but wisdom and sincerity produce conviction. Logic, passion, poetry, taste, intonation, gesture, learning and genius are all the *tributaries* of eloquence, but they are not it. Eloquence is an outward manifestation of a sincere, earnest soul, of a soul deeply interested in some subject and intent upon some ends, of a soul full of truths and emotions, guided by the understanding to the accomplishment of its purposes. The *words* by which it is conveyed, Mr. Coleridge has called *living words*. "The wheels of the intellect," he says, "I admit them to be; but such as Ezekiel beheld in the visions of God as he sat among the captives by the river of Chebar. Whithersoever the spirit was to go, the wheels went, and thither was their spirit to go, for the spirit of the *living* creature was in the wheels."

The leading quality of eloquence, and that which expresses its combined elements in one word is *force*. We say *force*, rather than earnestness, for while we cannot be forceful without earnestness, we may, through lack of wisdom, be earnest without force.

Let us illustrate this quality by examples both secular and sacred, and then show some of the principles on which it depends.

Begin with Homer. The *Iliad*, though an epic poem, is every where alive with oratory. Its speeches are of course the creations of the poet, yet they are unquestionably conceived in the spirit of ancient eloquence, and become realities to the vivid imagination of the blind old bard. They are clear, rapid, concentrated, wisely directed, irresistible utterances. They burst out like lava from a volcanic mountain, pouring down in rivers of fire.

They always have an end, a meaning, an object, and never forget that "a strait line is the shortest distance between two points."

Demosthenes was the very personification of force. In the oration for the crown, which Bossuet has somewhere pronounced the greatest work of the human mind, and of which Cicero—after describing his *ideal* of eloquence to be what no human genius ever did or can attain, after denying that Crassus or Cotta or Hortensius were in this high sense eloquent, or even that Demosthenes himself, *qui unus eminet, inter omnes in omni genere dicendi*, (*Orator* 29,) could satisfy his ears, ever desiring an infinite unreachable excellence—says, "that in this oration for Ctesiphon, where the orator speaks of his own deeds, councils and merits in respect to the republic, the *ideal* is filled, so that no higher eloquence can be required;" in this oration for the crown, we say, *force* is the predominating quality. In this master-piece of oratory, genius and judgment, logic and passion, vehemence and self-control, combine like so many chemical elements, to produce that intense livid heat, by which rock is melted and iron is consumed.

The circumstances were indeed unusual, and without the concurrence of which Demosthenes, though still perhaps without a superior, would never have been *the* Demosthenes to whom eloquence herself does obeisance as her prince. The orator, goaded by his deadly assailants—his honor, prosperity, life, everything he had toiled for and valued at stake—was excited to the highest degree. As though he had been raised up, as an illustration of eloquence for all ages, his great powers were stimulated and concentrated to the production of a speech, which for two thousand years has been considered a perfect model of its kind. It is force personified.

The same quality distinguished Cicero, though in an unequal degree. Cicero was the superior of Demosthenes in general learning, in philosophy, and as a great writer on numerous topics, and not inferior to him in statesmanship, nor in some departments of oratory. Yet the strength, the majesty, the *vis animi*, the concentrated energy of the former was rarely paralleled by the latter. Cicero was like the Amazon, great in all its windings, and on the whole the broadest, largest, mightiest river in the world. But Demosthenes was one whole Niagara whose awful thundering flood nothing could resist. At the same time Cicero excelled most if not all other orators in those very attributes which made Demosthenes super-eminent. At the close of his

great orations, he gathers his arguments and thoughts into one mass which by ardor of emotion, he kindles into a devouring flame. It was this intenseness of feeling, especially in the peroration, to which he attributes principally his success. No secular orator ever surpassed him in pathetic conclusions. After him Hortensius pleading for a friend, feared to respond. Catiline, accused by him in the senate was struck dumb. On another occasion Curio, attempting to answer him, suddenly sat down, saying that his memory had been taken from him by poison. Most of his cases in the forum were obtained, according to his own account of the matter, by a kind of rhetorical passion, preceded however by clear and conclusive argument.

He secured them, he says, not so much by his genius as by his feelings—by grief in his defences, by indignation in his accusations. Intense, though wisely directed, emotion, *magna vis animi*, a great power of passion inflamed him, so that sometimes he could scarcely contain himself. The outpourings of his full heart were overwhelming.

Let us select a few of the chiefs of oratory from another age and portion of the world. There are perhaps no brighter names in the department of secular eloquence than those which shone in the British senate during our own revolution. With other qualities of successful oratory, it was *force* which made them peculiarly eminent. Take first Mr. Fox,—a man of singular wisdom, integrity, and common sense, a business man, a matter-of-fact man, his whole soul went out after his clear positions and historical demonstrations and pressed them irresistibly into the hearer's heart. "It was," says Mr. Hazlitt, "to the confidence inspired by the earnestness and simplicity of his manner, that Fox was indebted for more than half the effect of his speeches. Some others, (as Lord Lansdown for instance,) might possess nearly as much information, as exact a knowledge of the situation and interests of the country, but they wanted that zeal, that animation, that enthusiasm, that deep sense of the importance of the subject, which removes all doubt or suspicion from the minds of the hearers, and commends its own warmth to every breast."

Some give the palm of British oratory to the Earl of Chatham. What was the secret of his power? It was not learning, it was not imagination, it was not cunning. It was authority, it was vehemence, it was an indomitable energy of purpose to carry his points. With a firm conviction of the proper ends to be obtained, he exercised a sort of magnetic power of determination to obtain them.

Burke was in some respects a greater man than Chatham or Fox. Perhaps he had at his command more of the material of oratory, than any other English statesman. But there was a want of that directness, that concentration of thought, that *fire*, which is essential to the highest effect. He was too loquacious, sometimes too abstract and prosy. There is some justice, in the satire of Goldsmith, in the *Retaliation* :—

“ Here lies our good Edmund whose genius was such
We scarcely can praise it, or blame it too much ;
Who too deep for his hearers still went on refining,
And thought of convincing while they thought of dining.”

Burke however was not only a statesman, a genius, a scholar, but an orator. He did not always like Chatham concentrate all his vast powers upon one point, and carry it with the irresistible impetus of his attack. But Burke was still among the sons of the mighty. He was a whole *cloud* of thunder, wind and rain, which passing off with a bow upon it left the earth fresh and beautiful, while Chatham was a single bolt falling straight from Heaven, burning, melting, shattering what it struck. It was simple force which gave the latter superiority.

In our own country, we need but mention Patrick Henry and Fisher Ames, as illustrations of the power which earnest feeling combined with wisdom gives to speech. Nor is the greatest living orator an exception. With a mind expansive as the globe, fertile as the country whose constitution he defends, solid and massive as the granite of his native state, his wise positions, his clear logic, his compact thought, his burning spirit, manifest in the eye, the cheek, the hand, the whole body, give to his eloquence a power before which enemies quail, and under the influence of which men sometimes hold their breath, or shout with involuntary applause. The leading characteristic of Webster's eloquence is force.

We pass from secular oratory to the pulpit. But here let it be premised that force is not vehemence alone. There is force in the still small voice as well as in the earthquake. That which produces conviction, that which deeply affects the feelings, that which moves to action partakes of this excellence. There is force in mathematical demonstrations. When Archimedes proved that the weight of a solid body in water is diminished in proportion to the weight of the water displaced, and by this means discovered the amount of alloy which an artist had fraudulently used in mak-

ing a golden crown for king Hiero, he is said to have exclaimed *ἐπὶ πᾶσι, ἐπὶ πᾶσι*, such was the power of the conclusion upon him. And if any one could produce in few words a demonstration of the soul's immortality, which should have all the conclusiveness of mathematics, his speech though bare of rhetorical ornament, though destitute of metaphor or imagination, would have greater effect upon many minds, than all the sublimities of Milton condensed into one paragraph.

There is force too in *beauty*. Moonlight, the music of birds, the Æolian-harp, flowers, sometimes impassion the soul. Turn to the closing lines of the 6th Book of the Æneid, where Virgil in those beautiful elegaic hexameters, describes the young Marcellus, Augustus' nephew and adopted son, moving mournfully in the world of shades, with eyes cast down, and gloomy night around him. What more effective than where he exclaims, *Hæu, miserande puer! si qua fata aspera rumpas, Tu Marcellus eris.* What exquisite tenderness, as father Anchises calls for handsfull of lilies, to strew around the unhappy shade, and pay it these sad offices of respect and affection, though in vain. All is gentle, intensely beautiful, tender, and yet how overwhelming. If Octavia fainted during the rehearsal, and Virgil received a present, amounting to seventy-eight pounds sterling a line, as history relates, it was a tribute to the genius of the poet no greater than the surpassing eloquence of this inimitable paragraph deserved.

There is indeed force in every variety of wise and earnest speech. In the great thoughts and rotund periods of Johnson, in the keen satires of Pope and Horace, in the ludicrous imaginations of Don Quixote, in the cutting irony of Junius, and the savage humor of Dean Swift.

We make these remarks not only to explain the nature of *force*, but to prepare the mind to see it exemplified in its *tender* as well as in its more majestic forms, in the Christian pulpit. Christian oratory demands its sons of consolation as well as its sons of thunder. Pathos and unction, so rarely seen or required in the senate, have their proper throne, in the sacred desk. The Christian religion is characterized less by vehemence than by tenderness. It appeals indeed to all the powers of the human mind. It affords opportunity for cool statement and reasoning, for awful sublimities, for gorgeous descriptions, for utterances of chilling horror; it does not forbid sometimes a chastened wit, but its favorite theme is "that dear blood for sinners spilt, which shows my sin in all its guilt." This is the key note of that holy psalm which, sweet as the harp

of angels, more softly sad than the dirge of Mozart, is to be wound-ed out from Calvary's cross through all the world.

Among distinguished preachers, the French, and those chiefly in the age of Louis XIV. have paid most attention to oratory. Bossuet, Massillon and Bourdaloue were justly considered by their countrymen the most eloquent men of their times. They are the founders of what may be called the French school of oratory, a school of great excellences though great defects. They were all court preachers, Catholics, Frenchmen, and not safe models for the protestant American pulpit. Fanciful interpretations of Scripture, declamation, artificialness, excessive flattery are their prominent faults. But they were all great preachers. They made powerful exhibitions of the majesty and awfulness of God, they searched and harrowed the guilty conscience, they struck the delicate cords of tenderness and produced showers of tears.

The arrangement of their thoughts is clear, explicit and full without redundancy. There is beautiful completeness in their discourses, and often bursts of emotion in the climaxes which have rarely been imitated. They had the courage and the sensitiveness,—and the French mind allowed it—to give themselves up to their emotions, and reproduce their own strong feelings in their audiences. The matter and structure of their sermons, the manner of delivery which was mostly memoriter, and the physical temperament of both speakers and hearers, was adapted to powerful effect. Voltaire frequently attended the preaching of Bossuet, and from that snarling infidel was extorted the testimony, that among all the elegant writers of the age, Bossuet was the only eloquent man. Most critics will be disposed to acknowledge that his immediate successors, Bourdaloue and Massillon, were scarcely his inferiors.

The protestant Saurin was less learned, less artificial, more careless and inelegant, but not less effective. His discourses are torrents of fire, and their immediate influence was often equal to their character. He may be profitably studied, but not safely imitated. His sermons show the power of intense emotion, in producing its desired effects.

The English sermonizers have rarely been distinguished for the highest eloquence. Barrow is a mine of rich thought, all gold and precious stones. Jeremy Taylor was a wilderness of sweets. Howe was serious and mighty in the Scriptures; Tillotson wise, elegant, but cold. Baxter was heart-searching, pungent, and sometimes pathetic. But all of them, except perhaps the last, were

deficient in oneness and concentration, and still more in self-abandonment to the great emotions which the tender or awful themes of the New Testament are calculated to inspire. Old John Bunyan with his comparative ignorance, his colloquialisms, and violations of taste, in true oratorical fire, was more effective than either of them.

Whitefield belonged to two continents. He had a deep experimental perception of gospel truth, and an almost infinite sense of its importance. He saw, or thought he saw, the English and American churches, reposing on the pillows of a dead orthodoxy, or in the freezing slumbers of a delusive Arminianism. The doctrines of regeneration, and justification by faith alone had to a great extent faded out of view. He looked upon our congregations as in immediate, fearful danger. He looked upon the cross of Christ as the only refuge. He felt the great truths of our religion, as almost no other man ever did. To him they were an ever present reality. He thought himself raised up to enforce them ; they were as a fire in his bones till he spoke. With great majesty and persuasiveness, he went forth as a divinely commissioned messenger to announce the wrath and mercy of God. At one moment he stands by the roaring flames of hell and cries, *Flee, flee, flee O sinner, flee !* at another by the cross, crying, *Come, come, come poor sinner, come !* He united the courage, the judgment, and the passions essential to a perfect popular orator, and by a complete self-abandonment to his work, and to its appropriate emotions, he became the most effective of preachers.

Our own great Edwards was eloquent, but in a different way. His mind was of crystal clearness, acute, logical, ratiocinative, ardent. His convictions of truth were as decided as Whitefield's. He was more solid, if possible more solemn, soul-searching, and soberly earnest. But he had not that power of appealing to all the passions of men in popular address. He wrote his sermons and confined himself to his notes. But he went on uncovering men's hearts, bringing out evil from the deepest recesses ; exhibiting the hideousness of sin in the magnifying glass of truth ; arresting the guilty and arraying them before the judgment seat of Christ ; painting heaven above and hell burning beneath, and wretched sinners suspended by a hair over its horrors ; till a whole assembly on one occasion rose and stood pale and trembling, ready to exclaim, where, O where shall guilty souls find refuge !

We have not time to proceed further in our illustrations of force, or the power of real, unaffected, heartfelt but wisely man-

aged earnestness. We see that it is the soul of eloquence, and are now prepared to inquire more particularly on what it depends.

It depends first, and as a prerequisite, especially in this country, upon a well trained and well disciplined mind. Natural genius, without cultivation, will sometimes, under favorable circumstances, produce a powerful effect. We see it in stupid orators, during the canvass of an exciting election. We have felt it in the public confessions of many a recovered drunkard, who from his own melancholy experience, narrates the woes of them who "tarry long at the wine." The outcry of real distress is always eloquent; so is the burst of unfeigned joy; so is the anthem of salvation shouted by the young convert. But we should remember, that it is not merely an occasional outpouring of emotions, on some one subject that the pulpit and especially the American pulpit demands. It is a perpetual flow of wise and earnest speech, *a whole life of oratory*, an amount of literary labor paralleled in no other profession. Critics express amazement at the mental fertility of Walter Scott, but every clergyman who composes his two full sermons a week, writes sufficient for five or six moderate sized octavos in the course of a year, and enough for a considerable library during his ministry. It is true that few men accomplish so much; for they find it impossible. They resort to exchanges, to extempore, or to premeditated but unwritten discourses, or to a repetition of some of their best sermons. But with these alleviations, the amount of labor requisite to prepare for the American pulpit, taken in connection with the pastoral and miscellaneous duties of the minister, is incredible to those who have not experienced it. Now a mind of moderate capacities, and imperfect cultivation, with sincere piety and apostolic zeal, can produce a few valuable not to say brilliant discourses. But after a few Sabbaths, certainly after a few months or years, when by frequent repetition, the fire of one's eloquent thoughts has perished, his performances become necessarily flat, sterile and unprofitable. The preacher to sustain himself must be constantly presenting truth in new relations, with new forms of speech, and with fresh emotions. *Difficile est proprie communia dicere* says a Roman critic, (*Ars Poetica* 125). But to speak well on common topics, on the same reiterated themes, is the employment of the minister's life. To do this he must have a mind disciplined to investigation, and furnished with materials of thought. Without it a man can no more make good sermons, week after week, and year after year, than he can make worlds.

Even with it, he may fail, but without it, failure is unavoidable. Remember he is to speak to the same congregations, to intelligent, shrewd, thinking New Englanders, to the vigorous, masculine intellects of republican, opinionative Americans; he is to speak on subjects with which many of them have been familiar from their childhood, which they have heard not merely once or twice, but—in respect to those who sit under the same preacher, as is sometimes the case, half a century,—thousands of times. He who could uniformly speak well, under such circumstances, without cultivation must be more than man.

Nor can a mind *continue* well furnished without continued study. Our collegiate and theological courses are perhaps sufficient, by way of professional preparation. But in them we attain only the rudiments. Our early acquisitions are our capital which must be constantly increased to meet increasing wants. Whoever expends upon it, in neglect of all accumulation, will soon become an intellectual bankrupt. And here with all deference we would start an inquiry as to the cause of the prevailing mania in our congregations for young ministers? Why are so many old men turned out of their pulpits, to get their living by the road-side, or even not get it in their profession at all? Is it because they have less experience, less wisdom, less piety, less information than their younger brethren? Certainly, *no!* Is it because, as Sampson lost his strength with his hair, men lose their power of efficient speech, as their locks fall off, or begin to change their color? Why who is the genius of eloquence in Homer? It is not the *Pylian sage*, the patriarch of three generations—

“Experienced Nestor, in persuasion skilled,
Words sweet as honey from his lips distilled.”

Who is the “old man eloquent” of the American congress? Who but a statesman of almost four score—a man who if he had been the pastor of a country church, ought according to the natural course of things to have been superannuated and laid aside twenty years ago. The stars both of the American and British senates are nearly all venerable for years. And no person has yet been thought worthy of the Presidency of the United States, the most responsible office in the world, till he had attained the experience of an aged man. Why then this general desire to exchange old men for young ones in the pulpit? Among other reasons may not this be *one*? Amidst the labors of the ministerial profession, in the constant interruptions to which it is exposed, in

the severe draughts which are continually made upon the pastor's spirits, is not study too much neglected? Are not "the old acquaintances," if we may whisper such a question among ministers, too often brought forward? "The barrel" too often upturned?—the yellow, blotted manuscript too frequently exposed? Or are not the same generalities, though on fresh paper, too often repeated. We know the ready apology, and it has weight. In the multiplicity and pressure of duties, there is not time for study. But may we not as well reverse the position and say, *in the absolute necessity for study*, there is not time for so many miscellaneous avocations? Why should study so indispensable to success be placed last in the catalogue of our employments? Ought not this to be a fixed principle with every settled clergyman, that the most sacred purpose for which time is given, next to actual preaching and the cure of souls, is *study*? "Give thyself to reading," said Paul to Timothy. "Neglect not the gift that is in thee. Meditate upon these things, give thyself wholly to them; that thy profiting may appear to all." We do seriously advise every young minister, if he would give the pulpit its true power, if he even desires to retain his situation, to let *study* be the last duty which he neglects. In addition to some general knowledge of the current literature, by which he acquires a perception of present modes of thought, and the condition of the popular mind, let him discipline his powers occasionally at least, if not by mathematical demonstrations, by the close study of such works as Butler's Analogy and Edwards on the Will, by reading the magnificent prose and poetry of Milton, by attention to such delineations of character as are found in Othello and Macbeth. Let him also give some attention to the ancient classics, to those immortal works which always have been and always will be models of good composition. Let him be as deeply read as possible in theology and in theological and general history. Above all, let him meditate upon the sacred Scriptures, catch the spirit of the sweet psalmist of Israel, and rise to the sublimities of those grand old prophets whose anthems resound like the sea. The New Testament will be the source of his authority, the chief fountain of his eloquence. The masters of Christian oratory are Paul and John, and—bowing reverentially at the name,—Jesus. "Never man spake like this man."

Study is both general and particular. We have spoken of it *generally*, though only in reference to eloquence. But there is a particular study which each particular sermon requires. "There

are," says Mr. Sheridan, "a few leading thoughts on every subject, and he that will chain his mind to the work may detect and bring them out." It is this chaining of the mind, in each successive preparation, which brings up the truth that is to be urged, arouses and inflames the spirit, and fits it for a powerful utterance.

With this general training and particular study, the orator is prepared for composition.

Force depends, secondly, upon a clear perception and exhibition of one's whole subject. The attainment of this clearness is often the most difficult part of the speaker's work. But previous training in the severer studies, with some attention to the best rhetorical canons, combined with practical experience, will constantly diminish the task which the uncultivated find it impossible to perform. A steady contemplation of the material to be arranged, with the end to be accomplished, will then prepare the mind, —like a general born to command, whose word brings every soldier to his place,—to collect the thoughts, and arrange them in their appropriate divisions and ranks.

Clear arrangement is among the essentials of good oratory. One secret of the unequalled power of a certain most eminent jurist, consists in the transparency, fulness and precision with which he states his case. "There is no better way," says Mr. Baxter (Reformed Pastor), "to make a good cause prevail, than to make it as plain and as thoroughly understood as we can." And says Fenelon, "the best way of proving the truth of religion, is to explain it *justly*," (Fenelon's Dialogues).

With clear statements the doctrines of a discourse are to be commended by illustration and sustained by arguments. Apt illustration illumines, vivifies, magnifies truth. The mind is pleased by it, and detained in contemplation of the sentiment advanced, till a corresponding emotion is enkindled. But our principal dependence in confirming truth must be upon sound and convincing *reasons*, drawn from the nature of things and the word of God. By these the understanding is satisfied, the intellect yields assent, cavilling scepticism, so natural to the human mind, is silenced, faith is strengthened, and that restraint which a wise man keeps upon his feelings till truth has been demonstrated, is removed.

In no country is the demand for argument more imperious than in this. We are a questioning, discussing, arguing people. This disposition is our birthright. It runs in the Saxon blood. It has been fostered by the Reformation, and by its acknowledged rights

of private judgment. The old puritan was a living book of logic. His indomitable will could be swayed only by reasonings. He submitted to God, but acknowledged nothing to be of divine authority till it was demonstrated to be such from the unquestioned principles of things, or "cleared" to him out of the Scriptures. Argument also was both the parent and the child of the revolution; nor can the great idea of American republicanism—liberty regulated by just law—be sustained without it. With us, all are readers, all are law-makers, all are voters; independent judgment, independent accountability, is the great doctrine of protestantism and Americanism. Our people are educated to discussion. It is as natural to them as their breath; and whoever, in this country, announces God's messages unsustained by their appropriate reasonings, as far as any powerful influence over the intellectual classes, or over the mass of our strong-minded yeomanry is concerned, speaks to the wind.

In any attempt, then, to enforce divine truth, it is the preacher's business, first to convince the understanding. Error must be opposed, its walls must be assailed and shattered by the hard-headed battering rams of logic. Sound doctrine must be presented, shown up, proved. The reasoner must be reasoned down, the arguer must be out-argued, the questioner mightily convinced, and the caviller silenced.

But here force requires condensation and concentration. Two or three invincible arguments clearly, fully stated, without redundancy of detail or of qualification, and expressed in the fewest possible words, will complete the work of conviction in the minds of a popular audience, better than long-continued processes, or innumerable feeble proofs. Whatever force there may be, over here and there a highly disciplined mind, in conclusions arrived at, after wearisome and tortuous wanderings through the labyrinths of a thoroughly metaphysical discourse, the mass of the people will neither be edified nor convinced. They must have argument, but it must be clear, invincible, and so brief, that the *media* of proof can be seen from beginning to end, and *recollected*. This is the preaching which captures the strong common-sense intellect of an American, and prepares the way for those effects which, based on solid and well remembered argument, rouses to action the powerful energies of his mind.

Next to argument comes *passion*. From the cooler region of the understanding we descend to the heart, and by metaphor, by imagination, by emotion, we kindle our foregoing logic into a flame.

When the machinery and everything else is in readiness, the steam, which has been gradually rising and condensing, is made to press upon the wheels of discourse and set it in rapid motion. But *here* there is a point to be reached, there is an end to be obtained. The mastery of one's whole subject implies the clearest perception of this end, a full vision of the stopping place to be aimed at, with a knowledge of the moment in which it is reached.

Perhaps popular speakers (and the remark applies to all parts of a discourse) fail nowhere more frequently than here. They sometimes neither see the thing to be done, nor know when it is accomplished. They begin before they have studied the subject *through*. They talk and talk on; and when the first hour is out, they may just as well talk through the second. They have proved nothing, have come to no result, have made no progress. Like a bewildered guide, they go round and round through the woods, and at length leave their audience in the swamps, or come out where they entered. If such oratory is ever entertaining, it is never forceful or effective. We should never commence our journey till we know where we are going to. Let the exordium and peroration of a discourse stand over against each other like the two continents at Beering's Straits, with one or both of which always in sight; while you cross as soon as practicable the intermediate sea of discussion, and complete the voyage.

With this clear perception of the whole subject, force requires a deep sense of its importance, with corresponding self-forgetfulness and abandonment to its power. He who attempts eloquence for the sake of *being* eloquent, or securing a reputation for oratory, or gaining applause, may be sure of failure and of deserved contempt. Let no man speak till he has something to say. We must have a subject, and deeply feel our subject, and try to impress not ourselves but our subject upon our hearers. Even the stage-player must enter, for the time being, into the character he assumes. He must be frenzied Lear, maddened by the ingratitude of his daughters; or thoughtful Hamlet, shaken in spirit by his mother's crime and troubled by his father's ghost. We must sincerely feel what we say, and never think to excite emotions in others which we do not experience ourselves. "*Si vis me flere,*" says Horace, "*dolendum est primum ipsi tibi; tunc tua me infortunia lædent, Telephe vel Pelen: male si mandata loqueris aut dormitabo aut ridebo* (*Ars Poet.* 102—105)—If you wish me to weep, you must weep first yourself; then will your misfortunes grieve me, O Telephus or Peleus; but if you speak badly things

commanded or on commission, I shall either sleep or laugh." It is this speaking on commission, speaking for hire, or because one must, particularly for personal display, speaking on subjects in which the would-be orator feels no real interest, that produces so much fustian and inefficient declamation: *Parturiunt mentes, nascetur ridiculus mus*.

We do not say that an ambitious man may never become eloquent. Ambition may stimulate to preparation, and sometimes lie at the foundation of great efforts. But we do say that consciousness of admiration, a desire to obtain applause rather than a verdict, even the idea of an audience present to witness an exhibition, paralyzes eloquence. Any self-consciousness in the act of utterance is always painful to the sincere. Hence that shrinking and distress of mind which the sensitive preacher experiences, when he knows that some person, whose opinion he values, has come to meeting just to hear him preach. He can preach *to* men, but he cannot preach *before* them. If the idea of a spectator being present, to hear in cold blood and to criticise, cannot be overcome, the preacher always falls below himself. It is a thousand times easier to address one's enemies, in direct opposition, than to *perform* before one's friends, who come simply to observe the performance. Self, for the time being, must be annihilated; and the circumstances, the occasion, the subject, fill the soul. Otherwise the attention of the speaker is divided, and his emotion quenched. His words descend upon an audience like shot without powder, with a great pattering, but with little execution.

In the *Philippics*, we can hardly suppose Demosthenes to have remembered that such a man as Demosthenes ever lived, much less that this same was the prince of all orators of the world. In reading those magnificent productions, the mind is filled with Athens, with Philip, with the coming flood of war, with the apathy and danger of its now effeminate victims. We draw the sword, we rouse all Greece, we rush out to meet the Macedonian and conquer or die.

In the splendid orations of his known rival, we are interested, charmed, enraptured. But we too rarely lose sight of the man. The speaker revels in the delights of his own eloquence. He seems often to be saying, as he lays his hand gracefully upon his heart, "here you see—*quod nihil est aliud eloquentia ipsa*—nothing less than eloquence herself."

Robert Hall may have been constitutionally ambitious. But by self-discipline and by the power with which his gigantic

intellect grappled an important truth, Robert Hall became distinguished for the manifest absorption of self in the greatness of his subjects. And this was one secret of his power. It was not so much the dissenting minister of Cambridge that Brougham and Jeffries ran to hear, as it was truth itself, moving in measured cadences, with irresistible cogency of argument, authority and emotion, right onward to its results.

The importance of this self-forgetfulness is proportionable to the dignity of the subject. The themes of the pulpit are the most vast, the most awful ever addressed to man. Hence apparent self-consciousness in the preacher betrays insincerity, and is absolutely intolerable.

Too much, we are aware, is expected of the sacred orator. No preacher could be constantly equal to the immensity of his themes and live. The outward physical machinery would be consumed by the excessive internal heat. Nor can he ever be satisfied with his own perceptions or feelings. But still a singular degree of abandonment to the subject is required of him and must exist. He who will not or cannot attain it, let him follow the plough or measure tape behind the counter, but let him not mount the rostrum, and above all the sacred desk.

And why should not the preacher abandon himself to his subject? In whose presence does he speak? First, in the presence of the Almighty, whose minister he is. Second, in the presence of miserable men whom he is commissioned to accuse. Third, of Jesus Christ who suffered death for them all and whose mercy he is to announce and enforce! Consider the awful circumstances in which he speaks—heaven glittering from afar, hell rambling beneath, sinners hesitating, the time for decision coming to an end! Can one think of self, of his reputation, of the applause his demonstrations, his figures, his balanced sentences, his fine intonations are to secure? Shall he sue for flattery, or canvass for votes, or shrink from the breath of censure? Remember he is the minister of God Almighty to the dying men whom he addresses.

In this connection we see the necessity of *faith*. We speak of it now not as an essential to salvation, but as a requisite to Christian eloquence. When religious truth fades out of view, when themes of eternity, as awful verities, cease to stir the soul, something insincere, artificial, unreal, is suggested to the hearer, and the speaker finds himself lifeless and inefficient. Unbelief relaxes the nerves of oratory, and makes one an empty declaimer,

instead of a powerful preacher. It requires the electricity of faith to produce sons of thunder.

It was this firm faith in the scriptural revelations, this vivid *realization* of the spiritual and the unseen, although of course never disconnected from divine influence, that gave the simple hearted Brainerd such irresistible power over the sons of the wilderness. Paul always spoke of eternal things as one *who knows*, and prophets uttered their terrific maledictions, and foretold coming glories, with the conviction of a conscious certainty. Grasp the truth with the simple but gigantic faith of a patriarch; live in the atmosphere of the invisible when its night stars beam steadily upon the soul; converse with God like old John Bunyan, like the reformer Knox, like the puritan Shepard; penetrate eternity, by a living confidence in its revelations; looking up steadfastly into Heaven, like the martyr Stephen, *see Jesus*,—and there will be an earnestness, a *reality*, a power which, if attended also with appropriate evidences, few can resist.

With all these qualifications, *force* implies *judgment*. The true orator is known as well by what he does not say as by what he does say. He avoids vulgarities, extravagances, pomposities. He remembers the maxims, "*ne quid nimis*," and "*there is nothing beautiful which is not true*." He rejects the decayed flowers of rhetoric, and declines to encumber truth by excessive ornament. He eschews dead forms of words, cold conventionalities, and the cant of sect. Like the Moor of Venice he avoids "*set phrase*" and in the sincerity of passion, "*a round unvarnished tale delivers*." Of course his speech has a meaning. It has also a certain easy native beauty, naturalness and grandeur. It was intended for the heart, "*it comes from the heart, and goes to the heart*." In nothing does the true orator offend, in nothing disgust, in nothing neutralize the magic of his emotions, or provoke the censure of the refined.

Some good preachers in other respects err here. They lack judgment. This appears not only in the arrangement of their thoughts, not only in mistaking what is appropriate to different times, occasions, connections, and audiences, but in logical incongruities, and uncomeliness of rhetorical costume. You will be interested, charmed; then comes a remark, so out of place, so vulgar, so shocking to a delicate taste, that you are offended and disgusted. What should we think of the Venus de Medici deformed by a crooked limb, or with an ugly wen upon her beauti-

ful neck? Or what would we say of the architect who should seriously reproduce the Parthenon with a country meeting-house steeple upon it? Could these objects, so beautiful in themselves, be seen, thus desecrated, without merriment or disgust? The same kind of fault prevails, in many a bold, off-hand orator who mistakes vulgarity for genius, and the shrinking of outraged sensibilities for the power of eloquence. Nothing is gained by bad taste in any direction, while the cultivated are offended. Audiences who listen to it and drink it in, are degraded by it, and if any good is done, it is at best but a billingsgate and tavern-slang piety which it produces. Delicacy, symmetry, beauty, are characteristics of the Christian religion. Our speech may be plain—no matter how plain,—unvarnished, unwrought, but it must be in accordance with the principles of taste, or it will lose its efficiency.

The force of speech depends also upon personal character. The ancients had a maxim, that no one could be eloquent but a good man. This is especially true of the pulpit. How can one recommend goodness, earnestly, powerfully, successfully, and for a series of years, unless he possesses it? How can he impress upon us the beauty of holiness, the bliss of harmony and communion with God, the infinite value of the crucifixion, the tenderness of Jesus, unless he has experienced it? Ignorance of what he utters will make his common places soulless, while the consciousness of a hollow heart paralyzes his spirit.

Besides, who does not know that on many subjects it is not so much what is said, as who says it? With what weight does a quotation from Milton or from Shakspeare, or a sentence from the farewell address of Washington, or an opinion from the great Edwards always fall! Yes, the simple opinion of some men is more powerful than the best logic and oratory of others. "Experience has convinced me," says Demosthenes, "that what is called the power of eloquence depends, for the most part, on the hearers." All men are influenced by authority, by weight of character, by the confidence they have in those who address them. Neither vehement declamation, nor cogent reasoning, nor solemn tones, nor tears, can have influence with a congregation, if we are known to be other than men of integrity, men of truth, men of honor, men who *are*, in some measure, what they preach. In order to successful pulpit eloquence, (we speak now only in reference to oratory,) the orator must at least *seem* good; and the only way to *seem* good, taking life together, is to be so.

We have now gone through with all that we intended to say upon the first and second topics proposed for consideration. The ends of the pulpit have been described as having respect to the present and eternal welfare of man. Its means have been presented as truth eloquently enforced, or, in one word, Christian eloquence. The nature of eloquence has been illustrated by some of the great examples of ancient and modern times, taken from the bar, the senate, and the desk. Some of the conditions have been stated, on which the power of the pulpit depends, such as a well trained and well furnished mind, including continued study, both of a general and a particular character; a clear perception of one whole subject, with precise statements, conclusive demonstrations, and earnest conclusions; a deep feeling of the importance of what is delivered with self-forgetfulness in the utterance of truth and self-abandonment to its power; also faith, judgment and character.

It remains, in conclusion, and as a stimulus to effort, that we allude to some of the motives by which the American pulpit excites its orators to a fulfilment of their mission.

These are found in the truth, in its author, and in its objects.

In the truth. Every Christian minister is an apostle of the truth. His commission is the highest ever given. "Is there a nobler work of God in the souls of men," says Herder, "than the divine thoughts, impulses, aims, and energies which he sometimes imparts to one chosen man for the cultivation of a thousand?" (Herder's Spirit of Hebrew Poetry). "God himself is truth," says Milton, "in propagating which, as men display a greater integrity and zeal, they approach nearer to the similitude of God, and possess a greater portion of his love," (Milton's Second Defence, 926). And a wiser than Herder, a more sublime than Milton, exclaims: "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace, that bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation, that saith unto Zion thy God reigneth," (Isa. 52: 7). As ministers of Christ, we are entrusted with that whose value the whole material *creation* does not equal. We are brought into partnership with God. As he spake stars and suns into existence by his word; so as co-workers together with him, we are to create, in the souls of men, new heavens and new earths, wherein dwelleth righteousness.

Motives to exertion are found not only in the truth, but especially in its author. We all have heard of the ivory statue of Christ, lately exhibited in our principal cities. It is the work of a Geno-

case monk, who spent four years, day and night, in its execution. Having accidentally, or providentially, found an enormous block of ivory, which antiquarians of Italy have pronounced a relic of the antediluvian world, though practically ignorant of statuary, he felt himself impelled to attempt an image of the divine Christ. "Suddenly," he said, "the inspiration came *like a thought*. He saw Christ on the cross—*dead*." The crucified vision was always before him. In giving it form, he sometimes labored twenty and even thirty hours together, till, under the influence of fasting and intense excitement, "a miraculous glory seemed to encircle the head of the figure, as he worked upon it." In four years it was done; and what a work! We saw it in Boston some months ago; and what a sight! It can never be forgotten, but never can be described. There it was: our crucified Lord! His head bowed; every cord in the body tense, every muscle extended, every vein swollen. And what a *countenance*! In it, masculine grandeur combines with the softest beauty. You see "agony knit into the brows and frozen upon the lofty forehead." You see resignation, patience, dreadful endurance, *love*. Men look at it in silence, and unbidden tears flow down their cheeks.

It is not the statue but the original, not the ideal but the reality, who is designated the author of truth. We are preachers, not of the ivory, but of the Christ who *liveth*, and was dead. That great heart of tenderness *beats* in the centre of his kingdom, and that large eye of love is upon us. By generosity known only in heaven, he has become our Saviour. We are his friends, his disciples, his preachers. It is for *him* that we would seek to be eloquent! If a poor monk, intensely excited by the ideal, found sufficient motive in it to stimulate his incredible labors for years, till his ivory Christ was fashioned and presented to men, how should we labor earnestly, powerfully, justly to exhibit Christ, evidently set forth crucified before us, as the sinner's friend. If anything can rouse to effort, sustain toil, produce enthusiasm, it is to be a preacher of Christ.

We find our motives, also, in the objects of truth. Its objects are men, men of ruined greatness, great in ruins. The human soul! What thoughts, what capabilities, what feelings does it possess! Created in the likeness of God, never dying, always expanding, the bliss of goodness flows through it like a river, or remorse burns it like a fire! It is broken, it is sick, it suffers. We are sent to "minister to minds diseased; to pluck from memory its rooted sorrows." We are to go and proclaim man's misery, to rake up

his sins from their burial places in the bosom, to show unspiritual, unregenerate man to himself, as odious, guilty, lost. We are to present the Saviour, to depict his noble character, to paint his dreadful sufferings, to tell the story of his love. We are to hold up Christ, to recommend him, to draw sinners to him. We are to heal broken hearts, to rebuild the ruined temples of humanity, to lift up degraded man to companionship with Jesus, to a rest in the bosom of God. We are to transform society, till it becomes a second Eden, whose trees are all trees of life, and around whose branches no serpent coils.

Men have been eloquent in the senate and on the field of battle; there are also Homers and Miltons and Shakspeares in the world; but there is an inspiration which neither patriotism nor blood can furnish, which Urania and Melpomene never felt; it is the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. This is the nerve, the energy, the soul of the true Christian orator. Its influence will often come upon him, and while he utters the Spirit's truth, as revealed in the holy word, he will preach with the Spirit's demonstration and the Spirit's power; for it is not he that speaks, but his *Father* that speaketh in him. Let him not be discouraged, then, by the greatness of his work. The germ of eloquence is in him. Meditation, study, prayer, will develop it. Great emotions, excited by great subjects, will give it vent. Wisdom will make it perfect. He who devotes some attention to Christian oratory every day, and has the soul of a true man within him, can scarcely fail to become eloquent at length.

ARTICLE IV.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

By Daniel R. Goodwin, Professor of Languages, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.

OUR readers will not be surprised at meeting the title of this Article in a Theological Review; for they must have observed that almost all, whether clergymen or laymen, who have hitherto discussed the subject proposed, have given it more or less of a theological aspect. The principles involved in the range which the discussion has taken, are *fundamental* in Christian as well as political ethics. We shall, therefore, offer no apology for introducing the subject here.

Yet we cannot dissemble that we have found it a most painful subject to reflect upon. So repulsive is the very thought of inflicting an ignominious death upon a fellow-being; so invidious is the position of defending penal severity, however just and necessary, against the claims of professed philanthropy, however misguided or mis-called; and such are the perfect chaos and furious *mêlé* in which this question of capital punishment has become involved—old landmarks abandoned, first principles disputed, almost every assertion or argument which is put forth with confidence on one side, challenged and disputed with equal confidence on the other—that our readers will give us credit for sincerity in saying, that the writing of the following pages has been to us not only no pleasant duty, but no easy task. Perhaps there is no subject in whose treatment flippancy, denunciation and personalities are more rife, or more entirely and grossly out of place. Should we be tempted to indulge in them, in any case, we humbly crave pardon of those who may feel thereby aggrieved.

The term “capital punishment,” as generally used in the following pages, will be understood to refer to *the penalty of death for murder only*. With the infliction of this penalty for other crimes, we are not at present concerned. As to its infliction for murder, our position is affirmative; but, at the same time, our general course of argument will be *defensive*.

It is proper that it should be so. Here is something which is assailed. Suppose no sufficient reason can be given for its abolition; shall it, then, be abolished? The question is not whether capital punishment shall be instituted. It is instituted. The question is, shall it be abolished? A law exists, has existed these four thousand years. Shall it be abrogated? This is the action which is called for. The abolitionists, therefore, (of course we use the word in its relation to the subject in hand,) have the aggressive, and their opponents the defensive side. On the former, therefore, the burden of proof must practically lie.

We say this, not for the purpose of getting any advantage in the argument by any logical trickery or technicality. Practical questions are not to be settled by logical figures or formulas or weather-gages, or lines of vallation or circumvallation, or any *ruse de guerre*. Our opponents are at perfect liberty to use what form of argumentation they please; and so are we. We wish it, therefore, to be understood once for all, that, though we shall freely employ positive arguments—for all such arguments are also nega-

tive, so far as they are made good—our main business at present is defensive, apologetic.

This question of capital punishment naturally and ordinarily divides itself into two parts, that of right, and that of expediency. But if these two branches are recognized at all, they must be understood in such a sense as not to involve one another, and should be kept clearly separate in the management of the discussion. Each must be considered as being capable of proof, independently of the other; so that we may not infer the right or wrong of capital punishment from its expediency or in expediency, nor, on the other hand, its expediency or in expediency from its being right or wrong; still less may we prove, as the abolitionists often attempt to do, in the first place, that it is wrong because it is inexpedient, and, in the second place, that it is inexpedient because it is wrong. It is true that, if, by appropriate evidence, we prove it to be a duty, or prove it to be wrong, though even then the question of its expediency or in expediency, so far as that question depends upon independent evidence, may not be settled, yet, for us as moral beings, it is not worth while to inquire further. The absolute authority of reason must prevail over all conclusions from sensible appearances. But if the point of expediency or in expediency should be established so far as it can be by experience and observation, the question of right or wrong will still remain not only undecided, but in the highest degree important.

Of course we fully admit that *practical* right is always coincident with *absolute expediency*; if indeed *absolute expediency* is not a contradiction in terms. But if we would distinguish the right from the expedient at all, (and it is plain men do ordinarily consider them distinct,) we must attach to them a meaning and assign to them a derivation and a direction consistent with such a distinction. Right is theoretical; expediency is practical. Right (or rather duty) commands; expediency advises. Right is to be ascertained by *deduction* from authority, intuition, or, in general, from some higher principle whether of reason or revelation; expediency is to be ascertained by an *induction* from facts. However, therefore, right and expediency may coincide in their last analysis and ultimate result, they yet differ essentially in their mode of proof. And the difference is important in this particular, that while the deduction of the right *may* be complete demonstration, the induction of the expedient can at best but *approximate* the absolute character of perfect proof.

That a certain procedure might appear to be expedient—might be *proved* to be expedient, so far as the proper appeal (that, namely, to facts) could ascertain the point, and yet might be found forbidden by the highest authority, that is to say, might be *wrong*, we suppose will be admitted. But *duty* and not mere *right* is the absolute antithesis to *wrong*; therefore, on the other hand, a certain procedure may be proved to be theoretically and generally right and yet be found practically inexpedient under given circumstances; or, in other words, an individual or a government may have a right, which nevertheless it may not be expedient to exercise. For example, it might be perfectly right legally to compel men to pay their debts of more than six or twenty years' standing, and yet not be expedient. On the other hand, however expedient it might seem, on grounds of mere utility, to kill off the insane, the infirm and the aged, and thus rid society of their burden, no Christian man could be brought to believe such a course to be right.

In our present investigation, therefore, the general question of right comes first, and after that the particular question of expediency. We do not propose to prove that the infliction of capital punishment is a *duty*; we shall defend it from the charge of being *wrong*; and thus, its rightfulness being established, its expediency will be left to be settled by its own proper, independent evidence—an appeal to facts. So far as any may choose to consider the right and the expediency necessarily interdependent, we may state our projected course of argument thus; to show, 1st, that capital punishment is right *if* it is expedient; and 2nd, that it is expedient *if* it is right.

But here we are met at the threshold by two opposing parties in the philosophy of jurisprudence, each of which claims for itself the entire field. The one party seems to maintain that the primary, if not the whole business of penal law is the simple execution of justice, that punishments are inflicted simply on account of the intrinsic demerit of crime and consequently that their ground and reason lie only in the past. The other party seems to maintain that the sole ground of human punishments is expediency, the good of society; and consequently that the reasons for them are to be sought in the future without any regard to the merit or demerit of him who suffers them; in short, that moral guilt is in no sense the ground of punishment.

Now the truth seems to us to be on both sides mixed with just so much of error as prevents the two parties from coalescing.

The *causa sine quâ non* and the *causa finalis* have long been distinguished. The general, rational ground of a proceeding and its particular, practical end are two things.¹ In our view, the idea of just punishment does involve, as its ground, the idea of crime—of crime as such. And this notion of ours is founded not upon the mere etymology of the word; which we readily admit to be a fallacious basis of reasoning, though not destitute of all pertinency—and they who urge it, do not urge it as their only reason; but upon sheer common sense, upon the general opinion and feeling of mankind. In our view, too, the idea of crime involves the idea of moral delinquency, demerit. We maintain therefore, that delinquency, demerit, moral guilt, are the indispensable condition, the *rational* or fundamental *ground* of just punishment. Without the assumption of this ground, there can be no proper punishment, though it may be falsely assumed, and then the punishment is misapplied.

It is in this point of view alone that human punishments can be brought into contact with the human conscience. Men who suffer punishment do not feel, ought not to feel or be taught to feel, that they suffer, either as benefactors of mankind, simply for the public good; or as victims of society, simply by the right of the public power;² or finally as victims of fate, simply in consequence of an unfortunate natural or social organization. And when the doctrines of some of our modern philanthropists shall have so far succeeded in undermining the moral basis of our social fabric, that such shall come to be the general feeling of criminals, we cannot help thinking that the *ground* of punishment will be so far slipped away from under it, that it will hardly stand much longer.

Should any think to demolish our position, and prove that expediency is the true ground and *norma* of human punishments, by the acknowledged maxim, that *no unjust punishment can be expedient*; we answer that such a maxim, so far from demolishing our position, does utterly demolish all antagonist positions. It

¹ This article was written before we saw, in a late number of the Biblical Repository, an able article by Dr. Lewis, in which he explains and defends his former positions and makes essentially the same distinctions which are made above. We have not thought it best to alter or omit anything in consequence of such coincidences.

² "Osservate, che la parola *diritto* non è contraddittoria alla parola *forza*, ma la prima è piuttosto una modificazione della seconda, cioè la *modificazione più utile al maggior numero*."—Beccaria, delle Pene, sez. 2. Such are the ethics of cold-blooded utilitarianism!

shows, what we most earnestly insist upon, that it can never be expedient for civil governments to *ignore* moral distinctions, to renounce their hold upon the consciences of men, to discard the idea of guilt from their definition of crimes. But if they recognize the just at all, they must recognize it as the fundamental, supreme law; it will not condescend to serve in a subordinate position. If, in that maxim, the just and the expedient are held to be synonymous terms, or the idea of the one be derived from that of the other, then the maxim amounts to just this: "nothing which is unjust can be just," or, "nothing which is inexpedient can be expedient"—a maxim from which no very mighty inference can be made either way. But, if *the just* and *the expedient* are understood to designate ideas radically distinct, then the truth of the maxim must rest on *a priori* grounds; it never could be established *a posteriori*. It is the expression of a faith which believes in the immutability and supremacy of moral distinctions, and in the wisdom and goodness of an Almighty Providence. For if the maxim be inverted thus: "no punishment which is expedient can be unjust;" its certainty, its evidence have vanished. To make a logical application of such a maxim, it is plain that, if you would avoid the vicious circle, you must first determine the question of expediency independently of all ideas of justice, and then bring your conclusion to the test. The maxim so applied must be unsafe and sometimes false, if you content yourself with any practical induction of facts in proof of the expediency in question; and if a still more extensive induction is demanded, the maxim of course becomes useless.¹ In short, the political expediency which undertakes to dispense with the ideas of morality, is the most inexpedient of all things, a perfect *felo de se*; the political expediency which would push away the basis of the just and right from beneath it, can neither support itself nor find anything else to rest upon; and can never come to a stable equilibrium until it has sunk to its own place in the bottomless pit.

A very acute writer in a late number of the Democratic

¹ Assuming that the questions of justice and expediency are to be ascertained by independent methods of proof, as stated above; not only will it not follow that whatever punishment is expedient must be either just or obligatory, but neither will it follow that "whatever punishment is just must be expedient." It will most certainly follow, however, that whatever punishment is obligatory, whatever punishment it is the duty of society to inflict, must be expedient. For it must be remembered that the opposite of the unjust, which designates what we are bound not to do, is, not the just, which designates what we are permitted to do, but duty, which designates what we are bound to do.

Review,¹ has undertaken to show, that all the principles of the common law are in direct opposition to those who maintain, that the *ground and reason* of punishment is the moral guilt of the offence. And how does he make this appear? Why, he says, that "all the great jurists have held it to be the great *aim and object* of penal law to prevent crime and to protect society;" and he, then quotes Blackstone, who says that "the *end or final cause* of human punishment is as a precaution against future offences of the same kind." But what does all this prove as to the *ground or reason* of punishment? Let a man read an indictment for murder or for any felony, drawn up according to the established formulas of the common law, and then ask himself what that law recognizes as the *ground and reason* of punishment. And the *dicta* of the commentators, fairly interpreted, agree perfectly with the principles and doctrines implied in those old formulas.

Blackstone, having defined a crime, says that, "in all cases it includes an *injury*; every public offence is also a *private wrong* and *something more*." As to the distinction of crimes into *mala prohibita* and *mala in se*, it is perfectly consistent with our views, so long as it is allowed, on the one hand, that it is morally wrong, wantonly, maliciously or selfishly to do anything which is injurious to society; and, on the other hand, that it is possible for society to inflict an *unjust punishment*; for that implies some rule of right above the mere will of society, and above the suggestions of any mere temporary and fluctuating expediency. "Criminal law," says Blackstone further, "should be founded upon principles that are permanent, uniform and universal; and always conformable to the dictates of truth and justice, the feelings of humanity and the indelible rights of mankind; though it sometimes (*provided there be no transgression of their eternal boundaries*) may be modified, narrowed or enlarged, according to the local or occasional necessities of the State which it is meant to govern." In commenting upon the *measure* of punishments, he implies continually that crimes may differ in their intrinsic "magnitude," "malignity," "atrociousness," "enormity," etc.; and concludes that "where men see no distinction made in the nature and gradations of punishment, the generality will be led to conclude there is no distinction in the *guilt*."² In all this Beccaria agrees with him. Lest this should be thought antiquated authority, we quote from the current language of lawyers at the present

¹ Vol. XIX. p. 91.

² Blackstone, Com. Book 4. ch. 1.

day. "All crime is sin, as well as misfortune; it is deliberate wickedness, which the criminal can avoid if he will; otherwise it is not *crime*." "Prisons, therefore, should be regarded as, and should be made, places of *punishment*, to which none are to be sent who are not deliberately wicked."¹

We feel sure, therefore, that we are following no mere theological prejudice, but the best expounders of the common law, the highest authorities in political ethics, and what is more, the plain dictates of common sense, in maintaining that the idea of just punishment always implies, as its *ground* or *reason*, the idea of *demerit* in the offender. The madman may be confined, chained, killed perhaps in an extreme emergency; yet he cannot be *punished*, whatever mischief he may have done. The ground of *demerit* is wanting.

But it must not be supposed that, wherever that ground exists, human laws should or may provide a punishment; that their punishments should be coëxtensive with ill-desert. These punishments may be coëxtensive with crime; but only, provided crime be defined as implying not only the injurious act, but the forbidding law.

Among offences, faults or sins, those are selected for the punishments of human laws which are assumed to be more or less remotely injurious to society. It is true that *all* faults and sins may be said to have this character. But, in the first place, it is not simply as faults or sins that they are punished by human laws; they are so punished only as considered in relation to the welfare of human society. The *object*, *end* or *final cause* for punishing them is to secure society from harm or injury; we say, negatively, to secure society from injury; not, positively, to promote the good of society. Punishments are not suffered as *sacrifices* for the public good. In the second place, not all wrong action, which can be shown to be injurious to society, should be made the object of human punishment. There is another limitation. It may be impossible from their very nature to ascertain and punish them; or the attempt so to do may cost more, or result in more harm to society, than the culpable actions themselves. The remedy may be worse than the disease. The disease must then be left to take its course.

Actions, in themselves indifferent, may become wrong by being *injurious to society*. Among actions, which, being in themselves

¹ Law Reporter, Vol. 9, p. 427.

wrong or indifferent, are injurious to society, it is the business of the legislator to ascertain those which it is expedient to punish, and to prescribe the just degree of punishment. Although, therefore, the civil government may not punish sin as sin, it punishes that only as crime, which has in it the nature of sin—demerit; it punishes on the *ground* of that demerit, with the *design* of protecting society; and the severity of its punishments should be graduated according to the enormity of offences, as measured both by their intrinsic character and by their injurious effects.

We confess that we agree with Franklin in the opinion that the thief, who thought it "hard that a *man* should be hung for merely stealing a *horse*," had quite as much reason on his side as the judge, who is said to have coolly told him, "he was to be hung not for stealing a horse, but in order that horses might not be stolen."

Beccaria, having reached the conclusion, "Che l'unica e vera misura de' delitti è il danno fatto alla nazione; e però errarono coloro che credettero vera misura dei delitti l'intenzione di chi li commette;" concludes the paragraph with the following: "Qualche volta gli uomini colla migliore intenzione fanno il maggior male alla società: e alcune altre volte colla più cattiva volontà ne fanno il maggior bene."¹ Strange he should not have seen that this statement is a perfect refutation of his own exclusive *measure* of crimes (as related to human punishments), as well as of that other measure which he taxes as erroneous. Each taken separately is imperfect and false; both combined are perfect and conclusive.

That the common law recognizes the *intention* as constituting, in part, the measure of crime, is evident from the forms of indictment for felony; and especially from the distinctions made between the different degrees of murder and man-slaughter.

We have been surprised to find the authority of Coleridge quoted in proof that "expediency is the sole foundation of *penal law*." We think it will be found, by examining the *Essays of the Friend* on "the Principles of Political Knowledge," that Coleridge has in view throughout, not *penal laws*, but the origin of government, constitutional arrangements, political and civil institutions in the more general sense, (as being monarchical or democratical, for example;) all which he doubtless held to be

¹ Dei Delitti e delle Pene. Sen. VII.

matters not of absolute, inalienable right, but of mere prudence and expediency.¹

¹ It is worthy of note that the writer in the *Democratic Review*, already referred to, cites Coleridge as saying (in *Essay III*): "Every institution of government needs no other justification than a proof that under the particular circumstances it is *EXPEDIENT*." And this the reviewer would evidently have us apply to *penal laws*. Now, in our edition of Coleridge, the passage reads thus: "Every institution of *national origin* need no other justification," etc. The difference strikes us as significant. Are *penal laws* institutions of *national origin*? Again, the reviewer continues to quote Coleridge as "declaring himself a zealous advocate for deriving the origin of all government from human *prudence*, and of deeming that to be just which experience has proved to be expedient." "That to be just?"—"that" what? Anything in general? Such an idea would have been as abhorrent to Coleridge's mind as hell to heaven. "That" penalty? There is nothing to authorize this in the context. It must mean, "*that*" government, or form of government; and if so, how does it appear that Coleridge makes "expediency the sole foundation of penal law?"

But the truth is, from Coleridge in the different moods of his mind, as from the sacred Scriptures, the most discordant doctrines may be proved by detached quotations. To ascertain his true meaning, especially when treating on practical subjects, we must always bear in mind two things: 1st, the general tone and spirit of his mind; and 2nd, the particular point of antithesis at which he aims in a given case; otherwise we may make citations from his writings which he himself would have considered libellous.

The strongest passage, we think, which the reviewer could have quoted from the "*Friend*," in favor of his views, occurs on page 173 (Marsh's ed.). "*Expediency* founded on *experience* and particular circumstances . . . must be admitted as the maxim of all legislation and the ground of all legislative power." But here, it will be seen by the context, he has in view such things as "the right of suffrage," which he denies to be either a universal or *natural* right; so far as it exists, he holds it to be a matter of *expediency*, and founded upon *property*. "From my earliest manhood," he says, "it was an axiom in politics with me, that in every country where property prevailed, *property must be the grand basis of government*," (p. 190). "To property, therefore, and to its inequalities *all human laws* directly or indirectly relate, *which would not be equally laws in a state of nature*," (p. 171). [To which class would capital punishment for murder belong?] "Thus as perspicuously as I could . . . I have pointed out the one only ground on which the *CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENTS* can be either condemned or justified by wise men," (p. 213). So far as governments have the basis on which Coleridge thus insisted, viz. property, their fundamental rule is, of course, *expediency*; who doubts it? But does capital punishment for murder come within the province of such an idea of government? That Coleridge cannot be supposed to refer to *penal laws*, in the sense alleged by the Reviewer, is evident from the following: "the *intention* of the agent, [in case of a charge of libel,] whenever it can be independently or inclusively ascertained, must be allowed a great share in determining the character of the action; unless the law is not only to be divorced from *moral justice*, (according to

Guizot has nearly expressed our views of the proper character of penal laws, in the following passages. "*L'Église ne faisait pas un code, comme les nôtres, pour n'y définir que les actions à la fois moralement coupables et socialement dangereuses, et ne les punir que sous la condition qu'elles porteraient ce double caractère; elle dressait un catalogue de toutes les actions moralement coupables, et, sous le nom de péchés, elle les punissait toutes,*" etc. Again, in showing the superiority of the laws of the Visigoths in Spain, drawn up under the influence of Christianity, to those of the other barbarian nations, he says: "*Ailleurs c'est le dommage presque seul qui semble constituer le crime, et la peine est cherchée dans cette réparation matérielle qui résulte de la composition. Ici le crime est ramené à son élément moral et véritable, l'intention. Les diverses nuances de criminalité, l'homicide absolument involontaire, l'homicide par inadvertence, l'homicide provoqué, l'homicide avec ou sans préméditation, sont distingués et définis à peu près aussi bien que dans nos codes, et les peines varient dans une proportion assez équitable.*"¹ So it seems the scientific codes of Europe agree with our common law in regarding the intention, the moral element, as fundamental in the idea of crime.

We protest, therefore, with equal earnestness against that theory of the rights of civil government, in reference to jurisprudence, which resolves it into a sort of human theocracy, grasping the prerogatives of the omniscient Judge, and trenching upon the retributions of eternity; and against that other theory which assigns to civil government a theoretical as well as practical omnipotence, founded upon a mere utilitarian expediency, and uncontrolled either by divine authority or the unchangeable principles of natural justice. And this we say, although we should be quite ready to rest the whole argument for capital

the old adage: you are not hung for stealing a horse, but that horses may not be stolen,) but to wage open hostility with it," (p. 63).

We close this long note by recommending all quotation-mongers to digest the following: "I have seldom felt greater indignation than at finding, in a large manufactory, a six penny pamphlet containing a selection of inflammatory paragraphs from the prose-writings of Milton, *without a hint given of the time, occasion, state of government, etc.* under which they were written; not a hint that the freedom which we now enjoy exceeds all that Milton dared hope for, or deemed practicable; and that his political creed sternly excluded the populace, and indeed the majority of the population, from all pretensions to political power," (p. 65).

The Italics in the above quotations are, in many cases, our own.

¹ De la Civilisation en Europe. Leçons 5me. et 6me.

punishment on the simple ground of expediency—which we think is the proper position of the question, if its opponents would fully and unequivocally yield the point of right and fairly meet us on that practical ground. A conditional right is all that we claim for it; that is to say, we deny that it can be shown to be wrong irrespective of its expediency. The abolitionists commonly assert or *imply* that society absolutely has no right to inflict it.

They deny, in the first place, that any such right can be derived to society from the individual right of self-defence, through the so-called social compact. Whether the theory of such a compact be well founded or not, we neither affirm nor deny. But we observe, that the abolitionists should not so readily take for granted that the right of self-defence, of which individuals have thus divested themselves, and with which they have clothed civil society, is after all just the same right in kind and degree, which each individual still retains as a member of constituted society and a subject of civil government; in other words, that the portion of right surrendered is the identical portion which has not been surrendered; that the individual right was originally no broader and no other than it still continues to be. Such was not the view of the originators, and most approved expounders of this theory. Blackstone, whose authority is so often quoted by the abolitionists, says: "It is clear that the right of punishing crimes against the law of nature, as murder and the like, is in a state of nature vested in every individual." It is plain from the connection, he means "the right of punishing" such crimes with *death*. Is it said that the precepts of the Gospel are against such a right? We answer; one thing at a time, gentlemen. We are now reasoning from the theory of the social compact; and our only sources of evidence are the light of reason, and the natural instincts and laws of the human mind. The precepts of the Gospel are addressed, not to men in a state of nature, not to society as such, but to individuals as living under constituted government. We conceive it to be one of the gravest errors of our modern "philanthropists," that the rights and duties of society and of the civil magistrate are no more, and no other, than the rights and duties of each individual as defined and limited in the Gospel.

In the second place, the right is denied because, it is said, individuals have not the right to take their own lives, and therefore they cannot convey such a right to society. This reasoning would

be very good, if, when they enter into the social compact, these gentlemen mean to commit murder; otherwise it is quite impertinent. Men are not supposed to invest society with this right in order to expose their lives, but in order to protect them. The object of inflicting capital punishment is to save lives by preventing assassinations; and the question is, have men a right to expose their lives to a less risk in order to secure them from a greater? When the small pox was committing its fearful ravages, before the use of vaccination was discovered, multitudes were inoculated with it because they could have it artificially at much less risk than in the natural way. It was found that about one in a hundred of those who were inoculated died, while perhaps ten of the hundred would probably have died of the disease in the natural way, had they not been thus protected. Now, had these hundred persons a right to have themselves inoculated, when it was morally certain that one of their number would lose his life by it? And had the physician a right thus to communicate the disease to a hundred persons when he knew that he should thus be instrumental in killing one of them? Men risk their lives in a thousand ways every day by sea and by land for no greater object than to secure their comfort or increase their wealth; shall they not be allowed to risk life in order to save life itself?

In the third place, some of the abolitionists seem to admit that society may have a natural right to inflict capital punishment. But it is only a seeming—an ostentation of logical liberality; for in the next breath they call it “legalized murder,” and, throughout, proceed upon the tacit assumption that it is absolutely wrong. They will say that “society must be sustained at all hazards;” but this they say only on condition that you will admit capital punishment to be unnecessary to that end. They will allow, for example, that society has a right of self-defence, as society, analogous to the right which individuals retain, as individuals; so that if it be *immediately and palpably necessary to its very existence* to take the life of the murderer, it has the right to take it. “We maintain,” say they, “the right of society to impose any restraint or punishment essential to its existence. We see not where [whence] it is to derive the right to imprison, especially for life, if it have not also the right to take life.”¹ This really sounds at first as though it were admitting, or rather maintaining, something. But immediately afterwards we are told, by ringing a change upon the trite dogma of Blackstone, which has become the funda-

¹ North American Review, Vol. LXII. pp. 44 and 48.

mental article in the abolitionists' creed, that, "To take life . . . is a fearful use of power, not to be justified by anything less than the express word of God, [and therein we are then assured there is no justification,] and the *absolute necessities* of human society;" that, "To take life for life must be *essential to the very life of society*." Now, is it not plain, that, on this strict method of interpretation, the doctrine which had just been so formally announced contains just nothing at all? It asserts and denies; it gives and takes, in the same breath. Are imprisonment and all legal penalties to be placed upon the same ground? This seems to be clearly implied. But if no legal penalty is justifiable which is not absolutely and demonstrably essential, *not to the well-being*, but to the *very existence*, the immediate self-preservation of society; and if, as we are told, such a necessity is not to be inferred from our "associations and fears;" if we are to wait until it is absolutely demonstrated from actual experience and palpable facts; it is easy to see whither this course of reasoning is leading us. For aught which appears in the shape of any such demonstration, society might exist, no man can say how long, if all administration of criminal jurisprudence were utterly abolished. There are doubtless, as we are often significantly told, other and more powerful influences and agencies to operate upon the good order of society than penal laws. There are moral influences, spiritual influences, the natural conscience, the love of happiness, some will add, the press and voluntary associations. On this doctrine, then, thus interpreted, if, as they maintain, the burden of proof must be thrown upon the law, we are bound to try the experiment and continue it until the absolute necessity required can be demonstrated to exist. The experiment might occasion great expense, great discomfort, great disorders; it might cost the sacrifice of a vast deal of social happiness and a multitude of useful lives. All this would prove nothing at all, so long as society could exist; for, so long, the prevention of such evils could not be shown to be absolutely *essential to its existence*. The exception, which even Beccaria makes, for cases of sedition or rebellion, would not be tenable on democratic principles.¹

¹ The Hon. Robert Rantoul, Jr., in one of his late letters on the Death Penalty, quotes from Montesquieu, as "an axiom which no one in the nineteenth century will be hardy enough to gainsay," the following sentence: (which is also cited by Beccaria;) "Tout châtiment dont la nécessité n'est pas absolue devient tyrannique." But if this "axiom" is to be taken, as Mr. R. seems to urge and leave it, *without any limitation whatever*; then we not only make bold

If, from such reasonings as are above referred to, the abolitionists would avoid the conclusion that imprisonment and all penalties ought to be abolished, they must maintain, that the right of inflicting the punishment of death, is to be put upon a different ground from that on which the right of inflicting other and inferior punishments is placed. And this they sometimes openly do. They say or assume that this is altogether a peculiar case. Probabilities may answer elsewhere, but demonstrations are required here. *Now we demand on what ground of natural right this distinction is made?* Here is a point in the argument of vital consequence to the cause of the abolitionists; a point, too, in regard to which the burden of proof clearly falls upon them. We call special attention to this; and we ask again, if those who assume this distinction have shown, or can show, on the ground of natural right, any sufficient reason for it? Do they appeal to the spontaneous instincts of men in a state of nature? These, as far as we can judge, are totally and unequivocally against them. Do they appeal to the teachings of the Gospel? This is not a proper source of proof on a question of natural right; and if it were, we should still answer, that we know of no distinction made in the Gospel between the right of inflicting capital punishment and any other punishment; say, imprisonment for life, or for any term of years. Do they appeal to the peculiar sacredness and value of human life and the consequent incomparable severity of the punishment of death? They can say nothing, (which shall not amount to a *petitio principii*,) tending to show the peculiar severity of capital punishment (for murder), without at the same time enhancing, *pari passu*, the peculiar enormity of the crime for which it is inflicted, and the unapproachable value and sacredness of the interest which it is designed to protect. Do they appeal to the theory of the social compact? That theory must be itself established, before they can prove or disprove anything from it; and, being admitted, we have seen that, according to the interpretation of its founders and apostles, it decides against them rather than for them. We fully admit and maintain that the severer the punishment, the greater should be the caution exercised in its infliction.

in "the nineteenth century" to gainsay it; but we declare it a palpable absurdity on any theory short of that which demands the abolition of all "châtiment." If, however, Montesquieu meant, as he probably did, using his words in a loose and popular sense, that all punishment which is not necessary to the *highest good* of society, i. e. that all *restraint* punishment, all punishment which is not in some way useful, expedient, becomes tyrannical; then we heartily subscribe to the "axiom," and the abolitionists are welcome to its full benefit.

tion; and, if you please, in the ascertainment of the authority on which it is inflicted. Consequently the infliction of infinite punishment would require absolute certainty, perfect demonstration of authority. And we presume that whenever it is inflicted, it will be inflicted on such authority. But here is no question of infirmities. Here is a practical distinction of degrees; for most of the abolitionists themselves insist that there are many things more terrible to men than death; many things sufficiently desirable to banish the fear of it. We therefore throw the burden of proof for their distinction on the other side.

The authority of Blackstone is cited, in a passage to which we have already alluded, and which has become a sort of *symbolum fidei* for all the impugnors of capital punishment, to show that nothing short of *demonstration* is required in this case. But, in the first place, if such strong expressions were extorted from Blackstone by the unparalleled rigor of the English law as it existed in his time, when, as he says, "among the variety of actions which men are liable to commit, no less than a hundred and sixty had been declared, by act of parliament, punishable with instant death;" and if they were used (as is the fact) with exclusive reference to the punishment of death for merely *positive* offences, infringements of the rights of property, is it fair, is it quite honest, to adduce them, with the authority of Blackstone's name, as applicable in their full force to the right of inflicting that punishment for murder? In the second place, if the authority of his name must be appealed to, let that authority be taken entire, and not in detached fragments; let him be allowed to interpret his own words. We suppose it will not be denied that he maintained the right of society to inflict the punishment of death for murder; and we have seen what sort of "demonstrations" he considered sufficient in the case.

For ourselves, we enter into no theories about the origin of society. Society is older than any theory. It is not a creature of theory, but of nature and necessity. We appeal to the laws of man's social and moral being, and to the exigences of his earthly existence. Wherever civil society exists, it is one of its inherent rights, and wherever civil government exists, it is one of its paramount duties, *to administer justice so far as the conservation of the general well-being may require—so far, at least, as to defend and protect the lives of its citizens.* A civil society which has not this right, and a civil government which cannot or will not perform this duty, fail of one of the essential objects for which civil society

and civil government were instituted among mankind. If it be asked, whence society derives this right? we answer, from its very nature; just as the individual derives the right of self-defence from his nature. The two rights are *analogous in their origin*, although the one is not derived from the other.¹

The civil government, therefore, is authorized and required to inflict the just penalty of death upon the murderer, whenever that penalty is necessary, in the common and practical sense of the word, for the protection of the lives of others, for the safety and defence of the community in general; that is to say, whenever it is strictly expedient. Our present positions are, therefore: 1st, that the punishment of death for murder is *just*; and 2d, that, being just, civil government has a right to inflict it, whenever it is expedient.

In defence of these positions we appeal to the common consent and consciousness of mankind, and to a deep and indestructible instinct of the human heart; a consent of consciousness impressed upon the pages of all history, both sacred and profane; exhibited, with a few trifling and partial exceptions, in the legislation and practice of all nations, ancient and modern, barbarous and civilized, pagan and Jewish, classical and Christian; a universal instinct, which began to utter itself in the conscience-stricken exclamations of the terrified Cain, and which has reverberated in the soul of every murderer from that day to this; which has been confirmed by the consenting voice of the poets, philosophers, and

¹ "Livingston concedes, and we think wisely, that governments have an undoubted right to inflict capital punishment provided it can be proved necessary to the preservation of public and private peace. Beccaria, it is well known, distinguishes the right of governments, which he defines to be the sum of the smallest portions of the private liberty of each citizen (*una somma di minime porzioni della privata libertà di ciascuno*), from the power which grows out of the supreme law of the safety of the people (*la suprema legge della salvezza del popolo*). Now, this distinction, as its author understood it, however unsound, is a perfectly innocent one, because, although he denies the right of a State to inflict death as a punishment, yet he grants the existence of the power, wherever its exercise can be proved useful and necessary, and therefore leaves the argument just where it would have been without the distinction. But his disciples, by losing sight of the true grounds of the distinction, have strangely misapplied it, in maintaining that capital punishment ought to be abolished for the mere reason that the right to kill cannot, as they say, have been among the rights surrendered in the social compact. The only intelligible and defensible notion of political right is that a State has a right to do whatever, on the whole, the best interest of the community requires."—*North American Review*, Vol. XVII, p. 265.

ages of all time, and which, as we believe, finds a response more or less distinct in every unsophisticated human heart.

We do not say that all this consent of nations, and this voice of humanity proves, demonstrates, our assumptions. We plead no prescriptions of fact against the dictates of reason. No ;—time sanctions no abuse, sanctifies no sin. All mankind may have erred. But surely it becomes the individual mind to be modest, when it calls in question the voice of the race—modest, we should say, even in urging its supposed demonstrations. And surely it hardly becomes the individual to arraign the race *publicly* at his bar, demanding of it to prove itself to be right, and threatening it, in case of its failure so to do, with summary condemnation ; and that without deigning, on his part, to offer any reasons to prove it to be in the wrong.

We say that this almost universal consent of mankind makes out a *prima facie* case ; that mankind are not bound to prove themselves in the right, but the dissentient is bound to prove them in the wrong, if he asserts it. This is the true position of the question. The assailants of capital punishment have generally felt it to be so ; and they have undertaken to prove that it is absolutely wrong for society to inflict the penalty of death upon the murderer ; that, in so doing, it but solemnly imitates and publicly authorizes the very crime which it professes to punish !

How do they prove this tremendous assertion ? Not by appealing to the universal consciousness. That is against them. Not by urging their own private consciousness. That could prove but little. They usually scout at authority ; which means, such authority as is against them ; for you will find most of their essays half made up of the same quotations from the same authorities, rearranged according to the principles of permutations and combinations, and retailed over and over again, as if repetition would compensate for addition. It is not to be denied that they have a few great names on their side, of which they are careful, from time to time, to give us a list, but neither is it to be denied that authorities are a hundred to one against them. They do well, therefore, not to rest their appeal with human authority. Their chief appeal is to the sacred Scriptures and to the spirit of Christianity. Some make this appeal in a manly and honest way ; some, as an *argumentum ad hominem* ; and some in their favorite alliteration, " the Gallows and the Gospel ! " We accept the appeal and meet the issue.

We are thus brought up fully and fairly to the Scripture argu-

ment ; and we shall be the last to shrink from any results to which it may conduct.

But in entering upon this argument we must have one thing distinctly premised and understood. We take the appeal to the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testaments. We hold that these two great portions of the word of God are not contrary to each other ; though we freely assign the greatest weight to the latter, as possessing an interpretative character and containing the latest decisions. But the instructions of the different parts of Scripture must be interpreted in consistency with the divine truth and authority of each other ; else the whole loses its authority together. To our minds it is a perfect absurdity to pretend to rest upon the authority of the New Testament while denying that of the Old. As well might a man sitting aloft upon the limb of a tree think to retain his position after severing that limb from the trunk. What is the New Testament, on the hypothesis that the divine authority of the Old Testament is denied ? A book which contains on the very face of it its own refutation, as far as any claim to divine authority for itself is concerned ; a mere collection of the writings of a number of deluded men, about another deluded man who really thought himself the Messiah divinely predicted and promised, when in fact no Messiah at all was ever divinely predicted or promised. We take the Bible and the whole Bible. We hold that the same " God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son ;" and that his voice, however he may, from time to time, have condescended to make it clearer for our apprehension, can never contradict itself.¹ As to

¹ There are some who seem to think that in adhering to the New Testament to the exclusion of the Old, they cease to be " Jewish," and become superlatively " Christian." Now we beg leave respectfully to ask how a " Christian" can deny the proper "*Messiahship*" of Jesus ? and how he can believe that, without accepting the divine inspiration of the Old Testament ? Men were first called *Christians*, not because they were very good men, but because they believed and maintained that Jesus was the *Messiah*. That a man may be a good and honest man without believing this dogma, and without being a Christian, we neither doubt nor deny ; and, on the principle that " an honest man's the noblest work of God," he may think this appellation the more honorable of the two. We shall not dispute that it is. Only, let him who thinks so be content with it. Let us not be misunderstood, however ; our Christian courtesy would forbid us to deny the name of *Christian* to any who may be desirous of assuming or of retaining it. We mean only to deny the exclusive, superlative claims which are sometimes put forth in certain quarters.

any distinctions which any may choose to draw between the different books of the Hebrew Scriptures, in respect to their inspiration; we presume the divine authority of the Pentateuch is as little likely to be disputed as that of any portion whatever of the Old Testament. With Esther and the Song of Songs our present question has nothing to do.

In arguing from the Scriptures against the right which we have undertaken to defend, some content themselves with merely saying, that "if the Gospel, by its whole tone, does not disprove the right of taking blood for blood, they despair of doing it by any extracts or reasoning of their own," and then throw the burden of proof upon the other side—(which they may reasonably hope is better able to furnish it?). This, to be sure, is a very cheap and summary method of reasoning. Few, probably, will consider it "demonstration."

Others make specific allegations from the Gospel. These may chiefly be reduced, so far as we know, to the inferences they draw from the "Sermon on the Mount."

Now this "Sermon" is no new thing in the Christian world. It is not to be numbered among modern discoveries. It has been received and acknowledged by the church in all ages, and loved by all good men in it. But it has been received in connection with the rest of God's word contained in the Bible, and interpreted consistently therewith. No Christian nation, from the time a Christian nation first existed till now, ever understood this sermon as abolishing civil government, or depriving the magistrate of the right to administer justice for the defence and security of society. No sect of Christians ever so understood it; except perhaps a few obscure heretics in former times, and a portion of a small but very respectable Christian society in modern times. No doctor of the church, and, we think we may say, no critic of respectable learning and abilities, who has been held in general estimation or authority, whether in the church or out of it, and to whatever school he may have belonged, supernaturalist, or rationalist, mythic, mystic or infidel, has so understood it.¹

¹ We ought perhaps to except Bayle, who maintained that a society of Christians could not subsist, and alleged in proof the command—"if any man strike thee on the one cheek offer also the other," and similar evangelical injunctions. Such commands Bayle urged, not as annihilating civil government by their authority, but the Gospel itself by their absurdity. "Il est étonnant," says Montesquieu, "que ce grand homme n'ait pas su distinguer les ordres pour l'établissement du christianisme d'avec le christianisme, même, ni les préceptes de l'évangile d'avec ses conseils. Lorsque le Législateur, au lieu de donner des loix, a

With those interpreters, therefore, who designedly and openly go the whole length of abrogating all penal jurisprudence, all civil government, all commercial intercourse, on the authority of this "Sermon," we hold no argument. They have the virtue of consistency and openness at least; and we respect them for it. But, for our present purpose, we shall consider it refutation enough of any interpretation, to show that, carried out consistently, it will not stop short of the entire abolition of all administration of human justice.

We suppose that the passage, "ye have heard that it hath been said, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you that ye resist not evil," is as strong a passage, in the letter and spirit of it, as can be urged against capital punishment from the New Testament. But can it require any labored argumentation to show that, if this passage can be thus applied, it is equally applicable to all cases of punishment, i. e. of the infliction of evil or suffering for crime? If a resort to the tribunals of human justice is here forbidden in cases of the most aggravated personal injuries, much more is such resort forbidden for minor wrongs; and if all such resort for redress is forbidden, then the administration of criminal jurisprudence, if not itself positively forbidden, is so by implication; or, at all events, is left without any use whatever for which it should exist among Christian men. And not only is the administration of *criminal* law forbidden, but all *civil* processes also; for did not our Saviour expressly add, "of him that taketh away thy goods ask them not again?" And does it not inevitably follow thence, on this method of literal and political interpretation, that no magistrate or civil officer has any right, as a Christian man, to demand, much less to compel, the payment of debts or the restitution of stolen goods? Why then should our courts of justice be kept open any longer? Their whole business is solemn, systematic, legalized outrage upon the first principles of the Gospel! As though the Gospel of Christ was given for the special protection of thieves and murderers!

Is it said that it is only the *form* of the old law as a *lex talionis*,

donné des conseils, c'est qu'il a vu que ses conseils, s'ils étaient ordonnés comme des lois, seraient contraires à l'esprit de ses lois."—Esp. des Loix. Liv. 24. Ch. 6.

We should also except Rousseau, if he is entitled to the name of "critic." His inferences from the Sermon on the Mount, he gives as follows: "Je me trompe en disant une République chrétienne; chacun de ces deux mots exclut l'autre. Le christianisme ne prêche que servitude et dépendance. Les vrais chrétiens sont faits pour être esclaves."—Du Contrat Social. Liv. 4. Ch. 8.

which is here repeated? We answer that the substitute is of the most general and absolute character: "I say unto you that ye resist not evil,"—not only are ye not to resist by direct retaliation but in no way whatever. Besides, is it to be supposed that our Saviour meant to say, "If a man strike you on your cheek, or deprive you of an eye or a tooth, you may have him punished in any way by a court of justice, provided only he be not punished by being smitten on his cheek, or deprived of his eye or tooth in return?" And so, if a man have committed murder, "he may be punished in any other way, by the knout or the rack, or any length or severity of imprisonment—only life must not be taken for life." Is this what our Saviour meant? If not, then it would seem it was not merely the *lex talionis*, as such, that he designed to repeal,—if he designed to repeal anything.

If it be asked what interpretation, then, can be given to the passage; we answer, that is no present business of ours. We are under no obligation to show what the text does mean. It is enough for us to have shown that the interpretation by which it is arrayed against us, is untenable, short of requiring the abolition of all penalties whatever for crime. But there is an old interpretation which has been given by most Christian critics, and received in the Christian church from time immemorial. According to that interpretation our Saviour did not mean in this discourse of his to abrogate the law of Moses, or any part of it, as a civil regulation; but to condemn the prevalent abuse which was made of its principles to the purposes of private selfishness, licentiousness, malice and revenge.¹ If any allow themselves to sneer at this ancient interpretation, or think it sufficiently refuted by being exclaimed at, it remains for them and not for us to offer a better. And we

¹ If a particular authority is wanted to confirm our exegesis, take the following, which we find in Michaelis; Mos. Recht. Art. 242.

"Christ does not find fault with the Mosaic statute of *eye for eye, tooth for tooth*; for he has throughout his whole sermon nothing to do with Moses, and neither expounds nor controverts his doctrines; he only condemns the bad morality of the Pharisees, which they thought fit to propound in his words. In the present instance these expositors confounded, as on many other occasions, *civil law and morality* together; and when the moral question was, How far may I be allowed to carry my resentment and gratify my thirst for revenge? they answered in the words which Moses addressed, not to the injured, but to the *injuring* party, or to the *judge*; and said: *eye for eye, tooth for tooth*. * * * Moses addresses the magistrate, or the delinquent who has mutilated his neighbor, and says: *Thou, delinquent, art bound to give eye for eye, tooth for tooth; and, thou, judge, to pronounce sentence to that effect*. Christ, on the other hand, manifestly addresses the person injured, and forbids him to be vindictive."

think it worth while here to observe, that in this law of like for like, which contains, under a mutable form, the immutable principle of even-handed justice, the specification "life for life," as it stands in the Old Testament, is in every case placed first. (Ex. 21: 23—25. Lev. 24: 17—20. Deut. 19: 21). Why then, if our Lord meant to abrogate the law, did he not begin with its principal and leading title? With our interpretation the reason of this is clear. The law of life for life, hedged in by all the cautious limitations of the Mosaic code, could hardly be perverted to purposes of private revenge; besides, if he had mentioned it, it would have been incongruous with his subsequent positive instructions.

But some will ask in amazement, if we presume to deny that the law of Moses was abrogated in the Gospel? We certainly do presume to deny it, in any such positive and formal sense as that in which we understand our opponents to maintain it. Did not our Saviour most solemnly deny it in that very sermon to which the appeal has been made? "Think not," says he, "that I am come to destroy the law *or* the prophets; I came not to destroy but to fulfil." It boots nothing to tell us, this applies only to the Decalogue. That is a mere assumption. Our Saviour makes no such distinctions. This is the very preface which he prefixes to those same comments upon the law, which our opponents undertake to interpret as its abrogation—a preface which was intended to serve as an express and solemn warning against all such misinterpretations.

Was the law of Moses too rigorous? So far from abating one jot or tittle of that rigor, Christ only reasserts it in all its length and breadth and depth and height. And it is remarkable, that he begins his comments with that very command in the Decalogue, for whose temporal sanction God himself originally instituted, and for which we maintain that civil governments have still a right to continue, the penalty of death. Does he repeal that command? No. Does he repeal that sanction? No. He recognizes and enforces it by still higher sanctions. It is indisputable that the enforcement of rigor is here the general drift and tendency of his discourse; *and in harmony with such drift and tendency* we are bound to interpret; unless we are to imagine our Saviour to have dealt in insinuations and inuendoes. "Ye have heard," he says, "that if any man kill, he shall be in danger of the judgment; [which, according to Josephus, was the designation of the lowest court of judicature, consisting of seven judges;] but I say unto

you, that, [according to any interpretation of the law and its sanctions], whosoever shall be angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment; and whosoever shall say to his brother, *Raca!* shall be in danger of the synedrium; [by the "synedrium," all critics agree, the Jewish sanhedrim, or council of seventy is meant, which had the power of inflicting the penalty of death by stoning;] but whosoever shall say, *Thou fool!* shall be in danger of the fire of Gehenna;" [i. e. of being burnt in the vale of Hinnom—the most terrific punishment which a Jew could imagine.] Does all this indicate any remission of the rigor of the law—any abrogation of its sanctions?

We not only freely admit, but strenuously maintain, in consonance with the authority of the best and oldest critics, that our Saviour here intends something more than mere temporal punishment; but that certainly is strange argumentation which would prove that, by merely asserting that a higher punishment was right, he intended to assert that the lower punishment was wrong, that in using the lower punishment as a symbol and illustration of the higher, he thereby intended to cashier the former as "savage and barbarous," as utterly inconsistent with the benign and merciful character, the indulgent and gentle spirit of the new dispensation. Let no one undertake to misrepresent us, as though we should say that our Saviour here enacted a law binding on all Christian governments, that whoever should say to his brother, *Raca!* should be stoned; and whoever should say, *Fool!* should be burnt. We neither say nor mean any such thing. We have already said that, according to our view, neither in this sermon, nor, we might have added, in any of his instructions, did our Saviour interfere, or intend to interfere, with the rights or duties of the magistrate, or have them in view in any shape further than to recognize them. That he does here recognize and does not abolish, but rather, if any inference can be made one way or the other from his words, does indirectly sanction and confirm, the penalty of death for murder, we cannot but think is sufficiently clear.

The drift of the whole passage, as bearing upon our present discussion—and it is one of the proof-texts adduced by our adversaries, we understand as follows. Our Lord would say: The murderer is by law punishable with death. Lest any should think that this is too severe a punishment, or that I came to substitute a milder; or lest any should think that the whole penalty ends here; I say unto you that the murderer, according to my interpretation of the law, is not only punishable with temporal and natural death, but

also with what that death foreshadows, with eternal and spiritual death. I would not have you confine your views to the punishments of time, but would have you carry them forward to the more awful and equally just retributions of eternity. And not only so; lest any should think that, provided they avoid the actual perpetration of the crime of murder, they may indulge freely in feelings and expressions of hatred, malice and contempt, I tell you that though you may thus escape the temporal penalty, you are nevertheless exposed to the eternal.

With those who deny all allusion to future punishment in this passage, we have no occasion to dispute the point. Their view only the more clearly defines its direct meaning as bearing upon temporal sanctions. And that the sanctions, if temporal, are *positive*, and not mere natural consequences, we suppose is sufficiently evident from the exigences of the context.

But we are reminded of the case of divorcement. In regard to a regulation on this subject, our Lord did indeed say, "for the hardness of your hearts Moses wrote you this precept;" and this, as far as we remember, is the most disparaging remark he ever uttered in regard to the law of Moses or any part of it. But here we see not a particle of evidence that he intended to abolish that precept as a civil regulation. The true meaning would seem to be, "Moses, (or rather God, who spake by the mouth of Moses,) knowing your cruelty and selfishness, and the danger in which a hated wife therefore would stand of abuse, allowed you to put away your wives by a certain legal formality, thus preferring a less evil to a greater." And is not this a good reason for a civil regulation? As a civil regulation, therefore, our Lord did not profess to interfere with it, but protested against its being assumed as a standard of moral purity, and declared that individuals had not the moral right, according to the true spirit of the law itself, and *in foro conscientiae*, to avail themselves of this legal permission, except in one case; which exception being made, his doctrine on the subject is brought into almost perfect coincidence with the interpretation given of this very law by one of the schools of Jewish doctors.¹

¹ Since writing the above, our attention has been directed to the account given of this matter by Michaelis in his *Mosaisches Recht*. We quote from it not only because it confirms our views, but because we have been struck with the almost perfect coincidence in the forms of expression. "Divorce was permitted by Moses for the prevention of greater evils, and on account of the *hard-heartedness* of the people. It may therefore be politically inexpedient, but it is not sinful, in a sovereign, even in certain cases not specified by Christ, to permit married persons to separate, on account of their unyielding and irreconcil-

The Pharisees did not understand him as hereby treating with disrespect, or proposing to annul, the law of Moses or any part of it; though they stood ready to catch at the least word of such a tendency, that they might accuse him to the people. Nay, he seems to appeal to his doctrine on this very subject as an illustration and proof of his assertion that he came not to destroy but to complete the law. "It is easier," saith he, "for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail;" and immediately adds: "Whosoever putteth away his wife and marrieth another, committeth adultery." (Comp. Luke 16: 17, 18 and Matt. 5: 17, 18). But even if we admit that, in this solitary instance, he did censure or annul a precept of the Mosaic code, what does this instance prove? What was the tendency of his amendment? Was it greater mildness and lenity? No. He censures a particular precept for its too indulgent character. "Moses suffered you to put away your wives," saith he, "but I tell you that whosoever putteth away his wife and marrieth another, committeth adultery." This he said knowing well that, by the law, adultery was punishable with death; but he said not a syllable about abolishing the penalty. That is the essential point.

Some may be hardy enough to assert that he did abolish the penalty; and refer in proof to the story of the woman taken in adultery in the 8th chapter of John's Gospel. Here let us quietly observe the material facts: 1. The authority of this passage is doubtful. It was not read in the churches for several centuries; it is wanting in some of the oldest Mss. and is rejected

able tempers. They are guilty of a sin in availing themselves of such a permission, but he is, as it were, sheltered under the example of God and of Moses, and sins not in granting it unto them to avert greater evils." Mos. Recht. Art. 2. Tr. Smith. And again in Art. 93: "Our laws might properly enough permit married persons of incompatible tempers to separate on the score of *the hardness of their hearts*, when we find that even Moses, who was sent by God himself, allowed divorce among the Israelites for that very reason; although even *then* it was, both in the sight of God and conscience, sinful. However, I do not, in thus speaking, mean to controvert the propriety of our permitting divorce in no other case than that wherein Christ has declared it morally right, and allowable *in foro conscientiae*; because I am sensible that facility of divorce is a very formidable evil and fraught with the most pernicious consequences to the morals of a nation."

"According to Christ's decision, that man who gave his wife a bill of divorce-ment for whoredom, committed no sin. It is allowed that here whoredom is to be understood not only of infidelity in the married state, but also of previous incontinence. The word in the original shows this; for Christ does not mention adultery, but makes use of the general term *πορνεία*, which signifies *want of chastity, or fornication*."

by some of the best critics. But we waive this fact. 2. Under the Roman government the Jews had not the power of life and death. By the laws of Moses adultery was a capital offence; but, by the Roman law it was not. 3. The question proposed to our Lord was both invidious and hypocritical; invidious, because his interrogators hoped to draw something from him on which to ground an accusation of contempt either for the Roman or the Mosaic law; hypocritical, because they pretended to have such an exuberant zeal for the honor of the law of Moses that they had conscientious scruples about submitting to the prohibition of their conquerors. 4. The question was not answered, but evaded. Again, this is the material point. In saying, "neither do I condemn thee," our Lord must be understood not in a moral but a judicial sense. That in such a sense he should not condemn the woman is natural. Why should he? He always declined, positively declined, assuming the office of magistrate or judge; and besides, both accusers and witnesses had disappeared. How could a judicial sentence be pronounced when there was neither accuser, judge nor witness in the cause? And as to the words addressed to the Pharisees: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her;" many of the best critics suppose the particular sin of which the woman had been guilty to be referred to; and, in this sense, the answer can hardly be urged against us, for no man would propose that secret murderers should take it upon them to inflict capital punishment on him who may have been discovered. But, at all events, the words were addressed either to extraordinary sinners or to ordinary sinners. If addressed to a set of great villains, whether secretly or notoriously so, they can prove little for our opponents; neither can they serve their purpose if addressed to sinners in the ordinary universal sense; unless it be argued that Christ meant to abolish all human penalties whatever; for, if their execution is to remain in abeyance till absolutely sinless men are found to execute them, it is hardly worth while to contend for the theoretical right of inflicting them.

Where then is the abrogation, either express or implied, of the judicial precepts of the Mosaic law? If any stronger cases in proof than these to which we have referred can be brought, we should like to know them.

We have purposely omitted alluding to the law of the Sabbath, because we suppose that case will hardly be urged. Yet it might easily be shown, that there is more evidence in the New Testa-

ment for the abrogation of that commandment than of any other in the Mosaic code.

And let it here be distinctly understood that the main point of our argument does not depend upon the validity of every particular in our exegesis. The burden of proof lies upon our adversaries. They array the teachings of the New Testament against the institutions of the Old Testament, and against the common consent of mankind. It behooves them, therefore, not merely to assail some particular points in our exegesis, but to refute it *in toto*; and not only so, positively to establish their own ground. In doing this, it will not avail them to appeal to this or that authority, which, though generally with us, may be against us in this or that particular. If the appeal is to authority on one point, it is so on every point,—main question and all. And with such an appeal we should be perfectly willing to submit the question. Besides, as to this gleaning of exceptions and stray admissions here and there, it is altogether a deceptive mode of reasoning. Fifty men may agree in maintaining a doctrine for which fifty reasons may be given. Each of the fifty men may urge forty-nine of the reasons and doubt or reject the fiftieth; and should the reason rejected be different in each case, this exception and admission-gleaner might show that every one of the fifty reasons was rejected by some one of the fifty men; and consequently, that their whole doctrine was utterly destitute of proof on their own showing; though every one of them stoutly maintained it with forty-nine good reasons to back him!

If it be still insisted, that the whole "spirit of the Gospel" is manifestly against our position; we answer, that those who urge this argument might do well to consider, whether, if they can maintain no more specific allegation than this, it may not be that they have mistaken their own spirit for the spirit of the Gospel. This is one of the most facile arguments in the world to urge, and one of the most difficult in the world to answer. It is an *inanis umbra*, a magnificent subject for declamation; but, as for its logic, you might as well attempt to grasp a pure spirit in your arms as hope to feel or find its substance anywhere. How, without immediate inspiration, have men ascertained the spirit of the Gospel, otherwise than from the instructions of the Gospel itself, or, perhaps, also, from the doctrines of the church and the general consent and practice of Christians?

If, as some seem to argue, the great touchstone of the spirit of the Gospel is the *example* of our Saviour, so that it is right for a

Christian to hold no office, pursue no business, do no action, for which He has not left a specific example ; then, indeed, is the business of Christian ethics very much simplified, and several other things will be abolished besides capital punishment.

But this general argument is sometimes stated in a somewhat more specific form, thus : the gentleness, meekness, forbearance, forgiveness, compassion, mercy and love, which everywhere characterize the Gospel, are inconsistent with the infliction of capital punishment for anything. When this objection is made in simplicity and sincerity, and in a spirit of gentleness and meekness ; when it comes from a heart which really embraces and submits to the Gospel, or from a mouth which openly and publicly assumes all the obligations of a religious and Christian faith and life, we meet it with unfeigned respect. But we beg leave honestly to say that, when it is insisted on by men who make no such pretensions, merely as an *argumentum ad hominem*, or a galling insinuation, coupled, it may be, with odious allusions and opprobrious epithets ; we do not attach to it any great importance.

We are not disposed for a moment to admit, that the defenders of the right of society to inflict the just penalty of death for murder, are any less thoroughly imbued with the evangelical spirit of meekness, forgiveness, compassion and love, than its assailants are. We devoutly recognize and heartily embrace these glorious traits of the Christian system. We cling to them with all the energy of our souls. We would not have the smallest iota frittered away from their full significance.

Look into any of the humble, noiseless spheres of Christian charity ; whose hearts and hands are busy there ? There are a great many objects of Christian compassion besides a handful of the worst of criminals ; a great many calls of Christian benevolence as imperative as that to save a few murderers from the gallows ; but devotion to those objects, obedience to those calls, may not be so sure to make a man notorious. We owe to the criminal our benevolent sympathies, our kind offices, our fervent prayers, our best efforts for his reformation and salvation ; but we owe to the rest of mankind a vast deal more. We need not revile Moses, we need not be more benevolent than Christ, in order to be truly Christian. We need not prefer the good of the murderer to the good of society, his life to the lives of hundreds of innocent men and women exposed by his impunity, in order to be truly Christian. The gentleness, compassion, love and forgiveness of the Gospel are no canting sentimentality, no sympathizing with

sin, no fondling of felons as poor unfortunates, no one-sided fanatic enthusiasm. They are calm, practical, comprehensive, manly, divine. For ourselves, we neither claim nor expect that our compassion and love should exceed the compassion and love of God himself, who expressly enacted the earliest law, so far as we can ascertain, inflicting capital punishment for murder, and, so far as we can ascertain, never expressly repealed it.

We utterly deny that the spirit of the Gospel is against that venerable enactment. It is instructive to find that the spirit of Robespierre and of the bloodiest Jacobins of the French revolution, was at one time against it; and with what fruits, the world has seen.

But some of our readers may have been ready to ask, whether we propose to have the *blue-laws* of early New England times re-enacted? whether we intend seriously to maintain that the penal code of Moses is still in force? By no means. We are not aware of having lisped a syllable to that effect. What we have all along maintained is, that the Gospel, neither by its teaching, example, nor spirit, has condemned or abrogated the judicial code of Moses. It left that code just where it was, just as it was, untouched and unimpaired. We have our Saviour's express words that he came not to abrogate the law, (for so the original word most literally means); can any express words of his be adduced to the contrary?

These are no new or strange views. They are simply the old-fashioned, plain, common-sense doctrine. The law of Moses may be divided into three parts: 1. The moral law, or Decalogue, which is generally recognized as binding in the New Testament; 2. The ceremonial law, or ritual, which was fulfilled and terminated by the Gospel, the whole truth which it was designed to adumbrate being revealed and realized by the crucifixion, resurrection, ascension and intercession of Christ; 3. The civil, judicial or penal code, (the judgments,) which, though not abolished or interfered with by the Gospel, was never enacted for the Gentiles; and ceased by its own limitations, or rather from the nature of the case, when the Jewish polity ceased.

We need not, nor do we, by any means, deny that the whole Mosaic law, judicial, ritual, *moral* and all, was abolished, utterly abolished, in the Gospel, as a *ground of human justification in the sight of God*. But what this has to do with the duties, powers, properties or uses of the *civil government*, it hath not been given to us to perceive.

Should any accuse us, therefore, of holding that the Mosaic code is still obligatory upon Christian nations, they will accuse us disingenuously and falsely. The Mosaic code is just as obligatory upon Christian nations as the laws of Solon, or Lycurgus, or the Twelve Tables; just as obligatory on us, in this country, as the Roman civil law, or the *code Napoléon*, and no more.

But this we contend for, nevertheless, that though, as a system of law, it is no longer in force; yet, having been divinely instituted, and never divinely annulled or condemned, it is not without great irreverence to be charged with barbarity, cruelty, folly or injustice;¹ that the principles involved in it are still valuable and available precedents; and that, in particular, it furnishes conclusive proof from divine authority that the punishment of death for murder is just; and strongly corroborates the evidence, drawn from the nature and objects of society, in proof that its infliction by the civil government cannot be in itself wrong.² If it be asked, whether Christian governments have a right to inflict the penalty of death in all the cases in which it was prescribed by the Mosaic code; we answer, yes, provided always, it can be shown that the light of nature is as clear in those cases as in that of murder, and that such a course is expedient. And it is only on condition of its expediency, nay, of its practical necessity, that the penalty of death for murder should be inflicted. We have not been contending with a man of straw, as some might reasonably suppose, in contending against the denial of such a conditional right; for the abolitionists do almost universally deny such a right. Besides, if there is any difference between right and expediency, if they are not taken as convertible terms, and if this question has anything to do with both; such a conditional right is all that can be contended for under the name of right. Such a conditional right established, the theoretic right, in its full and absolute extent, is established; which then waits for expediency in order to become a practical right, i. e. in order that its exercise should become fit and proper.

That the assailants of capital punishment deny its right, irrespective of its expediency, the whole course of their argument

¹ "A sanguinary," "crude, cruel, unchristian," "*Draconian*" code. See *O'Sullivan's Report*.

² No fair and reflecting mind can fail to perceive the wide difference, in the way of authority and precedent, between a set of general, formal enactments, intended as a system of permanent jurisprudence, as the divine norms of political justice, for a whole nation; and special commands and commissions given by God to individuals or nations in particular emergencies, or for specific, insulated and temporary purposes.

from the Scriptures implies; and one remaining argument, on which they have almost uniformly dwelt, will show still more conclusively. They contend that the sixth commandment cuts off from the civil authority all right to inflict the penalty of death for any crimes whatever. The Rev. Messrs. Spear, Chapin, Upham, Tenney, Lake, etc., insist upon this point as fundamental; Mr. O'Sullivan, in his Report, appeals to it with the greatest devotion; and even Mr. Rantoul, in his Letter of Feb. 14, 1846, as well as in his Report of 1837, calls the infliction of capital punishment a "violation" of the divine command "*Thou shalt not kill*."¹

As the learned author of the Manual of Peace handles the question more methodically than the rest, and as his authority as a Biblical critic must naturally have great practical weight, and perhaps has served as a basis for the declamations of many others; we shall meet the argument as he has presented it. He states his position thus: "We have no idea that this command, *Thou shalt not kill*, was limited, as some imagine, to cases of manslaughter and murder. We are aware that some distinguished names would impose this limitation. Even Rosenmüller translates it by the Latin expression, *NE HOMICIDIUM COMMITTITE*; thus limiting the prohibition to the crime of murder in its various forms. But we venture to assert, it will not be maintained by Biblical critics, that this limitation of meaning is found in the verb itself, which is unquestionably one of the most general import. The meaning of the passage, taken by itself, is simply this: *Thou shalt not take life; life is sacred, inviolable.*" pp. 90, 91. And again, on p. 222, he repeats: "It will be noticed that the command is given in the most simple and explicit terms. It is possible, however, that some may maintain, that it means simply, *Thou shalt not maliciously kill; thou shalt not kill with evil intent; thou shalt not murder.* But we are compelled to look upon this as a wholly gratuitous limitation. There is nothing in the Hebrew term itself, and nothing in the immediate connection, which requires us to limit the command in this way."

First, then, as to the meaning of the Hebrew term, considered by itself, which is the main pivot on which the controversy is made to turn. We shall not endeavor to determine it by an appeal to

¹ The writer in the North American Review, already referred to, while asserting his belief that the sixth commandment forbids "only murder, and has been wrongly used against all taking of life," yet allows himself to say, in another place: "Governments cannot monopolize the privilege of killing." Is this meant for declamation, or argument?

etymology, or to the definitions of lexicons or commentators; but we make our appeal directly to the final tribunal, the usage of the term in the text of the Hebrew Bible.

The Hebrew word translated "kill," in the sixth commandment, is רָצַח ; and whenever we thus speak of a word, in this discussion, we wish it to be generally understood as standing for this, or some of its derivative forms. This word is used, in all, forty-nine times in the Bible; of which, twenty-eight are in the Pentateuch and eight in Joshua; and in every one of these thirty-six cases, it is used in connection with laws relating to murder and manslaughter. Of the remaining thirteen cases, we omit two, (to which we shall refer hereafter,) in Ez. 21: 27 (22) and Ps. 42: 11 (10), where the Hebrew abstract noun is used, and which would not affect the result. Two more in Jer. 7: 9 and Hos. 4: 2, may also be set aside, as they are plainly quotations from the commandment in question, the same words being used in immediate succession for *murder*, *stealing* and *adultery*, as are employed in the sixth, seventh and eighth commandments. That in Ps. 62: 4 (3), can determine nothing either way. Neither can that in Prov. 22: 13; though, in this last case, some English readers might suppose that the "lion" was the implied "slayer." But there is nothing expressed or implied, in the original, to favor such a supposition. It might, with equal propriety, have been translated: "There is a lion in the way; I shall be *murdered* in the streets;" the Septuagint reads: $\lambda\epsilon\omega\upsilon\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\alpha\iota\varsigma\ \omicron\delta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \cdot\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \delta\grave{\epsilon}\ \tau\alpha\iota\varsigma\ \pi\lambda\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma\ \sigma\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\iota$.

Seven cases still remain, which are properly to decide the meaning of the word *out of* the Mosaic code; and in every one of which, there can be no doubt the word means *murder*, in the strictest sense. In 1 Kings 21: 29, we have a clear case of murder. Jud. 24: 4 records one of the most atrocious cases imaginable; which, in the sequel, led to the slaughter of more than forty thousand Israelites, besides the almost total extermination of one of their tribes. In Ps. 94: 6, Hos. 6: 9, 2 Kings 6: 32, Job 24: 14, and Isa. 1: 21, our translators have rendered the original word by *murder*; how correctly, any English reader can judge for himself.

Let us now return to the books of Moses and Joshua. Here, besides being used twice to express the prohibition of the sixth commandment, the word is employed thirty-four times in laws defining explicitly the mode of procedure in regard to those who should be chargeable with its violation. The passages referring to these regulations are contained in Deut. 4: 42 and 19: 3—13,

in the 35th chapter of Numbers, and in the 20th and 21st chapters of Joshua, and nowhere else does this word occur.

Thirty-two times out of the thirty-four, it is employed to characterize the act of homicide; where, in every case, the perpetrator was held to be, *primâ facie*, guilty of murder, and treated as *reus rei capitalis*. Hence, although, in its strict and proper sense, it indicates *murder*, it is used of course to designate the involuntary as well as the voluntary homicide. The matter can hardly be set in a clearer light than by quoting a portion of the 35th chapter of Numbers, italicising the words which are translations of רצח.

9. And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying,

10. Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, When ye come over Jordan into the land of Canaan;

11. Then ye shall appoint you cities to be cities of refuge for you; that the *slayer* may flee thither which killeth any person at unawares.

12. And they shall be unto you cities of refuge from the avenger; that the *manslayer* die not, until he stand before the congregation in judgment.

16. And [But] if he smite him with an instrument of iron so that he die, he is a *murderer*: the *murderer* shall surely be put to death.

17. And if he smite him with throwing a stone wherewith he may die, and he die, he is a *murderer*: the *murderer* shall surely be put to death.

18. Or if he smite him with a hand-weapon of wood wherewith he may die, and he die, he is a *murderer*: the *murderer* shall surely be put to death.

19. The revenger of blood himself shall slay the *murderer*: when he meeteth him he shall slay him.

20. But [And] if he thrust him of hatred or hurl at him by lying of wait that he die;

21. Or in enmity smite him with his hand that he die, he that smote him shall surely be put to death; for he is a *murderer*: the revenger of blood shall slay the *murderer* when he meeteth him.

Now is it not manifest that we have here a technical use of the word *murderer*, defined on principles similar to those on which it has always been defined by the common law? We say, a technical use; else, what mean the oft-repeated exclamation רצח, "a murderer!", and the reëchoing awful sentence, "the murderer shall surely be put to death?" What can be the force of such expressions, unless we have the proper, the strict legal sense of the term employed?

And as for the use of the word when it is translated "slayer," i. e. when it designates the unintentional homicide; in such a case, after the description of the fact it is never said, רצח, he is a "murderer!" but it is plain, nevertheless, that such a man was not to be treated as innocent. He was assumed to be guilty. So sa-

cred was human life, so jealous was the divine Legislator of the strictness of the sixth commandment, that whoever violated its letter, merely in the external act, was liable to be immediately cut down by the "avenger of blood," and was compelled, if he would avoid this doom, instantly to flee for his life to the city of refuge. And though, when arrived there, no man, whether a voluntary or involuntary homicide, was to be put to death, except at the mouth of two witnesses, testifying to the homicide act and its malicious character; yet, inasmuch as, owing to the absence of witnesses, many murderers might thus escape death, and as all verbal definitions and human judgments are necessarily imperfect, and many cases might arise with circumstances so complicated that it would be impossible to distinguish with precision between the voluntary and the involuntary homicide, as the involuntary homicide would, in most cases, be strictly chargeable with some degree of guilt, at least of imprudence, and as it was important for all to see that no man, by taking advantage of the technical distinctions of the law, or of its cautious provisions in regard to testimony, could intentionally or carelessly kill his fellow-man and escape all punishment; therefore, every homicide, having escaped to the city of refuge, and been there, on trial, acquitted of the charge of malicious murder, should nevertheless be compelled to remain there in custody till the death of the high-priest. In custody, we say; for this answered more nearly to imprisonment among us, than did anything else provided for in the Mosaic code. Such a homicide was not, indeed, shut up within the walls of a prison; but if he durst venture beyond the narrow precincts of his city of refuge, it was at the peril of his life; the avenger of blood might slay him and not be "guilty of blood."

What, then, could be more natural than that, in the spirit of such regulations, the involuntary homicide should be designated by the same technical term which properly designated the murderer? And can this application of the term be fairly adduced as throwing any doubt upon the strict meaning of the word when used without any explanatory connection?

But two extraordinary cases yet remain to be considered—two only out of the thirty-six in the law—two only, we might say, out of the whole forty-nine in the Hebrew Bible.

When it is said, in verse 27th of the chapter from which we have quoted above, "if the avenger of blood *kill* the slayer" who has escaped from his city of refuge; the word translated "kill" is this same *רָצַח*. But before any hasty inferences are made from

this case, we would direct attention to the facts; that this is the only case where the word is used in a similar connection; that it is not said here, the avenger of blood *shall* kill the slayer, as it is repeatedly said above, he *shall* slay the murderer (where of course a different word is constantly used for his act); nor is it even said, he *may* kill the slayer; but only, *if* he kill the slayer under these circumstances, he shall not be himself punished with death, he shall not be held guilty at law. But that the avenger of blood in such a case was not morally free from guilt is more than hinted at by the word employed. *In foro conscientiae* he was guilty of murder; he had slain a man whom the magistrates of his country had acquitted of death; he had shed "innocent blood," as plainly appears by a comparison of this passage with Deut. 19: 10. His act, therefore, though not punished legally, is not improperly designated by the same term which technically designates "murder."

The remaining case is the only one in the Bible which, to our apprehension, contains any real difficulty. Let us see how great that is. In the 30th verse of the 35th chapter of Numbers, the phrase, "shall be put to death," is given as the translation of מָוֹת in the third person singular of the future *active*. Now, it is to be observed that, elsewhere in this chapter, the phrase "put to death," constantly corresponds to some form of מָוֹת, to die; and, indeed, with the exception of one other case (Jer. 18: 21 where it is used for מָוֹת), this phrase is used throughout the whole Bible (how often any English reader can determine) *only* as the translation of the same Hebrew word מָוֹת. And, by the way, this is the word which would certainly have been employed in the sixth commandment, had it been the intention of the lawgiver, as alleged, to forbid the simple *taking away of life*, absolutely, under all circumstances.

In the second place, the original of this verse is very difficult, if not doubtful, so that some critics, Le Clerc for example, have proposed an emendation of the text.

In the third place, the Seventy, apparently aware of the difficulty of the case, have translated the clause, very literally, thus: *Ἡὸς παράξας ψυχὴν, διὰ *ζόματος μαρτύρων φονεύσει τὸν φονεύσαντα*. [ed. Breiting. 1730]; of which if any one can make sense, and especially the sense given in our translation, he is welcome.

In the fourth place, without proposing any new rendering, we shall content ourselves with observing that, if the common English translation conveys the true sense, the fact that the same

word, in two forms, stands here for the "murderer," and for the act of "putting him to death," is to be explained as an effect of paronomasia; a figure which, as is well known, plays a great part in Hebrew phraseology.¹

Finally, we protest against the criticism which would urge this solitary and difficult, if not doubtful case, to unsettle the primary and proper sense of the word in question, as inferable from its ordinary and almost universal use.

We know it may be plausibly said, and it is all which can be plausibly said, that the word in question is used to express the taking of life excusably, as in the case of the manslayer, as well as maliciously in the case of the murderer; by permission [once only, and hardly by *permission* then], and by commandment [in one solitary and doubtful instance]. We know that this statement can be plausibly made; but whether it can be intelligently and honestly urged against our position, in the light of the foregoing investigation, we leave our readers to judge.

If any more proofs are needed to confirm our position, they are at hand. We add, then, that if the Hebrew word translated kill, in the sixth commandment, do not mean, by its own proper force, and when not modified by any connection, "to murder," then there is no word in the Hebrew language which has that meaning—nay more, there is no word which comes so near that meaning by many degrees. *The word used is by far the strongest and most definite, for such a purpose, which could have been used.*

It is true that the excellent and learned author of the *Manual of Peace*, while he maintains in general that the sixth commandment properly forbids the taking of life, of any life, human or animal, does, a little after, generously admit, that "from the general objects and manner of the communication made at this time, we may infer, [so it seems we may infer *something* from the general objects and manner of the communication; let us remember that.] that the prohibition relates to the taking of human life and not that of brute animals." So much, then, "*may*" be granted; but that, observe, only on the ground of a faltering inference. So that the right of a Christian to kill a calf rests only on the uncertain basis of an inconclusive inference! Perchance he may thereby violate the sixth commandment! It will not do for him to appeal to the covenant with Noah; in this matter of "killing," we are expressly assured, the sixth commandment "was the beginning

¹ We might resort to the *future tense*, as the abolitionists do when driven to straits, but we will not.

of days." The Jews might have been subsequently allowed to kill calves "for the hardness of their hearts."¹

But, seriously, we think we can show that the term in question is limited in its signification, so as not only to exclude the case of killing calves, but a great many other cases of killing; and show it not on the ground of a begging inference, but on the demonstrative evidence of universal usage.²

¹ It is said that some sects in India hold the precept, "Thou shalt not kill," in a sense so absolute that they think it unlawful to kill vermin, or even seeds to which they ascribe a vital principle.

² We may as well say that we have examined with our own eyes all the passages—a thousand or thereabout—in the Hebrew, Greek and English Bibles, in which "killing" is referred to in any form. This we have been obliged to do without the aid of a Hebrew concordance, by the help of Trommius and Cruden. From the mass of our results we give below what seem to us the most important additional facts and references.

As above stated, the phrase "*put to death*" in the English Bible, always stands for some form of *מוֹת*, except in Jer. 18: 21 and Num. 35: 30.

"*Smite*" in the English Bible always stands for *נָחַץ*, except in Ex. 12: 23 and 21: 22; Num. 24: 17; Dan. 2: 34 and 5: 6. Remarkable are Ex. 21: 12 and Josh. 20: 5, where "*smite*" implies murder.

"*Cut off*" corresponds constantly to the Hebrew *כָּרַע*.

"*Kill*," "*slay*," "*murder*" correspond to various Hebrew words as follows:

רָצַח. The usage of this word has been fully presented above.

הָרַג. This, next to *רָצַח*, is the strongest and most definite word, according to the usage of the Hebrew Bible, to express the idea of "murder." It occurs about 173 times, and is translated, once by "put to death," Jer. 18: 21; three times by "murder," Ps. 10: 8, Hos. 9: 13 and Jer. 4: 31; once by "destroyed," Ps. 78: 47; once by "slayer," Ex. 21: 16 (11); nine times by "slaughter;" twenty-seven times by "kill;" and 131 times by "slay." The Seventy translate it 109 times by ἀποκτείνω, twenty-one times by ἀποκτενω, and the remaining times by various other words.

This verb frequently signifies to "kill" or "murder," in the same sense with *רָצַח*; [it is used for the act of Cain, for example; the latter verb *רָצַח* occurring, for the first time, in the sixth commandment;] but one of its most ordinary uses is to signify *slaying enemies in battle*. It is employed also in a variety of other connections. Three times it has an *animal for subject*, 2 Kings 17: 25, Job 20: 16 and Is. 14, 30; seven times it has an *animal for object*, Lev. 20: 15 and 16, Num. 22: 29, Is. 22: 13 and 27: 1, and Zech. 11: 4 and 7; twice it has an *inanimate subject*, Job 5: 2 and Prov. 1: 32; once it has an *inanimate object*, Ps. 78: 47 [tr. "destroyed"]; seven times it is used for *killing by commandment from God*, Num. 31: 17 (twice) and 19, Deut. 13: 9, Ex. 32: 27, Num. 25: 5, Ex. 9: 6; and *twenty times it has God himself for subject*, Gen. 20: 4, Ex. 4: 23, 13: 15, 22: 23 (24) and 32: 12, Num. 11: 15 and 22: 23 [the angel of the Lord], Ps. 59: 11, 78: 31, 34 and 47, 135: 10 and 136: 18, Amos 2: 3, 4: 10 and 9: 1, Hos. 6: 5, Lam. 2: 4 and 21 and 3: 43. Here are about forty cases out of the whole 173, besides that very numerous class in which it refers to killing ene-

The *killing* of brute animals is spoken of in the Hebrew Bible more than three hundred times; but רצח is NEVER thus used;

mies in battle. Surely, therefore, it cannot be compared with רצח, for the strength and definiteness with which it may denote "murder." We may add that it is never substituted for the latter verb in any repetitions or quotations of the sixth commandment.

רָצַח. This verb might be supposed to rank next. It is, however, either in its Hebrew or Chaldaic form, used but ten times in the Bible. Once it is translated "kill," Job 24: 14; and nine times "slay," "slain" or "slaughter," Job 13: 15, Ps. 139: 19, Obad. 9, and six times in Daniel.

It has *God for its subject* twice, Job. 13: 15 and Ps. 139: 19; an *inanimate thing for its subject* once, Dan. 3: 22; and an *animal for its object* once, Dan. 7: 11. In four cases out of the ten, therefore, it *cannot* mean "murder."

We may remark incidentally that the fact of this word's being used twice in the book of Job, while it occurs so seldom in the Hebrew Scriptures, and elsewhere exclusively in the later writers, and is so very frequent in the Targums, may be added to the other evidence collected by Vaihinger to show the later origin of the book in question.

רָצַח is translated into English by "smite," times unnumbered; and *always* means "smite," with such modifications as the connection would show, with the English as well as the Hebrew word. It is translated, however, once by "murderers," 2 Kings 14: 6; once by "slayer," Num. 35: 24; sixteen times by "kill," (sometimes, as in Lev. 24: 17, 18 and 21, signifying to kill man or beast, but always when connected with רָצַח, as it is four or five times, it signifies to kill man,) seventy-nine times by "slay," and eighteen times by slaughter. N. B. While it is translated "slew" in Ex. 2: 12, the same word is rendered "smiting" in verse 11th; from which it would seem that Moses may not have been so much a "murderer" as some have been willing to suppose (See N. Am. Rev. Vol. 62, p. 46); but rather an avenger of the death of his brother Hebrew; not to appeal to his probable consciousness of a divine mission; see Acts 7: 24 and 25.

מָוֶת, while, with its derivative forms, it is translated into English by "die" and "put to death" times without number, is also rendered thirty-three times by "kill" and ninety-one times by "slay."

רָצַח and מָוֶת are used about 230 times. Among these our translators have rendered it by "kill," "slay" and "slaughter" thirty-eight times; and in the remaining cases they have rendered it by "sacrifice," "offer," and their derivatives or equivalent words. Of the thirty-eight times, it is translated by "kill," (*of animals, not for sacrifice*), seven, or perhaps nine times, Ex. 22: 1, Prov. 9: 2, Gen. 43: 16. 2 Chron. 18: 2, 1 Sam. 25: 11 and 28: 24, Ezek. 34: 3, and perhaps Deut. 12: 15 and 21; by "slay," (*of animals, not for sacrifice*), four times, Deut. 28: 31 and 1 Kings 1: 9, 19 and 25; by "slaughter," (*of animals, not for sacrifice*), ten times, Ps. 44: 22, Prov. 7: 22, Isa. 53: 7, Jer. 11: 19 and 12: 3 [רָצַח is used for "slaughter" the second time in this verse] Jer. 25: 34, and 50: 27 and 51: 40, Ezek. 9: 2 (?) and Isa. 34: 6 (?); by "kill," (*of men, not in sacrifice*), once, Lam. 2: 21 [where God is the subject]; by "slay," (*of men, not in sacrifice*), once, Ps. 37: 14; by "slay," (*of men, in sacrifice*), five or six times, 2 Kings 23: 20, 1 Kings 13: 2, Ps. 105: 35 and 36, Ezek. 16: 20 and probably Isa. 66: 3; by "slaughter," (*of men, not expressly in sacrifice*), seven times, Isa.

animals are not *murdered*. Animals and inanimate things are sometimes said to kill; but *רָצַח* is NEVER thus used; they do not *murder*. In hundreds of instances God commands to kill, smite, slay, put to death; but *רָצַח* is NEVER thus used [except that single doubtful case already considered]; God does not command to *murder*. In a great variety of cases, God or an angel are said to kill, slay, smite, cut off, etc.; but *רָצַח* is NEVER thus used; God and angels do not *murder*. Times without number the Bible speaks of killing enemies in battle; but *רָצַח* is NEVER thus used. Is the killing of enemies in battle then to be called murder? The same cannot be said of any other word meaning to take life

14: 21 and 34: 2 and 65: 12, Jer. 48: 15 and Ezek. 21: 15, 20 and 33 (Eng. verses 10, 15 and 26).

נָחַץ, with its derivatives, is used about eighty-five times. Our translators have rendered it three times by "beaten" (with gold) 2 Chron. 19: 15 and 16; once by "shot out" (with arrow) Jer. 9: 8; once by "slaughter" Hosea 5: 2; twice by "offer," forty-two times by "kill," and thirty-six times by "slay." Of the last eighty cases, in sixty it means to *kill or slay animals for the passover or for sacrifice*; in four or five cases it means to *kill animals to eat*, Gen. 37: 31, 1 Sam. 14: 32 and 34 (twice), Num. 11: 22, and perhaps Isa. 22: 13; in four, it means to *kill human beings for sacrifice*, Gen. 22: 10 [Abraham and Isaac], Isa. 57: 5, Ezek. 16: 21 and 23: 39; and in eleven cases it means simply to *kill human beings*, 1 Kings 18: 40, 2 Kings 25: 7 and 10: 7 and 14, Num. 14: 6, Jer. 39: 61 (twice) and 41: 7 and 52: 10 (twice); though in all these last cases its true meaning would be more exactly expressed by retaining the figure of the original and translating by *slaughter or immolate*.

In Lev. 17: 3 we have supposed the meaning of this verb to be to *kill animals for sacrifice*; although Michaelis (Mos. Recht. Art. 169) thinks it means here to *slaughter in general*, without any reference to sacrifice. But surely the former is the prevailing sense of the verb, and it seems to us supported rather than opposed by the context. It is very instructive to compare this passage with Isa. 66: 3 and the context of the latter passage with Isa. 57: 15.

There is but one other Hebrew word which deserves to be noticed in this connection. That is:

נָחַץ with the adj. *נָחַץ*, which very frequently is used in the sense of "wounded;" and in the sense of "slay," "slain," (chiefly of enemies in battle,) some seventy times.

From all the above facts we think it abundantly evident that there is no other Hebrew word which, according to the *usus loquendi* of the Hebrew Bible, could, by its own proper force, signify so definitely and unequivocally, to MURDER, TO KILL HUMAN BEINGS WITHOUT LEGAL AUTHORITY, as the verb *רָצַח* which is actually used to express the prohibition in the sixth commandment.

¹ This last class of cases we commend to the special attention of the author of the Manual of Peace, as having a bearing upon his main subject in connection with which he often quotes this very sixth commandment as decisive authority.

that is ever used in the Hebrew Scriptures; and we believe the cases above described include more than nine-tenths of all the cases of taking life mentioned therein.

Does all this look as though the word translated "kill" in the sixth commandment meant to take away life, in any way, and under any circumstances? If any have ascertained such to be its meaning, they certainly did not discover it from the usage of the Hebrew Bible.

We turn to the usage of the Septuagint translators. By them *φονεύς* is used as the translation of *רָצַח*, sixteen times, and NEVER for any other word.¹ *Φονεύω* is used for *רָצַח* twenty-nine or thirty times, and only nine or ten times for all other words put together.

On the other hand *רָצַח* is ALWAYS translated in the Septuagint by *φονεύς* or *φονεύω*, with two exceptions. These exceptions are the cases of Ez. 21: 27 (22) and Ps. 42: 11 (10), which we promised to notice again. In the first passage the Seventy have put *βοή* for the Hebrew noun, and our translators have restored "slaughter," [qn. onslaught? sacking? butchery?]. In the second case they have translated the passage by a circumlocution, and our translators have put for the Hebrew noun "sword;" evidently with the right tact, considering *sword* as a general term for any deadly or murderous weapon.

The argument from this general correspondence of usage between the Hebrew and the Greek words signifying "to murder," is strengthened by considering that, among other Greek words used in the Septuagint in the general sense of *kill*, *ἀποκτείνω* alone is used more than 200 times.

Finally we turn to the authority of the New Testament. Here we ALWAYS find the sixth commandment translated by *φονεύω*. We NEVER find *φονεύω* or *φονεύς* employed in any other sense than that of "murder;" while the word *ἀποκτείνω* is employed some seventy times in the various senses and applications of which *kill* is susceptible. How would it sound for a universal command, *μὴ ἀποκτείνης*?

We cannot but think it demonstrated, therefore, as far as anything in the use of language can be demonstrated, that the sixth commandment, according to the inherent and proper force of the Hebrew verb, means neither more nor less than, "NE HOMICIDIUM COMMITTITE," "Thou shalt do no murder."

We are aware this whole tedious inquiry will be considered by

¹ Except in some copies once.

many as a work of supererogation ; (and in that case we hope not entirely without *merit*;) or perhaps as a foolish waste of time and pains. But if we have been fools, we have been so in answering far wiser men than ourselves according to their folly. We have seen and heard the assertion here controverted, so often reiterated by the assailants of capital punishment, until it has become, as it were, a stereotyped head of argument or rhetoric, that we thought it high time to have it thoroughly sifted. In attempting to accomplish that task, we have taken a great many more words than would be required for a very effective declamation on the other side. But let it be remembered, that as it is easy to make a true assertion which it might be very difficult to prove, so it is easy to make a false assertion which it may be very difficult to disprove.

But now, suppose our whole investigation in regard to the proper lexicographical meaning, or rather the true *usus loquendi*, of the term in question, resulted in just nothing at all. Suppose, which is manifestly false, suppose the word might of itself mean, as alleged, "to take life," in the most general and indifferent sense, in connection with any subject, object, or circumstances whatever; still it would not follow that there should be any reasonable doubt about its precise import in the sixth commandment. It seems we may "infer" something "from the general objects and manner of the communication;" and what inference more natural than that which has been made, apparently, by the Jewish doctors, the Septuagint translators, the New Testament writers, the Christian church, and almost all Christian critics in all ages, viz. that that commandment means simply, "Thou shalt do no murder."

Surely God is his own best interpreter; and unless He, in the most solemn manner, *commands* (not permits) in one breath what He has just solemnly prohibited in another, the 21st chapter of Exodus (vid. verse 12) and the 35th chapter of Numbers furnish ample evidence that He nowhere forbids the civil magistrate to take the life of the murderer. Is there not just the same evidence that the laws contained in the 21st chapter of Exodus and in the 35th chapter of Numbers were uttered and enacted by the express voice of God, as there is that the Decalogue was so uttered and enacted? And will it do for "Christians" to shrug their shoulders at them, muttering contemptuously the name of Moses? The contents of Exodus 21st were uttered, according to the record, amidst the awful thunderings of Sinai, and immediately after the promulgation of the Ten Commandments, comprising the solemn injunction,

"He that smiteth a man so that he die, shall surely be put to death." The more explicit regulations contained in the 35th chapter of Numbers, are introduced with these words: "And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak unto the children of Israel," etc.; and that Jehovah is the real legislator, throughout the chapter, is further evident from its close: "Defile not the land wherein I dwell; for I, the Lord, dwell among the children of Israel."

But when we appeal to God's statutory and judicial decisions, upon the meaning of his own fundamental law, this new school of interpreters enter one universal demurrer, in the words of our Saviour on the subject of divorcement: "For the hardness of your hearts, Moses wrote you this precept." But what right have they to apply this saying, the exact import and bearing of which is so uncertain, so as to nullify the meaning of Scriptures to which our Saviour never applied it, and which are perfectly clear and intelligible without it? It is too weak to bear the direct inferences they would make from it; much less ought they to suspend upon it such a huge mass of indirect conclusions. Granting that this oft-quoted saying means all which they assume in respect to the case then in hand, still its application to other cases can, at best, amount to nothing more than a *may-be*; and is this what is called proof? They seem to take for granted that there is not a word of the Mosaic law expressly confirmed in the New Testament except the Decalogue. But this is far from being the case. "Thou shalt not avenge;" "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;" and, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," etc., are express commands of the law of Moses expressly confirmed by our Saviour. Suppose, now, we should argue from these premises, that, *may-be*, this or that other law, nay, all the rest of the Mosaic code, has also been thus implicitly confirmed? But our opponents have not even room for a *may-be*, in the present instance. Hear the words with which Jehovah concludes the enactment of the laws referred to:

31. Moreover, ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer which is guilty of death; but he shall be surely put to death.

32. And ye shall take no satisfaction for him that is fled to the city of his refuge, that he should come again to dwell in the land, until the death of the high-priest.

33. So ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye are; for blood it defileth the land; and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it.

34. Defile not therefore the land which ye shall inhabit, wherein I dwell; for I the Lord dwell among the children of Israel.

Now what sort of a cause must that be, which feels driven to the necessity of maintaining, that these laws were not enacted as being right and good and well pleasing to God, but merely as a temporary indulgence to the savage character of the Jewish people? Yet the assailants of capital punishment generally, and the highly respected author of the *Manual of Peace* among the rest, have agreed to say that those laws, for which God himself thus gave his own reason, were given to the Jews because of the "hardness of their hearts!"¹

We confess that we see such assertions, from such men, with unfeigned and unspeakable amazement. What, then, could God have said more than he did say to make his design and meaning clear? Is it uncharitable to ascribe it to *their* "hardness of heart," (taking the phrase in the sense which it has in Mark 16: 14,) that they fail to perceive that those words of the Almighty will bear no such interpretation as they feel compelled to put upon them?

But, say they, if civil governments have a right to break the sixth commandment, and commit murder upon the murderer, why have they not also a right to break the eighth, and steal the property of the thief? We answer, that if these gentlemen will define what they mean by "property," and by "stealing," they will leave us nothing to do in demolishing their objection. According to their present argumentation, it will clearly follow, that all compulsory restitution, all legal seizure of the property of the thief is "legalized stealing." It is so by their own showing, just as much as the legal execution of the murderer is "legalized murder." There is no avoiding this conclusion. They have offered their own issue,

¹ Some seem to think they can evade the authority of the law of Moses by quoting Ezek. 20: 25: "Wherefore I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live." But the same prophet had already described the law given at Sinai thus: (10th and 11th verses) "I brought them into the wilderness, and I gave them *my statutes*, and showed them *my judgments*, which, if a man do, he shall even live in them." To which class, now, is Exodus 21st to be chronologically referred, to that described in the 25th, or that described in the 11th verse? Besides, by comparing the 25th and 12th verses, it would seem that what God *permitted*, rather than what he positively *ordained*, is there referred to. Or, will any choose to say that God positively commanded the Israelites to offer their children to Moloch, (verse 26th)? a question which may serve to disclose the impious absurdity of the whole supposition we are here controverting. What will these interpreters say to Malachi 4: 4: "Remember ye the law of Moses my servant, which I commanded *unto him* in Horeb for all Israel, [with] THE STATUTES AND JUDGMENTS?" Such is the solemn admonition with which the Spirit of prophecy sealed up its revelations, until the coming of the Messiah and of Elias his forerunner.

and let them abide by it. For a mere private citizen to take the life of a murderer, is doubtless murder; and so for a mere private citizen to take the property of a thief, though it be to make just restitution to himself, is doubtless theft. But these men apply the same principle to the case of the magistrate. Has the civil magistrate, has civil society, no more right or power than each private citizen? So they seem to argue. And yet this very objection is urged not only by recluse divines, but by practical lawyers and legislators! See the unanimous Report of a Committee of the New York legislature, drawn up by Mr. O'Sullivan, p. 23.

We have thus defended the right of inflicting capital punishment against all the arguments, so far as we know, adduced from the Scripture in opposition to it. We have shown that this right, proclaimed by the consent of nations and the common voice of humanity, is not contradicted by the voice of Christ, the spirit of Christianity, or the letter of the sixth commandment, but rather confirmed by them all. We wish it to be distinctly understood, that our argument, thus far, has been strictly *defensive*.

But we shall not leave this branch of the inquiry without referring to one *positive* argument from Scripture, which, if not irrefragable, certainly has never been refuted; we mean that founded upon the command addressed to Noah, and through him to all mankind: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made he man." The abolitionists generally affect to consider this text as quite unimportant. Yet they have turned it over and over, and wistfully examined it on all sides, if perchance they might detect some flaw in it. They have twisted, and wrenched, and tortured and tested it by all manner of critical and uncritical machinery and manipulation, in order to extort or extract from it some sense not absolutely contradictory to their notions. But, to this day, they have never agreed among themselves upon any other translation of it, than that which is given in the common English Bible, and which, for substance, has been given in almost all versions which have ever been made. But, say they, it is a solitary, antiquated, difficult text. As to its solitariness, is not a solitary command of God, authority enough? As to its antiquity, it answers our purpose the better for that. And as to its difficulty; wherein does it consist? We are bold to say that, grammatically and lexically considered, it contains as little difficulty as the average of Hebrew texts. If we cannot be reasonably sure of its meaning, we may give up the Hebrew Bible altogether, as little better than the Sphinx's riddle.

There are none so deaf as they who will not hear, none so blind as they who will not see. The text is indeed a difficult one, a grievously difficult one, for those who are determined not to receive from it the simple sense which lies upon the face of it.

Some have professed to think it satisfactorily set aside by being resolved into a mere prediction. But, even considered as a mere prediction, it would prove too much against them; since, coupled with the reason assigned, the predicted act of shedding the murderer's blood, would seem very plainly to be approved by God as proper and right.

Others, seeing this, have preferred the interpretation: "Whatsoever sheddeth man's blood, by man shall its blood be shed;" a translation, by the way, to which we have not the slightest objection, provided only it be rightly understood by the English readers. No critic of common sense, who could spell a Hebrew word, ever doubted that, in the original, the idea of *man* was included as the agent in the shedding of human blood; the term "*whatsoever*" was originally suggested in order to include the idea of the *beast also*, which was thought to be equally implied in the original; but some of the abolitionists who resort to this rendering, have been stupid enough to suppose that the idea of *man* as the shedder of blood was thereby excluded, and that in spite of the manifest exigences of the connection.¹ The same acute in-

¹ See Chapin's Three Discourses, Boston, 1843, p. 17. Also O'Sullivan's Report, p. 27.

Mr. O'Sullivan ventures to allege, as his authority, "that profound and learned critic Michaelis of Göttingen, who, in his commentaries on the laws of Moses (ch. 4. art. 274) says expressly: 'the sixth verse must be rendered, not *whosoever*, but *whatsoever* sheddeth human blood.'" Now, turning to the Article referred to in Michaelis, we read as follows: "*Whatsvener creature sheddeth human blood, be it man or beast, by man shall its blood, in like manner, be shed*, Gen. 9: 6; for, according to the tenor of the preceding verse, where beasts as well as men are mentioned, and where God had said that from men as well as beasts he would require the blood of man, not, indeed, immediately, but, as he himself expressly declares, by the instrumentality of man, to whom he assigns the duty of avenging it, the sixth verse is to be rendered not *whosoever*, but *whatsoever* sheddeth human blood, so as to include beasts AS WELL AS MAN." We have before us the 2d edition of O'Sullivan's Report, and Smith's Michaelis, Lond. ed. 1814. We are amazed at Mr. O'Sullivan's quotation from the "profound and learned critic of Göttingen." We have no respectful words by which to characterize such audacious garbling.

Our statements, in the text above, had been written before we saw Mr. O'Sullivan's Report or consulted Michaelis. The Report fell under our notice first, and when we saw the citation from Michaelis, we feared that we had expressed ourselves quite too strongly; but how great and agreeable was our surprise, on

terpreters insist upon the phrase, "At the hand of every man's brother will *I require* the life of man," as proving that man is not authorized to execute the judgment *upon man*, but God is to do it in *propriâ personâ*; as though it was not said, "at the hand of every beast will *I require* it," also. Is God, then, to execute the judgment upon beasts in *propriâ personâ*? Another thing is observable; these interpreters abandon the theory of a prediction in connection with the sixth verse, as soon as they think they can confine it to the punishment of beasts, apparently thinking it a sense intolerably jejune to suppose the Almighty to have solemnly announced to Noah and his sons the momentous prediction, that if a beast should shed human blood, the beast's blood would probably be shed likewise. The verb, therefore, they think to be *imperative*.

Others have contrived different, and still different ways of obtaining a sense to suit their purposes. We may not ascribe such efforts to dishonesty, but is it uncharitable to ascribe them to prejudice?

At length, none of the old hypotheses having given general satisfaction, a new hypothesis has just been broached;¹ viz. that this statement to Noah contains no reference whatever to murder or manslaughter, but simply prohibits cannibalism! Against this crime, however, it seems to be acknowledged a punishment is denounced.

This hypothesis is put forth with an imposing display of various linguistic lore. Its sacred sense, laid up originally in the "sanctuary of the Essenes, the depositaries of the Jewish spiritual philosophy," [is not the Christian, the New Testament philosophy, spiritual enough?] and transferred thence, (by what cabalistic process one does not exactly understand,) into the "mystic" head of Monsieur D'Olivet, has been now at length raked up from some long forgotten essay, in which D'Olivet undertook to "restore the Hebrew language," by translating the *spirit* instead of the *letter*.

Such is the pedigree of the theory. We have heard before of *spiritualizing* texts of Scripture; but this is the first time we ever heard of applying this process in the very act of translation, of

turning to Michaelis, to find that his authority was altogether against the very opinion for which Mr. O'Sullivan quotes him, and precisely coincident with our own views!

¹ Vide "Cannibalism, the crime prohibited in the ninth chapter of Genesis," by John W. Browne. Boston, 1846. Charles and John M. Spear, Publishers.

substituting the spiritual sense to the entire exclusion of the literal sense, and thus getting rid of the latter altogether by rendering it nonexistent. This is a refinement and perfecting of the process of spiritualizing which is doubtless destined to work wonders. Who can tell what metamorphoses this process may not produce? What an entire revolution in the whole business and art of "correct translation?"

The present herald of this "spiritual" hypothesis, professes to have devoted himself to the study of the passage in question, after having first carefully divested his mind of all prejudices and prepossessions; and invites others to follow his example of unbiassed, childlike simplicity. Yet, in another place, he admits that he "*presumed* a mistranslation" in what he is pleased to call "James's Bible." That is to say, the only prejudice he had in his mind was, that, at all events, the sense of our present translation was not the true sense. Let others follow him thus divested of prejudice, and very likely they may reach the same results. Dr. Strauss, in his *Leben Jesu*, insists strongly upon his claims to the almost solitary honor of bringing to the criticism of the Gospels a mind swept perfectly clear of all prepossessions and assumptions; and then goes on to reduce the whole history of Jesus—that title-deed of man's salvation—to a mere myth, a pious fable! Let us not be charged with appealing to the *odium theologicum*. Indeed the throwing out of this charge commonly implies in the bosoms of those who make it, the existence of that very intolerant spirit which they assume in others and profess to rebuke. We do not mean to charge any one with being an infidel either openly or in disguise like Dr. Strauss. Surely a man may believe in antediluvian cannibalism and yet be an honest man and a good Christian. What we do mean to say is, that these claims of superior freedom from prejudice are mere idle talk, or something worse.¹

Are this writer's notions of the origin of the Mosaic code to be inferred from the following passage? "If the law of degenerate,

¹ We cannot forbear quoting one passage from the Essay containing this new theory; because it is so distinct an acknowledgment of the truth of our positions in regard to the general consent of Christians on the main subject of our present discussion. "It is to be taken," says this writer, "that the great body of all persons who are inclined to orthodox views of religion, with the orthodox clergy at their head, sincerely believe capital punishment sanctioned by the express revelation of the voice of God in that chapter of Genesis. The shadow of this belief, more or less dark, as it may be, rests upon almost the whole heart of Christendom."

godless human society had not *first assumed* to punish crime with death, *out of* its own evil and fallen state, *on the authority* of its own passions and darkened heart, would this passage [in Genesis] ever have been resorted to as Divine sanction for that penalty?"

That *he* knows no human code, any more than we, which inflicted the penalty of death for murder, before the Mosaic was enacted, is clear from another passage, from which he thinks to draw various important inferences. "From the beginning of Genesis," he says, "down to the Mosaic code, from Cain down, no murder which is mentioned in the Bible, and there are several, is stated to have been punished with death."

Others, as well as he, have constructed long arguments¹ to prove that, because God did not directly and personally carry into effect the laws, which, most expounders of the Scriptures declare, he made for inflicting on the murderer the penalty of death, therefore he never made such laws! As though any body had ever maintained that the Almighty constituted himself the direct executor of the commands which He addressed to others.

Dr. Cheever had suggested the idea that the principle of lenity, exhibited in God's treatment of Cain, had been so abused by the antediluvian world, that murder had become rife among the crimes—the deeds of violence, which called aloud for the Divine vengeance. And this experiment of lenity having proved thus signally abortive, a severer course of administration was divinely instituted, immediately after the flood. This suggestion seems to have been a special offence to the abolitionists, over which they have stumbled headlong one and all. And no wonder. It threatened to take out of their mouths one of their most familiar topics of declamation. They have generally dismissed it with a sneer, as though Dr. Cheever, or any man in his senses, had suggested that God tried this experiment for His own instruction, and not for man's correction. Dr. Cheever doubtless meant that these gentlemen might learn something from the experiment themselves, not that God had learned anything from it.

But it is a mere assumption, they say. Suppose it is; is it not as good and as likely as some other assumptions, until it is disproved? It has some show of evidence; else, what means the infallible statement: "the earth was filled with violence?"

Now the author of this new theory of primitive cannibalism, *though he cannot bring a solitary instance in point of fact to prove*

¹ Vide North American Review, Vol. LXII. p. 46.

his theory—and Dr. Cheever has one, the instance of Lamech—yet, having no longer any motive to reject the principle of interpretation on which Dr. Cheever's inference is founded, accepts it and enlarges its application. "But," says he, "what was this mystery of wickedness, this solemn *all flesh had corrupted his way on the earth*, and *the earth was filled with violence*, so that it must be drowned in the baptismal waters of a flood to cleanse it? May it not be this very thing? (i. e. antediluvian cannibalism). What could like this fill up the measure of all iniquity, and make an exterminating flood-baptism needful?"

In short, therefore, says this theory, it ought not to be a capital crime merely to kill a man; it is heaven-daring impiety to punish the mere murderer with death; the real crime consists in eating the man you have murdered; only abstain from the eating, and all is well; but whoever eats a man shall——be eaten in turn! This seems to be the only consistent sense to be made of all this learned and spiritual exegesis about primeval cannibalism, when the different parts of it are put together.

But in all seriousness, dismissing this novel theory, we beg leave to ask those who not only deny that the right to inflict capital punishment can be founded upon this text in Genesis, but who also maintain (as the abolitionists do, almost with one united voice) that the infliction of the penalty of death upon the murderer is as much *murder* as the act for which it was inflicted—we beg leave to ask them, what sense, on this theory of theirs, they make of the text, whether considered as a command or a mere prediction: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man *shall his blood be shed*, ~~for~~ *in the image of God made he man*?" According to this doctrine, it will be observed, if the first shedding was a crime, the second is equally so; and then comes in, *as a reason for both*, "for in the image of God made he man"!!

As to the question whether this passage do indeed contain a command or a prediction; it is perfectly clear, there is no occasion for appealing from the English "shall be shed" to the original, under the pretext that the original throws any new doubt or any new light on this particular point. It is true that the English language has another and more unequivocal form for the future; but it seems to be forgotten that it has also another and more unequivocal form for the imperative. The original language has no other form for either, and may therefore be understood here in either sense; and so may the English by which our translators have rendered it. How then would you get a more faithful trans-

lation? *Is it desirable absolutely to decide, IN THE TRANSLATION, a question which the original does not decide?* The defenders of capital punishment have shown no such desire. They are constant, and always have been, with the translation of the verb as it stands. No phraseology, in English or in any other language, could convey the precise impression of the original, with all its two-fold associations, with all its definiteness and all its ambiguity, (if it have any,) better than the simple English "shall be shed." To appeal from this to the original as being more indefinite or more ambiguous, is merely throwing dust into the eyes of the unlearned; and betrays the weakness of the cause from which the appeal proceeds.

The English translation, in this particular at least, furnishes just as good a basis on which to construct the meaning of the text as the original does. What then is the meaning? For an answer to this question, we appeal to all the readers of the English Bible, to say whether the first, obvious and unprejudiced interpretation of the passage is not that which receives from it the impression of a command? We cannot doubt the answer.

We believe it to be a command; but we do not therefore believe it to be binding, *ad litteram*, as a mandate of absolute, universal and perpetual obligation. We believe it to be a command addressed to reasonable men, as reasonable men, couched in the most general terms, and left to their conscience and common sense to be interpreted and applied according to the exigencies of times, places and circumstances. We believe its expressed purpose, viz. to preserve inviolate the image of God in man, to be of vastly more consequence, according to the true *animus* of the divine legislator, than the precise manner in which that purpose is to be secured. Still we cannot but find in this connection, a clear *authorization*, at least, for the infliction of capital punishment for murder, whenever and wherever men find such infliction expedient for the protection and security of human life. And we confess, further, that the existence of such a command, made on such an occasion, does, to our mind, create a strong antecedent *probability*, that the infliction of this punishment for this crime *will be* expedient, as long as the descendants of Noah continue in their present fallen state upon earth.

But some say, if we are to understand this as a command, then we must take it just as it stands, without any explanations, exceptions or modifications; and consequently we are as much bound by its absolute requirement to execute the hangman (not

to say the sheriff, judge, jury, legislature, nay the sovereign people themselves, of whom the others are only the representatives and agents;) as we were to execute the murderer, whom the hangman has just killed. The utter absurdity of such suppositions is a sufficient proof of their fallacy. Indeed, assume as true the meaning which these gentlemen attach to the sixth commandment, and the conclusion they have reached would be equally applicable to all the regulations of the Mosaic code requiring the murderer to be put to death; from which it would follow that the first murder that should be committed after the enactment of those regulations, would imply the extermination of mankind *seriatim*, after the fashion of the story of the woman and her kid. (We beg pardon for the comparison, but it is as dignified as the objection).

We have said that, supposing this in Genesis to be a command, we also suppose that command to be addressed to reasonable men, and to be received by them as such; and this cuts off the force, not only of such supposed objections as that above, but of several others equally ingenious, about executing animals, insane men, etc., which have been from time to time invented. To say that because it is a divine command, men cannot be allowed to *interpret it in good conscience and by the light of reason*, is to say that it is impossible for God, by the medium of human language, to convey a command to the human mind. We are not to suppose that in wording his commands God had an eye to the special accommodation of quibblers.¹

¹ It is said that, according to the context, if a man is killed, it is made the duty of his brother and not of the magistrate to shed the blood of the murderer. Be it so. But here again the means are subordinate to the end. Unless this provision had been abused, it might have accomplished the purpose as well, probably, as any other. As every man must have an *heir*, so, in the sense of this passage, every man must have a *brother*. The provision existed, and probably was abused. It is recognized as an existing fact in the Mosaic code, but is guarded, regulated and modified. If, in process of time and under an almost total change of circumstances, regular political societies and governments being established, it is found necessary further to restrain the exercise of this primeval right, or wholly to transfer it from the private individual to the magistrate, we see nothing, according to our view of the original law, inconsistent with so doing; *provided only the end of the law be secured*: *Qui facit per alium facit per se*. The main point is, the end must be secured; and somebody must be empowered to secure it.

But again it is said: by the context we are forbidden to *eat flesh with the blood*; and it is added: "this injunction has never been observed by Christians." We answer that according to Acts 15: 28, it did "seem good to the

But it is asked; if this were understood as a command, why did not men think of obeying it until the promulgation of the Mosaic code? We answer, if such be the fact, then you must cease to wonder at the distinct, stern and stringent provisions of that code on this subject.

Finally, it is said, (as though those who say it did not perceive that they are helping to answer the question they had just asked), that even after the enactment of the Mosaic code, we read of

Holy Ghost and to the apostles" [this is better authority than Moses?] to require the Gentile converts to observe this prohibition. Its object was to guard against idolatry on the one hand, and "savagery" on the other. And though it be by no means expedient in the present state of civilization and refinement among Christian nations, that the prohibition should be expressly incorporated either into the civil or canon law; we, nevertheless, take the liberty to think that it was a wise prohibition for the times; and, for the principle of it, is still binding not only upon every Christian, but upon every man of refined sensibility and cultivated understanding. But it is still insisted that by this law we are directed as much to put the beast to death, which kills a man, as to execute the man who kills his fellow. We think this a good principle too, and civil society has a perfect right to make such a regulation. But we shall be told of a horse throwing his rider and killing him, and similar cases. We answer, they are nothing to the purpose. They are not within the intent of the law. But if an ox or a horse, from the impulse of a *vicious* temper violently assault a man, run upon him and kill him; we are disposed to think it a wholesome regulation that the beast should be put to death. Such was the regulation which God condescended to make in the Mosaic code; thus interpreting, (as any reasonable man except our modern ingenious critics must have done before,) the meaning of the general enactment in Genesis. It is true that in putting the beast to death we cannot make the example a terror to other beasts; but, if we could, it would be an additional reason for his being killed. And if Christian governments have not enacted such a law in modern times, it is either because they do not deem it needful or expedient; or it is because they have a less sensitive regard for the sanctity of God's image in man than their maker would have them cherish.

But it is triumphantly said, no Christian government has forbidden eating blood, or requires the execution of capital punishment upon beasts. Be it so. What does that prove? That they have not enacted the infliction of capital punishment upon the murderer? The inference is strong. That they have not professed to derive their right for the infliction of capital punishment from this passage in Genesis? The inference is false, in point of fact. That they are inconsistent? Still it would remain to show, in which scale the change should be made so that the balance of consistency might be restored. But according to our view there is no inconsistency at all. We regard the text in question as containing a general principle, couched in the form of a command, but which is after all not so much *mandatory*, perhaps, as *permissive* and *advisory*; but which, at least, confers a right, in all the particulars of it—a right whose exercise is to be determined according to the exigences of time and place.

many murderers who were not punished with death; as David, for example; one favorite instance for all. We admit the fact. But now for the inference. Is it, that the law of Moses, therefore, did not exist? Or that its enactment had been only a divine farce, meant for temporary effect? Or is it not rather that the law, a divine and therefore a wholesome law, existing in all its force, was not executed? We think the last is the most likely inference. And we find other evidences of its truth. It is one of the most frequent complaints which God makes of his people by the mouth of his prophets, that they do not "execute judgment," that "violence" abounds; that the land is "polluted with innocent blood," from which God had told them it could be cleansed *only* by the blood of him that shed it.

We repeat, therefore, the solemn divine admonition, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed;" and hold that it contains in it a voice of universal warning and of universal right; of warning, to the murderer; to the magistrate, a right of punishment. The abolitionists may stumble at it, and stumble over it, as they will; they can never move it out of their way. There it stands, and there it will stand forever.

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE V.

ON THE STUDY OF HOMER.

The Iliad of Homer, from the Text of Wolf. With English Notes.
By C. C. Felton, Eliot Professor of Greek in Harvard University.
New and Revised Edition. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1847.

By James E. Boise, Professor of the Greek Language, etc., Brown University.

WE hail with peculiar pleasure the appearance of a new edition of Felton's *Iliad*. In this age of books, when the press teems with innumerable productions, like flies in a summer's day, just entering on their brief existence, it is pleasant now and then to be reminded of the past, to converse with those colossal minds which flourished when Carnac and the pyramids were built; and the monuments of whose genius, unlike those astounding piles of

granite, have survived, unharmed, the shock of centuries. We are thus taught that there is something stable and enduring, even in our ephemeral race. The voice of that blind old bard, which was heard among the isles of Greece, when two hundred warriors with horses and chariots went forth from each of the hundred gates of the Egyptian Thebes,¹ though it be almost silent in the land where it was first uttered, has wandered far beyond the adventures of the much-wandering hero, beyond the gardens of the Hesperides, and the giant Atlas, who supports upon his shoulders the pillars of the heavens. There was a truth and a life in that voice which was almost divine; which, after so many generations of men, is sweet and charming as ever.

We cannot but respect the effort to preserve the best treasures which by-gone ages have bequeathed to us; especially, if we may, without fear of diminishing their value, make use of them ourselves, and be enriched and made happy by them. Our thanks, at least, are due to the man who offers us one of the best gifts which it was in the power of Alexander or of Caesar to confer. And we may feel a reasonable pride in being admitted to the society of one who has been, at different times, an intimate companion with Pericles, and Cicero, and Burke; with Virgil, and Dante, and Milton.

"The tale of Troy divine," has ever been most admired by those who have read most extensively the best literature of other times and other languages; and by those to whom age has given most experience and most wisdom. The stripling, who has just mastered the rudiments of the Greek language, and who, with grammar and lexicon, hardly translates fifty lines a day into the most bald prose of his native tongue, knows as much of the harmony of these "words which flowed sweeter than honey," as we should learn from the ploughboy's carol, respecting the music of Handel or Mozart. Nor can he appreciate, any better, the truth, and simplicity, and energy of Homer's characters and scenes. Something of the same sort, and equally calculated to inspire enthusiasm for an author, may be witnessed in the grammar school, where a boy is appointed his task "to parse" so many lines of Dryden or Pope. This uninviting exercise may be useful, may be even necessary, to the education of a youth; but how strange and destitute of beauty does the naked idea appear to him when stripped of the decorations of rhyme, and rhythm,

¹ Il. 9. 381 et sq.

and poetic imagery! He can hardly believe it to be the same lofty and pleasing conception. Thus, when the student has not yet learned enough of Greek to catch the idea from the flowing measures and the "winged words" of the original; and while he estimates the beauty and the sense of the most exquisite passages by an extemporary translation—the most uncouth perhaps, and the most inane, falsely called "*literal*,"—he may surely be pardoned for saying that he discovers little to admire in the poetry of antiquity. It is unquestionably true that he discovers little; but it is not true that there is little to be discovered. It were as easy for the astronomer to discover Orion and the Pleiades through the densest mist, as for any body to discover the full and true character of Homer through an ordinary class-room translation. As the most beautiful countenance, when reflected from an irregular and broken mirror, appears distorted and ugly, so, in a similar way, the finest passages in an ancient author may be misrepresented and spoiled by the medium through which they are viewed. The truth of this statement would become more apparent, by placing almost any scene in Macaulay's exquisite "*Lays of Ancient Rome*," side by side with a similar one in Homer. Should the student perchance be reading the fifth book of the *Iliad*, or any passage of the same kind, let him compare with it the *Battle of Lake Regillus*. He will thus, we think, derive a more comprehensive and just idea of the force of the Homeric descriptions.

Every intelligent scholar must have felt very keenly how inadequate, for the expression of the mere idea, regardless of the harmony, are the most labored and the best translations.¹ It is not till the din of a barbarian tongue is hushed, and the sweet music of the Ionian words falls upon the ear, that the first conception of Homer is caught. Then, too, the charming and life-like pictures of this great master, in their due proportions, are first presented to the eye.

We may thus see how it happens that so many, in their school-boy days, are disgusted with the finest creations of genius, and are led to rank their Homer and their Virgil among the dullest of books. Because the path seems long, and steep, and rough at the outset,

¹ Even in the single matter of epithets, how many difficulties are encountered. How few have felt so well satisfied with their expressions for *πολύμητις*, *πολύμηχανος* and *πολύτλας*, epithets of *Ὀδυσσεύς*, that they do not, upon every recurrence of the Greek word, labor to invent some new phrase by which to translate it. To these instances may be added *διοτρεφής*, *διογενής*, *δοσυρικλυτός*, *μέροπος ἄνθρωποι*, *καλλίσφυρος νύμφη*, *μελίχιος μύθος*, and a multitude of others.

they cannot be persuaded that they shall one day reach the summit, where it will become pleasant and easy.¹ But the testimony of those who have mastered the difficulties, is uniform and decisive. To them, indeed, the varied scenes of Homer are most attractive. Their simplicity, their vividness, their unique character, are felt and acknowledged. The mere tyro cannot understand the venerable Frederic Jacobs, when he says, as quoted in Professor Felton's Preface: "The language of Ionia resembles the smooth mirror of a broad and silent lake, from whose depth a serene sky, with its soft and sunny vault, and the varied nature along its sunny shores, are reflected in transfigured beauty." Almost exaggerated seems the following declaration of Mr. H. N. Coleridge, in his introduction to the study of Homer: "I am not one who has grown old in literary retirement, devoted to classical studies with an exclusiveness which might lead to an overweening estimate of these two noble languages. Few, I will not say evil, were the days allowed to me for such pursuits; and I was constrained, still young and an unripe scholar, to forego them for the duties of an active and laborious profession. They are now amusements only, however delightful and improving. Far am I from assuming to understand all their riches, all their beauty or all their power; yet I can profoundly feel their immeasurable superiority to all we call modern; and would fain think that there are many, even among my young readers, who can now, or will hereafter, sympathize with the expression of my ardent admiration."

Of the character of this new edition of the *Iliad*, it is scarcely necessary to speak. Felton's Homer has long ago established a reputation in our own country; and it has been favorably noticed abroad. The London Examiner in 1843 said of a former edition: "we very much question whether, with all our preëminence above the Americans in the elegances of life, we could produce a school-book that should, by its beauty, vie in any degree with the Homer of Professor Felton." We venture to predict that the reputation of the book will not suffer from the present "new and revised edition." It is adapted to the existing wants, and keeps pace with the advancing scholarship of the country. Much, indeed, has been left very judiciously for the learner himself to accomplish, with the aid of his Crusius, or his Liddell and Scott;

¹ Τῆς δ' ἄρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάραιθεν ἐθήκαν
'Αθανάτοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὀρθίος ὁλμός ἐκ' αὐτῆν,
Καὶ τρηχδὲς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἰκῆται,
'Ρῆιδι δὲ ἐπειτα πέλει, χαλεπὴ περ ἱούσα.—Hesiod, *Épy.* 289 sq.

both of them invaluable helps in the study of Homer; and both of them, we are most happy to say, now offered to American students. These works now render many notes which would have been serviceable a few years ago entirely unnecessary.¹ We hold that it is even better to learn the form and meaning of a word from a good lexicon than from a miscellaneous commentary; for, though the particular fact, which the student needs to know in the sentence before him, may be more readily gained by a note on the word, yet he will fail in this case to ascertain the general usage, without which the true scholar is never satisfied. Mr. Felton seems to have aimed, and we think with a good degree of success, *not to burden the student with help*, but to furnish such and only such as will prove useful to the industrious and intelligent learner. Upon the first book, the annotations are more frequent and more exegetical; for, the difficulties in the study of Homer are greatest at the outset. To him who is familiar only with the Greek as it was spoken at Athens in the days of Pericles, the style of Homer seems like a new language. The numerous

¹ Had the commentary in the present edition of Felton's Homer been entirely written since the publication of the lexicons above mentioned, we presume a note might occasionally have been omitted which we now find; and others might have been somewhat modified. To exemplify the remark, let us examine a few of the notes at the beginning of book 10th: "2. *δεδημημένοι*, overcome with, from *δαμάω*." This passage is referred to in Crusius, both under *δεδημημένος*, which occurs in alphabetical order, and under *δαμάω*. It is also cited in Lidd. and Scott, under the latter word; and in both lexicons it is accompanied with an appropriate definition. — "15. *προθελύμνους*, by the root." The same word, in a different gender, occurs in the preceding book, v. 541. If it were understood in the former instance, it could hardly be obscure in this passage; which, moreover, is cited and translated in both lexicons. The same may be said of *ποδηνεκές*, v. 24; and of *στεφάνην*, v. 30. — "43. *ἐμὲ καὶ σέ*. The sentence is elliptical. *ἰκάνει*, or some such word, must be understood." This phrase would occasion no difficulty to the student who understands the same construction in the preceding book, v. 75. and v. 608. — "124 *ἐμὲ πρότερος*, before me." We cannot suppose the meaning of these words would be obscure to the youngest student of Homer. It would be as unprofitable as it were easy to multiply such criticisms. We would simply say, that in Homer, notes upon the forms of words are generally rendered unnecessary by the lexicographers. In place of them, more frequent explanations of the construction might, perhaps, in the present edition, have been profitably substituted. Thus, a note upon the construction of *Σκάνδειαν*, 10. 268, might not be out of place; and an explanation of the passage, 9. 560 etsq., would be very acceptable to the young student. We will not mention other instances of the kind; since there is so much room for disagreement on this point. It is much easier to write a commentary, than to anticipate in all cases the wants of the learner; and explanations, which are very useful to some persons, seem to others wholly unnecessary.

words which he has never before met with, the strange irregularities of declension and inflection, the frequent juxtaposition of vowel sounds so repugnant to the Attic rules, impart a novel and bewildering appearance to the first page which he reads in Homer. Even to the Athenians themselves, it must have been a somewhat rugged task to become conversant with the early language of Greece, so as to understand their first great poet. He who has not made himself familiar with the style of Chaucer, may be convinced of this fact by a perusal of the *Canterbury Tales*; for, the interval between the father of English poetry and the writers now living, is about the same as between Homer and the perfection of the Attic dialect. Every one must have observed, however, in reading the early Greek, after he has surmounted the obstacles of the first few pages, how surprisingly similar are all the new and strange forms and idioms. Indeed, he soon ceases to notice them; and begins to think them as regular as the words of Xenophon. We see, therefore, much wisdom in placing the grammatical notes chiefly at the beginning of the work; and, in subsequent parts, making them frequent only in the more difficult passages.

From a partial examination, we are led to the opinion that the typographical accuracy is such as to warrant the confidence of scholars; and, added to this, the distinctness and general neatness of the text, render the work superior, in its external form, to most editions of the ancient classics.¹

The exquisite literary taste, which is everywhere displayed in Felton's Homer, must be apparent. This we apprehend is the most striking feature of the book; and in this respect we presume it may safely be compared with any edition of an ancient classic, which can be selected. Mere information is not the sole object of the notes, or of the preliminary remarks. The form in which it is presented was evidently considered; and the student, instead of being disgusted with coarse expressions and barbarous idioms, which so disfigure and impair the value of some critical philologi-

¹ We have examined the text of a considerable part of the 9th book, and a portion of the 10th; and, if we have detected the main errors, they will rather serve to show, since they are so minute, how nearly faultless the text is. Without specifying those instances in which different editors are not agreed, we find in book 9th, line 222nd, *εὐτο* for *εὐτο*; line 233rd, *ὑπέρθυμοι* for *ὑπέρθυμοι*; line 373rd, *ἔων* for *ἔων*; line 383rd, *ἄν* for *ἄν*'; line 600th, *γερων* for *γέρων*; book 10th, line 4th, *φρεσὲν* for *φρεσὶν*; line 37th, *ἐταίρων* for *ἐταίρων*; line 52nd, there should be a period after *Ἀχαιοῖς*.

cal works, will rather be allured by the elegance and refinement which everywhere prevail in this. We regard it as no small recommendation. The tendency of the youthful student is always to fall into loose and careless habits of expression; to give a bungling paraphrase rather than a translation. If, therefore, he have a text-book in which the most scrupulous care is exercised in every annotation to represent with the nicest accuracy in idiomatic English the expression as well as the idea of the original, it will do something towards forming the same habit in himself. But in addition to this, it will do much towards smoothing the ascent of the hill of knowledge, and alluring him onward, and upward. It will give an inviting aspect to his labors, and remove to some extent the false impression that everything is quaint and prosy in the ancient classics. To the same purpose are the frequent allusions to the character and habits and elegant arts of the Greeks. We are reminded now and then that wit and humor and taste almost unequalled were striking features of the Hellenic race; that the elegant arts were carried to the highest perfection among them; and that art and literature went hand in hand under the patronage and protection of the same celestial beings.

A proper place is given in the preliminary remarks to those views concerning the author or authors of the Homeric poems, and kindred subjects, which have so much interested the learned world since the days of Heyne. In a school-book, an extended account of these discussions would be unnecessary. The young student is not prepared either to decide upon the justness of different hypotheses, or to appreciate the grounds upon which they are made. His first business is, or ought to be, to become acquainted with what is in *the poem itself*, not with what this critic has written about it, and another critic has advanced in refutation. Still, it would not be well to read Homer in entire ignorance of all that has been said on this subject. A few of the leading facts ought to be presented distinctly to the mind. This is most happily done in the preliminary dissertation, and in the remarks which are quoted from Grote's History of Greece. "The first doubt," says Professor Felton, "of the personal existence of the individual author of the Iliad and Odyssey was expressed by Hædclius and Perrault, two Frenchmen, who maintained, that the Iliad is a compilation of minstrelsies, put together by successive editors, the work of many poets of the heroic age, who sang of the wars of Troy and the exploits of the heroes engaged in them.

This theory was afterwards adopted, and developed with great ingenuity and learning, by Heyne. Wood believes in the individual existence of Homer, but thinks it impossible that he should have known anything of alphabetic writing; . . . Wolf's *Prolegomena* to Homer contains the most systematic and masterly discussion on the subject, though new light has been thrown on the question since his day, and his opinions have ceased to be the prevailing belief of the learned world. He maintains, that neither the whole *Iliad*, nor the whole *Odyssey*, is the work of one author. The outline of his argument is this,—that, for reasons already mentioned, the art of writing, if invented in Homer's time, was not applied to the writing of books,—if Homer did not know how to write, he never could have formed the idea of composing books of such extent,—that such a whole was not in keeping with the civilization of his age. In addition to this, there is in the *Iliad* a great inequality between the first and the last book,—from the nineteenth to the twenty-second, the tone of thinking and expression differs from the first part of the work,—and from the eighth book, marks of the process of connecting the rhapsodies together, are plainly perceptible. Finally, in the time of Homer, the language was not carried to such a point of grammatical and metrical perfection, as it appears to have attained in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The result of all these inquiries is, that neither of these epics belongs to one author, or to the same age. Several parts of the *Iliad* are wholes, by themselves; the seventh, eighth, and ninth¹ books are entirely occupied with the victorious exploits of Hector. Some parts, such as the catalogue of ships, the funeral games, the story of Dolon, were afterwards inserted. Such is, in substance, the view of Wolf."

"Most scholars are now agreed that there was a Homer,—the greatest of the epic bards; that he sang in separate chants or rhapsodies, the exploits and the heroes in the war of Troy; but that other bards sang more or less upon the same themes, and their productions were not always distinguished, in the tradition, from his; and that, in fact, the *Iliad*, at least in its present form, is chiefly the work of this great Homer, but was put together from the mass of his productions, in the form in which we now have them, by collectors several centuries after his age."

Mr. Grote's view of the structure and plan of the *Iliad*, in which

¹ This is a mistake. The leading subject of the ninth book, is the embassy to Achilles.

every one must discover great ingenuity and ability, will be apprehended from the following paragraph :

“ Nothing is gained by studying the *Iliad* as a congeries of fragments once independent of each other ; no portion of the poem can be shown to have ever been so, and the supposition introduces difficulties greater than those which it removes. But it is not necessary to affirm, that the whole poem as we now read it, belonged to the original and preconceived plan. In this respect the *Iliad* produces upon my mind an impression totally different from the *Odyssey*. In the latter poem, the characters and incidents are fewer, and the whole plot appears of one projection, from the beginning down to the death of the suitors ; none of the parts look as if they had been composed separately and inserted by way of addition into a preëxisting smaller poem. But the *Iliad*, on the contrary, presents the appearance of a house built upon a plan comparatively narrow and subsequently enlarged by successive additions. The first book, together with the eighth, and the books from the eleventh to the twenty-second inclusive, seem to form the primary organization of the poem, then properly an *Achilléis* ; the twenty-third and twenty-fourth books are additions at the tail of this primitive poem, which still leave it nothing more than an enlarged *Achilléis* ; but the books from the second to the seventh inclusive, together with the tenth, are of a wider and more comprehensive character, and convert the poem from an *Achilléis* into an *Iliad*. The primitive frontispiece, inscribed with the anger of Achilles and its direct consequences, yet remains, after it has ceased to be coëxtensive with the poem. The parts added however are not necessarily inferior in merit to the original poem ; so far is this from being the case, that amongst them are comprehended some of the noblest efforts of the Grecian epic. Nor are they more recent in date than the original ; strictly speaking, they must be a little more recent, but they belong to the same generation and state of society as the primitive *Achilléis*. These qualifications are necessary to keep apart different questions, which, in discussions of Homeric criticism, are but too often confounded.”

It is not our purpose to attempt any criticism upon these views. Much has been written upon the subject by abler and more mature scholars. We must confess, moreover, that to ourselves, these discussions are far less interesting than the noble poem which called them forth. The coolness of the Homeric critics has sometimes reminded us of the botanist who rudely tears in

pieces the most beautiful flower, that he may discover its secret organization. We would run to neither extreme; though we should not despise the science, we beg the privilege to spare and admire the flower. Thus while due attention is given to all the modern and contradictory views of Homer, may we never forget Homer himself! Undoubtedly those questions respecting the author of the Homeric poems, and the manner in which they were handed down from one generation to another, are highly important on many accounts; but they are not inseparable from an admiration and just appreciation of the poetic beauties of the great father of Grecian song. The student who should never hear of the controversies of modern critics might linger with delight among the graphic and ever-varying scenes of the Iliad. Long ago, ere the Chemnitz weaver had sent his son adrift upon the world, or the German Wolf had ever attacked the ancient citadels, many a scholar had been quickened to new intellectual activity, had been improved in taste and judgment, and with more than Siren power had been charmed by the masterly delineations of "the blind old bard of Scio's rocky isle." Would that the same effect were oftener witnessed now! Would that the youthful student read less *about* Homer and more *of* Homer! Learned dissertations, so to speak, are mere stagings erected to garnish the noble structure on which they depend for support. The one, if the course of events for the last half century indicates aright, will soon fall to the ground as altogether useless; the other shall remain, fresh as the work of yesterday, to distant ages.

These remarks are not suggested by any undue prominence, given to the Homeric discussions in the present edition of the Iliad. Far from it. To our mind, the subject is here presented happily; in such a manner, and with such an aspect as admits of little improvement. But at other times, and in other ways, we have been forcibly impressed with the belief, that those who have not yet read half of the Iliad, to say nothing of the Odyssey, would be as much benefitted, in all the essential points of their education, to prosecute, almost to the exclusion of collateral questions, their reading of Homer;—whomsoever or whatsoever the word may signify;—Homer, the study and admiration of Pindar and Sophocles, of Virgil and Horace, of Dante and Milton.

There are scenes, beautiful and impressive, in that wonderful poem, the Iliad, which will repay an attentive perusal the second or the third time. Like some masterly design on the living canvas, their full meaning is not to be gathered at once, but the de-

lineation becomes at each successive view more striking, more pregnant with life and beauty. Odysseus in his many wanderings, whether in the palace of Circe or the island of Calypso, in the cave of the Cyclops or at the court of Alcinoüs, scarcely found more to please or astonish, than the diligent student will find in the two great Epics of antiquity.

How distinct, among that multitude of heroes, is the portraiture of each! Achilles, sullen and wrathful, apart from his companions "where the sea-waves roared on the sand-beach," or rising from the curiously wrought lyre to welcome the ambassadors of the Achaeans;—in the fierce conflict with the godlike Hector, or receiving at dead of night with pity and kindness the aged and trembling Priam;—in all of these scenes, how vivid is our conception of that fierce and impetuous, yet generous character!¹ The brave Diomed, the inventive Odysseus, the dauntless Ajax, the old man Nestor, the kingly Agamemnon, would each of them serve as a hero for an epic poem. And on the side of the Trojans, distinguished among many brave men, appears the intrepid, the self-sacrificing, the gallant, but unfortunate Hector. What an intense and mournful interest is imparted to that noble character, as warrior, and patriot, and husband, and father! But not in the delineation of heroes alone did Homer excel. How charming is the loveliness and grace of Helen! How touching the conjugal love and how pathetic the lament of the orphan Andromache! Besides all these, to the susceptible and superstitious Greeks, those divine personages who engaged in this memorable war must have added no little interest to the story. If we mistake not, this great variety of character, so nicely portrayed and so exquisitely interwoven, is one chief source of interest in the Iliad; and in this respect it surpasses all poems of its kind. The hero of the Aeneid would maintain no very honorable rank among the heroes of the Iliad; and his goddess-mother sheds no very brilliant lustre over his virtues. "The heroes and heroines of the *Jerusalem Delivered* are noble and attractive. It is impossible to study them without admiration; but they resemble real life as much as the Enchanted Forest and spacious battle-fields, which Tasso has described in the environs of Jerusalem, do the arid ridges, waterless ravines, and stone-covered hills in the real scene, which have been paint-

¹ The verse of Horace:

Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer,

presents only one phase in the character of Achilles.

ed by the matchless pens of Chateaubriand and Lamartine." The arch-apostate, the true hero of the *Paradise Lost*, possesses too little that may be considered human to be compared with Achilles or Agamemnon or Hector. He is to be classed rather with Homer's delineations of Mars or Jupiter, although he is far more colossal and more divine. The great dramatist of modern times has alone rivalled Homer in the variety and distinctness of his characters.

Few poets have conceived with such clearness or presented with such picturesque and vivid effect the scenes they attempt to describe. Perhaps the most graphic of them all is the meeting of Hector and Andromache, and their last sad adieu. The departure of our first parents from their blissful abode in Paradise, though a much loftier theme, must yield to this in dramatic effect. Kindred to this scene is that in which Andromache first descries the corse of her husband on the plain, dragged behind the chariot of Achilles; and her passionate lament on the recovery of consciousness. As a specimen of Professor Felton's manner, we quote the notes on this passage. It occurs in the twenty-second book, and extends from the four hundred and seventy-seventh to the five hundred and fourteenth line inclusive.

" ' Andromache was recovering from her fainting fit ; her breathing came back by degrees only ; she now gasped out a few broken tones of woe. Finally, when she has wholly come to herself, she breaks out in the following words.' Cr. Dionysius of Halicarnassus cites this verse (476) as a specimen of imitative harmony. Upon which Montbel remarks : ' I doubt much whether our ears, but little trained to the sounds of the Greek language, can well appreciate these delicacies, which depend on the cadence of the phrase, and the measure of syllables. . . . But what may be felt in all times and in all countries is the delineation of this pathetic scene, in which the poet has represented the sorrow of Andromache. . . . Retired within her palace, Andromache is the only one who has not heard of the terrible calamity of the Trojans. She only knows that Hector has remained outside of the gates, and she orders her women to prepare the bath, that her husband may find it ready on his return from battle. All these details are true and touching ; and how much does Homer add to the pity with which this unfortunate wife inspires us by this so natural reflection : ' Unhappy one, she knew not that, far from the bath, Athene had subdued her husband under the hand of Achilles.' Meantime, alarmed by the cries which strike her ear, she wishes

to know what new misfortunes threaten her, and mournful presentiments arise in her soul. Soon she arrives at the summit of the tower, and can no longer doubt her misfortune. 'She sees him dragged before the city; swift horses drag him mercilessly towards the ships of the Greeks.' If I am not mistaken, there is here great delicacy, a profound knowledge of grief, in not having named Hector on this occasion; she sees him, τὸν δ' ἐνόησεν; horses drag him, ἵπποι μὲν ἔλκον. . . . The end of the narrative is of equal beauty, and the calling to mind the veil which she had received from Aprodite on the day of her marriage, is one of those fine touches of feeling which Homer could not allow to escape him.' "

How great and versatile was that genius which sketched with equal truth and power and distinctness, the battle-field, and the domestic circle; the angry debate, and the hospitable entertainment; the storm gathering over the sea, and the firmament in a starry night. The artist dipped his pencil in the colors which nature herself had provided, and with no model to guide his hand but her own perfect symmetry, he delineated in the fairest forms and the most just proportions whatever be attempted.

The personifications in Homer are many and striking. Instead of tame, absurd and impalpable creations, they are generally instinct with life; furnishing a clear idea to the painter or sculptor; and are the standard representation of all subsequent poets. To say nothing of that great system of mythology which is more fully and beautifully sketched in Homer than in any other writer, and which furnished such ample materials to Phidias and Polydectus, to Zeuxis and Parrhasius, those minor personifications which did not form a part of the ancient mythology are scarcely less distinct and life-like than the delineations of the fierce-eyed Minerva, the white-armed Juno and the aegis-bearing Jupiter. Every one will recollect the sketch of Discord (*Ἔρις*):

"dire sister of the slaughtering power,
Small at her birth, but rising every hour,
While scarce the skies her horrid head can bound,
She stalks on earth, and shakes the world around ;

the outline of which picture Virgil has borrowed in his fine description of Fama. The terrible scourgings of a guilty conscience are made doubly fearful in the form of the dread Eriunyes; who walk in darkness, and whose power extends to the regions of the

dead.¹ Somewhat singular, is that personification of prayers, in the speech of Phoenix to Achilles, which Cowper translates as follows :

" Prayers are Jove's daughters, wrinkled, lame, slant-eyed,
Which, though far distant, yet with constant pace
Follow Offence. Offence, robust of limb,
And treading firm the ground, outstrips them all,
And over all the earth before them runs
Hurtful to man. They, following, heal the hurt.
Received respectfully when they approach,
They yield us aid and listen when we pray.
But if we slight, and with obdurate heart
Resist them, to Saturnian Jove they cry
Against us, supplicating that Offence
May cleave to us for vengeance of the wrong."

The famous Scylla, with her dragon throats and sharp claws, surrounded with half-projecting dogs, furnished to Milton his ideal of

" the snaky sorceress, that sat
Fast by Hell-gate."

It were needless to multiply instances; such as the beautiful pictures of the Hours, the Graces, the rosy-fingered Aurora, and many others. It is more agreeable to the student to discover them for himself; just as the traveller, who views the magnificent ruins of an ancient city, is more elated if he comes upon them unexpectedly. What we would say is this: the personifications of Homer are generally more fresh and vivid than those of the later poets. This may be owing partly to the imagination of the poet himself; and partly to the age in which he lived. The morning had just dawned upon him. He wandered abroad when everything was green, and sparkling with dew-drops. Many a delicate flower, in sweetness and beauty, opened before him, and many a leaf was set with diamonds which a fiercer sun would dry up at noon. He had, then, only to stretch forth his hand and gather what lay in his path.

These remarks upon the *Iliad*, to which we have been almost unconsciously led, might be extended indefinitely. We are aware, that they will convey the most imperfect idea of those brilliant scenes, which rise up to the view in rapid succession and endless

¹ Il. 19. 259.—'Ἐρινύες, αἵθ' ὑπὸ γαίαν

'Ἀνθρώπων τίνυνται. — The doctrine of a future retribution, is not merely hinted at in this passage.

variety. Even the most elaborate and the most successful description of them, like a graphic account of Athens or of Memphis, could accomplish little more than to incite a desire in the reader to view them for himself. And this, in the case of Homer at least, would be precisely what we could wish. It is a book which deserves to be read, and to be studied, far beyond the attention which it receives; and we are glad that the facilities for understanding it are now so greatly multiplied.¹

ARTICLE VI.

THE SPIRIT OF PROPHECY IN RELATION TO THE FUTURE CONDITION OF THE JEWS.

By Rev. Luther F. Dimmick, Newburyport, Mass.

THE future condition of the Jews, is a subject which has received, from various sources, no small attention. The subject is worthy of attention. It is worthy of attention, for its own sake. Every branch of truth, and every department of the divine operations, has in it something to repay investigation. The connection of this subject with other themes, imparts to it a still higher interest. The right understanding of it will lead to some views of essential importance, in regard to the general character of the religion of the Bible; besides which, some lessons of practical duty will grow out of it. The Jews have been a people greatly distinguished.² Their origin was remarkable,—Abraham, the fa-

¹ We should not omit to mention, in this place, Mr. Owen's excellent edition of the *Odyssey*. With the flattering notices of it which have already appeared, we fully concur. The editor understands the wants of the student, and possesses much skill in meeting them. His work deserves and will receive the thanks of many who read the story of the much-wandering *Odysseus*.

² The early designation of the people was, "Israel," "children of Israel," derived from Jacob their father, who obtained the surname of *Israel*, at the remarkable scene of Peniel, when he obtained a signal answer to prayer, (Gen. 32: 24—30). Subsequently, after the division of the tribes, the two branches of the nation were Judah and Israel, Judah being the principal tribe of the division to which it belonged. At length, Israel being removed, and Judah, or the branch passing under that name, being the part that remained, and with which the Christian world has had the most connection, we use this term, *Jews*, sometimes, though rather improperly, as including the whole people.

ther of the faithful, and the friend of God. For two thousand years, they constituted God's visible church, while all the other nations of the world were left without the impressive merciful visitations with which they were favored. Through this dark period, they were the depositaries of the oracles and the ordinances of the true religion, for the world's benefit in subsequent time. And through them came, at length, the world's Deliverer, "the Light and Life of men." To these things the apostle alludes: "What advantage, then, hath the Jew? or what profit is there in circumcision? Much every way; chiefly because that unto them were committed the oracles of God," (Rom. 3: 1, 2). "To whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises. Whose are the fathers, and of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, who is over all God blessed for ever. Amen," (Rom. 9: 4, 5). The *past*, in respect to them, is full of wonders.

The present state of the Jews, as every one knows, is a state of dispersion. Reckoned at about six millions, they are scattered through almost every part of the civilized world.¹

In respect to the future condition of the Jews, two leading views are entertained. One is, that of their literal restoration to Palestine, the land of their fathers; the reëstablishment of their national polity and worship; their conversion to Christ, and his reign among them, marked with peculiar manifestations of the divine favor, making them the head of all the nations of the earth,—a peculiar people in time to come, as they have been in time past. Some suppose Christ will descend personally, and reign personally, in his bodily presence, at their head, in Palestine, making all nations subject to them, and using them as his instruments, or prime ministers, in carrying forward his purposes in the other parts of the world. The other view entertained respecting them, is, that they will be converted to Christ, and, *in common with all other nations*, partake in the blessings of his reign on earth and in heaven, leaving their outward earthly condition to be determined by circumstances, and by general providences, in the same manner as that of all other nations is determined. In the investigation of this subject, it is not a mere superficial view of

¹ "Of the two and a half tribes which removed east of the trans-Jordanic cities, Judah and Benjamin, and half Manasseh, I compute the number in every part of the world as exceeding six millions. Of the missing nine and a half tribes, part of which are in Turkey, China, Hindostan, Persia, and on this continent, it is impossible to ascertain their numerical force."—*M. M. Noah's Discourses*, pp. 36, 37.

it, with which we should be satisfied. It is a subject which enters deeply into the economy of the gospel, and involves principles of the very highest moment in the interpretation of the Bible. The gospel itself, in some important respects, borrows its character from the manner in which this question is settled.

I would not conceal it now at the beginning, that I have less confidence in the *literal* in this matter, than some others have. But I will not forestall the arguments. They shall speak for themselves.

The arguments urged in favor of their *literal* restoration, and the reëstablishment of their polity and worship, with the peculiar marks of the divine favor referred to, are several: I. The covenant, by which God conveyed the land of Palestine to Abraham and his posterity, it is said, is declared to be an everlasting covenant, and the land is conveyed as an everlasting possession. The leading passages are the following: Gen. 17: 7, 8; 26: 3; 48: 3, 4; Ps. 105: 8—11, which the reader may consult in their respective places. Now, it is said, since the covenant giving to Israel the land of Canaan, is an "everlasting covenant," and the land is given to them for an "everlasting possession," the people must return and dwell there; else the promise of God fails,—his gracious covenant is not fulfilled.¹ II. It is said that the land, described in various promises to the patriarchs, has never yet, the whole of it, been possessed by their descendants; and, as the promise cannot fail, the people must, on this account also, return, that *the whole* of what is promised them may be put in their possession. The borders of the land are frequently described in the Scriptures. As, to Abraham: "Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt, unto the great river, the river Euphrates," (Gen. 15: 18). By Moses its borders are more particularly noticed. The substance of the statement is, that the land was bounded on the south by the wilderness of Zin, along the coast of Edom, to the outer coast of the Salt Sea eastward; and, westward, by a line passing through Kadesh-barnea to Azmon, and the river of Egypt, going out at the sea,—the great sea, or Mediterranean. On the west, "ye shall even have the great sea for a border; this shall be your west border." On the north, "from the great sea, ye shall point out for you Mount Hor; and from Mount Hor, to the entrance of Hamath, and to Zedad, and Ziphron, and Hazar-enan." And on the east, "the border shall descend, and shall reach unto the side of the sea of Chinnereth, and go down to Jordan, and the goings out of it shall be at the Salt Sea," (Num. 34:

¹ See Keith's *Land of Israel*, p. 20, etc.

3—12). Within these boundaries, it will be seen, the country east of the Jordan is not included. The two tribes and a half had already taken possession of that country; and it was not necessary to speak of it, in assigning the boundaries to the inheritance of the other nine tribes and a half. The country east of the Jordan is immediately afterwards mentioned, with the tribes that had received it for their inheritance, as a separate item, (vs. 14, 15). The general representation of the Scriptures includes expressly this eastern country also. "From the river of Egypt, unto the great river, the river Euphrates." "From the wilderness, and Lebanon, from the river, the river Euphrates, even unto the uttermost sea, shall your coast be," (Deut. 11: 24). From the wilderness of Zin and Edom on the south, to Lebanon and the entrance of Hamath on the north, and from the Euphrates on the east, to the Mediterranean on the west.¹ Now it is insisted, that this land has never, the whole of it, been possessed by the descendants of Abraham; and that, therefore, they must return, and be reinstated there in their national capacity, in order that the promise may be fulfilled to them. There is a necessity for their literal restoration, and a reorganization of their polity, that *the whole* of the land described, may be subjected to them, and enjoyed by them. Without such restoration, in this respect also the covenant of God fails.² III. It is argued, that there are

¹ See also Joshua 13: 5, and Judges 3: 3, where mention is made of the "entering into Hamath" as the north border.

² It has been contended by some, that "the river of Egypt," mentioned in the covenant with Abraham, and in describing the boundaries of the land, in Numbers, is the Nile; and that, therefore, a half of Egypt itself is included in the promised land. See Keith's *Land of Israel*, p. 81, etc. But of this there does not seem to be sufficient proof. Joshua speaks of the river "Sihor, which is before Egypt," (13: 3); i. e. which runs, on the borders between Egypt and Palestine. Jeremiah speaks of this river, and says: "What hast thou to do in the way of Egypt, to drink the waters of Sihor?" (Jer. 2: 18). What more natural, in the inhabitants of Palestine, than to call this the river of Egypt, dividing, as it does, Egypt from their own territory?

Moreover, where is the evidence that any of the patriarchs, or any sacred writer, ever considered Egypt, or any part of it, as belonging to the promised land? When Abraham went down into Egypt to sojourn there, because "there was a famine in the land," he does not appear to have done it as one going to another part of his own promised inheritance, but to the inheritance of another people; and when the famine had subsided he returned again to his former place, (Gen. xii. xiii). When Jacob was about to die, he said to Joseph: "Bury me not, I pray thee, in Egypt. But I will lie with my fathers, and thou shalt carry me out of Egypt, and bury me in their burying place," (Gen. 47: 29, 30). He considered Palestine as his home, and the place where he ought to

many express declarations of Scripture, giving explicit and unquestionable assurance, that the seed of Abraham, once possessors of Palestine, shall be restored, and possess the land again, and enjoy there again their former national polity. This branch of the subject is one of much importance, and shall receive due attention. IV. There are several important circumstances connected with the Jewish people, it is contended, which favor their literal restoration, and their exalted and long continued national glory in their ancient land. It is congruous, it is thought, with the distinctions they have already enjoyed, that they should be also greatly distinguished in future. "Their past exaltation, their present degradation, and their future glory," presuming the future from the past, "are events unparalleled in the history of nations," (*Frey's Judah and Israel*, p. 249). "The wonderful preservation of [the Jews] as a distinct nation, is another argument in favor of their [literal] return to their own land. No people have continued unmixed so long as they have done." *Ib.* pp. 291, 292. "Another argument, is the general expectation of the people to return to the land of their fathers. This desire is interwoven in all their prayers from day to day, and more particularly so in the prayers for the festivals, especially on the feast of the passover, where it is said repeatedly: 'This year we are here, at the next year we shall be in the land of Israel.' " *Ib.* p. 293. Again: "A most remarkable circumstance and strong argument in favor of the people's returning again to the land of their fathers," is, "that they are so situated that at the shortest notice they are ready and able to depart as easily as when they came out of Egypt." "They have no landed property, or civil or other connections, to detain them. Their possessions, consisting in movables, may easily be conveyed with them." *Ib.* 294, 295. Moreover, it is said, the land seems, in the providence of God, to be specially preserved for them, not being inhabited, except very sparsely, by any other people; and the way seems, even now, preparing, by the break-

rest. And so Joseph when he was about to die, "took an oath of the children of Israel, saying, God will surely visit you, and ye shall carry up my bones from hence," (*Ib.* 50: 25). He, too, felt that, not Egypt, but Palestine, was the appropriate burying place for him. And the reason he expressly assigns in the preceding verse: "God will surely visit you, and bring you out of this land, unto the land which he sware to Abraham, to Isaac and to Jacob," (*v.* 24). Egypt, then, was not the land which God sware to these patriarchs. Palestine was the land; and Egypt, not any part of it, was included within its borders. "The river of Egypt," therefore, was not the Nile, but the river that is before Egypt,—"in the way of Egypt,"—the river that divided the two countries.

ing up of the Ottoman power, for their return. *Ib.* pp. 296, 297. With these things, additional to the others mentioned, in favor of the doctrine of a literal restoration, who can doubt, it is demanded, that a literal restoration will take place? "The denial of it may well seem to be an impeachment of the truth of God, in regard to the very thing on which he hath staked his faithfulness." Keith, p. 66.

Such is the substance of the argument, so far as we have seen it stated, in favor of the literal restoration, and the future earthly glory, of the Jewish people.

We come now to the examination of the different branches of this argument. And here we do not hesitate to express our conviction, at the outset, that they are not valid, for so much as their friends would make of them. We confess we incline to the belief, that prophecy assures us only of the conversion of the Jews to Christ, in common with other nations, and of their participation in the blessings of his reign, on earth and in heaven, leaving their outward earthly condition to be determined by circumstances, and by general providences, in the same manner as that of all other nations is determined.

It is proper to be observed here, that those who take this latter view of the case, do not pretend to determine that the Jews will not, in the progress of events, return, in some numbers, to Palestine. They may do so; and possibly, under mistaken notions, endeavor to reestablish their polity and worship. What they will do, it may not be for us to say, any more than it is, what any other nation will do. The question is, Whether the Scriptures, rightly interpreted, do in fact teach any such thing as this literal restoration and reestablishment of their institutions; whether this doctrine of *literalism*, as to them, is to be taken as a true and veritable part of Christianity, and Christianity is to be made responsible for the carrying out of the scheme it contemplates? Is this, in fact, the development into which Christianity is to unfold? Is this the great form it is to assume? Or is the work which Christianity is to perform in the earth, of a different character?

I. The argument supposed to be found in the covenant with Abraham, called "an everlasting covenant," and giving to him and his posterity the land of Canaan "for an everlasting possession," which covenant was renewed to Isaac and to Jacob, and is recognized in subsequent Scriptures.

The argument here presented contains two points to be considered. Its validity turns, *first*, on the import of the word "*ever-*

lasting," as used in this connection ; whether it means, here, a full and absolute eternity ; or whether it is modified by the subject to which it relates, and is to be interpreted of a protracted yet lesser duration ; and, *secondly*, on the question, whether, if there be in the covenant a deeper element, rendering it strictly eternal, that element has reference to the literal Canaan, or to something of which the literal Canaan was a shadow and a figure ; whether, as, in the progress of things, the covenant is fulfilled, it will not gradually throw off its earthly appendages, and rise and disclose a spiritual good, of which all figures and shadows in this world are but the faint illustration.

The expressions, "everlasting covenant," "everlasting possession," are, in themselves, capable of either of these two interpretations. They may mean a covenant, a possession, absolutely without limits, strictly eternal ; or they may mean a covenant, a possession, of an enduring character, for a long, yet limited period, circumstances requiring such limitation.

Of this latter use of the word "everlasting," or its equivalent, in the Scriptures, we have numerous instances.¹ God says of the rainbow, that it is a token of "the everlasting covenant between him and every living creature of all flesh that is upon the earth" (Gen. 9: 16), a covenant of very long duration, the meaning is ; though, according to the common doctrine, the time will come when the arrangement will cease, as the world itself will be destroyed, though not by flood. Again, he said to Abraham respecting circumcision : "And my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant," (Gen. 17: 13). Yet circumcision is abolished, no one, probably, supposes ever to be revived as an ordinance in the church of God. Of the passover it was said : "Ye shall keep it a feast by an ordinance forever," (Ex. 12: 14). Yet the passover has ceased. "Christ our passover," the SUBSTANCE, "being sacrificed for us" (1 Cor. 5: 7), the *shadow* has fled away. Of the servant who wished to remain with his master, it is said : "His master shall bore his ear through with an awl, and he shall serve him forever" (Ex. 21: 6.), perpetually, that is, as long as he lives, though not literally without end. The priesthood of Aaron was called "an everlasting priesthood" (Ex. 40: 16) ; yet the priesthood of Aaron has ceased. Of the great annual atonement among the Jews, it was said : "This shall be an everlasting statute unto

¹ The original word most usually employed is עָלָם, either alone, or in some of its combinations ; though occasionally some other expression is used.

you," (Lev. 16: 34); yet that annual atonement has ceased. The house, sold in a walled city, not redeemed in a year, it was decreed, "shall be established forever to him that bought it" (Lev. 25: 30); not for a literal eternity, but while the house endures. Of servants bought of the heathen, it is said: "They shall be your bond-men forever" (Ib. v. 46); shall not go out, that is, at the year of jubilee, but remain during life. The blowing of trumpets, it was said to the Jews, "shall be to you for an ordinance forever" (Num. 10: 8); not eternally, but while the Jewish economy should endure. The heap of stones at Jordan, Joshua said: "shall be a memorial unto the children of Israel forever" (Josh. 4: 7); a memorial of long continuance, onward through the ages before them, was the meaning. It has ceased. Of Samuel, about to be left at the tabernacle, it was said: "that he may appear before the Lord, and there abide forever" (1 Sam. 1: 22); not absolutely, and in the highest sense, forever, but perpetually, during his natural life. Achish said to David: "I will make thee keeper of mine head for ever" (1 Sam. 28: 2); not any longer, certainly, than they both should live. Abner said to Joab: "Shall the sword devour forever?" (2 Sam. 2: 26); shall our wars and strifes be protracted still? Solomon said of the temple: "I have built thee an house to dwell in, a settled place for thee to abide in forever" (1 Kings 8: 13); and God said in reply: "I have hallowed this house, which thou hast built, to put my name there forever" (Ib. 9: 3); yet Solomon's temple long since ceased. The elders who counselled Rehoboam to listen to the requests of the people, added: "then they will be thy servants forever" (1 Kings 12: 7); not longer, certainly, than they all should live.

And these are but specimens of a use which is frequent in the Bible. If it be inquired, how we shall determine, in different cases, whether the expressions, "everlasting," "forever," and others of equivalent import, are to be understood of a very long time, or of absolutely unlimited duration, the answer is, the subject matter of the discourse, and the connections of the passage, must furnish the rule of judgment. Nor is this a far-fetched rule, to serve a purpose. The whole genius of language rests upon this principle. Words have different meanings. And the particular meaning, in a given case, must be determined by the subject of the discourse, and by the connections in which the word stands. The expressions, "everlasting," "forever," in the passages above mentioned, must be thus limited by their connections, and the subjects of the discourse in which they are used. An absolute necessity

exists for such limitation. They can mean only, during the present economy of things, or while the world shall continue, or during the Jewish dispensation, where the rites peculiar to that dispensation were spoken of, or during natural life, where such was the subject of discourse. Another fact may be added here; which, with a believer in the literal restoration, will have weight. In the prophecy of Jeremiah, the people of Judea are spoken of as having slidden back with a "perpetual backsliding" (8: 5); which is about equivalent to the word everlasting; yet this backsliding is not supposed to be strictly eternal. Again, of the judgments to come upon them, it is said: "to make their land desolate, and a perpetual hissing," strictly, according to the original, "a hissing forever," חִסּוּן, (18: 16). And again, "to make them an astonishment, and a hissing, and perpetual desolations," or literally, according to the original, "desolations for ever," חִסּוּן, (25: 9). The desolations, after all, must be repaired—in fact, were repaired, after the seventy years. And if the words in question must be understood in a modified sense here, why not in the other cases? Now take the "everlasting covenant" with Abraham, giving him and his posterity the land of Canaan, "for an everlasting possession." May it not be, that this language is to be understood, after all, in a limited sense? Indeed, it must mean something less than absolute eternal duration, if the world is ever to have an end. Canaan can be enjoyed only while the world shall endure. And, if the language must be restricted, may it not be restricted to the measure of the ancient economy, meaning *perpetual*, a perpetual possession and home, in distinction from the wandering life which the father of the faithful was then living—a possession and home to continue through many ages, even for thousands of years, till the economy about to be there established should be needed no more in the world. This is the kind of duration which the word designates in the other cases. Why may it not designate the same here?

There is, indeed, a sense, and that a very important sense, in which the covenant with Abraham was strictly an eternal covenant, and the blessing promised,—not the earthly Canaan, but that which the earthly Canaan prefigured,—an eternal inheritance. The blessing included, and was designed more and more to unfold into, a spiritual good, that should continue, not only through the duration of earth, but through the duration of heaven itself. It was a blessing in Christ, and including Christ and his

grace, and the fruits of his grace, while eternity shall endure. So the apostle interprets it. "To Abraham and his seed were promises made. He saith not, And to seeds, as of many; but as of one, And to thy seed, which is Christ," (Gal. 3: 16). Christ was the leading blessing, even in the covenant with Abraham,—Christ, and the eternal heaven which he has prepared for his people. Hence it is written: "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise" (Gal. 3: 29); heirs of heaven according to that very promise which God made to Abraham. So Abraham himself understood it. Through those transactions, and the ordinances of his time, he "saw Christ's day, and was glad" (John 8: 56); and not only Christ's day on earth, but something of the glory of Christ's heavenly kingdom. "He looked for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God;" and, with his fellow-sojourners in Canaan, through faith, "desired a better country, that is, an heavenly," (Heb. 11: 10, 16). This was the vision that filled the believing eye of the father of the faithful, and the other patriarchs who embraced the promises. The earthly Canaan,—a blessing, indeed, in itself,—was yet but a shadow of richer blessings seen through it, the kingdom of Christ, and the glory of heaven.

Now to interpret the promise to Abraham, as a mere promise of the earthly Canaan to him and his posterity, is, it appears to us, to rob it of its chief grandeur and glory. To assert that the Jews must return to Palestine, and be reorganized into an earthly kingdom, at this late day of the world, in order that God's promise to Abraham may be fulfilled, is taking the matter,—we cannot resist the conviction,—altogether from the position in which the apostle has placed it. It is apparently going back to things exploded. It is coming down from heaven to earth. The promise may have had an immediate reference to the earthly Canaan, the shadow, while that shadow was needful in carrying forward the great economy of grace, and may be spoken of, in a modified sense, as "everlasting," or perpetual, in common with other things, which were ordained to continue while the dispensation then existing should endure. But when the substance shines out, and rises more and more into view, with each revolving age, till, under the present dispensation, the shadow has almost entirely sunk and lost itself in the superior glory; may not the shadow be left in its obscurity, and the substance, glorious beyond description, take its place? It is according to the economy of grace,

that it should. The shadow, the type, when it has served its purpose, disappears, as the morning star ceases to be seen after the rising of the glorious full-orbed sun.

The argument, then, from the covenant with Abraham, in favor of a yet future earthly kingdom of the Jews, of the character and splendor for which some are looking, we cannot make seem to us otherwise than exceedingly slender. Adopted, as it has been, by excellent and learned men, we must still think it is the result of mistake in interpreting the promise, and of some failure, in this one point, to apprehend the true character of the Messiah's dispensation.

II. The argument arising from the alleged fact, that the people have never yet possessed the *whole* of the land promised, next claims our notice. If they have never yet possessed the whole of the land promised, the reasoning is, they must yet be literally restored, and spread themselves over the whole of it, and enjoy it through a period of long duration; for the promise cannot be broken.

The land promised, as we have seen, was the territory extending "from the river of Egypt, unto the great river, the river Euphrates," and from "the wilderness of Zin, to the entrance of Hamath." These were its borders.

Now, is it a fact, that this territory never was wholly possessed by the children of Israel? This is a question of no small interest. Even, indeed, if the people never did possess the whole land promised, God might still excuse himself, from the fact, that they had broken the covenant with him, and this released him from his obligation to them. As it was expressly said, at an early date, respecting driving out the corrupt nations from before them: "The anger of the Lord was hot against Israel; and he said, Because that this people have transgressed my covenant which I commanded their fathers, and have not hearkened unto my voice; I also will not henceforth drive out any from before them, of the nations which Joshua left when he died.—Therefore the Lord left those nations, without driving them out hastily, neither delivered he them into the hand of Joshua," (Judges 2: 20—23). Such might have been the proceeding of God wholly and finally, without any breach of integrity or veracity on his part. The covenant broken by the people, he was not helden; he was free. But not to rest the matter on this ground, as God is always better to us than our deserts, let us see, whether, in

fact, there was any such failure, in the sequel, to possess *the whole* of the promised land.

In the book of Joshua it is said, toward the close of the book, and after the conquests by Joshua had been narrated: "And the Lord gave unto Israel all the land which he swore to give unto their fathers; and they possessed it, and dwelt therein. And the Lord gave them rest round about, according to all that he swore unto their fathers; and there stood not a man of all their enemies before them; the Lord delivered all their enemies into their hand. There failed not aught of any good thing which the Lord had spoken unto the house of Israel," (21: 43—45). Now here is an assertion, that the people had been put in possession of "all the land which God swore to give unto their fathers." It may be, indeed, that this was spoken only in a looser sense, as denoting merely a general triumph of the arms of Israel, various tribes remaining still within their borders not wholly subdued. The book of Judges shows such to have been, in fact, the case. But the triumph was signal, insomuch that the sacred writer declared that God had fulfilled his promise: "There failed not aught of any good thing which he had spoken; all came to pass." Is not this rather a stumbling-block to those who would lead Israel back to Palestine, lest the promise fail? So again, Joshua in his farewell address said: "Ye know in all your hearts, and in all your souls, that not one thing hath failed of all the good things which the Lord your God spake concerning you; all are come to pass unto you, and not one thing hath failed thereof," (23: 14). This would seem as though, in a general sense at least, the land God had spoken of to them, had become their possession. We may admit, as before, that the possession was not entirely complete and unmolested. Remnants of the nations within their borders were still unsubdued. But there was a general triumph, a general and glorious fulfilment of the promise, or it could not have been spoken of in terms like those here employed.

At a later period it is said of David, that he "smote Hadadezer, the son of Rehob, king of Zobah, as he went to recover his border at the river Euphrates," (2 Sam. 8: 3). Or, as expressed in another place: "David smote Hadadezer king of Zobah, unto Hamath, as he went to establish his dominion by the river Euphrates," (1 Chron. 18: 3). These passages show that the dominion of David did extend to the Euphrates and to Hamath. Whatever dispute there may have been in those quarters, he

marched his armies thither, and "recovered" to himself what belonged to him, and "stablished his dominion" there. The Euphrates, we have seen, was the eastern border of the promised land,—and Hamath was the northern border of the promised land; the most distant borders in these directions ever mentioned. The dominion of David, therefore, did extend over the whole territory in these directions, as it is known to have done in others.

In the time of Solomon, the extent of Israel's dominion is still more particularly mentioned. "Solomon," we are told, "reigned over all kingdoms, from the river," [Euphrates, the meaning is,] "unto the land of the Philistines, and unto the border of Egypt; they brought presents, and served Solomon all the days of his life," (1 Kings 4: 21). See also 2 Chron. 9: 26. At the dedication of the Temple, it is said: "Solomon held a feast, and all Israel with him, a great congregation, from the entering in of Hamath unto the river of Egypt, before the Lord God," (1 Kings 8: 65). See also 2 Chron. 7: 8. At a little later period, it is said: "Solomon went to Hamath-Zobah, and prevailed against it. And he built Tadmor in the wilderness"—Palmyra, far eastward towards the Euphrates,—"and all the store-cities, which he built in Hamath," (2 Chron. 8: 3, 4). Signifying that, however occasional disturbances might occur, his dominion extended over these realms.

Of Jeroboam, the son of Joash, more than two centuries after Solomon, it is said: "he restored the coast of Israel from the entering of Hamath unto the sea of the plain," or Dead Sea, (2 Kings, 14: 25). Invaders were expelled, or the remnants of former tribes who had occasioned trouble, were overpowered. The border was maintained; and three hundred years afterwards, when the captivity came up from Babylon, under Nehemiah, they gave thanks to God for his covenant with Abraham, granting him the land of Canaan, and add: "And hast performed thy words; for thou art righteous," (Neh. 9: 8). They considered the covenant as having been fulfilled. God had given them what he promised them.

Now, what is the amount of the argument for the literal restoration of the Jews, that they must go back in order to possess the *whole* land included in the covenant with Abraham, and that unless they do thus the covenant of God fails? Is it not a slender argument, on which to hang so important a conclusion? Even allowing that, sometimes, Israel did not enjoy, in the land, the

full amount of peace and blessing, which the promise, as repeated on particular occasions, seemed to contemplate, there was reason enough for such failure, in their sins. They broke their covenant with God, and that released him, in such points as he chose, from his obligation to them. And admit that the people were curtailed in the possession of their territory still more in the latter periods of their history, till, at length, they were wholly deprived of it. They had had the blessing, and it was continued to them through the duration of the economy for which it was given; and they had abused it, and the economy ceased, and it was taken from them. All the connections of the subject show, that the possessions of Israel, for periods of no small duration, were as extensive as the grant in the covenant to Abraham; and that the argument, that they must be restored in order to enjoy the whole land, or the covenant of God fails, is without solid foundation. They have enjoyed what God stipulated. They considered themselves, while the ages were passing, as enjoying it. It remains for them now, to enjoy the richer blessing, of which that earthly Canaan was but the shadow. In this, we rob them not. We wrong them not. We point them to a higher good;—a good which is substantial, and literally eternal; a land, whose skies are brighter than those that hang over Palestine; a land, whose fruits and streams are richer and clearer than Palestine ever knew; a land, over which no desolating scourge shall ever sweep; a land, an abode, which God has blessed with the blessings of life for evermore.

III. But we are pointed to express declarations of Scripture, in which, it is said, explicit and unquestionable assurance is given, of a literal restoration of the Jews, and a reëstablishment of their polity in their ancient land.

To these passages of Scripture it becomes us to give very serious and careful attention,—not for the purpose of establishing a theory preconceived and adopted, but that we may understand what the import of the Bible on the subject really is. In the application of these passages, two errors, we think, have been committed. One is, that passages relating to a *former* restoration of the Jews,—passages which received their accomplishment in ages long since past,—are held to be still in force, and are relied upon as proof of a now future restoration. The other error is, that of giving passages, in which the blessings of the Christian dispensation are promised under a Jewish dress, or in Jewish types and figures, a literal interpretation, rather than a spiritual,

corresponding to the character of the dispensation to which they relate.

Captivity and restoration,—being given into the hands of enemies as a punishment for sin, and being delivered and reinstated in the enjoyment of liberty again,—were themes very familiar to the ancient mind. These were channels in which judgments and mercies often flowed. The state of early society favored things of this sort. In accordance with this, Moses addressed the children of Israel, at the very commencement of their national existence. Having announced a remarkable catalogue of blessings that should attend obedience, and of curses that should follow disobedience, he added: "And it shall come to pass, when all these things shall come upon thee, the blessing and the curse which I have set before thee, and thou shalt call them to mind among all the nations whither the Lord thy God hath driven thee; and shalt return unto the Lord thy God, and shalt obey his voice, according to all that I command thee this day, thou and thy children, with all thine heart, and with all thy soul; that then the Lord thy God will turn thy captivity, and have compassion upon thee, and will return and gather thee from all the nations whither the Lord thy God hath scattered thee. If any of thine be driven out unto the utmost parts of heaven, from thence will the Lord thy God gather thee, and from thence will he fetch thee; and the Lord thy God will bring thee into the land which thy fathers possessed, and thou shalt possess it; and he will do thee good, and multiply thee above thy fathers," (Deut. 30: 1—5).

Such was the tenor of God's arrangement with his ancient people. And, on a larger or smaller scale, it was carried into effect, while the dispensation involved in their organization was continued. See their early history, as given in the book of Judges. When they were obedient, they prospered. When they were disobedient, "the anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he delivered them into the hands of spoilers that spoiled them, and he sold them into the hands of their enemies round about," (Judges 2: 14). He sold them into the hand of Chushan-rishathaim eight years (3: 8); and into the hand of Eglon, king of Moab, eighteen years (v. 14); and afterwards into the hand of Jabin, king of Canaan, who had 900 chariots of iron, and mightily oppressed the children of Israel (4: 1—3); and then, after a respite, into the hand of Midian seven years (6: 1); then into the hands of the Philistines, and the children of Ammon, eighteen years (10:

7, 8); then, again, into the hands of the Philistines forty years, (13: 1).

Thus Israel lived, amidst alternations of captivity and restoration, of oppressions and deliverances, for near three hundred years. For one third part of the time and more, they were in the hands of their enemies. They seem not to have been conveyed to a distance from their land, as in subsequent instances. Still they were sold "into the hands of their enemies round about."

In subsequent time, there were greater calamities of this description. About three hundred and eighty years from the time of the Judges, or 761 B. C. while Pekah reigned in Samaria, we are told: "came Tiglath-pileser king of Assyria, and took Ijon, and Abel-beth-maachah, and Janoah, and Kadesh, and Hazor, and Gilead, and Galilee, all the land of Naphtali, and carried them captive to Assyria," (2 Kings 15: 29). This deportation seems to have included the two tribes and a half, "the Reubenites, and the Gadites, and the half tribe of Manasseh," on the east of the Jordan, (1 Chron. 5: 26).

About thirty-eight years after this, or B. C. 723, "in the fourth year of Hezekiah, and seventh of Hoshea son of Elah king of Israel, Shalmaneser king of Assyria came up against Samaria, and besieged it. And at the end of three years they took it.—And the king of Assyria did carry away Israel unto Assyria," (2 Kings 18: 10, 11). These were the captivities of the Ten Tribes, or ten and a half tribes, from which, especially from the last, they never extensively returned.

The captivities of Judah were at a little later period. They were several distinct visitations; but were so near together, that they have generally been reckoned as but parts of one grand catastrophe. About 600 B. C. "in the third year of the reign of Jehoiakim king of Judah, came Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon unto Jerusalem, and besieged it. And the Lord gave Jehoiakim king of Judah into his hand, with part of the vessels of the house of God; which he carried into the land of Shinar, to the house of his god; and he brought the vessels into the house of his god," (Dan. 1: 1, 2). Daniel and his companions were a part of this captivity, with, doubtless, many others of the nobles and chief men of the nation. Nebuchadnezzar "bound" Jehoiakim "in fetters, to carry him to Babylon" (2 Chron. 36: 6); but afterwards permitted him to remain as his vassal. "Jehoiakim became his servant three years," (2 Kings 24: 1). At the end of three years, "he turned and rebelled against" his master. And this brought on him

a second visitation. "The Lord sent against him bands of the Chaldees, and bands of the Syrians, and bands of the Moabites, and bands of the children of Ammon, and sent them against Judah to destroy it, according to the word of the Lord, which he spake by his servants the prophets," (2 Kings 24: 1, 2). These nations were subject to Nebuchadnezzar, and moved at his bidding. Jehoiakim seems to have perished in this struggle, with his chief officers of State; and, as the prophet Jeremiah informs us, upwards of three thousand more of the Jews were conveyed to Babylon, (Jer. 52: 28).¹ About five years from the rebellion of Jehoiakim, under the reign of his son Jehoiachin, came Nebuchadnezzar again, with his armies, and besieged Jerusalem, and took it; and carried thence to Babylon the king, and the royal family, all the treasures of the house of the Lord, and of the king's house, all the mighty men of valor, even ten thousand captives, and all the craftsmen and smiths; none remained save the poorest sort of the people of the land," (2 Kings 24: 10—16). This was the third calamity, and greater than either of the former.

About eleven years after this, in consequence of the rebellion of Zedekiah, whom Nebuchadnezzar had set up in Judea, the armies of Chaldea again laid waste Jerusalem and the surrounding country, committing great devastations, and carrying still more of the people into captivity, leaving only "of the poor of the land to be vine-dressers and husbandmen." "So," concludes the narrative, "Judah was carried away out of their land," (2 Kings 25: 1—21).

Here is the Babylonish captivity, which constitutes so great an era in Jewish history. In the space of about eighteen years, the city of Jerusalem, and the land extensively, were made a desolation. And it lasted SEVENTY YEARS.

Now it is important to be observed here, that it was in connection with this captivity, a little previous to it, or in the midst of it, that the more distinguished of the Jewish prophets lived, those from whom are quoted chiefly the passages composing the main part of the argument for a yet literal restoration.

ISAIAH.

Isaiah is computed to have flourished about one hundred years previous to this great judgment. He predicted it, however, as approaching, in consequence of the abounding wickedness, into which the nation, even in his time, had fallen.

¹ "Three thousand Jews and three and twenty."

The book of Isaiah has been considered as consisting of two parts. The first includes chapters i—xxxix. This portion of the book is made up extensively of reproofs of the nation for their sins; threatenings of the calamities that, in consequence, were to come upon them; similar reproofs and threatenings in regard to several surrounding nations; interspersed with predictions of the Messiah and his kingdom, with several other matters.

The reproofs are like the following: "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth; for the Lord hath spoken; I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against me."—"Ah, sinful nation, a people laden with iniquity, a seed of evil doers, children that are corrupters."—"How is the faithful city become an harlot! It was full of judgment; righteousness lodged in it; but now murderers," (1: 2, 4, 21). Such is the style in which Isaiah addressed the people in his time.

Then as to the judgments impending. Sometimes he spoke of them as already present; sometimes as near at hand: "Your country is desolate, your cities are burned with fire; your land, strangers devour it in your presence, and it is desolate, as overthrown by strangers."—"Jerusalem is ruined, and Judah is fallen."—"And he will lift up an ensign to the nations from far, and will hiss unto them from the end of the earth; and behold they shall come with speed swiftly; none shall be weary, nor stumble among them; none shall slumber nor sleep; neither shall the girdle of their loins be loosed, nor the latchet of their shoes be broken. Whose arrows are sharp, and all their bows bent; their horses' hoofs shall be counted like flint, and their wheels like a whirlwind; their roaring shall be like a lion, they shall roar like young lions; yea, they shall roar, and lay hold of the prey, and shall carry it away safe, and none shall deliver it. And in that day they shall roar against them, like the roaring of the sea; and if one look unto the land, behold darkness and sorrow, and the light is darkness in the heavens thereof."—"Until the cities be wasted without inhabitant, and the houses without man, and the land be utterly desolate; and the Lord have removed men far away, and there be a great forsaking in the midst of the land."—"The land shall be utterly emptied, and utterly spoiled," (1: 7. 3: 8. 4: 26—30. 6: 11, 12. 24: 3). Thus full was the prophet's mind of the desolating judgments that were to come upon his nation, and particularly of the captivity that was but a little before them.

The remaining part of the book of Isaiah, chap. xl—lxvi, inclusive, contains some most glowing descriptions of the deliverance

of the people from the calamities they were to suffer, and particularly from the predicted captivity; in connection with which are frequent notices, and even extended representations, of the greater and spiritual deliverance, which Christ was, in due time, to effect for the world; a deliverance, of which all former deliverances were a shadow. The kingdom and glory of the Messiah caught the prophet's vision; and sublimer strains the world does not contain, than this prophetic and seraphic writer presents.

Survey, now, some of the passages from Isaiah, usually adduced in the argument before us, and see what construction it is most reasonable to put upon them. "The Lord will have mercy on Jacob, and will yet choose Israel, and set them in their own land." He adds, that "strangers shall be joined with them, and they shall cleave to the house of Jacob; and the people shall rule over their oppressors," (14: 1—3). Is it most natural to look, for the fulfilment of this promise, to some event now, in these latter ages of the world? or to deliverance from the captivity then about to take place, of which the prophet so frequently spake, and of which his mind was so full? The earlier event, unquestionably, is the one to be preferred, unless there be some special reasons for understanding it of the remoter. This is a grand rule in the interpretation of prophecy: *Let it apply to the earlier event, when the earlier event constitutes a proper fulfilment.* And subsequent expressions show that that earlier event was, indeed, the one intended. "It shall come to pass, in the day that the Lord shall give thee rest from thy sorrow, and from thy fear, and from the hard bondage wherein thou wast made to serve, that thou shalt take up this proverb against the king of Babylon, and say, How hath the oppressor ceased! the golden city ceased! The Lord hath broken the staff of the wicked, and the sceptre of the rulers," (vs. 3—5). A large part of the chapter is occupied with a triumphal song over *Babylon's fallen king*; by whose fall the captive people obtained deliverance. This, then—deliverance from the Babylonish captivity, was what the prophet promised. If there was any further blessing couched in his language, it was a spiritual blessing relating to the Messiah's times; of which all former deliverances may be considered, in a sense, as figures.

Another passage is the following: "It shall come to pass in that day, that ye shall be gathered one by one, O ye children of Israel. And it shall come to pass in that day, that a great trumpet shall be blown, and they shall come, which were ready to perish in the land of Assyria, and the outcasts in the land of Egypt,

and shall worship the Lord in the holy mount at Jerusalem," (27: 12, 13). "These verses," says one, "predict the restoration of the Jews after the captivity; and under that event, their recovery from their present dispersion," (Scott, *in loc.*). But why the latter? Why make the passage refer thus to two events? The former restoration was manifestly the thing in the prophet's mind. And there is no evidence that he looked any farther than that particular event. If any one pleases to make that event illustrative of a great principle, running through all God's dealings with his people, *that he will deliver them from their afflictions when they cry unto him*, and also a shadow of the spiritual deliverances that were to come in the Messiah's time; there is probably no objection to such a view of the case. It is probably the true view. But why should two *literal* restorations be attributed to the same promise, when the promise itself gives no notice of but one? The general law is, that, where one event is a shadow of another or type of another, the latter is spiritual, owes its superiority to the former, its richness, its glory, to the spirituality of its character. But let the passage, in its literal import, stand to its original event.

So in other places, glowing descriptions of this event are given, mingled sometimes with expressions that will bear a future application, and sometimes giving no indication of looking beyond the former event. "The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad for them; and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose. A high way shall be there, and a way, and it shall be called, The way of holiness. And the ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come to Zion with songs, and everlasting joy upon their heads; they shall obtain joy and gladness, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away," (35: 1, 8, 10). Beautiful language this, to be accommodated to any turning to the Lord, or deliverance which he may effect for his people! Yet, in its original design, intended simply to describe restoration from the Babylonish captivity. The whole chapter, of which this forms a part, is a most vivid description of that restoration.

The latter part of the book of Isaiah, particularly, abounds with passages of this sort: "Comfort ye, comfort ye my people, saith your God. Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem, and cry unto her, that her warfare is accomplished, that her iniquity is pardoned; for she hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins," (40: 1, 2). Why look beyond the restoration, which, when the language was uttered, was just about to take place? True, the language is capable of being accommodated to any case, and to all

cases, where calamities have been suffered, and there is about to be a return of the Divine favor. And it contains a most sweet promise to all of this description. The Jews of the present time may appropriate it, spiritually, when the veil is taken from their hearts, and they believe in Him, whom their fathers crucified. They shall be comforted, and pardoned, and blessed. But the strict application of the passage is, to the restoration from Babylon, and nothing more, in its literal acceptation. In accordance with which, it immediately follows: "The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a high-way for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made low; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain; and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it," (vs. 3—5). The mandate is given, to prepare the way for the return of God's chosen to their own land. He himself would appear, and lead them on; and the world should adore the power and grace that effected for them the signal deliverance. This is the thing which filled the prophet's vision. Again: "Sing, O ye heavens; for the Lord hath done it; shout, ye lower parts of the earth; break forth into singing, ye mountains, O forest, and every tree therein; for the Lord hath redeemed Jacob, and glorified himself in Israel."—"That saith to Jerusalem, Thou shalt be inhabited; and to the cities of Judah, ye shall be built, and I will raise up the decayed places thereof; that saith to the deep, Be dry, and I will dry up thy rivers; that saith of Cyrus, He is my shepherd, and shall perform all my pleasure; even saying to Jerusalem, Thou shalt be built; and to the temple, Thy foundation shall be laid," (44: 23, 26—28). This is manifestly the restoration near the prophet's time, Cyrus, the chief instrument of that restoration, being expressly named. That, then, is the event to which the prophet's language belongs. So again: "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace; that bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation; that saith unto Zion, Thy God reigneth!—Break forth into joy, sing together, ye waste places of Jerusalem; for the Lord hath comforted his people, he hath redeemed Jerusalem," (52: 7, 9). The literal restoration from the Chaldean captivity, is the thing intended. To make it apply to a restoration of the Jews now in our time, or subsequently,—a literal restoration to the literal Jerusalem,—is altogether losing sight of what

filled the prophet's mind,—of an event then just before him,—or it is *doubting* his vision, of which the narrative itself gives no evidence.

It were not possible in the space allotted us, to adduce all the passages from this one prophet Isaiah, relating to this subject. He gives assurance to the people, that “a remnant shall return” (10: 21); that “the Lord shall set his hand again the second time to remove the remnant of his people” (11: 11); referring to the first time, or the deliverance from Egypt; as it is expressly said, “like as it was to Israel in the day that he came up out of the land of Egypt” (v. 16); that God has “chosen them, and not cast them away” (41: 9); that they shall “go forth of Babylon, and flee from the Chaldeans, with the voice of singing, saying, The Lord hath redeemed his servant Jacob” (48: 20); that they shall “build the old waste places, and raise up the foundations of many generations” (59: 12); that “they shall build the old wastes, and raise up the former desolations, and repair the waste cities, the desolations of many generations,” (61: 4). Which is it most natural to suppose,—that this relates to the restoration just about to take place when the prophet wrote,—that it was uttered for the encouragement of the people then, at his own time? or that it was spoken of some far future restoration, under another economy of things, overlooking what was then immediately to occur? Can it admit of reasonable doubt, that the prophet had in view the restoration from Babylon, and the reestablishment of the nation *there*, in the promised land? And these are specimens of passages with which the book of this prophet abounds, and which are to be interpreted in the same manner.

There are passages in this prophet, of another description, which are to be noticed in connection with the subject before us. The prophet, as has been already said, frequently looks forward to the Messiah's times. He sings: “Unto us a child is born, unto us a Son is given; and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, The mighty God, The Everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace. Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice, from henceforth even forever. The zeal of the Lord of hosts will perform this,” (9: 6, 7). He sings: “There shall come forth a Rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a Branch shall grow out of his roots.—With righteousness shall he judge the poor, and reprove with

equity for the meek of the earth.—There shall be a root of Jesse, which shall stand for an ensign of the people; to it shall the Gentiles seek; and his rest shall be glorious," (11: 1, 4, 10). In these times, "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid.—They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain" (saith God); "for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea," (va. 6, 9). He sings: "Behold, a King shall reign in righteousness, and princes shall rule in judgment," (32: 1).

Besides passages of this character, relating somewhat particularly to the *person* of the Messiah, there are others which describe more especially the glory of his reign; a subject to which even those now repeated also have reference. These passages, as was natural, sometimes borrow their form of expression, their figures, their illustrations, from the former dispensation—the dispensation existing when they were uttered. This was altogether to be expected. The error committed in relation to these passages is, that they have been interpreted as predicting *the restoration of the ancient economy*; whereas they only predict, as we trust it will be made to appear, *under language borrowed from that economy*, the universal prevalence of the true religion in the earth. The arrangements of the ancient economy,—the services then rendered, were the dress in which religion then appeared,—the form in which it presented itself to the world. What more natural than that, in describing its future glory, even though external changes were to take place, yet the language should have been derived from the economy, with its services, then existing?

Survey now a moment some of the passages in question. "It shall come to pass in the last days," says this prophet, "that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. And many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among the nations, and rebuke many people; and they shall beat their swords into plough-shares, and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. O house of Jacob, come ye, and let us walk in the light of the Lord," (2: 2—5).

What does this mean? that Judaism is to be reestablished at

Jerusalem, and that all nations are to go up to Jerusalem to worship, according to the ancient law, "three times a year" (Ex. 23: 17; and that Jerusalem is to be the grand central point, all luminous and glorious, the top of the nations, sending out its light and influence to the rest of the world, through all coming time? Or, is it intended *under imagery drawn from the then existing dispensation*, to represent the glory of the Messiah's reign? Whatever distinction the literal Jerusalem was to have, when the prophet wrote, has she not already had it, in the rebuilding of her temple, and the reëstablishment of her state after the Chaldean captivity, and in the appearance of the Messiah among her children, and the foundation of the Christian church in the midst of her—an institution literally to bless all nations? Is not this the thing which the prophet designed to set before us, only employing Jewish phrase, because Jewish phrase was the garb in which, then, the true religion appeared in the earth? It is impossible for us to doubt, that it is the spiritual reign of Jesus, which is designed to be set forth in the prophet's language.

Again the prophet says: "In this mountain shall the Lord of hosts make unto all people a feast of fat things, a feast of wines on the lees, of fat things full of marrow, of wines on the lees well refined. And he will destroy in this mountain the face of the covering cast over all people, and the veil that is spread over all nations. He will swallow up death in victory; and the Lord God will wipe away tears from off all faces; and the rebuke of his people shall he take away from off all the earth; for the Lord hath spoken it. And it shall be said in that day, Lo, this is our God; we have waited for him, and he will save us; this is the Lord; we have waited for him, we will be glad and rejoice in his salvation," (25: 6—9). Must Judaism be reëstablished at Jerusalem, in order to realize the great results here promised? Why is it not more rational to suppose, that Judaism accomplished its work, when it gave the Messiah to the world? And that now the Messiah's *spiritual reign* is to produce the blessed state of things here figuratively described?

And so of other passages. "Behold, I will lift up mine hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the people; and they shall bring thy sons in their arms, and thy daughters shall be carried upon their shoulders. And kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers; they shall bow down to thee with their face towards the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet," (49: 22, 23). Shall this be literal? Is this the true

appointed relation between Jews and Gentiles in the fulness of the Messiah's reign? Or is this a figurative and impressive representation of the universal triumph of the true religion, the religion of Christ, with the reverence and homage which shall everywhere be rendered to it, and the unhappiness of its rejectors? Does not the latter seem altogether the more rational interpretation?

Again it was said to Zion: "Arise, shine; for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee.—And the Gentiles shall come to thy light, and kings to the brightness of thy rising.—The abundance of the sea shall be converted unto thee, the forces of the Gentiles shall come unto thee. The multitude of camels shall cover thee, the dromedaries of Midian and Ephah; all they from Sheba shall come; they shall bring gold and incense, and they shall show forth the praises of the Lord. All the flocks of Kedar shall be gathered together into thee, the rams of Nebaioth shall minister unto thee [for sacrifice]; they shall come up with acceptance on mine altar, and I will glorify the house of my glory, (60: 1, 3, 5—7). Shall the Jewish sacrifices, then, be restored? Shall the blood of bulls and calves, and rams and goats, again flow in the worship of God? Shall the world go back again to the rites of that old dispensation, "a yoke," says the apostle, "which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear?" (Acts 15: 10). To what purpose, then, is Christianity? Why did the blood of Calvary flow? And why all the declarations respecting this surpassing glory of the Messiah's reign? Let the passage be, then, a figurative description of a spiritual religion, such as the Messiah has actually introduced into the world, and all is right; it is inimitably beautiful, and portrays a blessing in which the world shall rejoice through unnumbered ages. And one more passage: "Behold, I create new heavens and a new earth; and the former shall not be remembered, nor come into mind. But be ye glad and rejoice forever in that which I create; for, behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and her people a joy," (65: 17, 18). And "as the new heavens, and the new earth, which I will make, shall remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain. And it shall come to pass, that from one new moon to another, and from one Sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord," (66: 22, 23). This must be a figurative promise of spiritual good, the blessings of the Messiah's reign. All flesh, on all sides of the world, cannot *literally* go to Jerusalem

every new moon, and every Sabbath, to worship. It is a glowing description of the fact, that all will be true worshippers. The literal *must* be thrown aside; the spiritual *must* be adopted. Jerusalem, dropping her childish garments which she has outgrown, rises and unfolds into a spiritual being, of which her early existence was a shadow; and, in the person of the Messiah and his dispensation, which have sprung from her, pours her blessings over all the earth.

Such is a specimen of the teachings of Isaiah on the subject before us. And is there anything here, which requires us to believe in a literal restoration of the Jews, yet future, to Palestine, and the reestablishment of their ancient polity there? May not the passages which relate manifestly to the former restoration, be considered as fulfilled by that restoration, and their import, in the *literal* acceptation, exhausted? And may not the passages which relate to the Messiah's reign,—and *must* they not, for consistency's sake,—be interpreted as figurative representations, highly beautiful and glowing, of the triumph of a spiritual religion?

JEREMIAH.

Jeremiah flourished somewhat more than 100 years after Isaiah (B. C. 629—588, according to the common reckoning), and the latter part of his course, was at the very time when the captivity took place.

This prophet, in the early part of his office, employed the strongest terms of reprehension towards the Jews, for their manifold wickedness. The picture drawn presents a state of things truly appalling: "I had planted thee a noble vine, wholly a right seed; how then art thou turned into the degenerate plant of a strange vine unto me? For though thou wash thee with nitre, and take thee much soap, yet thine iniquity is marked before me, saith the Lord God," (2: 21, 22). "Behold, thou hast spoken and done evil things as thou couldest," (3: 5). And the threatenings followed: "Out of the north an evil shall break forth upon all the inhabitants of the land," (1: 14). "Destruction upon destruction is cried; for the whole land is spoiled," (4: 20). "I will make Jerusalem heaps, and a den of dragons; and I will make the cities of Judah desolate, without an inhabitant," (9: 11). "I will give all Judah into the hand of the king of Babylon, and he shall carry them captive into Babylon, and shall slay them with the sword," (20: 4). "This whole land shall be a desolation,

and an astonishment; and these nations [some others with Judah] shall serve the king of Babylon seventy years," (25: 11). The latter part of the Book of this prophet relates particularly to the execution of these threatenings, the actual captivity that occurred—interspersed frequently, as the former part is occasionally, with promises of restoration, and glances at the coming glory of the Messiah's reign, towards which the Jewish mind was ever directed. These things, with some denunciations on the surrounding nations, employed the mind and pen of Jeremiah, during his active life of some forty years; a part of the time dwelling with the people in the land (40: 6), and a part of the time with a small company who had removed to Egypt, carrying the prophet with them, (xliii). He died, leaving the people in their dispersion and bondage.

See now, particularly, what this prophet says with reference to restoration, and whether it is to be understood of the restoration then to take place, or of a restoration of the Jews from their present dispersion: "I will take you, one of a city, and two of a family, and I will bring you to Zion," (3: 14). This is most naturally understood, certainly, of the restoration then about to take place.

Again, it shortly follows: "At that time they shall call Jerusalem the throne of the Lord; and all the nations shall be gathered unto it, to the name of the Lord, to Jerusalem; neither shall they walk any more after the imagination of their evil heart. In those days the house of Judah shall walk with the house of Israel, and they shall come together out of the land of the north, to the land that I have given for an inheritance unto your fathers," (vs. 17, 18). What is the import of this prediction? It foretold the restoration then about to occur, "out of the land of the north. It spoke of Judah and Israel as "returning together;" which, to some extent, was then actually the case. It spoke of "the gathering of all nations to the name of the Lord," which is rather, perhaps, a glance at the better times of the Messiah's reign. Their being gathered "to Jerusalem," is but the dress of the truth, in accommodation to the institutions of worship then existing.

But "The house of Judah," it is said, "shall walk with the house of Israel, and they shall come together out of the north country, to the land that I have given for an inheritance to their fathers." And Isaiah had predicted the same: "The Lord shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the earth. The envy also of Ephraim shall depart, and the adversaries of Judah shall be cut off.

Ephraim shall not envy Judah, and Judah shall not vex Ephraim," (Is. 11: 11—13. They shall be together, that is, as one nation; as they were before the revolt of the Ten Tribes, and shall live together in peace.

This, many are disposed to think, is yet to take place. And it is deemed a grand argument in favor of a literal restoration. But what are the facts of the case? Did not some, from the Ten Tribes, as well as from the Two Tribes, actually return to Palestine at the end of the Babylonish captivity? Israel had been in captivity towards a century and a half longer than Judah. Josephus says, indeed, that "the entire body of the people of Israel remained in that country," (Antiq. 11. 5). That is, there was, no public organized movement for their return, as with Judah. And a large portion, of both branches of the nation, seem to have remained in the countries whither they had been carried. They had acquired property, and made friends, and were happy in their new location, and were unwilling to be at the trouble of a return to their land. As Josephus says also of Judah: "Yet did many of them stay at Babylon, not willing to leave their possessions," (Antiq. 11. 1).

Yet a part returned. And that part, there is reason to believe, contained a portion of Israel, as well as of Judah. When Cyrus, on obtaining the supremacy of the East, made his proclamation for the restoration of the captive people, the country of Israel's captivity, as well as that of Judah's, constituted a part of his dominion. And the proclamation was made "throughout all his kingdom," (Ezra 1: 1). Who can doubt that Israel, to some extent at least, as individuals, availed themselves of the advantage of it? Moreover, the proclamation speaks of "the Lord God of heaven," whose house was to be built at Jerusalem, and of "ALL HIS PEOPLE," which can hardly be understood of less than all who had any interest at Jerusalem, Israel as well as Judah, who had all built the former temple, and claimed Jerusalem as their own; and commands respecting every such one: "Whosoever remaineth in any place where he sojourneth, let the men of his place help him," (Ib. vs. 2—4). This covered the sojournings of Israel as well as of Judah.

In the decree of Artaxerxes in favor of Ezra, a few years later, it is said: "I make a decree, that all they of the people of Israel, and of his priests and Levites, IN MY REALM, which are minded of their own free will to go up to Jerusalem, go with thee," (Ezra 7: 13). Josephus says that Ezra "read the Epistle at Babylon, to those Jews that were there; but he kept the Epistle itself, and

sent a copy of it to all those of his own nation, that were in Media," (Antiq. 11. 5). Media was the place of the Ten Tribes. Hence the remark of Henry on this subject: "Both Assyria [with Media] and Chaldea"—the land of the captivity of Israel, as well as that of Judah—"fell into the hands of Cyrus; and his proclamation extended to all the Jews in all his dominions. And therefore, we have reason to think, that many of the *houses of Israel* came with those of Judah *out of the north*," (Henry, in loc.). They came, indeed, under the banner of Judah; as many, in early times, after the division of the kingdom, and the defection of the Ten Tribes, under Jeroboam and other wicked kings, forsook their own tribes, and their own branch of the nation, and joined themselves to Judah and Benjamin, for the purer worship of God which was maintained there, (Vid. 2 Chr. 11: 16; 15: 9; 31: 6).

The returned captives from Israel may have been fewer in number, (doubtless were much fewer,) than those from Judah, as they had been longer in captivity, had less vivid apprehensions of their own land, and had found more to interest them in the countries where they dwelt. Yet the more pious and devout, of both branches of the nation, it seems reasonable to believe, came up to rebuild the temple, and restore the Jewish State.

In the book of Ezra, giving an account of the restoration, we have the two phrases, *Judah and Benjamin* and *the children of Israel*; the first, designating the Two Tribes and a Half, which were the more prominent actors in all the latter scenes of Jewish history; and the last, seeming to have a wider reference, looking more towards *the whole nation* collectively. "Then rose up," says Ezra, on the proclamation of Cyrus, "the chief of the fathers of Judah and Benjamin," (1: 5). And, afterwards, at the dedication of the temple, it is said: "And the children of Israel, which were come again out of captivity," [with others mentioned,] "did eat" (6: 21); seeming to have a reference to a company collected from the nation at large. Josephus, referring to the encouragements which Cyrus gave the people to return, says: "When Cyrus had said this to the Israelites, the rulers of the two tribes of Judah and Benjamin, with the Levites and priests, went in haste to Jerusalem," (Antiq. 11: 1). And of the company going up he says: "They chose themselves rulers, who should go up to Jerusalem, out of the tribes of their forefathers (Ib. 11. 3); not from the tribes of Judah and Benjamin exclusively, but from *the tribes of their forefathers*. This looks as though the whole twelve tribes had something to do in the matter of the restoration. "The Sa-

maritan Chronicle asserts, that in the thirty-fifth year of the pontificate of Abdelus, three thousand Israelites, by permission of king Sanridius, returned from captivity, under the conduct of Adres, son of Simon," (Rel. En., Art. CAPTIVITY). And at the dedication of the temple, when it was completed, it is said, that, among other sacrifices, they offered "for a sin-offering for all Israel, twelve he-goats, according to the number of the tribes of Israel," (Ezra 6: 17); and, on another occasion, "twelve bullocks for all Israel and twelve he-goats, for a sin-offering," (Ib. 8: 35). It seems most natural to conclude, that Israel and Judah were mingled together in these services, that all the tribes which had been carried captive had their representatives at this feast, so that it was strictly a *national* celebration. It may be true, therefore, as expressed by another: "We see Palestine [from this time to the end of that dispensation] peopled by Israelites of all the tribes indifferently" (Rel. Encyclop. art. Captivity of Israel), Judah and Israel forgetting their former antipathies, according to the prediction of the prophets, and living together again as one nation, and in peace. And what has been said by another writer may not be wholly unworthy of regard: "All questions, therefore, and investigations, for the purpose of ascertaining what has become of the TEN TRIBES, and whether it is likely they will ever be discovered, are superfluous and idle," (Jahn, Heb. Com. chap. 7, § 53). The idea is, that the tribes were extensively broken up and commingled together in their dispersions, and such portions of them as returned were commingled together in their restoration. And this may be an indication, in the providence of God, that that economy has accomplished its work in the world, and has permanently given place to something that is better. It may be in keeping with Judaism, to believe that the Messiah, when he shall come, will disentangle these intricacies, hunt up the lost tribes, show each its genealogy, and give them the earthly glory for which they are looking. But does Christianity, the question is, make itself responsible for these results?

Let some other passages receive attention. In chap. xxiii. of this prophet, Jeremiah, it is said: "I will gather the remnant of my flock out of all countries, whither I have driven them, and will bring them again to their folds; and they shall be fruitful, and increase.—Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely; and

this is his name, whereby he shall be called, The Lord our Righteousness. Therefore, behold the days come, saith the Lord, that they shall no more say, The Lord liveth, which brought up the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt; but the Lord liveth, which brought up, and which led the seed of the house of Israel out of the north country, and from all countries whither I had driven them; and they shall dwell in their own land," (23: 3, 5-8). Here, also, is a sort of generic vision, having reference, primarily, to the literal restoration, and glancing at the still greater deliverance of the Messiah's dispensation, of which that was a figure, and which that ever suggested. Nothing is more natural than this kind of proceeding. Nor is it any objection to this view, that the allusion to the Messiah's reign is thrown into the middle of the sentence, the beginning and the end relating to the other subject. Such sudden transitions are a part of the manner of the Jewish prophets.

In chap. xxix, it is said: "For thus saith the Lord, That after seventy years be accomplished at Babylon, I will visit you, and perform my good word toward you, in causing you to return to this place.—I will turn away your captivity, and I will gather you from all the nations, and from all the places whither I have driven you, saith the Lord; and I will bring you again into the place whence I caused you to be carried away captive," (vs. 10, 14). This is, manifestly, the literal restoration, and nothing more. The attempt to make it mean more than this, is altogether uncalled for and gratuitous.

In chap. xxx, we have the two connected again: "The days come, saith the Lord, that I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel and Judah"—both branches of the nation—"saith the Lord; and I will cause them to return to the land that I gave to their fathers, and they shall possess it. — Strangers shall no more serve themselves of him. But they shall serve the Lord their God, and David their king, whom I will raise up unto them. Therefore fear thou not, O my servant Jacob; neither be dismayed, O Israel (both branches of the nation); for, lo! I will save thee from afar, and thy seed from the land of captivity; and Jacob shall return, and shall be in rest, and be quiet, and none shall make him afraid," (vs. 3, 9, 10). This is manifestly a prediction of the restoration then about to take place, with a glance at the future blessings of the Messiah's reign; those blessings being promised in Jewish phrase, clothed in Jewish dress, as it was most natural should be the case.

In chap. xxxi, are some expressions much relied on as proving a literal restoration yet to come: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love. — I will build thee, and thou shalt be built. — I will bring them from the north country, and gather them from the coasts of the earth. — He that scattered Israel will gather him, and keep him, as a shepherd doth his flock. — They shall come and sing in the heights of Zion," (vs. 3, 4, 8, 10, 12). But may not all this be said in reference to the restoration then about to take place when the prophet wrote? Why need we look further than that, for a fulfilment of the predictions?

In the latter part of the chapter is notice of a new covenant which God would make with his people; not such a one as he made with them when he took them from Egypt; but a covenant of a deeper and more enduring character. "I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people." And the assurance is given, that the ordinances of heaven, the courses of the sun, and the moon, and the stars, are no more enduring, than these engagements of God to his chosen, (vs. 31—40). But in all this, may we not understand the spiritual covenant which God makes with his people, which is strictly eternal? It looks like a spiritual transaction: "putting his law in their inward parts, and writing it in their hearts." If there be an earlier application of it, connected with a literal restoration, the time intended may be that when the people came back from Babylon, tender and broken-hearted, grateful and devoted to the service of God. But whatever was wanting there, a spiritual religion, like that of the Messiah, when truly embraced, will entirely fulfil.

Other promises in this prophet are to be interpreted in the same manner. "I will gather them out of all countries, whither I have driven them in mine anger, and in my fury, and in great wrath; and I will bring them again into this place, and I will cause them to dwell safely; and they shall be my people, and I will be their God; and I will give them one heart, and one way, that they may fear me forever, for the good of them, and of their children after them. And I will make an everlasting covenant with them, that I will not turn away from them," (32: 37—40). "I will cause the captivity of Judah and the captivity of Israel to return, and will build them as at the first." — "I will cause the Branch of righteousness to grow up unto David; and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the land. — If ye can break my covenant of the day, and my covenant of the night, and that there should not

be day and night in their season; then may also my covenant be broken with David my servant, that he should not have a son to reign on his throne; and with the Levites the priests, my ministers," (33: 7, 15, 20, 21). "Be not afraid of the king of Babylon, of whom ye are afraid; be not afraid of him, saith the Lord; for I am with you to save you, and to deliver you from his hand," (42: 11). "Fear not thou, O my servant Jacob, and be not dismayed, O Israel; for, behold, I will save thee from afar off, and thy seed from the land of their captivity," (46: 27).

Such is a specimen of the predictions in Jeremiah relating to the restoration of the Jews. And now taking into view the fact, that he lived in the time of the dispersion, and died leaving the people in their captive state, of which is it most reasonable to believe that he spoke, of the restoration then about to take place, glancing occasionally, as the subject was suggested, to the more important work the Messiah was to perform in the world? or to some literal restoration now at this far distant period? Let the prophet speak of the subject in hand, and let his glances at the far future be at the Messiah and his dispensation, that great idea ever present to the Jewish mind; and all is natural and easy—just as we should expect. But the attempt to make out a course of prediction in reference to a literal restoration from present dispersions, overlooks the subject in hand, introduces a principle of interpretation that tends to secularize religion; and, by depriving many passages of their spiritual import, robs them of their chief richness and glory.

[To be concluded.]

ARTICLE VII.

MEIER'S LEXICON OF HEBREW ROOTS.

Hebräisches Wurzelwörterbuch, nebst drei Anhängen über die Bildung der Quadriklern Erklärung der Fremdwörter im Hebräischen, und über das Verhältniss des Ägyptischen Sprachstammes zum Semitischen; von Dr. Ernst Meier, Privatdocenten an der Universität zu Tübingen. pp. 783. Mannheim, 1845.

By Rev. Charles A. Hay, Professor in Lutheran Theol. Sem., Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

THE consanguinity of the Semitic and Indo-European languages is now generally acknowledged. But as to the degree of

relationship that exists between them, there is still much difference of opinion. Gesenius, in his *Thesaurus and Manual Lexicon*, was continually on the lookout for points of contact, and succeeded in finding many cases in which the apparent coincidence was very striking. That the Graeco-Latin branch of the great northern family of languages derived its written characters from the Semitic, he has shown most satisfactorily in his "*Monumenta Phoenicia*,"¹ but the connecting link that proves the original substantial identity of the languages themselves, he believes he has discovered in the Sanscrit, the classic language of the East.

Once fairly started in this direction and eager to find resemblances of this kind, we are not surprised to see him occasionally led into error by coincidences which subsequent investigation has proved to be merely fortuitous. The reason of this we find in the fact that he compared already developed grammatical forms, in Hebrew, with the clearly ascertained roots of the Sanscrit, as is hinted at by his pupil and commentator Roediger,² who, in allusion to these attempts of Gesenius, remarks :

"A remote connection between these languages cannot be denied, and therefore a comparative investigation of them is of value for lexicography ; but one needs great caution and a comprehensive knowledge of the relations of sounds in both families, in order to avoid error and deception in comparing them. In the present state of the investigation, there is almost as much merit in rejecting that which does not bear all the marks of affinity, as in discovering what at first sight may appear to agree."

Or in the words of the author whose work we propose briefly to notice :

"This relation [of original identity between these languages], can only then be clearly proved when we reduce the dissyllabic stems to their simple monosyllabic original elements, and thus trace them up to one fountain head, where the nations and languages, that subsequently so greatly diverged, formed one great uniform whole, and had as yet no separate existence. This principle has as yet not been generally acknowledged. In practice, at least, even the most judicious philologists have sinned against it. For it will presently be shown, that of the analogies collected by Gesenius, who went to work in his comparison of the Sanscrit

¹ See a few selections from the tables of Gesenius' splendid work in Prof. Conant's edition of Roediger's *Ges. Hebr. Gram.* p. 16.

² Conant's ed. of Roediger's Gesenius, p. 19, and Stuart's ed. p. 3, 4, note.

without settled principles, but still with less arbitrariness and violence than others, scarcely a fourth part are genuine, and that, consequently, the relationship of the two great families of languages, is essentially different from what this celebrated linguist (sonst so verdiehter Forscher) supposed it to be. The fundamental error lies in this, that he compared Hebrew verbs, which in their present simplest form are proper *perfects*, and therefore not *roots*, with roots in the Indo-Germanic family, without ever starting the question as to the seat of the root in Hebrew; much less answering it, and thus leading back this singular phenomenon to its source in the structure of the language. The same fault, moreover, characterizes all past attempts at comparison and derivation in the Semitic languages." Introd. p. 4.

"These attempts at comparison now appear to me as voyages of discovery undertaken without compass, and in which, even that which was intuitively correctly apprehended, could not be conclusively proven." Preface, p. xx.

This sounds very much as though we were to expect at the hands of our author, a sudden divorce between the Asiatic sisters and family dissensions among their European descendants. Far from it! Whilst, on almost every alternate page, showing, or attempting to show, how exceedingly mistaken Gesenius was in his supposed resemblances, he assumes far higher ground than Gesenius ever dreamed of, and asserts, that "in general, the fundamental roots in the Semitic [reducible, as he subsequently maintains to the number of *twenty-four*!] together with their simple, original meaning, occur also in the Indo-Germanic, and even correspond to these frequently in their secondary or derived significations." Pref. p. xl.

Here we have a vast stride in comparative philology, *if our author's theory be correct*. We hear Roediger whilst treading in his master's footsteps and perpetuating his fame, warning against his enthusiastic advances in this direction, as follows: (l. c.) "It is already an established result that *these two families of languages do not stand in a sisterly or any close relationship to each other*, and that the characteristic structure of both must be dissected before we can find the original parts which they possess in common." And at once we hear the response from a pupil of the rival school, 'I have dissected the characteristic structure of both, and have proven them to be twin-sisters.'

The comparison of these languages, however, was of course

not our author's main design in the preparation of his "*Lexicon of Hebrew Roots*." His object was to arrange scientifically all the materials of the classic Hebrew. Here the great question would naturally be 'where lies the original root?' And it was in prosecuting this investigation that he was led to the result to which we have just alluded. Others have proposed this question before, but no one has satisfactorily answered it. None of the recent grammarians, indeed, have been content to regard the trilateral verbal forms in their present state as the original roots.¹

Ewald (l. c.) suggests, that "in the internal vocalization [of the trilateral root] there lies the original difference between the verb and the noun; so that we can no longer pronounce the root, i. e. the three consonantal sounds, as a pure root, without making this distinction, but [must pronounce it] either as a verb קָרַב or as a noun קָרַב. In the present development of the language the root is therefore merely a learned *abstractum*, as an invisible root of which we see only the stems and branches that have grown forth from it." The roots, then, in his view, consisted originally of three consonants, at present unpronounceable, except as verbs or nouns.

Gesenius already, in the *Lehrgebäude*, had thrown out some hints in regard to the probable nature of these original roots. After describing the present simplest forms (which he nevertheless calls *wurzelhafte, radical forms*) and commenting upon their uniformity, he proceeds (§ 53, 3): "However universal this uniformity may now be, we nevertheless meet with several phenomena that clearly prove it not to have been equally universal in the beginning, but brought about at a later day, although no doubt in the youthful period of the language, by a sort of grammatical systematizing (*grammatischer Reflexion*)." These phenomena are:

a) The numerous series of verbs that have two radical letters in common, and differ either by the repetition of one of these or the addition of a semi-vowel; e. g. יָרַב and יָרַב to be good, נָפַח and נָפַח to blow, דָּבַח and דָּבַח, דָּבַח and דָּבַח to strike;

b) The original monosyllabic substantive forms אָב father, אִמָּה mother, הָר mountain, עִיר city, יוֹם day, יָד hand, דָּם blood, etc.; and

c) The classes of verbs which have two consonants in common, but vary greatly in the third one, and yet agree at least fundamentally in signification; e. g. לָעַד, לָעַב, לָעַט, לָעַה, לָעַס, לָעַץ, לָעַץ.

¹ Gesenius' *Lehrgebäude*, § 53, 2. Ewald, *Gram der Hebr. Sprache* (3rd edition) §§ 204, 205. Stuart's or Conant's Roediger's Gesenius, § 1, 3, b. and § 30, 1 and 2. And yet the unfortunate habit still remains almost universal, of calling these forms the roots of the language.

כֶּחַךְ, in the different dialects, with the signification *to kick*; כֶּחַךְ.

כֶּחַךְ, כֶּחַךְ, כֶּחַךְ, דָּחַךְ, דָּחַךְ, דָּחַךְ, *to push*; etc.

These 'phenomena' or facts have been the theme of much speculation. It was no doubt these that led *Neuman* more than a century ago,¹ not merely to assert the original monosyllabic character of all Hebrew roots, but also, after endeavoring to ascertain the ultimate signification and power of the original elements of the language from their name, form, etc., to attempt with these a reconstruction of the radical forms, or, what is almost equivalent to this, a deduction of the meaning of the biconsonantal term from the united significations of its constituent parts. Even then, however, this theory was not new, for *Rave* had published it in his *Deliniatio Analogiae Hebraicae*, Amst. 1647.

In the work before us we recognize a theorist of the same class, who introduces however an additional feature, to us entirely new, and which he makes the ground-work of his whole performance.

Before proceeding to sketch the author's theory of the original character and the development of the Semitic dialects, and indeed of language in general, we will state the usually entertained opinion on this subject as expressed by Nordheimer, (p. 7 of the Pref to his *Hebr. Gram.*): "Since the external sound belongs entirely to the material and the idea which it represents as exclusively to the immaterial world, the two stand at a distance so remote from each other, that the connection between them has hitherto been a complete *res occulta*; and such doubtless it will continue, so long as we shall remain ignorant of the nature of the union existing between the body and the soul. For the present, therefore, we must rest content, with the ability to trace the connection of such of these representatives of ideas with their originals, as are rather imitations of natural sounds than the immediate production of the operations of the mind, viz. *onomatopées*; while that which exists between those words and their primary cause, whose origin lies in the activity of the soul, whether excited by sensation or reflection, is likely to remain forever an impenetrable mystery."

Our author, on the other hand, after denying that the language contains a single example of onomatopoeia (see p. 35), maintains that there was a kind of linguistic instinct originally active in the

¹ Gesenius, *Geschichte der Hebr. Sprache u. Schrift*, S. 125.

formation of the Semitic dialects, and indeed of all languages, by which certain sounds were felt to be proper representations of certain classes of ideas, and hence were originally employed in all languages to express those ideas. Further, that the original combinations of these elementary sounds were all monosyllabic, consisting in every case of two consonants of different organs, and deriving their significations from that of the final consonant.¹ Alas, that these *roots of the language* no longer occur in their original form, (or at least very rarely and then as *petrifications*, for so he somewhere designates the monosyllabic particles whose derivation is not apparent) but in a developed state, having undergone certain changes and "representing an idea either as an *act* or *deed*, operative and growing into being, or as quiescent, completed *existence*, i. e. they represent either verbs or nouns, therefore developed stems." Intr. p. 5.

Assuming, then, the original embodiment of the prominent ideas of the language in some twenty-four monosyllabic roots, with their modifications, (classified and presented in a tabular form on page 747,) he next proceeds to inquire, upon what principle their development into the simple verbal stems we are now in the habit of calling *roots* was regulated. And here he comes forward with his theory, which, he predicts is to effect an entire reformation in this department of philology! See Pref. p. xx. "Die ganze Art der Semitischen Sprachvergleichung wird künftig eine wesentlich andere werden."

And what is this theory? *That the verbal stems*, (i. e. the simplest form of the verb, *the perfects*) *have been formed just as in the Sanscrit, Gothic, Greek and Latin*, by the REDUPLICATION OF THE RADICAL SYLLABLE. "The essential nature of the *perfect* in Sanscrit, as well as in Gothic, Greek and Latin, consists in the reduplication of the radical syllable; e. g. Sanscr. *tan* = extend, *perf. tatana*, I or he extended. In like manner *τέρενα*, *τέρενα*, cecidi, cucurri, momordi, etc. Gothic, *skaiskaid*, I or he separated, *haihait*, I or he called, *staistant*, I or he pushed." Intr. p. 5.

¹ Those ending in a *labial* letter, whatever the first consonant may be, all growing out of the idea of *drawing together, fitting, joining*, etc. with secondary meanings easily deducible from these; e. g. קס, חס, רס, etc.

Those, on the other hand, that end in a *dental* or *lingual* all express originally the idea of *separation, splitting, dividing*; e. g. כח, רח, קח, שח, etc.

And the *gutturals* and *palatals* give to the root the signification of *making dense or firm*; e. g. שח, כח, לח, פח, etc.

"Instead of the whole root, however, in Sanscrit, (to go no further for the present,) only the first radical sound, or of two initial consonants only the stronger is repeated, as of *γράφω*, *γράφω*. And then in place of a guttural the corresponding palatal is repeated, e. g. *gam* to go, perf. *gagama*, and in place of an aspirate the corresponding tenuis; e. g. *dhd*, perf. *dadhd* (*τίθημι*) as in Greek *θύω τίθηκα*; *φιλέω, πεφίληκα*. Similar substitutions, but not according to any regular system, occur also in Hebrew. . . . The reduplicated syllable is, moreover, always abbreviated in Sanscrit as also in Greek, so that the tone usually falls upon the second syllable, in which the radical vowel, if it had been short, is almost always lengthened, or if it had been long, remains so; *τάλανδ*, beside *τάλανδ*." p. 6.

"I hope, in what follows, to prove to a demonstration, that the Hebrew perfect had its origin in the reduplication of the radical syllable and herein agrees with the Sanscrit and its cognates. Only it may be proper for me at once to remark, and cursorily to prove, that the repetition and augmentation of the simple, radical syllable in the Semitic dialects, takes place in a greater variety of forms than in those languages, and hence has maintained a character peculiar to itself." p. 7.

Here he stumbles upon the great difficulty of his undertaking. It may not require much skill to discover at least a semblance of reduplication in such forms as *קָנַח, קָנַח, קָנַח, קָנַח*, etc.; but it is notorious, that in the vast majority of Hebrew perfects the similarity lies between the *last two* radicals, e. g. *קָנַח, קָנַח*, and the whole class of *על* verbs, together with such forms as, *קָנַח, קָנַח, קָנַח, קָנַח*, etc. or between the *first and third*, e. g. *קָנַח, קָנַח, קָנַח, קָנַח*, etc. where these are identical, together with such as, *קָנַח, קָנַח, קָנַח, קָנַח*, etc.

But this mountain is a molehill before our author; he clears it with a leap. For what is the object of reduplication? It is to represent "*an extension of the verbal idea*." That is, we may compare the developed, *perfect* verbal form to the stem of a tree or horn of an ox, where the concentric circles prove the past development of the object. Now in the Indo-European family of languages, this extension of the verbal idea is represented in all cases, by *prefixing* to the root the root itself in a modified form; that is, the root has developed itself into a stem in a certain direction. The Hebrew roots, however, whether from greater fertility in the mental globe of patriarchal times, or for some other cause unknown, shot forth in various directions. The Semitic

languages exhibit not merely a *prae-reduplication*, (Vorn-verdoppelung) as in the Indo-European family, but also a *post-reduplication*, (Hinten-verdoppelung). In the words of our author, "This reduplication can occur:

I. *In the beginning of the word*, by the repetition of the first radical; e. g. כָּלַל, חָקַק, חָכַם, from the roots כָּל, חָק, and חָכ.¹

II. *In the end of the word*; either 1. By the repetition of the first radical, as נָקַח, חָקַח, נָחַח, etc. or 2. By the repetition of the second, as חָלַל, חָחַח, etc.

III. The deficient reduplication can be compensated for by a kind of *guna-formation*,² e. g. חָכַם, חָכַח, חָכַח, comp. ḥgo, ḥgi; mōveo, mōvi; lāvo, lāvi, etc. This prolongation takes the place of reduplication and corresponds precisely to the lengthening of the radical syllable, some traces of which we find already in the Sanscrit, e. g. *niene*, I meant." Ib.

Taking it now for granted that this method of *prae* and *post* reduplication was followed in the development of the original roots, the next question would be, whence the almost infinite variety in the verbal consonants? This difficulty also vanishes at the magic touch of our author, for "In general, it is to be observed, that the language endeavors, both in the first and second of these classes, to avoid the repetition of the same consonant both in the beginning and end of the word, and hence changes the reduplicated letter into one nearly related to it. This gives rise to great variety in the development of the stems and in the secondary significations, which same end is attained in the Indo-European family by composition with prepositions,"³ e. g. חָקַח, for חָקַח, perf. of

¹ The root is, by the theory, doubled, כָּל־כָּל; the first כָּל is then omitted, as in *cucurri* for *cu(r)curri*; and finally the first כָּל for the sake of euphony, changed into חָק, of the same organ. This is in few words, the author's theory, applied equally at the beginning or end of the root and carried out consistently through the whole work.

² "Guna consists in the prefixing of a short *a* and Vridhhi in that of a long one; but in both cases the prefixed *a* sound, according to settled laws of euphony, forms a diphthong with the radical vowel." Bopp. *Vergleichende Gram. des Sanscr.*, etc. I. § 26.

³ Take the following from page 8, as an illustration: "From the stem חָקַח [cut], which is to be looked upon as a new ground-form or original stem, we find the following sub-stems have grown forth. חָקַח=חָקַח to strike, hammer, pr. split, break in pieces; further, with a change of *s* into *r* חָקַח, to keep off, pr. attack; חָקַח section, end, point; hence, the head of a pillar, chapter. From this stem there is further derived, by a change of *r* into *l*, חָלַח, to separate, divide; hence חָלַח a wall, pr. that which shuts out, separates; comp. חָלַח to separate, pierces through, hew down, kill. Also, with a change of *l* into *h*, חָחַח to separate, keep off, cover;

the root קָנַע , קָנַע , from the root כָּן , to separate, bend, softened from קָנַע ; also קָנַע , instead of קָנַע , from the root נָד , to separate; קָנַע for קָנַע ; etc. Especially frequent is the change of the T into the S sounds, and the reverse, according to established and well-known laws; e. g. קָנַע instead of קָנַע from the root צָב , to bind together; קָנַע to seize, for קָנַע from רָחַק , etc.

This subject of changes and substitutions among the similar and related sounds, the author takes up in *extenso* and makes indeed the system of transmutations the subsidiary basis of his whole arrangement, to the utter disregard of all alphabetic order. The want of this (though in some measure atoned for by full indexes at the end), together with the fact that sufficient prominence is not given in the unbroken paragraphs, either to the "stems" or "branches," renders the work unnecessarily heavy.

In the arrangement of the materials, he has collected, in the first place, all the PRÆ-REDUPLICATED VERBAL STEMS¹ and classified them in the following way:

I Those in which the first radical is, as in Sanscrit, repeated

hence, clothes, comp. קָנַע , to separate, keep off, conceal; קָנַע , close, compact,

of a seam; קָנַע , to surround. The under-garment, קָנַע , is purely Semitic and passed hence to the Greek $\chiιτῶν$, $χιτῶν$, and by transposition *tunica*."

It may interest the reader, to see, in juxtaposition with this description of the supposed development of the root כָּט (cut), the Indo-Germanic method of indicating the various modifications of the same idea, as presented by the author, p. 86. The stem appears in German, as *Schneiden*, assuming, by the prefixing of prepositions, among others, the following variety of forms and shades of meaning. *Schneiden*, to cut; *beschneiden*, to circumcise; *ver-schneiden*, to cut up, castrate; *an-schneiden*, to carve; *zu-schneiden*, to cut out, as cloth for a coat; *aus-schneiden*, cut out; *auf-schneiden*, to cut open; *vor-schneiden*, lead in cutting; *zer-schneiden*, to cut to pieces; *ab-schneiden*, to cut off; *ein-schneiden*, to cut in; *durch-schneiden*, to cut through; etc.

¹ He asserts that there are no original substantives, or nominal roots, in Hebrew, but that our present nouns, without exception, are an after-growth from the verbal stems, p. XLV. Pref. He admits, however, a second class of roots in the demonstrative and personal pronouns (which in fact appear to be common to almost all known languages, cf. Nordheimer's Heb. Gr. § 125 sq., and p. XVIII. Pref.) but denies the simple interjections, ah, O, ha! etc., a place in the sphere of rational language (cf. Ewald l. c. § 201), inasmuch as "they are merely mechanical expirations which involuntarily escape from the lungs in gaping or sighing." The language of irrational animals consists of interjections. In the present work he leaves out of view the pronouns and interjections, and confines himself mainly to the discussion of the verbal roots, with their development into perfects, nouns substantive and adjective, etc.

and usually softened; as **הָבֵא** from **בָּא**, to *bring together*; **הִפְרֵד** from **פָּרַד** to *separate*.

II. Those in which the gutturals and palatals **ק**, **כ**, **ג**, **ח** and **ע**, have been changed in the reduplicated syllable into **י** or **א**; as

הָרַחַק, **הָחַל**, **הִקָּץ**, etc.

הָאָחַל, **הָאָבַל**, etc.

All the stems, or developed perfects, thus formed, (between seventy and eighty in number,) he believes himself able to trace up distinctly to *six principal roots*, whence he accounts for their striking similarity of signification. He thus arranges them:

1. **עט**, **עד**, **חד**, **גר**, **בר**, **קר**.
2. **עס**, **עץ**, **עז**, **חז**, **נו**, **טס**, **קץ**;
further, **עש**, **חש**, **כש**, **קש**.
3. **חר**, **ער**, **חר**, **גר**, **פר**, **קר**.
4. **אל**, **חל**, **על**, **חל**, **גל**, **כל**, **קל**.
5. **יז**, **יו**, **ען**, **יון**, **גן**, **כן**.
6. **יב**, **חב**, **גב**, **קב**, **כב**, **חב**, **קב**, **כה** = **כס**;
which are related to **גם**, **חם**, **ים**.

He next proceeds to the discussion of the **POST-REDUPLICATED STEMS**, which embrace by far the greater number.

The first class here includes *such as repeat the first radical*, either unchanged, as **קָרַס** for **סָרַס**, **נָחַן**, etc.; or with some modifications, rarely euphonic, but generally according to strict principles based upon the nature of the sounds themselves, e. g.

1. Gutturals are exchanged for each other and the palatals; **הָפַק** from **הָן**, where the reduplicated **ח** has been supplanted by the **ה**; **הָפַח** for **הָחַח**; etc.

2. Dentals and linguals interchanged; as **הָפַחַל**, **הָפַחַל**, etc.

3. Labials interchanged; as **הָפַחַל**, etc.

4. Consonants of different organs;

a) Gutturals into *s* and *t* sounds; as **הָפַחַל**, **הָפַחַל**, etc.

b) Dentals and linguals into gutturals; as **הָפַחַל**, **הָפַחַל**, etc.

c) Gutturals and palatals into labials; as **הָפַחַל**, **הָפַחַל**.

The second class includes *such as repeat the second radical*.

1. Those that begin with a *guttural*; as **קָשַׁק**, **חָח**, etc.

From these are formed **קָשַׁשׁ**, **חָחַח**, **חָחַח**, etc.

2. Those beginning with *s* and *t* sounds; *pr*, *ps*, etc.

From these we have *ppš*, *psš*, *stš*, etc.

3. Those beginning with *labials*; as *ps*, *rs*, etc.

From these are formed *ppš*, *rrš*, *stš*, etc.

4. Those beginning with *liquids*; as *pr*, *pl*, *pn*, etc.

ppš, *rrš*, *stš*, *rrš*, etc.

ppš, *stš*, *rrš*, *stš*, etc.

ppš, *rrš*, *stš*.

The third class embraces the *Monosyllabic Perfects*, formed by contraction. The author, in order to be consistent, has here to assume, at an early period of the history of the language, a development of some of the original roots into trilaterals and their subsequent contraction into the forms in which we now find them. Such are *šp* from the root *šp*, contracted from *šwp*; *šp* for *šwp*, from *šp*; *šp* for *šwp*, *šp* for *šwp*, *šp* for *šwp*, etc.

Among the most attractive portions of this interesting work are the *Appendices*, in the first of which the author discusses the *Quadrilaterals* and finds in the manifold and manifest reduplications of simple roots a powerful argument in favor of his theory of the formation of the perfect.

In the second appendix he treats of the foreign words which at various periods were introduced into the Hebrew. Many that have been commonly held to be such, the flexibility of the language, according to his theory of its development, enables him to account for on the supposition of their Semitic origin.

In the third, he discusses the relation of the language of Egypt to the Semitic dialects. He regards them as essentially different, notwithstanding their similarity in the pronoun, in the want of a neuter gender, in the method of forming the comparative, etc., "which may be accounted for sufficiently, by the simplicity and antiquity of both families." The items of difference are of much greater importance, affecting their original development and organic structure, e. g. the affixes to the verbs are separable and the root usually remains unchanged; the original roots in the Egyptian frequently terminate in a vowel; compound substantives, aside from proper names, here frequently occur, etc. On the other hand, such facts as the following, viz: 1. "That the names of the country, of the principal river, and of the inhabitants are nearly all of Semitic origin; p. 728. 2. That many Egyptian designations of arts, vessels, measures, buildings, and

even of indigenous animals and other familiar objects are of Semitic origin; p. 732. 3. That the principal deities of the Egyptians, as well as their designations, are Semitic, p. 737," led him to infer "with some degree of certainty that the descendants of Shem, especially the Babylonians and Phoenicians not only in general, had frequent intercourse with the Egyptians, and introduced from Babylon the division of the year into twelve months, the week of seven days, measures and weights, many implements, etc., but that already in the infancy of the Egyptian people a very considerable commingling of both must have taken place, out of which and under the mighty influence of the Egyptian soil [climate, etc.], the peculiar character of Egyptian mind and life was developed. The general similarity of religious belief, and the probably more advanced culture of the Semitic nations, secured for them the powerful religious influence which the extensive intermixture of their language, and especially the introduction of the names of their deities before alluded to, clearly proves them to have exerted.

Hence we feel constrained entirely to dissent from the opinion formerly so generally held, and still occasionally advocated, of the positive influence of the Egyptians upon the religious and political culture of the Hebrews. What they have in common, e. g. circumcision, was manifestly transplanted from Semitic to Egyptian soil;" comp. p. 401 sq. and 744.

It now remains for us to give some specimens of the Author's method of discussing the individual roots and tracing out the derived meanings.

Whatever may be thought of his theory of reduplication and of deducing the signification from the organs of speech employed in the enunciation of the original root; his laborious industry in the comparison and ingenious collocation of the Semitic dialects cannot but awaken increased interest in the lovers of oriental philology, and set forth with still greater clearness their intimate relationship, and the consequent necessity of an acquaintance with all of them to a *thorough* study of the Old Testament.

We select an illustration or two from each of his three great classes, choosing such words as are of frequent occurrence and endeavoring, by breaking up his paragraphs, to render him somewhat more lucid.

Among the *Prae-reduplicated Stems* we find for instance the following:

“אכל” (p. 59) from the root כל, to separate, divide, hence destroy, devour, in various senses, said of fire, pestilence, war,—especially also of food; hence in general, eat, eat up.

Post-reduplicated, the stem appears as כָּלַל, to be all gone, disappear, Pi. complete; כָּלַף, to separate = keep off, include. Comp. אָכַל, friculi, scabit, edit; אָכַל, rex, tyrannus, pr. the decider = הָאֵלִים imperator.

קָבַץ (p. 26) from the root כב, to bring together. Cf. קָם to draw together, come together, hence also to cover; קָבַץ = κάταραπ something drawn together, hence a) gummi, κόμμι, gum of trees = جَمْع. b) Of a contracted, small form. Harsher, as لَمَقَم, to grasp.

The significations of קָבַץ are, therefore :

1. In the Arabic, حَكَم, to bring together = make fast (= حَكَم to bind together) hem, keep off, defend, restrain.
2. To MAKE FAST = fix firmly, appoint, and more particularly in a legal sense, to prepare or resolve upon a firm, specific decision; hence, in general, decide, decide a contest, judge, with which the idea of power and sovereignty is naturally connected. The simple, related stem حَم also signifies to firmly determine, distinctly specify. In like manner, the related جَمْع IV.
3. To make something fast, mentally, i. e. grasp, comprehend, perceive, understand; hence Aram. and Arab. حَكَم, discern, know, Heb. קָבַץ intrans., to be wise, intelligent, sensible.

From the same root the post-reduplicated perfect كَمَح = كَمَح is formed, with the signification of drawing together, holding back, hence to put on the reins; in which case the repeated ك is softened to ح just as it appears prae-duplicated and softened in حَكَم.

Radically related is also the stem حَمَا, to hem, keep off, defend; חָמַץ, which corresponds precisely to the Sanscr. jam = hem. For the Germ hemmen, Eng. hem, signifies strictly, draw together, whence also grasp, catch, hold back; hence (Germ.) Hamen, purse-net, hamus, hook.

From the first signification we easily deduce that of drawing

over, covering, as in *كَمَّ*, *كَمَى*, *عَمَّ*; hence (Germ.) *Hemd* shirt; comp. Swedish *ham*, cover, garment, (as *كَمَعَ* an upper male garment) Germ. *Himmel*, heaven, i. e. the aerial covering; comp. Germ. *Bett-himmel*, *Thron-himmel*, canopy of a bed or throne. From the signification of *drawn together* there is further derived that of *firm, strong, hard*, especially in several Arabic forms, as also the related old High Germ. *hamar*, Slavonic *Kamen*, stone, rock, whence (a stone-axe) an instrument for beating, *hammer*.

By means of the fundamental signification we can also explain that of *weakening, destroying*, comp. *كَمَّ*, *هَمَّ*, to contract one's self = shrink up, waste away, grow poor, etc. Somewhat different is the derivation of the Swedish *hamla*, Eng. *hamble*, properly to *hem* or *lame* by cutting the tendons of the knee. Comp. *كَمَعَ* *amputavit pedes*. And further, to obstruct or weaken the power of the male, hence to *unman, lame, cripple*; comp. Germ. *Hämmeling*, one castrated, *Hammel* the castrated male sheep. Finally, *drawing together* is often used in the sense of *collecting, heaping together*, e. g. *جَمَعَ*, *كَمَّ*, etc.

The third method of developing the perfect, viz. by the prolongation of the radical vowel, also occurs with this root, and those related to it, in several formations, which however all proceed from the fundamental signification already given, and only by its means are they susceptible of a satisfactory explanation; e. g.

كَمَّ to bring together, heap up, *كَامَ* II. Hence *كُومَة* (*كُومَة*) = cumulus) pr. heap, group, further, the *Pleiades*. Also,

قَامَ, *كَمَّ* to draw together, draw in the feet, obstruct one's way, detain; hence, in the Arabic to continue standing, delay, stand, etc.; in the Hebrew to stand, maintain a position in a place, insist upon something, etc. Then also to come to pass (Germ. zu Stande kommen), to gain a firm footing; when, to come into vogue, arise, in various senses.

The stem *קָמַן*, to remain standing, from the root *קָם* = *קָם* is related to the one under consideration, as will subsequently be shown. Gesenius, in his Man. Lex. compares *קָמַן* with *קָקַן*, as though *קָם* were the root, which is altogether a mistake.

From the *Post-reduplicated Stems* we select the following:

דָּבַר from the root דב, comp. דָּבַשׁ through which it is derived.¹

1. *To press together, drive together*; hence,

דָּבַר, that which hurries away, sweeps off, *the pestilence*; comp.

דָּבַר *perdidit*. דָּבַר *interitus*, דָּבַר id. Kindred with דָּבַר is the Arab. دَبَل *pestis*.

דָּבַר *the bee*, pr. that which presses, sharply attacks, = *stings*, injures.

דָּבַר the pressed together, *closed up*; hence the most retired part of the temple.

דָּבַר *the drifts, rafts*, 1 Kings 5: 23.

The Hiph. with דָּבַר signifies *to drive under something, suppress, subject*, Ps. 18: 48. 47: 4.

2. In general, *to drive together, especially drive and lead cattle*, hence, דָּבַר, pasture.

3. In the Piel, *to bring together or order words*, i. e. *to speak* דָּבַר. Comp. *ipeir, sermo*, etc.

שָׁמַר from the root שם = *hold together, hold firmly, keep*.

שָׁמַר that which is dense, firm, hard; hence, a) *A thorn*. b) *A precious stone*, named from its hardness. Hence also the names of several cities = *fortress*.

שָׁמַר *Lees*. Originally, that which is drawn together, drawn off, i. e. the sediment deposited in the fermentation. Com. Engl. *sediment, lees*, French *lie* (pr. that which settles) kindred with the German *legen, to lay*. Since wine is improved, if after several tappings the lees are entirely separated from it, *Hefen-wein* שָׁמַר Is. 25: 6 [Engl vs. *wines on the lees*] signifies wine cleansed from the lees = excellent wine; which expression was selected here on account of the play upon words with שָׁמַר fat, juicy meats. We might thus render it: "Ein Mahl von Mast-fleische, ein Mahl von Most-flaschen; von markigem Mast-fleische, von geläuterten Most-flaschen."

The expression "settled on their lees" i. e. grown thick upon them, Zeph. 1: 12, (stiff or stupid with what one has gained and hoarded up,) confirms the original signification here given. Comp.

¹ That is, according to the theory of the author, in the regular series of mutations the reduplicated stem דָּבַר would assume the form דָּבַשׁ (the lingual being changed into a sibilant) rather than דָּבַר, so that the presence of the form דָּבַר presupposes the other, which however nowhere occurs as a verb, though we find it in several derivations, viz. דָּבַשׁ, *honey*, דָּבַשׁ, *hump*.

Amos 5: 11. The figure alludes to the fact that wine which stands too long upon the lees easily spoils and becomes thick. Comp. Jer. 48: 11. "Moab lies thickened upon his lees, was not poured from our vessel into another, etc." The common idea that *lees* are so named from their quality of preserving, is altogether erroneous.

The word *לֶאֱסוֹף* has been adopted in the Coptic, *Shemer* = *fermentum*, because many kinds of lees, e. g. those of beer, cause other substances to ferment; hence in upper Germany *Hefel* (*Hefe*) for *leaven*.

לָרַץ from the root *רָץ* signifies originally not to be rough, according to Gesenius, but, as the kindred stems, to separate, split, break through; hence Piel, set loose, arouse, especially a contest, Prov. 15: 18. Hithp. arouse one's self, be zealous; hence also, to quarrel, contend.

לָרַץ the substantive also, does not, (as Gesenius supposes,) derive its signification, viz. *throat*, from the idea of a rough tone, but means simply, a split, a hollow place; hence, *throat*, *windpipe*, Ps. 5: 10: "Their throat is an open sepulchre." Compare in German *Kehle* = *gula*, Persian *گل* *gula*, and *glutus*, throat, with the low German, *Kuhle*, hole, ditch, as *rumen* and *rma*. The passage cited by Gesenius, Ps. 69: 4, proves anything else than that the throat has its name from roughness; for *לָרַץ* is Niph. part. of *לָרַץ*, to cease glowing, dry up, as Ps. 102: 4: "I am exhausted by my crying, my throat is parched." On the other hand, where it signifies to call with or out of the throat, the strict sense is to speak with a loud, full voice; cf. Is. 58: 1. Ps. 115: 7. 149: 6.

Similarly derived meanings grow out of the stem *לָרַץ* [i. e. from the root when reduplicated by the repetition of the last letter] = to split, separate, divide, hence 1. To take away, hurry off, Hab. 1: 15, Prov. 27: 7, as the Arabic *جَرَّ*. 2. To divide, separate, hence *saw*, as the German *sägen* is kindred with *secare*; and also Poel, to be sawed in pieces, 1 Kings 7: 9. Finally 3. To split, divide, also means to crush with the teeth; hence *לָרַץ* a) That which has been made small, crushed, chewed; hence, that which was eaten. Thus we can explain the phrase *לָרַץ לָרַץ* to bring up what was chewed, i. e. to ruminate, Lev. 11: 3—6. Deut. 14: 6, 7. Once it occurs as *לָרַץ לָרַץ*, Lev. 11: 7: "To chew the chewed," i. e. to chew the second time, ruminate. b) That which has been made small, separated, signifies also a piece, a single one; hence, grain, as a small object, thus also a small weight, the twentieth part of a

shekel, as the German *Gran* (grain) from *granum*. In like manner also is explained גִּרְטִי, the *small, single, little piece*; hence berry, Is. 17: 6. Further, גִּרְרוֹת *Fauces*, pr. the splits, holes, i. e. windpipe and throat; whence in general, *throat*, neck; always used of the outside of the neck, whilst גִּרְוֹן usually signifies the inside, although not in all cases, vid. Is. 3: 16, where it designates the outside and front of the neck. Cf. حَرٌّ, hole, hollow. These significations are used interchangeably. Even צְנַאֲרַי, *neck*, from צָר strictly means *split, cleft, opening*, cf. *fauces* with χάσμος, *split, gaping*, German *gähnen*, hence *throat*; gula = throat and neck.

Gesenius confusedly and arbitrarily develops the whole series of words derived from גִּרְר from the imitation of a natural sound which corresponds to the German *gurgeln*, *s-charren*, etc. The *Gurgel* [the upper part of the throat] is not so named in German from *gurgeln*, [to gurgle] any more than *Kopf*, head from *köpfen*, to behead or to grow into a head, or *Nase*, nose, from *näseln*, to nose, as a dog, or to speak through the nose, . . . but on the contrary the Latin *gurgus* depth, abyss, (cf. Sanscrit *gri*, to swallow down) shows the original signification of the reduplicated root in *gurgulio*, windpipe, German *Gurgel*. The Icelandic still has *Kuerkur*. As a secondary signification we have "to utter guttural sounds, chirp," in Sanscrit, *gri* = to utter a sound, in general, γῆρυς, to sound, sing, speak; *garrere*, prate, gabble. Then, more specifically, the picturesque reduplication غَرَّغَر, *gargarizare*, γαργαρίζω, *gurgle*. Gurgling is, moreover, not the principal function of the throat, so that it is difficult to conceive how any one could have supposed it to have derived its name from that operation.

From the *Monosyllabic Stems* we select a single example, viz.

בָּוֹא, (p. 639) from the root בא = בה = בָּק, pr. *push* = penetrate

בָּעֵמָּה a) penetravit in medium, b) firmiter mansit in loco;

בָּעֵמָּה importune institit;

בָּא 1) Penetrate, = *enter, enter into*; then in general, *go*. 2) Come. Arab. بَاء IL. inivit feminam; venit in locum, ubi commoratus fuit. بَاو coitus conjugalis.

בָּ, the preposition, also belongs unquestionably to the stem בָּוֹא. Ethiop. *ba*, Arab. ب, Aram. בִּי (instead of בָּא, as בִּי instead of בָּא) prop. a *status constructus* which signifies *introduction*, and hence,

as preposition, *in*. Comp. the kindred, simply-reduplicated stem in the substantive **בָּאֵב**, **בֵּאֵב**, entrance, *door, gate*, **بَيْب**, *canal*, (*pr. way*). Hence the opinion of the old grammarians is not so utterly groundless, who regarded **א** as nearly related to **בֵּאֵב**, if we have correctly derived this latter word, p. 524, which will scarcely be doubted. Ewald (*Ausführl. Lehrb.* § 217, 9) compares **א** with **אָן**, *between*, which appears, however, inappropriate both for the form and signification. The etymology of the Arab. **فِي**, *in*, is precisely similar, which is a derivative from **فُ** mouth = aperture, entrance, variously applied, as **فُوهَة**, *os, ingressus plateae, viae, vallis; principium rei*; so that the preposition has nothing to do with **א**.

ARTICLE VIII.

NEANDER'S CHURCH HISTORY.

General History of the Christian Religion and Church; from the German of Dr. Augustus Neander. Translated from the second and improved edition, by Joseph Torrey, Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in the University of Vermont. Volume First comprising the first Great Division of the History. pp. 723. Boston: published by Crocker and Brewster. London: Wiley and Putnam. 1847.

By Rev. Dr. Sears, President of Theological Institution, Newton, Mass.

At length a part of the long-expected translation of Neander's church history by Professor Torrey has appeared. For ten long years, the theological student has been rejoicing, with some little abatement towards the end, in the near prospect of possessing this truly Christian and philosophical history of the church. The unskilful and repulsive translation of a part of the work by Rose, only increased the general desire for the expected American translation, which, it was believed, would be more worthy of the original. Indeed, it may be said that Professor Torrey, from his known scholarship and the force of peculiar circumstances, enjoyed a good reputation, as a translator of Neander, even before the work was executed. Winer has, for the same length of time,

been praised for his *Lexicon of the New Testament*, which no human being has yet, ever seen. These two works have, for sometime, been considered by the learned as indefinitely postponed. But here, as in most other cases, it turns out, that nothing takes place without a reason. At least, this is true in respect to the delay of Professor Torrey; and it is hinted, by the friends of Winer, that in consequence of some change in his views, occasioned by the recent investigations of other scholars, he has found it necessary to remodel his lexicon, which, according to promise, should have appeared in 1834.

When the recent splendid edition of Chrysostom's works was nearly ready for delivery in Paris, the painful intelligence reached us that the whole edition was destroyed by fire. The great work of F. W. Schubert, entitled *Staatskunde*, giving a statistical view of the different countries of Europe, was arrested in 1839 by a fire which destroyed the manuscript of the volume relating to Prussia, then ready for the press. The announcement of its appearance in 1846, however gratifying to the public, brought with it the sad recollection of seven years of lost labor. A similar occurrence in respect to Niebuhr's *Roman History*, is familiar to all. Professor Torrey's misfortune, if we are rightly informed, for we have only the proof-sheets of his work without the preface before us, was somewhat different. Just as he was ready, after an immense amount of labor, to publish his translation, it was announced, that a new edition of the original, materially altered and improved, was already in progress. Had the translator, fatigued with his toil, and shrinking from a repetition of it, published at that time, what he had prepared, the public would have been deprived of the benefit of the author's last revision. It was a manly resolution, to sit down to the task of a re-translation, for the sake of giving to the reader the improvements which seventeen years of study and reflection had enabled Neander to make in the two volumes, which in the translation before us are united into one.

As our views of any work are affected by our knowledge of its author, and as but little is generally known of the personal history of Dr. Neander, we have deemed this a fitting occasion to lay before the reader some particulars relating to the most interesting period of his life, which have accidentally been brought to light from an unexpected quarter.

In the years 1803 and 1804, there were living at Berlin several young men of high aims and of some poetical talent, extensively

known at a later period of life as elegant prose writers, who, according to a good custom then very prevalent, formed themselves into a club, for purposes of literary improvement. They were Varnhagen von Ense, Chamisso, Neumann, Hitzig, Theremin, and a few others, to whom Klaproth and Neander were subsequently added. They published at that time a *Musen Almanach*, familiarly called by them "The Green Book," from its color, which attracted some attention, and was variously reviewed by the different and dissentient schools of critics. It was condemned by Merkel, but commended by Schlegel. At first, the business of the day with each being ended, they went and passed a half, and sometimes the whole of a starry night with Chamisso, who stood as sentinel at the Brandenburg or Potsdam gate, discussing poetical subjects, and laying out plans for study. Afterwards, when they had their "Poetical Tea of the Green Book" at the house of Hitzig, Theremin, or of others who could furnish the accommodation, their love of the poetical hours, when all was silent and the stars were inviting to thought, led them to hold their meetings from midnight to day-light. In 1804, a separation became necessary. Hitzig, who had finished his course of legal study, was to go to Warsaw, in a civil office as "assessor." He is chiefly known as *Criminal-Director*, in Berlin. Theremin was to go to Geneva to complete his theological studies. He afterwards became celebrated, as an evangelical court preacher at Berlin, and continued to attract large audiences till his death, which recently occurred. Varnhagen von Ense went to Hamburg to prepare for the university, where Neumann, a few months later, joined him. Chamisso, as lieutenant in the army, was soon removed from Berlin to Hameln in the south-western part of the kingdom of Hanover, where he remained till after the battle of Jena. Klaproth did not go on his journey to China till the next year. Before the circle was broken up, a permanent bond of union was effected by the formation of a society, called τὸ τοῦ νόλου ἄστρον, the North being symbolical of intelligence. A lively and enthusiastic correspondence was carried on between the members of this society after their separation, and to this we are indebted for our information concerning Neander.¹

It was while Varnhagen von Ense and Neumann were prosecuting their studies at the "Johanneum" at Hamburg, of which the celebrated Gurlitt was then the rector, and where Kraft now

¹ *Leben und Briefe von Adelbert Chamisso*, herausgegeben durch J. E. Hitzig, Leipzig, 1839.

is, that they made the acquaintance of Neander, then but seventeen years of age. The facts brought to light in respect to his pursuits and character at this period of his life, and which throw light on Neander's character as a historian, are as instructive as they are interesting. Neumann, in a letter to Chamisso, dated Hamburg, Feb. 11, 1806, says :

"We [i. e. himself and Varnhagen von Ense] have become acquainted with an excellent young man among our fellow students, who is in every respect worthy of being received into the society of the North Star. Plato is his idol, and his perpetual watch-word. He pores over that author night and day ; and there are probably few who receive him so completely into the very sanctuary of the soul. It is surprising to see how all this has been accomplished 'without any influence from abroad. It proceeds simply from his own reflection, and his pure and innate love of study. Without making himself particularly acquainted with the Romantic school of poetry, he has, from the impulse given by Plato, worked out the results in his own mind. He has learned to look with indifference upon the outward world."

This first gleam of light cast upon Neander's early history, reveals important mysteries. It shows us, in part, the laboratory, where those processes commenced which are now of such potent efficacy in the Christian world. We here learn from a few hints, what we shall learn more fully from Neander's own letters, that he was as original, as singular, as susceptible of deep and intense emotion, and as distinct from the rest of mankind, as was John Foster. Unexpected as it may be to some of our readers, we cannot help alluding to the parallel which has forced itself upon us while reading this correspondence. Neander is no less profound and independent than was Foster, while he is more comprehensive, and incomparably more learned. Introspection was equally the peculiar habit of each, and with each the secret of his great power. We seem to be introduced by them into the chambers of an immense subterranean cavern, where some of nature's greatest mysteries stand revealed. Both are distinguished by magnificence of thought, and reach of imagination ; but these qualities are combined in different proportions, and directed to different objects. The thought of the one is both massive and regular, and moves like the heavy wheel by which the solid bars of iron are cut in our machine-shops. That of the other is more elastic, and has more of the irregularities and free movements of genius. The imagination of the one is like the broad flapping

wing of the albatross, heavily soaring high and far; that of the other is like the pinion of a more aerial bird, decked with a brilliant plumage, and having a motion infinitely more rapid and varied. Neander's imagination is more historical, constructive and architectonical; Foster's is more creative, free and salient. In the former, a philosophical intellect prevails over and suppresses the fancy and regulates the imagination; in the latter, an intellectual imagination allows the play of the fancy, and moves with ease and freedom. Religion is with each the central object of regard, around which all other things revolve. The religion of each is his own, a matter of personal conviction, and too deep to be affected by the tastes and fashions of the times. Neither feels obliged, or inclined to pay much regard to the orthodoxy of the church as such, and consequently, agreement or disagreement with it, is a matter of comparative indifference; while both have an interest in evangelical religion more pure and unfeigned than that of most of the zealots who denounce them. Both of these great men, we regret to say, have, in consequence of indulging too freely in speculation on certain topics of the Christian system, fallen into what we must regard as errors. Still, they are preëminently teachers of the present generation on the subject of a vital Christianity; the one speaking from the professor's chair, the other writing from the author's solitude; the one read and studied by the educated clergy of the age, the other, the favorite popular writer with the virtuous, the intelligent, and the refined both in England and in America. In respect to Foster, the public have the means of information before them. In respect to Neander, it is proper for us to proceed to justify the observation now made.

The three young men were now (February, 1806) nearly ready to enter the university. Neander, at first, seemed inclined to enter at Göttingen, as it might be supposed he would, that being the place of his birth. Varnhagen and Neumann gave the preference to Halle. Chamisso, whose literary tastes were very decided, was desirous of leaving the military service, and joining his friends. At length, Neander promised not to separate from his companions, and the plan was formed, for the three to go in company to Halle, and to take Hameln where Chamisso was stationed, on the way, and, if possible, to persuade him to leave the army and accompany them. The heart of each seems to have been fully set upon this scheme; and they afterwards looked upon Halle as their common home. Their anticipated union

(which, indeed, was merely anticipated, but never realized,) in this place, in which they could indulge their warm hearts in the delights of friendship, and their enthusiasm, in study and mutual improvement, continued to be the subject of their most ardent desires, and was to their youthful imagination a state of paradise where every wish would be gratified. Chamisso, in a letter to Varnhagen, dated Feb. 17, 1806, says: "Union at the university at Halle,—that is the question! It is my most ardent wish, but"—. And again Feb. 26: "Yes, brothers, I will do my utmost, and what that is, we will see when we are together. To belong to each other, you to me, and I to you, that is my desire. Yes, brothers, let us all keep this in mind, and do our best to bring it about. I will use your own expressions, 'You must, *must* do it, as certainly as you are my friends,'—you must, as you do not go by way of Berlin, come this way and visit your brother in the wilderness.—The account you give me of Neander, affords me great pleasure; and I send him a most sincere and hearty salutation. But he must not go to Göttingen. Tell him so. I know how things go there."

The earliest letter from Neander to Chamisso, was written from Hamburg, March, 1806. In this he says: "I thank you that you have anticipated me in declaring fraternity with me.—I found no one of similar tastes, with whom I could form an intimacy; and being of a timid nature, I was disinclined to seek for one; but that law of nature, by which kindred souls are brought together, led to an acquaintance with my excellent friends, Varnhagen von Ense and Neumann, who made me a member of the society. I can truly say, that from that time many things became clear and intelligible to me, which before were obscure, and seen, as it were, in the distance. I now understood myself better. No one really comes to feel what he is blindly in pursuit of, till he is brought in contact with others who are like himself. Outward circumstances, which, however, can affect only what is outward, threaten, indeed, to separate us, now that we have become acquainted. Let them have their sway over outward events, and over men of slavish sense, who are as external as the events themselves, but the free immortal spirit is like its divine author, who by the silent laws of nature, calmly exercises supremacy, unconcerned about favor or opposition from without.—Union and brotherhood are accepted from you, and proposed, in turn, to you by

August Wilhelm [Neander],

τὸ τοῦ πόλου ἄστρον."

We have given but a part of this first letter, written throughout in a Platonic spirit, and that part, on account of its abstract character, has been given in a free translation. By some unknown cause, Neander was prevented from going with the others and visiting Chamisso at Hameln. They went directly to Hameln, and spent the night with him on guard, and by moon-light, passing back and forth along the walls of the city near one of its gates, these three ardent young men deliberated upon their plans of life, and course of study. To Chamisso it was an important crisis. After weighing all the considerations for and against abandoning his military prospects and devoting himself to literary pursuits, and warming into enthusiasm, as the project of living with his friends at Halle became the distinct topic of conversation, he fell upon the necks of Varnhagen and Neumann and solemnly promised to join them, as soon as he could obtain his dismissal. Afterwards, May 8, he says, in a letter to Neumann: "I have already, ἀδελφοί ἀδελφοί, sent a large package to Halle, addressed to brethren K. A. Varnhagen, W. Neumann, and A. W. Neander, students in Halle." In July, he writes to Varnhagen at the close of his letter: "Farewell, friend of my heart. Embrace Neumann cordially in my name, and go to Neander, tell him how I love him. Let us not only be associated, but united in one." To the same he writes July 23: "I hope soon to write to Neander and Raumer [Karl, now professor in Erlangen]; salute both for me. Raumer's beginning is splendid. He must not go to Rome without first promising to remember us.—Neumann, Neander, Raumer, Schleiermacker, Blanc and Theremin's brother, greet them all. Χαίρετε, τέκνα."

But we must recur to Neander's intellectual and religious history. His next letter without date,—for he appears to have been, at that period, as indifferent in respect to time as he was in respect to space,—but probably written just before his journey to Halle, shows very clearly that his mind was approaching to a transition state from Platonism to Christianity. Of his former Jewish education, under the influence of which he had continued until a comparatively recent date, there is here no trace.

"Dear friends, all of you together," he now writes, "it is a good omen for our society, that each of us felt an electric excitement in favor of it, before he was aware of a similar impulse in the others. My letter of Wednesday will explain my meaning. Even such accidental circumstances, [as his acquaintance with Varnhagen and Neumann?] although they are not accidents in

reality, but the necessary results of our similar intellectual tendencies, only serve to proclaim the existence of the all-controlling *ἀνάγκη*. May our society, by contributing to our higher improvement, prove to be one of the forms under which motherly nature [The *μητρικὴ* of Plato?] appears. In the ever during music of ages, may it not leave behind expiring sounds. 'Pray and labor,'—let that be the bass note; or rather praying merely. For what else should a human, or even a superhuman do than pray? Whatever he does is nothing but a prayer, directed to the all-controlling divinity. The result of effort is but the giving or the withholding of what was supplicated. This order of things is common both to the initiated and the uninitiated in religion. All persons, either consciously or unconsciously, pray; but the prayer of the pious man only can be heard; for he does not pray for this or that particular thing. He rather *inquires* than prays. The *result*, whatever it be, is the answer, declaring that this or that particular occurrence *ought* to take place,—that such is the divine will. In this way, the answer is always favorable; for the good man desires nothing else. He will always fall in with the notes of the *ἀνάγκη*, and never wish to introduce his own. Thus true freedom is the product of necessity, and identical with it. Monday, perhaps I shall be with you. Should I come, I hope to find you all there. Saturday, I expect to receive letters from you all. Do and suffer what you may; I cannot merely *wish* you anything; but one thing I can do, I can *will*, and I can *strive* to be one with you."

What seriousness, what philosophical earnestness does this letter betray, of an unaided youth, seventeen years of age, struggling out of Judaism through Platonism into the fulness of Christian truth! A mind so honest in its inquiries, and so intense in its action, could not long remain in darkness, nor fail of exerting great influence, if once truly enlightened from above.

The next letter, bearing no date, but evidently written not long after, shows some progress in his knowledge of religion. He was still living in an inward world peculiarly his own. The truest subjects were connected in his mind, with the theory of the universe and with God. He was now struggling, like a young Hercules, with "the monster" of rationalism, and, in his odd Platonic phraseology about "cold" and "heat," he states the true principle of piety far more philosophically and comprehensively than those do who passively inherit their faith, or learn it from the catechism.

"My hearty thanks," he begins, "for your kind letter. I have

often replied to it in thought, and it was only necessary for me to give an outward form to the reply in order to send it to you. But precisely when one is most in harmony with himself, is he least inclined to disclose himself to others. It is that happy and glorious state, where thought, feeling, intuition and everything about us, is one. How difficult must it be for such a person to unfold successfully, part by part, that which is simultaneous and which exists only as a whole.—To apprehend the mind of the Deity from the successive and partial manifestations made in his works, is attended with the same difficulty as the attempt to recognize a friend, in his whole nature, from his letters. In the magnificent epistle of nature, we cannot understand the spirit which produced it, except we have the key to it within ourselves,—except, from within, we recognize the Deity, having our life in him, and our communion with him, so that what comes to us from without shall be a mere sign of his character.

With me the outward and the inward are still in conflict. There are three grades of what is called coldness. First, the lowest grade, where everything is decidedly cold, that is, either bald sensuality, or mere intellect without feeling. The second is that in which there is some inward warmth, but not enough to penetrate through the outward coatings in which it is enclosed,—the state in which the inward and the outward are not in harmony. In the former case the *ἀσθένεια* is internal; in the latter, it is external. The third grade is that in which there is neither excessive cold nor excessive heat, but in which heat and cold are suitably combined, so as to produce a coldness which is the result of *σθένος*. Of these three the multitude know only the two extremes. Those in whom the two extremes properly meet and harmonize, call the one extreme a freezing cold, and the other excessive heat or fanaticism. These have that union of maturity with childlike simplicity, which constitutes the *ῥησμονία τῷ Θεῷ*, or moral perfection. To whichever of the above-mentioned grades we belong, we should aim, each from his own position, at this perfection. I will aim at it from mine, which is the second above described. I am not striving for that blind and senseless harmony in which the outward and the inward are *takter qualiter* kneaded together, that common factitious unity or negative harmony, by virtue of which one stands midway between different parties, seeking the friendship of all. The character must be developed from within, and not built up from without."

The fourth letter, written before their arrival in Halle, and

probably in April 1806, exhibits Neander as triumphant over the doubts and difficulties which had perplexed his mind, and as a fresh convert, decided and clear in his faith, and fully resolved on a life of active piety. Here we perceive the first aspirations of this remarkable youth, towards that standard which he has, at length, attained. The inward triumph over rationalism was now complete. Now he was ready to devote his life to theology, having discovered its central point, which gave to it a unity and consistency, and in view of which he could best understand his own moral history. By devoting his life to these studies, he believed he could most successfully develop his own powers, and most effectually promote that religious reform which had become the object of his strongest desire.

"Dear friend," he now writes to Chamisso, whom he had hoped to visit on his way to Halle, "I regret very much that I was not permitted to see you in Hameln. Halle will be our place of meeting. There we shall all meet, secluded, as far as possible, from the outward influences of the *worldly* world (as, alas! it everywhere is), and enjoy the spiritual peace of a *civitas Dei*, whose foundation stone is, and always must be, love. The more I become acquainted with myself, the more I am dissatisfied with the world; and, for the same reason, those who are not my particular friends must be dissatisfied with me. Their presence makes me dumb. I cannot swear allegiance to mere human reason, which departs more and more widely from the one centre of all that is holy and divine, and from the sacred, and to them unknown, pleasures of the city of God,—I cannot follow that reason, so called, which, with cold and perverted moral feelings, creates idols [i. e. invents new systems] of its own. Yes, against such a system, against everything which it holds sacred, its gods and its temple, let there be eternal war! Let each one fight with the weapons which God has given him, till the monster is slain. O that there were union and coöperation among those who contend for the true God and the true church! It is sad and heart-sickening, to see them separate on account of mere forms, overlooking the fundamental truths in which they agree. But let us trust in God, whom we desire to serve, and let no sacrifice be to us a sacrifice. I have made up my mind to study theology. May God give me strength, as I desire and shall endeavor to do, to apprehend and proclaim to erring men the only true God in a spiritual way, which the unassisted intellect can never comprehend. Holy Saviour, thou alone canst reconcile us

with the ungodly race, for which, contrary to their desert, thou didst burn with love,—didst live, and suffer, and die. Thou didst love the profane; and we can only hate and despise them!"

The letter which follows was written sometime during his six months' residence at Halle; we do not know when, except that it could not have been either at the beginning or at the end of that period. In it there is evidence that the whole realm of a spiritual Christianity was rising with more and more magnificence before his vision. We are here not to look for a nicely adjusted doctrinal system, which he had not yet attempted to work out in detail, and respecting which he now manifests no particular concern; but we are to look for those general conceptions of Christianity to which a sanctified heart and a newly awakened imagination were leading the recent convert. This is the feature in which Neander's mind bears the most striking resemblance to Foster's. He is giving pictures—panoramic views of the spiritual world, as he now, with a clearer vision, beholds it.

"My dearest friend," he says, "I was prevented by a theological dissertation which I had on hand, from answering your letter as early as I desired. That you do injustice to your own virtue, only renders you the dearer to me. We all, while passing through conflicts and striving after inward peace, find occasion to reproach ourselves. But you must allow that you over estimate me by placing me above yourself. Christian friendship does not make one blind to the faults of a friend. Even joined with virtue, the germinating evil of an unsubdued imperfect nature is not overlooked by it, though the good which is mixed with the evil is equally recognized as a ray of the divine goodness.—So long as there is evil in us, (and how much is there in me!) we ourselves are evil; there is still a conflict remaining,—the forbidden fruit still allures us.

There are earthquakes in the spiritual, no less than in the natural world. The vitiated mind is always, as it were, in an earthquake. In such an individual, nature is never in a state of repose; conscience will avenge itself on him. At one time his nature spits out its fire through the crater of the passions, and scathes everything with its livid streams. At another his whole soul is buried under the lava of indolence, so that, for a long period, the splendid fabric of former exertions or of natural genius lies under ashes, till it shall be uncovered with the spade and the mattock of reason.

"In the Bible, my friend, we read of demons; and what are we, sinful beings, but persons demoniacally possessed? Demons are symbols of the corrupt nature within us, which makes us rage and foam, and fall prostrate, and run into the water, and into the fire. Is it in the body only, that we find palsies and convulsions? And are there not demons which in the Scripture language make us deaf and dumb? And what does the Saviour effect? He speaks to the demons and they flee. Yes, so it is; the Saviour found in us the abode of demons. That was the first step towards our recovery. The untaught mind, that cannot understand itself, looks abroad to find Satan. We must find him within ourselves, if we would learn his impotency. So soon as the demons recognize the presence of Christ, their power is gone; for then they must come to a knowledge of themselves, and flee into the dry and desert places of the stupid and sottish, where there are no refreshing waters. For, like a mad dog, they dread these waters.

Why do you not attempt to represent in genuine poetry the divine life of Christ, in its deep symbolical import, as you find it to correspond to what passes within your own breast! Single scenes in his life embrace the entire spirit of recent times. The healing of demoniacs, the rage of the demons is a poetical representation of the religious features, which appear in the moral struggle of the present age. Such a theme, one worthy of your character, I should like to see treated by you. I speak as it appears to me, from a religious point of view; as an uninitiated person, I cannot tell how it would appear from a poetical point of view, whether or not it would correspond with the requisites of the divine art.

In the religion of the Cross, Satan himself is a servant of God. He is to try the righteous, acting sometimes upon the body, sometimes upon the mind, in order that they may the more glorify the grace of God. The good, who are in a state of union with God, laugh at him. To them he is as nothing. He exists only to bring them to the knowledge of this fact. Through weeping, they are to learn to laugh. The story of the two old philosophers, the one of whom laughed at everything, while the other wept at everything, represents the two poles of the ancient world—comedy and tragedy, Aristophanes and Aeschylus.—With nations as with individuals the sportiveness of youth, the result of a buoyant nature, passes away with youth itself. But antiquity was to weep also, in order that He might come, who was to dry

all tears, and restore men to an enduring serenity and a holy cheerfulness, delivering them alike from a mirth that is volatile and a seriousness that is gloomy, thus uniting and correcting both extremes.—In the ancient world appeared, at first, fate as that in which all things are swallowed up and lost, represented poetically in the mythical world, and socially in the State, where every individual was merged in the mass. Next, individuality began to appear; a dissolution and conflict ensued, the individual energetically opposing himself to the all-subduing fate. The iron-hearted Stoic came forth, with the motto given by Lucan: *victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa Catoni*. At last comes the reconciliation of the individual with the universal in Christ, in which the individual, as such, has a personal immortality secured to him, and is, at the same time, fraternized with the mass. I have now given you the pitch and prelude. You may go on with the tune, if they touch a responsive chord in your soul, and thus let us echo and reëcho to each other notes which shall make a pleasing and perpetual symphony."

As these letters of Neander are thrown into an appendix to the first volume of Chamisso's life, and no letters of the latter to the former are found in the collection—they were probably not preserved by Neander—we are deprived of one important source of information. A few things, however, may be gathered from Chamisso's letters to his other friends. There can be no doubt that Neander's condition was but little above that of indigence. In a letter to Varnhagen, dated, Hameln, Sept. 7, 1806, Chamisso says: "Apropos of the letter from France, how our accounts stand with Neander, I do not know. I desire by no means to be too exact with the saint. If you think it best, pay the postage for him." This remark was evidently dictated by a delicate regard to Neander's pecuniary circumstances. In the same letter, he says: "I cannot, at present, prosecute my Greek studies. With the aid of a translation I have read the *Enchiridion* of Epictetus, respecting which I shall, perhaps, write to Neander. His letters to me are admirable." In a letter to Neumann, he says: "The letters of this original genius, as I can comprehend him, are first rate." About the same time he writes to Varnhagen: "From Neander I have received a letter [probably that, the substance of which has been given just above], such as he alone could write. It must have been written about the fourteenth [of October, 1806].—he never thinks to give the date." This negligence was probably connected with a mental peculiarity which

has accompanied him through life. His custom is not to take notes when he reads for historical purposes, but simply to write, on the blank leaf at the end of the Greek or Latin folio which he is consulting, the number of the page, trusting to his memory for the rest. So when he lectures, he has no notes before him, except a small slip of paper, containing dates and references. Prodigious as his memory is known to be in other respects, it seems not to be favorable to the recollection of numbers.

Within three days after the destruction of the Prussian army by Napoleon at Jena, that is, on the 17th of October, Bernadotte captured Halle, and on the 20th the university was suspended by Napoleon and the students ordered to disperse. Chamisso writes to Mrs. Fanny Hertz, of Hamburg, Nov. 5: "I have just received a letter from Neumann at Göttingen, whither he and Neander have fled. The University of Halle, which was to be my second home, has ceased to exist.—After a wearisome journey on foot, during which Neander was taken ill, forsaken by all and destitute, they reached Göttingen, where a certain Dr. Gesenius, of that place, was a guardian angel to them." Gesenius, once relating to the writer the incident here mentioned, said that he was returning to Göttingen from Nordhausen, his native place, which was then in flames, the French having set fire to it. The soldiers of the broken Prussian army were returning to their homes. In the general confusion, Gesenius saw two youths, on their way from Halle to Göttingen, one of them unable to walk any further, and penniless. He procured a carriage for the unknown young student and conveyed him to Göttingen. It was Neander; and this circumstance led to a friendship which lasted for life. Gesenius himself, then but twenty years of age, was just beginning, at Göttingen, his career as teacher of Hebrew, and Neander was one of his first pupils in Hebrew and Arabic.

Though Neander became attached to Gesenius and Planck and other teachers in the university, as men and as scholars, he refused to acknowledge them as religious guides. At no period of his life, do we find him more thrown back upon his own convictions, or more dissatisfied with the theological influences with which he was surrounded. Indeed he could scarcely endure to live in so cold a religious atmosphere as that which then prevailed at Göttingen. In his last letter to Chamisso, written in 1806, we find him saying: "At first it was painful to me to be thrown into this place of icy coldness for the heart.—But now I find it was well, and thank God for it. In no other way, could I have

made such progress. From every human mediator, and even every agreeable association must one be torn away, in order that he may place his sole reliance on the only Mediator.—What are the words of a teacher? If he has the truth, he has taken it from that source where I can find it also.—I cannot see the light except with my own eyes, and through the light. It beams upon me just in the way in which my eye is fitted to receive it. But if they [his teachers] are seeking after anything else than the only true God, whether it be nature, or the universe, or humanity, or art, or Satan—whatever it be, if it be not offered to him and sanctified by him, the voice of all nature, and charity itself will pronounce it a lie.” He had before drawn a true picture of himself, when he said, in the same letter: “The *πρόθεσις* αὐτοῦ, the aim and the substance of all theology, has been the goal and the guiding star of all my studies. I have been endeavoring to sink lower and lower into the depths of the soul to find there the light of the true God, who illumines and gives warmth to all.”

Judging from these early letters of Neander, the only specimens of his private correspondence, which, so far as we know, have come before the public, we cannot doubt that should as full a record of the heart and inner life of Neander, in the form of journals and private letters, come to light, as that which has recently been laid before the world from the papers of Foster, it would give a similar interest to his published works, and furnish a similar explanation as to their origin and character.

Neander, as a historian, has written no less from his heart, than from the records of antiquity. He has not, like most ecclesiastical historians, looked, through the cold medium of the intellect and of criticism, at Christianity and then at its history, as two outward objects, comparing them with each other and setting down the results. As a true believer, whose whole life was in Christ and for Christ, he studied Christianity, carrying to it an interpretation from his own heart; and he studied history in the same way. No man has examined either the New Testament, or the remains of ancient Christian literature with more scrupulous care. No historian relies more exclusively on well authenticated facts in support of whatever finds a place in his narrative. But we do not so much perceive these facts themselves as we do the reflection of them from the mirror of the author's mind. To this union of the objective and subjective methods, to the sound principles which he entertains in respect to each, and to the thoroughness and fidelity with which they are followed out, the history

presented in this translation owes its chief interest and its chief value. As to the investigations on which the work is founded little can be said by way of objection. If the author's critical labors are not perfect, they are certainly unsurpassed. As to the coloring which Christianity itself and its history have received from his own mind, we feel disposed rather to be thankful that it is so good, than to complain that it is no better. Milner is nearly the only one with whom he can be compared in this respect, and he represents the piety of the English mind. The type of Neander's piety is less exclusive, or rather is less the product of any one country or of any one age. It is more comprehensive or generic, but also more indefinite. Hence he unites the suffrages of all parties more than any other writer; and yet scarcely any party is exactly satisfied with him. The historical school of Tübingen, under the able and learned Bauer as its Corypheus, are loudly protesting against *Neanderizing* Christianity and all history. While they profess great respect for Neander as an individual, they cannot endure to see his individuality transferred to the mass of the whole church. Though we have no sort of confidence in the projected reform of church history by that new and ambitious school, and infinitely prefer Neander's view of Christianity and of history to Bauer's, according to which a subjective and even Hegelian *speculation* is substituted for a subjective *piety*, still we think Bauer has assailed Neander at his weakest point. The careful reader of the "Planting and Training of the church under the apostles," will discover here and there that Neander has lent to the apostles a little of his own theology and liberal principles. So in his history of the church in later times, we are sometimes led to suspect that he has given a tinge of his own feelings to other men whose characters he was portraying. We are the more confirmed in this opinion from the fact, that he over-estimated the piety, or supposed piety, of some of his early companions. Chamisso did, indeed, possess, in early life, an unusual elevation of character, and had a good *poetical* conception of Christianity. Perhaps, in the time of his outlawry by Napoleon, he passed through an inward struggle in which the subject of religion was concerned. Still we cannot, without a smile, read such expressions in Neander's letters to him as, "My dear friend and brother in Christ."

Any extended examination of the contents of the volume before us, which we might wish to make, is precluded by the length of the preceding remarks. We have only room for a word in re-

gard to the character of the translation. In general terms, it may be said, that it answers very nearly to the expectation which the public have entertained in regard to it. Few are at all aware of the number and magnitude of the difficulties which a translator of Neander must encounter. A strictly literal translation would be wholly unintelligible to the English reader, so peculiar are the workings of the author's mind, and his manner of expressing his thoughts. And yet the thought and the form of expression are so blended and inwrought into each other, that the former can hardly be recognized without the latter as its counterpart. The translator has wisely adopted a middle course, giving a literal version wherever the analogies of the language would bear it, and substituting other modes of expression, where a verbal translation would be intolerable in English. His ingenuity must have been often tasked to the utmost, and in a few cases he seems to have given over in despair. The truth is, complete success in representing Neander's thoughts in English is altogether out of the question. Very frequently the only alternative is to adopt a word which is not so used by English writers and leave the sense to be gathered from the connection, or to resort to loose and inadequate English expressions at the sacrifice of force and precision. The book would have been more attractive to the general reader, had both the phraseology and the structure of the sentences been less strictly conformed to the original. As it is, it must be *studied* in order to be understood, and with superficial and hasty readers, a great and constantly increasing class, the *Entwickelungsprocess* in finding out the meaning will be slow. But for such the author never wrote, and to such no translation, perhaps, would be of any use. To those who bring to the perusal of this work habits of deep reflection and a love of fresh and original truth, it will not be difficult to follow the clear though unbeaten track of the author's mind, and to learn to associate both ideas and words in his way, though new to them. Such persons will highly prize this rich mine of thought, and will work it the more successfully for the strict fidelity of the translation.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTES ON BIBLICAL GEOGRAPHY.

By E. Robinson, D. D., Professor at New York.

I. SITE OF HAZOR.

In the Number of this work for Feb. 1846, p. 213, after assigning the reasons which go to fix the position of Hazor "on the south of Kedes in Naphthali, somewhere on the way between Kedes and Safed," I suggested that "it is a matter well worth the attention of future travellers, to ascertain whether there exists in that district any remains, or any name, which may correspond to the name and the features of the ancient Hazor."

I was not then aware, that something had already been done in this respect. On mentioning the subject to the Rev. Eli Smith, after the article was printed, he informed me that while at Kedes in April 1844, his attention had been directed to a large *Tell* called *Khureibeh* some distance south of Kedes, on which were said to be ruins. He kindly furnished me with the following extract from his journal, with the accompanying remarks. If *Khureibeh* be not Hazor, it is at least deserving of further examination; and we may hope that Hazor may yet be identified, either there or in that region.

"*Khureibeh* is a *Tell*, apparently with ruins on it, at the south end of the plain of Kedes. Its bearing from Kedes is 186° . Just there, in a deep ravine, the *Wady el-Mûadhdhamiyeh* [coming from near *el-Jah*] finds its way into the plain of the *Hûleh*, at the fountain of *Mellâhah*."

"The above is all the notice my journal contains respecting *Khureibeh*. We did not visit it; and I can add but little from recollection. It rises from an uneven tract, apparently on the north side of the deep ravine. I should judge it to be less than three miles from Kedes; and though aided by a spy-glass, I could not determine, whether the appearance of ruins on it might not be natural rocks. The name implies that it is a ruin. Should this turn out to be the *Hazor* of Scripture, perhaps the fountain *Mellâhah* may be the *En-Hazor* of *Josh. 19: 37*."

II. ANTIQUITIES ON THE ROUTE FROM BA'ALBEK TO HAMATH AND ALEPPO.

It is singular that in respect to just these regions, certainly among the most accessible in Syria, we have less information than of almost any other. Of the tract between *Ba'albek* and *Hums*, we have as yet only *Buckingham's* meagre notes, (*Arab Tribes*, p. 486 sq.) and the still briefer ones of *W. H. Barker* on his visit to the sources of the *Orontes*; *Jour. of Lond. Geogr. Soc. 1837*. Between *Hamath* and *Aleppo*, the direct

road usually followed by travellers and caravans, presents little of interest; but a route further to the west, which Burckhardt took, leads through a region full of antiquities, though that traveller has not fully described them. The following extracts of a letter recently received from the Rev. W. M. Thomson of Beirut, will serve to give the reader some idea of the interesting objects still to be explored in those regions. I subjoin at the close some explanatory remarks.

"Beirut, Dec. 14th, 1846.

REV. AND DEAR SIR,—My late tour to Aleppo gave me an opportunity to complete my exploration of the Phenician cities, and led me to many other places of interest, as Selucia, Antioch, Jebel Simûn, full of Grecian towns and temples, Aleppo and its neighborhood, the great salt valley where David conquered Hadadezer, etc. This *Valle of Salt* is the most extraordinary place I have yet visited. I could also say something about Zobah, *Khandesek*, etc. in this connection.

Returning from Aleppo, I first visited Jebel el-Aala, ten hours nearly due west of that city; a singular isolated mountain with some sixty-five or seventy ruined Grecian towns, beautiful temples, churches of old date, with many Greek inscriptions. This mountain is inhabited by Druzes; some of whom had once lived in Abeil. They were like old acquaintances. From Jebel el-Aala my route was south by Jebel Nusrin to Edlip; then to Riha; then to the vast remains at *el-Bâra*, perhaps the largest ruin in Syria. I copied many inscriptions, all Greek. Next to *Apamea*, the ruins of which have never yet been described, or at least not in any book I have seen. Burckhardt could not have examined them. There is a single avenue from a mile to a mile and a half long, one hundred and twenty-three feet broad; with a colonnade twenty-four feet wide on each side for a foot-path. The columns were six feet apart. They were of various sizes, from three to four feet in diameter, and thirty-four feet high, with beautiful Corinthian capitals and cornice. The shafts of the columns were of all kinds, plain, fluted, flute inserted, double fluted, and twisted. There must have been about sixteen hundred columns, forming one of the most magnificent avenues in the world. But I cannot enlarge.

I visited *Sejda* and Hamath; and then kept along the eastern base of the mountains of the Nusairiyeh to the head of the Lake of Hama, called Kedes in the old Arabian geographers. Here I discovered the ruins of a Grecian city, called Kedes and also Kudesianos, at the head of the lake, from which the name of the lake no doubt came. I then followed up the Orontes to *Riblah*, the "*Riblah in the land of Hamath*," 2 Kings 23: 33; and thence to the great fountain of the Orontes, leaving Jûry, the *Laodicea ad Libanum* on my left. This fountain is near Hürmul. It is twice as large as that of the Jordan at Tell-el-Kâdy. It rises under Lebanon, and sends out a strong river, which bears directly across the plain towards Anti-Lebanon, until it reaches Riblah, when it turns north and runs down into the lake. This almost impassable river forms the natural southern boundary for the kingdom of Hamath; and guides to the northern limits of the land promised to Israel. I was extremely interest-

ed in this region. The two ranges of mountains come close together; and here I suppose was the "entering in" of the land of Hamath.

There are two objects of peculiar interest. One is the ruined convent [cavern] of *Mār Marūn*, the founder of the Maronites. It is hewn out of the solid rock, immediately over the great fountain of the Orontes, a dark prison-like construction, more resembling the stronghold of a bandit, than the peaceable abode of the ministers of Jesus Christ, and strikingly emblematical of the dark, fierce, boorish sect, which traces its rise to these dingy caverns. The other curiosity is a very large monument about two miles east of the fountain, called *el-Kāmo Hürmel*. It is built of large hewn stones, is twenty-five feet square at the base, rises seventy or eighty feet, and is terminated by a pyramid. The four sides are covered with figures of various animals, intermingled with bows, arrows, spears, and other implements of the chase, in *alto rilievo*, beautifully executed, and as large as life. This monument is in full view of Riblah, which lies on the river below. Can it have been the work of Nebuchadnezzar, when he was encamped here, and designed to commemorate his conquests? Or is it a great hunting trophy, erected by some one of the chase-loving Seleucidae? I can meet with no description of this wonderful monument in any book of travels. The style of architecture will not contradict the first supposition. There is no inscription in Greek; which would hardly have been the case, had it been constructed by that scribbling people. They could hardly set up a stone in this region, without inscribing something upon it; and had this monument, in some respects the most singular one now standing in Syria, been erected by any of the Graeco-Syrian monarchs, they would hardly have failed to put at least their name upon it.

I passed up between the two ranges of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon to the water-shed between the Orontes and the Litānī, near 'Ain (see Num. 34: 11); and so by way of Ba'albek and Zābleh to my residence at Abeih.

My colleague, Dr. De Forest, was so much interested in my account of this route, that he set out to visit it a short time after my return. Following my directions, and having more leisure, he visited both sides of the lake Kedes, passing on the east as he went, and returning on the west side from Apamea. He also visited Selemqa east of Hamath; and thinks he has discovered the site of Shepham, Num. 34: 11.

A little society of intelligent Arabs, mostly young men of Beirūt, has lately been commenced; one of whose objects may possibly interest you. They are preparing a *descriptive catalogue* of all known works in Arabic; and these will prove to be more numerous than was supposed. When they shall have made this as complete as possible by corresponding with literary men in Egypt, Bagdad, Damascus, Aleppo, and other centres of Arabic learning, and by the catalogues of European libraries, it will be prepared for the press by Nasif el-Yazagy, the best native Arabic scholar now known in this country. I hope they will be able to print an English translation in parallel columns. Having then the name, character, subject, and value of all Arabic works, it is a part of their plan to use this catalogue as a guide in the purchase of books for an Arabic library.

May we not hope, that this undertaking will not only give a new impulse to the study of this noble and wide-spread language; but that it will also aid in the effort to revive a taste for improvement, which has slept for so many centuries in these oriental countries. With the revival of literature will be introduced the *press* with its mighty and transforming agency. As these young men are generally not wealthy, and the forming of an Arabic library will be expensive, the work must of course advance very slowly. Still, in fifteen or twenty years, a good deal may be done.

I remain, with great respect, yours, etc.

W. M. THOMSON."

I subjoin a few remarks upon some of the names of places mentioned in the above letter, viz. those printed in *Italic*.¹

Valley of Salt. This is the celebrated valley or lake of salt, now called *es-Sibkh*, about eighteen miles south-east of Aleppo, near the village Jebûl. It is described by Maundrell (p. 213), by Pococke (II. p. 168), and more particularly in Russell's *Nat. Hist. of Aleppo*, I. p. 55. In winter the rains and torrents, with a few springs, convert the surface into a shallow but extensive lake. In summer the water evaporates, leaving a crust of salt of various thickness and quality. This is broken up, sorted, and carried to Jebûl; where it is dried and winnowed, and thence sold to all parts of the country; furnishing indeed the main source of supply for all northern Syria.—It is related of David (2 Sam. 8: 3—13) that he undertook a military expedition in order to extend his dominion to the Euphrates; and being attacked by Hadadezer, king of Syria-Zobah, he routed him and subdued the whole of northern Syria. After an enumeration of the rich offerings which David made in the temple on this occasion, it is immediately added, v. 13: "And David gat him a name when he returned from his smiting of the Syrians (אֲרָם) in the *valley of Salt*, eighteen thousand men." All the circumstances, and the vicinity of the Euphrates, leave little occasion to doubt, that the valley of Salt here named is that above described. It is true, that in the parallel passages, 1 Chron. 18: 12, Pa. 60: 2 (inscr.) we find the reading *Edomites* instead of *Syrians*. This has evidently arisen in the course of transcription, by the change of a single Hebrew letter (אֲרָם for אֱדוֹם). These passages all obviously refer to the same event; and a change of the name being here unquestionable, it is much easier to account for the substitution of *Edom* for *Syria*, than vice versa. The later Jews were far more familiar with the neighboring Edomites, than with the regions of northern Syria; and would be very likely to confound this distant valley of Salt with that at the south end of the Dead Sea mentioned on another occasion in connection with Petra; 2 Kings 14: 7.

Khandsereh is mentioned by Abulfeda as situated in the border of the descent about two stations south-east of Aleppo. It was at one time the seat of a Khalf Omar, of the line of the Ommiades. But since the days of Abulfeda the name has been entirely lost to modern geography; and

¹ The best maps for consultation are those of Berghaus and Hughes; the latter in the Atlas published by the London Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, No. 98.

now re-appears for the first time. See Abulf. Tab. Syr. p. 170, ed. Köhler.

El-Bāra. This place was visited by Niebuhr in 1766, who writes the name *Beraa*, in Arabic *Birāah*; also *Kefr el-Barā*; see *Reisebeschr.* III. p. 95. Burchhardt took it in his route from Aleppo to Hamath in 1812; he writes it correctly *el-Bāra*. He says: "The mountain of *Riha*, of which *el-Bāra* forms part, is full of the ruins of cities which flourished in the times of the lower empire; those of *el-Bāra* are the most considerable of the whole;" *Travels in Syria*, p. 130. Both he and Niebuhr speak of the remains of public buildings, churches, and private dwellings; and especially of three tombs,—plain square structures surmounted with pyramids, one of which has fallen. Niebuhr, misled by the similarity of the name, seems to regard this as the ancient *Beroea* of Syria; but the specifications of all ancient writers go to make that place identical with Aleppo; Cellarius *Not. Orb.* II. p. 362. But without much doubt, *el-Bāra*, as suggested by Niebuhr, marks the site of the city *Albaria* destroyed by the crusades in 1096; see Robert Monach. lib. VII, in *Gesta Dei per Francos*, p. 67.

Apamea was a large city on the valley of the Orontes, often mentioned by Josephus and other ancient writers; see Cellarius, II. p. 354. In the time of the crusades it was still a flourishing and important place under the Arabic name *Fāmīeh*, and was occupied by Tancred; it is also described by Abulfeda as situated near an extensive lake in the valley; Wilken *Gesch. der Kr.* II. p. 274. Abulf. Tab. Syr. p. 114, 157. On the strength of these notices the name *Fāmīeh* has continued to be inserted on modern maps down to the present century; although both the name and the site have long been forgotten in those regions. Niebuhr heard at Aleppo in 1766, that the site of the former *Fāmīeh* was now called *Kūlat el-Mudūk*; *Reisebeschr.* III. p. 97. Burchhardt in 1812 found the castle of this name occupying a hill projecting into the valley of the Orontes, not far from the lake *et-Tākah*; and although he could not enter it nor examine the neighborhood, yet he fixes upon it as the probable site of Apamea; *Trav. in Syr.* p. 138. In connection with the Euphrates expedition in 1835, Mr. Ainsworth visited this region, and speaks of *Kūlat el-Mudūk* as the site of Apamea, and as exhibiting "ruins of a highly ornamental character. Part of the town is enclosed in an ancient castle situated on a hill; the other ruins lie in a plain; part of a strong wall and an archway still exist, and also remains of a temple. In the adjacent lake are the celebrated black-fish, the source of a distant commerce;" see *Journ. of the R. Geogr. Soc.* 1837, p. 414, 415. The above account by Mr. Thomson is still more full and satisfactory.

Sejḍr is at the point where the Orontes issues from the mountain ridge which it breaks through below Hamath; a bridge here crosses the river. On the summit of the range on the west bank stands a castle; which in its present state is from the times of the later Khalifs; but the many remains of Grecian architecture, fragments of columns and elegant Corinthian and Doric capitals, indicate that a Greek town formerly stood here. It is doubtless the site of the ancient *Larissa* of Syria, situated between Apamea and Hamath. See Burckh. *Syr.* p. 143. Cellarius, *ib.* p. 356.

Riblah, situated at the elbow of the Orontes, was first seen by Buckingham in 1816; he writes the Arabic name *Rabla* instead of Riblah, and appears to have had no suspicion of its identity with the Riblah of Scripture; Arab Tribes, p. 491. It was however recognized by Gesenius; but has since been described by no traveller until the visit of Mr. Thomson.

Laodicea ad Libanum. This place is often mentioned by ancient writers; but the only specifications of its position are found in the Itineraries. The Itinerary of Antoninus places it between Emessa (Hums) and Heliopolis (Ba'albek), at eighteen Roman miles from the former and sixty-four Roman miles from the latter. The Peutinger Tables give it at twenty Roman miles south of Emessa. These distances, so far as is yet imperfectly known, accord best with the site of *Jûsy*, three or four miles south-east of Riblah, on the side of Anti-Lebanon. "It was said to be a large city, and to have pillars and aqueducts and castles in it; and below it, on the plain, about two miles to the north of it, was another tower called *Jûsy el-Jedîd*. The former was now entirely deserted; but the latter still retained some inhabitants;" Buckingham, Arab Tribes, p. 490. All this accords well with an ancient site upon the mountain; while the name and the inhabitants have apparently been transferred to the plain. Compare the similar case of Sarepta, now Surafend; Bibl. Res. III. p. 412—414.

Source of the Orontes. The remotest source is a rivulet coming from Anti-Lebanon near the village of Lebneh ten or twelve miles north of Ba'albek. This little stream flows through the plain, and approaches the western hills that skirt the foot of Lebanon near Hümmul; where it unites with the waters of the large fountain spoken of by Mr. Thomson. This latter is usually regarded as the head of the Orontes; the natives considering not the most distant, but the most copious fountain, as the proper source. The same is true in relation to the sources of the Litány, the Barada, and the Jordan. A large volume of water "springs with some violence from a natural basin in the rock, of a triangular form, measuring about fifty paces, and nearly concealed on each side by trees and bushes;" see W. B. Barker in Journ. of the R. Geogr. Soc. 1837, p. 99.—The cavern now called *Deir Mâr Mârôn* or Convent of St. Mârôn, was known in Abulfeda's day as *Mûghârat er-Râkib*, the Monks Cavern; Tab. Syr. p. 150. The reference of it therefore to the founder of the Maronites, may not improbably be of later date.

The *Monument* described by Mr. Thomson near Hümmul is unique, and deserves the early and attentive examination of travellers and antiquarians. It was seen across the plain by Buckingham, who merely speaks of it as "a high and large tower, seen at a great distance, and called Koormee;" Arab Tribes, p. 489.

ʿAin is most probably, as suggested, the Scriptural name occurring in Num. 34: 11, and obviously situated south of Riblah. It lies north of Lebneh, and is therefore north of the water-shed. It is mentioned by Buckingham, ib. p. 487.

III. THE SABBATICAL RIVER. RAPHANEA.

The famous *Sabbatical River* of Josephus (B. J. 7. 5. 1) has recently been identified, by the Rev. W. M. Thomson, with a large intermitting fountain near the Convent of Mâr Jirjis and the castle el-Husn north of Lebanon; see Silliman's Journ. of Science, Nov. 1846. This fountain had already been noted by Burckhardt; Trav. in Syr. p. 150. There can be no question as to the identity; and thus another incidental proof is given of the general correctness, and trustworthiness of the Jewish historian. On two points, however, there is perhaps room for future elucidation. Josephus describes the river as "between Arka which belonged to Agrippa's kingdom, and Raphanea." Arka is situated at the north end of Lebanon not far from the coast, and doubtless made part of Agrippa's original kingdom of *Chalcis*; this latter city having been situated in the Bûkâ'a, not far from Ba'albek; see Jos. Antiq. 14, 3. 2. The text of Josephus therefore needs here no change. As to Raphanea, which Mr. Thomson supposed he had found at some distance north of the fountain, there are several historical notices which serve to fix it in another place. Raphanea was still a town of importance in the time of the crusades. In 1126 King Baldwin II. subdued it, in connection with Count Pontius, who had for a long time pressed hard upon it from a castle he had built upon a neighboring mountain; Wilken Gesch. der Kr. II. p. 527. This castle was called *Barinum*, in Arabic *Bârn*, and came at last from its importance to supersede the name or mention of Raphanea itself; Wilken ib. II. p. 605 u. 652. It was destroyed in 1236; ib. VI. p. 557. In like manner Abulfeda testifies, that the castle *Bârn* was founded by the Christians about 1120; and that in his day it was a small place with ruins and ancient substructions, called *Rafaniyeh*, situated a day's journey south-west of Hamath; Tab. Syr. p. 107. In accordance with all this, Burckhardt while on his way from Hamath to the castle el-Husn, at the distance of ten or eleven hours from Hamath, was pointed to a ruined castle on a mountain, an hour from his road, called *el-Bârn*; Trav. in Syr. p. 155. The coincidence is complete; and there can be little doubt but that these ruins mark the position of Raphanea. The ancient name of the city has been supplanted by that of the modern castle; as in the parallel instance of Apamea described above.

ARTICLE X.

LITERARY AND MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE.

Vatican Library. This library was founded by Pope Nicholas V. in 1447, who transferred to his new Vatican palace the Mss. which had been collected in the Lateran as early as the fifth century. The present building was erected by Sixtus V. in 1588. The library has been augmented from time to time by various purchases, bequests and donations. In this work, Leo X. was particularly active, sending agents into distant countries to collect Mss. The great body of the treasures, especially of

Mss., is contained in an immense hall, (which is divided by pilasters into two portions,) and in two wings or galleries which extend from the end of the hall to an immense length. Painted cabinets or presses, entirely closed, contain the books and Mss., so that a stranger would have no suspicion of the nature or value of the contents. All that meet the eye are walls bright with tasteless, modern frescoes, Etruscan vases, tables of granite, statues, a column of oriental alabaster, etc. The halls are sadly wanting in the literary air of a library. The *genius loci* is concealed by inappropriate decoration. Overloaded ornament is indeed the characteristic of modern Italian taste, particularly in architecture. Among the Ma. treasures, which the writer looked at, were the Virgil of the fourth or fifth century, with fifty miniatures including a portrait of Virgil; a Terence of the ninth century with miniatures; Cicero *De Republica*, the palimpsest discovered by Cardinal Mai, under a version of Augustine's Commentary on the Psalms, a quarto of 598 pages, parts of it much defaced; a Pliny with very fine figures of animals drawn on the lower margin; a Greek calendar of the tenth century, gorgeously illuminated with basilicas, martyrdoms, etc.; the four Gospels of A. D. 1128, a very interesting Byzantine Ms., in quarto; an immense Hebrew Bible, folio, splendidly illuminated, almost beyond the power of a common arm to raise from the shelf, and for which the Jews of Venice are said to have offered its weight in gold; an *officium mortis* with most expressive and beautiful miniatures; the *Codex Mexicanus*, a very long calendar; the autograph copy of the *De Sacramentis* of Henry VIII. with the inscription on the last page, "Anglorum rex Henricus, Leo Decime, mittit hoc opus et fidei teste et amicitias;" and the Letters of Henry VIII. to Anne Boleyn, seventeen in number, very characteristic of the amorous and capricious monarch. It is a curious fact, that since his day, and in consequence of his proceedings, the government of Great Britain has had no official intercourse with that of Rome. The printed books are mostly contained in eight or ten common rooms, within glass cases. Many of the volumes being bound in the white vellum for which Rome is so famous, make quite an imposing show. Of course the library is deficient in many works which are found in Protestant libraries. One room is wholly occupied with 400 volumes of engravings, mostly in large folio. The Papal government is extensively engaged in executing engravings; of some kinds it enjoys a monopoly. The *custode* stated the number of printed books in the Vatican library to be 100,000, and of Mss. 35,000, probably much exaggerated, especially in respect to the printed books. The Ma. treasures are precious beyond all price, and it is supposed, that valuable discoveries would be the result of a free and thorough examination. Complaints are made of the illiberal policy pursued by the present librarian, Cardinal Mai. This celebrated scholar, now somewhat advanced in life, has been satisfied for some years with his former reputation.

Essaias Tegner, bishop of Wexio in Sweden, the distinguished poet and professor of Greek literature, died on the second of Nov. 1846, aged sixty-four. He was the most eminent literary character in Sweden and his death is greatly lamented. The Swedish academy of Sciences went into mourning for one month, and the president, the historian, Geijer, is to pronounce his eulogy. Though eminent in literature he is said not to have neglected his spiritual duties. He is well known to those who

read the English language, by the fine translations of Mr. Longfellow.—Lepsius, the investigator of Egyptian antiquities, has just been knighted by the king of Prussia, and made regius professor in the university of Berlin.—C. F. Neumann, an eminent professor in the university of Munich, has just published a History of the British war in China. He speaks English perfectly, is well versed in the literature of England, and is one of the first Chinese scholars on the continent. He resided in China several years and by his knowledge of native sources has given the Chinese version of the causes of the war, as well as the English. A writer in the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, pronounces the history to be very able and impartial. The great lesson which the book teaches is the folly of the exclusive system which has so long characterized the Chinese policy.—Stephen Endlicher of Vienna has published a Chinese Grammar under the title, 'Anfangsgründe d. Chines. Grammatik,' in 288 pages, which is highly commended in the last No. of the Vienna Jahrbücher.—The same publication contains a review by the veteran G. Hermann of Leipsic of several works on Æchylus, which have lately appeared in England and Germany. Of one of these editors, F. A. Paley, who has published an edition of the tragedies, Hermann writes thus: "The expectations which the preface awakens are by no means fulfilled. The critic is wholly "unsicher," shows neither a sufficient acquaintance with the language, with the metre, nor even with the prosody. He is not familiar with the Greek tragedians," etc. Franz, who has translated one of the tragedies for the Berlin theatre, is commended, having examined, among other Mss. the Medicean which are the most important. Hermann thus gives his judgment on Ahrens, who has published on the Greek dialects: 'Ahrens looks upon the Greek authors in respect to forms and words, not in relation to the thoughts and tone of the writers. He needs a critical discipline. His conjectures are commonly vague, roundabout opinions.'

The great work by Prof. Rosellini of Pisa, on Egyptian Antiquities, published by the Tuscan government, is now complete. It is entitled "L' Opere dell Rosellini Monumenti dell' Egitto è publiati in quaranti Dispensi," etc. The text is published in forty numbers or livraisons. The plates, sixty in all, are in large folio; a few of them are colored. The price of the whole work, including the plates, is 1636 paoli, about \$163. It is stereotyped and sold for the Tuscan government by William Pianti, bookseller, Florence. It would be a valuable addition to all our public libraries in the United States. The learned author died shortly before the completion of the publication. The antiquities collected by him in Egypt are deposited in Florence. They consist of the articles commonly found in Egyptian museums. Among them is a porcelain bottle with an inscription in Chinese characters, said to have been found in an Egyptian tomb. There is also the Scythian car, found in the tomb of one of the captains of the host of Rameses the Great, B. C. 1560. It looks exceedingly fragile. It is wholly of wood, carefully worked, with some ornaments of ivory. There are no pins or bands or fastenings of metal. There is another small collection of Egyptian antiquities in Florence, in the imperial gallery. The most important museum in Italy is at Turin, collected by Drovetti. It is said to contain 8000 articles. The principal objects are, with few exceptions, in the highest state of preser-

vation. The specimens of Egyptian statuary, many of which are colossal, are the most valuable portiana. The most remarkable is what is supposed to be the statue of Sesostris. Could this collection and the two at Florence be united, scientifically classified and described, they would afford a most interesting study.

One of the most interesting spots near Venice is the island of St. Lazzaro, a small island, about an hour's sail in a gondola from the city. The island was given by the senate of Venice in Sept. 1717 to the abbot and founder of the Armenian community, Dr. Mechitar. An air of uncommon neatness and order pervades the entire establishment. The church is a simple yet handsome edifice with fine altars. Services are held every day at 5 A. M., at noon, and at 3 P. M. There are an archbishop, twenty-five priests, thirty pupils, seven Armenian and thirty Italian servants now resident on the island. It is the metropolis of Armenian literature. Four printing presses are constantly employed. The works published are sent to the Armenians in all parts of the world. The compositors are Italians who have merely a mechanical acquaintance with the Armenian characters. A book has been published in twenty-four languages, containing twenty-four prayers of St. Nerses, answering to the hours of the day. The library is worthy of a king's palace, most exact in its proportions and tasteful in its ornaments. The beautiful book-cases, made of the pear-tree, contain 15,000 volumes, handsomely bound. Among them are Elzevir and Aldi editions. In another room are 1000 Armenian Mss. mostly inedited and a copy of each of the works which have been printed at the establishment. Among these are translations of Young's Night Thoughts and of the Paradise Lost.

Messrs. D. Appleton and Co. announce as in press, A New Edition of Livy for the use of Colleges, with English Notes, by Professor J. L. Lincoln, of Brown University. The text will be based upon that of the recent valuable German edition of Dr. Alschefski, of Berlin, the first two volumes of which were reviewed in the last Number of this Journal. The Notes will be partly philological, aiming at the solution of grammatical difficulties, and at the illustration of the language, with references to the grammars and other helps most in use in this country; and partly explanatory, giving the necessary information on all obscure matters, and in regard to the early history of Rome, furnishing as far as practicable, the results of the researches of Niebuhr, Arnold, and other modern writers, together with references to Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities. The edition will be furnished with a Geographical and Historical Index, with a Plan of the City of Rome, (from the recent German work of Prof. Becker, on Roman Antiquities,) and other useful illustrations.

The works of Josephus. A new Translation by the Rev. Robert Traill, D. D. With pictorial illustrations from drawings taken on the spot, by Wm. Tipping, Esq. This is an attempt by means of a new and good translation and splendid illustrations, to introduce Josephus to the rank of an English classic. Two parts have been received, which fully sustain the public expectation. It is understood to be under the editorial supervision of Isaac Taylor, Esq., of Ongar. We know of no work which promises more for the elucidation of the Bible. We hope to speak of it more fully in another Number.

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ARTICLE I.

ZUMPT'S LATIN GRAMMAR.

A Grammar of the Latin Language, by C. G. Zumpt, Ph. D., Professor in the University, and Member of the Royal Academy of Berlin. From the ninth edition of the original, adapted to the use of English students by Leonhard Schmitz, Ph. D., late of the University of Bonn. London, 1845.

By Charles Siedhof, Ph. D., late Rector of the Gymnasium at Aurich, in the Kingdom of Hanover.

In order to examine this valuable work from a proper point of view, and to form an estimate of it not merely as a grammar, but also as an indication of the rate of progress made in classical learning, it will be necessary to direct our attention first to other works of a different character, though of a similar design, which preceded it. At a time when nothing was required of the Latin scholar but an ability to write and speak the language as it had been in common use for centuries in the literary world, a lifeless and uniform method, as represented in the Grammar of J. Lange, of which not less than forty-two editions appeared, would meet the demand in elementary instruction. The circle of knowledge was then exceedingly narrow; and besides, the Germans, at that time, possessed no independent national literature. Consequently, reading was rather oft repeated than widely extended; and thus a great intimacy was contracted with the Roman classics, which compensated, in great measure, for the deficiency in

grammatical training. But an age of independent inquiry succeeded; the trammels of tradition were by degrees thrown off; and scholars were disposed to look into the nature of things, each for himself, more fearlessly and searchingly. Now Basedow made his appearance. With a keen glance, he discovered and exposed the defective character and bad influence of a merely mechanical system of education; but by maintaining that nothing except what was of direct practical utility should be studied by the young, he fell into the opposite extreme, which, in the end, would necessarily produce a reaction. According to his view, since language was but the mere expression of thought, it could best be acquired orally. Consequently grammars should be banished from the schools. From this point of view, the venerable Campe could say that the inventor of the spinning wheel deserved to be held in higher estimation than the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey. It was in allusion to this school that Ernesti said, "the mother-tongue (*Frau Muttersprache*), becoming proud of her new distinction as mistress, threatens to turn the Latin out of doors." Here, as in all controversies, there were violent partisans on both sides, fighting desperately for existence, and a third class who acted the part of mediators. The philologists of the old school looked with a friendly eye upon these last, whose aim was not to neglect ancient learning, but to exchange its cumbrous and unseemly dress for one of more comeliness and grace. By this means the popular favor, which was beginning to be lost, could be recovered and secured.

The first who attempted a reform of the old system of grammar was Scheller the lexicographer, a very industrious scholar, whose labors will always be regarded with respect, notwithstanding the disposition of later critics, particularly Reisig, to speak disparagingly of them. Bröder's work, with its brief rules and well-chosen examples, was much more successful. His peculiar method of treatment had the effect not only to facilitate the labor of committing to memory, a practice which universally prevailed at that time, but to secure, in his view a much higher end, namely, to allure the student to habits of reflection. After him, Wenck made the first direct attempt to arrange the grammatical materials of the Latin language, not according to arbitrary rules, but according to philosophical principles. The attempt was not very successful, though the elder Grotendorf,¹ who had the supervision

¹ To be distinguished from the younger Grotendorf, whose Latin Grammar has recently been edited anew by Krüger.

of the later editions of Wenck, had the confidence to say, in a preface, that he believed he had now brought the grammar of the Latin language to its highest degree of perfection. The work, however, had but a limited circulation. It was at this time that Zumpt first made his appearance as a Latin grammarian; and certainly no book of the kind ever published, was more deserving its reputation than this has been; a reputation which it still continues to enjoy. The principal aim of the author seems to have been to devise a logical system of grammar, and in this he has been unusually successful. He has accurately distinguished the different periods in the history of the language, and also the different kinds of composition employed by the various classes of writers, and then has presented the whole in a simple and perspicuous style. In this last respect, his Grammar is the rival of the Greek Grammar of Buttmann, which, as to style and manner of execution, is universally regarded as a model. Like Buttmann, he is willing to appear before the public in the character of a learner. Every successive edition gave evidence of the author's diligence in study.

Ramshorn, who next appeared before the public as a Latin grammarian, though he wrote in different journals disparaging reviews of the work of his predecessor, could effect no more for himself than to secure undue praise for his merit as a collector of original examples to illustrate the rules of grammar. These examples, on which his fame chiefly rests, are often taken from false readings, or from passages misinterpreted by him, and besides not unfrequently fail to establish the point for which they are adduced. A work so artificial in its arrangement, so overloaded with minute divisions and refinements, so erroneous in its rules, followed as they were by a multitude of examples, which, instead of illustrating a principle often perplex one by their obscurity, could never be generally adopted as a guide in teaching the young.

About this time, a new epoch in respect to Latin grammar was introduced. The influence of the Hegelian philosophy did not indeed directly affect this department of study. But the grammatical researches of Grimm, which brought to light such treasures of knowledge hitherto unknown, could not fail to extend their influence to the Latin language. With him commenced a process of historical inquiry so illimitable in its extent and so astonishing in its results, that the cultivators of Latin philology desired to apply the same method to their own department, and see if

they could not arrive at similar results. At the same time, the comparative study of languages in connection with the Sanscrit, as prosecuted by Bopp and others led to the discovery of general laws, by which many isolated facts could be explained that had hitherto baffled all the learning and ingenuity of the grammarians. Meanwhile Becker has brought out a system in respect to the German language, according to which the language appears to have within itself a perfect organization. This development is, to the best of our knowledge, more perfect than any which has been made in respect to other languages. Various writers, as Weissenborn, A. Grotefend, Feldbausch, and, at length, Kühner have endeavored to apply the system of Becker to Latin grammar, while others have given the preference to other methods. Among the latter, Bilothe deserves the first place, whose early death all unite in deploring. He had been trained in the Hegelian school of philosophy ; and he retained the discipline and exactness of method which that school imparts to its disciples, while he abandoned its peculiar doctrines. There is no grammatical work on the Latin language, whose design and plan are so perfect as that of the School Grammar of Bilothe, recently edited by Ellendt. The arrangement is so systematic and the rules so clear and precise, that, had the author given as much attention to the details of the language as to the method of treating it, scarcely anything more could be desired. Otto Schulz has also won general respect on account of the logical accuracy and the perspicuity which characterize his Latin Grammar. Reuscher, from Reissig's school, has attracted less notice. Reissig's lectures on Latin grammar, edited after his death by Haase, give abundant evidence of the high aims of their author, but they also betray his defects. In themselves considered, they are a singular compound of seriousness and frivolity, of ingenuity and prejudice ; while for the *present age* they are rendered truly valuable by Haase's ample and critical notes. Though these latter are very rich, and accurate in the examples collected, the *results* cannot always be trusted, on account of the occasional incompleteness of the collections made.

Before we pass to an examination of the work before us, it seems to us necessary to premise a few observations on the nature of grammar in general, and on the method of the grammar of a given particular language in particular. We may thereby not only avoid a direct collision with the respected author,—which would be of no use here where we are concerned with principles

alone,—but we may have more space for the discussion of the necessary details. We have directed our attention, with intense interest, for a series of years to the grammar of Zumpt, and made it the basis of our study of the Latin language, and especially of the language of Cicero, whose entire works we have perused fourteen times for grammatical purposes, and may therefore, perhaps, indulge the hope of being able to contribute something from this source to the improvement of that valuable work. It will, of course, be impossible to incorporate in this review all the results of the investigations which we have thus made. We must, therefore, content ourselves with producing only so much as a regard to the practical influence of this work as a school-book requires.

If language is the form which thought assumes, grammar is one department of the philosophical treatment of that form. Lexicography is the other. Grammar treats of the connection of single forms of thought in constituting a sentence. Now as every man has an individual character peculiar to himself, so has every nation its peculiar character. Although the individual thinks according to the same general law as the nation, and even the race, still, if he have a marked character, he will express his thoughts in a peculiar way. This constitutes his style, by which nothing is meant but his peculiar mode of expressing his ideas. Precisely the same is true of a nation as such. Its language has different characteristics from those of any other nation. Even when several languages have one common descent, the offspring have a family resemblance. But they nevertheless differ from each other like different children of the same parents.

For authors of grammars, it was a happy era when men were unsuspecting enough to regard grammar as a statute-book, which regardless of legal principles, was a mere record of positive enactments. At that time, all grammars of the various languages were of the same stamp. The grammatical observations of most of the Dutch philologists on particular authors would fit one author just as well as another. When this comfortable manner had had its day, an attempt was made to substitute in its place what was called philosophical grammar. To this class belong the grammatical works of Vater and Sylvester de Sacy. It could not, however, but become evident in a short time, that nothing could come of such a method but definitions; and even these were defective because they were not the result of historical investigation. At present, this method is merged in the logical, founded on the

analysis of thought, which Becker, Herling and their numerous followers have adopted.

It is, to be sure, possible to sketch an image of an individual, by stating and illustrating the nature of man in general, and then pointing out how that nature is modified in the case of a given person. But this is a long and circuitous way, in which one is in danger of losing sight of the direct object of his pursuit. Again, all the grammars of languages the most various would, by such a procedure, come to have the same features. This method is correct only when one applies it to his mother tongue, which in this way alone can be thoroughly comprehended; for the investigator then sees in it his own spirit embodied in a distinct form, and thus the laws of the language are laid open to him.

If two grammars of two distinct languages resemble each other more than the languages themselves do, or—to retain the figure formerly employed—more than two individuals do, either one or both of them are constructed on false principles. The true principle is to be found only in the nature of the language, as the form which thought assumes, that is, in the form as such. The key to the peculiar character of a people is furnished by this form or mode of expression, not by the thought or thoughts as such, which, in particular circumstances might, for anything that appears to the contrary, belong to many nations. But how differently are the same thoughts expressed in different languages!

The grammarian must first acquire a view of the character of a people by studying separately and distinctly and then classifying the facts of its language and history, which together constitute, as it were, its soul and body. Hereby will he obtain a true image of the nature of the human mind as it is modified in the particular type before him. Then can he with the greater certainty, trace the individual traits, and show how these, when combined, must produce the general features as a whole.

We cannot here follow out this train of thought, or give more particularly the grounds for characterizing the Latin as the language of rigid law, the Greek, as the language of art unconsciously representing ideal beauty, and the German as the transition from the former to the latter, or rather the combination of what is authoritative and objective in the former with what is spontaneous and subjective in the latter. We have discussed these points in another place.¹ We are here concerned, not so much with these views, as with the right apprehension of the principle on

¹ Otto Wigand's *Vierteljahrschrift*, Vol. I. No. 1, 1845.

which every grammar of a foreign language must be founded, namely, that of the particular form of such language. The principle on which a grammar of one's mother tongue is to be prepared, must, indeed, always be that of logical analysis.

Our author was the first to construct a grammar thoroughly on the latter principle. At the same time, his talent for nice observation, and his habits of careful investigation tended, in the course of several successive editions, to render that principle a secondary, and the perfecting of the several rules, a primary object. This the author himself confesses in his various prefaces, though not without side glances and an unfriendly mien at the method of later grammarians. We can easily imagine that a man who has accomplished what Zumpt has done, may become so attached to his work as to be shy of those who would improve upon the principle on which it is founded. We are far from wishing to cast reproach upon him, or upon any other person, for such a cause; for we recognize in this a necessity of nature from which no one is exempt, and least of all any one who, with great effort and devotedness to his task, has, for his times, accomplished it in a manner worthy of all imitation.

Being unable to compress into a single article any thorough examination of so broad a subject as that of Latin grammar in its whole extent, and having elsewhere¹ reviewed the etymological part of this same work, we shall restrict ourselves, in the present instance, to that part of the grammar which treats of the Syntax of the Latin tongue. We shall follow our author section by section, making such corrections and additions as seem to us necessary.

It may be proper here to remark, that the ninth edition of this Grammar does not differ essentially in its character from the eighth. The changes introduced relate not to the plan or tendency of the work, but consist in additions, improvements and corrections; and these are to be found on almost every page. The sections from 804 to 812, vary indeed in their order slightly from those of the preceding editions; but no great inconvenience to those who wish to combine the use of the last with any other edition will arise from so trifling a change.

We begin with § 363. In this section, according to the most recent investigations, a larger range is given to the use of the adjective as a substantive than was given in the former edition. Even before that edition Klotz had proved, in a remark on Cioe-

¹ Mager's *Pädagogische Revue*, 1845, Nos. 1 and 2.

ro de Amicitia V. 17. page 115, that docti and indocti are very often used as substantives. Hand's remark in his *Lehrbuch des lateinischen Stils*, p. 160, in which he expressly denies that an adjective is ever used as a substantive, is quite unaccountable. For further evidence compare Cic. pro Sextio XXVII 68: *Multa acerba, multa turpia, multa turbulenta*. Also phrases, as, *dementis est* Cic. de Officiis I. 24. 83: *Sunt enim ignorantis* Cic. Tusculan. I. 33. 80. A collection of all the passages in Caesar and Cicero where adjectives are employed substantively, is much needed.

† 365. The former too great restriction of the use of the adverb in connection with *esse* is relinquished. Yet the rule is not now sufficiently comprehensive. It is well known that *satis est* occurs very frequently. Cf. Cic. ad Famill. IX. 14. 2: *quam satis est*; and in a great many other places: *Parumne est*. Cic. pro Sext. XIV. 32.

† 366. In the example taken from Cic. pro Archia XII: *qui est ex eo numero*, etc. the preposition *ex* is to be stricken out; for it is not to be found, even as a doubtful reading, in that passage; but it is erroneously retained in all the editions of this Grammar.

† 367. It is true that with Cicero the singular of the verb follows *uterque*, *quisque*, etc. But the author should have noticed such passages as Cic. de Finn. III. 2. 8. *quod quum accidisset, ut alter alterum necopinato videramus statim*. Cic. ad Fam. III. 13, *uterque nostrum—devinctus est*, as the singular always must be used after *uterque* in connection with the genitive plural, and never, as one might suppose, can the form *uterque nostrum devincti sumus* be used. Exceptions; the Codex Erfurtensis has in Cic. pro l. Man. II. init. after *alter*—*alter arbitrantur*, which also according to Bennecke on this passage and according to Wunder in Varr. lectt. Cod. Erfurt, seems to deserve the preference.—De Inventione I. 3. 4. reads *quisque cogereantur*.

† 371. With *id quod*, when it relates to a whole clause, reference is made by Zumpt only to the nominative and accusative. For examples of the ablative, cf. de Invent. I. 26. 39: *id quo*. Liv. XXI. 10: *id de quo*.

† 372. The example *haec fuga est*, for which Zumpt has given no authority, is found indeed in Liv. II. 38, but *Drakenborch* has there according to the best Codd. *hoc*.

† 373. It should have been mentioned in this section, that the singular always follows *pondo*. Cf. Liv. XXVI. 14. 8: *Pondo auri septuaginta fuit*. Liv. XXVII. 10. 18.

† 374. Under the remark upon the singular of the verb after *aut—ant*, might also have been adduced, Cic. pro Plano. XXIX. 70: *aut Metellum Pium aut patrem ejus facturum*.

† 377. A clear example for the neuter of an adjective referring to a masculine or feminine noun, as the name of a *thing*, is found in Cic. de Ami. XXVII. 100; *sive amor sive amicitia. Utrumque enim dictum est ab amando*.

† 380. On *videri* it ought to have been observed, that it is *always* used personally, even when *found in an intermediate clause* with *ut*, Cic. ad Famill. XVI. 4: *teque, ut mihi vinus est, diligit*. See the examples quoted by the author to show this.

† 381. There is in this paragraph an omission. We must add, that in such infinitive sentences as can be translated by the indefinite nominative, *one*, or the word *on* in French, the common adjective pronoun *his* is also in Latin expressed by *suus*. Cic. in Pisonem XX. extr.: *Quid est aliud furore, non cognoscere homines; cruentare corpus suum leve est; major hæc est vitæ, famæ, salutis suæ vulneratio*.

† 384. To the verbs here cited should be added *legare*, Cic. pro Sext. XIV. 33: *legatos, quos—legasti*. In Vatin. XV. 35: *legati—legarentur*.

† 388. Freund in his Latin Lexicon states that *profugio* was not used with an accusative till after the Augustan age; but this is a mistake; for Cic. pro Sext. XXII. 50, has: *Quum vim profugisset*. But this is perhaps the only example to be found in Cicero's writings. It would have been better, however, if our author had not inserted, without any further explanation, this with the class of verbs that are commonly followed by the accusative.

† 389. Rem. 2. Add after the words, *rem cum re*; e. g. Cic. Brut. XXXVII. 138: *cum Græcorum gloria—copiam æquatam*.

† 389. Rem. 3. It should have been remarked here, that *aemulare* is used with the dative of a person in a bad sense only, as Cicero explains it, Tuscul. IV. 26; in a good sense always with the accusative. Of the former use only a single example is furnished by Cicero, Tusc. I. 19. 44: *quod iis aemulemur*. The remark that it is used with the dative might better have been omitted.

† 394. Among the examples cited for this use of the ablative no one is taken from Cicero, so that one might suppose it was unknown to this writer. But cf. Cic. Phil. IX. 7: *Quoniam cum Dolabella, hoste decreto, bellum gerendum est; ad Fam. VII.*

30: *quo mortuo nunciato* (renunciato). Further, for the vocative, Propert. II. 15. 2: *lectule deliciis facte beate meis*.

To the words named in remark 3. of the same paragraph should be added the verb *probare*. Cic. pro Milone XXIV. 65: *mirabar vulnus pro ictu gladiatoris probari*. In Verr. V. 29. 78: *quem pro illo vellet probare*. De Invent. I. 48: *pro vero probatur*. It stands also elsewhere in the same sense, cf. Cic. pro Sext. XXXVIII. 81: *qui pro occiso relictus est*.

‡ 396. The passage: *Eodem castra promovit*, etc. is not to be found in Caesar de Bello Gallico I. 48, but de Bello Civili I. 48.

‡ 410. When the author speaks concerning *amicus*, *inimicus*, and *familiaris*, which are used as adjectives as well as substantives, passages might have been quoted where both usages are combined, cf. Cic. pro Sext. VII. 15: *multo acrius otii et salutis inimici*.

‡ 411. *Sacer* should have been noticed here. It is not connected with the dative by Cicero, as it often is by other writers. The genitive is found Cic. in Verr. Act. II. 1. 18. 48: *illa insula eorum deorum sacra* putatur. The same is true of *vicinus*.

It is very surprising that the author retains the old distinction in respect to the use of *similis* and *dissimilis* founded on the idea of *external* and *internal* resemblance. If Cicero be read with a moderate degree of attention the untenableness of this will sufficiently appear. *Similis* and *dissimilis* referring to *persons* (men and gods) are used only with the genitive, cf. Cic. de Rep. I. 43: *qui in magistratu privatorum similis esse voluit*; referring to *things*, indiscriminately, with the genitive or dative. Examples are hardly necessary. Still, cf. Cic. de Nat. Deorr. I. 35. 97: *canis nonne similis lupo?* The passages which seem to contradict this are so few in number that we are compelled to question the correctness of the text. So Cic. in Verr. Act. II. 3. 53. 124: *Verris similem futurum*. Here the final *s* of *Verris* could easily have been absorbed by the following word *similis* in the manner of writing used by the ancient Romans. From the time of Livy the dative prevails; in the poets of the Augustan age the genitive perhaps never occurs, cf. Madvig ad Cic. de Finn. V. 5. 12.

‡ 413. *Cedo tibi locum, regnum, mulierem*. Never did a Roman of the classical period speak thus. Cicero used only the accusative of an adjective in the neuter, e. g. *multa*, cf. Cic. de Off. II. 18. 64.

‡ 414. For the different meaning of *metuo* with the dative and

the accusative a proof passage is found in Terence Andr. I. 3. 5: Si illum relinquo, ejus *vitae* timeo; sin opitutor, hujus *minas*.

†416. It is known that *inesse* is construed by Cicero always with *in* and the ablative never with the dative. The only passage, de Off. I. 42. 161: *quibus* autem *artibus* aut prudentia major *inest* aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, does not prove much, because it is so easy and natural for the following *quaeritur* to have an influence upon the construction. *Incumbere* is never construed with the dative by Cicero but with *in*, in a figurative sense, with *in* and *ad*. To connect *assuescere*, *consuescere* and *insuescere* with the dative or *ad* is a later use; in the time of Cicero they govern the ablative. The few exceptions cannot affect the rule, e. g. Caes. de B. G. VI. 28: Uri *assuescere* ad homines ne parvuli quidem possunt.

†417. It should be remarked that Cicero rarely used *desperare* with the dative or with *de*. He construes the verb regularly with the accusative. Here it is to be observed that the difference of meaning presented by our author does not depend upon the difference of construction. Cic. pro Sext. XL. 89: Desperabat *iudicii* turpitudinem.

†419. As is well known, there are very many examples of the construction *probatur a*, which might have been noticed; e. g. Cic. pro Mil. XIII. 6: Causa Milonis a Senatu probata est; de Finn. IV. 8. 19: ab ea non sit probatum.

†420. Rem. The Graecism here mentioned, *aliquid mihi volenti est*, is found not only in Sallust and Tacitus, but also in Livy, XXI. 51: *quibusdam* *volentibus* novas res fore.

†421. Rem. The name also, with Cicero, stands in the accusative after *nomen imponere*, Acad. II. 47. 145: etiam *nomen* est rei, quod ante non fuerat, *κατάληψιν* imposuit.

†423. *Tædium* is neither a word of Cicero nor of Caesar.

†426. In this paragraph it should have been stated, that if the *genitive of an attribute stands in apposition*, still another substantive is to be added; e. g. Cic. maximi ingenii *homo*, not merely maximi ingenii. Although the *genitive alone* is occasionally found in Livy, it is very rare with Cicero. It is found so in Livy, e. g. XXII. 60; XXVIII. 22; XXIX. 31; XXXVII. 7; XXX. 26; XXXV. 31; XLII. 55. With Cicero it occurs Phil. III. 15. 38: *quodque* *provinciam Galliam certeriorum, optimorum et fortissimorum virorum, amicissimorumque reipublicae civium*, — retineant; pro Sext. LVI. 126: summus artifex et mehercule *partium* in re publica tamquam in scena, *optimarum*.

† 429. A Graecism should have been mentioned here, which is found, for instance, in Cic. pro Sext. XLIII. 93: *quam sciatur duo illa reipublicae paene fata, Pisonem et Galbinum, alterum haurire—innumerable pondus auri,—alterum pacem vendidisse.* Cf. Lucian. D. D. 16: *οἱ δὲ τοὶ παῖδες ἡ μὲν ἀνὰ τὴν ἀφ᾽ ἑρμῆος,* etc. as is very common in Greek.

† 433. The connection of an adjective of the second and one of the third declension in the genitive used as nouns, occurs even in Cicero, cf. Cic. de Nat. Deor. I. 27. 75: *nihil solidi, nihil expressi, nihil eminentia.* The use in this example has its ground in concinnity.

† 434. After *tum, temporis* should have been added; “but Cicero uses *id temporis*,” e. g. pro Milone X. 28; XX. 54.

† 435. Here could have been quoted some examples from Cicero; e. g. ad Fam. II. 18, extr. *Superioris lustris reliqua*; pro lege Man. III. *insignia* with the genitive; but also de partit. orat. XXI; in Verr. I. 38. II. 59, and Acad. II. 11. 36, *insigne*; pro Balbo V. *Sola terrarum*; Lael. IV. 14: *extremum* disputationis.

† 437. Rem. 2. The remark concerning *plenus* and *refertus* might give the impression that Cicero not only *commonly*, but *always*, used *refertus* with the ablative and *plenus* with the genitive. But this is not true. Cf. ad Attic. III. 14: *plenus expectatione*; pro Planc. XLI: *Cognovi refertam esse Graeciam sceleratissimorum hominum ac nefariorum*; pro lege Man. XI. 31: *referto praedonum mari.* But compare remark 462. To the passages on *consciis* with the dative might have been added pro Cluent. XX; in Verrem IV. 58.

† 446. The verb *incusare* is not Ciceronian; for Cat. Maj. V. 13, is *incusem* without manuscript authority. Rem. 1. If the prepositions are mentioned, *inter* should be enumerated with the rest. Cf. Cic. pro Rost. Amer. XXXII. 90: *qui inter Sicarios et de beneficiis accusabant*; Phil. II. 4. 8: *quo modo sis eos inter sicarios defensurus.* Quaestio is to be understood in the simplest way.

† 461. It should be remarked that *natus* when used figuratively is always to be put with the preposition. Cic. pro Sext. VII. 15: *nefarius ex omnium scelerum colluvione natus*; ibid. XXII. 50: *Marium—ex iisdem radicibus, quibus nos, natum.* The number of passages where this construction is found are extremely numerous; on the other hand the use of *natus* with *ex*, though connected with the father, is not rare. Cf. Cic. de Finn. II. 19. 61; Lael. VIII. and others.

† 455. Although it is true that if *men* are the instruments, in general the verb is not often placed with the bare ablative, yet the use in *particular* cases is to be observed. Cf. Caes. de B. G. I 8: Caesar *ea legione*, quam secum habebat, *militibusque*, qui ex provincia convenerant,—morum fossamque perducit; Cic. Tusc. I 1: non quia philosophia graecis et litteris et *doctoribus*, percipi non posset. Expressions, especially, which signify soldiers are usually placed thus in the ablative without the preposition; these are then regarded as mere instruments in the hand of the commander. Cic. pro Sext. XXXV. 75: Quum forum—*armatis hominibus* ac *servis plerisque* occupavissent; ibid. XLIV. 95: qui stipatus *sicariis*, septus *armatis*, munitus *inducibus* fuit; Id. pro Leg. Man. XI 30, twice: *magnis* oppressa hostium *copiis*, and, *legionibus nostris*—iter—patefactum est: Id. in Vat. XVII. 40: Milonem—*gladiatoribus* et *bestiaris* obsedissem rempublicam; Id. pro Sext. XXIV. 54: erat expulsus vi, *servitio* denique *concitato*.

† 460. The verb constipare is to be stricken out, because it never occurs with an ablative.

† 462. We have, in section 437 above, the construction of *refertus*. Here it is to be remarked, that Latin writers prefer to construe it with the genitive when used with reference to persons. Cf. Cic. de Orat. II 37. 154: nam et *referta* quondam Italia *Pythagoreorum* fuit; pro lege Man. XI 31: *referto praedonum* mari; pro Planc. XLI 93: *refertam* esse Graeciam *sceleratissimorum hominum*; pro Fonte. I 1, (according to the former division of the oration, not that employed since Niebuhr's discovery of some parts of this oration before lost,) *referta* Gallia *negotiatorum* erat; ad Attic. VIII 1. 3: etsi propediem video *bonorum*, id est, *laetorum* et *locupletium*, urbem *refertam* fore; Ibid. IX. 1. 2: urbem *refertam* esse *optimatum*; sometimes also the ablative of persons is connected with it. Cic. pro Rege Dejotar. XII 33: *armatis hominibus refertum* forum (compare remark 2. † 455); Phil. II 27. 67: *aleatoribus referta*; pro Varr. II 1. 52: domus erat—*praetoria turba referta*; Orat. XLI 140: *quibus referta* sunt omnia.

† 463. There is also another passage in which impleo is construed with the genitive, viz. Cic. in Verr. Act. II 46. 119: Itaque L. Piso multas codices implevit *eorum rerum*.

† 467. Rem. Dignus is often put without either the ablative or qui and the subjunctive, if that of which one is worthy has already been mentioned or may be understood from the connection. So Cic. pro Rosc. Amerino V. twice (indignissima and indigniora); pro Planc. III 8; pro Mil. VII 19; Phil. XIII 21. 48; in

Verr. II. l. V. bb. 170 ; pro lege Man. XVII. 52. Compare Stürzenburg pro Archia, page 57—59 (Latin edition).

‡ 471. The following ablatives are remarkable : Cic. in Verr. II. l. 3. 90. 210 : qui *tantis rebus* gestis sunt ; Phil. VI. 5. 12 : quis *tantis rebus* gestis fuit ; Famm. IV. 6. 6 : qui — clarum virum et magnis *rebus gestis* amisit ; pro Archia XII : hominem *caussa hujusmodi* ; Tusc. I. 35. 85 : Metellus *honoratis* quatuor filiis. There is a reading in this last passage which has *honoratus*, but it is of no authority.

‡ 476. If *duration* is expressed before ante, the accusative is always used, not the ablative. Cf. Cic. pro lege Man. XVIII. 54 : At Hercule *aliquot annos continuos ante legem* Gabiniam — caruit ; Phil. V. 19. 52 : *triennium ante legitimum tempus*.

‡ 477. Cic. Brut. VII. 27 : *Post hanc aetatem aliquot annis*.

‡ 480. The example here quoted from Caesar de B. G. I. 48, and which is found in ‡ 478 of the former edition, does not occur in de B. *Gallico*, but de B. *Civili* I. 48.

‡ 482. There is indeed a very great number of passages in which totus is joined with in ; Cic. pro Ligar. III. 7 : *in toto* imperio ; Lael. II. 6 : *in tota* Graecia ; Verr. IV. 32. 72 : *tota in* Sicilia ; in the same section *in Sicilia tota*, and in sec. 2, *in tota* provincia ; ad Famm. III. 8. 38 : *in tota* nostra amicitia ; de Orat. III. 25. 96 : *in toto* corpore ; Phil. II. 8 : *tota in* oratione. All examples of this character must be classified, because they differ from each other in nature. But we omit that here, and reserve it for another occasion.

‡ 483. Here it should be stated that after malo and praestat, *ut* is better, the thing compared must be introduced by quam. Cf. Cic. ad Att. VII. 15 : Cato jam servire, *quam* pugnare mavult ; pro Sext. LXIX. 146 : praestat recidere, *quam* importare. This is very frequent, as is well known.

There is with Cicero a no inconsiderable number of examples in which the ablative is put instead of quam with the accusative. It occurs, as is known, very often everywhere. Here we may set down a single case, Cato Maj. XII. 14 : nihil *mente* praestabilius dedisset.

‡ 490. Among the verbs which are followed by in with the ablative, imprimere should have been mentioned. Although this verb occurs in ‡ 416, yet the example given in that section appears rather strange and out of place there, because it is put down without any explanation of its peculiar use. Cf. Cic. de legg. I. 10. 30 : *in animis imprimuntur*, and in the same place immedi-

ately after: *in omnibus* imprimuntur; Nat. Deor. I. 16. 42: quod *in omnium animis* eorum nationum impressisset ipsa natura; de Fato XIX. 43: imprimet et quasi signabit in animo; but this passage is not clear on account of signabit which follows imprimet; Acad. post. I. 11. 41: *in animis* imprimerentur; Phil. XIII. 15. 30: vestigium *ubi* imprimas, and in many other places which the lexicons indicate.

† 493—516. The exposition of the tenses and of their consecution which is given in this part of the grammar is not so clear and satisfactory as one might expect. But we are unable here, for want of space, to attempt another exposition; we shall rather continue to furnish corrections and additions for the single paragraphs.

† 512. A very large number of passages, which are apparently but not really irregular, might be added to the remark under this section. We would call special attention to the thirty-eighth chapter of Cicero's oration pro Sext. because a multitude of such examples are concentrated in this chapter.

In section eighty-second of this chapter is found: At vero illi ipsi parricidae, quorum effrenatus furor alitur impunitate diuturna, adeo vim facinoris sui *perhorruerant*, ut, si paullo longior opinio mortis Sextii fuisset, Gracchum illum suum, transferrendi in nos criminis causa, occidere *cogitarint*. From this example as well as from those quoted by the author, viz. Cic. Brut. LXXXVIII. and Cor. Nepos Arist. I. and from many other examples, it becomes manifest, that *ut*, denoting a result, can be followed by any tense which the nature of the thought either makes necessary or permits. Tantus fuit, ut omnes eum *admirentur* means, he was so great that all are still admiring him (though he may have died long since). Tantus fuit, ut omnes eum *admirarentur*, means, that all admired him *then* (i. e. when he was living). Tantus fuit, ut omnes eum *admirati sint*, means, that all have once admired him. Tantus fuit, ut omnes eum *admiraturi sint*, means, that all will at some time admire him. Thus *perhorruerant* in the above example agrees very well with *ut—occidere cogitarint*. In the same chapter, † 83, is found: Ac, si tunc P. Sextius, iudices, in templo Castoris animam, quam vix retinuit, *edidisset*, *non dubito*, quin, si modo esset in republica senatus, si majestas populi Romani revixisset, aliquando statua huic ob rempublicam intersecto in foro *statueretur*; further, in the same oration, chapter XXIX. 62: Quod ille si *repudiasset*, *dubitatis*, quin ei vis *esset allata*, quum omnia acta illius anni per illum unum labefactari vide-

rentur?—ad Fam. XIII. 1. 5: *dubitat* quin ego—consequi *possem*, etiamsi aedificaturus *essem*. These examples, which might be multiplied, show that, especially after *non dubito*, a conditional clause is placed without any regard to this phrase.

Soldan, ad Sic. pro Ligar. XII. 34: An potest quisquam *dubitares* quin, si Ligarius in Italia esse *potuisset*, in eadem sententia *fuert* (all. *fuisset*) futurus, makes a distinction between the periphrastic conjugation and the regular tenses of the verb, and claims for the former alone the usual consecution of tenses. But this is as unsatisfactory as what Bennecke says, in a comment on that passage, that hypothetical sentences have no dependence on the leading verb. An example of the periphrastic conjugation besides the one quoted, is also to be found in Cic. pro Planc. XXIX. 71: si voluisses, non dubito, quin—si *conversura fuert*. A discriminating examination of the particular phrases to be found in the language relating to this subject is much needed. Here we only remark further, that tenses which do not correspond to each other are also found in *imperfect* conditional sentences, especially in interrogations and exclamations; Cic. pro Cluent. VIII. 25: *quis est*, qui illum absolvi *arbitraretur*?—de Legg. III. VI. 14: qui vero utraque re *excelleret*, ut et doctrinae studiis et regenda civitate princeps esset, quis facile praeter hunc *invenire potest*?

‡ 518—519. The explanation of the use of the indicative in a conditional sentence has been very much improved in the new edition. We add here only two examples, the first of which makes the difference between the indicative and subjunctive very clear. Cic. pro Rosc. Am. XXXII. 91: Erucius, haec si haberet in caussa, quae commemoravi, *posset* ea quamvis diu dicere, et ego *possum*; the other has the protasis expressed by the ablative absolute and the apodosis by the indicative. Cic. pro Mil. XII. 32: Atque *Milone interfecto*—Clodius hoc *assequebatur*, ut—, which means, *if Milo had been killed, Clodius would have effected that*, etc.

‡ 519. In the middle of the section our author has construed incorrectly the example taken from Cicero in Vatini. I. 2: Eterim *debuisti*, Vatini, etiamsi falso *venisses* in suspicionem P. Sextio, tamen mihi ignoscere, because he has not quoted the passage in full; for after ignoscere follows: *si in tanto hominis de me optime meriti periculo et tempori ejus et voluntati parere voluissem*. This makes it clear, that the clause, etiamsi—venisses, has no relation whatever to *debuisti*. *Si—voluissem* forms rather the hypothetical protasis to it. The same mistake is found in the preceding editions.

§ 522. The example, *sive tacebis, sive loquere, mihi perinde est*, should have been stricken out from the former editions, because it is not correct Latin. *Perinde est*, in the sense given to it by modern writers, *it is all the same to me*, is entirely unclassical. Cf. Stürenburg ad Cic. de Off. p. 133-4 (first edition, Lips. 1834), and Hand in Turselin. IV. 461.

The principle, so simple in itself, which regulates hypothetical sentences, often appears, in the various school-books obscure only for this reason, because the authors have failed to form a perfectly clear idea, how many kinds of conditions, and consequently, of conditional sentences there may be. In endeavoring briefly to set forth our views, we must, on account of our limited space, content ourselves with a mere outline, but we hope in the meantime to contribute some little to the simplification of our school grammars and of the mode of oral teaching in this respect. Hereby shall we be enabled the more easily to apprehend the nature of the imperfect tense which is the subject of this paragraph, and which is by no means to be considered as similar to the Greek imperfect.

There are three kinds of conditions, and consequently, of conditional sentences.

1. The first is where there is an absolute uncertainty as to what is said. E. g. *Si habeo pecuniam, tibi dabo*, that is, "I will give you money, if I have it," but I do not know whether I have it or not. The probability on either side is equal. The antithesis must always be *sed nescio*; and the mode, the indicative.

2. The second is where there is a mere possibility, but not a probability as to what is said. E. g. *Si habeam pecuniam*, etc. "If I should have money," but I doubt whether I shall have it; it is more probable that I shall not have it. The antithesis is, *sed dubito*, and the mode subjunctive in any tense except the imperfect and the pluperfect.

3. The third is where a complete denial of what is represented is implied. E. g. *Si haberem pecuniam, tibi darem*, "If I had money, I would give it you." The antithesis with the imperfect subjunctive, must be in the present indicative of the verb used in the first clause, preceded by *sed non*, e. g. *sed non habeo*, (therefore I cannot give it you); with the pluperfect subjunctive, the antithesis must be in the perfect indicative with *sed non*. The mode is the subjunctive, the imperfect for present, and the pluperfect for past time. If the sentence ran thus, *si habuisset pecu-*

niam, tibi dedissem, the antithesis would be, *sed non habui pecuniam*, (ergo tibo non dedi).

In these conditional sentences of the third class, the imperfect subjunctive never expresses past time, but is merely an imperfect as to its form. In reality, it has the force of the present, as the conditional pluperfect subjunctive has that of the perfect.

It frequently happens, however, that the imperfect subjunctive in conditional sentences, has not the force of the present, but of a proper imperfect, which implies that an act *was* continued during another past act. The antithesis is, in such cases, always *sed non* with an imperfect indicative. If the conditional clause is introduced with *nisi* the antithesis is, of course, formed with *sed* without *non*.

Here is to be explained the peculiarity to which the author refers in section 525.

Let us examine the first example adduced by our author, taken from Cicero pro Milone XVII 45: *Quos clamores (Clodius), nisi ad cogitatum facinus appropriaret, nunquam reliquisset*. The antithesis here is, *sed appropriabat facinus* (namely, quum clamores reliquit). We can, indeed, express this by the pluperfect subjunctive in English; but then the two parts of the sentence would stand in no immediate connection with each other, whereas the Latin imperfect expresses simultaneousness with that which is expressed by the pluperfect in the following clause. We can hereby perceive how much more precise the Latin is in such expressions, than the English.

For the rest, the expression of the author is either obscure and equivocal, or incorrect, viz. that "completed actions of the past times are often transferred, at least partly, to the present, by using the imperfect instead of the pluperfect." The imperfect has nothing in common with the (real) present; it designates only a present, which was *such* when a *PAST act was taking place*.

As in the protasis, so also in the apodosis the imperfect subjunctive is very frequently used instead of the pluperfect. But this is to be explained precisely in the same way as that mentioned in the foregoing paragraph.

In the view here given, we have omitted the consideration of the clause following after the conditional clause. These invariably form sentences *by themselves*, and have no direct grammatical dependence on the foregoing clause. It is, however, natural that an indicative in the one should be followed by an indicative in the other, etc.; but it is not *necessary*. It is the simplest way

to supply, where such a dissimilarity occurs, a corresponding clause. But we cannot here enlarge upon this subject.

† 528. At the close of this section, it is said, that *Quis putaret, quis arbitraretur*, etc. are more rarely used in the sense of, "who would have thought, who would have believed; and it would seem from the connection as if the examples there taken from Cicero were the only examples which occur with this writer. Our author did not probably mean to assert this, because the construction is very frequent indeed. Cf. Cic. ad Fam. II. 13. 13: *quis putaret?*—Ibid. XV. 16, med.: *quis putaret?*—pro Sext. XLII 89: *quid ageret?*—pro Sext. IX. 20: *quis—arbitraretur?* and very often elsewhere. The words of our author: *The third person is more rarely used in this manner*, should be changed to: *Also the third person is very often used thus*.

† 533. Our author is not quite correct in making no difference between *metuo* and *timeo* with the infinitive and *vereor* with the infinitive, although the former is very rare with Cicero. Madvig, in the remark † 376 of his grammar, maintains that in good prose only *vereor* is found with the infinitive, and Freund, in his lexicon on the word, says expressly that *timeo* with the infinitive is not Ciceronian. But cf. Cic. pro Rosc. Coma. I. 4: *quo nomen referre in tabulas timeat*. *Metuo* with the infinitive and with the accusative before the infinitive is found only with the poets.

† 535. *Neve* cannot stand after *timeo*, but either *et* or *aut* must follow this word. *Timeo ne legat et scribat*, or *aut scribat*. In the former, it is indicated that we fear both; in the latter, either one or the other.

† 536—7. Klotz, ad Cic. Tusc. II. 26. 64, explains the distinction between *non quo* and *non quod*, by saying, *non quo* means always, *with the intention, non quod, in the view* (opinion) that —. As all the passages have not been critically examined upon this point, we pass it by with adducing a few examples. Cic. ad Fam. XVI. 6. 1, *quia* precedes *quo*. The words are: *Tertium ad te hanc epistolam scripsi eadem die magis instituti mei tenendi causa, quia nactus eram, cui darem, quam quo haberem, quid scriberem*; Cic. pro Sext. XLIII. 93: *quo* fortissimum ac summum civem in invidiam homo castus ac non cupidus vocaret, without a comparative; Ibid. XXVIII. 61: *non quo* periculum suum non videret, sed — putabat, without any causal particle, and with a change of construction; Cic. de R. P. p. 22 (ed. Heinrich): *qui—cordatus fuit, et ab Eanio dictus est non quod ea quaerebat, sed quod ea respondebat*, where the reason for the indicative is clear.

In the example taken from Livy XXX. 27, the author is doubtful whether *non quia* with the indicative in the protasis, is according to good usage. Compare Cic. pro Planc. XXXII. 78: *non quia multis debeo,—sed quia* saepe concurrent; Horat. Sat. II. 2. 89: *non quia* erat, sed —.

§ 541. Our author mentions the example in Cic. ad Att. VII. 1. which is corrected in punctuation by Bremi. But there is another passage in Cicero pro Flacco, XXXIII. extr. (where it is to be found in the ed. of Orell.); *quid? nos non videbamus habitare una? quis hoc nescit? tabulas in Laelii potestate fuisse, num dubium est?* Here also the punctuation presents the means of making the correction. Here it is to be thus punctuated; *quis hoc nescit, tabulas in Laelii potestate? num dubium est?* so that the accusative before the infinitive is dependent on the clause, *quis hoc nescit*, not on *num dubium est*; Cic. ad Fam. XVI. 21: *Gratos tibi optatosque (rumores) esse —, non dubito*, writes Cicero the son. In the words: “Yet after *dubito* and *non dubito* at the beginning of the second paragraph;” the first *dubito* must be stricken out; for what classic author ever uses *dubito* thus without a negative particle?

§ 551. The indicative is found, Cic. pro Planc. XXX. 73: *quod ejus in me meritum tibi etiam ipsi gratum esse dicebas. Quod* is construed with *negare* as well as with *dicere*. Cic. ad Fam. VII. 16: *quod — negant*. Cf. Cic. pro Arch. XII. 31: *quod expetitum esse videatis*.

§ 553. Add after *nescio quomodo*, *nescio quo pacto*. Cic. de Amicit. XXVI. 100: *nescio quo pacto* deflexit.

§ 561. The different significations of the indefinite and general expressions and the constructions appropriate to them are not pointed out with sufficient clearness in this paragraph. *Quis est qui* may be the paraphrase of the question with *quis*. In this case the subjunctive is used only when other reasons make it necessary. Cf. Cic. ad Fam. VII. 12. 21: *Quis enim est, qui facit nihil sua causa?*—ad Attic. XVI. 1. 2: *sed quid est, quaeso, quod agripetas Buthrosi concisos audio?*—pro Cluent. LXIV. ext. *quid est, quod minus probabile proferre potuistis?*—Acadd. postt. I. 4. 13: *quid est, quod audio?* This is rendered manifest by the addition of the pronoun *illud*. E. g. Cic. pro Sext. LVI. 120: *quid fuit illud, quod — summus artifex — egit?* This use is very frequent with Plautus and Terentius. *Quid est, quod* has two other significations. It serves, first, for a (negative) exclamation, usually but improperly marked as an interrogation. In this case *qui*

is followed by the subjunctive. If, in the second place, it expresses inquiry for the *reason* or *occasion* of a thing, in which case it is often changed into *quid est cur*, or *quid est quamobrem*, the subjunctive likewise follows. It would be unnecessary to cite examples which everywhere occur.

§ 563. The example, *sunt enim permulti optimi viri, qui valetudinis causa in his locis conveniunt*, where the author, by a slip of the memory, has substituted *in his locis conveniunt* for *in haec loca veniunt*, Cic. ad Fam. IX. 14. 1, is in direct contradiction to the teaching of our author respecting the construction of *convenire in locis* § 489. The statement should therefore be altered.

§ 564. The subjunctive also follows *qui* when it has the signification *although*, in which case *tamen* follows very often. Cf. Cic. de Orat. I. 32. 145: *quin etiam, quae maxime propria essent maturae tamen his ipsis artem adhiberi videram*; Ibid. I. 18. 82: V. Matthiae ad Cic. pro Rosc. Amer. VIII. 23.

§ 568. The construction which follows *dignus* and *indignus* depends entirely on the sense. So *quod* follows, Cic. pro Rosc. Amer. L. 147: *nisi hoc indignum putas, quod vestitum sedere in iudicio vides*; so the Acc. c. Infin. also in the same, III. 8: *sum vel hoc indignissimum est, vos idoneos habitos*. Also in Verr. II. 24. 58; Cic. pro leg. Man. XIX. 57, and in other places. *Eximius qui* is construed like *dignus qui* in Cic. Div. in Caec. XVI. 52: *te illi unum eximium, cui consuleret, fuisse*.

§ 574. *Quamquam* with the subjunctive is very frequent in Cicero if one regard merely the words without searching for the reasons. Cf. de Orat. III. 26. 101: *quamquam illa ipsa exclamatio—ut velim crebra*; pro Planc. XXII. 53: *quamquam ne id quidem suspicionem coitionis habuerit*; pro Sext. XXX. 64: *quamquam quis audiret?*—in Vatin. XIV. 33: *quamquam id ipsum esset novum*; pro Mil. XXXIII. 90: *quamquam esset miserum*, and in many other places. As the mood does not depend upon the conjunction, but rather the conjunction upon the mood; *quamquam* stands with the subjunctive if the sentence requires the subjunctive irrespective of *quamquam*. But grammarians do best where they make the manner of thinking and of expressing thought prevailing with a people their rule and standard.

§ 575. It should have been remarked, that *donec* with Cicero is exceeding rare. It is nowhere found in *Caesar*. Our author should have noticed this distinction according to his usual custom.

§ 579. Rem. The distinction between the conjunctions *quam* and *si* appears quite manifest in Cic. pro Rosc. Amer. XXXV.

100 : *Si prodierit atque adeo quum prodierit* (scio enim proditurum esse), audiet.

‡ 590. It would seem from this paragraph as if *satis est* and *satis habeo* occur with the infinitive perfect only in the silver age. This is however not true. Cf. Cic. de Inven. I. 20. 28 : *quia satis fuit dixisse*, and a little before, *si cujus rei satis erit dixisse*, and elsewhere. Still it is not frequent in Cicero.

‡ 599. Rem. Here it should have been remarked that the *historical infinitive* of the passive is exceedingly rare. Although Sallust delighted in this construction, as our author rightly observes, yet the passive with him occurs only in the following few places : Cat. XXVII (fatigari) ; Jug. XXX. (agitari) ; Ibid. LX. (ferri) ; Ibid. LXXXIII. (trahi).

‡ 607. There are some other interesting examples of the personal construction of several verbs in the passive voice. Cic. pro Sext. LIV. 95 : *hic accusare eum non est situs*.

Rem. We may still ask, how *dicitur* is to be construed when it is not translated by, *he is said*, but by, *it is asserted*, or in a similar way. Cf. Cic. de Finn. III. 18. 60 : *Sed quum ab his omnia profiscantur officia, non sine caussa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes*, and with a proleptic demonstrative pronoun, Cic. de Finn. V. 24. 72 : *Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic —* ; in Verr. IV. 18. 38 : *De hoc (Diodoro) Verri dicitur, habere eum perbona torenmata*. *Dicitur* must always be followed by an accusative before an infinitive, if a dative is connected with it. De Orat. I. 33. 150 : *Vere etiam illud dicitur, perverse dicere homines perverse dicendo facillime consequi* ; pro Mil. V. 12 : *Sequitur illud, quod a Milonis amicis saepissime dicitur, caedem—senatum judicasse contra rempublicam esse factam*, although the accusative before the infinitive is here to be considered as depending on *sequitur*. The nominative before the infinitive, after *dicitur*, is also to be found, e. g. in Cic. pro Sext. XVII. 39 : *C. Caesar—inimicissimus esse meae saluti ab eodem quotidianis concionibus dicebatur*.

Here two passages may be given containing compound tenses. Cic. Orat. IX. 29 : *qui—ab Aristophane poëta fulgere dictus esset*, and Ibid. IX. 27 : *ii sunt existimandi Attice dicere*.

‡ 612. In the sentence, *non vales, non audes esse uxor*, the unclassical *vales* should be stricken out. Moreover *nescire* frequently occurs thus with Cicero, as we may learn from ‡ 610. Cf. pro Mil. XXII. 75 : *nescis inimici factum reprehendere*. So

also *scire*, e. g. de Orat. II. 22. 91: *sed tamen ille nec deligere sci-
vit*; and *discere*, e. g. de Orat. II. 16. 70: *etiamsi haec nunquam
separatim facere didicisset*, and *perdiscere*; Ibid. 69: *qui hominis
figuram pingere perdidicerit*. An example of a peculiar use of an
infinitive after *possum* may here be mentioned. Cic. pro Caecina
XVII. 50: *Potest pulsus, fugatus, ejectus denique; illud vero
nullo modo potest, dejectus esse quisquam*. This whole passage af-
ter the proleptic *illud* is very peculiar.

† 613. *Cupio* is not followed by *ut* in Cicero. Here also belongs
cogito in this sense. Cf. Sic. pro Sext. XXXVIII. 81: *siquidem
liberi esse cogitareti*; Ibid. 82: *ut—Graecum illum suum—occi-
dere cogitarint*; pro Mil. XX. 63: *qui ipsius loci spe facere impe-
tum cogitarat*.

Various peculiarities might be mentioned here, but we must
limit ourselves to the citation of one passage which renders the
distinction of the different constructions after *concedere* very clear.
Cic. pro Rosc. Amer. XIX. 54: *Verum concedo, ut ea praetereas,
quae, quum taces, nulla esse concedis*.

† 614. *Nihil antiquius habeo* is followed by the infinitive in Cic.
ad Fam. XII. 29. 3: *Nihil ei fuisset antiquius, quam ad Capito-
nem—reverti*.

† 615. *Rem. Suadeo* with the accusative before the infinitive is
found in Cic. pro Arch. VI. 14; pro Caecina V. 10; with the in-
finitive only de Finn. II. 29. 96: thus *admonere* in Verr. I. 24;
monere de Finn. I. 20. 66.

[To be concluded.]

ARTICLE II.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

By Daniel E. Goodwin, Professor of Languages, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me.

[Concluded, from No. XIV. p. 323.]

[It is due to the writer of this Article, and to the readers of the
Bibliotheca, to say, that the whole of the Essay was prepared
some months before the publication of the former part, and for a
destination quite different from its appearance in this Review.
If therefore the following portion should seem when taken by

itself, to wear too much of a political aspect, we trust it will be excused, partly for the sake of this apology, and partly for the sake of its connection with the more strictly Theological portion which has preceded it. We have not thought it best altogether to omit the portion which follows, because, although considered in relation to the general principles involved, the former part of the discussion is by far the most fundamental and important; yet, considered in practical connection with the particular question in hand, we cannot help regarding the branch of that question discussed in this latter part, viz. the point of expediency, as really containing the substantial and decisive portion of the whole argument to all men of impartial minds and plain common sense.]

Before proceeding to the argument from expediency, we will first dispose of a few miscellaneous objections which have not fallen directly in our way in the foregoing investigation of the question of right.

1st Objection. "Capital punishment is wrong because the innocent are sometimes executed."

If innocent men have been recklessly executed, whenever and wherever it may have been done, we shall be the last to say one word in extenuation of the deed. The wilful execution or procurement of an unrighteous sentence of death, knowing it to be such, we hold, of course to be murder, and murder of the most atrocious die. It adds to the common enormity of the crime the character of a treacherous and nefarious attempt against the moral basis on which the whole fabric of human society reposes. Hence the Jews are properly stigmatized in the New Testament as the murderers of our Lord; although his crucifixion took place according to all the forms of law.

Further, we maintain that all possible precaution against error ought to be taken in capital cases; and a capital sentence never passed or executed so long as there is any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.¹

¹ By "reasonable doubt of guilt" we do not mean mere uncertainty, for absolute certainty is not to be expected; we mean a reasonable ground for believing that the innocence of the accused is not altogether improbable. "*La certezza, morale non è che una probabilità, ma probabilità tale che è chiamata certezza, perchè ogni uomo di buon senso vi acconsente necessariamente per una consuetudine nata dalla necessità di agire, ed anteriore ad ogni speculazione. La certezza che si richiede per accertare un uomo reo è dunque quella che determina ogni uomo nelle operazioni più importanti della vita. Ma questa morale certezza di prove è più facile il sentirla che l'esattamente definirla.*"—Beccaria; de' delitti e delle pene; sez. 14.

All cases of unjust executions whose occasion falls under these two heads, viz. false testimony or want of due caution in weighing the evidence, are cases of *abuse*. They prove nothing at all in regard to the right, except that, like all other rights, it may be *abused*. Other cases, if there are any, which do not fall under either of these two heads, are to be ascribed to the necessary fallibility of human judgments; and, if they prove that therefore, there is no right to inflict capital punishment upon the murderer, they prove that there is no right to inflict any punishment or in any way to administer legal remedies, until human justice can be raised above all liability to human error. It cannot be denied that more caution, as a matter of fact, is taken in capital cases, than in any other, whether civil or criminal; so much so, that the exceeding difficulty of obtaining a conviction for murder is constantly urged against the expediency of capital punishment by its assailants. Let them agree upon their indictment. They have busied themselves of late most strenuously in making up all the cases that can be discovered or surmised of unjust executions for whatever crime and arising from whatever cause, and are apparently endeavoring to make the world believe it the ordinary rule that no sooner does a capital trial come on than, by some inexplicable fatality, both judges and jury are seized with such a headlong desire to hang somebody, anybody but the right man, that they always convict the innocent and acquit the guilty.¹

The cases of injustice which they allege are depicted in the most glowing colors and form a great part of the staple of most of their essays on this subject, interspersed here and there as the spice and spirit of the whole.² But such things are addressed to men's feelings and imagination much more than to their reason; and would be appropriately answered by frequent pictures of horrible murders and massacres. Let them sift their cases and see how many of them are cases of real, unavoidable error; and then let them show that a liability to error in this case invalidates the

¹ We have heard a good woman urge it as a personal objection to capital punishment, that she lived in bodily fear of being one day hung in her innocence. People commonly think it more important to be protected from being murdered, as the greater danger of the two.

² Montesquieu has well said: "C'est mal raisonner contre la religion [on toute autre chose,] de rassembler, dans un grand ouvrage, une longue énumération des maux qu'elle a produits, si l'on ne fait de même celle des biens qu'elle a faits. Si je voulais raconter tous les maux qu'ont produits dans le monde les loix civiles, la monarchie, le gouvernement républicain, je dirais des choses effroyables."—*Espirit des loix*. Liv. XXIV. ch. 2.

right any more than in all other departments of the administration of human justice.

2d Objection. Here they meet us with another objection as a sort of clencher to the first. "Capital punishment is the only punishment which is remediless." We deny it utterly. All unjust punishment is in one sense remediless. Done is done. Besides, it is practically remediless, for rarely, if ever, is any effort made to remedy it so far even as a remedy is possible. This is not all. When a man, after having been imprisoned for a crime one, two, three, four, five, ten, twenty, or thirty years, dies; and is then found to have been innocent; how will you remedy it? Any man may die at any time; are you not, then, afraid to imprison him, lest you should do him remediless wrong? It is said to have been ascertained that some hundreds of persons have been buried alive; must we therefore keep all dead bodies above ground until the air is tainted with the putrefaction? Is no sexton allowed to throw a clod of earth upon a coffin, is no man allowed to have anything to do, directly or indirectly, with a burial, until he has assured himself to a perfect certainty by the evidence of his own senses, that death has actually taken place? In short, will the consciences of good men one day grow so tender that they will not dare to move to the right hand or the left, without first stopping for a demonstration?

3d Objection. We find the objection gravely made in respectable quarters, "that the innocent relatives and friends of the guilty man, who is hung, are made to suffer with him, and often more than he, the disgrace and infamy, etc." How is this to be avoided in any case? Does the infamy attach itself to the punishment, or to the crime? Or is it the mode of the punishment which is most complained of? How came this mode of punishment to be so infamous? How, except from its association with the crimes for which it has been inflicted? Crucifixion was a most ignominious punishment among the Romans; would it be so among us? Do people expect to make murder any more respectable by imprisoning instead of hanging the murderer? Suppose it were possible, is it desirable to do it? Will they not rather make imprisonment more odious? It is now felt to bring some disgrace on a man's friends when he is sent to the State prison. If murderers are sent there too, will it diminish the disgrace attached to imprisonment for other crimes? According to the objection, if any such disgrace or suffering already falls upon the innocent relations of the incarcerated culprit; imprisonment ought

to be abolished. Much more then ought it to be abolished when this disgrace and suffering are increased. And the conclusion from the whole is, that it is wrong to hang or imprison any man who has any friends in the world; but if you can find a man perfectly friendless, this objection abandons him to his fate.

4th Objection. "Capital punishment is retaliatory." The whole force of this objection rests upon a paltry play upon the ambiguity of a word. If it be meant that this punishment is *revengeful*; we deny it totally. We deny that it ought to be, need be, or is any more *revengeful*, than any other punishment—imprisonment for example. If it were we would not defend it a moment. It is just and right. When the protection of society requires its infliction, it may be executed and ought to be executed, from motives of the purest justice and philanthropy. If, however, by its being retaliatory is meant merely that it is the infliction of like for like, and is therefore wrong; we see no force at all in the objection. According to this, if a man is guilty of false-imprisonment, it would be wrong to punish him with imprisonment, because that would be retaliatory; or if a man defrauds or steals from his neighbor, you may require him to make restitution perhaps, but as to any punishment beyond that, you may inflict what you please except taking another cent from him—that would be retaliatory.¹

5th Objection. "The administration of this punishment is, always has been, and must be, unequal; and therefore unjust." If this objector mean, that all who are capitally convicted should be treated exactly alike—that no pardons or commutations should be granted; then he must settle the question with some of his friends whom he will find bitterly complaining of the unparalleled barbarity of Massachusetts in executing *sixty per cent.* of her con-

¹ Beccaria, the great apostle of our modern anti-gallows philanthropists, has no objection to this sort of retaliation. Of the punishment of false accusation he says: "Ogni governo e repubblicano e monarchico, deve al calunniatore dare la pena che toccherebbe all'accusato." This is the special case to which the principle is applied in the Mosaic code, and for which it has been retained in the canon law. But Beccaria is willing to give it a much wider application. He would have injuries against the person punished corporeally; against property, punished pecuniarily; against the honor, punished infamously. "Che la pena," says he, "sia conforme quanto più si possa alla natura del delitto." "Attentati contro la persona debbono infallibilmente esser puniti con pene corporali." "I furti che non hanno unito violenza dorrebbero esser puniti con pena pecuniatoria." "Le ingiurie personali e contrarie all'onore debbono essere punite coll' infamia."—De delitti e delle pene; Sez. 15, 19, 20, 22 and 23.

victs. If the objector complains of caprice or wrong motives in the exercise of judicial or discretionary power, we heartily agree with him in condemning them; but we deny that they are necessary—at least to any greater extent than in most other cases of punishment. Like many other objections, this is as applicable to the administration of penalties and of legal remedies generally as to this particular case. Human laws and their execution are necessarily imperfect; but their imperfection need not, and probably, but for the disturbing influence of such objections, as we have been considering, upon public opinion, it would not be (if indeed it actually is,) greater in this case than in any other.

6th Objection. Some of the Abolitionists say that “the punishment of death is needlessly severe;” and others insist upon it that it is “inadequate to the enormity of the crime for which it is inflicted.” These two objections may offset one another.

7th Objection. “Capital punishment violates the sacro-sanctity of human life.”

The great motive of capital punishment, the only proper motive is, the protection of human life from violation. It is wonderful to observe by what jugglery its opposers are endeavoring to engross all the credit of this motive to themselves. We profess to have at least as much regard for the sanctity of human life as they; and we retort that it is they who would expose it to violation. They are not distinguished from us by any greater regard for the sanctity of human life, but only for the “sacro-sanctity” of murderers. The Roman tribunes were held to possess this attribute of “sacro-sanctity,” so that whatever they might do while in office, it was sacrilege to offer them any violence. These men would have the privileges of such a character attach to all murderers. They would have every murderer possessed of a charmed existence. And this they call a superlative regard for the “sacro-sanctity” of human life! They might as well deny the right of the magistrate (as indeed some of them do) to seize the property of the thief; and then take to themselves the credit of a superlative regard for the rights of property!²

¹ Vid. N. A. Rev. Vol. 62. p. 56.

² It is a remarkable fact that multitudes of the abolitionists—the mass of them, we should think—are friends of war. Is one of their neighbors barbarously murdered? Such is the sacro-sanctity of human life in their eyes, such the tenderness of their consciences, and such the overflowing exuberance of their Christian sympathies, that they can by no means consent that the villain, who is convicted of having perpetrated the horrible deed, should suffer the pen-

8th Objection. "When a murderer is executed, he has either repented and is prepared to go into another world—and in that case he is certainly fit to remain in this; or he has not repented, and in that case, by taking his life, men send him unprepared into eternity, and consequently consign him to endless torment." This dilemma seems to be considered by many as conclusive of the question. But we utterly protest against thus appealing to the retributions of eternity. It is getting entirely out of our depth, and setting ourselves about business which does not belong to us. But if such objections must be made then we reply, to the first horn of the dilemma, that we never heard of a murderer confessing and deploring his crime in Christian penitence, who did not, as the apostle Paul said he would do, consent freely to die. He has magnified the law whose penalty he suffered. Nay more; men under the influence of repentance and of the instinctive consciousness of the justice and fitness of capital punishment for murder, have voluntarily confessed their guilt and surrendered themselves to the hand of human justice. So much for the guilty but penitent sufferer. As for society, which is represented as endeavoring to replace the loss of one man, good or bad as the case may be, by voluntarily throwing away another man confessedly good; we say, on the other hand, that society gains more good from the imperturbable execution of its just laws upon one such offender than it could derive from the useful lives of many such if they were spared. But we wish to be understood distinctly to repudiate any argument tending to defend capital punishment as proceeding from any motive of benevolence towards the criminal. We do not believe in any such way of showing kindness. The benevolence of the law in this case is not a private but a public benevolence, a love which prefers the lives of the innocent mass to the life of the guilty murderer.

To the other horn of the dilemma, we answer; that by all

ality of death; such is their fellow-feeling for the criminal, they will move the three worlds to save him from the gallows. But let a foreign people refuse reparation for encroachments or depredations on our *property*, and they are forthwith ready to attack that people with fire and sword, they are willing to spill the best blood of our own citizens, and to cut down thousands of innocent men on the other side—not to speak of helpless women and children! Alas, for the consistency of poor human nature! We saw not long since, paraded in one of the abolitionists' journals, a list of the great men who had espoused their cause, and among the rest the name of Chancellor M'Coun. Soon afterwards we saw a report of the same distinguished gentleman presiding at a war meeting in the city of New York!

means a long respite should be given to every convict before his execution. But if, after such respite he is still unprepared to be launched into eternity, his blood is upon his own head. He has in reality destroyed himself. Living under the known laws of God and nature and human society, he committed a crime whose penalty he knew to be death, and he must abide the consequences. It is not so much the hangman that takes his life, as he that kills himself by the hangman's instrumentality. We ought by all means to beware that we *do the murderer no injustice in this world*. That is our sphere. That is our business. Let us see well to that. And we need not trouble our heads with any fears that God will do him any injustice in the world to come. Let us leave the retributions of the next world in God's hands. They are matters too high for us to meddle with. *If it be any injustice to the executed murderer to suffer endless torment hereafter, if it be inconsistent with infinite benevolence, we may be tolerably sure he will not suffer it.* Further, we are not aware that this objection is often made or much felt by those who believe in the eternity of future punishment. It is thrust upon them as an *argumentum ad hominem*, by those who deny such eternal punishment; and, as thus urged is fully answered by the *argumentum ad hominem*, that, according to the creed of those who urge it, capital punishment, so far from being over-severe or cruel, sends the impenitent murderer from this world, where he might do much harm and could enjoy but little good, directly to eternal blessedness.

9th Objection. "We ought to say to ourselves when a convict is led to execution, 'There goes my father, or my brother, or my son,' and so feeling, how could we think the infliction of capital punishment to be right?"

This reasoning, if good for anything, would strike out all penal inflictions. But we reply, it is false. The great, manly heart of the elder Brutus was to be preferred to all this effeminate sentimentality. He loved his sons, but he loved his country more. He preferred her welfare, her liberty and the integrity of her laws to his private affections and personal happiness. The objection derives its force from sheer weakness and selfishness, and not from the precepts of Christianity. Christianity is not inconsistent, we trust, with the keenest sense of justice and the most enlarged benevolence. We admit the fact that we ought to feel as the objector requires, but we deny the inference. Let the culprit be a son or a brother—and it might be salutary for us to en-

deavor to feel that every convict were thus nearly related to us—still, if he has committed that crime which by laws human and divine is declared worthy of death, we should not refuse to let him die—he should not himself refuse to die. If it were our own personal selves, and we were possessed of right feelings, we should not refuse to die. We ought not so to refuse; and the experience of others shows that we should not as a matter of fact. Now it is surely enough, if we fulfil the royal law according to the Scriptures, to love our neighbor, not merely as a son or brother, but as ourselves.

10th Objection. "The voice of nature, as expressed in the universal, instinctive horror of the hangman and his office, condemns capital punishment." We answer, that this feeling is not directed exclusively against the hangman's office, but the same feeling, though in a less degree, attaches to the office of the police-man and the jailor. Indeed it is shared in some degree by all the ultimate instrumentalities in the infliction of penalty. The more ultimate, the more *absolutely necessary* any office is, the *less honorable* it is. Those external functions in our physical economy which are the most indispensable to our existence are deemed the most base. This is a sufficient answer to those who say, "if you consider the office of hangman so necessary, why not assume it yourself?" For the rest, we answer in the words of Diderot, who thought capital punishment inexpedient, and whose views may therefore be considered by our opponents the more impartial. "I have before shown," he says, "how natural it seems that the laws should have ordained death as the punishment for murder, and that the public feeling was in harmony with those laws. The horror which is felt for the executioner by no means proves that the penalty of death is unjust. That horror arises from the peculiar compassion which man feels for his suffering fellow-man; and which would be the same if he saw him in *that state in which despair does not terminate his woes, but only begins them*: [terms by which Beccaria had described the horrors of that imprisonment which he proposed to substitute for the penalty of death]. Arm the executioner with chains and scourges; make it his office to render odious the life of the culprit; and the spectacle of the sufferings of which he will be the instrument, will make him equally detested; but the penalty he inflicts upon the convict will be none the less just. It is not therefore nature that inspires the horror which is felt for the executioner, but this is rather an instinctive emotion, a physical repugnance which one man feels

in seeing another suffer, and from which I conclude nothing against the goodness of the law."—Beccaria *De' delitti e delle pene*. Nota 66. Diderot might have added that we are probably irritated by the want of feeling which the executioner commonly exhibits, and disgusted by the barely mercenary motives which induce him to undertake the office. But surely it will not do to abolish all offices in society which are usually exercised from base motives, or which are repulsive to delicate sensibilities, or by which men of respectable standing would feel degraded. In short the paradox we meet with here, is of wider application than the abolitionists seem to suppose.¹ They must find better grounds than this before they can demolish the right of society to inflict capital punishment. We recommend them to make diligent inquisition.

We now turn to the concluding branch of our argument; that which relates to the *expediency* of the penalty in question.

We do not flatter ourselves that we have answered all objections and opposing arguments which have ever been urged on the question of *right*; but this we have done—we have honestly and openly met, and refuted as we might, those of the greatest weight,

¹ It is indispensable for the health of our cities that they should be cleansed of the filth that is liable to collect in them. Will these gentlemen volunteer their services? or will they condemn the scavenger's business as inhuman and unnatural?

A petition was some time since got up in one of the States, as we understand, and numerous signed by the leading abolitionists, praying the Legislature to compel the clergy, who were in favor of capital punishment, to perform the office of executioners. This argument is, of course irrefragable; it is useless to reason against a practical joke.

These gentlemen complain lustily that their opponents appeal to the *odium theologicum*! Yet you will sometimes find their beautiful alliterative exclamation: "THE GALLOWES AND THE GOSPEL," "THE GALLOWES AND THE GOSPEL," placarded as the running title of entire articles; and sometimes interspersed in italics or capitals, as the most attractive ornament of successive paragraphs. This sounds to us very like an appeal to some "*odium*." If it is not the "*odium theologicum*" it wants a technical name. What shall it be? The "*odium evangelicum*?" It may be thought this musical paronomasia of theirs contains some latent argument. If so, we would suggest that the argument might be considerably varied and extended by the exercise of a little verbal ingenuity. We might say, for example, "The Bailiff and the Bible! The Testament and the Turnkey! The Prison and the Parson! Jesus and Jails! Our Saviour a Sheriff!! We might extend this principle of demonstration to other departments, and exclaim, for instance, Devotion and a Demagogue! or, Philanthropy and Politics! But, for ourselves, not having the honor to be enrolled in the clerical profession, we are neither hit nor hurt by such arguments, and therefore do not retort them.

whether real or apparent—all, so far as we know, which can plausibly claim a right to the honor of being answered.

In entering now upon the question of expediency we might fairly take for granted that the question of *right* was absolutely settled; that the right of inflicting capital punishment was positively established. But we need not assume so much as that. All that we need take for granted, and so much we shall take for granted, is that the punishment in question is neither shown to be wrong, nor to be obligatory. And we shall therefore recognize no arguments, as of any validity, on this question of expediency, which are based directly or indirectly upon the assumption that it is wrong, inhuman or unchristian. We shall give heed to no insinuations of injustice or barbarity; no aspersions of revenge or malice; no hard names of any kind. Nor, on the other hand, shall we allow any assumption of its being an *absolute duty* imposed by the direct revelations of God's word.

The question on which we enter is purely a practical question—a business matter, to be settled by business men on business principles, disturbed by no foregone conclusions, no pious scruples, no ultra-philanthropic speculations. We here demand an open field. The question which we have just left is a matter of theory; the question on which we enter is a matter of fact. Its decision therefore may fluctuate from day to day, and may always leave room for a great diversity of honest and reasonable opinion.

Our position here is, that, for the crime of murder,—when the guilt is unquestionably established,—it is expedient to inflict the just penalty of death, in order to the general protection and security of human life. In other cases there are other ends of punishment; but this is the only end worth mentioning in this case. And is it not end enough? What higher or more imperative object can be proposed, in the enactment of penal laws, than the protection and security of human life.¹

¹ Some of our great modern reformers, who seem to think themselves wiser than either man or his Maker, maintain that the protection of society, determent from crime, are no legitimate objects of punishment. *One man*, say they, *ought not to be punished for the good of others*. Thus they would resolve all legitimate punishment into chastisement, and their reforms would reach much farther than the abolition of capital penalties. But that *the determent of others* from the commission of crimes is the great end of punishment, is recognized by Moses. His language is, that *others may hear and fear and shun the like crimes*. Dent. 17: 13 and 19: 20. It is recognized by the apostle Paul, who says, "Them that sin rebuke before all, *that others also may fear*." 1 Tim. 5: 20. It is recognized by the apostles Peter and Jude, both of whom declare that Sodom and

Does this penalty tend to the accomplishment of that object better than any other means? We think that it does. Our reasons for this opinion are; 1st, That no other form of punishment is fitted to produce upon the mind of the community so salutary a dread and such an effectual horror of the crime of murder,—this is a fact of general consciousness; 2d, That no other punishment can furnish so good a security against frequent resorts to

Gomorrh were doomed to destruction “as an ensample to those that after should live ungodly.” 2 Pet. 2: 6. Jude 7. It is recognized by every penal code that was ever invented. Cicero thus expresses the spirit of the Roman law: *ut poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat*.—Pro Cluentio 46. It is recognized by the common law of England and by the common sense of mankind. Even Beccaria recognizes it in the fullest manner. “Qual è il fine politico delle pene? Il terrore degli altri nomini.” “Il fine delle pene non è altro che d’impedire il reo dal far nuovi danni ai suoi cittadini, e di rimuovere gli altri dal farne uguali. Quelle pene dunque e quel metodo d’infiggerle dove esser prescelto, che, serbata la proporzione, farà una impressione più efficace e più durevole sugli animi degli uomini, e la meno tormentosa sul corpo del reo.”—De’ delitti, etc. Sezz. 16 and 12.

“That profound and learned critic of Göttingen” states the case thus. “The essential purpose of punishments is no other than what is usually expressed in indictments and sentences, viz. *to serve as an example to others*. And though those who have nothing to do with punishments, and who philosophize in corners without any experience, have, out of those treasures of thoughts, which they denominate philosophy, and in their zeal for the improvement of theology and criminal jurisprudence, brought forward this proposition, that *all punishments should have amendment for their object*; still the proposition above mentioned, that *punishments are meant as an example to others*, is so evident, that no man who has to administer justice, can mistake it.” One is surprised to find that Michaelis wrote the following passage so long ago as 1775.

“The doctrine, that the amendment of delinquents is the end of all punishments, which runs counter to the principles of every system of human jurisprudence hitherto framed, has not found, in Germany, so much patronage among lawyers, (because they have so many different punishments before their eyes, which have *no such object* in view, and yet are necessary,) as among a certain set of theologians, of a new way of thinking, because they have found it useful in combating the doctrine of the eternity of hell-torments. With these theologians, however, I have here nothing to do. They are, indeed, rather too irritable, and too much of a persecuting spirit for me; much more so, at any rate, than the most strictly orthodox divines of the preceding age; of whose persecuting spirit, however, they loudly complain; just like the fat Englishman, who, in a crowd, within a small apartment, took up four times as much room as any other person, and yet growled horribly, on account of the people squeezing him so closely, while yet every one of them required such a wide space for himself.”—Essay on Punishments. Appendix to Mos. Recht. Vol. IV. pp. 371 and 458.

How wonderfully permanent are the traits of national — and of some other — characters!

"Lynch-law," and methods of popular and private vengeance; and 3d, The good effects of this penalty as shown by the results of statistical comparison.

As to the first point of appeal. We do not refer exclusively or particularly to the seared consciousness of a few hardened villains—though we have no doubt that if that could be fairly reached, it would be found, in a vast majority of cases, strongly in our favor—but we refer to the common, natural consciousness of mankind, the ordinary, pervading feeling of the community. Our aim looks beyond mere temporary expedients. The great object, as we understand it, should be, not so much to deter a few hardened villains from committing murder, as to prevent others from becoming so depraved and reckless as to be capable of its commission.

We have in view a gradual, permanent, universal, educating influence; an influence, therefore, which is not *immediately* terminated by the abolition of the punishment, nor could it be immediately restored by the restoration of the punishment after it had been once abolished. This silent, educating influence of penal law we consider by far the most important of all the influences which such laws can exert.

Let us not be supposed, however, to think that the influence of penal laws is the only or the greatest restraining influence in society. Far from it. There are many other influences of far greater power and efficiency. Still, neither in the case of murder nor of other crimes, can we, consistently with the highest welfare of society, dispense with this other and added influence of penal laws and penal inflictions; and this is an influence, taken all in all, by no means to be despised as comparatively inconsiderable. That was a sound sentiment of Blackstone, which we have already quoted in another connection, "When men see no difference made in the nature and gradations of punishment, the generality will be led to conclude there is no distinction in the guilt." Here the educating power of the law upon the mass of society is distinctly recognized. And indeed this silent influence of the law in all departments not only in determining the public conduct, but in moulding the public conscience, is greater than is always supposed. A statute of limitations, for example, to the coercive aid of the law in the collection of debts, is doubtless expedient; yet, though it is manifestly no limitation to the moral obligation of payment, how many, who would take fire at being thought anything less than honest and upright men, do neverthe-

less feel, more or less consciously, that when the statutory limitation is passed, their obligation is somewhat diminished?

If other crimes, therefore, are punished with the same penalty as murder, they gradually come to be considered as not differing much in enormity; and this effect follows as much when capital punishment is inflicted for murder and other crimes indifferently; as when, that punishment being abolished, imprisonment is awarded to all alike. In the former case human life is cheapened by the needless frequency of executions; in the latter case, by the trifling rate at which it seems to be estimated; and in both, by the withdrawal of all legal motive to abstain from murder after the commission of other crimes, and sometimes it may be, by the additional motive furnished for the commission of murder in order the better to conceal the antecedent capital offence.

We would have a horror inculcated for the crime of murder different in kind from the horror that may be felt for other crimes. The incomparable and unapproachable value of that which is at stake and is to be protected—the safety and sanctity of human life—demands it. But this peculiar, salutary horror is not to be infused, by a difference of a few years in the term of imprisonment. In proof that the penalty of death is fitted to infuse this horror of murder into the generality of human minds, we have appealed to the common consciousness of mankind; and we might appeal to the whole style and drift of the argument of our opponents on the subject of right, to show that they too share in that ordinary consciousness.

But they meet us with cases of men who have laughed and danced and sung and committed all manner of levities upon the scaffold. There may have been a few, a very few, such cases. But what do they prove? If it be supposed that men of ordinary mental habits will be led in reflecting upon such a scene to say to themselves: "Well, if a course of iniquity can so revolutionize all the natural and moral elements of a man's mind, rendering him so conscience-seared, desperate and demoralized, that, all reeking with the guilt of murder, he can come to enact such a scene upon the very scaffold; then I see no great objection to entering upon a course of crime which will probably lead to the commission of murder and to just such a fearless, hopeless, happy gallows-death;"—if an ordinary man could be supposed to reason thus, then such a case might be urged against our present position; otherwise not. We think he must be already an almost hopelessly hardened wretch who could harbor for a moment

such a course of reflections. And according to our notions and feelings, no case of execution could read to the community generally a more awful and effectual lesson for inspiring an habitual horror of murder and of that course of criminal passions and practices which leads to its commission, than just such an execution as the objector has described.

But it is commonly said and urged with great vehemence by the abolitionists that, "by the execution of the murderer, the civil government sets public example of the commission of the very crime it punishes, cheapens human life, and brutalizes the moral sense of the community." All this may seem very plausible to the consciousness of the abolitionist himself, who holds or professes to hold that capital punishment is legalized murder; but we shall not by any means allow him to take that point for granted here, having already fully discussed it under the head of the *right* to inflict the penalty of death. And unless that be granted, we really see no great force in the objection here, simply because it ceases to have any claims to truth. As to brutalizing the moral sense of the community; this, like many other things now very emphatically repeated by the abolitionists, is a mere echo of a phrase and a sentiment which were very appropriate to the habit which once existed in England of inflicting capital punishment for almost every and any trivial offence. But when that punishment is inflicted only for murder, how that can be said to be a brutalizing of the moral sense of the community which is in fact the most public, emphatic and solemn expression of the detestation and horror which the community feel for the crime of murder, surpasses the acuteness of our vision and the limits of our comprehension to perceive. We will not allude to what irreverent, if not blasphemous, conclusions this objection would lead as applied to the Divinely ordained Mosaic code—that might lead back to the Scripture argument again; but we will say that, on this theory of moral influences, it is hard to understand how, with the almost universal infliction of capital punishment for murder, the world has ever reached its present refined state—a state so refined that on this very ground some have been led to think, with some plausibility, that it might afford now to dispense with capital punishment altogether.

But before dismissing this point, we will add, that if the abolitionists have anywhere, in any State, so far succeeded in perverting and corrupting public sentiment, that, as a matter of fact, the people do generally regard capital punishment as legalized murder.

der; then by all means they had better abolish it. Whatsoever is not of faith, though it be but simply eating a piece of meat, is *sin*.

But it is said in corroboration of the force of their objection above urged, that murders and other crimes are sometimes committed in sight of the gallows, and that villains consider public executions as their great holydays. We think there is much truth in this which deserves consideration; but nothing which properly militates at all against our position. Great popular gatherings always furnish opportunities and occasions for thefts and acts of violence. The sort of people who are most likely to be drawn together at a public execution are the very people most likely to intend or be tempted to commit those crimes. Those people who desire to witness a public execution are precisely the people whom such a spectacle cannot profit. Let executions then be comparatively private. To say that thus we give up the whole principle of their preventive, deterring power, is entirely to mistake the mode in which this or any other punishment operates to deter from crime. The existence of the law, its known existence as a stern, practical fact, must instil, as nothing else in the way of punishment could so effectually do, an habitual, pervading horror of the crime for which such a dreadful punishment is inflicted. The fear of death is by no means ordinarily increased, by being brought close to us. The contrary is the merciful ordination of Providence. The imagination is vastly more efficient here than vision. Does imprisonment lose its preventive efficacy because the prison walls are made of stone and not of glass?

As to another form which is sometimes given to this objection, viz. that hardened wretches have been known to say when convicted for murder, that they did not see "why the government should wish to monopolize the liberty of killing," or sentiments to that effect; we answer that we believe it would be hard to find a case in which a murderer was known really to *have acted* upon any such principle; and to quote the absurd and reckless bravadoes with which some abandoned wretch has attempted to bolster up his courage and smother his conscience in the immediate prospect of the gallows, is a sorry sort of argument to introduce into a serious discussion.

But although the abolitionists, in discussing the question of right, are wont to descant upon the tremendous severity of the penalty of death,—so great and dreadful, they say, as to transcend the sphere of human justice and all the rights of civil society,—

though they charge it as cruel, savage, barbarous beyond measure; if not as absolutely unjust, at least as utterly inhuman and unchristian, *inconsistent with the spirit of forbearance, forgiveness and compassion which characterize the gospel*; yet, when they come to the question of expediency, to consider the influence of punishment as deterring others from the commission of crime, they take great pains to set forth the horrors of that imprisonment which they propose as a most efficient substitute; they depict it in the most gloomy colors, as being incalculably more severe, awful, frightful, than death itself,—and doubtless it needs all their powers of painting and rhetoric to make men believe it; in short, they seem perfectly willing to harrow up a Christian's heart to the very core by the imagination of the appalling sufferings they would have inflicted on the convict.

They may be sincere in all this. But if so, they must give up their claims to superlative kindness and compassion for the criminal; they must abandon their high-flown phrases about the meekness and benevolence of the gospel. Diderot, who believes with them in the superior efficacy of imprisonment (or slavery) as a punishment, honestly confesses this. In commenting upon Beccaria's picture of the horrors of imprisonment, he holds the following language: "So I think, and one cannot fail to be struck with the author's reasons. But I observe that *he renounces, and rightly, his favorite principle of gentleness and humanity towards the criminal. 'Despair terminates not his woes amidst chains and stripes and iron grates, but only begins them.'* This picture is more terrible than that of the wheel, and the punishment which it portrays is in substance more cruel than the most barbarous death."—Note 54 to Beccaria.

"An eloquent writer," quoted with approbation in Mr. O'Sullivan's Report, makes a similar confession. "Indeed we make no doubt," says he, "that the *ennuï*, the repining at imprisonment in a solitary cell would prove *torture more exquisite than all the deaths invented by a Dionysius, a Perillus, a Domitian, or a Nero.*"¹

¹ If it be said that it is not the external restraint, privation, toil or suffering, which is insisted on as constituting the terrors of imprisonment; but the internal anguish, the upbraidings of the mind, the corrodings of remorse and conscious guilt; we answer that this last is a sort of punishment—most awful indeed—but which you can neither *inflict* nor *remit*, however much you may desire it, whether in this world or the world to come. You need not imprison the murderer in order to bring this punishment upon him in full measure. He must infallibly meet it some time or other. If this is your only ground for imprisonment, therefore, you will not stand on it long. You will soon propose to

But the trouble is, you cannot make men, bad men, believe it. The less of conscience, the less of thought, the less of human sympathies a man has, the less will be to him the horrors of such an imprisonment. Yet such are the men who are to be restrained by it. To say that men, bad men, fear imprisonment of any kind (unless connected with severe *bodily torture*, and we do not understand this to be recommended) more than death, is simply false. One swallow does not make a summer; an exception does not disprove a rule. That an ignominious death is the most fearful of all punishments to any and every *class* of men, is a fact too notorious to allow us to waste time in proving it.

But suppose the fact were otherwise, and suppose you could make men generally believe in all that is said of the transcendent horrors of imprisonment; what would then become of the application of another of the pet principles of the abolitionists, viz. that the efficiency of penalties depends more on their *certainly* than on their *severity*, and that their *certainly* is practically in the inverse ratio of their *severity*? If the great practical objection to capital punishment now is that juries are unwilling to find a man guilty, even with the clearest evidence, because of the dreadful severity of the punishment; will they be more ready to bring in such a verdict when you have fairly convinced them that the punishment you have substituted is incomparably more severe and terrific? The truth is, you cannot convince them of it; you cannot make common sense men believe it, and you know you cannot.

But, say the abolitionists, "When the law regards and treats the substitution of perpetual laborious imprisonment as a merciful commutation of the higher penalty of death, the public will generally do the same; [undoubtedly, and so they would, let the law do as it might;] while the former, if standing at the head of the scale of punishments, as the highest and worst, would strike a greater real terror, and operate as a more powerful preventive restraint, than the latter."¹ We suppose we ought to be convinced by reasoning so cogent; but we cannot help asking, what would be the effect on public opinion, if, imprisonment being declared by law the highest penalty, *death were declared a subordinate* punishment, and inflicted for inferior crimes? Would men come to think it to be really so? Opinion and imagination doubt-

leave murderers to be punished by God and their own consciences in the natural way, without any presumptuous interference of human laws and penalties.

¹ O'Sullivan's Report, p. 110.

less have great influence over us ; but there are some things too hard for them. But, imprisonment being *really* the severer punishment of the two, how happens it that it never occurred to any people, to any legislator, or jurist or man of common sense, to adjust a scale of punishments, in which imprisonment should hold the highest and death a subordinate place ? If, on the other hand, the penalty of death be not introduced into the scale at all, and imprisonment is made the highest penalty, what will you have as the next below it ?—and the next ?—and the next ? Why, imprisonment forsooth : and so the argument tumbles down on the other side. What new principle of determent, pray, do you introduce into your scale by this ingenious device ? Have we not imprisonment as a penalty now, with all its horrors be they more or less, perpetual imprisonment, imprisonment at hard labor ? How do you propose to make it a higher punishment than it is ? By simply cutting off all that is above it ? That is like making a man taller by cutting off his head. What would be the effect of cutting him down still more ? Would the same rule hold ?

We confess that, for ourselves, we had been accustomed to suppose, not that men feared death most of all punishments, *because*, by a fortuitous concurrence of accidents, human laws had almost universally assigned it as their highest sanction ; but rather that wise and prudent legislators had selected it as the highest sanction of human laws, *because* mankind naturally dreaded it most. But suppose imprisonment can be made, in reality, a severer punishment than death ;—the abolitionists insist upon it, and we are ready freely and fully to admit it ;—still we utterly deny that the generality of mankind can be made to *fear* it more than death. The natural instincts of the human mind are too strong for the refinements of pretended philosophy. Here is the precise point where the argument pinches. Imprisonment (such as the abolitionists have proposed) is the *more cruel* but *less terrible* punishment ; death is the *more terrible* but *less cruel*. If, then, the design of penal laws is, not to take vengeance or inflict wanton cruelty on the offender, but to deter others from offending ; which of the two shall be inflicted ? Will you enact the severer penalty which will deter men less, or the milder penalty which will deter them more ? We do not ask here, which is the more merciful and Christian, but which is the wiser and more expedient course ? Let the abolitionists be consistent and adhere to something throughout. We protest against that Protean style of argumentation, by which, when the question of right is under dis-

cussion, they declaim against the "death-penalty" for its vindictive and unchristian cruelty; and again, when the question of expediency is under discussion, they cry it down because it is not half so severe or cruel as another punishment which they propose as its more efficient substitute. Some of them, it is true, make a lame effort to save their consistency at this point, by affirming that imprisonment is the more *severe*, but death the more *cruel* punishment. Thus the whole fabric of an elaborate argument, on a great practical, common sense question, is made to rest upon the narrow basis of a nice verbal distinction. But such an insignificant basis can no more support it than the Hindoo's tortoise could support the world. Diderot, as will be seen above, was aware of no such nice distinction of words. Nor do the very writers who make it adhere to it any longer than they have in mind the momentary purpose for which it was invented. It is a distinction which in itself is hardly worth making; and when made, their application of it to the case in hand is a mere assumption, whose legitimacy we totally deny. It should rather have been said that death is the *more severe* and imprisonment the *more cruel* punishment.

But you say, we have perpetual imprisonment in our statute book indeed, but it is rarely if ever inflicted; and you propose to secure its perpetuity in this case by a constitutional provision. "This is something;" but, alas, constitutions are easily changed. A little "log-rolling" will carry almost any measure. Let a convict have a few hundred friends, let him have wealthy and influential connections, and it would be strange if they could not form a party of a few thousand voters pledged to insist upon his enlargement. And it would be strange if, *in time*, in the course of five, ten, or twenty years, they should not find an opportunity when, parties being nearly equally divided and party feeling being strong, they might sell their votes on their own conditions. Witness the results of the late elections in New York and Delaware, results which should cause every friend of good order and equal laws to tremble.

But, besides all this, public opinion would not sustain such a punishment as is proposed. Convicts imprisoned for life, would still be, as they always have been, enlarged, on an average, in about six or eight years. One generation will not consent to be the jailors and executioners for their predecessors. They will not consent to inflict or even to witness punishment—"horrible" punishment, intense suffering; when the crime has long since been

forgotten. Their humane sympathies must and will operate without any check.

You may pretend that imprisonment is as terrific a punishment as you please; men who are tempted to commit crime will know all the contingencies, above referred to, and many others still more obvious, tending to show it to be highly improbable that they would have to spend a very long life in prison; they will count upon these contingencies; and you cannot help it.

We shall despatch in few words our second head of argument in defence of the expediency of capital punishment—the fact, namely, that it is the best security against the exercise of private revenge.

We take it for granted that capital punishment is not shown to be wrong; if private revenge is not wrong under the gospel, it is at least inexpedient in well-regulated society. As a matter of expediency, it cannot be questioned that the calm, cautious, impartial, inflexible; the stern yet merciful, infliction of public justice is vastly to be preferred to the precipitate, reckless, cruel, often misguided executions of individual vengeance.

Political institutions must be conformed to the actual state of society; they must deal with men as they are, not as they ought to be. Now there is a great deal of *hardness of heart* yet in the world. There is no people on earth who are all perfect Christians. There never has been and is not likely soon to be such a people. No Utopias or Platonic republics have yet been realized. And those laws are unwise, to say the least, which are based on an assumed perfect state of society, which nowhere exists. When that state is reached we will agree to abolish not only capital but all other punishments.

The abolitionists appeal to public opinion, to the conscientious scruples of jurors to show that capital punishment is inexpedient. We appeal to public opinion, to the settled conviction and feeling of the great mass of mankind, and of our own community, that death is the appropriate and only appropriate penalty for outrageous murder, to show that that penalty is expedient. Abolish it, and sooner or later you will have the ancient Gôel reëstablished with all his vindictive violence, with all his rights and with all their abuse. Abolish it, and though the face of society may now be calm and unruffled, the time is not distant when some atrocious assassination will call forth an uncontrollable burst of popular fury, there will be a tumultuous resort “to Lynch law,” and it would not be surprising if some of our tender-hearted reformers,

who now make such a fuss about the hangman, should be among the foremost in executing the violent behests of the mob. The case of Merton of Philadelphia shows what evil consequences naturally ensue when the law leaves an outrage without any (or, what is the same thing in principle and in practice, *without any adequate*) punishment. A man of Merton's spirit, when wronged, will take the vengeance into his own hands; and, what is worse, will be sustained in so doing, by the acclamations of a sympathising community. But we will not dwell upon this point, because it may be said to be mere theory and surmises, which, according to the abolitionists, are disproved by *facts*. Let us turn then, finally, to the consideration of their facts and statistical arguments.

They assert that "wherever and whenever the abolition of the punishment of death has been tried, it has uniformly been followed by the happiest results;" while, on the other hand, they charge that "capital punishment has been tried and failed; that it is useless and worse than useless; that it has not accomplished but rather defeated the purposes for which it was designed." Thus they voluntarily take upon themselves the burden of proof; as, in fairness, they, as abolitionists, ought to do.

In support of their first position, they allege three principal instances; the Roman, Russian and Tuscan—instances which have been urged and answered by the abolitionists and their opponents, hundreds of times, probably, within the last fifty years. They are urged still, as if they were entirely new; and, however threadbare, they have a prescriptive right to a place in the present discussion.

In regard to the case of Tuscany we freely confess we know of nothing new. The abolition of capital punishments there, for some twenty years about the close of the last century, is said by the abolitionists to have been accompanied with the happiest effects; their opponents demur. The statistics of the case we have never seen. For aught we know, they might have some weight in favor of abolition. We have repeatedly seen general assertions, but we have never seen the proofs. At all events, if our view of the gradual, educating influence of penal law be correct, the results of so short and limited an experiment could not prove anything very conclusively against the expediency of this penalty. And finally we may fairly ask why the present grand duke, who is known to be a most amiable and liberal-minded prince, and among the most popular in Europe, has not ere this reenacted the abolition which is said to have been productive of such happy

consequences? Surely he knows as much about those happy consequences as the gentlemen on this side of the Atlantic.

The Russian and Roman cases were strongly urged by Blackstone against the indiscriminate infliction of the punishment of death; but lay in his clear mind in perfect consistency with maintaining both the right and the expediency of capital punishment for murder.

As to the case of Russia we do not know that much more than general statements and opinions have been given; chiefly derived from the casual observations of Count Ségur and his conversations with the Czarina herself. It seems that capital punishment has never been entirely abolished in Russia. It is still inflicted occasionally at the express command of the emperor.

In despotisms, where the government and the people feel themselves to be distinct parties, a mitigation of penalties may be received by the latter as a boon. But with us the case is different. The government—it is the people.

But we ask the abolitionists whether they have examined the details of Russian criminal law, and especially whether they have ascertained and considered the character of the penalties substituted there for capital punishment; and whether, after such inquiry, they are ready and willing to make the same substitutions among us? There are, undoubtedly, punishments worse than death;—barbarous, excruciating, protracted tortures; inquisitorial practices; punishments, which, even if they could be imagined expedient, find no shadow of recognition or authority in the word of God, and are utterly abhorrent to the natural instincts and common voice of humanity. What do they think of being starved in Siberian cold, and tortured *ad libitum* by the knout? And how long will they quote from an empress of Russia, with the greatest devotion, the sentiment: "We must punish crime without imitating it; the punishment of death is rarely anything but a useless barbarity;" when it is remembered that those are the words of the reckless and shameless adulteress Catharine, who reigned by right of having murdered her husband?—truly, just the most natural origin in the world for the Gospel of abolishing the Gallows!

¹ "To remove every obstacle, prince Iwan, an inoffensive youth was also secretly cut off. The bloody capture of Ismael and the partition of Poland must excite indignation against her conduct, as proceeding from the same corrupted heart which waded to the throne over the carcass of a murdered husband."—*Lemprière*.

As to Rome. The Porcian law is said to have abolished capital punishment, to have been enacted A. U. C. 454, and to have continued in force 250 years. "In this period the republic flourished; under the emperors severe punishments were revived, and the empire fell"

Let us observe the facts more narrowly. In the first place, the date¹ of the Porcian law seems to be placed just 100 years too

¹ Montesquieu, and a multitude more who have copied him, place the date of the Porcian law A. U. C. 454. Adam, in his Index to the Roman Laws, gives the same date, and says it was passed by P. Porcius Lacca, a tribune.—Antiquities, p. 215.

In an Index to the Roman Laws contained in the Bipont Ed. of Cicero's Works, Vol. 3, p. 42, this Porcian law is said to have been enacted by *M. Porcius Cato*, tribune, anno DCLIV.

All the original authorities referred to on either side are Liv. X. 9. Cic. pro Rabin. 3. 4. Ver. V. 63. Sallust. Cat. 51. Cicero and Sallust make no allusion to the date of the law. The whole burden, therefore, falls upon Livy. His words are as follows: Eodem anno [452 v. 453] M. Valerius Cos. *de provocations legem tulit diligentius sanctam; tertio ea tum post reges exactos lata est; semper a familia eadem; causam renovandae saepius haud aliam fuisse reor, quam quod plus paucorum opes quam libertas plebis poterant. Porcia tamen lex sola pro tergo civium lata videtur quod gravi poena, si quis verberasset, necassetque civem Romanum sanxit.* Valeria lex, cum eum qui provocasset virgis caedi, securique necari vetuisset, si quis adversus ea fecisset, nihil ultra quam improbe factum adjecit; id (QUI TUNC FUDOR HOMINUM ERAT) visum, credo vinculum satis validum legis, nunc vix serio ita minetur quisquam." Here is manifestly a mere incidental mention of the Porcian law, as being known in Livy's time, and no proof whatever of its date or author. Nor does Livy elsewhere, so far as we can find, give any further account of it. But, about the year 554, he mentions M. [not P.] Porcius Lacca as tribune of the people, and M. Porcius Cato as aedile and praetor.—Liv. xxii. 7. As this is certainly the age of Porcius Cato and as no other Porcius Lacca is anywhere mentioned by Livy, this is probably the true date of the Porcian law—that is to say, 100 years later than Montesquieu and others have placed it.

Dr. Arnold, in his learned and critical history of Rome, makes no mention of the Porcian law. And this is natural; for of the period from 550 to 650 he gives but a meagre sketch, to connect the earlier and later portions of his history. In the former and more elaborate work, however, after mentioning the passage of the Ogulnian bill, anno 452 vel 453, he adds: "In the same year M. Valerius re-enacted for the third time the famous law which bore the name of his family, and which was, in fact, the Roman law of trial by jury, as it permitted every citizen to appeal from the sentence of a magistrate in capital cases to the judgment of his country."—Vol. I. p. 535, Am. Ed. This Valerian law also expressly provided that whoever should aim to become king *should be punished with instant death.* Vol. II. p. 38, Arnold adds that "the years which followed the passing of the Ogulnian law are politically almost a blank; they present no new law."

Before concluding this note, we cannot forbear commending to the serious

soon. For the evidence on this point, we refer the curious reader to the note. In the second place, this law was introduced not as a matter of criminal jurisprudence, but rather as a popular and political measure, intended to protect the plebeians from the capricious violence of patrician magistrates. This was its democratic side. It had also an aristocratic side. It was a law for the protection of a privileged class. It never applied to the Latins, to slaves, or to the non-citizen classes, who oftentimes constituted the far greater portion of the inhabitants of Rome. Even in the case of Roman citizens, it was scarcely in force except with-

attention of our readers the following reflections of Dr. Arnold on the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators. "On no occasion," says he, "were the faults of the Roman constitution more mischievously displayed than in these proceedings. So ill framed were the laws, that the worst criminals could not legally receive that punishment which our natural sense of justice, no less than the maxims of state policy, declares to be the only adequate chastisement of the worst kinds of wickedness. Thus, although justice and the public safety alike demanded the execution of the conspirators, yet these claims could only be satisfied by an assumption on the part of the senate of a power to dispense with the laws, and by another appeal to abstract principles in order to justify a departure from the ordinances of the existing constitution. The advantage thus offered to a popular leader was not lost upon Caesar; he had now obtained a point on which the *sincere but ill-judging friends of liberty might be induced to sympathize with the vilest supporters of sedition*, and which might effectually terminate that short-lived harmony between honest men of all parties, which had been produced by the first discovery of the conspiracy. It mattered nothing that no traces of a sanguinary or tyrannical spirit were to be found in Cicero's proceedings; that after the execution of five persons, all guilty of the most heinous crime on the clearest evidence, the justice of the government was satisfied. Caesar's ambition required that he should excite the resentment of the people against the senate; and here, as on every other occasion, he sacrificed to it the welfare of his country."—*Later Rom. Commonwealth*, Vol. I. p. 331.

Cato Minor, grandson of M. Porcius Cato the great censor, himself proverbially distinguished for probity, truth and patriotism, strongly advised the capital execution of the conspirators: Julius Caesar made a strong argument against it; one of the strongest and best, as reported in Sallust, that the abolitionists can find. Such were Julius Caesar's conscientious scruples and bowels of compassion, that he could not bear to have five murderous traitors put to death for the safety of his country; though he was ready to sacrifice no less than a million of innocent lives to his unhallowed lust of personal power!

We trust our modern abolitionists are not generally possessed with the spirit of a Catharine II. and a Julius Caesar. But we fear some of them would have voted for the banishment of Cicero; and, if they had the opportunity, would petition to have Dr. Arnold appointed hangman, as an insult for his honest approbation of Cato's opinions. No character is more suspicious than that of the political "*philanthropist*."

in the walls of the city. It was often violated both by the people and their magistrates. Add to all these facts that the times antecedent and immediately subsequent to its enactment were the most virtuous times of the Roman State. *Qui tunc pudor hominum erat!* exclaims Livy. The severe laws of the twelve tables had educated a race of men of sterner and stricter morality, of more solid and masculine virtue, than the world has elsewhere seen. This boasted law was introduced; the State continued to flourish externally; but morals and virtue went on decaying, till the privileged descendants of those same noble old Romans had sunk to a depth of corruption and moral degradation which we find described in its true and appalling colors in the first chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans;—an abyss and a loathsomeness of moral pollution from which, not only not the now necessary restoration of capital punishment, but not even the introduction of Christianity itself, could save them. The insinuation that the restoration of this penalty was the cause of the very degradation which it failed to remedy is on a par with Gibbon's insinuation that the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire were owing to the introduction of Christianity. The abolitionists are welcome to all the strength they can get from the example of the ancient Romans.¹

From statistical tables of the results of the criminal administration of various countries, they undertake to prove that "the frequency of executions has constantly occasioned a corresponding frequency in the commission of capital crimes; and a diminution in the number of executions has constantly occasioned a corresponding diminution in the frequency of murders and of all crimes formerly punished capitally."

Now we might reasonably set aside all such argumentation as being a most palpable and, coming as it does from intelligent men, a most amazing invasion or perversion of the relation of cause and effect. We might say, the frequency of crimes has not been owing to the frequency of executions, but the frequency of executions has been owing to the frequency of crimes; and so in the case of the alleged corresponding diminution. This is manifestly true when identical times are taken. And if the immedi-

¹ As to the experiment of Sir James Mackintosh in India, it is enough to say that his successors, wise and practical men as well as he, have not seen fit to follow it up. The probability is, that Mackintosh reaped the harvest which his predecessors had sown; and his successors have been obliged to return to the sowing again.

ately subsequent years are taken in each of the cases, it does not much affect the soundness of their reasoning, for *moral* effects do not so suddenly follow from *external* causes. And finally, when they take long periods for comparison,—as they rarely do with a fair statement of the premises, i. e. without mixing up the executions for all offences capital in one time and place with the executions for murder only in another time and place,—we say, when they take long periods for comparison, they seem to forget the natural result of increasing civilization accompanied with the elevation and increasing comfort of the masses, and ascribe everything to the simple effect of the penal administration.

We might further object that, strange as it may seem, statistics are easily made the most deceptive basis for argument, that can possibly be invented. Let a man pick and pack his facts to suit himself and he can prove from statistics anything he pleases.

But, for the sake of argument, we will waive both these objections. We will admit, since our opponents are pleased to assume it, that the whole effect, in the phenomena of crime, whatever it be, is to be ascribed to the actual administration of the penal law; and we will take their own selection of statistical tables just as they have given them to us. Even then we think we can show, that their own facts not only do not establish their conclusions, but fairly considered, do unanswerably refute them.

In order to restrain this inquiry within reasonable limits, we shall take from among the multitude of statistical statements and reports which they have published, six letters of the Hon. Robert Rantoul, jr. addressed in February, 1846, to the governor and legislature of Massachusetts. Considering Mr. Rantoul's high character and standing as a lawyer and a gentleman, and the fact that he has shown a larger and more devoted interest in this subject than perhaps any other man in New England, we presume the selection will not be objected to. If anywhere we can find a strong case made out for the abolitionists we may expect to find it here.

But even while confining ourselves to Mr. Rantoul's documents we shall be obliged to content ourselves with noting but few of the many cases in which his facts point directly against him.

In his third letter he instances the case of Belgium, where capital punishment was abolished in 1829, and his statistics extend to 1834. We might fairly set this case entirely aside, inasmuch as Mr. Ernst, the Belgian minister of justice, who may be assumed to know something about the matter, in his official report for 1835,

declared himself against the expediency of the abolition judged by its practical results. It is true the abolitionists disputed his views and inferences; still we might fairly reject the case as remaining yet *sub lite*. But let us take Mr. Rantoul's facts as he presents them.

His tables extend over a space of thirty-nine years, from 1796 to 1834. If we divide this time into periods of ten years each, (nine years for the first period,) it will appear by these tables that, taking Belgium exclusive of Limbourg and Luxembourg, the average annual convictions for all capital crimes, in passing from the first period to the second, diminishes 111 per cent.; in passing from the second period to the third, it diminishes 100 per cent.; and in passing from the third period to the last, it *remains without any diminution at all*, exactly stationary. In the midst of this last period capital punishment was abolished; in the first period it was executed with the greatest rigor. And if we confine one side of our comparison exclusively to the period subsequent to the abolition, and select the last of the five years, (which is perfectly fair on Mr. Rantoul's own principles of reasoning,) we find that the number of capital convictions in 1834 compared with the annual average during the fifteen years next preceding the abolition was as 23 to 13.7; compared with the average for the first four years subsequent to the abolition, it was as 23 to 9, and within the same time the annual average of murders had increased from 3.2 to 7. How much has abolition protected the sanctity of human life, according to all this?

But it is boldly asserted that the most gratifying result of the gradual and constant diminution of crime during the thirty-nine years preceding 1834, which the table covers, was owing to the diminished frequency of executions; and the case is put thus: "After the period ending 1799, the [annual average of] executions *increase* thirteen, the [annual average of the] convictions for murder *increase* four. In all the following periods they [both averages] *decrease*."

Now let us look the facts straight in the face. During the five years immediately subsequent to 1799, there was a great *increase* in the severity of the criminal administration and an *accompanying increase* in the frequency of murders. This is just what we should expect. But as men do not commit crimes because they have themselves been hung for it, but rather are hung because they have committed the crimes; if we would not totally pervert the relation of cause and effect, we should look to a subsequent

period—to the next five years, if you please—for the *consequences* of this *increase* of severity. And what do we find? Why, we find that in the next five years the annual average of convictions for all capital offences fall off from seventy-one to thirty; and for murder, from thirty to sixteen! From which it would appear that, on the very basis of reasoning assumed by our opponents, the execution of thirteen felons per annum during one five years, saved the lives of fourteen innocent persons per annum during the next five years. And what is more, deterred fourteen miserable men each year from bringing upon their souls the unutterable guilt of imbruing their hands in the blood of their fellow creatures. And even this makes the case too favorable for the abolitionists, for at least one third, (and probably one half,) of the executions, during that period of great severity, were for *other crimes* than *murder*. Such was the aspect of facts in 1809. Now a principle of reasoning that was good in 1834 was equally good in 1809; and suppose we planted ourselves at this last date, we ask if the beneficial, protective effects of capital punishment are not fully demonstrated—we mean, on our adversaries' own principles? So much for the experiment in Belgium.

In his fourth letter, Mr. Rantoul takes up the case of Massachusetts, and finds that in a period of sixty-five years from 1780 to 1845, sixty *per cent.* of all the convicts for capital crimes have been executed; and this he denominates “a stern and unrelenting rigor not elsewhere known in Christendom.” It will be remembered that other abolitionists complain of the remission of the penalty in any case, if it is inflicted at all, calling such remissions “caprice, injustice, bold and cruel mockery.”¹ But what is one man's food is another's poison. It would seem impossible to satisfy all demands. We will follow Mr. Rantoul.

“In Massachusetts,” says he, with less executive clemency than in any other State or nation of which I have read, for the nineteenth century, murder seems to have increased. For if we divide our period of sixty-five years into three periods of twenty years each, and place by itself the last period of five years, we have the following result.

From 1780 to 1800 convicted for murder 7 in 20 years.

“	1800	“	1820	“	“	12	“	“
“	1820	“	1840	“	“	13	“	“
“	1840	“	1845	“	“	5	“	5 years
						or the rate of	20	“ 20 years.”

¹ See North American Review.

"Convictions then," he adds, "are about *three times as frequent* as they were fifty years ago."

So far Mr. Rantoul. He seems to have forgotten that he has made his period actually consist of eighty instead of sixty-five years. But let us follow him quietly. He says murders have nearly trebled. But if you take the comparative population at the dates compared, (and it must be remembered he stops his average not at 1845 but at 1860,) *that* also will have more than trebled; and after all that can be said about temperance reformation and so on, it can hardly be supposed that the strictness or general prevalence of virtue and morality has increased in Massachusetts in the last sixty-five years. But we omit this. In order to obtain his result he has averaged the last five years over fifteen years to come, thus dooming fifteen poor fellows yet unknown, to commit murder in Massachusetts before the year of grace 1860. This seems to us, to use a homely proverb, counting his chickens before they are hatched. We suppose it will be admitted that if such averaging is fair for *one* period of twenty years it is equally fair for *another*. Let us try it, by the aid of another table he has furnished in which the whole period is divided into lustra.

We find that from 1825 to 1830, there were six convictions for murder, which would give an average, for the period of twenty years from 1820 to 1840 of twenty-four murders;—the actual number was thirteen. We find also that from 1795 to 1800, there were no convictions for murder at all—what average would this give for the next fifteen or even 100 years? And suppose in the year 1800 some excellent philanthropist had proposed to introduce into Massachusetts the abolition of capital punishment, which had already been enacted in Tuscany and, as is said, with the happiest results; and suppose some defender of capital punishment, in that same year 1800, reasoning on Mr. Rantoul's principles of statistical comparison, had undertaken to show that capital punishment had already succeeded to absolute perfection in repressing the crime of murder, not a solitary instance of conviction for that crime having occurred within the last five years? And suppose the abolitionist had replied: "Nay, but on the contrary, the facts demonstrate the truth of my theory; for you see, as soon as you stopped your executions entirely, murders ceased entirely. There are no murders because there are no executions;"¹ then we should have had one of Mr. Rantoul's principles

¹ There was *one* execution, of a convict of the former period; so that our abolitionist is not *exactly* right with his facts. But that is nothing strange.

of statistical reasoning arrayed against the other. Which should have prevailed one can hardly say. If either mode of reasoning is good for anything now, it was worth just as much then. This is not all. This very period of five years in which no convictions occurred, Mr. Rantoul is very careful to pack into his first period, so as to get the fewest number of murders possible in that to compare with the greatest number possible in the last period. What would have been the result of his comparison if he had taken his starting point five, ten, or fifteen years sooner, we are unable to tell.

But taking the fifty years preceding 1845, and dividing it into two periods of twenty-five years, thus throwing into the first period the five years in which there were the least number of convictions, viz. none at all, and into the last period the five years in which there were the greatest number of convictions which these tables assign to any period of five years; we have the following result.

From 1795 to 1820, convictions for murder 14 in 25 years.

" 1820 " 1845, " " 18 " "

The increase of population from 1810 to 1835, was about 43 *per cent.*; the *increase* of convictions for murder was only 28½ *per cent.* And this seems to us the most favorable comparison to Mr. Rantoul's side which can fairly be instituted on the basis of his own tables.

If, however, we begin with the "nineteenth century," as he seems to propose, and take full periods of twenty years, the result is,

From 1800 to 1820, convictions for murder 12 in 20 years.

" 1820 " 1840, " " 13 " "

The *increase* of population was about 30 *per cent.*; the *increase* of murders about 8 *per cent.*

So much for the effect of the unparalleled, barbarous and unchristian severity of penal inflictions in Massachusetts, in increasing the frequency of murders; as appears by comparing Massachusetts with herself at successive periods of her history. The increase of population was an element in the comparison which Mr. Rantoul found it very convenient to *ignore* altogether.

But he is not content with comparing Massachusetts with herself, he points to her unrelenting rigor in executing 60 *per cent.* of her convicts; while England, whose government he thinks he has a right "justly to denounce as sanguinary," in a period of twenty-one years, from 1813 to 1834, executed but 31 *per cent.*

of her convicts for murder. But of what consequence is it for him to prove that Massachusetts is more severe, (or more cruel if you please,) unless he proves that that severity fails to prevent the commission of crime? Let us look to this material point. We take his own premises and carry them out to their results.

By referring to tables of population which are in every body's hands, it will appear, that, for the period of twenty-one years here instanced, there was in England, on an average, one murder for less than every 15,000 inhabitants; while for twenty years, ending in 1835, in Massachusetts, there was but one murder for every 45,000 inhabitants. From which it appears that the ratio of murders to the population, in England, was about three times as great as in Massachusetts at the same period. In other words, the stern severity with which Massachusetts has ever been accustomed to administer her penal laws, has saved two innocent men from the hand of the assassin for every murderer who has been executed. And, what is more again, has prevented two other men from committing this horrible crime.

But if the comparison with England, though proffered by Mr. Rantoul himself, be thought in any degree unfair, on account of the sanguinary character of her code at the time referred to; then take the comparison with Belgium, whose lenity is so much boasted of; and what is the result? For twenty years, ending in 1834, Mr. Rantoul states that the executions in Belgium were but 27 *per cent.* of the convictions. But it appears by his tables that the number of convictions for murder in that time was 134; in Massachusetts for twenty years, ending in 1835, the convictions for murder were only twelve. That is to say, under the boasted lenity of Belgium, there was one murder to every 30,000 inhabitants, while under the barbarous severity of Massachusetts there was one murder to every 45,000 inhabitants; in other words, the habitual rigor of Massachusetts diminished the number of murders 50 *per cent.*

So much for the statistical proof that punishment increases crime, and that the surest way to get rid of crime is to dismiss the criminals with impunity, or at least, not to treat them very harshly! And let it be again observed, we have taken the very issue offered by our opponents, and tried it according to their own principles of evidence, and by cross-questioning their own witnesses. We leave our readers to judge of the result.

We have hitherto considered the statistical argument exclusively in its bearing upon the crime of murder. The abolitionists

have strongly asserted and fully committed themselves to the doctrine that the abrogation of the penalty of death for other crimes (besides murder) for which it had been before inflicted, has operated not only to the diminution of murders, for which it continued to be inflicted, but also of those very crimes for which it had been abolished. Now, although we have not the least particle of sympathy for that most abominable system of English legislation contrived by the rich in contempt of the poor, by which the poor were first cut off from all honest means of subsistence, and then strung up like dogs if they dared lay hands on anything to satisfy the cravings of nature : though we have no sympathy with any laws which inflict the penalty of death for mere infringements of the right of property ; yet that any man should steal simply because he is in danger of being hung for it ; while it is what these reasoners seem to assume, is what we find it exceedingly difficult to understand or believe.¹ But that fewer murders should be committed after capital punishment has been abolished for other offences not attended with violence, than were committed before, is what we can easily conceive, and what, so far from showing the want of preventive efficacy in this punishment, decidedly and unanswerably establishes it.

When, for example, the punishment of death for highway robbery, committed without violence, was abolished and reserved for murder only ; it was found that the number of murders sensibly decreased ; for the plain reason that the robber could now pursue his trade without running the risk of being hung, provided he abstained from committing murder. Whereas, before, he often preferred to murder those whom he robbed, perhaps because it might increase the probability of concealment.² At all events his moral sense, his horror of murder, was not sufficient to prevent his adding this crime to the other. But, after the change in the law, his exposure to death as an additional punishment did prevent the additional crime ; and that, although the temptation to commit it, as a means of diminishing the probability of discovery

¹ If they explain by saying that thieves count on the probability of escaping all punishment when the penalty is too severe ; we answer, that their assertion here controverted is that the number of *convictions* is greater when the punishment is capital, than after it is changed.

² "A la Chine, les voleurs cruels sont coupés en morceaux, les autres non : cette différence fait que l'on y vole, mais que l'on n'y assassine pas."

"En Moscovie où la peine des voleurs et celle des assassins sont les mêmes, on assassine toujours. Les morts, y dit-on ne racontent rien." *Esprit des Loix*, Liv. 6. ch. 16.

for the other crime, remained the same as before. We point to this fact as a perfect, practical demonstration of the preventive power of capital punishment. Yet the abolitionists appeal to this very fact as being in their favor, showing, say they, that in proportion as you have restrained the application of capital punishment, *murders* have diminished. We trust there are few unprejudiced minds which cannot see the absurdity of such an appeal.

But, notwithstanding all *a priori* reasoning to the contrary, they insist upon it as a matter of fact, that, in England for example, where capital punishment has been abolished for most other crimes besides murder, the frequency of these very crimes has diminished as well as that of murder—that men have not only ceased to murder when they rob, but have also ceased to rob, now that there is no danger of being hung for it. Mr. Rantoul enters at length into the demonstration of this point; but as we have access to statistics of equal authority with his, and much more to our purpose, we shall not follow his lead any further.

We extract the following from the *London Law Magazine* for August, 1846; and we venture to say no higher English authority can be found; besides it will be seen the facts are from official returns.

“We proved, say they, (in a former number,) by the extracts from the Home Office returns that the modern repeal of penal acts imposing capital punishments had, in each case, been followed by an enormous increase of the crimes previously punished by death; and, in order that there might be no sort of doubt left in rational minds on the subject, no peg whereon to hang cavil or criticism and escape the plain inference of the facts, we gave the annual amount of committals for these very crimes, through a period of no less than ten years, beginning in 1835, three years before the abolition took place and extending down to the then last published returns for 1844.”

“The result of these tables was conclusive. In comparing the crimes committed before and after the abolition, we took care to avoid laying stress on the years immediately following the change in the law, for the obvious reason, that the real effects of such changes never immediately follow them. It takes some time for a new law to become known and to develop its results. We therefore compared the three last years preceding the change of the law in 1837 with the three last years of which the results were known. Thus compared the returns of committals showed an increase in attempts to murder, stabbing, etc. of 98 per cent.;

in burglaries, 115 per cent.; in robberies, 33 per cent.; in arsons, 124 per cent.; in rapes, 102 per cent.; comparing in this last instance the offences preceding 1841, when that law was altered."

"This precise classification was quite immaterial to the general fact of a large and fearful increase of these sanguinary and fiendish crimes."

The writer then gives a comparative table, including the year 1845, in which year it seems there was a marked diminution in England of crimes of all sorts and however punished—and this fact, by the way, is directly in the teeth of Mr. Rantoul's main argument in his 6th letter.

According to this table of the returns of the Home Office, comparing the period of five years ending 1840 with the period ending 1845, attempts to murder, stabbing, etc. had increased more than 37 per cent.; burglaries, more than 50 per cent.; robberies, more than 26 per cent.; setting fire to dwellings, etc., more than 119 per cent.; rape, etc., 81 per cent.

"Here is an increase of 45 per cent. at any rate in these crimes, of which nearly all ceased to be punished capitally during the five years ending in 1840. It is useless to struggle with these facts. Any blockhead or quibbler may distort or garble; but, fairly stated, the fact is, that the practical result of the abolition of capital punishment has been an immense increase of crime; and it is no sort of answer to say that in 1845 these crimes were less in number than in 1844. Granted that they were, but so were all other crimes. No one held or holds that crimes once punished capitally are incapable of the fluctuations incidental to crime at large. Besides, staticians and statesmen, if they deserve either designation, deal with periods of years and not with isolated years, which are obviously insufficient to mark the phases of social condition. As well may we measure the ebb or flow of the tide by the comparative height of successive waves."

"This result is not confined to any one single class of offences, but with slight variations extended to the whole number of those which ceased to be punished capitally; whilst the same increase did not take place in other classes of offence to which capital punishment still attached; as, for instance, in the case of murder, attempts to murder attended with dangerous injuries, both capitally punishable (in England) and some others; in which, though there has been some increase since 1837, it has been no more than proportioned to the general increase of crime, and bears no comparison to the enormous increase of those crimes which have

ceased to be capitally punished; thus bringing the effect home to at least one of its causes."

"No statistical chicanery, no legerdmain of partial and defective returns, no picking out of particular years by charlatan philanthropists, can gainsay the conclusive evidence of these great facts. Isolated offences and particular years may indeed be so packed in groups as to vary and possibly, in some instances, to change the result; but all statistics are susceptible of similar jugglery, and the honest inquirer will have no difficulty in detecting the *ruse*, and ascertaining the real result of the entire facts. The annual tables published by the Home Office, and collected by Mr. Redgrave, ought always to be consulted by any one who really desires to fathom the subject. Any reference to picked figures which evades the evidence of the whole returns for the ten years is not trustworthy."

"We have already shown that no confidence is due to the statistics of the abolitionists, who have been sufficiently unwary to commit themselves to the absurd statements that the offences in question have diminished. However innocently many of them may have been duped, the imprudence of such an advocacy is fatal to its influence on the minds of all reflecting men."

We here close our argument. And we conclude this long Article with a simple allusion to one particular practical consideration, which properly has no bearing upon the general argument either of right or expediency—we mean as to what action may be required of a legislature in a given state of public opinion. If the moral sense of the community; (however sound or perverted it matters not;)—if the moral sense of the community be, as a matter of fact, opposed to the infliction of capital punishment for murder; if juries can scarcely be found to try such cases, and judges to pronounce such sentences; then we say decidedly, let the legislature abolish capital punishment. But let this state of facts be first fairly ascertained, and not assumed simply because the abolitionists make a great deal more noise about the matter than the approvers of the law as it is. We have felt bound to take our stand not against such legislative action in such a state of the premises; but against those influences which are so industriously at work to produce such a state of the premises. Our appeal is not to the legislature, but to the people themselves.

NOTE

TO THE ARTICLE ON MACHIAVELLI IN THE LAST VOLUME.

We beg leave here to correct a mistake which occurs on page 138, Vol. III. In a passage quoted from Machiavelli, he is made to say, "Upon a thorough examination of Borgia's conduct I see nothing worthy of political reprehension." The word "political," is not found in the original; and, though we thought, and still think, it manifestly implied by the context, yet it is but justice to ourselves to say that, in our original draught, we had placed the word in brackets. The brackets were accidentally omitted either in our copy for the press, or by a typographical oversight. We make this explanation because there is nothing in authorship of which we have a greater horror than of falsified or garbled quotations.

Bowdoin College, March, 1847.

ARTICLE III.

THE SPIRIT OF PROPHECY IN RELATION TO THE FUTURE
CONDITION OF THE JEWS.

By Rev. Luther F. Dimmick, Newburyport, Mass.—[Concluded from No. XIV. p. 369.]

EZEKIEL.

Ezekiel was partly contemporaneous with Jeremiah, though a little later. He flourished, according to the usual reckoning, from B. C. 595—574, a period of twenty-one years. He perhaps lived beyond the latter date.

Ezekiel exercised his office in Chaldea, "among the captives by the river of Chebar," (1: 1). He seems to have been carried away with the *second* company of captives, connected with Jeremiah, (Jer. 34: 1. comp. Ezek. 1: 2). Most of the people, therefore, remained at Jerusalem, and in Judea, several years longer, of whom he makes frequent mention.

Ezekiel began his ministry also by declaring the wickedness of the people, and denouncing still further judgments against them. "A rebellious nation," he called them; "impudent children;"

"most rebellious;" "impudent and hard-hearted," (2: 3, 4, 7. 3: 7). "Therefore thus saith the Lord God, Behold I, even I, am against thee, and will execute judgments in the midst of thee. I will make thee waste, and a reproach among the nations," (5: 8, 14). "Destruction cometh; and they shall seek peace, and there shall be none," (7: 25). "I will—deliver you into the hands of strangers, and will execute judgments among you," (22: 7).

What does Ezekiel say of the restoration? "Thus saith the Lord God, Although I have cast them far off among the heathen, and although I have scattered them among the countries, yet will I be to them as a little sanctuary in the countries where they shall come. Therefore thus saith the Lord God, I will even gather you from the people, and assemble you out of the countries where you have been scattered, and I will give you the land of Israel," (11: 16, 17). The literal restoration from Babylon is manifestly the thing here intended. Why should the interpreter look any further? The prophet is among the captives, asserting God's just prerogatives in chastening them, threatening further corrections, and then promising the return of prosperity.

In a later chapter, the prosperity is still further predicted: "Thus saith the Lord God, When I shall have gathered the house of Israel from the people among whom they are scattered, and shall be sanctified in them in the sight of the heathen, then shall they dwell in their land that I have given to my servant Jacob," (28: 25). Restoration from Babylon is evidently here also intended. The exigencies of the place require nothing more.

So again: "Thus saith the Lord God, Behold I, even I, will both search my sheep, and seek them out. And I will bring them out from the people, and gather them from the countries, and will bring them to their own land, and feed them upon the mountains of Israel, by the rivers, and in all the inhabited places of the country," (34: 11, 13). Nothing seems plainer, than that here again is simply the restoration from Babylon. The language is also fulfilled by that event. Though in a passage following, reference is made to the higher subject, which that prefigured. "I will set up one Shepherd over them, and he shall feed them, even my servant David; he shall feed them, and he shall be their shepherd. And I the Lord will be their God, and my servant David a prince among them; I the Lord hath spoken it," (vs. 23, 24). By *David* here, is evidently meant the Son of David, the Messiah, the true Prince of Israel, and of the ransomed nations of the world.

Chap. xxxvi. of Ezekiel may be considered a stronger passage in favor of something yet future. It is a graphic description, addressed to the land of Israel, its mountains and hills, its rivers and valleys, its cities and villages, laid waste by the heathen, of returning prosperity, and the residence of its own people again within its borders; the people themselves also being addressed in relation to this subject: "For I will take you from among the heathen, and gather you out of all countries, and will bring you into your own land." Then follow promises of still further good. "I will sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness, and from all your idols, will I cleanse you. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you: and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments, and do them. And ye shall dwell in the land that I gave to your fathers; and ye shall be my people, and I will be your God," (vs. 24—28). Two kinds of blessings are promised here. One is, that of dwelling again in the land. The other is, that of a right heart, and the special divine favor corresponding with it. The external part of this promise may be considered as accomplished when the Jews were restored from Babylon. Something of the internal part also was then accomplished. For the Jews were then cured of idolatry, never falling into it afterwards, and exhibiting in other respects, for some time, no inconsiderable reformation.¹ If a part of the spiritual blessing

¹ "Doubtless many of the Jews, who returned from Babylon, were thus renewed and sanctified; yet numbers of them continued strangers to such special blessings, though preserved from outward idolatry."—Scott in loc. "The next thing I would take notice of," says Edwards in his "History of Redemption," "was the pouring out of the Spirit of God that accompanied the ministry of Ezra the priest after the captivity. That there was such a pouring out of the Spirit of God that accompanied Ezra's ministry, is manifest by many things in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah. Presently after Ezra came up from Babylon, . . . he set himself to reform the vices and corruptions he found among the Jews; and his great success in it we have an account of in the 10th chapter of Ezra: so that there appeared a very general and great mourning of the congregation of Israel for their sins, which was accompanied with a solemn covenant that the people entered into with God; and this was followed with a great and general reformation, as we have there an account. And the people about the same time, with great zeal and earnestness and reverence, gathered themselves together to hear the word of God read by Ezra, etc. They wept when they heard the words of the law, and set themselves to observe the law, and kept the feast of tabernacles, as the Scripture observes, after such a man-

still remains to be enjoyed, it can be enjoyed by a spiritual conversion to Christ, without any change of outward condition.

The xxxvii. chapter of Ezekiel is also strongly relied on in the argument before us. It contains, first, the vision of the valley of dry bones. The prophet was set down in a valley full of bones, and they were very dry: and he prophesied upon them, according to the commandment of God, and they lived, and stood up, an exceeding great army, (vs. 1—10). What was the meaning of this vision? The Author of the vision shall himself explain. "Son of man, these bones are the whole house of Israel. Behold, they say, our bones are dried, and our hope is lost: we are cut off for our parts." These were the complaints they made in their bondage and depression. "Therefore prophesy and say unto them, Thus saith the Lord God, Behold, O my people, I will open your graves, and cause you to come up out of your graves, and bring you into the land of Israel. And ye shall know that I am the Lord, when I have opened your graves, O my people, and brought you up out of your graves, and shall put my Spirit into you, and ye shall live, and I shall place you in your own land: then shall ye know that I the Lord have spoken it, and performed it, saith the Lord," (vs. 11—14). Why now go beyond the restoration then shortly to take place, for the fulfilment of this prediction? Does not God himself declare that that was the event intended? It is, indeed, true, that the passage may be applied to other events, and other cases, by way of accommodation. But we are inquiring after the true idea which the prophet had in his mind. And this most evidently was, the restoration from Babylon.

In the latter part of the chapter, is recorded an emblematic transaction, showing the union of the two branches of the nation after their return, and looking forward to the better days of the Messiah, when all the ancient things foreshadowed would be fully enjoyed. The prophet, by divine direction, took two sticks, and wrote upon them for the two branches of the nation, and

ner as it had not been kept since the days of Joshua the son of Nun. . . . And after this, having separated themselves from all strangers, they solemnly observed a fast, by hearing the word of God, confessing their sins, and renewing their covenant with God; and manifested their sincerity in the transaction, by actually reforming many abuses in religion and morals." May not this pouring out of God's Spirit, after the captivity, and the reformation it produced, be a fulfilment of the promise: "I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them?" It looks very like it—at least the beginning of the promised good.

joined them in his hand as one stick, signifying that the two branches of the nation should again become united in one. "I will make them one nation in the land upon the mountains of Israel; and one king shall be king over them all.—David my servant shall be king over them; and they shall have one Shepherd," (vs. 16—24). They were "one nation" after their return to their land, and continued so till Christ came, and they rejected him, and were themselves rejected in return. In the last expressions, reference is particularly made to Christ. But where prophecy thus runs into the present dispensation,—a spiritual dispensation,—is it not to be, in general, interpreted spiritually, according to the nature of the dispensation to which it refers? The dress may be ancient; but the truth relates to these latter times.

Again in this prophet it is said, "Now will I bring again the captivity of Jacob, and have mercy upon the whole house of Israel, and will be jealous for my holy name.—Then shall they know that I am the Lord their God, which caused them to be led into captivity among the heathen; but I have gathered them unto their own land, and have left none of them any more there. Neither will I hide my face any more from them: for I have poured out my Spirit upon the house of Israel, saith the Lord," (39: 25—29). Here is manifestly the early restoration, glancing, possibly, at the further blessings to which it was to lead.

From the xl. chapter of this prophet to the xlviii., inclusive, there is a vision of a city, and a temple and its appurtenances, and the allotment of the land of Palestine among the tribes of the people. We cannot go into any detail on this subject. The general picture is before every reader of the Bible; and each, who wishes it, can revive the impression by a fresh perusal.

Some will have this to be a prediction of what is yet literally to occur. But what is the necessity for such a view of the case? Was not the vision exactly suited to the condition of things then existing when the prophet wrote? It was "in the five and twentieth year of their captivity," that the vision was granted, (40: 1). The people were depressed and needed encouragement; and God gave them, by the prophet, a glowing picture of their rising city, and restored temple, and the land divided among their tribes. What can surpass the appropriateness and beauty of this representation, in this view of it? It was just what was needed. Why now shall we take it away, and apply it to a literal city, and literal temple, and literal allotment of the land, yet to be? Let it stand where the prophet put it, and it is glorious. But put to

the Christian dispensation, as a prediction to be yet literally fulfilled, it is out of place. This dispensation, by its spirituality, "excelleth in glory," so that such externals are not needed.

Does it not appear, then, that even Ezekiel, rightly and carefully viewed, leaves the doctrine of a literal restoration of the Jews from their present dispersions, unsustained? He lived amidst the scenes of the captivity. He spoke of a restoration; but it was a restoration *then* to take place. He glanced occasionally, as others had done, to the Messiah's time; but his utterances of the Messiah's time, are to be understood according to the nature of the Messiah's dispensation, to which they relate. Whatever be the dress of his thought, it is a grand and glorious spiritual reality into which the germ is to unfold. This we believe to be the economy of ancient prophecy, in relation to these latter times.

DANIEL.

Daniel has little in relation to the subject before us; though he flourished at the very time of the captivity; was himself one of the early captives at Babylon; and lived, at least, till the restoration was in progress, (fl. B. C. 607—534). He speaks of the literal restoration, the time of which, as it approached, he "understood by books" (9: 2), i. e. by Jeremiah's prophecy, (25: 12. 29: 10). He was employed in the public affairs of the empire; gave some of the grandest views extant, of the destiny of nations; and intermingled instruction respecting the kingdom which the God of heaven should set up (2: 44), and respecting the Messiah, who should be cut off, but not for himself (9: 26), with the troubles and commotions by which his dominion in the earth should be established.

HOSEA.

Hosea flourished about twenty-four years earlier than Isaiah, (B. C. 764—723). He predicted especially the captivity of *Israel*. "Yet a little while, and I will — cause to cease the kingdom of the house of Israel. — I will utterly take them away," (1: 4, 6). "Ephraim shall be desolate in the day of rebuke," (5: 9). He speaks also of restoration. "Then shall the children of Judah and the children of Israel be gathered together, and appoint themselves one head, and they shall come up out of the land: for great shall be the day of Jezreel," (1: 11). This comports with the

actual facts of the restoration under Zerubbabel, at the end of the captivity.

Again: "For the children of Israel shall abide many days without a king, and without a prince, and without a sacrifice, and without an image, and without an ephod, and without teraphim: afterwards shall the children of Israel return, and seek the Lord their God, and David their king: and shall fear the Lord and his goodness in the latter days," (3: 4, 5). A *general* view of their subsequent prosperity seems here to be given; first, their return from captivity, during which all the ordinances of religion had been suspended; and, then, the goodness of the latter days, or of the Messiah's reign, if any please; but a goodness that can be enjoyed in any other place, as well as in Palestine. The blessing was, doubtless, substantially possessed, by restoration from the captivity, to the enjoyment of the ordinances of the true religion, and the Messiah's appearance among them at the appointed time.

"I will heal their backsliding," says God; "I will love them freely: for mine anger is turned away from him. I will be as the dew unto Israel: he shall grow as the lily, and cast forth his roots as Lebanon. His branches shall spread, and his beauty shall be as the olive-tree, and his smell as Lebanon. They that dwell under his shadow shall return; they shall revive as the corn, and grow as the vine: the scent thereof shall be as the wine of Lebanon," (14: 4—7). The former restoration, we believe, was the fulfilment of this beautiful promise. The restored nation, both parts united in one, was shortly raised to a good measure of prosperity; and, with some interruptions, so continued to the coming of Christ. This, it seems to us, was the event which the prophet had in his mind. The passage, like all others, may be applied to other events, and other cases, by way of accommodation. But used as proof of a literal restoration of the Jews, yet to come, it is, we cannot resist the impression, eminently out of place.

JOEL.

Joel flourished about sixty-four years after Hosea—about forty years after Isaiah, (B. C. 720). He predicts judgments in the form of drought, and famine, and locusts, and calls on the people for repentance, (1: 2: 1—17). He promises subsequent prosperity, and especially an outpouring of the Spirit from on high (2: 18—32), which can scarcely be interpreted of anything less than the

gospel dispensation, (see Acts 2: 16—21). He notices also particularly the literal restoration, of which he gives a vivid description, when he "shall bring again the captivity of Judah and Jerusalem," and judge the nations which had afflicted them, (chap. iii).

Amos.

Amos flourished a little before Joel, (fl. B. C. 795—784). He also was chiefly a prophet of Israel, on whom he pronounced judgments, in connection with the surrounding nations, alluding occasionally to Judah. "I will cause you to go into captivity beyond Damascus, saith the Lord, whose name is, The God of hosts," (5: 27). "I will sift the house of Israel among all nations, like as corn is sifted in a sieve," (9: 9). Yet, "in that day, [afterwards], will I raise up the tabernacle of David that is fallen, and close up the breaches thereof; and I will raise up his ruins, and I will build it as in the days of old.—And I will bring again the captivity of my people of Israel, and they shall build the waste cities, and inhabit them, and they shall plant vineyards, and drink the wine thereof; they shall also make gardens, and eat the fruit of them. And I will plant them upon their land, and they shall no more be pulled up out of their land which I have given them, saith the Lord thy God," (9: 11, 14, 15). Here is the early literal restoration. Some think that more is meant; particularly from the expression, "shall no more be pulled up out of their land which I have given them." But this expression may be used in a sense somewhat below its highest possible import. It does not surely mean that the Jews will inhabit Palestine to absolute eternity. A limit must be fixed somewhere; at least, if the present economy of the world is ever to have an end. Why may it not be a strong expression, to signify that the condition of the people should be more permanent than before,—that they should not be again removed out of their land, while the dispensation that gave them being should endure? As interpreted by the continuators of Poole: "Which promise," say they, . . . "was on God's part with admirably constancy and patience to that sinful nation performed through 600 years, perhaps the longest time of freedom from captivity they ever knew," (Annot. in loc.). Henry attributes to the passage a spiritual import: "That the kingdom of the Messiah shall take such deep rooting in the world, as never to be rooted out of it," (Expos. in loc.). The former is the view we

prefer. We see in the passage no solid ground on which to rest belief in a yet future literal restoration.

OBADIAH.

Obadiah was 200 years after Amos (B. C. 587), and was contemporary with Jeremiah. He denounced judgments upon Edom, who had helped on the distress of Judah in their dispersions, and says still: "But upon Mount Zion shall be deliverance, and there shall be holiness; and the house of Jacob shall possess their possessions," (v. 17). The literal restoration then shortly to take place.

JONAH.

Jonah seems to have been the most ancient of all the prophets, whose writings are now extant, having flourished about B. C. 840. He has nothing relating either to the captivity or restoration.

MICAH.

Micah seems to have been a contemporary with Isaiah, (fl. B. C. 743—700). He predicts approaching judgments, mingled with reproofs; and adds assurances of returning mercies. "I will surely assemble, O Jacob, all of thee; I will surely gather the remnant of Israel," (2: 12). "According to the days of thy coming out of the land of Egypt, will I show unto him marvellous things," (7: 15).

NAHUM.

Nahum prophesied about the same time (B. C. 710); but says nothing of the Chaldean captivity, or the subsequent deliverance.

HABAKKUK.

Habakkuk prophesied about a century later, (B. C. 609). He threatens invasions by the Chaldeans (1: 5—11); declares that the Chaldeans shall, in their turn be judged, and better days succeed (2: 4—14); but gives of them no particular description.

ZEPHANIAH.

Zephaniah flourished about the time the captivity was commencing, (B. C. 612). His opening sentence was: "I will utterly

consume all things from off the land, saith the Lord," (1: 2). He promises restoration, and subsequent blessing. "Sing, O daughter of Zion; shout, O Israel; be glad and rejoice with all thy heart, O daughter of Jerusalem. The Lord hath taken away thy judgments, he hath cast out thine enemy. — At that time will I bring you again, even in the time that I gather you: for I will make you a name and a praise among all people of the earth, when I turn back your captivity before your eyes, saith the Lord," (3: 14, 15, 20).

HAGGAI.

Haggai prophesied after the captivity was ended, and the Jews had returned, many of them, to their land, (B. C. 520). His main office was, to encourage the Jews in rebuilding their temple, and reorganizing their state. He assured them that "the glory of the latter house," though the building was far inferior in size and beauty, should yet be greater than that of the former (2: 9); an impressive hint, by the way, which it would be well for all interpreters of the prophetic writings to regard. Why was the latter house to be more glorious than the former? Because the Messiah should appear in it; because it was to be instrumental, more immediately than the former, of introducing a spiritual religion into the world; showing that even then, the spiritual, in the prophet's esteem, was more glorious than the external; and that the whole of Judaism attains its chief glory, as it drops its cumbersome garb of externals, and unfolds and rises into a spiritual system, with a spiritual God, requiring a spiritual worship. Let Haggai teach this great truth; and let it be believed and embraced in its glory.

ZECHARIAH.

Zechariah prophesied about the same time with Haggai, but through a longer period, (B. C. 520—500). His office also was, in part, to encourage the people in rebuilding the temple. He promises better things. "Sing and rejoice, O daughter of Zion: for lo, I come, and I will dwell in the midst of thee, saith the Lord. And many nations shall be joined to the Lord in that day, and shall be my people: and I will dwell in the midst of thee," (2: 10, 11). "Thus saith the Lord, I am returned unto Zion, and will dwell in the midst of Jerusalem: and Jerusalem shall be called a city of truth; and the mountain of the Lord of hosts, the holy mountain. — I will save my people from the east

country, and from the west country; and I will bring them, and they shall dwell in the midst of Jerusalem; and they shall be my people, and I will be their God, in truth and righteousness. — Yea, many people, and strong nations shall come to seek the Lord of hosts in Jerusalem, and to pray before the Lord," (8: 3, 7, 8, 22). "Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem: Behold, thy King cometh unto thee: he is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass. — And he shall speak peace unto the heathen; and his dominion shall be from sea even to sea, and from the river even to the ends of the earth," (9: 9, 10). "And his feet shall stand in that day upon the mount of Olives, which is before Jerusalem on the east, and the mount of Olives shall cleave in the midst thereof toward the east and toward the west, and there shall be a very great valley; and half of the mountain shall remove toward the north, and half of it toward the south. — And living waters shall go out from Jerusalem. — And the Lord shall be king over all the earth: in that day shall there be one Lord, and his name one. — And "the nations, which came against Jerusalem, shall even go up from year to year to worship the king, the Lord of hosts, and to keep the feast of tabernacles," (14: 4, 8, 9, 16).

The question here is: Which is most reasonable, to understand all this in a literal sense—as yet to take place *literally*, at Jerusalem, and through the earth? or to understand it as a high wrought picture, in Jewish dress, of the Messiah's advent among men, and of the results of his dispensation through earth's rolling ages? The latter is, to us, immeasurably the grander and more glorious view; and the view, we think, that accords with the laws of prophetic language, and with the genius of both the ancient and modern dispensations. Indeed, if the strictly literal is to be adopted, it not only restores Judaism to the Jews, but makes it also the religion of other nations, even all the nations of the earth, (comp 5: 2, 19). All these must go to Jerusalem yearly, to worship, and "to keep the feast of tabernacles." Who can believe it in its literal acceptance? Surely this glowing prophet must have intended to be understood as predicting the universal prevalence of a spiritual religion, the Jewish dress in which he clothed it notwithstanding.

MALACHI.

Malachi is the last of the prophets, and flourished about 100

years after Zechariah, (B. C. 420). He reproves the people for their hypocrisy, and assures them that a spiritual religion will soon prevail among the nations. "From the rising of the sun even unto the going down of the same, my name shall be great among the nations; and in every place incense shall be offered unto my name, and a pure offering: for my name shall be great among the heathen, saith the Lord of hosts," (1: 11). Incense—the *literal* incense—would be offered only at Jerusalem. This, therefore, which is to be offered in every place, must be a spiritual incense—a spiritual worship. See, hence again, how the prophets themselves are losing the external in the spiritual and the true!

This prophet merely points further to the Messiah, "The Lord whom ye seek shall suddenly come to his temple" (3: 1), and to the preparatory measures by which he shall be introduced; and the ancient prophecy, and canon of Old Testament Scripture is closed.

Now what is the result? Must there be, in these last ages of the world, a literal restoration of the Jews to Palestine, and a reorganization of their state and worship there, and peculiar marks of divine favor towards them above all other nations, in order to meet these predictions of the prophets? To us, we confess, it does not appear so. The prophets, in the passages we have considered, and in others of similar character which might have been quoted, spoke mainly of two themes. One was, the literal restoration then shortly to take place. The captivity was existing around them, or in immediate prospect; and this, the restoration then to occur, was the more immediate and engrossing object which filled their minds. But the soul kindling at the subject, the transition was very natural to the higher and more glorious deliverance which Christ was in due time to effect for the whole world. This second theme, therefore, not unfrequently engaged their attention. And in treating of this theme, they presented the subject extensively in Jewish phrase, as this was the current phrase of their time. But it by no means follows that this phrase is to be understood always in its literal acceptance. On the contrary, the literal, in many cases, as we have seen, cannot possibly be carried through. It cannot possibly be, humanly speaking, that, every new moon, and every Sabbath, all flesh shall literally go to Jerusalem to worship (Is. 66: 23); or that all shall go even yearly to keep the feast of tabernacles, (Zech. 14: 16). These

representations *must* designate merely the *universal prevalence of the true religion*. So of the incense to be offered in every place, (Mal. 1: 11). It cannot be the *literal*. The expression must mean the true spiritual worship. Moreover, the promises made to the people, that David should reign over them (Ezek. 34: 23, 24. 37: 24, 25), cannot refer to the *literal* David, who had then been long dead. They must have reference to David's seed, David's representative,—mainly the Messiah; whose kingdom is a spiritual kingdom. And is not here the key to unlock the meaning of the other predictions relating to this general subject—the principle on which they are to be interpreted? And further still: The literal, even if it could be carried through, is not, in our apprehension, by any means so grand and glorious—does not contain in it anything like the amount of blessing to the world—as the spiritual. The spiritual makes the Gospel a system of hidden glories, which are to unfold through all time, and through eternity. “While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal,” (2 Cor. 4: 18).

NEW TESTAMENT.

But the argument from the New Testament, or the light which the New Testament throws on this subject, is yet to be considered.

There are but few passages in the New Testament, which have been relied on as proof of a yet literal restoration, and reestablishment of the Jewish polity and worship in Palestine. “The reason is plain,” it has been replied; “the Jews were at that time [the time of writing the New Testament], still in their own land: the only question agitated was, whether all Israel was cut off, or only a part.”—(Frey, Judah and Israel, p. 303.) Still a few passages have been adduced in support of a yet literal restoration. In our Saviour's prediction of the *destruction* of the Jewish state, he says: Ye “shall be led away captive into all nations; and Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled,” (Luke 21: 24). “These words,” says one,¹ “imply that the time, however distant, would come at last, when Jerusalem shall no longer be trodden down of the Gentiles.” Several different views have been taken of this passage. Grotius says that Chrysostom, in his discourse against the

¹ Dr. Keith, p. 54.

Jews, interprets it *of the time of the universal judgment, and hence denies that the Jews will ever return to their land.* He also quotes Origen, against Celsus, as saying, *we may confidently pronounce, that they will never be restored.*—Vid. Poli Syn. in loc. Rosenmüller says,—*unto the end of human affairs, when nations shall not any more be.* But allowing that the words of the Saviour do look forward to a time when Jerusalem shall be delivered from its present depression, still they do not inform us what shall be afterward. They do not give us any assurance, or intimation even, of the restoration of the former Jewish polity and worship. Jerusalem and Judea may partake in the improved state of things which is generally to prevail. The whole world shall be delivered from the curse in the Messiah's reign. And even granting that the Jews will, in some numbers, return to Jerusalem, this does not render it necessary to make their return the subject of prophetic song for three thousand years; nor does it follow, that Judaism must be established again, in order that they may find, through that, an entrance into the true fold of Christ. The Gentiles shall come to a better mind; and all, Jews and Gentiles, shall conspire together in the service of God.

We are pointed to another passage. "Behold, your house is left unto you desolate. For I say unto you, Ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord," (Matt. 23: 38, 39). This indicates that the Jews will come to a better mind; that they will, at length, repent, and be ready to hail and embrace the Messiah. But anything further than this, it does not seem to teach.

Another passage is, the inquiry which the disciples made of Christ, after his resurrection, whether he would "at that time restore again the kingdom to Israel," with his reply, that "it was not for them to know the times or the seasons, which the Father had put in his own power," (Acts 1: 6, 7). This answer of Christ, it is said, implies, that he would restore the kingdom, according to the views the disciples cherished; only he would not inform them as to the time when. But it seems rather to imply, that the disciples knew not what they asked; that the Saviour saw their minds to be confused and dark, and unprepared to receive any explanation he might give of the subject; that while a blessing was in reserve for Israel, they would know better its character after they had become further enlightened by the Spirit of grace. Hence the promise which immediately follows: "But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you,"

(v. 8). Then ye shall understand it. And it is remarkable, that the disciples never gave up the idea of a secular kingdom, till the Pentecost. Then they relinquished it. They no more inquired, when their Master would restore the kingdom—the temporal kingdom—to Israel, but turned their eye to the spiritual blessing.

The fact that the New Testament contains so little which can be construed into an argument in favor of a literal restoration, and its expected concomitants, is worthy of much consideration. What the Bible does not say, is sometimes as important as what it does say. If the literal restoration, and reestablishment of the ancient polity, had been so prominent a part of Old Testament prophecy, as some think, would not the New Testament writers, coming so much nearer the time, have caught some glimpses of the truth in like manner? Would not the subject have risen upon their view in superior grandeur, and might we not have expected representations from them even more glowing and graphic, than the ancient Scriptures present?

The scope of the New Testament lies in the other direction. In the first place, the New Testament teaches, most explicitly, that the Jews will be converted to Christ, and, in common with the Gentiles, be partakers in the blessings of the gospel. And, in the second place, it teaches, with equal explicitness, that, under this dispensation, the Jews and the Gentiles are put upon a common level; that, in point of privileges and distinctions, there is no difference between them. These two propositions, we think it will be found, contain the substance of New Testament teaching in relation to this subject.

That the Jews and the Gentiles are to be, in common, partakers of the benefits of Christ's dispensation, has been taught, indeed, from the very beginning of Messianic prophecy. In Abraham and his seed, it was said, that all the nations of the earth should be blessed, (Gen. 18: 18. 22: 18). And by the prophet Isaiah: "It is a light thing that thou shouldst be my servant, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth," (49: 6). In fact, this office of the Messiah, as having relation to both Jews and Gentiles, forms one of the leading features of ancient prediction.

So of the New Testament: The annunciation of the angel to the shepherds at the Redeemer's birth, is of the character. "Behold, I bring you glad tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people," (Luke 2: 10). When it is remembered that it was to

the Jews that this annunciation was made, it will appear more significant that the gospel is given for the whole world of mankind. No distinction between Jews and Gentiles is hinted.

The song of Simeon, at the presentation of Christ at the temple, is of similar import: "A salvation prepared before the face of all people: a Light to lighten the Gentiles, and the glory of thy people Israel," (Luke 2: 30—32); coupling them both together as common sharers in the blessing.

Our Saviour's conversation with the Samaritan woman, is another instance. "Our fathers," said she, "worshipped in this mountain, [Gerizim]; and ye say, That Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship. Jesus saith unto her, Woman, believe me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. Ye worship ye know not what: we know what we worship: for salvation is of the Jews. But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth: for the Father seeketh such to worship him. God is a Spirit; and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth," (John 4: 20—24).

This is one of the very remarkable and instructive passages of the sacred oracles. It declares the entire spirituality of the religion which Christ was about to introduce among men; presenting to them a spiritual God, and requiring of them a spiritual worship. It abolishes the distinction of places, which had existed. Neither Jerusalem, nor Gerizim, would thenceforth have any peculiar sacredness attached to them. Neither Palestine, nor any other country, would have any peculiar, exclusive preference, in the regard of Jehovah, as had heretofore been the case. Under the dispensation of the Messiah, the whole world would be a temple, and the whole surface of the earth an altar; and wherever there should be found a human being with right dispositions within, there would be an acceptable worshipper. This might be Jew, or Gentile. To whatever community he may belong, right dispositions within will recommend him to the favor of heaven. Wrong dispositions will shut him out from the circle of that favor. This is the genius of the Christian dispensation. This may show us the improbability that it would concern itself much with the literal restoration of the Jews and of Judaism to Palestine.

In our Saviour's conversation with the Jews, is a passage of striking beauty and force in relation to this subject. "I am the good Shepherd:—I lay down my life for the sheep. And other

sheep I have, which are not of this fold : them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice : and there shall be one fold, and one shepherd," (John 10: 14—16). It is an object of great moral sublimity which is here presented us. The whole world, "One fold under one Shepherd!" And the implication is, that whatever good there is for one part of the world, the same is provided for the others also. Whatever there is for the Jew, the same there is for the Gentile ; and whatever there is for the Gentile, the same there is for the Jew. In this wonderful system of mercy, whatever light there is for the benighted ; whatever pardon for the guilty ; whatever purifying grace ; whatever comfort and peace, hope and joy ; and whatever eternal salvation ; the same shall be to the Jew and to the Gentile alike. Can the Saviour's words be understood otherwise than in this broad and glorious sense ?

Caïaphas spoke a truth, which God gave him in honor of his office, wicked man though he was, when he said, that it was expedient that Christ should die, "not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one, the children of God that were scattered abroad," (John 11: 52). The same oneness is signified of all those composing the Messiah's kingdom, as that before presented. The Jewish nation and those scattered abroad, are ONE ; seeming to say, that they are entitled to equality of privileges.

In reference to this subject, the Jewish mind, in the time of Christ, was under profound mistake, and the strongest prejudice. "Ye know," said Peter, "how that it is an unlawful thing, for a man that is a Jew, to keep company, or come unto one of another nation." The Jew considered himself the peculiar favorite of Heaven, and all other nations as outcast and unclean. "But," adds the apostle, "God hath showed me, that I should not call any man common or unclean," (Acts 10: 28). The anointing which he had received at the Pentecost, with what he had witnessed of the operations of grace, convinced him that his former prejudice was wrong. As expressed in a subsequent verse : "Of a truth, I perceive that God is no respecter of persons : but in every nation, he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him," (vs. 34, 35). Peter awoke as from a dream of all his previous life, and now first discovered, that before God Jews and Gentiles are on a level, and are to be judged according to their character. Even under the former dispensation, the distinction between them was not so great in God's regard, as the

Jew, in his blind zeal and vanity imagined it to be. And especially did the apostle now discover, that this equality before God, this community of blessings and privileges was to be the character of the new dispensation.

The same apostle afterwards repeats the sentiment—gives this view of the case—with still greater explicitness. Referring to the Gentiles, he says: "And God, which knoweth the hearts, bare them witness, giving them the Holy Ghost, even as he did unto us; and put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith," (16: 8, 9). This is the doctrine of the new dispensation—"PUTTING NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JEWS AND GENTILES."

The apostle to the Romans speaks somewhat largely on this subject. He teaches, in harmony with what has just been repeated from Peter, that the outward distinction was never really of so much account as some made it. "He is not a Jew," he says, "which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh." These externals are not the great thing required; never were the great thing required. "But he is a Jew which is one inwardly: and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God," (2: 28, 29). Here is a spiritual religion emphatically inculcated; and the declaration unequivocally made, that he who has this has what God requires. The true Israelite is a man renovated within. And the man renovated within, is the true Israelite,—the true carrying out of the great idea which this term designates. It was always mainly so; and is emphatically so under the new dispensation.

Again this apostle, speaking of Jews and Gentiles, says: "The righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, [is] unto all, and upon all them that believe; for there is no difference," (3: 22). This places the Jews and the Gentiles on the same level before the infinite One, and in the regards of his grace. As he says again: "Is he the God of the Jews only? Is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also. Seeing it is one God, which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith," (vs. 29, 30).

Again this apostle says: "They are not all Israel, which are of Israel," (9: 6). Not all the natural descendants of Israel, are the true Israel of God. As before said, something more than this is needful,—even a new heart through grace. And where this new heart through grace exists, there is an Israelite indeed; there is

a development and carrying out of the primary and true idea. This, if we mistake not, is the spirit of the passage; and it would seem to signify, that when Israel, now become the true Israel of God in Christ; when the veil is removed from them; when the heart of stone is taken away out of their flesh, and a heart of flesh is given them in its stead; when they are washed, and sanctified, and justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of our God; when they are new creatures, and are blessed in their Messiah, with present peace, and the hope of heaven; when all this occurs, it would seem to signify, that they will not be obliged to go up to Palestine, in order to realize any substantial blessing promised to them in the covenant. They have the blessing, in connection with those from the Gentiles, who have become the true Israel of God. Both classes stand upon the same level. In both classes,—Jews and Gentiles,—“they which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God,” (v. 8). But in both classes, they who are the children of the Spirit, are the children of God. And they are one; between them there is no difference. As it is said again expressly: “*For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek: for the same Lord over all is rich unto all that call upon him,*” (10: 12).

In the xi. chapter of this epistle, there is a somewhat extended statement of this subject. “I say then,” says the apostle, “Hath God cast away his people? God forbid! For I also am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin. God hath not cast away his people which he foreknew,” (vv. 1, 2). “Blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in. And so all Israel shall be saved,” (vs. 25, 26). Gentiles and Jews together shall be partakers of the gospel. Subsequently, in the same chapter, the church is likened to an olive-tree. The Jews were once its branches. They have been broken off, and the Gentiles grafted in their place. But they shall again be grafted into their own olive, and both together shall partake of the root and fatness of the olive-tree, (vs. 17—24). This is the same doctrine as before. But no distinction is apparent in regard to privilege or place. All seem to be on a level.

There is another expression in this chapter, which deserves notice. “Israel,” the apostle says—where he means the great body of the nation—“Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded,” (v. 7). What did Israel seek for? They sought, in their way, for the favor of God; for the blessing of the Abrahamic covenant.

This, according to their view of it, was what ever filled the Jewish mind. They failed, however, to obtain it, because they sought it wrongly, and their whole view of the matter was wrong. "But the election hath obtained it" By "the election," we are to understand that portion of the nation who had embraced the Messiah—who had become true Christians. **THEY HAD OBTAINED THE BLESSING.** This seems plain. And if they had obtained the blessing, when they were converted to Christ, and had become interested in his salvation, then other Jews also, and all Jews, when they become true Christians, and secure a part in the Messiah's present and eternal favor, will have obtained it. This will be the fulfilment of the Abrahamic covenant to them. That covenant provides for nothing more. We cannot see any way to escape this conclusion from the apostle's language. Jews and Gentiles are alike before God, and are alike in favor in the Messiah's kingdom. Converted Jews, whether in Palestine, or in China, or on this Western continent, or wherever they may be, have obtained the blessing,—the same blessing, neither more nor less than that which converted Gentiles enjoy.

Similar are the instructions which this apostle communicates in other epistles. In 1 Cor. 12: 13 he says: "For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one spirit." Are "one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles," putting them on a level.

To the Galatians he says: "For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ." And adds, as if to preclude controversy: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus," (3: 27, 28). Could anything be more explicit? Is it not here taught, that the distinction between Jews and Gentiles is abolished?

In this same chapter are some other expressions, of the same general import. In v. 14, it is said: "That the blessing of Abraham might come on the Gentiles." By "the blessing of Abraham," is intended the blessing promised in the covenant with Abraham. As said again: "And if ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise," (v. 29). The doctrine of these passages is, that being a good man, makes one of the seed of Abraham—spiritual seed—and heir to the blessings promised in the Abrahamic covenant. The Jews stand upon the covenant with Abraham; that is, when they are con-

verted, and become spiritual men, they stand upon it in the highest and fullest sense. The same is the case with the Gentiles. When they are converted, and become spiritual men, they stand upon the covenant with Abraham. It is to them alike the foundation of hope and of life. Whether they are converted in Palestine, or in the most distant quarter of the world, the "blessing of Abraham" is upon them; and, so far as appears from these passages, is upon one as much as upon the other. The Gentile obtains as much as the Jew. So that if the former need not go to Palestine, neither need the latter. As another has expressed it: "The Gentiles were included in the Abrahamic covenant, as well as the Jews; and therefore [the Jews] have no exclusive right to the things of God's kingdom," (A. Clarke, on Rom. 9: 6).

To the Ephesians, the apostle, speaking of the Jews and Gentiles, and the benefits of Christ to them both, says: "For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us," (2: 14). Allusion is here made, probably, to the arrangements at the temple, where the court of Israel and the court of the Gentiles were separated by a wall. "There was a partition," says Josephus, "made of stone, all round; whose height was three cubits," or about four and a half feet. A man could conveniently look over it, but no Gentile might pass it. "Upon it stood pillars," continues the historian, "at equal distances from one another, [on which were inscriptions] declaring the law of purity, some in Greek and some in Roman letters; that no foreigner should go within that sanctuary," (Bell. Jud. B. V. c. 5. § 2). The penalty for violating this law, seems to have been death, (vide Acts 21: 30, 31).

Now this partition-wall, which separated between the court of the Jews and the court of the Gentiles, the apostle tells us, Christ has "broken down." Under the Messiah's reign, there is no distinction. Jews and Gentiles now worship together in the same court; and are alike accepted, if their hearts be alike penitent and sincere. They are one; as it follows: "to make in himself of twain one new man, so making peace," (v. 15).

Again, to the Ephesians, it is said: "That the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of his promise in Christ by the gospel," (3: 7). Could anything more decidedly put Jews and Gentiles upon the same footing? To be a "fellow-heir," is to be a joint-heir to the same inheritance. They are of the same body. They are partakers of the same promise. If the Jew has an earthly inheritance prescribed to him in the

covenant, the Gentile must be a partaker with him in that also, as well as in the heavenly.

To the Philippians, the apostle, speaking of Christians, says: "We are the circumcision, which worship God in spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh," (3: 3). This is the true carrying out of the original idea of circumcision. He that 'worships God in spirit, and rejoices in Christ, and has no confidence in the flesh,' is of the circumcision—is what the ancient circumcision signified; meets the claims of God, and the blessing of the covenant descends upon him. In harmony with which it is said in another place, of the external rite: "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God," (1 Cor. 7: 19). True cordial obedience is the thing at which the Christian dispensation looks. He that hath this, Jew or Gentile, will be accepted. He that hath it not, must be rejected. They are both to be treated exactly on the same principle.

So, to the Colossians also, it is said, in terms emphatic, like some already repeated: "And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him: where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free: but Christ is all, and in all," (3: 11). Glorious triumph this, over the petty distinctions, and jealousies, and variances of earth! A grand and universal oneness marking the dispensation of Christ,—Christ himself is the absorbing thought, and his disciples on a level, rendering homage to his name!

Such are specimens of the teachings of the New Testament respecting the Messiah's kingdom and reign among men. What now is the result to which they bring us? Must there be a literal restoration of the Jews to Palestine, and a reorganization of their state and worship there, in order to meet these representations of the New Testament? Do these representations favor such a thing? Do they not, on the contrary, go entirely against it?

It may be said, that, very truly, the great amount of blessing included in the Abrahamic covenant is a spiritual blessing; yet there may be, to the Jew, still further, a secular good, only so small, in comparison, that the writers of the New Testament in treating the subject, did not think it worth while to mention it. We should like to know, then, if a subject, which occupied so high a place in all ancient prophecy as some think the literal res-

tion of the Jews does, when it came several centuries nearer its realization, and under a clearer dispensation, so dwindled down, as to be thought by the apostles and evangelists not worthy to be mentioned? A strange anomaly this, it would seem to be, in a great system of wisdom, truth, and grace! Is it not more likely that the ancient prophecy has had put upon it a wrong interpretation?

Certain it is that, between the Old Testament and the New, there is an apparent discrepancy in relation to the subject before us, if the former has, in this matter, by a large class of writers, been rightly interpreted. Which, then, is the most reasonable, that the ancient obscure communication, abounding in figures and poetry, should be interpreted by the more recent, the clearer and plainer, or the reverse? Undoubtedly, the Old Testament and the New, cast a mutual light upon each other. Yet the New is the clearer communication; most divested of figure; and shows, in many points, more explicitly and definitely what the mind of the Spirit is. The New, then, it would seem, in cases of doubt and difficulty, should interpret the Old. Let it so interpret; and we have a spiritual religion, without any predicted Judaism to return; the world has now its last dispensation commenced, and the way is open for the spread of the true religion, every man, where the gospel finds him, being invited to embrace it, and become a child of God, and an heir of glory.

IV. But another branch of the subject demands notice: The circumstances and facts in the providence of God, which are urged as arguments in favor of a yet literal restoration. These were alluded to in the early part of this discussion.

As to these circumstances and facts, too much, probably, has been made of them. Some of them have, in themselves, been magnified beyond due measure.

The past distinctions of the Jewish nation, it is thought, must be followed by corresponding distinctions in future. But this is by no means certain. A nation may be greatly distinguished at some period of its history, and may afterward lose that distinction, never to be regained. The Babylonian or Chaldean monarchy, was once the glory of kingdoms. We may not understand, in all respects, why God, in his providence, brought that great kingdom into existence. It was a combination of splendor and power, such as he saw fit to allow; and doubtless he had some use for it in the grand economy of the world's affairs. And, that use accomplished, the great kingdom was laid aside to be no

more. Babylon wrought out her problem, whatever it was, and sank into the dust. So of the Median and Persian dominions; and so of the Egyptian and Grecian and Roman States. God had an object to accomplish by each of these. And when they had wrought out each the problem he had given it, they decayed and dwindled, and seem not likely again ever to see their ancient grandeur. So it may be with the Jews. It may be that they wrought out their problem, in preserving the true religion through two thousand years of corruption, and giving, at length, the Messiah to the world; a problem with the like of which no other nation has ever been honored. Suppose this should constitute the sum of their national destiny. They would have no reason to complain. Looking at God's treatment of nations since the world began, it does not follow that, because the Jews *have been* distinguished in time past, therefore, they must inevitably be equally distinguished in time to come.

The preservation of the Jews as a distinct people, has probably been overrated in its importance. They have had their religion, with great strength of attachment to it, and almost universally, since their present dispersion, the hatred of Christians, to keep them distinct. They imprecated the blood of Christ upon themselves, and upon their children, (Matt. 27: 25); and Christians, in a blind zeal, have been too ready to aid in fulfilling the imprecation. Between the Jew and the Gentile there has been, for these reasons, a deep and a broad chasm. Still, it has not been so peculiar, that no approximation towards it has been witnessed in other cases. It may be questioned, indeed, whether the Mohammedans are not nearly as distinct from the nations in the midst of whom they live, as are the Jews; and whether the Armenians are not about as distinct from the Turks, under whose dominion they dwell, as are the Jews from any people, in the midst of whom their lot is cast. An oriental correspondent of the American religious press, has recently spoken of the Armenians as "the Jews of Christianity," (vide N. Y. Observer, May 1, 1847); intending, manifestly, this very kind of separate existence in the midst of another people. Even the Jews themselves, indeed, have not always kept perfectly distinct. Dr. Wolff, in his Narrative of his late Mission to Bokhara, says, "It is a remarkable fact, that there are some Jews at Mowr, who have professed the Mohammedan religion and become Turkomans, and that there are Jews at Khiva, of whom I was told at Mowr, who, though remaining Jews, have intermarried with the Usbeks,"

(p. 169). Subsequently, he speaks again of this latter fact, and in more comprehensive terms. "The Jews at Khiva intermarry with the Mohammedans at Khiva, while the respective parties preserve each their separate religion," (p. 287). Perhaps facts of this sort would be frequently disclosed, were the residences of the Jews in the Oriental world better known.

Dr. Hyde, in his *Religion of the Ancient Persians*, relates a fact bearing on the question before us. "The most ancient Persians," he says, "whose pure and genuine posterity remaining at this day among the Mohammedans and others (or in a manner by themselves), live in Persia and in India, cherishing their ancient religion and ancient customs, and retaining their most ancient rites to this day, neither eating nor drinking willingly with any except their own; and even among themselves contracting marriages with none but those of their own tribes; and with foreigners, as far as possible, having communication in nothing except in trade," (p. 2). Here is separate existence in the midst of another people, analogous to that witnessed in the case of the Jews. The instance is on a smaller scale, indeed; yet it is probably of longer duration.

The facts now mentioned may suggest the inquiry, in respect to the separate existence of the Jews, whether, in truth, there is need of any such *special* providence of God as is sometimes supposed, to account for the phenomenon. A providence there is indeed—a providence in all things: and a providence here unquestionably. And the separate existence of the Jews to this hour, has had its use in the economy of God's proceedings in behalf of his kingdom. They are a testimony—not voluntarily, but in the deep counsels of God—to the truth of the Christian religion. Here they are, the very people with whom Christianity had its origin. Their rejection of the Messiah, and leaving that religion to rise alone in the world, and against all their opposition and rage, shows it to be divine. Augustine calls the Jews the librarians of the Christian church, (vide Lardner, IV. 530, 531). Their present sufferings also show the verity of the New Testament predictions, (vide Lardner, VI. 590). But neither these things, nor the separate existence of the Jews, are any certain evidence, as far as we can see, of their going back to Palestine, and of the reorganization of their state there: which would be, to 'build again the things that have been destroyed' (Gal. 2: 18), and so far as it had influence on the world, to roll its affairs back two thousand years.

Nor is the particular expectation and desire of the Jews to return to Palestine, any certain evidence that they will ever there realize that for which some are looking. They had an expectation and desire of an earthly kingdom, when Christ was with them: but the thing desired was not granted them. We have freely admitted that, in the progress of time, numbers of the Jews may, and, in all probability will, return to Palestine. Still, when they are converted to Christ, they will think less about such return. The great body of Judah never came up from Babylon; a less proportion still from the Ten tribes in Media and Assyria. And to our mind, there is no decisive proof, that they ever will come up. When they are converted to Christ, and obtain an interest in his salvation, they will obtain the blessing the covenant promises them. And so of the more modern dispersion. While some will go up to Palestine, as the way is prepared, others, comfortable and prosperous, will prefer to continue where they are. The Rothschilds will perhaps not remove their banking house to Jerusalem, nor Neander forsake his professor's chair at Berlin, nor M. M. Noah his judges' bench at New York. And so of many others. Let the Jews be converted, and embrace the gospel, and the blessing of the covenant with Abraham will be upon them, and they may go anywhere, or stay anywhere, and it will be well with them,—well on earth and well in heaven.

As to the present state of the Jews, in that they possess in general only movable property, and are thus in circumstances to leave their present residences for the land of their fathers at short notice, this may have arisen, in some cases, from their desire to return, but more generally, probably, from the cruel oppressions and exactions to which they have been subjected by the nations among whom they have lived. The laws may have forbidden them to hold the more fixed kinds of property. Or they have themselves avoided those kinds of property, as more exposed to depredation. They have wished to keep their property hidden as far as practicable, from the public view, lest it should be taken from them; and in a condition easy to be removed, that they might flee with it from one city to another, or from one country to another, as occasion might require, to save it from the hands of rapacious governments, or individual plunderers. But really this fact, of possessing in general only movable property, is of very small account as an argument for a literal return to Palestine. If they expected an angel's voice at midnight, bidding them arise and depart, there might be something in it. But suppose the

Jews were actually to repair to Palestine within a year, what would hinder their converting real into personal and movable estate, in one quarter part of the time to elapse before their departure? In any ordinary way of the occurrence of such an event, estates might be changed from one form to another, with perfect ease and facility, as the case might require. Whether their possessions, therefore, be in real or personal estate, is a very small consideration, in reference to the matter before us.

And the condition of the land, as now thinly inhabited and desolate, and thus affording room for the returning Jews, is only in keeping with the condition of several surrounding countries, as Egypt and Syria, and, indeed, almost the whole of that part of the Oriental world. In those genial regions, once, human nature and human institutions flourished. There were the highest developments on that spot, which those ages of the world produced. The nations then existing there, wrought out their great problems, and, in connection with their movements, abused great light; and a reaction has taken place there—a period of obscurity, as the former was of brightness. Undoubtedly all those realms are yet to be revived under the Messiah's reign. Within them every interest of man is yet to flourish, and flourish more abundantly than in any former period, and in connection with the same flourishing condition of those interests in other parts of the world. But that the Jews must return and establish Judaism there, as the channel through which this result is to be reached; and that this is a main burden of ancient prophecy; is not only unsupported by the New Testament, but savors, in our judgment, more of the fanciful than of the solid, and is contrary to the leading views the New Testament gives us of the spirituality of Christ's kingdom.

As to present movements among the nations in that quarter, little need be said. What they will work out, no one knows. Nor are they the main hope for the advancement of religion in the earth. "The kingdom of God cometh not with observation." In some way, providences will be adapted to further the great work of God in the earth. But how, before their occurrence, it may not be practicable for us to say.

The influence of the conversion of the Jews, on the conversion of the rest of the world, has often been made the subject of disquisition. The apostle says that their rejection of the gospel was the occasion of giving the gospel to the rest of the world, and that their conversion will confer upon the world a still higher benefit. "If the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing

of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fulness? —If the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world, what shall the receiving of them be, but life from the dead?" (Rom. 11: 12, 15.)

The order which some have supposed will be observed in this matter is the following: *First*, the restoration of the people to the literal Canaan; *secondly*, that they will then rebuild the city Jerusalem, and reestablish Judaism for a season, perhaps *forty years*; *thirdly*, that they will afterward be besieged by many nations, according to the prediction of Zechariah, which nations shall be destroyed miraculously by God himself; *fourthly*, in that day, and in view of this deliverance, Judah and Israel shall be converted unto God; and, *finally*, the Messiah, having descended from heaven, shall reign on the earth, in connection with this community, for a thousand years.—(Rev. J. S. C. F. Frey, *Judah and Israel*, pp. 288, 302, 304.)

To this advent of the Messiah is applied, as we have before noticed, in a literal sense, the prediction of Zechariah: "His feet shall stand upon the Mount of Olives, and the mount shall cleave in the midst, eastward and westward, and there shall be a very great valley; and half the mountain shall remove toward the north, and half of it toward the south," (14: 4).

A distinguished clergyman,¹ at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Meliorating the Condition of the Jews, held in New York, May, 1846, said, the belief he devoutly held was, "that the literal interpretation of prophecy is the only consistent one; that the Jewish people would yet return to the land of promise; and that the Lord Jesus Christ would himself personally reign among them, literally making the literal Jerusalem the throne of the Lord, and using Jacob for his battle-axe to subdue the nations to himself." "Fill the world with converted Jews, flowing forth from Jerusalem, as Jehovah's throne, and you send forth a power to gather in the harvest of the earth. Where, I ask, is the Mount of Olives, on which his blessed feet are once more to stand? For this I look. No millennium do I expect from the present gradual diffusion of the witness of the gospel, or until Israel has seen the descending Saviour, and returned under their holy David to the land that God gave them by covenant for an everlasting possession. Everything else is but a prelude. Then, and not till then, will the triumph come. When a converted Israelite,"² he adds, "four years

¹ Stephen H. Tyng, D. D. of New York.

² Michael Solomon.

ago, was about to proceed on his mission to Jerusalem, I thought, and indeed remarked to a friend, 'Who knows but he may live to see the feet of the Saviour alight on Olivet?' (Vide Jewish Chronicle for June 1846.) Statements resembling these, more or less modified, are not unfrequently heard from other quarters.

Now this view of the case seems to us fundamentally erroneous. Must the affairs of God's kingdom of grace stand still, or nearly so, till the Jews are gathered back to Palestine? till the Redeemer descends in his bodily presence upon Mount Olivet? till he establishes there an earthly throne, and thence dispenses his commands by Jewish missionaries? Is the literal the true, that all nations must go thrice a year, nay, every new moon, and every sabbath, to pay their homage at Jerusalem? that all must come bending to the Jew, and "lick the dust of his feet?" Where, then, is the spirituality of our religion? where the glorious teachings of Christ and his apostles, assuring us, that, under this dispensation, between the Jew and the Gentile there is no difference? The literal, to the full extent, cannot be the true interpretation.

Nor need the world stand still in regard to the kingdom of God. The way is already prepared for action. "Preach the gospel to every creature," (Mark 16: 15). The Jew need not wait for the Gentile, nor the Gentile for the Jew. Thrust in thy sickle now, for the time of harvest is already come. Very true, the conversion of the Jews will give an impulse to the course of righteousness in the earth. The conversion of any people gives such impulse. The bandfuls gathered at the Sandwich Islands the past few years, have sent a thrill through the whole Christian world. Much more, when the many millions of the seed of Abraham are gathered in—a people of great interest from their past history, and of higher present character—will a thrill be felt. It shall be as life from the dead. Whether they are gathered into Palestine, or gathered to Christ in the places they already occupy, will not be material as to this result. Indeed, if there be a difference, if the Jews are to be Christ's peculiar agents in carrying forward his kingdom in the earth, it would seem to be better that they should be dispersed somewhat as they now are. This gathering everything into Jerusalem, is not the way to make it most effectual on the world. Accordingly, at the beginning, when the apostles and evangelists were hanging around Jerusalem, God sent a persecution among them to scatter them, (Acts 8: 1, 4). And when they were scattered, then it was that the kingdom spread, and rose. So now, if the Jews are to be God's great agents, above all others, in his

works of grace, it would seem to be most wise that they should remain scattered, as they are, that their light may everywhere shine, and their influence be everywhere felt.

It seems strange, if the Jews are to have the distinction in future for which some are contending, that our Saviour did not allow it to them, and that the apostles did not confer it on them. The grand matter of controversy, between the Jews and Christ, and between the Jews and the apostles, was this very subject now before us. The Jews claimed preëminence and peculiar privilege above the Gentiles. They would have an earthly kingdom, and a glorious temple, and a mitred priesthood, and holocausts offered upon their altar, and be the head of the nations. Christ would not grant it to them. Their kingdom must cease. Their temple must be destroyed. Judaism must be laid in the dust. A spiritual religion only must prevail. And hence they crucified him. The apostles would not allow it to them. The middle wall of partition must be broken down. All must be one. And hence the oppositions and persecutions which they met with from city to city.

Now why did Christ and the apostles contest this point so with the Jews, if the Jews are yet to have the very thing contested granted them? Why, at least, did not the Saviour promise a restoration of their State at some future time? And the apostles a rebuilding of the wall at some future time? Under the former dispensation, when desolations were threatened, promises often followed. "Jerusalem shall be built again," (Isa. 44: 28. Dan. 9: 25). "I will restore her judges as at the first," (Isa. 1: 26). But here, no such thing. All is silent. Spiritual good is, indeed, promised in abundance. But in regard to this secular distinction, all is silent. Why not believe, then, that the secular external distinction has utterly ceased, and that now the spiritual good—rich and splendid beyond description, of which the former was a shadow—is the grand and only thing to which the promise of the covenant is now to be applied?

The other view of the case is, we cannot resist the conviction, doing an injury to the Jew. It is fostering his pride. It is making him vain. It is promising him distinctions which the Saviour did not promise him, and which the apostles did not promise him, and thus turning his eye away from the simple and true glory of the gospel, and giving his heart a disrelish for its pure, spiritual, and humbling truth. It thus hinders his salvation, or tends to hinder it, if he is not a Christian; and if he is a Christian, injures the humility and excellence of his character.

Let him be taught, as the apostle teaches, that there is no difference; that all are one in Christ Jesus; and he will avoid these injuries, and these dangers, and fall into sentiments of a common brotherhood with the rest of the race.

Let it not be said, then, that we wrong the Jew, by the views here inculcated. Instead of this, it may be said, that this is the only view that does him justice. We direct his eye away from the world of shadows, in which his fathers lived, to the glorious substance, to which those shadows have given place. What is a king at Jerusalem, to a king on his throne of glory eternal in the heavens? And what is a religion, going forth from Jerusalem, with its temple, and altar, and Jewish rites, to a religion that comes down from the city of the great King, the celestial city, all light and glorious, making the whole world a temple, and the whole earth an altar, and every spiritual man an acceptable worshipper—a friend of God below, and an heir of bliss immortal? Take Abraham himself. Place him in Palestine, according to some earthly interpretations of the promise, and surround him with all the splendors there that the most sanguine of this class of interpreters have imagined. What is that to the splendors that now surround this father of the faithful and friend of God, in the realms of glory immortal? O we do not wrong the Jew, when we point him away from the shadow to the glorious substance; when we endeavor to persuade him from *Judaism*, that he may become imbued with *CHRISTIANITY*.

Were we to address the Jew, we would speak to him as our elder brother; and our address should be in the language of the prophet: "O house of Jacob, come ye, and let us walk in the light of the Lord," (Isa. 2: 5). Greatly honored in past ages, and still beloved for the fathers' sakes, we would say to him, Turn away your eye from the shadows and mists which prevented your fathers from seeing the Messiah's glory, and which have hitherto shut out from yourselves the visions of his face, and look upon the glorious and immortal substance to which those shadows pointed, and have now given place. Think less of the earthly, and more of the heavenly; less of the external, and more of the spiritual. Think less of your temple, and your altar, and the rams of Nebaioth; and more of a world-wide worship, and the blood which Messiah has shed upon Calvary. If thou wilt change thine earthly residence, go where it liketh thee, Providence affording thee opportunity. If thou wilt go to Palestine, and dwell among its vine-clad hills, and olive yards, and sweet-scented val-

leys, and purling streams, and the way is open, go, and God's blessing go with thee; only do not make it heaven; do not commit the great error of thy fathers, in letting the Canaan below, blind thee to the Canaan above. If thou wilt dwell in any other country, dwell there, assured that he who has his sins forgiven, his nature cleansed, and his name inscribed in the Lamb's book of life, obtains all the substantial blessings of the Messiah's dispensation. Wherever thou art; whatever suns shine upon thee, whatever breezes fan thee, of whatever waters thou dost drink; remember, Heaven's last dispensation has come. The Messiah has been here. His glory is in the gospel. Behold it, do homage and live. "O house of Jacob, come ye, and let us walk in the light of the Lord!"

Were we to address the Gentile, we would speak to him of his elder brother, and of his indebtedness to the Jew. We would remind him that the Jew preserved for him the Oracles of God, and the true religion, through long periods of darkness, danger, and corruption; that the glorious gospel which he now enjoys, is but Judaism, dropping its exuberance of dress and externals, and unfolding into its true and appropriate spirituality and greatness, in connection with the wonders of redeeming love in the Son of God. To the Gentile let it be still further said, "Behold the love." For thee also is this salvation. Thine is the privilege, equally with the Jew, to drink at this fountain; to eat of this immortal fruit. Thine, wherever thou mayest dwell—around the polar circle, or under the burning equator; in the crowded city, or the solitary desert, or the island of the sea; wherever thou art—thine, too, is this wonderful favor. Here thy sins may be forgiven; here thy nature cleansed; here thy name inscribed in the book of life, and thy soul be made to live eternally in glory!

The Gentile should be grateful to the Jew; should pray for the Jew; should labor especially for the spiritual good of the Jew—laboring wisely, that he may do him good, and not evil: teaching him, not to turn his face back "to the weak and beggarly elements," (Gal. 4: 9), of an exploded dispensation; not to seek to be "entangled again with the yoke of bondage," (5: 1), "a yoke," says an apostle, "which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear," (Acts 15: 10); but to look for a glorious spiritual kingdom, which "is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost," (Rom. 14: 17).

And Jew and Gentile together should accept this great salvation. "Behold, I create new heavens and a new earth," says

God, (Isa. 65: 17). And the process of this new creation has commenced. Here has already been wrought deliverance for the captive sold under sin; deliverance for the blind, the naked, the poor. Here is already poured abroad provision for all spiritual maladies and wants. The provision is complete. The last dispensation is doing its work. The great ransom is urged upon all. Draw near ye ends of the earth, and all that dwell in its uttermost corners; Jews, Gentiles, Barbarians, Scythians, bond, free; all complexions, of all climes; all degrees of intellect; kings, peasants, philosophers; wherever humanity dwells, and sins and suffers; all, draw near; here is salvation for you: forgiveness, cleansing, peace, life eternal. This is the time. "The day of vengeance is in my heart," says God; "and the year of my redeemed is come," (Isa. 63: 4). Come, then, thou earth, and do homage at thy Redeemer's feet, and live!

ARTICLE IV.

GERMAN LITERATURE IN AMERICA.

Select Treatises of Martin Luther, in the original German, with Philological Notes, and an Essay on German and English Etymology, by B. Sears. Andover: Allen, Morrill, & Wardwell. 1846.

By Professor Philip Schaf, D. P., Mercersburg, Pa.

THREE centuries ago the power of the German mind shook the church and the States of Christendom to their lowest foundation. The need of a reformation, which had long before been prepared in different ways, in the most profound and noble minds, awoke with concentrated force in the bosom of an humble and conscientious, yet gigantic monk of Wittenberg, and worked itself out to a clear conviction. He was chosen by Providence to be the oracle of the times, to be the leader of all who longed for deliverance from the fetters of the second Egyptian bondage. Just such a man was needed—one who did not lightly take upon himself the responsible work of reform; who was not filled with empty dreams of liberty; who, in destroying the superstition which had gathered around the faith, would not destroy the faith itself; but

who by painful experience was acquainted with the entire system, whose fetters he was destined to break ; who, with all the energy of a faithful and obedient monk, had struggled to obtain salvation through the ordinances of mediæval catholicism. He possessed therefore the indispensable requisites of a genuine reformer—an experimental knowledge of the church which was to be reformed, and a deep religious earnestness, which sought not distinction, but which labored only for the glory of God and the salvation of men. By obeying we learn how to rule ; authority educates for freedom ; the law is a schoolmaster unto Christ.

After this man had for years borne the burden of the ordinances of his mother-church, after he had sought in vain to work out the salvation of his soul by penance and mortification, and had only by this painful process of self-destruction come to a clearer consciousness of his sin and guilt, dawned at last his day of evangelical freedom. He had the courage to renounce all self-constituted righteousness, to cast away all the lumber of good works, so-called, all self-confidence, as offensive to God. He had the still greater courage, to cast himself with all his thoughts, feelings and will into the arms of the free and all-sufficient grace of God in Christ ; and lo ! in this unqualified faith in him he found at once, as an unmerited gift, all that he had before sought in his own way in vain, righteousness, repose for his troubled conscience, peace with God and with himself. Then it was that in the shameful sale of indulgences, by which the pardon of sins and peace with God were offered for a pitiful piece of money, he was brought into direct contact with that system which, in the most revolting manner profanes things the most sacred. Then, forced by his conscience and his sense of duty as a teacher in the church, he raised his thunder-voice. His word wakened echoes in all parts of Germany, but opposition also in the dominant powers of the times ; in the halls of the universities, on the throne of the emperor, and in the episcopal chair of the head of Christendom. Enemy after enemy arose. The Wittenberg Augustinian had no money, no arms, in short, no outward power ; but, what was more than all these, and which brought them all to shame, he had the power of faith and of the word. From the pulpit and the professorial chair he called attention to the pearl which he had found ; by writings, which flew with the rapidity of lightning over all Europe, he announced to the world the central doctrine of his spiritual life, that of the justification of the sinner through the merits of Christ by faith alone, and the sweet fruit of this so-

ligious freedom. He became the Reformer of his time against his own will and in the most innocent way, one may almost say, in spite of himself. Every struggle into which he was forced became a victory for his cause. In a few years the Wittenberg movement had become the world-movement. The words, the spirit of the Reformer had become seated in the hearts of millions, and had burst forth in a flame. He no longer stood alone, nations were on his side. It was therefore no longer his work, but a part of the history of the world, which is, so to speak, at the same time the judgment of the world.

I need not mention the name of *Luther*; it is on every one's tongue. He needs no monument,—a eulogy would be too late. The history of three centuries tells us what he was; Protestantism is his indestructible monument.

And this Protestantism, what is it? Pass through Germany, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, England, Scotland, and North America, and there you will everywhere find its expression in the religious and political institutions, in the moral character of these nations, in their science and art, in their restless activity, in their uninterrupted struggle for advancement, nay, even in commerce and manufactures, in rail-ways and steam-boats, and in that scarce visible messenger of the air, which, to crown all, scorns time and space. Ask Calvinism, Puritanism, and Methodism whence their origin, and they will answer, We are only a continuation of the movement commenced in Germany in the sixteenth century. What is the declaration of the independence of '76 with its great idea of the liberty and equality of all men? Did it fall direct from heaven? No; it is only the application of the protestant principle of religious liberty to civil and social life. What gives victory, right or *wrong*, to our arms in Mexico? If you trace the cause up to its fountain-head, you will find that the power of Protestantism over a petrification of past times manifests itself even here. In short, Protestantism, however imperfect it may be at present, is the power which rules the modern world, it is the life-blood of modern history, of the present civilization: in it we all live and breathe, in so far as we really live, and do not merely vegetate.

Germany is then the birthplace of modern history, the hearth of all those ideas which govern the modern world. For this reason it has just claims upon the respect and gratitude of every protestant, and deserves to be studied by the present generation, especially by Americans.

It may be said, indeed, that the relative importance of this country in the sixteenth century, is no guarantee for the worth of her present literature. The current of the national spirit may there have become sluggish or even stagnated, as is the case in Palestine, Asia Minor, and Greece. This bare possibility, however, has here no application at all. For every one who is at all acquainted with the case, knows that there is no country in which such a ceaseless activity prevails in the very highest departments of science and literature, as in Germany. The movements which have taken place there since the beginning of the present century, especially in theology and philosophy, and which are at this moment directed more and more to practical subjects, call into exercise an intellectual force and energy, very similar to those which convulsed Christianity in the age immediately preceding the Reformation. This enormous scientific activity must finally have a practical result; it cannot be possible that it is mere empty, useless trifling. If otherwise, we must despair altogether of the power of the spirit, and of the presence of a God in history.

There are cases in which one and the same nation has played two successive parts in the great drama of the world's history, or has become world-historical a second time, always, of course, under a different character. Rome, for example, in her first act, governed the world with the sword, and laid almost all the civilized nations of antiquity prostrate at her feet. But her sword was broken by the gospel of peace, the Roman eagle was cast into the dust by the northern irruption, as by a tempest, and she stepped forward a second time to govern with the cross all western Christendom, until the time of the Reformation.

But we need not appeal to such an analogy. It lies in the very nature of Protestantism that it cannot be completed in one act. It is a perfectly authorized protest of religious freedom, founded and based upon the word of God, against an outward despotic ecclesiasticism, of private judgment against the shackles of tradition; of the principle of individuality against the stiff authority of public opinion. It is clear, however, that Protestantism is just as liable to degenerate into the opposite extreme of spiritual libertinism and licentiousness of opinion, as Catholicism to run out into Popery. Just as clear is it that there is truth in the ideas of authority, of law, of tradition, and the unity of the church, and that these are necessary to Protestantism, as complementary elements to give it a churchly character and secure its spiritual life against incurable disease. The country, then, which performed the first part of the work, has

now taken upon herself the obligation of accomplishing also, so far as it is able, the second part for the good of Christendom, with the coöperation, of course, of all other protestant countries, that thus the work may be carried out to its proper end. In the sixteenth century Germany commenced the great *schism* in the church, and it is now therefore, in the nineteenth century, her most weighty task to lay the foundation of the still nobler work of *union*, and to do this, as in the other case, by the power of philosophical and theological thought, by the might of ideas. To accomplish this, she needs, of course, the coöperation of those nations which are furnished with a practical talent, the gift of organizing, viz., the English and Americans. We have thus given the highest position from which the importance of German literature for this country can be viewed—its relations to the church. This may be a new idea to most of our readers. It is, however, by no means, a mere fancy, but a conclusion derived from a calm examination of various appearances and signs in the highest sphere of our present American literature. Before we enter more particularly on this subject, we shall give an outline of the course of Protestant theology in Germany since the Reformation.

The productive period of Protestantism was followed, in the seventeenth century, by the period of reflection. It then took upon itself the duty of comprehending the heritage left it by its fathers, of defending it against the attacks of enemies, and establishing it upon a solid basis. This movement is represented by the celebrated dogmatic and polemic works of Chemnitz, John Gerhardt, Hutter, Quenstedt, Calov, and others, all of them written in Latin. These works can still be considered, in a certain sense, as the depositaries of dogmatic learning, and of the Protestant polemics against Romanism. In these efforts, however, the church fell into a new scholasticism, which reduced the living vigor of the theology of the Reformation into abstract formulas appealing only to the understanding, and gradually lost sight of the practical wants of the heart in meeting the demands of theological orthodoxy. This lifeless orthodoxy necessarily produced an antagonistic element in the consciousness of Protestantism. The reaction first arose in the pietism of Spener and Franke, which had for its object to satisfy the claims of the heart, of practical religious experience. Soon, however, the sceptical understanding shared largely in the same general movement, in the form of Rationalism, which looked upon the Protestant orthodoxy as a new papacy, and a betrayal of the Reformation. The eighteenth cen-

tury may be properly called the revolutionary or destructive period, preparing the way for a new structure, however, by clearing away the old rubbish. It had a fiery hatred against tyranny of every kind, and was striving for freedom; not, however, for the blessed freedom of the children of God, but for that of the flesh. It desired an earth without a heaven, a State without a church, a religion without a revelation, a Christianity without a Christ, a humanity without a God. In these times, rationalism, under different forms, pervaded the whole church, and, as is well known, it is not yet altogether eradicated. It showed itself in England and Scotland in the form of Deism, Latitudinarianism and *Indifferentism*; in France, as downright Materialism and Atheism; in North America it revealed itself in the defection to Arminianism, and in the general deadness of the churches: Wherever it could not develop itself scientifically, there it existed at least practically, often even under the cloak of orthodoxy. In Germany, however, it entered most deeply into the spheres of theology and philosophy, and produced an extensive literature full of learning and acuteness. The German mind, having a strong inclination toward theory, and a truly unwearied industry in scientific researches, when a sceptical spirit was once awakened, could not be satisfied with a mere denial of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity and popular representations of its truths, but took great care to prove its assertions, and fortify its position with a bulwark of learning. It formally attacked the Bible, investigated its origin, the authenticity and integrity of its separate books, and all the historical circumstances to which it owes its origin, in order to arrive at the conclusion that it is a mere human production, although of the highest kind. With an unwearied spirit of inquiry, it passed through the different periods, even the most retired nooks of church history, to prove that the received orthodoxy was the offspring of the worst passions, of party interests and the despotism of church and State; that it was therefore merely a product of man, which, besides, had changed its color in different times, and had therefore no right to exercise authority over a thinking mind.

However low the judgment we may form of Rationalism, we cannot deny that this important movement was, in some sense, natural and necessary. Just as little can we maintain that it stands in a merely accidental connection with Protestantism. Protestantism shook off the fetters of a blind authority, aroused the spirit of free inquiry, and insisted upon understanding how the truths of revelation could be harmonized with the dictates of

human nature. This end could not be reached at once. Inquiry is a continuous process, which, according to the laws that govern the development of life in the individual, and in all history, passes through all kinds of obstructions, deviations, and diseases, but in the end always advances. Rationalism is an example of this process, being a diseased, yet historically necessary crisis. It believes truth only, when it has found it rational, and made it agree with its own thinking. In this it is, indeed, altogether one-sided, the religious interest is subordinate, and that which it calls reason is generally nothing more than the dry, superficial, abstract, everyday understanding, which cannot be an arbiter in the highest spheres of the spirit, and of which holds true what Paul says (1 Cor. 2: 14) of the *ψυχὸς ἀνθρώπου*. Nevertheless, it revealed many weak points in the old system, cleared away many prejudices, rendered criticism more acute, and opened the way for new developments in theology. This rationalism having been inwardly surmounted, the theology which has sprung up in its place has, in consequence, a higher scientific character, and better satisfies the demands of reason, than the former orthodoxy. And it was in the same country, where rationalism was carried out to its furthest consequences, and assumed its most dangerous form, that it was confronted with its most powerful opponents, and most effectually assailed.

Since the close of the last century, German literature, in all its departments, has experienced a glorious resurrection, and been clothed in a truly classical form. Every one is acquainted with the masters of German poetry, Göthe, Schiller, Tieck, Novalis, the Schlegels, Uhland, Rückert, and others. Germany has done more for classical philology in the last fifty years, than all other civilized nations together. No important philological work can appear at the present time, without having availed itself, directly or indirectly, of the researches of a Wolf, Hermann, Creuzer, Ottfried Müller, Lobeck, Passow, Böckh, Bekker, etc. The grammars and dictionaries, which are in most general use in this country and in England, are translations of Zumpt, Matthiae, Buttmann, Rost, Kühner, Schneider, Passow. This is not at all contested. Every one, able to form a judgment in the case, will at once admit the extensive learning of German writers, the depth and penetration with which they enter most profoundly into the spirit of Grecian and Roman antiquity, and every philologist, who knows his own interest, will endeavor to make himself acquainted with these vast treasures. In the sphere of historical research,

the names of John von Müller, Niebuhr, Leo, Ranke, stand conspicuous ; and translations of several of these works, e. g. Ranke's History of the Popes, and of the German Reformation, show, that the attention of England and America has been directed to these researches.

The later German philosophy has comparatively found least acceptance with the Anglo-American mind, although, in this very sphere, the German genius has accomplished gigantic labors since the close of the last century. Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, authors severally of new systems, connected however inseparably, as links of one chain, and whose successive systems grew with dialectic necessity each out of the preceding, need not fear comparison with the greatest philosophers of Greece. Various combined circumstances explain the disfavor with which German philosophy is looked upon among us at the present time. The English mind is rather averse to abstruse, metaphysical speculations. The philosophy of Locke also, which was already scientifically overcome in Kant's Critic of Pure Reason, has obtained such general sway in England and America, that it is hard to renounce its authority. Lastly, pernicious consequences for theology are feared from the above mentioned philosophy. To support this, appeal might be made to the so-called left side of the Hegelian school, with Strauss at its head, who has reduced the gospel history to a wreath of myths, woven unconsciously by the Christian church in a state of poetic fervor, whilst filled with Messianic ideas. It should not be forgotten, however, that every philosophical system can be applied to theology in a twofold manner, can be used as an apology for Christianity, or misused as a weapon against it. The Platonic philosophy was, for many of the greatest church fathers, as Justin Martyr, Clemens of Alexandria, Origen, and even Augustine, a bridge to lead them to faith in Christ ; whilst the later Platonists, as Plotinus, Porphyry, and Jamblichus, endeavored with its aid to restore heathenism, or, directly or indirectly, to assault Christianity. The eulogists of Locke's philosophy, who condemn German speculation as being infidel, should remember that Hume obtained his scepticism, Gibbon his bitter enmity against Christianity, and Tindal, Collins, and Bolingbroke their deism, from this same fountain. Such also is the case with Hegel. Strauss and Bruno Bauer are not his only disciples. Men like Marheinecke, Daub, Billroth, Erdmann, and still more Göschel, have obtained from his system the strongest scientific weapons against Rationalism, and endeavored with Hegelian dialectics to establish on

new grounds, the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Divinity of Christ, etc. But distinguished American theologians refer us, in support of their opposition, to the later German speculations, to theologians of considerable merit in Germany, who condemn it in the same unmerciful terms. Here, however, there is generally a misunderstanding at bottom, since in speaking of German philosophy reference is falsely had to a particular system. But as we can speak in general of an English philosophy, without having reference to the system of Bacon or Locke ; just as well, and with far greater right, can we speak of a German philosophy, i. e. a general philosophical mode of thinking, which serves as a common basis to all the better schools, notwithstanding all the differences among them. When therefore, the celebrated church historian, Neander, shows a decided opposition to the system of Hegel, we must not conclude thence that he is an enemy to German philosophy in general ; much less, that he would be willing to exchange it with the system of Locke ; his intimate relations with Schelling, concerning whose positive system he entertains the most sanguine hopes, prove the contrary.

Notwithstanding all these obstructions, we see that German speculation has made its way, in more recent times, into England and America. Men such as Coleridge, Carlyle, Marsh, have evidently received their mental stamp under its influence, and their ideas are spreading further every day in the large circle of their readers. Dr. Rauch's *Psychology*, although it has not, thus far, attracted the attention which it deserves, will yet come into favor ; and it will be found that it is the best work on the subject in the English language, and an ornament to American literature. We have no desire at all that any German system of philosophy should obtain a general ascendancy among us. This is, besides, altogether impossible. Our view, on the contrary, is this, that our American philosophy should be modified and carried forward to a more advanced position, by the direct or indirect influence of the better philosophical literature of Germany. Why should not "the science of sciences" be capable of development just as well as other departments of learning ? Whilst, during the last fifty years, the natural sciences have advanced with giant strides, our philosophy has continued essentially upon the position of the seventeenth century. Far otherwise is it in Germany, where the advances of other sciences, and especially of theology, go hand in hand with the advances of philosophy. For some parts of theology, especially of dogmatics and morals, philosophy is indis-

pensable. But from the position of Locke we cannot treat doctrines, e. g. those of the Trinity, incarnation, freedom of will, immortality, in a way that will satisfy the demands of the present times. This is felt to be the case by many of our most gifted young men, who in other respects have no sympathy with German literature.

In theology, lastly, in all its branches, especially in Exegesis, Church History, Dogmatics, Symbolics, and Ethics, Germany has shown an extraordinary productiveness, since the late great revival of religion in that country. It would lead us much too far to characterize here the different schools, and to mention their most important representatives. This would be an interesting subject for a separate and thorough Article for the "*Bibliotheca Sacra*," which we very willingly leave to a more experienced pen. We only wish here to call attention to one point, which is of the greatest practical importance, although very little or not at all considered. The extensive exegetical and historical learning of the German theologians is coming to be admitted on all sides, and an acquaintance with their works in *this* respect, is looked upon as very useful and important. The names of Neander, Olshausen, Hengstenberg, Tholuck, Nitzsch, Twisten, Jul. Müller, Dorner, Ullmann, Lücke, Harless, Bleek, and others, have become favorites amongst us. Many of our most respectable theologians, however, who set a high value upon German learning, and know how to make good use of it in their own works, still show a strong opposition to the dogmatical and philosophical *ideas* of German theology. At one time they fear rationalism, then transcendentalism or mysticism, or something, at any rate, which is contrary to their own system and dangerous to the tendency of their denomination. This is very natural, and we blame no one for it. There is, we admit, in the writings of these men a certain freedom and unbiassed judgment, which cannot be easily understood. It requires a long acquaintance to surmount successfully these stumbling-blocks. The German spirit has passed through a terrible battle with scepticism, and has come out victorious. The best advice we can give here is, to cast oneself boldly into the whirlpool, and swim through it; not merely to sip at the cup of doubts, but to drain it to the dregs. He who makes but a superficial acquaintance with German theology and philosophy, runs great risk of doing injury to his simple, child-like faith; but he who contends with it manfully, and passes through the whole intricate and tedious process of investigating the deepest grounds of

our most holy faith, will come out more firmly grounded in orthodoxy than before. We cannot expect that our own theology will long be spared such struggles. Have they not even already commenced, and that through the influence of the negative and sceptical part of German literature? Is not even the pantheism of the left side of the Hegelian school transplanted into the midst of us? Unitarianism and Universalism put on the armor of foreign learning and speculation; and if we do not greatly mistake the signs of the times, we will venture to predict that a terrible struggle in the sphere of science awaits us. But to fight this battle successfully, we need the most effectual weapons. We must assail the enemy in his own camp, and discomfit him with his own weapons. If we only evade his attacks, or meet him in our old worn out armor, he will justly mock us. After gunpowder had been invented, victory could be obtained no longer with bow and arrow. Every period has its own way of doing battle, and its own armor. This is true of theology also; although errors and the enemy remain the same in the lowest depths of the heart, they nevertheless change their colors, armor, and mode of attack. Therefore it is of the utmost importance that the watchmen of Zion should watch closely all their movements and stratagems, follow them up to their secret lurking places, and never rest, until the cause of truth has been justified on all sides, and all opposition to the church been converted into a blessing.

We would also remind those, who look with distrust upon German dogmatics, that a merely outward learning, one which is not quickened by a distinctive spirit, and pervaded by a living principle, can help us but very little; and that, just by means of his ideas, the German is called upon to do, and has already done the greatest service both to the church and the world. His learning is to a great extent only the fruit of these ideas, and interwoven with them in the most intimate manner. His great researches, for example, in the sphere of church and dogmatic history, are inseparably connected with the whole modern view of the church and her development. The *spirit* which breathes through the immortal work of Neander, is of far more account for theology, than even the most learned investigations. But good fruits always point us to a good tree. Luther and Melancthon no doubt did important services to the Reformation by their learning; yet that great movement was by no means a product of the learning, but of the deep practical religious ideas, which filled the minds of

these men, and impelled them to new investigations and researches.

In the present evangelical theology of Germany there is reigning a genius, which refers us prophetically to a higher future of the church. Through the unwearied diligence of learned men, the entire field of the history of the kingdom of God in all countries and times, has been laid open. Narrow prejudices and party interests which formerly separated Protestants from Catholics, Lutherans from the Reformed, modern times from the middle ages, and excited them to a fanatical hatred against each other, have been made to vanish through the power of a liberal and unprejudiced science, a science whose sole object is truth. A cordial sympathy is felt for all forms of Christian life, and the footsteps of the Lord, who promised to be with his own always, unto the end of the world, are recognized with reverence even in the darkest ages. These grand views of the church of Christ and her development cannot possibly allow us to be satisfied with the present distracted condition of Protestantism, especially as it has worked itself out practically amongst us, but must point us far beyond this to a time, when one united and truly evangelical catholic church, enriched by the treasures of all past centuries, and adorned with the virtues of all true children of God of every creed or denomination, shall arise from the wreck of sectarianism, and go forth in transcendent beauty to meet her heavenly Bridegroom. In this very thing lies the great *practical* significance of the better German theology for the religious condition of our country. Even we are becoming every day more and more conscious of the truth, that our sectarianism is an *abnormal* condition of the church, that it stands in direct opposition to the sacerdotal prayer of our Lord, and the idea of the church, which includes essentially the character of unity and catholicity, and that it hinders the most important interests of piety. We openly confess that we have no confidence in the so-called Evangelical Alliance of the last year; we look upon it, however, as an important sign of our times inasmuch as a large and respectable portion of Protestant Christianity has, by its mere appearance there, declared in fact that they are dissatisfied with sectarianism and are longing for the unity of the church. We have now arrived at a crisis which, although it is grounded in the development of Protestantism itself, refers us with the same historical necessity to a point beyond it; and this crisis must be surmounted in the very land where it has reached its culmination, namely, in America. One

of the first and most indispensable means of removing this crying evil, is without doubt a reformation of theology. This must cast off the sectarian character with which it is at present clothed among us; lay aside its selfishness, and its insignificant party contentions, and become in spirit and truth free, united and catholic in the best sense of the word, and train up in the same spirit the future servants and leaders of the congregations, and through them the congregations themselves.

Of course, this work cannot be accomplished by theology alone, whether it be German, or any other. This theology must be changed into flesh and blood, into life and activity. For this work the American nationality, which possesses an uncommon practical talent, is peculiarly fitted. We do not hesitate therefore to assert, that the better element of the German theology transplanted to the soil of the New World, the world of the future, will yet bear much richer fruit, than even in the land of its birth, or in England. America is besides under particular obligation to transplant the spirit of the evangelical German theology, and to appropriate to herself in a living and organic way all the riches of her learning. For America is, in the first place, a free port to the entire old world. It exists not merely for English, Scotch and Irish; but every one, who believes in freedom and in the future, finds here a hospitable reception, and the most unlimited field to unfold his powers. This large and wise liberality is the most beautiful ornament of our constitution, and one of which it must never be robbed. For this reason we cannot suppose that our nation is to be a mere copy of England, but that, by a full appropriation of everything good and true in all European nations, it is to arise more and more to originality and independence of mind, and turn a new leaf in the history of mankind. A second ground of this obligation is the fact, that there exist among us already two organized German churches, Lutheran and Reformed, with German education and German customs, which form a very important part of our population especially in the Middle and Western States. Through increasing immigration these are daily growing in importance and influence. Their institutions of learning are becoming more and more conscious of their peculiar calling, and although they desire to be truly American with all their heart, yet they are unwilling for this very reason to be purely English or Scotch, but Anglo-German. Although their influence upon the literature of the country has been thus far very limited, we cannot from this draw an unfavorable conclusion for the future. The case will be

substantially changed, when once the masses are spiritually quickened, and thoroughly educated ministers occupy every station. Can we suppose that God has transplanted three millions of Germans to this continent, so pregnant with future events, only to be swallowed up in a foreign nationality without leaving a trace of their former existence behind them? Shall we not rather suppose that they are intended to act as a leaven upon it, to impart to it elements, which shall increase its powers, and lead it on to new paths of development?

Thus we have given briefly our views concerning the importance of German literature, especially of theology, for America. That we are not indulging in dreams and idle fancies, is proven by the fact, that since the last twenty years a steadily growing interest has come to be taken in it especially in New England, and that an acquaintance with it is looked upon more and more as a necessary element of all higher education, even of ladies. In the leading literary journals we always find notices of translations of German works, or compilations from them, and our best authors show in their own works an immediate or mediate acquaintance with corresponding works of the German. In theology and philology the school of Andover deserves the highest praise. Paying no heed to the doubts and exceptions of ignorance and prejudice, it has opened the way to those rich fountains, and drawn from them with a noble and honorable love for learning. Her present eviable position and her extensive influence give a triumphant proof of the wholesome fruits which have been produced by her efforts. But the movement once commenced, must necessarily be carried forward. To check the progress of German literature in this country is just as impossible as to banish railways, or steamboats, or the magnetic telegraph from the world. The Puritans do not belong to that class of persons who leave a work but half done. "Go ahead" is their watchword in all their undertakings. Whatever is done in New England gives measure and law to the whole United States. It is the cradle of our religious and political freedom, of our social habits and customs. It will also justly retain this tone-giving position, as long as it maintains its superiority in intelligence, in scientific culture and practical ingenuity; and that this is still the case, the writer of this imperfect sketch is free to admit, notwithstanding all his German Pennsylvania patriotism.

The book, whose title we have put at the head of our Article, is also an evidence of the growing interest of New England in Ger-

man literature. We welcome it as a valuable contribution to a thorough knowledge of the German language and of the theology of the Reformation. It appears in very excellent style, and is highly creditable to the publishers. The printing is correct with exception of some unimportant errors such as almost unavoidably creep into every work.¹ These "Select Treatises of Martin Luther" are important in a double point of view. First and chiefly they have a *philological* value as a help in the learning of the German to those who have already proceeded beyond the elements. In this respect the book is admirably adapted to the higher classes in our colleges. The copious notes of the editor are abundant evidence of his thorough acquaintance not only with the forms but also with the spirit of the language, and are the more valuable since the larger part of such helps do not go beyond the mere surface. It was a happy thought of Dr. Sears to select Luther's writings, above all others, for this purpose; for he was not only a reformer of the faith, but also of the language of his nation. His translation of the Bible, especially, is a classic master-piece, and marked out the path for the later German national literature. The greatest poets, as Göthe, Schiller and Herder, formed their style upon this unsurpassed model. As Luther is the most true, original and vigorous representative of the German national character, both in its lights and shades, so too, he handles his mother tongue with an admirable and truly genial mastery. "Luther's language," says the renowned philologist Grimm, who is here the most competent judge, "on account of its noble and almost wonderful purity, and also of its mighty influence, must be considered as the kernel and basis of the new High German, from which even down to our times there have been only unimportant deviations, and these mostly to its injury in force and expression. The new High German may, in fact, be designated as the Protestant dialect; and its free and liberal spirit has long since obtained the mastery over the poets and writers of the Catholic faith, unconsciously to themselves. Our language, indeed, according to the irresistible course of all things, has sunk down into certain fixed grammatical forms, and relations of sounds; but for that which nourishes and regenerates these forms and sounds, for that which has caused it

¹ E. g. p. 17, *Adluss* for *Abluss*; p. 18, *seyr* for *sehr*; p. 19, *löcherichen* for *löcherichter*, *Opinien* for *Opinionen*; p. 98, *Kurper* for *Körper*; p. 105, *Deutschlann* for *Deutschland*; p. 213, Note, *den Aeltern* for *die*, and *die Kinder* for *der*. We often meet with *ck* instead of *k*, e. g. in *Gedanken*, *strecken* (p. 290), and *tz* instead of simple *z*, as in *Hertz*, *Schmertz*, etc.

to put forth the blossoms of a new poetry, we are indebted to no one more than to Luther." Whoever, then, would obtain a thorough mastery of the modern German language, whoever wishes to understand it genetically, must go back to this fountain, which gushes forth so fresh and clear, and he will assuredly be struck with ever increasing wonder at its singular force, flexibility, fullness, depth and manifoldness.

These "Select Treatises" are also important in an *historical* and *theological* point of view. They lead us into the laboratory of that stupendous religious movement, which shook the whole of Europe, and founded a new world in the Western hemisphere. For the United States, through the medium of English Protestantism, are, in their thinking and acting, rooted in the German Reformation. But it is impossible to obtain a complete knowledge of the great Reformer without access to his works in the original. They are so peculiarly German, that even the best translation must be defective. Here, now, is an opportunity offered to become acquainted with several of his most important productions, which once kindled the fire of enthusiasm in thousands and millions of hearts. The selection appears to us to be on the whole a happy one. The most important and interesting piece is manifestly the famous "*Schrift an den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation; von des christlichen Standes Besserung.*" Luther wrote this at the end of June, 1520, and in it, for the first time in a formal way, regardless of consequences, declared war against the whole Romish system. Before this, he had chiefly attacked only some single crying abuses. This is a genuine national work, written with the fiery zeal of an Elias, and with the noble indignation of a German heart. It worked like a fire-brand in the German nation. Before two months had passed, four thousand copies were sold. It has a certain affinity with the patriotic efforts of the German knights, Ulrich von Hutten, Franz von Sickingen, and Sylvester von Schaumburg. Luther saw in them his helpers, but at the same time he discerned very marked defects in their procedure. In their opposition to the Italians, they proceeded from a one-sided patriotic and political point of view, and made use of carnal weapons; by bitter sarcasm, biting irony, and the warlike sword, they would overthrow a system which could be successfully conquered only by the spiritual might of the positive truth of the pure gospel. Thus Luther, in the year 1521, wrote to Spalatin regarding Hutten: "I would not that they should fight for the gospel with violence and bloodshed, and thus have I answered him. By the *word*

is the world overcome, by the word is the church preserved, also by the word will it again come to its rights; and Antichrist, as he got what is his without violence, will without violence fall."

The most important thought which Luther declares in his appeal to the German nobility is that of the universal priesthood of Christians, in opposition to an exclusive hierarchical order in the Catholic church. The distinction between clergy and laity is merely a distinction of office, and necessary for the sake of order. But every one, says Luther, who has been baptized, and who believes in the Lord Jesus Christ, is essentially a priest and king. Who does not at once see the extremely important consequences which the realization of this genuine Protestant idea must bring with it into the religious and even the political life of the world? For we may say that the democratic ideas of modern times are only a transference of the doctrine of the universal priesthood from the domain of the church to that of the State. It might indeed now also be the case, that the laity of the higher ranks, who, with so great trust, encouraged and called upon Luther to shake off the Romish yoke, would assume to themselves too many rights over the church. This was in fact the case in the period of the Reformation, with the kings and princes in Germany and England; and it cannot be denied, that the Reformers were not always circumspect enough in guarding against the evil of a sort of papacy of royalty (*Caesareopapismus*), which has done so much injury to the Protestant church of the old world.

Our limits forbid us giving an account of the other pieces contained in this volume, which are partly of an exegetical and practical religious character, and partly relate to education. We only wish to be allowed to make one proposal before we take leave of this book. Luther's activity as a Reformer may be divided into two periods, which are very different from each other, but which, instead of excluding are complements of one another. The dividing line between the two was the year 1521. In the first period he contended from the Protestant position against Popish errors. It was a contest of freedom against spiritual tyranny, of living faith against dead works of the law, of the deepest convictions of the soul against an outward ceremonial service, of the feeling of individuality and nationality, which had attained its majority, against the arrogant usurpations of a foreign power beyond the Alps. This contest against Rome began with the ninety-five theses, and reached its highest point at the Diet of Worms, where Luther bore fearless testimony to his deepest convictions,

in the presence of the mightiest representatives of the empire and the church. From that period, he did not bring forward anything essentially new against the Roman Catholic church. The principal battles on his side had been fought, and he had dismantled, for all times, the chief fortresses of the Papacy.

But there still remained for the Reformer another, and equally important work, although in many respects more difficult and unpleasant. He had to cut off the excrescences of his opposition to the Papacy, to curb the excesses of the movement which he had himself begun, and thus to save it from a complete degeneracy into a lawless radicalism. This false tendency manifested itself first in Wittenberg, and partly among the friends who sympathized most deeply with Luther's views, during his retirement in his Patmos at Eisenach, and like a shadow accompanied the progress of the Reformation through all Germany, Switzerland, France, Holland, and England. Luther did not wish to destroy the church, but merely to purify it; nor to annul the sacraments, nor bring them down to insignificant ceremonies, but merely to cleanse them from superstitions and additions; not to rend the unity of the church, and open door and gate to sectarianism, but only to break the bonds of tyranny over the conscience, and dissipate the false semblance of an external conformity; not to make Christians free in untamed recklessness and arbitrary notions, but with rational liberty conformed to law. Therefore, instructed by the occurrences at Wittenberg, he contended from a sound, catholic point of view, against the ultra Protestants and pseudo-Protestants of his time; he defended ecclesiastical discipline and order against wild and factious enthusiasts, the obligations of the law against Antinomianism, the lawfulness of Paedo-baptism against the Anabaptists, the mystic significancy of the eucharist against an abstract intellectual, rationalizing tendency; in short, the idea of the church of history and of authority, against an exaggerated religious and intellectual subjective tendency, perilous to Christianity itself. This is the catholic, the *churchly*, the positive, the constructive aspect of Luther's efficiency. It was this, too, which saved Protestantism in the narrower sense, the product of his earlier efforts, from destruction. It is of the highest importance that we understand both these elements in Luther's character, and recognize their mutual relations. Unhappily it is only the anti-Roman Luther who is usually appreciated among us; but the anti-pseudo-Protestant, the anti-sectarian, the anti-rationalistic, the evangelical catholic, and *churchly* Luther, is wholly ignored and misunder-

stood. But for our times and our land, it is the latter which is of the greatest importance. Our chief enemy at present is not the Papacy of Rome, but a false Protestantism, a sectarian spirit, and those rationalizing tendencies in the very midst of us, which impair our powers, promote the growth of Catholicism, and threaten at last the total abolition of the true character of the church. If we prevail over these enemies, Rome has no power over us, and no future in this land of freedom. So long as we are subservient to the sectarian spirit, and, in our attacks against Rome, take the anti-ecclesiastical and anti-historical position of ultra and false Protestantism, all our shafts will fall back upon ourselves, and a few years will teach us to be careful and to tremble for our own existence. For our part, we have too much trust in history, or rather in the unseen and all-wise Ruler of history, not to hope with all assurance that our Protestant theology and church will soon come to a consciousness of the dangers that threaten us, will enter into the right way, and at last issue forth victorious from its struggle against its foes.

Dr. Sears might make a valuable contribution to this purpose, if, in a second volume, he should bring before our theological youth who are learning German, some of Luther's writings in his contest *against* ultra Protestantism, and *for* the church and its institutions, and thus complete the portrait of this greatest of the Germans. As poet, as husband, as father, as friend, and as correspondent, Luther deserves to be known amongst us; and De Wette's collection of his letters presents for this object the richest materials. This might easily be combined with the plan we have proposed; and in taking leave of the honored author, we wish him the needful leisure and inclination for its accomplishment.

ARTICLE V.

SHAKESPEARE — THE OLD AND THE NEW CRITICISM ON HIM.

By Rev. Leonard Withington, Newbury.

Sic fautor veterum, ut tabulas peccare vetantes,
Quas bis quinque viri sanxerunt, foedera regum
Vel Gabiis vel cum rigidis aequata Sabinis,
Pontificum libros, annosa volumina vatum,
Dictitet Albano Musas in monte locutas.

Horace to Augustus, l. 23—27.

As our discourse will be on criticism, it may be well to begin by asking, What rank it holds in literature, and how the judicious critic compares with the inventing poet. Genius is the quality of the one; judgment of the other. Criticism, though subsequent, has some place in the world of learning. It is secondary to genius as the moon borrows its light from the sun. Very little credit is due to that *recognizing* criticism, which never discovers and can only be directed. Still less is due to the prattle of affectation; the last echo of absurdity. Some seem to have no consciousness of their own. Their very taste is manufactured for them. The cant of criticism is supremely absurd. Dr. Goldsmith has well remarked¹ that "the praise which is every day lavished upon Virgil, Horace and Ovid is often no more than an indirect method the critic takes to compliment his own discernment. Their works have long been considered as models of beauty and to praise them now is only to show the conformity of our taste to theirs; it tends not to advance their reputation but to promote our own. Let us then dismiss for the present the pedantry of panegyric." How much of this self-praising criticism is there in the world! The true meaning is: See what a fine taste I have! My mind is actually in contact with the author, I admire. I am actually a congenial spirit, and you are a barbarian, if you do not agree with me. You may often stop the mouth of such an idolater by just asking him for a little analytic discrimination.

Yet criticism has done an important office in the world. If there were none to judge it would be in vain to write. The truth is, when a work of genius first appears, by its breaking through

¹ Review of Barrett's Translation of Ovid's Epistles.

conventional rules, its own excellence operates against it.¹ The common taste has been formed on different models. All the *dilettanteism* of the upper circles is against it; and the people need to have their attention directed to the recondite beauties which they are too idle to pursue and have too little skill to find. Thus Addison held his classic torch before the statue of Milton, and thus every great poet has had his gentleman-usher to introduce him into the saloon of his reputation. That *divining* criticism, which foresees the result of an untried experiment is no mean quality; and is certainly of essential service. When Dr. Bentley, for example, long before the place of Newton was fixed, and who had from his previous studies every temptation to be a pedant to the old philosophy,—when Bentley, I say, so liberally sounded the praises of the new philosophy, he showed as much discernment in this kind of criticism as he ever did in restoring the reading of an ancient manuscript. When Pope received from the booksellers the manuscript copy of Akenside's *Pleasures of the Imagination*, and told him to offer no mean price, for this was no every day poem; when our Franklin commended Cowper's *Task* (for never were there two geniuses more different than Franklin and Cowper); when Gifford predicted the success of Byron, it was by a sagacity which was only second to the productive power. To enter the tangled forest and amidst its thick bushes and darkening boughs to discover and point out the infant magnolia, is next in merit to planting the tree. Let no man then despise the original critic; for discerning judgment follows close on the path of inventing genius. While the one weaves the deathless laurel, the other winds it on the deserving brow.

We have of late years had a vast mass of very cheap criticism. It consists in rapturous admiration of what has often been admired before. It looks up to the sun and says—not merely that it is bright—but that there are no spots on it. It places its discernment in having no discrimination. Shakespeare himself, if consciousness ever reaches the tomb or the world beyond it, must blush, I apprehend, at the wholesale praises heaped upon him, which certainly he never attempted to deserve.

A remarkable change has taken place within forty years in the criticism on this author. The critics of the old school allow that he is a great genius and has boundless invention; but they contend that his works are very imperfect; he mixes beauties and

¹ Sometimes at least; there are works, however, which strike the universal heart.

absurdities together; he is a wonder, considering his age; but it would be very strange, if he were an overmatch for the general improvement of the whole mass of society. He had divine impulses, but they sometimes led him wrong. Milton in two lines has involved his character:

" Or sweetest Shakspeare, fancy's child,
Warble his native wood-notes wild.¹

He is Fancy's child and her sweetest progeny, but then his notes are wild and rustic. Dryden, who had some right to *teach others* in an art in which he so well *excelled* himself, says: "He was a man of all the moderns and perhaps the ancient poets who had the largest and most comprehensive soul. All the images of nature were still present to him and he drew them, not laboriously, but luckily. When he describes anything, you more than see it, you feel it too. Those who accuse him to have wanted learning, give him the greater commendation. He was naturally learned; he needed not the spectacles of books to read nature; he looked inward and found her there. I cannot say he is everywhere alike; were he so, I should do him injury to compare him with the greatest of mankind. He is many times flat and insipid; his comic wit degenerating into clinches, his serious swelling into bombast. But he is always great when some great occasion is presented to him.² No man can say that he ever had a fit subject for his wit and did not raise himself as high above the rest of poets:

Quantum lenta solent inter viburnæ cupressi.

The consideration of this," continues Dryden, "made Mr. Hales of Eton say, that there was no subject of which any poet ever writ, but he could produce it much better done in Shakespeare; and, however others are now generally preferred before him, (i. e. in Charles the Second's day,) yet the age wherein he lived, which had contemporaries with him Fletcher and Jonson, never equalled them to him in their esteem. And in the late king's court, when Ben's reputation was at the highest, Sir John Suckling and with him the greater part of the courtiers, set our Shakespeare far above him."³

¹ L'Allegro, lines 133, 134.

² Not exactly so; the great fault of Shakespeare is that he often lurches you on the most solemn occasions. He trifles when you want him to be serious, and after raising your expectation to the highest pitch, presents you with the meanest buffoonery.

³ Essay on Dramatic Poetry; Dryden's Works, Vol. I. p. 72.

A little farther on : " If I would compare him with Shakespeare, I must acknowledge him the more correct poet, but Shakespeare the greater wit. Shakespeare was the Homer, or the father of our dramatic poets, Jonson was the Virgil, the pattern of elaborate writing ; I admire him, but I love Shakespeare." The last remark is a beautiful touch of natural criticism. There are writers whose artificial beauties we admire by rule ; there are others whose unlabored excellences flash on the heart. Our admiration is ravished from us, before we know how to give it.

Pope says that Shakespeare wrote better and worse than other men, and Dr. Johnson in his antithetic way says :¹ " The work of a correct and regular writer, is a garden accurately formed and diligently planted, varied with shades and scented with flowers ; the composition of Shakespeare is a forest in which oaks extend their branches and pines tower in the air, interspersed sometimes with weeds and brambles and sometimes giving shelter to myrtles and roses, filling the eye with awful pomp and gratifying the mind with endless diversity. Other poets display cabinets of precious rarities, minutely finished, wrought into shape and polished into brightness. Shakespeare opens a mine which contains gold and diamonds in inexhaustible plenty, though clouded by incrustations, debased by impurities and mingled with a mass of meaner minerals."

Mr. Hume, whose taste was formed on French models, is still more limited in his admiration. " If Shakespeare be considered as a *MAN*, born in a rude age and educated in the lowest manner, without any instruction either from the world or from books, he may be regarded as a prodigy : if represented as a *POET* capable of furnishing a proper entertainment to a refined and intelligent audience, we must abate somewhat of this eulogy. In his compositions, we regret that great irregularities and even sometimes absurdities should so frequently disfigure the animated and passionate scenes intermixed with them ; and at the same time, we admire the more these beauties on account of their being surrounded with such deformities. A striking peculiarity of sentiment, he frequently hits as it were by inspiration ; but a reasonable propriety of thought, he cannot for any time uphold. Nervous and picturesque expressions as well as descriptions abound in him ; but it is in vain we look either for continued purity or simplicity of diction. His total ignorance of all theatrical art and

¹ Preface to *Shakespeare*.

conduct, however material a defect; yet, as it affects the spectator rather than the reader, we can more readily excuse, than that want of taste, which often prevails in his productions and which gives way only by intervals to the irradiations of genius. A great and fertile genius he certainly possessed, and one equally enriched with the tragic and comic vein; but he ought to be cited as a proof, how dangerous it is, to rely on these advantages alone for attaining excellence in the finer arts. And there may even remain a suspicion that we overrate, if possible, the greatness of his genius, in the same manner as bodies often appear more gigantic, on account of their being disproportioned and misshapen."¹

Such is the general testimony of the critics of the old school. It is remarkably unanimous. Some of them were not unsuccessful poets themselves. They had a right to speak. The age of artificial raptures and mystified discernment had not yet dawned on the world. There was not then a chorus consisting of a chosen few, ambitious to toss every cloud into a fantastic shape and gild it with borrowed brightness until it became a voluntary image; and having a power of transforming obvious blemishes into recondite beauties as if on purpose to leave the slow sentiments of mankind behind the critic's rapid discrimination. The poet's character then floated on the surface of his works.

But a new school has since arisen. It was imported from Germany, and began in England with Mr. Coleridge. They may be called *perfectionists*; they can see no faults in Shakespeare. His perversions of language; his hard metaphors; his incredible plots; his tumid speeches; his mixture of buffonery in his most solemn scenes; his want of decorum; his indelicacies; his puns and clinches, are all right; so many mysterious proofs of his profound knowledge of human nature. That mighty salvo of *imitating nature* (which by the way in most of these things he does not imitate) is a mantle which covers all the multitude of his literary sins;—just as if there were not deformities in nature which ought not to be imitated; just as if there were no such thing as selection. Surely it is the duty of the poet, when he imitates nature, to choose its most instructive side.² He must not turn a premis-

¹ History of Great Britain, Vol. 4. Appendix, p. 187, 2d edition, quarto.

² "A play, as I have said, to be like nature is to be set above it; as statues which are placed on high are made greater than the life, that they may descend to the sight in their just proportion."—Dryden's Essay on Dramatic Poetry; Works, p. 91.

And again; "There may be too great a likeness; as the most skilful paint-

uous mirror to a deformed landscape; he must not take the likeness of a man having a cancer on his face with the exactness of the daguerotype. He must make his roses conceal his thorns, and his verdant herbs and waving grass close over the worms and reptiles which crawl beneath them. His business is to give us pleasing, not promiscuous imitation; to move our passions without debasing our hearts.

When so much has been said of his matchless beauties, it cannot be unprofitable to turn our eyes to his forgotten faults. Promiscuous praise is seldom just or enduring. It is corrupting too. It not only gives mortal frailty a dangerous influence over us; but it produces a kind of literary despair. No mortal will be likely to surpass, either in virtue or wisdom, the idol he has been instructed to adore. If the people in Massachusetts should once be persuaded that Princeton-hill is the highest eminence that ever pointed to the sky—the result must be that Teneriffe and Mont Blanc will be forgotten. There may be such a thing as having the imagination shrivelled even by the magnificence of Shakespeare.

In stating a few of the faults of the great poet, I feel I am executing an ungracious task. I expect to be charged with want of perception, want of taste, want of enthusiasm. I shall have the satisfaction, however of uttering my own impressions, and of not being the ninety-ninth repeater of raptures which were never felt.

The first fault which I shall mention, and one which seems to me to be very material in a poet, is, he has no sympathy with moral sublimity; no pictures of sublimé, self-sacrificing goodness; never draws us to the *καλο-καγαθία* of the Greeks; in fact, he has no sympathy with the noblest aspiration of the soul. He sees the beautiful in persons and objects, but he never ascends to the great sea of beauty, *ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαιος τοῦ καλοῦ*, to which Diotima told Socrates,¹ the philosopher must rise above particular persons and material objects. He has no confidence in human improvement and progression; he never pants after a better state; he never kindles with liberty, nor rises with religion. His poetry is Epicurean throughout, and he loves to sleep on rosy pillows in

etc affirm, that there may be too near a resemblance in a picture; to take every circumstance and feature is not to make an excellent piece, but to take so much only as will make a beautiful resemblance of the whole."—*Defence of the Essay on Dramatic Poetry; Works, Vol. I.*

¹ See the Symposium, page 206, D., Stallbaum's Plato, Vol. I.

a sensual Elysium. He sees sights of earthly bliss, and hears such sounds ; not like those which broke on Milton's ear, the choral warbling of Heaven, but such

As are those dulcet sounds in break of day,
That creep into the dreaming bridegroom's ear
And summon him to marriage.

He is peculiarly sarcastic on the democratic principle. He was a narrow conservative ; he bowed to the diadem ; he catered to the taste of a voluptuous aristocracy ; and was at heart, I suspect, a true Epicurean. In his *Julius Caesar*, he introduces the rabble merely to show that they were well worthy of the chains that Antony was about to impose on them. Nor can it be said that he was merely drawing a picture of the degenerate republicans of that degraded age. In *Coriolanus* he has given us the same lesson. In *Jack Cade*, *Henry VI*, he has repeated the picture ; and he seems to delight in heaping ridicule on that hope that has united religion and liberty in one great design, and animated patriots and martyrs when suffering unto death. This is more remarkable, as Shakespeare himself lived in a most fermenting age. All Europe was on fire ; Protestantism was established ; the Netherlands were free ; Germany was awake, and the poet lived down to the year 1617. The Thirty Years' war was already begun. The hero Gustavus Adolphus was already in the germ of his strength. All Europe was bursting into enthusiasm, and the rising sun of a new age was shining on the parting clouds of the old dispensation. Yet our divine poet, with all his myriad-mindedness, never catches one spark of the general flame. He sees the rights of man, the destiny of thrones, the fate of free principles, and the hopes of divine revelation, all trembling in the scale, and yet he never casts in the feeblest make-weight to turn the balance to the right side. It is remarkable that he wrote an historical play on the most exciting period (*Henry the VIII*), and yet he passes entirely over the Protestant religion, the cardinal point in that wonderful reign. His fancy never kindles at this moral beauty ; his heart is cold and dead to all these influences. He never casts his eye on the supreme pattern ; he was never smitten by her form, nor worshipped at her shrine. He never rose with a rising age ; he saw not man's aim and destiny. The only millennium he looked for was such as would have gratified his own Falstaff.

Nor can it be said that such subjects are not suited to the dra-

ma. We have a most striking picture of stern endurance under hated tyranny in the *PROMETHEUS VINCTUS* of *Æschylus*.

Ἐγὼ δὲ ταῦθ' ἅπαντ' ἠπισάμην
Ἐκὼν ἐκὼν ἡμαρτιον, οὐκ ἀνήσομαι,
Θνητοῖς δ' ἀρήγων, αὐτὸς ἐπρόβην πόνοισι. — lines 265—267.

Corneille, in a servile age, touched the same note. It was the inspiring genius of Schiller's song. Could Shakespeare have written the scene between the Marquis Posa and the King in *Don Carlos*? —

The poor and purblind rage
Of innovation, that but aggravates
The weight of th' fetters which it cannot break,
Will never heat *my* blood. The Century
Admits not my ideas: I live a citizen
Of those that are to come. Sire, can a picture
Break your rest?

And again:

Look round and view God's lordly universe:
On Freedom it is founded, and how rich
It is with Freedom! He the great Creator
Has given the very worm its sev'ral dew-drop;
Even in the moulding spaces of Decay,
He leaves Free-will the pleasures of a choice.
This world of *yours*! How narrow and how poor!
The rustling of a leaf alarms the lord
Of Christendom. You quake at every virtue;
He not to mar the glorious form of Freedom,
Suffers the hideous host of Evil
Should still run riot in his fair creation.
Him, the Maker, we behold not; calm
He hides himself in everlasting laws;
Which and not him, the skeptic seeing, exclaims
"Wherefore a God? The world itself is God."
And never did a Christian's adoration
So praise him as this skeptic's blasphemy.¹

If this is not the individualism and conformity to the downright nature of the English poet, it is something better. If it is not human, it is celestial.

Shakespeare has been so often praised for his almost miraculous development of character, that it may move the spleen of his admirers even to suggest that he ever falls short of perfection in this citadel of his strength. Yet, as he often writes with more haste

¹ Schiller's *Don Carlos*, Act III, Scene 10, Carlyle's Translation; *Life of Schiller*, p. 94.

than skill, it is not to be wondered if he has sometimes fallen into inconsistencies, and given us pictures of which the originals were never found in nature. It is really laughable to see what the perfectionists make of the character of Hamlet. One tells us it is a delineation of intense goodness; another, of one's meditation; Goethe thinks it is the exhibition of man whose destiny is too mighty for him; he sinks under it, as the root of the plant may burst the vase in which it grows; one reader I have found, who thought it was a delineation of revenge; especially as he did not kill his father-in-law at prayers, because he wished to destroy his soul as well as his body;¹ and sent Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, by a forged commission, to their final doom, and yet say:

Why, man, they did make love to this employment;
They are not near my conscience.²

Now though the *perfectionists* tell us that the reason of this difference is, that the poet is so profound that he hides his purpose so deeply that no critic can find it,³ yet it is a much more natural conclusion, where so many wise men differ, to suppose that Shakespeare, like other mortals, has failed in a province where he is generally so strong.

He has surely little skill in the purely pathetic. I am aware that some of the critics, even of the old school, have claimed this for him. Pope tells us, in his preface, that "the power over our passions was never possessed in a more eminent degree, or displayed in so different instances. Yet all along there is seen no labor, no pains to seize them; no preparation to guide our guess to the effect, or be perceived to lead toward it; but the heart swells and tears burst out, just at the proper places."⁴ Though we have often been told that he is equally master of the tragic and comic vein, yet no man can be argued out of his perception. That part of tragedy which consists in a mind torn by ambition, darkened by misanthropy, rushing to murder, or sinking in remorse; in depicting these agitations, I grant he leaves almost every other poet out of sight and remembrance. When he opens the superstitious world on us, when he dives to the tomb and recalls the dead, we shudder at his mystic power. But for simple pity he is not eminent. He is always counteracting his own purpose. There can be no mistake here in any reader, who has not

¹ Hamlet, Act III, Scene 3.

² Hamlet, Act V, Scene 2.

³ See Schlegel's Lectures, L. XXIII, p. 360.

⁴ Pope's Preface to Shakespeare.

wrought himself into an artificial state, and is willing to surrender himself to his own feelings. What is pathos? It is always an abstraction; it is always idealism; and it is no paradox to say that our images and groupings may be *too natural* to be pathetic. You must show innocence and simplicity suffering, and pure innocence is not found on earth. You must not be *too true* to nature; you must not throw in those abatements, which are always found in real life. You must hide those circumstances which mar the picture and check the tear, by a contrary power, just as it begins to flow. No doubt, Clarissa Harlow, (if she ever had a prototype in real life,) had many follies and faults which would abate our sympathy. But Richardson was too wise to bring them forward. He makes her a suffering angel. Shakespeare always blabs out the whole secret. Thus Romeo is deeply in love, and at first sight; because he is so inflammable. He passes from Rosaline to Juliet with scarce a moment's pause, and dying for each. Now I have no doubt that this may be nature (for love is more owing to susceptibility, than to excellence in the objective), but it is very little calculated to increase the pathos. Nor is this the worst. In the most pathetic scenes (so intended), where the whole energy of the fable seems to force him and his readers to be serious; when aged imbecility is persecuted with ingratitude, and disappointed love weeps over the tomb, he thrusts in some contemptible joke, which loses its power by having wandered from its place. It is as if Harlequin should break into a room where there was a dead corpse and attempt to dance, in his motley coat, over the coffin. Thus when Juliet hears of her lover's death as she supposes, the poor, afflicted girl breaks out into these dignified and natural lamentations:

[But first the simple reader must understand the beautiful allusion:—the word *aye*, in former times, was pronounced like the pronoun *I*; and both, of course, like the word *eye*; so that we have here a triple pun.]

Hath Romeo slain himself? Say thou but *I* [aye]
And that bare vowel *I* shall poison more
Than the death-darting *eye* of cockatrice:
I am not *I*, if there be such an *I* [aye].

But her lover is not a whit wiser; no wonder, they were enamoured; for they were certainly well matched. For Romeo laments his banishment in such strains as these:

¹ Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Scene 2.

Heaven is here,
Where Juliet lives ; and every cat, and dog,
And little mouse, every unworthy thing,
Live here in heaven, and may look on her,
But Romeo may not.

After this pathetic mentioning of cats and dogs, he goes on to flies. They may light on her, and he cannot.—

*Flies may do this, when I from this must fly.*¹

Such is the pathos of Shakespeare.

He often lurches us, too, in the very scenes where he has raised the greatest expectation. When Juliet is found dead in her bed, (as the family suppose,) and the whole circle is thrown into confusion, (if ever he wished to touch our pity, it was then,) he has introduced his nurse thus lamenting :

O woe ! O woful, woful, woful day !
Most lamentable day ! Most woful day,
That ever, ever, I did yet behold !
O day ! O day ! O day ! O hateful day !
Never was seen so black a day as this :
O woful day, O woful day !²

In Hamlet, no scene is more important than the play in which the young prince expects to detect the guilt of the king ; he confines Horatio to observe him *even with the very comment of his soul* ; and our expectations are wrought up to the highest pitch :—we wonder what Hamlet is going to say ; when, lo ! his feelings evaporate in this wise speech :

For thou dost know, O Damon dear,
This realm dismantled was
Of Jove himself ; and now reigns here
A very, very—peacock.³

When king Lear, oppressed by his daughters, is turned out into the storm and all nature seems to sympathize with him, the heavens dart their fires ; the tempest blows and the poor dis-crowned king feels as if all the elements were combined against a head

— so old and white as this.

In this scene, when if ever a poet was called to select the images which elevate the sublime and deepen the pathetic, it was on such a solemn occasion, we have a fool who regularly mixes his

¹ Romeo and Juliet, Act IV, Scene 3.

² Act IV, Scene 5.

³ Hamlet, Act III, Scene 2.

buffoonery with his master's sorrows, as if the one could not subsist without the other. With regard to this, Schiller has the conscience to say: "When I first, at a very early age, became acquainted with this poet, I felt indignant at his coldness, his hardness of heart, which permitted him in the most melting pathos to utter jests; to mar, by the introduction of a fool, the soul-searching scenes of Hamlet, Lear and other pieces; which now kept him still when my sensibilities hastened forward, now drove him carelessly onward, when I would so gladly have lingered. . . . He was the object of my reverence and zealous study for years before I could love him. I was not yet capable of comprehending nature at first hand."¹ No doubt, the German poet was natural in his first impressions; thousands have felt exactly so. But was he right in his efforts to conquer them? Did he reach nature by art? "What we call seeking after our duty," says bishop Butler, "is often nothing else but explaining it away."²

It is vain to say here that this method is a close adherence to nature. Surely Shakespeare himself, has *some* principle of selection; and was instinctively drawn to pursue *the beautiful* even in his utmost devotion to that which is *true*. I do not object at all, to his passing from the homely and the comic, in the same drama, to the tragic and sublime. I am inclined to think that our smiles prepare the way for our tears; such a drama is, no doubt, a more faithful picture of life. But what I object to, is throwing contrary weights, at the same moment, into the mental balance and thus counteracting the very design the author has in view. If a lion and monkey appear on the ground together, depend on it the sympathy of the spectators will be with the monkey; the ludicrous will overpower the sublime. Not even the high name of Shakespeare can make such mixtures either right or pleasing. If you doubt it I appeal to a kindred art. Mr. Burke tells us of a painter, who delineating the Last Supper,³ placed under the table, beneath Christ and his apostles, a dog gnawing a bone, and he severely censures the bad taste which could join so homely an event with so solemn a scene. Every reader must agree with him; and what is wrong in the painter cannot be right in the poet; for our sentiments in each case are precisely the same.

The fact is, that Shakespeare's love of homely nature led him

¹ See Carlyle's Life of Schiller, p. 14, note.

² Butler's Sermons, Sermon VII. Vol. I.

³ Hints for an Essay on the Drama, Burke's Works, Vol. V. p. 351, Boston edition, 1813.

away from those beautiful combinations in which pathos must consist. It is folly to heap inconsistent praises on the same man. There can be no mistake here. If Otway, Southern, Richardson, Rowe, Mackenzie, Talfourd in *Ion*, are pathetic, Shakespeare is not; at least it is not his discriminating excellence. For myself, I must confess (be it shame or truth) I have never had a heartier laugh than at some of his *tragic* scenes.

He selects very improper subjects for representation. He wants decorum; his ladies are immensely indelicate, and permit such language before them as marks and can scarcely be justified by even a semi-civilized age. It is one of Schlegel's paradoxes that the English had reached the very height of true refinement in queen Elizabeth's day. "With regard to the tone of society in Shakespeare's day, it is necessary to remark, that there is a wide difference between true mental cultivation and what is called polish. That artificial polish which puts an end to everything like free original communication, and subjects all intercourse to the insipid uniformity of certain rules, was undoubtedly wholly unknown to the age of Shakespeare, as in a great measure it still is at the present day in England. It possessed on the other hand, a fulness of healthy vigor, which showed itself always with boldness, and sometimes with petulance. The spirit of chivalry was not yet wholly extinct, and a queen, who was far more jealous of exacting homage to her sex than her throne, and who with her determination, wisdom and magnanimity, was in fact well qualified to inspire the minds of her subjects with an ardent enthusiasm, inflamed that spirit to the noblest love of glory and renown."¹ Her majesty's care in exacting homage to her sex, was seen in pulling off her shoe and throwing it at the head of one courtier; in swearing at another; in being chased into her bed-chamber by a third; in allowing one bishop to tell her publicly that she was an "untamed heifer," and another to describe the whole sex in the following strain: "Women," said bishop Aylmer in a sermon at court, "are of two sorts. Some of them are wiser, better learned, discreeter and more constant, than a number of men; but another and a worse sort of them, and the most part, are fond, foolish, wanton flibbergibs, tattlers, triflers, wavering, witless, without counsel, feeble, careless, rash, proud, dainty, nice, tale-bearers, eves-droppers, rumor-raisers, evil-tongued, worse-minded, and in every wise doltified with the dregs of the devil's

¹ Lectures on Dramatic Literature, Lect. XXII. p. 349, Black's Translation.

dunghill.”¹ After such a specimen of courtly refinement, we can scarcely wonder that the poet, equal to his age, should make a rich and noble father address his daughter in such language as the following :

Mistress minion, you,
Thank me no thankings and proud me no proude,
But settle your fine joints 'gainst Thursday next,
To go with Paris to St. Peter's church,
Or I will drag thee on a hurdle thither.
Out, you green-sickness carrion ! out you baggage !
You tallow face !²—

Or that two queens should address each other in such an imperial style as the following :

Elinor. Come to thy grandam, child.
Constance. Do, child, go to it' grandam, child ;
Give grandam kingdom, and it' grandam will
Give it a plum, a cherry, and a fig :
There's a good grandam.³

Now though we have no doubt that a determined critic, who is himself a perfect rarity, may discover some profound beauty here, some exquisite imitation of nature ; yet for our humble selves, who are always content to admire poetry on its surface, we must be permitted to avow that our first impressions will conquer our last—namely, that nothing but the sacred name of Shakespeare can rescue such ineffable nonsense from eternal contempt.

He is often very unskilful in making the marvellous, probable ; most of his plots turn on incidents which tempt our disgust by destroying our belief. *Incredulus odi*. Here he differs immensely from Walter Scott, who always makes the wonderful credible by explaining some natural reason for supernatural appearances. There is profound truth also in the remark of Hume, already quoted, there “ may even remain a suspicion that we overrate if possible, the greatness of his genius in the same manner as bodies often appear more gigantic on account of their being disproportioned and misshapen.” The similitude is true whatever you may say of the thing it illustrates. It is said, that most spectators see St. Peter's church at Rome, for the first time, with feelings of great disappointment ; at least with an inadequate conception of its beauty. Everything is so well proportioned, so finished, so grad-

¹ See Neal's Puritans, Vol. I. c. 8. p. 571.

² Romeo and Juliet, Act III. Scene 5.

³ King John, Act II, Scene 1.

ual, so uniform, no break on the eye; no contracted imperfection, that (as the Platonists say, God left the seeds of chaos in creation that we might see better the germs of order) the spectator forgets particular beauties in the matchless effect of the whole. I am inclined to think that we are most unjust to the most finished poets. We praise the judgment of Virgil; we talk of his art, we depreciate his genius and call him a cold inventor of harmonious perfection. Yet Macrobius has justly said, after all his art and all his imitations, he drank his creating excellence from the fountain of nature. *Videsne eloquentiam omni varietate distinctam? quam quidem mihi videtur Virgilius non sine quodam præsagio, quo se omnium profectibus præparat, de industria sua permiscuisse: idque non mortali, sed divino ingenio prævidisse; atque adeo non alium ducem secutus, quam ipsam rerum omnium matrem naturam, hanc prætexerit velut in musica concordiam dissonorum.*¹ This is saying of the polished Virgil exactly what we are taught to say of the irregular Shakespeare.

I hope I shall not be regarded as a perfect barbarian if I add, that even his knowledge of nature is not universal. Why should the worst part of human nature be put for the whole? Why should knowing grog-shops, harlots' gaming-houses, bar-rooms, and brothels, be called knowing mankind? Has not every house its parlor as well as sink; and has not the bush its rose as well as thorn? From all his characters, in all their motives, I believe I may say, religion never emerges. He has never drawn a CHRISTIAN. I do not attribute this so much to the impulse of his genius or defect of observation, as that Christian piety is not a very theatrical virtue. Yet Coleridge and Talfourd¹ have both proved that it is possible to show to a weeping audience the *spirit* of religion without its terminology.

Thus I have endeavored to show how our admiration of beauty leads us to deformity, when our idolatrous homage tempts us to push excellence up to perfection. I am altogether of the old school. Nothing can be more disgusting than the assumed superiority of the new critics. Their new discerned beauties are only some false visions seen by blindness. What! Milton, Dryden, Pope, Johnson, Hume, the very countrymen of the poet, drinking in the vernacular language, to yield to Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, and Schlegel! My reason for engaging in this ungracious task,

¹ *Saturnalia*, Lib. V. c. 1.

¹ In the *Tragedies*, *Remorse* and *Ion*.

is a sincere conviction that both our taste and morals must suffer, if we are taught to read so powerful an author without DISCRIMINATION. He is a great genius; but his faults and merits are so blended that, if we permit his ethereal flights too much to charm our fancy, his sensual tendencies will inevitably taint our hearts. He is a great genius; but I distinguish between power and development, between the abilities of the man and the perfection of the work.

Before concluding these remarks, it may be permitted, in so grave a work as the BIBLIOTHECA, to ask what place the volumes of Shakespeare should hold in a clergyman's library; and what lessons of utility he may derive from so remote a department of literature. Omitting the benefits of the poetic analysis of human nature; omitting his powers of language and illustration; his wonderful structure and diction, there are especially *two* important lessons, which a preacher may learn from this great master of the drama, which I have not seen noticed.

In the first place, then, it is obvious that one of the great difficulties respecting the inspiration of the Scriptures, and also the interpretation, is, not giving full play to the sphere of language. The Bible is not a series of direct propositions, laid down by a formal logic, and to be understood, like the Elements of Euclid, in the most direct sense. It is poetry; it is painting; it is rhetoric; it is dramatic, in some of its exhibitions; it is lyric; and its meaning is only infallible and instructive when we reach it. The man who receives the obvious and direct sentiment, and makes *that* the dictate of inspiration, will be often grievously deceived. Take the Book of Job, for example; it is a drama; it is full of moral painting; and the object of many a speech is, not to give us a philosophical proposition from the chair of a teacher; but to paint the progress of accusing jealousy or excusing patience, suspicion, agony, perplexity, sorrow, or despair. The man that does not understand this principle, has not found the key which must unlock the golden treasures of the Bible. Now Shakespeare is the author, of all others, that best understood this moral painting. He never talks like a philosopher, but always as a poet. Different as he was from the sacred writers as a moral being, he is always in close communion with them as a genius. "It is obvious," says Professor Richardson, "that though the *description* of a passion or affection may give us pleasure, whether it be described by the agent or the spectator; yet, to those who would apply the inventions of the poet to the uses of philosophical investigation, it is

far from being of equal utility with the passion exactly imitated." And again: "Compare a soliloquy of Hamlet, with one of the descriptions of Roderigue in the Cid. Nothing can be more natural in the circumstances and with the temper of Hamlet, than the following reflections:

O that this too, too solid flesh would melt, etc.

In the Cid, Roderigue, who is the hero of the tragedy and deeply enamoured of Climene, is called upon to revenge a heinous insult done to his father by the father of his mistress; and he delineates the distress of his situation in the following manner, certainly with great beauty of expression and versification, but not as a real sufferer.

Perc jusque au fond du coeur
D'une atteinte imprevue aussi bien que mortelle
Miserable vengeur d'une trop juste querelle,
Et malheureux object d'une injust rigueur,
Il demeure immobile, et son ame abattue
Cede au coup qui me tue.

This harangue would better suit a descriptive novelist or narrator of the story, than the person actually concerned. Let us make the experiment. Let us change the verbs and pronouns from the first person into the third; and instead of supposing Roderigue speaks, let us imagine the state of his mind is described by a spectator: 'pierced even to the heart, by an unforeseen as well as mortal stroke, the miserable avenger of a just quarrel and the unhappy object of unjust severity, *he remains* motionless, and *his* broken spirit *yields* to the blow that destroys him'—

Il demeure immobile, et *son* ame abattue
Cede au coup qui *le* tue—

Try the soliloquy of Hamlet by the same test; and without the words 'he should,' which render it dramatic, the change will be impossible."¹ This distinction between imitating a passion and describing it, must become almost instinctive to the diligent student of Shakespeare.

Now we venture to say that no distinction can be more important to the man who hopes to grasp the true spirit of revelation. The Psalms are, most of them, PICTURES of devotion, perplexity, sorrow, penitence, trust, gratitude. The whole book of Ecclesi-

¹ A Philosophical Analysis and Illustration of some of Shakespeare's Remarkable Characters, by W. Richardson, Professor of Humanity, Glasgow, Introduction, p. 17.

astes, has scarcely a direct sentiment in it. It is the utterance of the *feelings* of a man wandering without faith, and disappointed in the pursuit of the world. Dr. Dwight was surely no mean man, and moreover he was a poet; and yet if the reader will look into his first volume of Miscellaneous Sermons, sermon XVII, he will see how totally at a loss he was from not understanding this great principle of interpretation. He supposes Ecclesiastes 3: 12 to be a formal proposition, having all the authority of inspiration; and if so, why not take one step more, and say, we must believe that somehow the 19th verse is true: "For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no preeminence above a beast."

The other lesson, taught us by Shakespeare, is, the wisdom of certain rules in restoring a copy which, to a man not familiar with the subject, appears very perverse and paradoxical. One of Griesbach's¹ rules is, that the harsher reading is often to be preferred, to the more easy and obvious one; and this appears very strange to some, as having no other tendency than to fill the Bible with ungrammatical structures and unauthorized sentiments. No doubt the principle may be pushed too far; but its necessity and wisdom are abundantly confirmed by studying the text of Shakespeare. Thus in Othello, Act I, Scene 1, Iago says of Cassio:

A fellow almost damned in a fair wife.

As it appears afterwards that Cassio was not married, it has been proposed to read for *wife*, *life*, supposing the poet to allude to Luke 6: 26, "Wo unto you when all men shall speak well of you." I am, however, inclined to the old reading. For first, Shakespeare seldom alludes to the Bible; secondly, the difficulty arises from not understanding the pregnant meaning of the word *almost*. We find from the play that Cassio was connected with Bianca, and that it was rumored that he was going to marry her, though the rumor was "the monkey's own giving out. She is persuaded I will marry her, out of her own love and flattery, not out of my promise." The phrase, therefore, "almost damned in a fair wife," means, he is on the verge of being married to a harlot. This use of the word *almost*, however unusual in other writers, is exquisitely Shakespearean, and is no doubt the true reading. So in Macbeth, we have these lines:

¹ I quote from memory. I forget how Griesbach expresses it; but it is something to this effect.

I have lived long enough : my way of life
 Is fallen into the sear, the yellow leaf ;
 And that which should accompany old age,
 As honor, love, obedience, troops of friends,
 I must not look to have ; but in their stead
 Curses, not loud but deep ; mouth-honor, breath,
 Which the poor heart would fain deny, but dare not.¹

In some of the copies it is " my MAY of life is fallen into the sear, the yellow leaf." Here I should be inclined to the new reading, if it were Dryden, Lee, or Rowe. " May of life," would be far more natural and easy ; or perhaps Spring of life—vernal season. But not so Shakespeare. He hates to be prescriptive, and loves to be specific ; and " May of life," for its vernal season, would not be unnatural in a poet whose diction is always his own.

The genius of Shakespeare, is like a vast pile of buildings, lighted up by the midnight conflagration ; where the splendor of the fire meets the smoking rafters—astonishing sublimity and meanness, conjoined and reconciled in the blazing ruin.

ARTICLE VI.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PROFESSOR VOIGT AND THE BISHOP OF ROCHELLE.

Translated by Professor Emerson.

[The following letters are taken from the last edition of Prof. Voigt's *Life and Times of Hildebrand*.²

Before presenting the letters, it is needful to give some account of the work itself by which they were occasioned and to which they so frequently refer. On its own account, too, the work is well worthy of a more extended notice than can here be given, being one of the most interesting and important productions of the kind. It everywhere bears marks of a thorough acquaintance with the original sources, and of a vigorous and inde-

¹ Macbeth, Act V, Scene 3.

² Hildebrand als Papst Gregorius der Siebente, und sein Zeitalter, aus den Quellen dargestellt von Johannes Voigt, Geheimer Regierungsrath, ordentlicher Professor der Geschichte an der Universität zu Königsberg, u. s. w. Zweite, vielfach veränderte Auflage.—Weimar, 1846, 88. 635.

pendent mind. The events portrayed are exceedingly numerous and well arranged, and cast so strong a light on that profoundly dark and eventful period, as to bring the eleventh century almost as near to us as the fifteenth.

According to Prof. Voigt, the grand object of Hildebrand (Gregory VII.), was, to purify the church from simony, to enforce the celibacy of the clergy, and to elevate the papal above the imperial throne. All three of these objects were intimately connected together. In order to suppress what he called simony, the pope must be able to punish the princes as well as the clergy for practising it—the sellers as well as the buyers of benefices. And in order to remove from the clergy the temptation to simony, and to emancipate them from a sordid dependence on the State, they must abandon their wives and families and live on nothing. Thus detached from servility to the civil power, the clergy would unite harmoniously with their head in subjecting the princes to his sway. This threefold object was the grand effort of Gregory's life. To its accomplishment he devoted all the energies of his mighty mind, both before and after his elevation to the throne. A more complicated and arduous task was never assumed by a mortal. For in achieving it, he had to subjugate, not only the kings, but also his own clergy, and to encounter, not only the worst, but also the best as well as the strongest passions of our nature—ambition, avarice, luxury, and likewise the fondness for the domestic relations. Nothing but a concurrence of the most favorable circumstances could have enabled even a Hildebrand to succeed at all in such a crusade against human nature. And even he, after a twelve-year's struggle and after the most wonderful successes, fell at last in the conflict, uttering, as his last words, "I have loved righteousness and hated iniquity, and therefore I die in banishment."

To him, the exaltation of the papacy was the perfection of righteousness. Prof. Voigt, however, does not indulge in remarks of this kind. Most of his censure is bestowed on the vicious antagonist of Gregory, the emperor Henry IV; and the entire work is fitted to give a more favorable view of that pope, if not of popery itself, than the one generally entertained by Protestants. This feature of the work has given it a rare popularity in papal countries, and subjected the author for a while, to the suspicion, both among papists and protestants, of being a covert papist. And hence, as will be seen, the occasion for the ensuing correspondence. To himself and those best acquainted with him, these

suspicions were as amusing as they were baseless. And his book together with his correspondence, instead of fixing on him the base charge of treachery to the good cause of Protestantism, has only led, from step to step, to the present high offices he holds under a government so watchfully Protestant as that of Prussia.

The first edition of the work appeared in 1815 when the author was a young man. He had spent four years in preparing it. Several impressions were subsequently printed, but no improved edition before the recent one here noticed. In 1819, the work was printed by the papists in Austria, and widely read by the clergy. The report was circulated from Austria, that pope Pius VII had even hired Prof. Voigt to write it. In 1840, an Italian translation was published in Milan, and circulated in Italy.

Previously, in 1838, a French translation was published in Paris, of which three impressions were soon called for. These translations appear to have been made by papists, and without the knowledge of the author. The French translation was made by the Abbe Jager, accompanied by notes. A copy of this translation came into the hands of the bishop of Rochelle, and induced him to address his first very artful letter to the author,—doubtless a fair specimen of many a proselyting epistle to other men from kindred sources. A complete collection of such letters if practicable, would doubtless afford much instruction as well as amusement, and might cast an important light on the mysterious conversion of many a proselyte to the papal or the semi-papal faith.—T₂.]

“Clement Villecourt, by the divine compassion and the favor of the apostolical see, bishop of Rochelle, to the renowned Professor J. Voigt, of the University of Halle.

“Most illustrious Professor,—Wonder and admiration have attended me while reading the equally learned and pious pages you have written on the Life and Pontificate of Gregory VII. For since I had read the posthumous works of the celebrated Leibnitz, I had nowhere found among the Reformed, a more candid mind or more perfect wisdom.

“Who is this? I said (while day and night holding in my hand such a work); who, this writer, of such admirable judgment? Is he a follower of Luther, or of Calvin? But how a Lutheran, or a Calvinist? But to whichever standard he belongs, who is less hostile to the church of Rome, nay, equally friendly?

“At all events, this epistle shall be the interpreter and the wit-

ness of my great veneration for you. But if you would inquire further and know my desires and wishes, I will say freely and fully what I think. *Vehemently do I wish you a Catholic.*

"I implore God Almighty and shall pray without ceasing for the most learned Mr. Voigt. And what shall I ask? this; that since he acknowledges in his illustrious history of Gregory, that as there is one God so is there *one faith, one church, and also one head*, he may thus openly profess himself a son of the Catholic church, after having given so great a proof of his being a friend—if I may not say a soldier—of the holy see.

"The swift years are passing; eternity is at hand. O, with what exultation will Gregory, now crowned in heaven, meet so pious a defender entering the sacred courts! With what embraces will he clasp you as a *Catholic*!!

"Arise! and on! Let not the light that is in thee be darkness. After such innumerable conflicts of Gregory as thou hast graphically described, such solitudes, so many labors, so many persecutions, wilt thou, illustrious and faithful writer, wilt thou, another Cobbett, fear the onsets of sophists, the scoffs of the abandoned, the weapons of sectaries, or the loss of either wealth or fame? Look at the Turenns, the Stolbergs, the Hallers, after the Papins, the Perrons, the Spondans, etc., as crowned with the laurels of orthodoxy, after abandoning the armor of the sectaries. From their celestial seats they invoke and incite you, an exile navigating the billows of error, and now nearing the haven of truth, and chide your delay. Inwardly, you are now a Catholic, they say; you believe with the heart unto righteousness: may you now profess faith with the mouth unto salvation. The learned applaud you: it is a small thing: the orthodox now applaud you.

"May God deign long to preserve to us a teacher so illustrious, a professor of the university at Halle so erudite, a writer of the history of Gregory so veracious and candid, and meriting so much from the Romish church.

"By this letter, from my hand, may the Holy Ghost reveal to you, most excellent sir, the secrets of a heart devoted to you.

"O that he could embrace you, and revere you, and honor you as present, who as absent, embraces and reveres and honors you.

CLEMENT, *bishop of Rochelle.*

"Rochelle, Feb. 12, 1839."

Our author remarks that he had good reasons for delaying, for some months, an answer to the bishop's letter. In the mean

time, the bishop also addressed a letter of thanks to Frederick Hurter for his *Life of Innocent III*, in which he expresses his fear that "the learned professor of Halle had taken it ill that" he had poured out so freely the wishes of his heart to him, and therefore he would not speak so freely to Frederick Hurter of Schaffhausen. An extract from this letter is given in Voigt's preface, with a brief notice of its contents, by which it would seem that the bishop of Rochelle was much pleased with Hurter's work, but thought it not wise to make quite so undisguised an assault on his fidelity as a Protestant.

At length Dr. Voigt made the following reply :

"Most Venerable Sir! Most Excellent and Reverend Bishop!

"Your letter to me, some months ago, respecting my account of the Life and Pontificate of Gregory VII, was the occasion of both joy and sorrow. For I greatly rejoiced at finding in you, as appears from your letter, a man distinguished for piety and learning, and also for sincerity of mind and zeal for the church, and one whose words accord with his thoughts, and his acts with his words, and who, not at all imbued with hatred of heretics, as they are called, even loves, and esteems, and honors those who acknowledge not only one God, but also one faith, one church, and one head, although not that which is at Rome. For you yourself, most venerable Sir, in your kind words, have frankly professed that you sincerely esteem and honor me, though not a Catholic. And therefore, from my inmost soul, I also esteem and honor you as of high merit in your church, and a most learned and ingenuous man; just as, while describing the life and pontificate of Gregory VII, I admired, and shall forever admire and honor him as the hero of the church and a man of splendid virtues and firmness of mind and tenacity of purpose. For it becomes one, when describing the achievements of men, to admire and honor all who excel in virtue, magnanimity, elevation of mind, genius, and probity. Truly, therefore, do I revere both Socrates and Caesar, both Mohammed and Gregory VII, both Luther and Frederick II, king of Prussia. And this veneration, and respect, and love of all truly excellent men, appears to me as it were the true holy spirit with which every historian must be imbued if he would unveil what I may call the divine revelation in the history of nations.

"But, as I have already said, your letter also gave me pain, and that because, most reverend Sir, you regard me, not so much as a veracious and pious historian, as one 'still sailing amid the bil-

lows of error, though now just nearing the haven of truth,' (which, in your opinion, is the Catholic church,) and who, most reverend Sir, you say you greatly wish were a Catholic, and whom you seem to revere and love; for in this matter and in your opinion of me, and your wishes and desires respecting my mind and will, you greatly err. I, indeed, with you, acknowledge and revere both one God and one faith, the truly Christian faith; and one church, the common society of all upright, pious and good Christians; and also one head of this church, Christ, the Saviour of all Christians and the Fountain of all our salvation. But with me it never was, nor is, nor will be, that Roman or Catholic faith which they call the only true faith; never that Roman or Catholic church, which they say is the only saving church; never that Romish priest whom they call the true head of the church.

"But if, to use your own words, you would know my wishes and desires respecting you, I will, reverend Sir, as you have done to me, tell you frankly and fully what I think. With a pious and candid mind I esteem and honor you for your sincerity and piety, for your high and amply attested merits in the cause of the Romish church, and for your zeal in ecclesiastical matters and in your faith; and yet, as I do not wish you a Lutheran, so neither may you wish me a Catholic. May you rather beseech Almighty God, of his grace and clemency, to lead not only me, but all men, to the true faith, the true and saving church, and the head of our church, Jesus Christ. Pray also, I beseech you, that, not Gregory VII, but Christ himself, our Saviour, may meet me when I enter heaven. And certainly, most venerable Sir, do I pray instantly for you, that the gates to the seats of the blessed may at length be opened to you by the true Head and King of the church, the Saviour of all Christians.

"Farewell, then, and receive this epistle from me as the sincere witness and interpreter of my cordial esteem and high regard for you.

Farewell, your most obedient,

JOHN VOIGT, *Prof. of Hist. in the University
of Königsberg.*

Königsberg (in Eastern Prussia), June 23, 1839."

Here, as Prof. Voigt supposed, the matter was ended. But the bishop seemed to think it expedient again to address him, partly by way of apology for the bold advances he had made.

Prof. Voigt, as appears from the date of his letter, had now
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been transferred to his present office in the University at Königsberg.

The following is the last letter of the bishop to him.

“ *Rochelle*, Aug. 8, 1839.

“ Most learned Professor!

“ Your long-desired letter at length reached Rochelle, while, like a father among his children, I was presiding over the annual assembly of the clergy of my diocese. For it is the custom in France for the parochial clergy, once a year, to devote themselves entirely to spiritual exercises, for eight days, in order that, after shaking off the dust of the world, with which even pious hearts are sometimes defiled, they may return the more alert, prompt, unshackled, to their sacred duties.

“ With eager hands I received the epistle, the organ of your heart, read with attentive eyes, and as an anxious friend meditated with all emotion. I pondered the words; I sought in your sentences that holy and immaculate religion which alone and everywhere is dear to me; joyful I followed you rejoicing, and sad I followed you sad, being mindful of Paul's direction, to ‘rejoice with those that do rejoice, and weep with those that weep.’

“ I neither deny nor dissent, most excellent Sir; as I ought, I do sincerely esteem and honor you, though not a Catholic. For even if the treasures of your wisdom and learning did not wonderfully commend you, (and in that respect, with what regard and emotion should I embrace you!), who would dare pronounce any one an exile from the bonds of that charity which the Saviour commands to know no bounds? I agree with you in the sentiment, that men of magnanimity, genius, and probity, are to be greatly admired for these endowments.

“ But nothing more can be required. For we are not to honor the daemon of Socrates, the luxury of Caesar, the robberies and adulteries of Mohammed. Of the rest I say nothing. I also admit that true wisdom, wherever found, comes from the Most High, and is an exhalation of God's virtue, a real emanation of the splendor of the Almighty, and the brightness of the eternal light, however difficult it may seem to me to decide where this true wisdom is found, especially in those out of the visible body of the church.

“ But how the love of this wisdom can be called the Holy Spirit himself (I speak frankly), I can by no means see. Nor

do I perceive how the encomium of this wisdom, whatever it be, can be called a revelation.¹

"I now come to the points in my letter which gave pain to your excellent heart. Be assured then, honored Sir, that this was contrary to my intention. For why should I wound one who has not injured me, when Christ forbids me to hate, nay, commands me to love, even my enemy? Are you not my neighbor and brother? I therefore receive and love you, my neighbor and brother, even as myself. Indeed, I peculiarly embrace you, as no ordinary brother, but as one learned and filled with the precious treasures of science. And what wonder, then, if I should wish your soul and mine, which are already connected by so many similar sentiments, bound together by the same religious bonds? Truly did I most ardently wish you a Catholic, and an avowed one, when I viewed you as just on the threshold of the Catholic church. Yet I erred, you say. But you will please to pardon this error, as not malicious, nor insidious, nor feigned. In disclosing to you my mind and my desires, I considered myself as joining in Christ's prayer to the Father, that all might become one and be joined together in unity. For what can the one God desire, if not unity? For, to use the words of the apostle: Christ gave some apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers, for the edification of the body of Christ, until we all come to the *unity of the faith*, that we now be no more as children, tossed to and fro and carried about by every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, by craftiness, to the circumventions of error; but that, doing the truth, we may grow in him who is the head, even Christ.

"A great impiety I grant it would be, to deny Christ to be the invisible head of the church; for all true Christians of all ages have so received and acknowledged him. For otherwise, the words of the Spouse of the church would not be true: I am a king—I am the vine, and ye are the branches. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, no more can ye except ye abide in me. Without me ye can do nothing. I will not leave you orphans.—Lo, I am with you alway even unto the end of the world.

"But the church is a kingdom, and a visible kingdom; and a visible kingdom requires a visible prince, just as a family a father, although we have a father in heaven from whom all paternity is derived.

¹ In these two points, the bishop strangely mistakes or else perverts the bold but well guarded figures of speech which our author saw fit to employ, as the reader will perceive by recurring to Prof. Voigt's letter.—Tx.

" You reject the Roman pontiff as head of the church. I confess, I expected no such thing ; especially as I saw you so ready, shall I say so pious, a defender of the pontiff as assailed for many ages by the rage of a thousand calumniating foes.

" Melanchthon, Grotius, Leibnitz, acknowledged the beautiful monarchy in the church ; and thence greatly lamented that the Roman pontiff was rejected by the Reformers, and saw and hoped for the remedy to the calamities of Christians, from that corner stone on which Christ built his church, that was forever to vanquish the gates of hell. With those learned professors I also associated you, a learned professor, rejoicing thus to magnify both you and my high respect for you. Pardon at least my intention, however grievous to you may have been the expression of my desires. Doubtless I should have been silent, had I foreseen the pain it would give.

" With many errors and even pernicious heresies, have the reformed reproached the reformed. These cannot have escaped the notice of so learned a man as yourself. I by no means doubted your rejection of these errors, these heresies, though sailing amid their billows. To me the language of your narrative savored of neither an errorist nor a heretic. Do you expect me to change my opinion ? ' But the Romish faith,' you say, ' neither has been, nor is, nor will be to me the only true faith.' Why then should I now discuss and dispute ? It is decided. According to you, the Catholic church has usurped the exclusive possession of truth, which other communities, teaching contrary doctrines, can also claim for themselves. For her intolerable pride, therefore, the church is to be rejected ; for how can she be tolerated, if she is a proud and unrighteous usurper ? Now, too, there exists no deposit of the faith, which deposit the apostle commanded to be kept ; but where will the deposit stand when there shall be no depositary ? For who will dare to attribute the depositary to himself, if all, though teaching contraries, may rejoice in an equal right ? Montanus says, *I enjoy the deposit* ; and the same thing is said successively by Manes, Arius, Nestorius, Eutiches, Pelagius, and so many myriads of other renovators. Good God, what a deposit of the faith ! if there is no society especially designated by Christ exclusively for its custody ! What a Christianity ! What a church ! how squalid ! how monstrous !¹

¹ Should some reflecting but illiterate Protestant be disposed here to suspect,

"Pardon me, most excellent sir; for from my inmost heart I cleave to the faith commended by Christ, the faith, I say, which was strengthened and sustained by the Saviour's prayers. Simon, Simon, saith he, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not. Always have I believed, that the faith of the prince of the apostles was confirmed and fortified by these words; and not merely the faith of Peter, the first pilot of the church (otherwise he gave nothing more to him than to the rest of the apostles), but also the faith of all Peter's successors, who were to rule the church which was at no time to be conquered by the gates of hell, the church, I say, the pillar and ground of the truth.¹ Hence the Roman Leo said, The solidity of this faith which was commended in the prince of the apostles, is perpetual; and as what Peter believed in Christ remains, so what Christ instituted in Peter, remains. Power lives in the faith of Peter, and Christ's authority excels. You will say, perhaps, that Peter is dead. But Chryologus answers, Peter always lives in his see, being represented by his successors, and ever stands before those who seek the truth. Relying on this belief, Irenaeus the disciple of Polycarp intimated, that all heretics were confounded by the Romish see and succession; Augustine boldly declared, that a cause was decided as soon as Rome had spoken; and Jerome was allied to the chair of Peter, following no other but the Roman pontiff.

"*Never, you add, is the Romish or Catholic church the only saving church.* But it was only to the pastors constituted according to the hierarchy established by himself, that Christ said, The Holy Spirit shall teach you all truth, and suggest to you all things

that the sound is in the inverse ratio to the sense, he may be assured that the above is no uncommon specimen of papal logic on such themes. Witness also what follows. It is the best that can be done in such a cause.—*TR.*

¹ So the bishop has always believed. Peter was distinguished from the other apostles only by Christ's thus praying that his faith might not fail. And this prayer was to be equally answered in all his successors on the papal throne, making them the effective guardians of the *sacred deposit* and the sure guides of the church. Even a Borgia, acknowledged by Catholics themselves to have been one of the wickedest of men, and utterly *destitute* of Christian faith, was to have his *faith* so strengthened that it would never fail him. And on this hangs all the supremacy of the Romish church.

So our bishop believes. And on his belief of such a point, and on the very doubtful belief of certain early writers whom he proceeds to cite respecting the supremacy of Rome, he seems still to hope that such men as Prof. Voigt may be induced to suspend their faith.—*TR.*

whatsoever I shall have said unto you ; go ye therefore and teach all nations. They who alone have the truth, and who alone are sent to teach, how shall they not alone have and confer salvation ? Do not the way, the truth, and the life walk with equal steps ? He walks in darkness who follows not Christ, the way, the truth, and the life. He follows not Christ, who hears not the church constituted by Christ ; and he is to be regarded as a heathen and a publican. Truth, too, is one ; for as, according to Paul, there is no coming together of light with darkness, and of Christ with Belial, so neither in a collection of various and alien doctrines with eternal truth.

“ Perhaps you will imagine all who are born of non-Catholic parents to be condemned by me. Judge me not so, I earnestly beseech you. I know many, who belong not to the body of the Catholic church, to belong to the soul of the church ; very many to err, and not to be heretics. Truly desirable it is, that all should be united to the external body of the church, that all within and without may be one body in Christ ; but it is one thing to long for this union, and another to condemn the erring and thrust them all indiscriminately into hell.

“ Many things still remain to be said respecting your letter ; but there is a time to be silent and a time to speak. But, candid professor, though you do not admit the expression of my wishes, yet do not, I pray you, reprobate the earnest longings of my heart as also not to be uttered.

“ Daniel was heard because he was a man of longing desires ; but you would not that my sighs for you be heard. But at least, if I am not deceived, the hour will come, known only to the Omnipotent, when you will no longer regard me as a stranger. Too happy shall I be, if the Holy Spirit himself shall penetrate and vivify us with the same unction. Meanwhile, if the impulse of your conscience induce you to pray for me, most certainly the prayers of your heart will not hurt me. Let Christ mould these and you will be safe.

“ You would not that Gregory VII, but that Christ should meet you as you enter the celestial palace ; and yet I confidently say, if it be given you to enter the celestial palace, you will exult at Christ's meeting you, and yet will not repel Gregory. You have celebrated and honored him when dead. You will salute and caress and admire him when glittering in splendor. He opening his arms to you, you will also open yours to him. At home you will not be an enemy to him whom you defended in exile. For

'you, learned Sir, most sincerely do I long for the day that shall know no end; the only true and unfailing glory; the only unfading crown.

"Thus put I an end to the interchange of letters between us. I desire, as I ought, to live and die a Catholic. Do not condemn the charity of the holy mother church when offering her bosom, though you refuse her breast. As I unroll the book of eternity, as I think of the snares of error, as I recollect the enemies of truth, as I ponder the fallacies of a trifle-loving life, for myself and my friends I beg for whatever is good and holy and safe, and dread whatever is injurious, and despise what is transient, and fear what is perilous. For what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul!

"Farewell, dear Professor, and do not repel my complaisance.

CLEMENT, *bishop of Rochelle.*"

Prof. Voigt informs us, that he did not think it worth while to go any deeper into the discussion, and here the correspondence was closed. The letters were read to a few confidential friends, and a copy of the first two was given to a person of distinction, through whom they found their way to the king of Prussia. The king was so much pleased with Dr. Voigt's letter to the bishop, that he ordered his ministers to write a brief note to Dr. Voigt, expressive of his high satisfaction. This note and the bishop's last letter reached Dr. Voigt at about the same time; and he was earnestly pressed to publish the whole correspondence. But sentiments of delicacy towards the bishop, who had spoken to him in language of such respect and affection, prevented him, for some years, from yielding to such entreaties. At length, however, in 1844, he found to his surprise, that the bishop had been restrained by no such delicacy. Soon after the correspondence was closed, which was written in Latin, a translation of the whole had been published in a French journal, "*Ami de la Religion*," in December, 1839; and from this French translation another had been made into German and published in a Catholic journal of February, 1840. Nor was this the worst of the matter. 'On comparing the translation with the original letters, Prof. Voigt found in many passages the sense of the words in part so altered and in part so craftily beclouded, that he could not sufficiently wonder how one could allow himself in such mistranslations and distortions.'

By such a use of these letters, and by further learning of a so-

ciety which existed in the diocese of Rochelle for the express purpose of making proselytes to the papal church, and which gloried in its great success at the period when the letters were written, Prof. Voigt 'became perfectly convinced that the bishop, in his letters to himself and Hurter, had merely in view the work of proselyting, and that his panegyrical compliments were merely allurements to the only saving church.'

These letters of the zealous bishop may afford us some idea of the means employed by the Romish church for making proselytes in this country and England as well as in France and Germany, and may well increase the conviction that secret arts have been very extensively used to excite and increase the widespread movement in the papal direction. Rome is as wise in the selection of her objects as in the use of her enchantments. Occasionally she may mistake, as in the case of Voigt and of Hurter. But men of feeblér intellect and greater vanity, or more superstitious propensities, fall a more easy prey.

ARTICLE VII.

THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.

By Rev. Henry B. Smith, West Amesbury, Mass.

Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte von Dr. K. R. Hagenbach, Prof. der Theol. in Basel. Erster Theil. Bis auf Johannes Damascenus. Zweiten Theiles erste Hälfte. Von Johannes Damascenus bis auf die Reformation. Zweiten Theiles zweite Hälfte. Von der Reformation bis auf unsere Zeit. Leipzig: 1840-41.

Compendium of the History of Doctrines. By K. R. Hagenbach. Translated by Carl W. Buch. Vol. I. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. [Clark's Foreign Theological Library, Vol. III.] 1846.

Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, von Dr. F. Ch. Bauer, ordentl. Professor der evangelischen Theologie an der Universität Tübingen. Stuttgart, 1847.

No book is at present more needed in our theological literature than a good history of doctrines. Dr. Murdock's translation

of Münscher's compendium is the only work to which our students have had access, and that is too meagre to satisfy the wants of a zealous inquirer, and is too far behind the present state of historical research in Germany to be of any decisive authority. It is remarkable, that while the English as a people are averse to speculation, and much more at home in history and in facts, they have been far less earnest, of later years, in investigating the records of the past, than have their more speculative and imaginative German neighbors. Especially is this the case in respect to the doctrinal history of Christianity, which is almost unknown, even by name, to the English literature, but which has been prosecuted with the greatest ardor and research in Germany.¹

Such a work would be of the greatest advantage to our theological literature in several ways. It would tend to relieve the too abstract character of many of our theological speculations. It would serve to make more clear to our minds the exact position of a particular doctrine in the whole scheme of Christianity; and thus keep us from laying an inordinate stress upon a truth which is of inferior moment. It would be one of the most effectual means of dissipating a too fond reverence for the past; and also of increasing our love to those abiding truths which we should find running through the whole course of the history of Christ's church, and determining its fortunes. Neither Tractarianism nor Socinianism would be possible to a mind that thoroughly understood the course of Christian doctrine. It would serve to make us tolerant of incidental errors, and firm in our belief of essential truth. It would deliver us both from a morbid fear and a morbid love of new theories. We should not be so apt to imagine that Christianity must stand or fall by one particular, and it may be novel, theory on one particular subject. It will bring before our minds the different phases both of truth and error; and both the errors and the wisdom of the past may help to make us wise. Thus our theological systems might become less abstract and more profound; our catholicity of feeling be enlarged; our confidence in the ultimate triumph of truth made more firm. Such a history would also serve

¹ It is a grievous reproach to the theological literature of England, that the two most interesting chapters in doctrinal history which that country has produced are to be found in the pages of Gibbon. The influence of his infidelity would have been greatly diminished had any of the English divines been able to present the results of equal research in a style as attractive as that which marks his narration of the controversies about the Trinity and the Incarnation in the twenty-first and forty-seventh chapters of his *History*.

to increase our knowledge of any particular doctrine in its relations to others, and likewise to make our views respecting it more precise. We should see its various phases, and under what influences these were formed, and be enabled to distinguish the permanent truth from the transient form. Such a course of investigation, too, is absolutely essential to a thorough understanding of the true character and the exact meaning of the Confessions of Faith which are most generally received among us. Single phrases in these symbols are the ripened fruit of ages of prolonged discussion. Both orthodoxy and heresy will thus be illumined by new lights. We may, also, here obtain new help in our defence against error, and, if it be needful, oppose the preponderant authorities in favor of the truth to the scattered opinions which heresy loves to cite. "It is many times with fraudulent design," it has been said, "that men stick their corrupt doctrines with the cloves of other men's wit;" and the best way of opposing this design is not, as this same author would have it, to rely wholly upon our own resources, but rather to show, that if error has its hundreds, truth has still its tens of thousands. For the systematic study of theology, also, a zealous study of the course of Christian doctrines would be of inestimable benefit. It would transfuse a new life into our systems. One of the best accompaniments of a course of systematic divinity would be a history that should trace the progress of each doctrine from the earliest times until now. Nor would such a work answer an unimportant purpose in deepening our faith in the divine and permanent authority of the sacred Scriptures. For, one of the most significant results of such a history is the evidence it affords, that the human race in its whole progress has not gone beyond the metes and bounds which the Bible gives. It is the life of the Scriptures which has passed over into the life of the church, and formed the very substance of all its doctrines. In all discussion and controversy, the human race has not advanced beyond the sacred truths and facts laid down in this marvellous volume.

It is a striking fact, noticed by Kliefoth, a profound inquirer into the idea of a History of Doctrines, that Christianity is the only system of religion which has what can properly be called *doctrines*.

Here alone do we find regular systems of doctrine, and a succession of such systems. No other form of religion which the world has known has ever produced any exposition of its articles of belief, which could for a moment be compared, even as exhibitions of intellectual power, with the theological systems which Christianity

has been always bringing into being. Mohammedism has its Koran, but where are its theologians? The Greek and Roman mythologies had, properly speaking, no doctrines, nothing which might serve as the foundation for a system of theology. As soon as a Greek or Roman began to think, he began to be a philosopher, and not a theologian. Plato did not speculate upon the gods, nor upon the articles of the Grecian faith; but he speculated upon the principles of the human mind, and upon the laws of being and action. The old dispensation, under the Jews, as compared with the new dispensation, also serves to illustrate the same fact. Christian theologians have made, and justly so, the Jewish dispensation a part of their systems of theology; they have shown where it should stand in such a system; but this the Jews themselves never attempted. They had prophets, but not theologians. They had a revelation, but no theology, strictly so called. They had doctrines, but no system of doctrines. Some reasons for this difference between the two dispensations, might be assigned, but we now content ourselves with simply noting the fact.

What is true of Christianity in regard to preaching, is also true in regard to theologizing: it is the only system of religion which has produced preachers and theologians. As it is only here that we find sermons, so it is only here that we have systems of theology. But not only is it a distinctive characteristic of the Christian religion that it has its doctrines, which are matters of faith, and its system of doctrine which have grown out of the doctrines themselves; but it has likewise had a *succession* of such systems. Each age, each "dogmatic period," as it has been called, will be found to have had a system of doctrines, or discussions upon certain doctrines, peculiar to itself. In one point of view, we may say, that there has been a perpetual flux, an unceasing change. The system of theology which satisfied John of Damascus, would not satisfy the "angelical doctor." Luther was a lover of Augustine, but the central point of Luther's system was different from that of Augustine; Calvin was an Augustinian, and yet the *Civitas Dei* was quite inadequate to satisfy the wants of the immortal author of the *Institutes*, or the wants of his times. Jonathan Edwards would not disdain the name of Calvinist; but Calvin could not have written such a treatise as that on the Freedom of the Will, nor such an essay as that on the Nature of True Virtue. No council of bishops from the whole Christian church of the first five centuries, could have drawn up such a Confession of Faith as that of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, nor would it have

issued such decrees and anathemas as are those of the Council of Trent. The terminology of the ancient church is no less strange to our ears, than would be ours to them. We find it difficult to understand their systems of subordination; they might be as little at home in our speculations upon free-agency. If they contended for an *iota* in respect to the doctrine of the Son, do not we for a dot in the deciphering of a manuscript? If they, for abstractions in respect to the Godhead, do not we for abstractions in respect to decrees? They defended Christianity against Judaizing ceremonies, and Hellenistic sophistry, and Gnostic reveries; but a different attitude of defence must be assumed, when it is opposed by philosophical deists, and rationalizing critics, and Romish superstition, and pantheistic transcendentalists.

In the different periods of the history of the church, it will be found, either that a different circle of doctrines is discussed; or, that the same doctrines are viewed under different relations and in new aspects, and exposed to the brunt of a fresh class of opponents, assailing it with a new series of questions. Thus Neander, in his *History of the Church*, has shown with admirable skill how the doctrinal questions which agitated the church of the first centuries were quite different from those discussed in the middle ages; the former having most to do with *theological* subjects, in the strict etymological sense of the term, with the relation of the Son to the Father, and of the Holy Spirit to both; while the latter were chiefly concerned with anthropological inquiries, and with the conflict about nature and grace. A new series of problems was introduced by the Reformation, described by one author (Kliefoth) as centering in the doctrine of Redemption (Soteriology), while Hagenbach, looking at the subject from a different point of view, describes as the age of "polemico-ecclesiastical Symbolism." The same writer designates the times in which we now stand, as "the age of criticism and of speculation, in which faith and knowledge, philosophy and Christianity, reason and revelation, are held up in contrast with each other, and their reconciliation attempted." "The very existence of Christianity is at stake;" and all present discussions "are preparing the way for a new period, for which history has as yet no name." The tendency of all present discussions, it has been said, is towards the questions connected with the nature of the church, and, still further, towards the union of all the separate churches in one great body. Whether we accede to such very general statements, or not, whatever we may think as to the entire applicability of such broad descriptions,

yet no reader of church history can fail to feel that they are of value in distinguishing one epoch from another; and, though they may express only a part of the truth, yet that part is what is too often neglected in our ordinary estimation of history. One set of doctrines is more fully discussed in one age and another in another. Centuries may elapse before there is any perceptible advance upon the decisions and conclusions of a given epoch, in respect to certain questions; but, meanwhile, the church has not been idle; it has entered upon a new series of investigations on other points. By and bye, the acts upon the former subjects, long since supposed to be closed, are again opened; the same doctrines reappear, yet never, or hardly ever, are they discussed in the same way. The terminology is altered; new questions are raised. The principles and results of intervening discussions are applied to this revived circle of doctrines. How different the Trinitarian controversy in the English church, in the latter part of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, from the Trinitarian controversy in the age of Athanasius! We are discussing the same doctrines which were in contest between Augustine and Pelagius, and yet who would now be content with the weapons then used, or the answers then given?

But the history of the changes, and differences of theological opinions, is not the most important or satisfactory part of their history. Where we see only change, we long for rest. Councils affirming and councils denying the same truths, combatants equally eager on both sides of some great question, doctrines with shifting phases from age to age, constant struggle succeeded only by a renewal of struggle, controversy after controversy, controversy within controversy and controversy about controversy, all this may be seen and disparaged by the most unpractised eye. Such an endless multiplicity of conflicting details, were this all, might indeed make a reader of church history faint-hearted and disheartened. Any one might be led to seek for relief in indifference or in devotion to some other pursuit. And the current modes of representing these doctrinal discussions, have helped to make men averse to the study of the history of doctrines. They are presented in scattered notices and fragmentary hints. They are given in the form:—such a man thought so, and another man thought otherwise. The most extravagant notions of the best and worst of men, the vagaries of the orthodox and the paradoxes of the heterodox, have been most diligently served up. And so, many a

sound divine has been made willing to forget that the doctrines he is discussing have been ever before discussed, or to remember past controversy only so far as it gives him help in a present emergency. And the best of Christians have been glad to close the book of controversy, in order to come back to the book of authority; to shut their eyes upon the spectacle of human passion and infirmity, in order to open them to the clear light of the divine Word. The Fathers have been more quoted in detached passages, than examined in their whole spirit; and many have ridiculed who have not read them; the schoolmen seem to be flitting about in a thick darkness, where no ray of light has penetrated, and where no research will discover more than a penumbra; the Reformers have received more adulation than examination. When any of them are known to be for us, they are quoted and praised; when they are not for us, if quoted they are reviled; and when they are neither for us nor against us, they are neither quoted, nor praised, nor reviled. And when they are quoted, it is in isolated sentences, for polemic ends, and too often without regard to the different characteristics of different ages, to the differences in the usage of the leading terms, and in the general bearings of their theological systems. And thus the whole history of doctrines, (if indeed even the notion of such a history has been made clear to the mind,) is looked upon as a vast collection of unconnected discussion, as an endless repetition of pleas and rejoinders for just the same truths, in the same form, from one age to another. And so many might be led to agree to a remark which an excellent minister once made, that he did not want any other history of doctrines than what the Bible gave him.

It becomes a question of some importance, then, whether there be a wiser way of looking at the changes in theological opinion. Have these ceaseless discussions answered any valuable end? Have they made truth more clear, and error more manifest? Has there been any progress, any permanent result wrought out by these prolonged and reiterated investigations? Can we find any law of order in the midst of the discord; any principles of stability in the midst of the fluctuation; any growth which is superior to decay?

That man is hardly supposed to be a rational believer in God's providential government of his church, who doubts that in the church itself as a whole, as an institution established among men for the redemption of the race, there is such progress and order and growth. As against the world the church has made ad-

vances; struggle and conflict indeed there have been, but there has also been victory. Even when it has seemed inactive, this may not have been indolence so much as repose. Even when it has seemed to retrograde we are ready to assert that "a masterly retreat" often displayed the most consummate generalship. And upon the whole, looking at the church through all the periods of its outward history, while we find it militant, we also find it to be progressive. And its external history as compared with the history of any other institution, or with the history of any nation or empire, is the most wonderful, the most pure, the most triumphant, the most progressive history, which it has been given to man's experience to know, or man's pen to write.

If it is so with the external fortunes of the church of Christ, what might we rationally infer would be the fact with its internal growth? The true life of the church of Christ is indeed a hidden life, it is hid with Christ in God; but the expression of that life is in its articles of faith, and its systems of doctrine. The truest history of the church is to be found in the history of its doctrines. Its external form has been derived from these; its external changes have by them been determined. The corruption of the church has been through corruption in its doctrines; the reformation of the church has been produced by reformation in its doctrines—the energy and illumination of the Holy Spirit being, of course and necessarily, always presupposed. The external history of the church can be written—can its internal history also be written? The former is a history of its growth in the midst of changes; is then the latter only a history of aberrations, without advance, and of eccentricities, without an orbit? The former is a history which lies at the very foundation of all modern history, and which has strangely influenced, if not determined the destinies of the nations in which the church has had its seat; has the latter, then, produced any influence upon the world of mind, and modified the opinions and speculations of mankind? And has it done this constantly and progressively? We believe that this can be shown to be the fact; that the doctrines of the Christian church, have a real history, and that it is a history, which yields to no other in its interest, its importance and its probable influence. And, while the very name of such a history is almost unknown among ourselves, while the English theology has studied the records of theological opinion almost solely for polemical ends, the patient and far-sighted and speculative German mind has entered into these researches with the most thorough investi-

gation, and brought out results of the most surprising interest. Germany already has a literature upon this subject, which, though just beginning to bear its riper fruits, is one of the most admirable products of German scholarship; and is equally distinguished for the accuracy and diligence of the examination of details, for the comprehensiveness, not to say boldness, of its general principles and results, and for the thoroughness and philosophical character of its processes.

To exhibit the evidence for this position would require a larger space than our present limits will allow. It would be interesting to inquire what is meant by a History of Doctrines; how far the works we have, correspond with the true idea of such a history;¹ and how such a history stands related to the doctrines themselves, to the immutability of truth, and above all to the divine records of our faith. The latter is a point which perhaps most of all requires a detailed examination; for it is one which in the German works with which we are acquainted has received the least attention; and yet it is one which would have the greatest influence upon the shape which should be given to such a history. Some seem to assume that the Bible is only the beginning, as it were, the seed of a new development, just as the works of Locke, for example, are of a new order of things, in the history of philosophy. With others the Scriptures express only the state of the "Christian consciousness" at the time of their appearance, even as the body of the present German theological literature expresses the present state of that same "consciousness" in Germany. Few or none seem to look upon the Bible as the source and the law of the whole history of doctrines; as being both the beginning and the end of the whole course of doctrinal discussion and progress. Yet this is the place which we believe this book ought to take, and which, by history itself can be vindicated for it. But we leave all further consideration of this subject, and also any further account of the different German works upon this branch of theological science, in order to give a general statement of some of the leading points which should be embraced in such a history, and a more particular account of the works we have placed at the head of this Article.

It should be the object of a history of doctrines to give in the truest possible manner the order in which divine truth has been unfolded in the history of the church. It must trace down the

¹ Kliefoth's *Einleitung in die Dogmengeschichte* (1839) is designed to answer this inquiry, and ably fulfils this purpose.

whole course of doctrinal discussion, give the leading characteristics of each epoch, as distinguished from all the others, and at last show just where the world now stands in the discussion of the problems which Christianity has presented to it. It should be a faithful mirror to the whole doctrinal history of the church. It must interpret each writer according to the sense of the age in which he lived, and not bring in subsequent views and modern notions to explain the meaning which an ancient writer gave to a phrase or dogma. It must show what are the points of difference in the reiterated controversies about the same doctrine. It must carefully distinguish the theological and systematic spirit of the different ages of the church, and not force a subsequent development upon an antecedent era. It must bring out into clear relief the influential personages of each age, and, in exhibiting their systems, distinguish between the peculiar notions of the individual and the general spirit of his times. It must show how controversies about one series of doctrines have modified the views held respecting other doctrines; how each doctrine has acquired a new aspect, according to its position in the mind or system of an author, or in its relation to the leading controversies of the age. It must show when a dogma was held strictly and when loosely; when disconnected from a system, and when embraced in a system. It must carefully guard against the error of supposing that when a doctrine was not carefully discussed by the inquisitive and discriminating intellect, it was not really cherished as a matter of faith. This is an error into which many have fallen. But we might as well suppose that men did not believe they had understanding, until they discussed the operations of this faculty, or did not trust to their senses until they invented a theory of sensation. Such a history must show the influence which councils, confessions and systems have had upon their respective eras, how preceding times led to such expositions of the faith, and subsequent times were affected by them. It must exhibit clearly the ruling ideas, the shaping notions in each system; and how each predominant idea has modified the component parts of the whole system. It will not neglect to notice the influence which national habits and modes of thought, which great civil and political changes, which the different philosophical schools, have had upon the formation of dogmas; nor, on the other hand, will it fail to notice how the Christian faith has itself acted upon and influenced these in its turn, if, indeed, the latter be not the point of view which should have the precedence.

Such a history must, finally, present before our eyes a picture of a real historical process, just as it has been going on, and the more faithful it is to all the leading facts of the case, the more philosophical and complete will it be as a history. By such an exhibition, the whole doctrinal progress of the Christian church being set before our eyes, we shall, in comparing its results with our own systems be able to see, wherein we are defective, one-sided and partial; wherein our systems need to be reformed, filled up or chastened; how they may be animated by a new life and gather better nurture; and, by comparing the results with the Scripture, we shall be able to see, what parts of its sacred truths have been least discussed, what problems yet remain to be solved, what is still to be done in order that our divine system of faith be wholly reproduced in the life of the church; in order that all its truths and doctrines stand out as distinctly and majestically in the history of the race, as they do in that Revelation which was given to control and determine this history.

To produce a work that would in any degree answer to such claims were no easy task. Before it could be brought into any reasonable compass there must have been a series of independent investigations upon all the leading eras, men, doctrines and general intellectual, moral and rational tendencies, which should in the work itself be presented in the form of concise and pregnant results. Such a preparatory labor has been going on in Germany for many years, and one of the best results of it is seen in *Hagenbach's Text-Book of the History of Doctrines.*¹

This work is probably the best compendium which we have upon that subject. The author belongs to that school of German theologians, already large and constantly increasing in numbers and influence, which is giving a new direction to historical investigations in theology. To Neander undoubtedly belongs the high praise of being the "father" of this school. Though it sounds very like an anachronism to call him, as he has been called, the "father of church history," that title having been already conferred upon one who lived some fifteen hundred years before him, yet he has an unquestionable right to the honor of having given the most decided impulse to the profound and extensive researches of the modern German school of historical theology. The secret of the power and influence of that school lies in sev-

¹ Since this Article was written we have noticed an advertisement of a new edition of the first volume of Hagenbach's book. Mr. Buch's translation was made from the first edition, which is also the only edition we have seen.

eral causes. It is thoroughly critical; not a phrase nor a fact is suffered to escape its notice; not a document can be found which is not examined and reexamined. Step by step it is pursuing its toilsome course backward into the history of the past, illuminating its records and making its men to live and speak and act again, and giving to all its controversies and speculations an air almost of present reality. It is also a school which is more deeply imbued with the Christian spirit than was that Rationalism which preceded it. It is not content with holding a negative, much less a hostile position, to the great facts and doctrines of the Christian revelation. While it has not yet attained to the height of the former German and our present orthodoxy, while it is averse to the precision both of the Lutheran and Reformed Confessions; it is also still more opposed to the reduction of all articles of faith to their lowest possible terms, to the emasculation of Christianity into a mere republication of what some men are pleased to call natural religion, to the confounding of theology with morality, and of the person and offices of Christ with the mission and duties of a moral teacher. Schleiermacher, with all his serious defects, did yet recall the men of his times from such an empty faith, to a higher appreciation of the reality, and the experienced reality, of the leading points in Christianity, considered as a redemptive system; and with the views of this great and generous theologian all this school are deeply imbued. The consciousness of sin, and the conscious experience of redemption through Christ; these are the two poles of his theological system. And although he gives it too subjective a character, and measures doctrines too much by experience, yet it is a subjective character wholly different from that of the antecedent rationalism. In him it is the heart, the Christian heart, which speaks, rather than the cold and lifeless understanding. And so his system has life, and his followers find that life expressed in the history of the church, in its doctrines and controversies, its usages and changes. This school, again, is animated by a truly philosophical, as well as by a general Christian spirit. While it is one of its distinguishing characteristics that it keeps the provinces of theology and philosophy strictly separate—for this was one of the leading distinctions, always carried out, in the system of Schleiermacher; yet it has not disdained to learn something even from the wise men of this world, even from the speculations of the modern German philosophy. Its attitude in respect to the results of the philosophies of Germany is hostile; but while it is exposing the in-

sufficiency of these systems to solve the problems of the Christian faith and firmly opposing their pernicious and pantheistic results ; it does this with far other weapons than those which are at the control of many, the severity of whose denunciations is equalled only by the extent of their ignorance, and who neither know nor care anything about that whereof they affirm ; and who are only careful to make their affirmations of repugnance so indiscriminate that they really become unmeaning ; who are as when one beateth the air, and is eager only to strike a heavy blow, not knowing nor caring whether he hits anything or everything.

But the German evangelical theologians are placed in a different position, and adopt a wiser course. Planted upon the fundamental truths of the Christian faith, as contained in the sacred Scriptures, and tracing the course of its doctrines down through the long series of its centuries, and finding in their own souls attestation and confirmation of the great leading features of the Christian redemption, they reject any philosophy which is at war with a faith whose origin is so divine, whose history is so wonderful, whose effects are so beneficent and unceasing. But even their philosophy has taught them better to understand the profundity of the Christian revelation, more thoroughly to investigate the cause of its history, more skilfully to trace out the connection of the different elements of the Christian faith and the sequence of its protracted controversies. It has forced upon them the necessity of so bringing out the fair and wondrous proportions of our divine religion, in contrast with the pretensions of a philosophy which claims to be universal and absolute, as to make it manifest that it is superior to the wisest and profoundest schemes which man has ever fashioned ; and in doing this they have been obliged to study its doctrines and write its history in a more philosophical and comprehensive spirit. In doing this the modes of investigation, both analytical and synthetic, which these philosophers have applied to the human consciousness, have been also made serviceable to the defence and confirmation of their faith.

The same use which American theologians make of the philosophy of Scotland, do the German divines make of the systems which their own land has brought into being. The same tendency to universality, to minute analysis, and to bringing all phenomena under the influence of all-comprehending laws and processes, which is seen in the German philosophy, their theologians have carried with them from their schools of philosophy into their

treatment of theology. But the way in which their philosophy has had the most important bearing upon their researches in the history of Christianity still remains to be mentioned. One of the tests which a German considers of valid and necessary application to a system of philosophy is, that it shall be able to explain the phenomena of history, the course of thought, the rise and fall of religions and systems ; that is, that all historical changes shall be seen to be the development of the principles and laws which are contained in their philosophical systems. This must be the claim and position of every system which aims at universality, which declares itself to be absolute. To history, then, they must go, and show that its unfalsified records will confirm the principles of their schemes. This the German systems, especially that of Hegel, have attempted ; and this is the way in which their abstract schemes have led to one of the most remarkable features in the present literary condition of that country, that is, that it seems to be giving itself up to the study of history with as fervent a zeal as ever it engaged in the discussion of metaphysical problems. The effect of this in drawing down the pride of their philosophic speculations, in compelling them to test the reality of their pantheistic abstractions by the realities of history and of life, and thus of showing the insufficiency of any pantheistic system to explain phenomena which not even one who denies the existence of matter can deny to exist, has been most signal and auspicious. Especially has this been the case with the application of the system of Hegel to the doctrines and history of Christianity, and most especially in its attempted solution of the problems contained in the person and work of our Lord. This was the rock upon which it fell and was broken. This is the reason why both Hegelian and Evangelical are engaged so earnestly in the study of history. This is one of the reasons, in addition to others connected with the whole character of the Lutheran theology, which has led to those more careful and profound investigations in the history of Christian doctrine, which have already produced a literature unrivalled by any on the same subject in any other land. All this is, indeed, in one point of view, a reaction from, but, in another point of view, it is a necessary consequence of, their daring attempts after a universal and absolute system. And the more history, and especially the history of Christian doctrines, has been thus studied the more deep seems to be the conviction of the German mind, that the historical problems are greater than are the problems of mere speculation, and

that no system can be true which perverts or disallows the substantial verities of the Christian faith, as exhibited in the Bible, in the church, in its history, and in the history of its doctrines. And so in the end it may be found, that the German philosophy, like all other systems, shall only contribute to enhance the glories of the truth as it is in Jesus.

It might be interesting and profitable to give a somewhat extended account of what the German mind has been doing in respect to the history of doctrines; but this we must waive for the present. They have produced, in succession, a series of valuable works, covering the whole ground, of which those that stand at the head of this Article are among the more recent. Münscher, Ruperti, Lentz, Augusti, Klee, Engelhardt, Baumgarten-Crusius,¹ and Meier, have all published able and learned works. Those of Engelhardt and Baumgarten-Crusius contain the results of the most thorough study of the original sources. Kliefoth has published an Introduction to the History of Doctrines, which is truly admirable, though pervaded somewhat too exclusively by the spirit of Schleiermacher's system of theology. But after all these works, we still believe that those portions of Neander's Church History which relate to the history of doctrines, are the most attractive, impartial, and truly philosophical, of any which have hitherto been written. His acquaintance with the original sources is probably unrivalled. His general tone is both Christian and humane. If he is often too tolerant of error, this is a more venial fault than a harsh intolerance, and less likely to pervert his critical

¹ The work of Baumgarten-Crusius was first published in 1832. Its learning is immense. Under a different title (*Compendium* instead of *Lehrbuch*), the first volume was re-written, and published in 1840. The second volume, containing the special history, was published in 1846, under the editorship of Hase. The text of this volume was all written out, "only the notes are wanting," said the author, just before his decease, to the editor; an important deficiency, since more than half of the volume is made up of the notes, which contain the chief citations and references. "An extraordinary way," says Hase, "of writing history, possible only to a man who had not merely the most intimate acquaintance with the sources, but always kept everything he had ever read in clear order before his mind—to write, as readily as a romance, a history which rested throughout upon the original authorities, and often upon the definite expressions, of a single document; and then, after months and years, to add to it, with a sure hand, the documentary evidence and all the learned apparatus." This deficiency, however, has been ably and fully supplied by the learning and zeal of the accomplished editor, a man whose own works are the most wonderful specimens of compressed learning and graphic statement of which the German theological literature, in the departments of church history and doctrinal theology, can boast.

judgment. If he seems indefinite in his statement of the views of the champions, both of heterodoxy and of orthodoxy; this may be partly because they were themselves not explicit; and this is a milder error than though he forced upon them the precision of usage which the theological terms acquired only at a much later date. If he delights in finding the points of union between the opposing parties; this may help to counterbalance the opposite evil of seeing always strife and never concord. Besides these works covering a larger field, there is a multitude of special histories, monographs, upon the great historical personages of the church, giving full views of their lives, times, controversies, and doctrinal systems. And the investigations are now concentrating more and more upon extended histories of special doctrines, of which that of Dorner upon the Person of Christ, is the most illustrious example; those of Baur upon the Atonement and the Trinity (including the Incarnation), are most learned and most Hegelian; that of Meier upon the Trinity is able and more orthodox than Baur; and that of Ebrard upon the Lord's Supper, published the last year, from the known ability of the author, is undoubtedly worthy of the highest consideration, and of special interest to us, since his views of the sacrament are Calvinistic.

The work of Hagenbach, to which we now turn, will be comprised, in the English translation, in two octavo volumes of about 500 pages each. Only the first volume of the translation has appeared, and of that we shall have something more to say after describing the main features of the original. This is quite uniformly referred to, with high commendation, by the fellow-laborers of the author in the same field. It is distinguished for its brevity, its clear statement of the leading points, its great candor, and its ample references to the body of contemporaneous literature. Much matter which ought to be in such a work, is referred to as contained in the other works on the same subject, which are supposed by the author to be accessible to his readers. Thus, upon many important points, v. Cöl'n's edition of Münscher (continued by Neudecker) is cited, but the original passages themselves are not quoted. The same is the case with other works. Such citations would be unnecessary in Germany. The author, in his preface to the second part of the second volume, says, that he takes for granted that Winer's Comparative View of the Confessions, will be in the hands of the students, and that he did not think it worth while to transcribe the passages from the older divines, which are found in such accessible books as Hase's *Hutterus Redivivus* and

De Wette's *Dogmatik der lutherischen Kirche*. It is a serious defect of the English translation, that it does not give these notorious and important passages. The additional bulk would not have borne any comparison with the additional usefulness. The same might be said of the references to the leading works upon particular doctrines, and the views of the most eminent men. It cannot be taken for granted that these works are in the hands of English readers. Very many of these references in the German, should have been enlarged into quotations in the English. But still, even without them, the translation might be of the greatest value as an incitement to more thorough investigations.

Hagenbach divides the whole history of Christian doctrines into five leading periods, with various subdivisions. The first period, from the end of the apostolic times to the death of Origen (A. D. 80 to 254), he calls the age of *Apologetics*. The second, from the death of Origen to John of Damascus (A. D. 254 to 730), is the age of *Polemics*. The third, from John of Damascus to the Reformation (A. D. 730 to 1517), is the age of *Systems of Scholasticism*. The fourth, from the Reformation to the Abolition of the Formula Consensus in Switzerland, and the rise of the Wolfian philosophy in Germany (A. D. 1517 to about 1720), is the age of conflicting of Confessions of Faith, or *polemico-ecclesiastical Symbolism*. The last period reaches from this era to the present time, and is described as the age of criticism, of speculation, of the conflicts between faith and knowledge, philosophy and Christianity, reason and revelation, and of attempts to reconcile these antagonisms.

Every writer, except a Hegelian, must be allowed to have a certain liberty in respect to his main divisions, and great freedom in the choice of the epithets by which he may characterize them. A Hegelian stands or falls by his trichotomy; but other men have a larger liberty of numbers. And this has been used most freely by the authors of church history and of histories of doctrine. Certain points are fixed; not even a Roman Catholic can forget the Reformation, though he may think the Council of Trent yet greater. The Council of Nice is generally assumed as another fixed point. Then we may take either John of Damascus or Gregory the First, according to our preference for the ecclesiastical or the doctrinal. Whatever may be the number of leading divisions, too, there will always remain a large possibility of subdivision. We may make three great epochs, or twelve; but under the shadow of the three greater, some ten or dozen lesser

ones will be sure to find shelter. It will be often convenient as well as right to say, *about* such a period. The main thing, however, is to give the leading doctrinal tendencies of the successive periods with tolerable exactness. The chief fault of the above division, we think, consists in the fact, that the ages are named, not after their doctrinal character, but after the *form* in which doctrines were presented and discussed; now it is polemics, now systems; at first, apologetic vindication, and at last antagonisms and adjustments. And then, too, the early Christianity was no more distinguished for its apologies than has been the later; it was only almost exclusively apologetic. The age of polemics did not cease with John of Damascus. There have always been conflicts between philosophy and Christianity, and faith and reason. Besides, in a history of doctrines, the division should be taken from the substance and not from the form; it should, if possible, exhibit the doctrinal character of the successive epochs. Thus the early ages of the church were chiefly occupied with the discussion of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation; the next period, with inquiries about nature and grace; the middle ages, not only with the development of the hierarchical system, and with systematizing the results of previous discussions, but also with the first rudiments of a correct theory of the atonement, and of a scientific natural theology; the period of the Reformation, with the articles of justification by faith, and the extent of church authority. Or, again, it has been said, that the past period embraced the purely theological questions; the second, the anthropological inquiries; the third, the subjects connected with redemption. The first is the early history; the second embraces the Augustinian and subsequent period; the third began with the Reformation; and now, it is said, we are entering upon a new series of investigations, those connected with the church. This is the scheme proposed by some writers, particularly Kliefoth, and, even if it be only an imperfect description of the actual course of the development of Christian doctrine; yet, the principle which lies at the basis of this division is preferable to that adopted by Hagenbach, if, indeed, he can be said to have any definite principle.

But this defect may be considered as merely nominal, and it is in part remedied by the full view which the author has given in the general description of each period, of its chief doctrinal features and controversies.

The introduction is occupied with giving a definition of doctrinal history; with exhibiting its relations to the other departments

of theological science ; with the mode of treatment, the arrangement and the sources ; and with a slight sketch of other works upon the same subject.¹

In the treatment of each period the whole subject matter is divided into general and special. Under the first or *general* division the author gives the leading characteristics of the period taken as a whole ; while under the second or *special* division he recounts the discussions and views upon the doctrines taken separately. The general doctrinal character, the statement of the chief controversies, heresies and tendencies, and some notices of the prominent theologians and their works, fill up the first or general division, under each period. In the special history of the first period, the author gives the views entertained upon almost all the topics of theology in systematic order, and in a much more systematic order than the opinions themselves were actually held ; more regularly, in fact, than he does in the second period, when there was actually an advance in this very respect. Under the head of each doctrine, then, there is first presented a concise statement of the views which were entertained, and this forms the text, which is fortified in a series of notes by ample quotations and references. This is the mode adopted throughout the whole work, and for the purpose for which it was written, to exhibit the results, and to guide in the study of the history of doctrines, it is probably better than would have been a more consecutive narrative, such as we have in Münscher's earliest work, and in Neander's church history. As a book for reading it is indeed less attractive, but as a book of reference its utility is enhanced. The work of Baur is also written in a consecutive narration ; but it everywhere takes for granted that the reader is familiar with other books which contain more ample and minute references.

The propriety of the division of the history of Doctrines into general and special has of late been much questioned. The first half of the works of Baumgarten-Crusius and of Augusti is entirely devoted to the general history, which is uninterrupted even to its close ; and then the second part contains the individual doctrines in their order. Baur and Klee and Kliefoth protest against this method, and assert that it destroys the unity of the history. Münscher (in his *Lehrbuch*) and Hagenbach attempt to unite the two, by first making a periodic division, and then subdividing each

¹ The work of Baur whose title stands at the head of this Article, gives the fullest account we have seen of what has been done in this department.

period into general and special. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. By an uninterrupted general history we acquire a more complete view of the full course and progress of doctrinal investigation; but when we come to the special history, this is comparatively unintelligible without constantly referring back to the general portion, for we cannot well understand the species without the genus, and it also involves the necessity of frequent repetition. On the other hand, in attempting to make it all special history, there is equally involved the necessity of somewhere and somehow giving those general characteristics of the epoch, which have exerted their influence upon the unfolding of each separate dogma. Again, there seems to be a practical necessity of dividing the whole history into periods; but this is exposed to the disadvantage of constantly interrupting the history of each doctrine, even when it may be in the full flow of its onward course; for, unfortunately, though one doctrine at a given period may have reached a halting place, and obtained a victory, yet the others may be just in the middle of their career or conflict.¹ Yet still there are some few but only a very few periods in which a total change in the whole character of theological and philosophical discussion is to be plainly discovered, and it is these which the historian must make the basis of his periodic division; and upon this basis he may establish his first great subdivision into general and special. This is the course of Hagenbach, and, for practical utility undoubtedly the wisest. And this is essentially the method of Baur, although his treatment of the *general* portion is much more general and abstract than is that of Hagenbach.

It will be unnecessary to go through the work of our author, or to give even his general views of the successive periods. It has already taken its place as one of the most fair-minded and thorough works in this most important and attractive department of theological inquiry. It is independent, manly and Christian in its whole general spirit. An English reader will indeed look almost in vain for the controversies which have agitated his church; and an American reader will think that the author knows nothing at all about the true character and progress of the Reformed or Calvinistic portion of the Christian church under An-

¹ Thus Hagenbach is obliged by his periods to interrupt the Trinitarian and Christological discussions, when they are in full progress; and to separate Gnosticism, and Manicheism, by too wide a line. His statement in § 43 that the ideas of the Logos and the Son of God were first identified by Origen, is manifestly incorrect; they were already identified in the creeds of the second century. Conf. Kling, Studien u. Kritiken, 1841, p. 816.

glo-Saxon influences. But the history of the progress and influence, both doctrinal and practical, of this noblest product of the Reformation yet remains to be written. A Lutheran, a German, cannot write it. He does not understand it. He hardly sympathizes with its profound and searching elements. He does not live in the experience of those doctrines, at once most spiritual and most practical which are exerting a greater moral and religious force, and not in this country alone, than those contained in any other system which the world now knows.

The translation of Hagenbach's history seems to be the first attempt of a young German scholar, and it is issued under favorable auspices in Clark's Foreign Library. The plan of this library is excellent, and the works seem to have been, for the most part, wisely selected.

The translation generally reads quite smoothly, and a cursory inspection, without comparison with the original, might leave the impression that it was well done into English. But a work like this should be accurate. We are for the greatest liberty in the breaking up of involved German sentences, and believe that a free paraphrase is often essential to a good translation. The translator has often been very happy in his mode of doing this. But the value of such a book, giving as it does the opinions of so many men and parties in the most compressed form, is very much impaired on the score of authority, if the translator, with all his changes and paraphrases does not give the exact sense of the original.

We have already spoken of one defect of the translation, considered as intended for the English public, that it fails to put the reader into the position in which a German stands, who may be supposed to have free access to the works so frequently cited. This might have been in part remedied, not merely by introducing the cited passages, but also by a frequent reference to English works, where such exist, upon the same subject. The *patristic* literature of England is by no means of inferior value. On some points it is more abundant than even the German. The English love the church of the first three centuries next to their own establishment. And they have honored it by the most liberal use of its stores. We have been surprised to find that this first volume which embraces just that period is so very meagre in its references to the body even of the contemporaneous literature. Bull is now and then referred to; but Kitto's Cyclopaedia, and Lardner come in as the most frequent authorities.

We have compared about a hundred pages with the original and we will proceed to give some examples of the mistakes which we have observed.

P. 1. § 1. An important element in the definition of the History of Doctrines is omitted. Hagenbach says that it is the exhibition of the "gradual development of the Christian *faith* into definite doctrinal conceptions (dogmas)," etc. That is, that which at first exists in the form of *faith* is what is developed into another form, viz. the proper doctrinal form. All mention of "faith" is omitted by the translator.

P. 4. § 2. It is stated that the History of Doctrines forms the transition from Church History to ecclesiastical theology, and to theology properly so called. The Germans always make, and rightly, a distinction between these two forms of theology. But all mention of "ecclesiastical theology" is omitted in the translation. At the end of the second note of this section the translator tells us that the theology of the future is the "subject" of the researches of doctrinal history, while the original makes sense by simply asserting that it is its "goal."

What sense can be made out of the first part of the third note to § 6? "Since the age of the Reformation the symbols are in relation to Protestants, what they formerly were in relation to heretical sects—the barrier which the ancient church erected in opposition to all who held other than orthodox views. On the other hand, the Protestants were naturally led, in a similar manner, to set forth their own distinguishing principles." What means this "on the other hand?" and were the symbols barriers against the Protestants, or of the Protestants? The object of the note in the original is to state, that since the Reformation, Confessions of Faith have acquired a different character from that which they had in the Catholic church; that they were *not* only barriers against heresy, but subserved other purposes. Not only does this idea not appear in the translation, but a wholly different one is given. And in the last part of this note, the important fact is stated that after the Reformation the History of Doctrines becomes identified with "Symbolik;" but this part of the note is omitted, although it is expressly referred to, and in the translation, only a few pages after (p. 17).

We are told on p. 9 that the Gnostic and Ebionitic tendencies would not be considered in this history, "if they did not differ from the orthodox belief." If the fact that they differ from orthodoxy is a reason why they should be considered, then a great

many other things might be brought into a history of doctrines on the same grounds. The mistake arose from a misunderstanding of the peculiar sense of the German, "*ein Anderes*." This involves an intimate relation, as well as difference.

The translator, in his preface, says that he has taken the liberty to omit some passages; but the reasons for his omission are not always obvious; and we suspect that the author could hardly feel indebted to him for leaving out the whole of the second note to the 11th section, which involves a justification of the mode in which he treats the general and special parts of his history. We are equally at a loss to know why, in giving the description of the fifth period, the translator should fail to translate the words: "*der angestrebten Vermittelung dieser Gegensätze*," since they are an essential characteristic of this era.

When, on p. 17, the translator speaks of the "conflict between a lifeless form of dogmatic orthodoxy and an imperfect enlightenment," it is difficult to conjecture the meaning of the phrase, and hardly any would suspect that the latter words stood for: "*einer unbestimmten Aufklärung*," or get from it anything approximating to the peculiar usage of the word "*Aufklärung*."

Manifest misprints of the original are retained: e. g. p. 22, "Glossarium * * * *infirmæ* Latinitatis."

P. 25, line 7, we have "symbolical" for "systematic."

We read, on p. 33, note (2): "That Christianity should become more perfect, is impossible from the Christian point of view, if we look merely at the idea of religion as taught by the Son of God," etc. A correct translation would be: "A perfectibility of Christianity is, from the Christian point of view, inconceivable, if we understand this as meaning an enlarging or perfecting of the *idea* of Christianity," etc. The larger part of the 3d note on the same page is omitted, although the statement contained in it is expressly referred to afterwards.

The spiritual nature of Christ, we are told on p. 34, was "personified" in his disciples; and that some of them were "more talented" than others.

In the original, on p. 43, we have the contraction: "*des rel. Lebens*," for "*des religiösen Lebens*," but it is translated: "of real life;" as if the "*rel.*" had stood for "*realen*."

P. 39, "*der Kirche gegenüber*," is rendered: "*in opposition to* the Catholic church."

The term "Alogi," is said, p. 49, to be given to those who maintain that Christ was a mere man, "on rationalistic grounds, and

from *conscientious* opposition;" but it should read: "*conscious* opposition;" which makes quite a difference in the sense. And on p. 50, "Gemüth" is translated by "public mind."

The Gnostics did not regard the principal object of Christianity to be "the separation of Christianity from its former connection with the Old Testament" (p. 62); for, that it had such a connection, would have been a greater concession than they would have made; but they thought that the essential thing in Christianity was, that it abolished all such connection." The sense of the whole of the last sentence of § 29 is entirely perverted in the translation by making the argument from the Sibylline oracles coördinate with those from the spread of Christianity and the destruction of Jerusalem; while the original places them on entirely different grounds.

Near the bottom of p. 68, we are informed that "Origen spoke also of *spiritual* and *moral* miracles, of which the visible miracles were the symbols: (he admitted, however, their importance only inasmuch as they were real facts)." The consistency of the parenthesis with the previous statement, it would be difficult to divine; but the difficulty vanishes when we know that he considered the visible miracles as having this spiritual import, as well as having an importance as real facts—"(*neben ihrer factischen Bedeutung*)."

"The incarnation of the Godman is the principal dogmatic idea of this period," (p. 163). Original: "The manifestation of the Logos in the flesh is," etc. In the translation, by leaving out the "Logos," the peculiarity of the discussions is lost sight of: they revolved about the Logos; one may say, that this is implied in the above, but still it is not a translation, nor does it give the definite idea which marks the era.

In describing the views of Irenaeus upon the Lord's supper, the translation says (p. 200): "But the reason which he argues in favor of his views, viz. that the Gnostics cannot partake of the bread and wine with thanksgiving, because they despise matter, shows that he regarded the elements as more than merely accidental things, though they are only bread and wine." How far removed this is from conveying the true sense, will be apparent from a correct rendering of the words after "matter:" "shows that, even if he did *not* regard the elements as mere bread and wine, yet on the other hand he did not conceive of them as mere accidents;" that is, in the elements is something more than mere bread and wine; but still the bread and wine are not mere accidents, but essential parts of the commemoration. That any one

should make against Cyprian "the charge of insipidity," (p. 202), can hardly be proved by the sense of the German "Nüchternheit."

Sometimes, even where the words are very simple, we have the sense of the original wholly changed. When, e. g., on p. 290, to which we have just accidentally turned, we read: "Concerning the origin of sin, the generally received opinion was, that it is to be ascribed to the will of man," etc.; the passage states, that the generally received doctrine was, "that the *essence* of sin has its *seat* in the will of man"? A most important statement of Müller, in respect to a misconception of Augustine's views, in the 4th note, is also omitted.

"The union of Christians with Christ," (p. 298) is given as the translation of "das Christliche Gemeingefühl;" and where the original asserts that some of the charges against the Pelagians might be attributed to a "*Consequenzwacherei*," the English tells us that Celestius was compelled to infer these consequences, which is not even hinted at in the German.

But we have probably already fatigued our readers sufficiently by these citations and comparisons. The usefulness of such a book, which is intended to be a work of authority, which is so exclusively devoted to the statement of facts and opinions, and upon the most important subjects of investigation and reflection, is greatly injured, and in some cases entirely annulled, by these mistranslations.

The author of the other work, whose title is placed at the head of this Article, is one of the ablest and most learned of the Hegelian interpreters of Christianity. He has written full histories of the doctrine of the Atonement, and of the Trinity and Incarnation. The latter is in three large volumes, and is the most complete work we have upon the subject. He has also written works upon the origin of the Episcopacy, upon the Christian Gnosis, or speculative Christianity in its historical development, upon the religious system of the Manichees, upon the Pastoral Epistles of Paul, and upon the Christian elements in Plato's system.¹ He also wrote

¹ Dr. Baur is regarded as the founder of a new school, in respect to the early history of the church. According to his view, the earliest Christian church was still deeply imbued with Jewish elements. This is seen in the Apocalypse and in the Epistle of James. Christianity is indeed, in some respects, a new power; but it is clad in the armor of Judaism. In the genuine doctrine of Paul, we find the first signs of a distinctly new order of things. This genuine doctrine is contained in the epistles to the Romans, the Corinthians, and the Galatians; the epistle to the Hebrews belongs to the same class. The smaller epis-

two able works in the Roman Catholic controversy which attended the publication of Möhler's Symbolism.

With such preparation he has come to the work of composing a text-book upon the history of doctrines. The extent and accuracy of his learning are undoubted; his critical skill is admirable; his mastery over the details, and his power of combining together, great masses of facts, in luminous and succinct statements, are often surprising. Grant him his theory, and with that theory he will go into the very midst of the disordered hosts of conflicting opinions, and call them all around him, and dispose them in regular order, and show you a complete organic series and connection derived from what seemed so chaotic. He leads you down the whole course of Christian history, brings out each new phase of doctrine in orderly succession, tells you why such a doctrine received such a form at one time, and another shape in a subsequent period; gives the great epochs of the doctrinal history of the church as coincident with or produced by the greatest changes in the sphere of human thought; and finally shows how, according to his speculations, the whole sum and substance of the Christian faith, all that is essentially true and abiding therein, is contained in and resolvable into certain positions of the Hegelian philosophy. All of Baur's previous works upon Christian doctrine have this character; but in none of them does it stand out more prominently than in his text-book. He does indeed here, sometimes,

ascribe to Paul, those to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philippians, indicate a much higher position than do the other epistles, and are probably, he says, not genuine, but belong to a later date. Until the middle of the second century, the church was going through the struggle with two great parties, the *Petrine* and the *Pauline*. The whole Jewish-Christian church was Ebionistic. (Conf. Schweigler's *Montanismus*.) This theory is resorted to, for the purpose of explaining the production of Christianity by a sort of natural process, out of the Jewish faith; and no more arbitrary criticism can be found, none more opposed to the true historical method of inquiry, than that which its author applies to the hitherto undoubted epistles of Paul. It proceeds from his reluctance to admit a full and distinctive revelation, given to man; and leads to a critical injustice like that which Hegel showed in his *Philosophy of Religion*, where he places the Jewish faith, even in its religious elements, beneath the Greek and Roman superstitions, simply because it came first in the order of time, and it would not consist with his notion of a progressive development, to suppose that that which was first in the order of time, contained as high an order of ideas, as that which came later. Such are some of the extravagant results to which the theory of *development*, when sundered from the recognition of a full and positive revelation, has led some of the more philosophical of the German theologians; and it suggests valuable and necessary cautions in respect to the employment of such a theory in theological matters.

seem almost to shrink back from the full avowal of the results to which his system leads him: he rather hints at than advocates some of the most destructive consequences of the pantheistic theory; he does not, for example, expressly deny the personality of God, nor the individual existence of man in a future state; but most manifestly all his speculative and theological (or, untheological) tendencies are most in harmony with such a denial. He leads you through the whole vast process of the Christian history, and conducts you to results which virtually overthrows every article of our faith, not merely in its form, but in its vital substance.

The plan of his work is simple and comprehensive. The whole process of the history of doctrines he brings under the relations which the mind, the spirit of man, has had to the substance of the Christian faith (dogma in its widest and ancient sense) in its different stages of progress. There are three such stages. The first is that in which the whole effort of the mind is to appropriate the doctrines, as mere articles of faith, as something objective; not so much to reflect upon them, as to express and receive them as matters of absolute faith. This period reaches to the end of the sixth century. The second period, that embracing the middle ages and scholasticism, is distinguished by the endeavor to bring the articles of faith into nearer proximity to, or reconciliation with, human consciousness; so that they should cease to be something merely objective. But the authority of the church then pressed so heavily upon men's minds, that this attempt failed. The absolute truth of the ecclesiastical dogmas was always presupposed. Before any true reconciliation between reason and faith, theology and philosophy, Christianity and human consciousness could be consummated, there must be a great revolution in the relative position of the two. And so in the third great period, that of the Reformation, we find the human mind at war with all church authority and tradition. The whole relations of theology and philosophy are changed. This principle, it is contended by Professor Baur, lay in the very nature of the Reformation, although it has been carried out to its full results only in the latest times. This process, now, is held to be not only real as a matter of fact, but absolutely necessary from the nature of mind. Man's spirit must go through this course. By this process, and only thereby, is truth eliminated. And the results to which it conducts us are the only abiding truths which a thinking man can receive or maintain. Philosophy is above theology; reason is above faith; all that is true in our systems of faith, is what philosophy on its own grounds

demonstrates to be the absolute truth. It demonstrates the truth; whatever cannot be thus demonstrated, whatever cannot be comprehended, whatever, in the phraseology of this school, cannot be a matter of self-consciousness, has no inherent validity, and is to be banished to the realms of fiction), or is of value only as a record of the course of human thought. The human soul has outgrown all that it cannot comprehend. In the whole history of the race, in every department, this same unalterable process has been going on, and in each it has led to the same results. All that is substantial in all history, all that is veritable in all doctrines, is the *philosophical* truth contained therein. The philosophy of the doctrine is the doctrine itself. The truths of revelation are nothing more than certain philosophical ideas.

A process more vast, and more desolating than this we are unable to conceive. This process, unfolded in the history of man, this theory asserts, is God himself; the Trinity—it is this process. The distinction between the infinite and the finite is abolished; God comes to consciousness only in the consciousness of man. The distinction between time and eternity, this world and another, is abrogated; the substance of eternity is contained in time. All that truly and forever exists in spirit, and spirit, not as individual, but as universal and impersonal. The whole order of our ideas is reversed. Reason domineers over faith; time over eternity; the human over the divine. The doctrine of the two natures of Christ is resolved into the union of the human and the divine in the history of the race. The atonement is a work of reconciliation performed only in and by the human spirit; justification is the conscious knowledge of each individual spirit of its union with the absolute spirit; immortality is not the continued existence of the individual after death, but is the continual existence of that which is spiritual; and while the Scriptures declare that the last enemy that shall be overcome is death, this philosophy by the mouth of Strauss asserts, that the belief in a future life is the last great enemy which speculative criticism has to contend against, and, if possible, to overcome.

To the exposition and propagation of this system in its essential parts the work of Baur is devoted. In compressed statements it brings forward all the main positions of the leading men and schools and parties and periods of the Christian church. Its array of learning, couched in pregnant statements and frequent references (almost uniformly without citations) is imposing. Its statements are lucid and comprehensive. Its philosophical part

alone is fully presented; the theological opinions are for the most part only briefly hinted at. In the course of 300 pages it gives its concise summary of the history of doctrines, and resolves them all into philosophy as their head and centre. Of course it is brief. The most important matters are often only hinted at. Yet it is an instructive book. Its perversions are not so much of the opinions of individuals as of the whole substance of Christianity. Its errors are chiefly in its philosophical constructions of doctrines. Such a system can afford to let the New Testament teach the main features of the orthodox scheme, for the New Testament has only the value of a record of the opinions of men, 1800 years ago; it can afford to let the current testimony of the universal church be on the side of orthodoxy, for the church is overmastered by philosophy. It can afford to be critical and thorough and comparatively impartial in giving all the facts of the case, for these facts are but the woof of the web which their system itself is weaving.

But it cannot afford to let a single article, not merely of the Christian faith, but even of the bold creed of natural religion, remain in its simplicity and integrity. It transforms and undermines each and all of them. Natural theology fares no better, but even worse, at its hands than does revealed religion. It sweeps through the whole sphere of faith, and with relentless hands destroys all that has ever been held dear and sacred. It knows nothing sacred except philosophy; it holds nothing as true but its own annihilating processes and desolating conclusions. It is the deadliest enemy which Christianity has ever encountered; and, only by Christianity, only by orthodox Christianity can it be overcome. The bulwarks of natural religion are insufficient against such a logical and learned and philosophical foe. A negative faith has nothing to oppose to its vast generalizations. A faith that rests only on abstractions is already in alliance with it. A faith whose only bulwark against deism and infidelity is in the doctrine respecting miracles cannot hold its ground against the criticism and philosophy of this new enemy. A faith which rests only on tradition cannot abide the searching tests which this school applies. Only a faith which rests in Christ as its centre, which is wrought by His spirit, and allies the soul to Him, which relies upon His sacrifice, and sees in Him the very incarnation of deity; only a theology which has its root and its life in Christ can withstand the encroachments of that fearful philosophy, which after annulling all faith in the past and all hope for any-

thing beyond the seen and temporal, leaves nothing for the race of man to accomplish, excepting the reorganization of human society in such a manner as will confer the largest and longest happiness upon those whose only destiny is to be denizens of this earth for threescore years and ten. The time is sweeping on when he who will not be a Christian must be a pantheist; when he who does not find God in Christ, will find him only in the human race; when he who does not love the human race for the sake of Christ will have no higher love than love to humanity.

Against this arch-enemy of Christianity the whole Evangelical German theology is now waging battle. On the field of history, in the sphere of criticism, in the domain of philosophy even, it is opposing it step by step. Every inch of ground is in dispute. It is not German theology as such which has led to these sad results; for it is against these results that the most vigorous efforts of this theology are now directed. Nor in them do we find the whole of German philosophy, nor even its necessary consequences; any more than we find the legitimate tendencies of Locke's system in the sensualist school of France. But we do here find the most learned and acute and philosophical system which ever did battle with the Christian faith. And in this conflict Christianity must either be annihilated or victorious beyond all former example. It is not a system of absurdities, it is not a mere matter of speculative inquiry, it is not a system which is so irrational that it should excite only our derision,—not such a thing is it that now engrosses the whole power of the German mind, and is feared by German Christians as nought else of human origin is feared; but it is a system the most comprehensive, the most intolerant, the most consistent, the most aggressive, which the human mind has ever reared. In no sport was it built up, and by no sneer will it be dissolved. The noblest minds and hearts of Germany are now contending against it—and this contest they wage not only for themselves, but for us also. And that it may issue in the final triumph of Christ and his church should be the constant prayer, as it is the firm faith, of every Christian heart.

ARTICLE VIII.

IMPORTANCE OF A PURITAN LIBRARY IN NEW ENGLAND.

NEAR the centre of the city of London, north of the old London wall, west of Bishopsgate street, etc., are several localities which are particularly interesting to Protestants and to the descendants of the Puritans. On the west is Smithfield, soon to be reclaimed, as we would hope, from the degrading use to which it is now applied, that of a cattle-market. The spot in which the martyrs were burnt is said to be in the centre of the pens, where the gas-lamp now stands.

On the north is Bunhill-Fields' Burying-ground, converted by Dr. Tindal, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, into a cemetery for the use of the Dissenters. It is walled and well kept; the tablets and various monuments are in their proper position; many young trees are growing, and the whole ground has a tidy appearance, though it has slight pretensions to beauty. It is known that one hundred thousand persons have been buried there; and this number constitutes but a part. It is understood that a Baptist clergyman has been collecting the inscriptions for publication. To a non-conformist, it is indeed sacred ground. We will select a few names from the distinguished or pious dead, whose memorials are there: John Bunyan, whose sufficient epitaph is, "author of *Pilgrim's Progress*;" Isaac Watts, D. D., the sweet singer of Israel; Mrs. Susannah Wesley, who died July 23, 1742, aged 73, mother of nineteen children, (among whom were John and Charles Wesley,) and whose inscription is:

"In sure and steadfast hope to rise,
And claim her mansion in the skies,
A Christian here her flesh laid down,
The cross exchanging for a crown;"

Daniel Defoe, author of *Robinson Crusoe*; George Burder, author of the *Village Sermons*; Samuel Stennett, D. D., the hymnologist; Daniel Williams, D. D., founder of the Red Cross library; Rev. Charles Buck, writer of the *Theological Dictionary*; Rev. Thomas N. Toller, the friend of Robert Hall; Henry Hunter, D. D., author of the *Scripture Biography*; Robert Winter, D. D.; David Nesmith, founder of city missions; Rev. George Clayton; Thomas Pringle, a philanthropist and poet; George Jerment, D. D.; Al-

exander Waugh, D. D., whose praise is in all the churches; Robert Simpson, D. D., tutor in Hoxton Academy; John Hardy, a strenuous defender of civil and religious liberty in the time of Wilkes; Rev. Daniel Neal, the Puritan historian; Dr. Lardner, author of the *Credibility of the Gospel History*; Dr. Abraham Rees, editor of the *Encyclopædia*; Rev. John Townsend, the founder of the Deaf and Dumb Asylum; John Guise, D. D.; Dr. Gill, the Commentator; Richard Price, D. D., etc.

Allhallows church, in Bread street, contains the remains of John Howe; in that same street, John Milton was born, and in that church he was baptized. He died of consumption at his house, Artillery Walk, close to Bunhill-Fields' burying ground. His remains were interred near those of his father, under the chancel¹ of St. Giles's church, Cripplegate, two or three minutes' walk from his house. On a pillar which supports the north gallery in this old church, is a tablet, on which are the following inscriptions: "Mr. John Milton, author of the *Paradise Lost*, born Dec. 9, 1608, died Nov. 8, 1674, was buried in this church. Milton's father, John Milton, died 1647, was also buried here." Fox, the martyrologist, was also buried in this church. Here Cromwell was married. A little east of Bunhill-Fields, in Tabernacle Walk, is the Tabernacle meeting-house, erected by George Whitefield; John Wesley's chapel is also near; the first house on the right, in the court in front, was the residence of Wesley, and here he died in 1791. In Christ church, Newgate street, Richard Baxter was buried.

But the most interesting object in this vicinity, in some respects, is the Red Cross library, in Red Cross street, Cripplegate, founded, as before stated, by Dr. Williams. The building, substantial and commodious, is on the east side of the street. It could not be placed on a more appropriate site. It is in the centre of that arena, where the great battles of civil and religious liberty were fought. It is near the spot embalmed by the blood of the martyrs of Jesus. Here Baxter, Bates, and Howe proclaimed the gospel with an unction, a power, and a comprehensiveness that have not since been surpassed. Hither, also, Whitefield's burning eloquence attracted crowds. And here Wesley was gathered to his fathers, full of years and honors. On this spot the blind poet meditated his "high argument." On this ground, multitudes have slept in Jesus, and together are waiting, in "sure and certain hope." Others may visit St. Paul's, or Westminster, or Windsor, where the

¹ By subsequent alterations in the church, the chancel is now in part the main aisle.

mighty dead of England rest in state; but to the Puritan, to the believer in Jesus, to him who honors the champions of freedom, or who delights to recall the names of those who preached the gospel almost with the tongues of seraphs, no locality in England, and perhaps but one on earth, is so full of impressive reminiscences.

Dr. Daniel Williams was born in Wrexham, Denbighshire, in 1644. He was one of the first who entered the ministry after the ejection of the Nonconformists in 1662, and was regularly admitted as a preacher at the age of nineteen. He spent some of the first years of his ministerial life in preaching in various parts of England, and then went to Ireland and became chaplain to the countess of Meath. Subsequently he was the pastor of a respectable church in Dublin, where he remained nearly twenty years. Towards the close of the reign of James II, in 1687, his opposition to Romanism in Ireland exposing him to danger, he came to London and took a foremost place among the Nonconformists. After the revolution, he was often consulted on Irish affairs by king William. About A. D. 1700, he became pastor of a church in Hand Alley, Bishopsgate street, where he remained twenty-seven years. On the death of Richard Baxter, in 1691, by whom he had been highly esteemed, he was chosen to succeed him at the Merchants' Lecture, Pinners' Hall, Broad street, which had been established in 1672, under the encouragement of the principal merchants and tradesmen belonging to the Presbyterian and Independent denominations in London. At this lecture, Drs. Bates, Manton, Owen, John Howe, Baxter and others officiated. The Antinomian controversy created parties among the Dissenters interested in this Lecture. Mr. Williams, rendering himself obnoxious to those who advocated the Arminian tenets, withdrew, along with Dr. Bates, Mr. Howe and others, and established another Tuesday Lecture at Salter's Hall. Mr. Williams's enemies, being foiled in impugning his opinions, endeavored to destroy his character, but without success. He took an active part in promoting the union between England and Scotland, consummated in 1707. In 1709, he received the honorary degree of D. D. from the universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh, at the same time with Dr. Calamy. On the accession of George I, in 1714, he had the honor of presenting the address to his majesty, at the head of the London Dissenting clergy of the three denominations. His health had, by this time, visibly declined. He died Jan. 26, 1716. In the funeral sermon, preached by Dr. Evans, who had been co-pastor with him

eleven years, he is said to have had "a copious invention, a penetrating judgment, a faithful memory, and vigorous affections." His discourses and treatises extend to six volumes octavo. He bequeathed most of his large estate to a variety of useful and benevolent objects. The great bequest of his will was for the establishment of a public library in London. For this purpose he had bought Dr. Bates's valuable collection of books as an addition to his own, at a cost of between £500 and £600. He authorized his trustees to erect a suitable building, the site for which was purchased by them in 1727, in Red-Cross street; and the library was opened in 1729. The terms on which it may be used are very liberal, all persons being admitted on application to one of the trustees. Since the library was established, very considerable additions have been made by legacies as well as by contributions in money and books. It has an annual income of £100 for the increase of the books. The number of volumes amounts to 30,000. In 1841, a new catalogue was made, in two volumes. Among the books and curiosities are the works of Graevius and Gronovius, Rymer's *Foedera*, the early editions of Milton's Works, with the first edition of the *Paradise Lost*, etc.

Dr. Williams's library will be particularly memorable as the scene of preparation for many of those struggles for the rights of conscience whose results have greatly promoted the interests of the Dissenters. Here, for example, those efforts were planned which brought about the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts. The large room or chamber in which these deliberations were carried on is adorned with a magnificent collection of the portraits of the Nonconformist fathers, and of their more immediate successors.

At our request the worthy librarian, Dr. Cogan,¹ prepared a catalogue of these portraits, which we here subjoin, adding some biographical notices. A few of the portraits are found in other parts of the house. Those with a cross prefixed are prints.

Alsop, Vincent, d. 1703, pastor at Westminster, the opponent of Sherlock.

Amory, Thomas, D. D., b. 1701, tutor of the academy, Taunton, pastor of Pres. Ch. Old Jewry, London, colleague with Dr. Price of Newington Green, d. 1774.

Annesley, Samuel, D. D., b. 1619. "Goods distrained in 1682 for

¹ Son of the author of the treatise on the Passions.

latent convictions, i. e. on oaths of persons he had never seen," d. 1696.

Avery, Benjamin, D. D., d. 1764.

Baker, Rev. Samuel, pastor at Bridport 1687—1727, d. 1748, "an excellent evangelical minister."

Barkstead, Francis. He and the two following were relatives of Dr. Williams's second wife.

Barkstead, Francis, jun.

Barkstead, Col. John, d. 1662.

†Barrow, Isaac, D. D., b. 1630, d. 1677, the well-known preacher and mathematician.

Bates, William, D. D., b. Nov. 1628, pastor of St. Dunstan's-in-the-west, and of Hackney, London, d. July 14, 1699.

Baxter, Rev. Richard, b. 1615, d. 1691, the distinguished preacher and author, one of Cromwell's chaplains, etc.

Bayes, Rev. Joshua, b. 1671, pastor of a church, Hatton garden, London, d. 1746.

†Bellarmine, Rev. Robert, b. 1542, d. 1621.

Belsham, Rev. Thomas, b. 1750, d. 1829.

Benson, George, D. D., b. 1699, commentator, colleague of Dr. Lardner, London, d. 1762.

†Bradbury, Rev. Thomas, b. 1677, pastor at Fetter-lane and Carey St., London, d. 1759.

Burgess, Rev. Daniel, b. 1645, pastor Brydges St., Covent garden, London, d. 1713.

Burroughs, Rev. Joseph, b. 1685, "a learned and judicious divine," minister of a general Bap. Cong., Barbican, London, d. 1761.

Byfield, Rev. Nicholas, b. 1580, commentator on Colossians and Peter, pastor in Chester and Isleworth, d. 1620.

Cartwright, Rev. Thomas, Lady Margaret's professor of divinity, Cambridge, preacher at Antwerp, opponent of Whitgift, etc. d. 1603.

Caryl, Rev. Joseph, b. 1601, preacher at Lincoln's Inn, member of Westminster Assembly, ejected from church of St. Magnus, London-bridge, commentator on Job, d. 1673.

Case, Rev. Thomas, one of the assembly of divines, ejected from St. Mary Magdalene, Milk St. London, styled by Baxter, "a holy, faithful, servant of God," d. 1682.

Chamier, Rev. Daniel, d. 1621, "sound" says Baxter, "in doctrine and life," pastor in Wetherby and London.

†Chandler, Samuel, D. D., b. 1693, eminent for learning, a celebrated controversialist on the Romish question, d. 1766.

- Charnock, Stephen, B. D., b. 1628, chaplain of Henry Cromwell lieutenant of Ireland, pastor of an Independent church in London, author of the work on the Divine Attributes, d. 1680.
- Chester, Rev. John, d. 1696.
- Clarke, Rev. Samuel, son of Rev. Sam'l Clark, the ejected minister of St. Bennet Fink, London, d. 1701.
- Coligni, Gaspard de, b. 1517, the celebrated admiral of France, murdered at the massacre of St. Bartholomew's eve, Aug. 24, 1572.
- Conder, John, D. D., b. 1714, d. 1781.
- Cotton, Rev. Thomas, b. 1654, d. 1730.
- Cradock, Rev. Samuel, b. 1620, d. 1706.
- Disnay, John, D. D. (a bust), b. 1746, author of a life of Dr. Jortin, d. 1802.
- Evans, John, D. D., b. 1678, co-pastor and successor of Dr. Daniel Williams, lecturer at Salter's hall, author of discourses on Christian Temper, etc., d. May 16, 1730.
- †Fénélon, Francois, apb. of Cambray, b. 1651, d. 1715.
- Flavel, Rev. John, b. 1627, pastor at Deptford and Dartmouth, the well-known author, d. 1691.
- Fleming, Rev. Caleb, b. 1698, d. 1779, writer in favor of Paedobaptism.
- Frankland, Rev. Richard, b. 1630, d. 1698.
- Gale, John, D. D., b. 1680, one of the ablest of the General Baptist ministers, educated at Leyden and Amsterdam, the opponent of Dr. Wall on Infant Baptism, d. 1721.
- Geddes, Alexander, LL. D., b. 1737, a liberal Roman Catholic divine, author of a new translation of the Bible, d. 1802.
- Gough, Rev. William, of Marlborough.
- Griffith, Rev. George, d. 1694.
- Grove, Rev. Henry, b. 1683, tutor in the Dissenting academy, Taunton, d. 1738.
- Hall, Rev. Thomas, b. 1686, d. 1762.
- Harris, William, D. D., b. 1675, forty years pastor of a church in Crutched Friars, London, author of a work on the Messianic Prophecies, etc. d. 1740.
- Haynes, Rev. Hopton, d. 1749.
- Henry, Matthew, the great commentator, b. 1662, d. 1714.
- Howe, John, b. 1630, "the greatest of the Puritan divines," chaplain to Oliver Cromwell, pastor in Silver St. London, etc. d. 1705.
- Hughes, Rev. George, B. D., b. 1603, educated at Corpus Christi

- Coll. Cambridge, ejected from Plymouth, silenced by Laud, father-in-law of John Howe, d. 1667.
- Hughes, Obadiah, D. D., b. 1603, minister at Southwark and Westminster.
- Hussey, Rev. Joseph, b. 1660, d. 1726.
- Jacomb, Thomas, D. D., b. 1622, educated in Magdalen Hall, Oxford, and Emmanuel and Trinity, Cambridge, ejected from Ludgate parish, London, in 1662, d. in 1687, in the house of his protectress, the countess dowager of Exeter.
- Jervis, Rev. Thomas, (a bust) b. 1748, successor of Dr. Kippis in Westminster, and pastor at Mill-Hill chapel, Leeds.
- Kippis, Andrew, D. D., F. R. S., b. 1725, pastor at Boston, at Westminster, tutor in Coward college, editor of *New Annual Register*, *Biographica Britannica*, etc. d. 1795.
- Lindsay, James, D. D., b. 1753.
- Mallet, Rev. Philip (a bust), d. 1812.
- Manton, Thomas, D. D., b. 1620, educated at Wadham Coll., Oxford, minister at Stoke-Newington and Covent garden, London, styled by Dr. Bates a divine of a "rich fancy, a strong memory, a happy elocution, an excellent Christian," etc., d. 1677.
- †Mather, Increase, D. D., b. 1639, Boston, N. E., d. 1733.
- Mauduit, Jasper, of Hackney, chairman of the Committee for managing the affairs of the Dissenters.
- Mayo, Rev. Richard, b. 1631, d. 1695, "an affectionate and useful preacher" at Kingston and London.
- Milton, John, b. 1608, d. 1674.
- Morgan, Dr. Thomas, b. 1752, librarian of Dr. Williams's library from 1804 till his death in 1821.
- Newman, Rev. John, b. 1676, d. 1741.
- Oakes, Rev. John, d. 1688, "of a sweet and even temper," successor of Thos. Vincent, London.
- Oakes, John, of Cheshunt, Middlesex.
- Oldcastle, Sir John, Lord Cobham, the martyr, burnt in St. Giles's Fields in 1418.
- Oldfield, Joshua, D. D., b. 1656.
- Palmer, Rev. John, b. 1729, d. 1790.
- †Pearce, Richard Edward, d. 1673.
- Perkins, Rev. William, b. 1552, fellow of Christ's Coll., Cambridge, a distinguished preacher, a "strict Calvinist," opponent of Arminius of Leyden, works in 3 vols. folio, d. 1602.
- Pett, Samuel, M. D. (a bust), b. 1765, d. 1823.
- Priestley, Joseph, D. D., b. 1733, d. 1804.

- Rees, Abraham, D. D., b. in Wales, 1743, pastor of Pres. ch. of St. Thomas's, Southwark and Old Jewry, London, editor of the *Cyclopaedia*, 45 vols., qt., d. June 9, 1825.
- Ridgeley, Thomas, D. D., b. 1667, author of the *Body of Divinity*, d. 1734.
- Robinson, Benjamin, d. 1724.
- Rogers, Rev. Daniel.
- Rogers, Rev. Timothy, d. 1729, co-pastor with Mr. Shower in London.
- Say, Rev. Samuel, b. 1676, d. 1743.
- Shower, Rev. John, b. 1657, co-pastor with John Howe in 1690 in London, afterwards pastor in Old Jewry and Jewin St., an eloquent and very devoted minister, d. 1715.
- Steel, Rev. Richard, b. 1629, d. 1692.
- Sylvester, Rev. Matthew, b. 1637.
- Toller, Rev. Thomas N., (medallion model), b. 1756, forty-five years pastor of a Baptist ch. Kettering, Northamptonshire, friend of Robert Hall, d. Feb. 25, 1821.
- Tong, Rev. William, b. 1662, pastor in Coventry, lecturer at Salter's Hall, biographer of Matthew Henry, etc., d. 1727.
- Tindal, Matthew, D. D., b. 1657, d. 1733.
- Vincent, Rev. Nathaniel, b. 1644, author of a treatise on the *Shorter Catechism*, d. 1697.
- Wadsworth, Rev. Thomas, d. 1672.
- Watson, Rev. Thomas, rector of St. Stephen's, Walbrook, London.
- Watts, Isaac, D. D., b. 1674, d. 1748, the well-known sacred poet.
- Williams, Daniel, D. D., b. 1644, founder of the library, d. 1716.
- Williams, Mrs., second wife of preceding, before the widow of Francis Barkstead, Jr.
- Williams, Dr. John, b. 1727, a short time librarian of Williams's library, d. 1798.
- Wilton, Samuel, D. D., b. 1744, minister at Tooting, Surry, and the Weighhouse, London, d. 1778.
- † Woodward, Rev. William, d. 1691, tutor in Oxford and minister in Leominster.
- Wright, Samuel, D. D., b. 1683, distinguished for pulpit talents, thirty-eight years pastor of a church which met at Blackfriars and Carter-lane, London, d. 1746.

Within a few years great changes have occurred in the doctrinal opinions of one of the three united bodies. The Unitarians,

who formed the great majority of the Presbyterians, seceded on the 4th of March, 1836. The Congregationalists, the Baptists and the few remaining orthodox Presbyterians are still known and recognized as the "Three Denominations," whose meetings are now held in the Congregational Library, Bloomfield Street. The library of Dr. Williams, however, is still the common property of the Dissenters and as such is used by them. The only change is, that the three bodies have ceased to hold their meetings in that library.

The facts, to which we have thus briefly alluded, have led us to reflect upon the practicability and expediency of establishing a Puritan Library and Museum in New England. Is it not desirable to concentrate in some one of the large cities of New England, the capital for example, a collection which shall do honor to the Puritan name and be a fitting testimonial of our gratitude to the great men to whom, under God, we owe our civil and religious liberties?

What departments or branches should such a Library and Museum include?

I. Books, pamphlets and periodicals published by the Puritans in England and in this country. It should embrace, as far as possible, all the writings of the leading Dissenters and Puritans, especially, from the reign of Elizabeth, and even from the first germs of Dissent in the days of Wiclif, down to the present period. It should comprehend the works of those noble men in the times of Henry VIII. and Edward VI, who had a leaning towards a dis-established church and who were in favor of a thorough reformation. Its shelves should be adorned, if practicable (as in many cases it would be) with the early editions of the four folios, fifty-eight quartos, forty-six octavos, and twenty-nine duodecimos of Richard Baxter; with the eloquent productions of Dr. Bates, the Dissenting Melancthon; with the two folios of John Howe, of whom it has been said, "*nihil nisi magnum unquam nec sensit nec dixit, nec fecit*;" with Dr. Owen's learned labors, which induced many eminent foreigners to make a voyage to England in order to converse with him; with the productions of the immortal Pilgrim, who printed as many treatises as he had lived years in the world; of Philip Henry and his greater son, who had that peculiar faculty that has been called a holy *naïveté*; of the honored historians of Dissent, Calamy, Neal, Brook, and Bogue; of the sweet singers of Israel, Watts, Doddridge, Sten-

nett, and Charles Wesley; of those high-minded men, greater than philanthropists, who laid amid tears and prayers, the foundations of the London Missionary Society. Neither would we exclude the works of many generous laymen, who contended for their civil and religious rights, at the risk of being immured in the Fleet, or executed at Tyburn. We would reverently gather up all those free-spoken words which so excited the anger of the high commission courts and star-chambers of arbitrary monarchs and bigotted prelates. There were not a few pamphlets and small newspapers published clandestinely during the reign of the Stuarts, written with pens of fire, and which reveal the character of those times far more vividly than any formal history or biography can do.

But the prominent place should be given to our own early Puritan literature. We would have it by eminence a New England library. We would hasten to gather up with pious zeal everything which was put into print by the courtly and learned Winthrops, by Norton, who had an "eminent acumen in polemical divinity," by the holy and tearful Shepard, by the humble and benevolent Wilson, by the sweet-tempered Mitchel, by the apostolic Eliot, by Hubbard the historian, by Prince the annalist, by the prolific author of the *Magnalia*, and by all who, through their works, illustrated the fortunes of the early colonists.

This library should, likewise, include the general histories of England and the United States, civil and ecclesiastical, the works of Clarendon, Burnet, Hume, Lingard, Hallam, Palgrave, Hutchinson, Grahame, etc.; also, as complete a collection as could be formed of the polemic literature relating to this subject, the controversial writings in which the 17th and 18th centuries were so prolific both in Old and New England, not only those called forth by the great struggle between the conformist and the non-conformist, but the "Apologies," "Defences," "Rejoinders," "Appeals," "Statements," etc. in which the various sects of Dissenters advocated or defended their peculiar tenets. The leading books and pamphlets at least in relation to these discussions should be procured. Some of them do not belong to the class of ephemeral literature. They enbalm some of the noblest specimens which are to be found of sterling and honest thought expressed in vigorous English. Many of them are necessary to the adequate understanding of the works of the great Puritan divines and civilians which are not professedly controversial.

II. Manuscripts. Some of these which might now be procu-

red would be of inestimable value. Many others would be objects of great curiosity. Samuel Stone of Hartford left a "body of divinity" which was often transcribed but never printed. Willard, vice president of Harvard college, left important works in *Mass.* We may, also, mention the *Mass.* of Stoddard of Northampton, Hooker of Hartford, Eliot the Indian apostle, the historians Gookin, Hubbard, Prince, the voluminous papers of Cotton Mather, the interesting journals of judge Sewall, the Literary Diary of president Stiles, etc. It is well known, also, that it is still a matter of deliberation where the numerous *Mass.* of president Edwards shall be finally deposited. The owners of them would undoubtedly feel inclined to place them in a General Library such as the one proposed. Many precious papers, not now publicly known to exist, utterly neglected, mouldering in chests or in garrets, constantly exposed to destruction, would be rescued, and would reach the same safe destination.

In England, also, some Puritan *Mass.* might be procured even at this late day. An agent, stationed in London and commissioned to visit the places once honored by the eminent non-conformists, would be able to gather up some precious spoil. During the present year a large collection of the *Mass.* of Dr. Doddridge, containing letters to him from many distinguished individuals, were sold by auction at a very moderate price.

III. Portraits, prints, etc. Some of the original portraits of the non-conformist fathers in England might yet, possibly, be procured. In other cases prints, busts or engravings might supply their place. Some of the portraits of the old Puritans are of little worth. Those by Hollar, Marshall Faithorne, Vertue, and Robert White were probably faithful.¹ Of the portraits of the New England fathers a much larger number might now be secured. Of many of the more distinguished individuals, several portraits on canvass are known to exist. The families of these venerated men not unfrequently become extinct in the direct line. In such cases it would not be difficult to purchase the portraits, perhaps *Mass.* and other valuable relics. Where they could not be procured by purchase or donation, they might be borrowed on an indefinite lease and placed in the Museum for safe keeping, as has been the case with some of the treasures of our Historical Societies. At all events it is practicable to collect a sufficient number to adorn some of the halls of the building devoted to this purpose. No spectacle could be more delightful to the genuine descend-

¹ Williams's Letters on Puritanism, 2d series, p. 109.

ants of the Pilgrims than a series of such portraits, time-worn and decayed though they might be. They would not reveal the inspirations of genius; they might not attract the votaries of the fine arts. But they would answer a nobler purpose. Their fading colors would teach a more impressive lesson. How interesting to see a chronological series, beginning with elder Brewster, Gov. Winthrop, John Robinson, John Harvard, John Davenport, Thomas Hooker, the Mathers, the Bulkleys, the Mayhews, the successive Puritan governors who were elected by the people, the authors of the two Platforms, the "venerable company of pastors" who gave their books as the foundation of Yale, the great man who labored in the revivals of religion in the middle and in the latter part of the eighteenth century, down to the patriarchs who have just finished their labors, the teachers of theology—the sage of Franklin, Wood, Shepard, Hyde, Dwight, and many others who were pillars in our churches. Even if but few of these pictured memorials of moral and intellectual worth could be assembled, how inestimable the treasure.

IV. Miscellaneous memorials, cherished articles employed in the studies and labors of distinguished men, characteristic remembrances, even should they be small, and in themselves of little value. At Eisleben are shown the cap, cloak, portrait and various relics of Luther; at Erfurt are his inkstand, table, Bible, portrait and other interesting reminiscences; in Halle is a pulpit in which he preached; in Wittenberg is his house or lodging in the old Augustinian convent, also his chair and table at which he wrote, the jug from which he drank, his stove made according to his own directions with peculiar devices, his professor's chair, two portraits of him by Cranach, and a cast of his face after death. In many other cities also various memorials may be found. Now if these relics, or the more interesting of them, could be collected at Wittenberg, the cradle of the reformation, and at the same time there could be deposited in that city those objects which are associated with the names of his distinguished co-laborers, what a spot it would be for the refreshment of the spirit! Other places would still retain permanent memorials of Luther. The Wartburg and the cell at Erfurt would still attract the traveller. Yet one place would be the central point of interest. *This* he would see if he were compelled to pass by all the others.

So at some central point in New England, touching mementoes of the great men, who have adorned her religious history, might be collected. Nothing at Abbotsford is so impressive as the hat,

staff and coat of the border minstrel precisely in the state in which he last used them. We are creatures of association. We should feel a deeper interest in the doctrines preached by the fathers of New England, if we had visible and tangible memorials of their existence and labors.

The following reasons may be stated for the establishment of such a Library and Museum as we have indicated :

I. It would form a centre of patriotic and religious reminiscence for New England and for all the descendants of the Pilgrims—the shrine to which those who revere the memory of the great and the good and the learned of past ages might repair. In the university library of Bâle we seem to be in the very presence of Erasmus, Euler, Oecolampadius, the Bernouillis and Holbeins. In Zürich, the portraits, Mss., and relics of Zuingli and other reformers are the cherished treasures. The public library at Geneva preserves the portrait, the published works, the Mss. letters and other remains of Calvin, though the place of his sepulchre is unknown. In these three libraries, the true Protestants of the three cantons have objects of deep and common interest. Their feelings of affection and veneration are garnered up in the old halls which still seem to be vocal with the stern and solemn voices of the sixteenth century. Similar would be the emotions which would be felt as we should gather around the place where the literary and theological remains of the founders of the New England churches and their descendants might be deposited. We may learn the effect of such an exhibition from the reverence which is now felt for the comparatively few and imperfect memorials which exist at Plymouth, Hartford, and other towns. It would unite in no common bonds all the children of the Pilgrims in their widest dispersions.

II. Such a Library would constitute an interesting memorial of the theological and literary labors of the Puritans. It would be a standing proof of the groundlessness of the charges which have been sometimes made against them as if they would dissociate piety from human learning. It would be a monument of the debt which the friends of knowledge and of civil liberty owe to them. Who could undervalue the English Dissenters, when he should see on the shelves of a library, as the product of their pens, *The Paradise Lost*, *The Pilgrim's Progress*, *The Saint's Everlasting Rest*, *The Blessedness of the Righteous*, *The Credibility of the Gospel History*, *The Cyclopaedia of Rees*, *The Hymns and Divine Songs of Watts*, *The Exposition and the*

Rise and Progress of Doddridge and many others in all departments of sacred literature? Some of these will last as long as the language itself. Robinson Crusoe, another imperishable work, was written by a Dissenter. So also, many of the writings of the New England Puritans, if not equally renowned, will not soon perish. The journals of the first governor Winthrop, full of touching interest, are a model of their kind. The metaphysical writings of Edwards are commended by the highest authorities in Europe. Some of the works of Dr. Franklin, a native of Boston, have an European currency. The State papers of the elder Adams and some of his New England contemporaries, elicited the praises of Burke. The theological writings of Dr. Dwight have enjoyed a large sale in this country and a still greater one in England. The theological opinions of Andrew Fuller, one of the greatest of modern English divines, were formed by a close study of New England theology.

III. An establishment of the nature described would be one means of perpetuating the religious principles and usages of the Puritans. It would not, of itself, indeed, be an effectual barrier against the encroachments of innovation and error. Like written standards, paper constitutions and other devices of man, its voice might be silent or unheeded. It might stand as an affecting memorial of the latitudinarianism or moral degeneracy of the descendants of those whose worth it commemorates. Such, however, would be a perversion of its legitimate influence. Its natural teachings would be in accordance with truth. It would be a great historical landmark, embodying in tangible form the spirit and the labors of what might be called the heroic or martyr-age in our history. Amid the necessary changes of society, in the introduction of new elements into our social and religious life, it would point to our past history, and enforce the lessons of veneration and love which it is so fitted to teach. And in the event of our apostatizing from the religious views of our fathers, such a monument might be one of the means of restoration, might utter one of those voices which would recall us into the path of safety and truth. In Germany there has been a sad and almost universal abandonment of the doctrines of the Reformation. Luther's name is on every tongue, while his doctrine is trampled under foot. Still, the veneration, the almost passionate admiration and love which are everywhere felt towards him, are among the brightest signs of the times and afford one of the strongest grounds of hope, that Germany will yet be rescued from its un-

natural alliance with error. His name will have a potent spell to scatter the darkness. The glaring contradiction exhibited by those who almost adore his memory, while they reject that belief which was to him dearer than life, will yet awaken earnest attention and lead to a more consistent practice. This veneration for Luther is, in part, owing to the touching and numerous memorials of him to be found in almost every part of Protestant Germany. The Wartburg, Erfurt, Eisenach, Tübingen, Wittenberg, Augsburg, keep alive the precious remembrances of Martin and his dear Philip, and aid that influence which Luther's hymns and catechisms, and the German language,—the undying memorial of the Reformation,—so powerfully exerts. Such, to some extent, would be the effect of the venerable memorials of our fathers, could they be drawn out from their hiding places, and be duly arranged and combined. A book would become a teacher; a manuscript would utter its admonitory voice; a pen, handled two hundred years ago by the holy Shepard, would not be a dull monitor. The picture of the apostolic Eliot would seem to follow us with its reproving eye, till we had copied his sublime example. The old pine pulpit of a Bellamy or a Hopkins would enable them yet to speak the words of truth and soberness. The very autograph might become a sermon. The stone taken from the threshold of one of their sanctuaries would cry out, and the beam from the timber would answer it.

IV. Such an historical Library and Museum would be of inestimable service to our future civil and ecclesiastical historians. It may be safely said, that however valuable the history of the Puritans would be, prepared by our contemporaries, the writers of a future age will enjoy in some respects far greater facilities for the task. They will bring to the subject more impartiality, a wider survey of the field and an ampler experience. Certain vital questions, now in the process of unfolding, will, in one or two centuries, admit of a satisfactory explanation. We live, e. g., too near the great revival of religion in Whitefield's time to be able to describe it adequately. All the results of the American revolution are not known. How inestimable at a distance of two hundred years from this time, would be a great collection of books and manuscripts, carefully arranged and supplied with all necessary literary apparatus. How grateful would be the historians of those coming times for a repository that a little care and expense might now establish. Should it be found impracticable to rescue from decay and oblivion, any considerable portion of the records

of the past, yet enough could be secured to form a nucleus for the time to come. Should it be difficult to dig up the mouldering remains of the seventeenth century, many treasures illustrating the eighteenth century are still procurable. To these might be added the more important books and Mss. which are from time to time becoming accessible by the deaths of their owners. Gradually a collection might be formed which would be exceedingly valuable to all who should at any future time engage in historical studies and a monument to the zeal and comprehensive views of its founders.

V. Such a Library, open and common to all, would tend to promote brotherly feelings among the descendants of the Puritans. It would be a bond of unity, a rallying-place for the affections, or at least a neutral spot where envious feelings would be hushed, and acrimonious controversies be suspended. In the presence of the venerable founders of New England, it would be almost like desecrating the grave of a parent to indulge in any other than fraternal feelings.

VI. The establishment of a repository, like the one described, would exert a favorable influence on the character of the sermons and other works which may hereafter be published by our clergymen. The expectation that one copy at least of a discourse would be sure of preservation and would be a representative of the character and talents of its author ages after he had deceased, could not be without some effect on the quality of the thoughts which he should commit to the press. He would wish to have them worthy of his ancestry and of the honorable company which they would enjoy. Had the painters, who took the portraits of the non-conformist fathers that now adorn the hall in Dr. Williams's Library, anticipated the destination to which those portraits have attained, they would have been more exact likenesses and been finished with the utmost possible care.

VII. We may add, in conclusion, that the accomplishment of the plan proposed would insure the preservation of valuable documents and curiosities which will otherwise be lost. Many inestimable treasures have already disappeared irrecoverably. Every year the loss is becoming greater. Death, fire, the wear of time when not guarded against, and various accidents are fast diminishing the honored memorials of original Puritanism. At the present moment it is possible to procure in England some of the pamphlets and newspapers which were published in England in the

times of Elizabeth, James I., Charles I. and the Commonwealth.¹ Early editions of the printed books published by Milton, Goodwin, Cartwright, Baxter, Howe, and other actors and preachers in that period, are still to be found. Yet these, as well as the pamphlets and Mss., are becoming, like the Sibylline books, the more precious as they diminish in number. The controllers of the great libraries in many parts of Christendom are more and more solicitous to obtain possession of these treasures. Several affluent private individuals in the United States are securing at great expense all the productions relating to Puritanism of any value which come into the English market. To our own country the same remarks are in a measure applicable. Much which was accessible in 1700 is lost forever. Much which might now be gathered up will wholly disappear in the lapse of half a century. Those treasures that might now be bought, or procured as a free gift, will soon pass into some public library out of New England or out of the country, or become the property of unknown individuals.

ARTICLE IX.

MISCELLANY — CORRESPONDENCE.

THE following is an extract of a letter which we have received from Prof. Rödiger of Halle, dated April 25, 1847: "I am laboring daily on the last *Heft* of the *Thesaurus* which I hope to be able to bring out towards autumn. It will contain not a little new matter which, I hope, will prove to be correct. Lepsius of Berlin is very busily occupied with Egyptian Chronology. I correspond with him on the points which relate to the Bible. He will soon print in the third *Heft* of the *Journal* of the Oriental Society a paper on the Decree of *Phitae*, similar to that of the Rosetta Inscription. In the second *Heft* there is a very good essay by Tuch on the 14th ch. of Genesis, which will be well received in the United States. Thenius of Dresden is laboring industriously on his Commentary upon the Books of Kings. The new edition of Winer's Biblical Dictionary is advancing. Tischendorf is editing the Septuagint,

¹ We have in our possession a few numbers of several of the newspapers published during the progress of the civil war, which impart a reality and a truthfulness to those stirring times which no formal history can secure.

but this work will exceed his ability, or rather he will busy himself on the small things, e. g. α , ϵ , η and ν , and other orthographic minutiae, while the pressing and difficult problem in relation to the Septuagint will remain for a time unsolved. Hitzig's Commentary on Ezekiel will be ready this summer, and though for my taste it will deal somewhat too much in conjectures, yet in acuteness and exact grammatical knowledge it will not be deficient. Petermann will edit a new edition of the Syriac Letters of Igaatius, with the aid of an old Armenian version. When I have completed the Thesaurus, I am thinking, along with other labors, of publishing a small Arabic Grammar for my lectures, since that by Caspari contains things which do not accord with my system and hence would only interfere with my instructions. I have this summer my third course in Arabic Syntax, with the reading of historical texts. A work important for Germany has appeared, on 'Protestantism' by Hundeshagen, which is valued by all parties. The library of our Oriental Society is established in Halle. Religious movements among us are now in the back-ground; the toleration-edict of March 30th has made a pause, and all the public interest is now turned towards politics and to the doings of the Chambers assembled at Berlin."

Another friend writes as follows in relation to the work by Hundeshagen: "A novelty in the literary world, which tells upon the German public,—published in the beginning of this or the end of last year (I forget)—is: *der Deutsche Protestantismus, seine Vergangenheit, und seine heutigen Lebenssprungen, im Zusammenhange der gesammten National-entwicklung, etc., von einem deutschen Theologen. Frankfurt on the Maine.* (2 R.) [German Protestantism, what it was, and the present vital questions with regard to it, considered and discussed in all its bearings on the whole national development (on all the conditions of the nation as it is developed at present)]. I have not had time to peruse it. So I cannot give an opinion of it.—Another book will appear this year's Leipsic Easter-Fair, which I think is very likely to be much read. Prof. Julius Müller, who you know was a member of the much spoken of Berlin Synod, has gallantly taken up the gauntlet, which, from one quarter by Uhlich, and from another by 'the Kirchen-Zeitung,' had been thrown down. The former adversary is disarmed before many courses; but the latter needs to be encountered with greater address and skill. His invectives, sneers, misrepresentations, and criminations of the resolutions and principles of that Synod, you will find in a leading article of the *Evangel. Kirchen-Zeitung*, January 1st, and the following numbers. Prof. Müller in refuting his adversary was obliged to enter more fully into the principle and views, under the influence of which the Synod had been working at its arduous task."

The following is from Prof. Hupfeld of Halle. "I contemplate continuing my *larger* Hebrew Grammar this year by publishing an additional second number (*Livraison*), containing an essay on the *Accents*, and thus concluding that part of the Grammar on Hebrew Writing (*Schriftlehre*). But I doubt whether I shall complete the whole work in the same manner as I have carried it on thus far. I intend to prepare, as soon as possible, a *shorter* Grammar of the Hebrew language, with the particular view of adapting it to use for lectures at colleges and universities, and for schools; which book will exhibit my system in its fundamental features.—I have thought of collecting my detached pieces, etc., yet the execution must be delayed till after the completion of the grammar. Such a collection will comprise partly essays treating on the History of Writing ("Schriftgeschichte") and Palaeography—partly purely grammatical ones; some of them published before, some still manuscripts. I cannot be positive as to the time when I shall prepare a General Introduction to the Old Testament [or: 'a History of Literature of the O. T.' (*Literaturgeschichte der A. T.*)] ; it may rather be at a more distant period, however desirous I am to body forth my views of this department of science. Among the existing only that of *De Wette* is worthy to be noticed and recommended."

The following extracts are from letters written at Rome.

"*Rome, Jan. 11, 1847.* This day an academical exercise was held in the college *De Propaganda Fide* in honor of the Magi or holy kings. Fifty-two young men and lads took part in it, in forty-eight languages and dialects. The exercises consisted of a series of declamations interspersed with several dialogues or colloquies and the singing of chants. The length of the declamations was from two to eight minutes. Some were committed to memory; others were read from *Ms.* They were in the following languages and dialects: Hebrew, Rabbinic, Syriac, Chaldee, Arabic, Coptic, Ethiopic, Samaritan, Armenian, ancient and modern Georgian, Koordish, Persian, Amharic, Turkish, Maltese, Greek ancient and modern, three in Latin, two in Chinese, Hindoostanee, Tamil, Singalese, Peguan, Angola (African), Wallachian, Albanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Polish, Lapponian, Swedish, Illyrian, Dutch, German, Swiss (a corrupt German, a dialect spoken in canton St. Gall, Switzerland), two in Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, English, Scotch, Irish, Celtic, and two languages spoken in Chili and Curaçoa, S. America. Most of the speakers are natives of the various countries indicated by the languages which they used. Their ages varied from ten years to twenty-five. Some boys excited much interest by their clever management of their parts and by their pleasant chants. The difference in form, complexion, physiognomy, enunciation was very striking. The interest

would have been increased, if the uniform ecclesiastical dress—a black gown and cap—had been exchanged for the costumes of the countries to which the pupils belonged. The tenor of the performances seemed to be in accordance with the object of the exercise—the visit of the Magi at Bethlehem. The exercise in English, was pronounced by Jeremiah Cummings of Washington, D. C., who closed with an address to England, lamenting her defection from the Catholic faith and congratulating his auditors on the hopeful prospects in that country of a return to the Catholic unity. The number of pupils of the Propaganda present was about seventy. Few spectacles would be more interesting than that of so many young missionary scholars literally assembled from the four quarters of the world, were they preparing to go forth as true missionaries of the cross of Christ. It is to be feared, however, that they will be the heralds of hurtful superstitions, rather than of salutary truth. The room in which the exercises were held, was crowded with about 300 gentlemen, most of whom were strangers at Rome. On the previous day the same performances had been rehearsed to a different audience.

The buildings of the Propaganda lie on a street of the same name which proceeds from the Piazza di Spagna, at the western base of the Pincian hill. The society was founded by Gregory XV, in 1622, for the spread of the Catholic faith. His successor, Urban VIII, completed his plans, and erected the present edifice in 1627. In consequence it bears the name Collegium Urbanum. The chapel was built by Alexander VII. The pupils board and study in this building, or rather in these buildings, which reach the whole length of the street, till they are prepared to depart to their fields of labor. Cardinal Barberini, brother of Urban, contributed largely for the support of the pupils. Printing is now carried on in the building in fourteen languages. Previously to the French revolution, fonts of types were owned in twenty-seven languages. The types carried to Paris, were restored in 1815. The congregation of the Propaganda consists of a cardinal prefect, now Simonetti; twenty-three associate cardinals, a secretary and prothonotary and several subordinates. The college for the education of the pupils is under the control of this congregation. The instruction for a number of years has been under the direction of the Jesuits, from whom the rector is also chosen. In the library are a collection of Chinese books, Coptic MSS., a codex of Mexican hieroglyphics, Greek, Roman and Coptic coins, Egyptian cameos, etc.

⁴ *Rome, Jan. 21, 1847.* Called, in company with a friend, on the celebrated linguist, cardinal Mezzofanti. He received us with the utmost kindness, seated us beside him, and entertained us with his conversation, till he was interrupted by another call. He said he enjoyed

good health for a man of seventy years, but that he had been unable to pursue his studies to any great extent, since Divine Providence had called him to his present post. He is a man of about the middle height, with benevolent and expressive eyes and of mild and attractive manners. He uses the English language almost with the propriety and fluency of a native, and is wonderfully exact even in matters of idiom and accent. He said he had no difficulty in learning to read English, but great in learning to pronounce it. On this latter point, he thought, the rule which Barretti, the friend of Dr. Johnson, gave in an elementary work, was the only useful one, viz. "Let a foreigner go to England with a pair of good ears." He remarked that the language was well spoken by the people of the United States, and with far less dialectic peculiarities than are found in England. His conversation showed an intimate acquaintance with English literature, the earlier as well as modern, with the dialects spoken in England, Scotland, etc. With my companion, who is familiar with German, the cardinal conversed in that language, with the same propriety and ease as in English, and offered to continue it in *Low German*, from which my friend shrank. He said that he had not derived much benefit from the scholars of the Propaganda, as, in general, they come to Rome when they are mere boys, with no grammatical knowledge of their respective languages, while they often used only a corrupt dialect. E. g. He learned to speak Chinese with an educated native who resided in Bologna. But when the cardinal came to Rome, he could hardly understand a China man whom he met in the Propaganda, while the Chinese could not comprehend him at all. The reason was that in the latter case, a dialect was used. Mezzofanti was the son of a humble tradesman of Bologna, and was, for many years, professor of Greek and oriental literature in the university of that city. He was called to Rome by Gregory XVI. and appointed to a post in the Vatican under Mai. Both were raised to the dignity of cardinals at the same time. At the age of thirty-six Mezzofanti is said to have conversed fluently in eighteen languages. At the present time he speaks forty-two. This knowledge is not of an artificial or mechanical character. It is accompanied with profound grammatical acquisitions and with an extensive acquaintance with the literature of the principal languages which he has acquired. Lord Byron's description of him is well known: "He is a prodigy of language, a Briareus of the parts of speech, a walking library, who ought to have lived at the time of the tower of Babel, as universal interpreter, a real miracle and without pretension too."

Mr. Clark, the publisher of Edinburgh, is about to commence a bibliographical monthly review. The plan is commended by Drs. Alexander, Brown,

Cunningham, bishop Terrot and others. The editor is not named. A quarterly biblical publication is also soon to be commenced in London, under the editorial care of Dr. Kitto, assisted by some of the leading contributors to the *Biblical Cyclopaedia*. The third edition of Elliott's *Horae Apocalypticæ* is in press. Several positions in it have been assailed by Dr. Candlish and others, still its popularity does not seem to be on the wane. A new and enlarged edition of Dr. Pye Smith's *Scripture Testimony* will appear in a few months. Dr. Davidson, professor in the *Lancashire Independent College*, is about to publish an *Introduction to the New Testament*. A part of it is ready for the press.

The *Germania and Agricola* of Caius Cornelius Tacitus, with notes for Colleges. By W. S. Tyler, professor of the Latin and Greek languages in Amherst College. New-York and London: Wiley and Putnam, 1847, pp. 181. We shall refer to this volume in our next number, not having received the sheets in season to examine them even cursorily. The external appearance is in every way prepossessing. The paper, type, etc. are uncommonly good. The text, with the life of Tacitus, occupies 74 pages; the notes fill the remainder. The editor seems to have availed himself of all accessible sources for the improvement of the edition.

Allen, Morrill and Wardwell have published a history of Rome from the earliest times to the fall of the Western Empire, by Dr. Leonhard Schmitz, Rector of the High School, Edinburgh, 1 vol. 12mo. Within the last thirty years, great light has been thrown on the subject of Roman history, by the investigations of Niebuhr, Arnold, Goettling, Rubino, Becker, Ulrichs, Bunsen and others. Much that had long been received as true history, has been clearly shown to be mere legend; and much which has been doubtful, has been proved worthy of credit, or its credibility satisfactorily disproved. The constitution of the Romans, their laws, religion, civil and social condition, have been for a long period subjects of investigation, and are now better understood by the learned than at any time since the downfall of the Roman State. But while all these improvements are accessible to the more mature scholars in the works of Niebuhr, Arnold and others, there has been no work suitable for the use of students in our schools and colleges, which has embodied the valuable advances made in Roman history. The text-books in use still teach many of the old exploded errors, and hence most students who may have devoted sufficient time to the subject, have a very imperfect view of the early history and government of Rome. The work of Dr. Schmitz fully supplies the deficiency which has so long existed. It presents in a pop-

ular form the investigations of the most distinguished scholars; it is written in a clear and happy style, giving results without the tedious process by which they have been attained; it distinguishes between legend and true history, where such a distinction is well established; and where there are points of doubt, or points still in dispute, these are admitted to be still unsettled, or "are passed over altogether in order not to confuse the learner." The student knows therefore on what he may rely, and what is still doubtful. Dr. Schmitz had rare qualifications for such a work. He was a pupil and an ardent admirer of the illustrious Niebuhr, and has devoted much time to the study of Roman history in preparing the unpublished lectures of Niebuhr from the notes taken by several of his most distinguished pupils. These advantages together with his well-known scholarship and habits of original investigation gave him qualifications for preparing a valuable history of Rome, which few of the scholars of Europe possessed. The work, it is confidently believed, will not disappoint the high expectations which have been formed respecting it. It will undoubtedly take the place of every other text-book of the kind, in our schools and colleges.

The library of Harvard University exhibits a gratifying increase from year to year. Within the last year about 1000 volumes have been added. The fund subscribed some time since for this purpose is not yet exhausted. There is also a stated fund which yields a considerable income for the same object. In the course of a year, the new and elegant building, which the Boston Athenaeum are erecting in Beacon Street, will be completed. It is hoped that this pleasant change in the locality of the library will lead to the enlargement of the number of books. Mr. Charles Folsom is the courteous and accomplished librarian. About \$2000 have been expended during the last year in the increase of the Library of the Andover Theological Seminary. This sum has been principally devoted to the purchase of works in the English language. Among the purchases are the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana* (which can now be procured bound for about £20) 30 vols. quarto, the *Edinburgh Cabinet Library*, 38 vols.; the *Parker Society Publications*, 18 vols., 8vo.; *Oxford Library of the Fathers*, 22 vols., 8vo.; the *Calvin Society Publications*, 8 vols.; the new edition of *Apl. Usher's Works*, 14 vols., 8vo.; also a complete sett of the *Journal Asiatique*, 50 vols., 8vo.; the first series of the *Biographie Universelle*, 54 vols., 8vo.; and the *Encyclopaedia of Ersch and Grüber*, now amounting to 84 vols. quarto.

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ARTICLE I.

CHRYSOSTOM, ARCHBISHOP OF CONSTANTINOPLE, VIEWED
AS A PREACHER.

A free translation from the German of C. F. W. Paniel, by H. J. Ripley, Professor in Newton Theological Institution.

[The original, of which the following is a free translation, is an Article in Paniel's *Geschichte der Christlichen Beredsamkeit*. It is a fair and impartial view of Chrysostom. The author is neither his eulogist, nor his apologist; he sees blemishes as well as beauties.

My aim has been in the translation to do justice to the original and yet to make a readable English article. I have also, at certain points, abbreviated the original essay.

The extracts from Chrysostom's discourses are here translated, and in some instances enlarged, from the original Greek, of the Paris edition of 1836. In the references to Chrysostom's Works, the Roman numerals indicate the volume, the Arabic the page.
—H. J. R.]

Among the early preachers, no one's life and fortunes were determined so much by his eloquence as were Chrysostom's. It was the cause both of his elevation and of his abasement; of the high respect he acquired while living, and of the still higher and more enduring renown which has been awarded to him since his death. His proper name was John. The surname, Chrysostom

(golden-mouthed), became appropriated to him in after times; yet certainly before the year 636, since Isidore of Hispala, who died in that year, speaks of him under this name.¹ As, however, it doubtless originated in the East, not in the West, he must have been known by it before the time of Isidore, though neither the early ecclesiastical historians, Socrates and Sozomen, nor Palladius, in his Greek biography of Chrysostom, make mention of it.

Biographical Sketch of Chrysostom.

Chrysostom was born, probably, about the year 347, at Antioch, of a distinguished and wealthy family. Soon after his birth he lost his father, Secundus, who held an important place in the staff of the highest military commander of the Roman Asiatic provinces. But his pious and excellent mother, Anthusa, who from love to her son and her deceased husband was disinclined to enter again the marriage-state, watched over his youthful years with most devoted and judicious solicitude. Though warmly attached to the Christian faith, she yet avoided the fault committed by other mothers of eminent teachers in the church, of devoting her son from his birth to the ministry, or to monastic life, and, in consequence, of giving him a contracted ascetic education; and, contrary to the practice of other women of high rank who obtained for their sons only some slight instruction in Latin literature and in Roman law, she rather provided for him the means of a general and thorough literary training.

His principal instructor was Libanius, the most distinguished heathen rhetorician of his time. Libanius early discovered Chrysostom's promising talents, and lamented, on his death-bed, that this scholar who afterwards became so much his superior in eloquence, could not be procured as his successor in the chair of rhetoric. In philosophy,² Chrysostom's instructor was Andragathus. Neither his belief in Christianity, nor his love of religion, suffered injury from his being educated by these heathen teachers; for his mother was in the habit of leading her beloved son, with Christian zeal, to the fountain of truth; and he made himself, by personal study, familiar with the Holy Scriptures.

¹ The name *Chrysostom* was also given to Antiochus, during his lifetime, a contemporary and opponent of John Chrysostom.

² Panisl says, *In der Beredsamkeit*. But I here follow the Latin biography appended to Chrysostom's Works, which follows in this instance the authority of Socrates and with which the statement of Leo agrees, in his edition of Chrysostom's treatise on the Priesthood, p. 1.—Tr.

He was, however, in his youth, far from being indisposed to participate in the scenes of public life. The dramatic exhibitions, against which at a later period he expressed himself with so much vehemence, and the pleadings of advocates at the forum, were particularly attractive to him. His earliest opportunity for exercising his native oratorical talent was at the forum; and he actually entered on the practice of law, an employment which was then the first step to the higher posts of secular honor. He soon, however, contracted a dislike for the low arts which the advocates allowed themselves; and this dislike gradually increased, till he became disaffected towards secular pursuits in general, and anxious for quiet retirement and exclusive occupation with divine things. Meletius, the venerable bishop of Antioch, encouraged his purpose, and, when he had spent three years in study and had received baptism, appointed him to the office of Anagnost; that is, a public reader of the Scriptures. He was at that time about twenty-three years of age.

Impressed with reverence for the monks and hermits who were living in the vicinity of Antioch, and many of whom were truly estimable men, he had, at an earlier period, been desirous to associate with them in their ascetic mode of life. It was not, however, in all probability, till after the death of his mother, who had in the most touching manner entreated him not to leave her, that he was able to accomplish this long-cherished purpose. In the monastery, two abbots, Carterius and Diodorus, the latter of whom became very distinguished and was appointed bishop of Tarsus, assumed his further education for the sacred office; and to the latter, particularly, he was indebted for his initiation into just grammatical and logical principles of scriptural interpretation.¹ After residing six years in the monastery, employed in extending his literary and religious attainments, besides writing a vindication of the monastic life, his health had become so impaired by his ascetic severities as to make it necessary for him, in the year 380, to return to Antioch.

He had, some years before, in consequence of his mother's entreaty and of his own modesty, declined the office of bishop to which it was in contemplation to elect him.² He was now, how-

¹ Neander, in the second edition of his *Life of Chrysostom*, is rather inclined to the opinion, that Diodorus was not connected with the monastery; but that, while a presbyter at Antioch, he also gathered around him a company of young men for theological instruction and preparation for the sacred office.—*Tr.*

² To this circumstance we are indebted for his treatise on the Priesthood, in

ever, ordained a deacon by Meletius, and about six years after a presbyter by Flavian, the successor of Meletius. As he was not allowed, while a deacon, to preach in public, his great abilities were not fully displayed till after he became a presbyter. Being now the principal and most intimate assistant of his bishop, and occupying the highest place in his esteem, he soon had most ample opportunity for extensive usefulness, as the distinguished preacher of a large congregation embracing, it was estimated, a hundred thousand souls.¹ In the second year after he became a presbyter, occurred the insurrection at Antioch, in which the statues of the imperial family were destroyed, and the city was in consequence subjected to great suffering. This was the occasion of his preaching the celebrated twenty-one discourses on the Statues. In these discourses, he did not restrict himself to the public calamities, though these were at the time matters of chief interest to the people of Antioch. He rather employed the occasion to expose such delinquencies of the Christians as gave them little solicitude, and to show the necessity of amendment. His activity in the ministry, besides the proof of it thus furnished, was so great that few days passed without his preaching in public.

For twelve years he labored at Antioch; and the fame of his eloquence and of his virtues had spread through the whole East. His promotion to a more distinguished post of influence, which might seem but the just recompense of his great merits, was, nevertheless, consequent on the accidental circumstance that Eutropius, the favorite of the emperor Arcadius, happening to be in Antioch, was filled with admiration at his remarkable eloquence. On the death of Nectarius, bishop of Constantinople, in the year 397, Eutropius proposed Chrysostom as the successor to that office. The church of Constantinople, assailed from all quarters by competitors for the vacant bishopric, could not form a decision, and at length solicited the emperor himself to appoint a bishop of approved abilities. With this the influence of the powerful chamberlain, Eutropius, was conjoined, and Chrysostom was selected.²

which he accounts for his declining the election, and unfolds his views of the high dignity of the sacred office.

¹ Antioch had a population of 200,000; one half professing the Christian religion.—Tr.

² This transfer to the highest post of the Eastern church was effected by authority and artifice, without seeking Chrysostom's consent. "Every preparation," says Neander, "being made, he was enticed out of the city of Antioch under a false

This new office, however, far from adding to his welfare, was on the contrary the occasion of his two exiles, and at length of his death; a well nigh violent death.

Animated with the most intense zeal for purity of morals, yet seeking to bring about reforms by applying ascetic principles, and often condemning even allowable gratifications; cherishing the loftiest ideas of the dignity and the duties of his office, at the same time disregarding the claims of the world, and particularly not heeding customs which excessive refinement and court-society had introduced; strict, in all respects, towards himself, making no allowance for human frailties; inclined to asperity in his judgments from his own consciousness of moral purity, and inspired with hatred of the prevalent corruption of the church; maintaining, also, a proud distance from every one whose virtue was stained—it could not but be, that, on taking up his abode at Constantinople with such peculiarities both of nature and education, he would make to himself many friends and admirers and equally many embittered enemies. The former he found in the middle and lower classes; the latter, among the higher and even among the clergy. To the better part of his people he was a model of the noblest virtues, a pattern of sobriety, of clerical dignity and activity. He was a friend of the poor, a protector of the oppressed, an unsparing judge of the wealthy and corrupt dignitaries. These last hated him as an enemy of their covetousness and licentiousness, of the baseness to which the men stooped, and the luxury and sensuality in which the women and widows of rank indulged; as a stern censor of the haughtiness of the great, and of the hypocrisy and corruption of the clergy. In these circumstances, and considering the power of the last-mentioned classes, it could not long remain doubtful what destiny awaited him. The hatred of the men in power and of the clergy, long sought for a pretext against him; but the most of his people were so fond of his preaching, that they clung to him with an affection that made it no easy thing to dispossess him of his office. Besides, in the distress which the seditious Goth, Gainas, had brought on the city and on the whole empire, Chrysostom had rendered services too great to be overlooked by the weak emperor.

As, however, he did not in his preaching spare the superstitious and corrupt empress Eudoxia, his numerous and powerful foes

pretext, in order to forestall his refusal and prevent the disorders which his congregation, who were so attached to him, might raise; and he was sent to Constantinople.”—Ta.

prevailed, at length, in a synod held at *the Oak*,¹ and composed of men unfriendly to him, to displace from office this mortally hated archbishop and his associates. The charges which they brought against him consisted, in part, of matters entirely alien from his character and wholly fictitious, and, in part, of wilful perversions and exaggerations; or were accusations which, in the judgment of every impartial person, could not but redound more to his honor than to his discredit. But however deficient these charges were in truth and force, this was compensated by the influence and malice of his opponents. His life, even, was in danger; for his enemies had laid against him² complaints of high treason, accusing him of having in a sermon called the empress Eudoxia a Jezebel; and perhaps he did, on some occasion, thus express himself. Neither the empress, however, nor his other powerful adversaries, among whom several women of blemished reputation, yet considerable for their rank and wealth, played a chief part, could prevail on the weak Arcadius to condemn him. To take a man's life whom so many bishops and the whole Christian community regarded with the highest love and reverence, seemed to the emperor too dangerous a step. He could not get Chrysostom into his power; for the people, three days successively, guarded the bishop's palace, and requested, as did Chrysostom himself, that the matter might be examined before an impartial and a larger synod. But when Chrysostom saw that the people's opposition to the authority of the State was likely to occasion bloodshed, he privately withdrew from the protection of his friends and surrendered himself to his enemies. He was conveyed away to the coast of Bithynia; but after a few days was recalled. This sudden recall resulted from the joint influence of the continued threatening excitement of the people, of a violent earthquake which had filled the superstitious Eudoxia with remorse of conscience, and of the representations of some of Chrysostom's friends in the imperial court. He was received with signal demonstrations of respect and amid the unbounded joy of the people.³

¹ Chrysostom's opponents deemed it unsafe to arraign him in Constantinople itself. The members of the synod repaired, therefore, to Chalcedon in the vicinity, and thence to a suburb of Chalcedon, named *the Oak*, and held their session in a church at that place.—Tr.

² "The Bosphorus," says Gibbon, "was covered with innumerable vessels; the shores of Europe and Asia were profusely illuminated; and the acclamations of a victorious people accompanied, from the port to the cathedral, the triumph of the archbishop."—Tr.

But the quiet between him and the empress continued only two months. He had again censured her in his usual harsh manner, and found fault with the extravagant veneration which the people paid to her statue; and he is said to have commenced the sermon on the festival of the martyrdom of John the Baptist with an allusion to the empress and to his own proper name John, in these words: "Herodias rages anew; anew she is excited; anew she dances; anew she seeks to receive in a platter the head of John."¹ From that time, the empress swore an unappeasable hostility to this unsparing orator. In connection with other enemies of Chrysostom, she succeeded, at a synod, in having him deposed a second time, and in procuring a decree for his banishment. But neither on this occasion could his enemies effect his removal from the city, till he delivered himself up in order to terminate the shocking and bloody acts of violence to which his adherents were exposed.

It was only for a few years, however, that he thus escaped the hands of hired assassins, from whom even in his own palace he had been in danger of his life. For his enemies, indignant at his finding friends even in his banishment at Cucusus, at his still exerting his influence in many parts of the East and even of the West,² and at his adherents' continued attachment to him, procured an additional decree from Arcadius, by virtue of which he was to be removed to Pityus, a town on the eastern desert coast of the Euxine and near the extreme limits of the empire. The

¹ Paniel here refers to the authority of Socrates. The sentence which he quotes from Socrates (Hist. Eccl. VI. 16.) contains the historical error respecting Herodias' dancing.

² "The three years," says Gibbon, "which he spent at Cucusus and the neighboring town of Arabissus, were the last and most glorious of his life. His character was consecrated by absence and persecution; the faults of his administration were no longer remembered, but every tongue repeated the praises of his genius and virtue; and the respectful attention of the Christian world was fixed on a desert spot amid the mountains of Taurus. From that solitude the archbishop, whose active mind was invigorated by misfortunes, maintained a strict and frequent correspondence with the most distant provinces; exhorted the separate congregation of his faithful adherents to persevere in their allegiance; urged the destruction of the temples of Phœnicia, and the extirpation of heresy in the isle of Cyprus; extended his pastoral care to the missions of Persia and Scythia; negotiated, by his ambassadors, with the Roman pontiff and the emperor Honorius; and boldly appealed from a partial synod, to the supreme tribunal of a free and general council. The mind of the illustrious exile was still independent; but his captive body was exposed to the revenge of the oppressors, who continued to abuse the name and authority of Arcadius."—*Tr.*

inhuman treatment he suffered during this journey, was too much for a constitution already enfeebled by the abuses he had so long endured. The noble sufferer did not reach the place of his banishment. Death overtook him on the way, in Comana, a city of Pontus. He expired, September 14th, in the year 407, with his favorite expression on his lips, "God be praised for everything."

His sixth successor in the bishopric of Constantinople had his remains removed to that city in the year 438, where they were received with marked reverence and with great pomp.

Such is a slight outline of the life and death of a preacher, of whom it may be justly said that all his prosperity and adversity, the honor to which he attained and the indignities which he suffered, his premature, and, in part, violent end, as well as his imperishable fame, sprung almost exclusively from his great eloquence and from the most praise-worthy, though not wholly unexceptionable, manner in which he employed it. Other celebrated preachers of antiquity, as Origen, Athanasias, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzum, also experienced the diversified lot of persecution and of respect, and have established the credit of their names even to our day. But in no one of them was it pulpit oratory that caused both the pleasing and the painful events of life, so entirely as in Chrysostom. Their distinction resulted, in a great measure, from causes other than oratorical merit. But whatever distinction Chrysostom obtained by other services, his pulpit eloquence was the central point around which everything gathered that affected him for good or for evil, during his life and after his death.¹

Chrysostom's Training for the Pulpit.

We pass now to the inquiry, How did Chrysostom become so distinguished an orator? In reply, it must first be said, that he was naturally endowed with most eminent oratorical talents. A strong, penetrating and comprehensive mind, a brilliant invention, an inexhaustible imagination, an abundant vein of wit, presence

¹ It has always been the case that men of inferior abilities have, through want of extensive views, passed an unfavorable judgment on the spirit and sentiments of men of distinguished endowments, and have traced the calamities which have fallen to their lot, not to the envy and treachery of those with whom they had to act, but to their own failings. So it has been in respect to Chrysostom. The historian, Socrates, who is generally a discriminating man, accuses him, in quite an extravagant manner, of indiscretion in his judgment and conduct, of anger, of weakness towards his favorites, and of haughtiness. The most of these objections have always been made against eminent men.

of mind, fervor and depth of feeling, readiness and exactness of observation, a decidedly practical bent of disposition—in one word, all the highest and most essential requisites of a good orator, were by nature united in him. His character, also, though represented by his opponents as proud, repulsive, austere and cold, was nevertheless a noble one throughout; he was animated with zeal for the welfare of mankind, and was undaunted where the vindication of truth and right was concerned. Even the pride with which he kept aloof from every thing low, and avoided contact with the great mass of unworthy ecclesiastics and with a court passionately fond of flattery, was, notwithstanding the severe persecution which he thereby incurred, more becoming and dignified in him, as a clergyman and an orator, than the contrary would have been.

Besides his excellent natural talents, he enjoyed a most favorable education. From his childhood, his tender and pious mother, Anthusa, instilled into him the purest principles of piety and virtue, and inspired him with a most glowing zeal for the holy cause of the gospel. With the Scriptures he early became extremely familiar, and was led into a thorough understanding of them by his own inward experience and the invaluable instruction of the great Diodorus. To this man, who became noted for introducing and freely following grammatical and historical principles in the interpretation of the Bible, he owed that aversion to trivial allegorizing, as well as to other abuses of the simple meaning of the Bible, and that profound, impressive and practical use of the Scriptures, which so greatly distinguished him above all the other preachers of the ancient Greek church. His mind, naturally inclined to free and unconstrained action, was still more preserved from narrow and partial views, and was enriched with copious stores of knowledge, by his study of the ancients. Not less happy was he in being educated by Libanius, the most celebrated sophist of his time. His taste, and his principles of eloquence were formed according to the rhetorical views of this master, while the mental abilities of the scholar enabled him easily to detect and to avoid his teacher's sophistries.¹

He also possessed that most necessary quality of an orator,

¹ "From an intimate acquaintance," says Neander, "with the philosophy of ancient Greece, and from his remarkable powers of rhetoric, Libanius was easily enabled to excite the warm imagination of his youthful followers by a display of heathen mythology, and to prejudice them against Christianity by specious and impious sophisms."—*Tz.*

knowledge of men. During his six years' residence with the monks, he acquired, by prayer and by the study of the Holy Scriptures and of himself, a deep insight into human nature, and thus laid the foundation of all true knowledge of men individually. When he afterwards took part in the care of one of the largest churches in the East, and became an actual observer of human conduct among the high and the low, he found it easy, as his sermons on the Statues show, to detect and bring to light the radical principles of moral evils. And though, after his removal to Constantinople, he gave so great offence in his preaching by a disregard of consequences, this did not arise from defective knowledge of the world and of men, but rather resulted from his ascetic strictness, from his burning zeal for the holy cause of religion, and, what can by no means be denied, a certain proud consciousness of his intellectual superiority and an elevated opinion of his official dignity. These two last qualities sometimes carried him beyond the limits of moderation and of allowable regard for others. And yet very many passages in his sermons show how well he understood the art of prudently regaining a favorable position, when the views he had presented were in danger of alienating the hearts of his hearers.

Distinguishing Qualities of Chrysostom's Discourses.

In order to show his distinguishing qualities, we shall consider, first, the excellences, and then the faults, of his discourses. It will be requisite, also, to discriminate between the substance of his discourses and their composition.

In regard to their substance, their excellence appears in their mode of interpreting the Scriptures, in their manner of treating doctrinal and polemical subjects, and in the prominence they give to Christian morals.

The earlier pulpit-orators were deeply infected with the passion of interpreting the Bible allegorically. Even Chrysostom, who was familiar with Origen's writings, could not entirely avoid this prevailing tendency of the times, but indulged occasionally in allegorical and mystical explanations. He was, however, the first preacher, after Origen's time, who interpreted the Scripture in a natural manner, keeping true to its sense, and applying it carefully to practical purposes. Though his mode of explanation is, in many respects, defective, he yet holds fast the main design; namely, to interpret the Bible in an instructive manner, and to set

in a clear light its inexhaustibly rich applications to men's hearts and lives. Before his time, abstruse metaphysical speculations, and the perpetual and exceedingly violent controversies with the so-called heretics, furnished the favorite themes for preachers. He is not himself wholly free from this fault. He falls, also, sometimes, like the preachers who preceded him, into speculative inquiries more suitable to scholars engaged in learned investigations, than to a promiscuous assembly seeking for spiritual improvement. He often violently combats the Jews and the heathen, particularly; and the positions he maintains are often built on the system which then prevailed in the church, rather than on a wide and liberal acquaintance with subjects themselves, and are, therefore, not free from confusion of ideas. Still, he ranked the subtleties of the then prevailing scheme of doctrine far below the practical interests of true piety and morality; and in this, he differed from almost all who had preceded him. The supposed orthodoxy of the church at that time evidently lay less near his heart, than its advancement in inward holiness. He speaks, consequently, in his sermons against the Anomoians with a moderation unusual for his time,¹ while he contends against the existing corruption of morals, often with a too unsparing zeal, and always with great earnestness. Hence, too, he took great pains to treat the speculative subjects which he was compelled to bring into the pulpit, not only with clearness and earnestness, but also with so copious an interweaving of practical observations, as would prevent hazard to his hearers' improvement in virtue and piety.

It was from this tendency of his mind that his preaching was so much occupied with practical religion. This department was greatly indebted to Chrysostom. It had not, indeed, been wholly neglected by the most celebrated preachers; and individuals among them had devoted special attention to it, even while engaged in their very diversified and violent doctrinal controversies. He is, consequently, by no means the earliest preacher whose extant discourses unfold ethical principles. Nor must we forget,

¹ And yet he put a high estimate on correctness in doctrinal views; for he says in one of his homilies on Genesis, that "a correct life is of no worth, unless accompanied with a correct faith." [Besides the reason presented in the text for the character of Chrysostom's discourses against the Anomoians, he was influenced also by the fact that many of this sect attended on his preaching, and he was desirous to win them over rather than to alienate them, while yet he wished to vindicate the truth. He was disposed even to discontinue preaching on the subjects in controversy, when he saw that many of them were present as attentive listeners. But by their own persuasions he was induced to resume the subject.—Tr.]

that morality, in his view of it, was as far from being the unadulterated ethics of Christianity as was that of the earlier preachers. Indeed, how could the man who had spent six years, as a recluse, on the mountains of Antioch, forget the feelings and customs of ascetic life? How was it possible that a man, who even while sustaining public offices persisted in monastic abstinence from all worldly gratifications, should often express other than partial and contracted opinions respecting earthly enjoyments and a life conformed to the dictates of nature?¹ Accordingly, he not only wrote whole treatises in commendation of monasticism, virginity and widowhood, but there frequently occur, also, in his sermons, remarks which elevate to the very highest point that superhuman perfection, those incessant mortifications, that religious hatred of intercourse with the world, which were considered the appropriate duties of monks, but which all are the sad fruits of a heated imagination. He goes so far as to call the monastic life the highest philosophy, and pronounces "the philosophy of the monks to be more radiant than the sun." And yet his better judgment, his knowledge of the proper sources of human virtue, and his sound interpretation of the Scripture, preserved him from an excessive valuation of even that class of monastic virtues to which his personal tendencies of thought and feeling so much inclined him. Thus, for example, he ascribes a very subordinate value, in itself considered, to the observance of fasting. And while he often used the term, philosophy, for monastic virtue particularly, he also extended it, on the other hand, to Christian virtue in general, and indeed so widely as to make philosophy consist in knowledge, conviction and action. He says: "Jesus calls virtue the entire philosophy of the soul;" and in this respect he sets the Christian philosophy in opposition to the heathen.

The chief leading principle of ethics is, in his view, the freedom of man's will, whereby man can, without compulsion and easily, attain to virtue. While maintaining this principle, however, he does not deny man's need of the grace of God; but as a necessary condition to the acquiring of this grace, he maintains, also, man's free agency. He thus destroys both the grounds for excuses on the part of the vicious, and the proud self-satisfaction of the merely virtuous. "If we are but rightly disposed"—such was his favorite maxim—"not only death, but even the devil,

¹ A medium course between that which Chrysostom followed and that which seems hinted at by Paniel would, doubtless, be a correct one for the clergyman.—
Tr.

cannot harm us ;" inasmuch as God has given conscience to man, so that the moral laws of our being are impressed on us by nature. Virtue is nothing else than obedience to the moral law which is natural to us. The manner in which Chrysostom applied this principle to specific cases shows, also, that he had adopted many Stoic doctrines and maxims, and that he used them, as well as the doctrines of Christianity, for practical purposes.

If we lay out of view these excrescences of Chrysostom's ethical system, his commendation of asceticism, his strong inclination to the Stoical philosophy, his unsparing strictness in passing judgment on the conduct of other men, and his occasional mistaking of specific directions, mentioned in the Scriptures as given to certain individuals and their consequent actions, for general principles of conduct, he must be acknowledged to have treated the subject of morals the most purely and fully, the most impressively and attractively of all the preachers of the fourth century. The sermons of no other father of the church are so eminently devoted to this department of instruction. Not merely that he preached special sermons on individual virtues ; but that all his discourses are throughout interwoven with lessons of practical religion. These lessons are also—except when he assumes an air of severity—presented in a winning and encouraging manner. Never was there an orator more accurately acquainted with the human heart, and with men of all stations and classes. Never was there one who could repress all ebullitions of the passions so effectually, or so inexorably destroy all the illusions of self-complacency, or so graphically and vividly portray vices as well as virtues ; nor could any one, with a more heartfelt interest, energy and impressiveness, inspire for virtue the weak, the wavering, and the erring. The marked efficiency of his discourses arose, above all, from his rare faculty of seizing the most favorable points for touching and moving the human heart.

Besides the substantial qualities, just mentioned, of Chrysostom's productions, his eminence is equally, perhaps even more, due to his manner of treating subjects. This is not, indeed, free from faults ; but, it has so many excellences, as to entitle him to the first place among the preachers of the ancient church.

His great adaptation to the popular mind holds the chief place among these excellences. He knew how to let himself down to the comprehension of the mass of his hearers without becoming undignified, and expressed himself so intelligibly and with such

simplicity and naturalness, as fully accounts for the delight and admiration with which not merely the higher classes, but particularly also the middle and lower, attended on his preaching.

Intimately allied to this quality, is his perfect *clearness*. He is extremely careful to avoid all obscurity of speech. He always selects the most usual words, and does not avoid even a term of common life, if he judges it necessary to the greater perspicuity of his language. This regard to clearness governs not merely his choice and arrangement of words, but likewise, and in a particular manner, the gradual unfolding of his thoughts. His interpretations of Scripture, as also his doctrinal discussions, universally, show with what art and aptitude, when not hindered by attachment to a system, he was able to clear up all obscurity.

In his efforts to adapt himself to the popular mind, to be perspicuous and easy of comprehension, he was aided by his *ready command of words*, one of his most prominent peculiarities. A genuine orator, evidently, can no more be deficient in copiousness of words than can a genuine poet. Chrysostom, however, possessed this indispensable quality in a remarkably high degree. His copiousness in words and forms of expression was inexhaustible, and speech poured from his lips like a full overflowing stream.

With this rich and luxuriant copiousness of language were combined *force, ardor* and *impetuous vivacity*. While explaining a passage of Scripture, he carefully expresses himself in a moderately flowing style; but when he is exposing sins and vices, or arguing against the heathen, the Jews, and heretics, his discourse takes a lofty flight and glows with animation; it strikes with force on his hearers' hearts, seizes and captivates their minds, and overcomes all the obstacles which error, delusion and sin may seek to throw in his way. No man knew better than he how to speak in a touching manner, with earnestness and energy. He detains himself, therefore, in the simple explanations and illustrations which the case seems to demand, no longer than is indispensable to making his hearers, in general, understand the point, or the passage, under consideration. This object gained, he gives himself up at once to the effort of making a deep impression on their minds and hearts. To this one chief aim he bends the whole strength of his mind, the full power of his inexhaustible imagination, and the whole compass of his extensive knowledge. Who can wonder, then, at the uncommon plaudits which he received

from his hearers?¹ They sometimes shouted for joy during his discourses, clapped their hands, waved their handkerchiefs in sign of applause, and even uttered aloud their assent.² He was always sure, while preaching, to have his hearers' hearts at his command.

With equal skill he could enchain his hearers by the *sublimity* of his thoughts and diction, and by the elevation and splendor

¹ In the beginning of his third Homily on the Gospel of John, he says that his hearers pressed into the innermost part of the church, towards the *Bema*, so as not to lose a word of the discourse.

² Chrysostom confesses that these expressions of approval were somewhat gratifying to his feelings. Yet he acknowledges his grief, that the very persons who seemed the most to honor the truth were, after all, the least improved by it. He, therefore, often requested his hearers to withhold their tokens of approval, or at least to express it, not by words and gesticulations, but by their good works. Thus, he says at the close of the 30th Homily on Acts: "When in preaching I am applauded, at the moment I have human feelings and am greatly pleased; but when, on returning home, I consider that those who gave applause have received no profit, but that by their very applause and praises they have lost all the good influence they needed, I am overcome with sorrow and feel that I have preached in vain. I say to myself, what good comes from my labors, since my hearers are unwilling to derive from my discourses any solid fruit? And I often think of proposing a law that shall prohibit applauses and enjoin on you to hear with silence and becoming good order. Bear with me, I beseech you, and yield to my wishes; and, if you please, let us now establish a rule that it shall be unlawful for any hearer to express applause in the time of preaching; but if any one feel admiration, let him admire in silence. Let all voluntarily join in the purpose and the effort to receive the instructions given."

At this point, his hearers under the impulse of feeling and through the force of habit clapped their hands. "Why," he at once asked, "do you thus applaud? I propose a law; and you cannot bear to hear it." [After mentioning the heathen philosophers who were not liable to be thus interrupted in their lectures, and referring to our Lord's sermon on the mount, during which no one expressed admiration, and reminding his hearers how much better it would be to treasure up the instructions of the pulpit and thus be able in conversation to express approval of the sentiments they had heard, he proceeds.] "Nothing is so becoming at church, as silence and good order. Noise is rather befitting theatres, and baths, and processions and markets; but here, where *such* instructions are imparted, peace and quiet should prevail."

[As he proceeded, shouts of applause were again uttered. "What does this mean?" he asked; "are you again applauding? It is not an easy thing; you have not yet had time to correct your practice."] . . . "Tell me, do you while celebrating the sacred mysteries indulge in noise? When we are baptized, when we are performing all those other things, is there not a universal silence and stillness? . . . On this account we are reproached by the heathen, as doing everything for parade and love of praise."

In similar terms he expresses himself in the 15th Homily on Romans, in the 7th on Lazarus, and the 17th on Matthew.

with which he arose on the wings of eloquence to the survey of divine subjects. Yet he is very far from permitting—as does Ephrem Syrus—this loftiness of speech to prevail throughout a discourse. It is rather one of his chief excellences and one of the clearest proofs of his thorough acquaintance with the oratorical art, that his discourses present great alternation of manner; the gentle and the forcible, the grave and the sprightly, the towering and the lowly, entreaty and rebuke, warning and consolation, so intermingled and so skilfully expressed, that the hearers' hearts were seized at every point, and all the powers of their souls most vividly challenged. This effect was the greater in consequence of his adroitness in turning to account passing events, whether in church or State, in the city or the congregation, in families or among individuals, and even occurrences which took place in the house of God during the discourse. His discourses were peculiarly the growth of occasions. The greater part, and the most distinguished of them, arose from circumstances existing at the time in the community. Even when no such special occasion suggested a subject, he yet endeavored to direct his hearers to the consideration of individual virtues or vices, instead of dissipating their attention by wide and general themes; for he well knew, that very general themes can neither be fully treated, nor make an enduring impression.¹

Finally, we must not forget his astonishing *richness in imagery, examples and comparisons*, as imparting to his discourses so much lucidness, power of impression, and variety.

With all his great excellences, Chrysostom was not free from very important *faults*. These must be ascribed, mainly, to the too unrestrained vividness of his imagination, to his having studied under a heathen sophist, to his long residence with the monks who maintained opinions more or less perverted, to the spirit which marked the preaching of his age, and, lastly, to his preaching with too much frequency.² Still, they are faults; and ought carefully to be exhibited for caution's sake, since he has been so extensively admired as the most complete model of sacred eloquence.

¹ He himself expresses the idea, that the art of limiting himself to a small compass in his sermons, and of exhausting a subject, was one of his principal endowments.

² He preached very often. Thus he says himself in his 5th Homily to the people of Antioch: "Though I preached on this subject [the using of oaths] yesterday and the day before, I shall yet continue on the same subject to-day, and to-morrow, and the day following."

Though he distinguished himself in the *interpretation of the Scriptures* above the most of his contemporaries, yet he is here occasionally in fault. Sometimes, through ignorance of the Hebrew language, he adopts the errors of the Septuagint; then again, he does violence to the language of Scripture from compliance with the current doctrinal opinions of his age.

The *definitions* which he proposes are often very vague, and include matter irrelevant and erroneous. He not only takes partial views of subjects, but also deduces from such views consequences quite unjustifiable. Related ideas he confounds with one another, and does not, with sufficient accuracy, separate the true from the false.

Many of his *doctrinal and practical principles* are open to a similar remark. With all his strength and liberality of mind, he was still a child of the age in which he lived and partook, in many respects, of its errors. Were not the external form of his panegyrics and treatises on the martyrs and their relics, on virginity and monasticism, quite as good as that of his other productions, one could hardly believe that a man who wrote so much that is truly valuable could have framed such distorted views of religion.

In the *style the materials and the structure* of his discourses, there are also important faults. Of these, deserves first to be mentioned the extreme to which he often carries the effort to be perspicuous. His natural copiousness in words and forms of speech, and his desire to be universally understood, mislead him frequently to explanations of things which are already sufficiently intelligible, to an accumulation of objections, in order to refute them, which no hearer would be disposed to make, and to repetitions, which are indeed mostly concealed under new forms of speech, but which are nevertheless repetitions of thoughts that he has already employed with sufficient clearness and energy. His discourses often become, consequently, prolix and lack variety.

To the same category belongs a too careful elaborating of *scenes and descriptions* in which he knew not where to stop; also, an excessive amassing of *examples and comparisons*, which at length become tedious, as only presenting one and the same thing under too many forms of speech. No orator is, generally, more happy in comparisons. Still, he often employs such as are wholly incorrect, and even such as from their very nature, do not admit of the supposed resemblances.¹

¹ We should consider, however, that Chrysostom's discourses were designed for

Further, in order to present a subject in the most favorable light possible, he does not hesitate to *magnify it excessively*, and in contrast with it to lessen below any just estimate other subjects, whether virtues, men, or external conditions, while at another time he estimates these latter not less highly.¹ Akin to this is his propensity to magnify beyond propriety what is really admirable and sublime, and thus necessarily to weaken its force.

Unworthy also of an orator so rich in thought is the *playing on words* to which he sometimes descends. He occasionally employs a word in a double sense, in senses really diverse, and even directly opposite; then again, he does violence to the various significations of a word so long as to make them seem to fit one and the same thing.

It was a favorite practice among the preachers of Chrysostom's time, to embellish their discourses with quite too many allegories; and they regarded these as the most beautiful and best parts of their productions. He is free from this fault. His allegories are not too frequent, nor are they forced. He does, however, often extend them much too far, and mingles one with another; so that this part of a discourse becomes constrained, unnatural and difficult of apprehension. In embellishments generally, he does not sufficiently restrict himself. Impelled by the prevailing taste of his hearers and by his own exuberant fancy, he is often lavish of tropes, images, and other means which, when discreetly employed, impart beauty and agreeableness to a discourse. And yet, through the perpetual recurrence of many favorite figures, his treatment of a subject, usually so diversified, lacks comprehension and fullness.

Such are the chief faults in Chrysostom's discourses. While they are sufficiently important to require notice, the shade which they cast is far from being deep enough to obscure the brilliancy of his productions.

hearers, not for readers. Consequently, though some of his comparisons will not bear close inspection, yet as presented to an audience whose minds were engrossed with the subject and the occasion, they doubtless led the hearers to the single point of resemblance aimed at by the preacher, while the incongruities would not arrest their attention.—Tr.

¹ In Reinhard, likewise, this fault is of frequent occurrence. As with Chrysostom, so with him, the virtue of which he is at any time treating is the source, the root, the mother of all good; while the vice against which he may be warning is, beyond comparison, the most detestable and abominable.

List of Chrysostom's principal productions.—Comparative Estimate of them.—Their general Characteristics.

The extant Homilies and other discourses of Chrysostom are so many, that only the titles of the principal ones can be here mentioned. They were in part prepared for the public by himself; in part, copied by clerical scribes. In early times, a number of homilies and discourses bore his name, which were not his. Many of such works were wholly unworthy of him, and were ascribed to him through a complete ignorance of the style of preaching which prevailed in the fourth century; of others, on the contrary, as being productions of distinguished men of his time, he would have had no reason to be ashamed. The best editors of his collected works, however, Morell, Saville and Montfaucon have separated the genuine works from the spurious, and have assigned the latter, in part, to their proper authors. This task has been continued in later years by other learned men, and is not yet completed.

To the indisputably genuine works belong the following, arranged according to their probable order of time: Twelve discourses against the Anomoeians on the Incomprehensibility of God; eight against the Jews and the heathen, maintaining the Divinity of Christ; seven homilies on Lazarus; twenty-one on the Statues to the people of Antioch; nine on Repentance; seven panegyrics on the apostle Paul, and twenty-five on the Saints and Martyrs; thirty-four homilies principally on individual passages of the New Testament; sixty-seven on Genesis; nine discourses on Genesis; sixty homilies on the Psalms; six on Isaiah; ninety are on Matthew; eighty-seven on John; twenty-five on the Acts; thirty-two on Romans; forty-four on 1 Corinthians and thirty on 2 Corinthians; twenty-four on Ephesians; fifteen on Philippians; twelve on Colossians; eleven on 1 Thessalonians and five on 2 Thessalonians; eighteen on 1 Timothy and ten on 2 Timothy; six on Titus; three on Philemon; thirteen on Hebrews. Besides these are many festival and occasional discourses. The occasional discourses which are most important in a historic view are those which relate to his two exiles.

Of these works, the following are particularly distinguished and may be remarked as peculiarly good: The seven homilies on Lazarus, the twenty-one on the Statues, the fifth on Repentance, the nine on Genesis (not to be confounded with the sixty-seven

on Genesis), the three on David and Saul, those on the Psalms and those on Matthew.

Of single productions, the following deserve special mention : The Homily on New Year's Day ; on the parable of the Debtors ; on the words : If thine enemy hunger, etc. ; on Alms ; on Future Happiness ; the first on Eutropius ; on Forsaking the Church to attend the Theatre ; besides separate panegyrics on Saints and Martyrs. In general, the discourses preached at Antioch are better than the later ones, as their author had there more time for pulpit preparation. The extemporaneous also, taken collectively, stand last in value.

From the preceding enumeration it appears, that Chrysostom's works consist, mostly, of homilies ; and these, on entire books of Scripture. This class of homilies belongs to the most diffuse and inartificial sort of addresses for the pulpit. In these he follows the order of the text, step by step, and connects with the separate verses and clauses instructive observations, which taken as disconnected passages, are as eloquent as any in his larger works. Whenever he was desirous to impress a particular subject on his hearers, suggested by the time or circumstances of the address, he introduced it at the beginning, the middle, or the close of the exposition, just as suited his feelings, without regard to the inquiry, whether it was appropriate to the passage under consideration. These homilies have, therefore, not much value, as specimens of art, in a collective view, but only in the individual parts.

In another class of his homilies is an approach to an arrangement according to art ; those for instance, which, like the seven on Lazarus, have reference, as a series, to one and the same passage of Scripture. Those, however, in which he employs a passage as the ground-work for one sole occasion, present the most orderly structure. Each of such discourses opens with an introduction almost always too long, though commonly displaying with brilliancy much oratorical skill and power. Then follows the treatment of the subject, which, however, has very seldom a logical distribution, but presents such a series of thoughts as spontaneously arose in the author's mind while reflecting on the subject. Hence, we seek in vain for that accurate and skilfully adjusted arrangement, that similarity of structure in the separate parts of the discourse, which is required by the moderns, and which, indeed, has its foundation in the very nature of oratorical compositions.

Chrysostom does not hesitate to make very long digressions to topics entirely foreign as well from his text, as from his particular

theme. Indeed, passages of this nature are often so extended that the original subject is thrust quite into the back-ground.

On the other hand, he frequently keeps to a subject with a tenacity which is far from pleasing.¹ Thus he has seven homilies on Lazarus, seven on the apostle Paul, and nine on repentance. So he has three on the history of David and Saul, five on the history of Hannah, the mother of Samuel, and sixteen against profane swearing.

We observe in passing, that he often preached extemporaneously, and interwove into his discourses thoughts suggested by events occurring at the time of preaching. Thus, whole series of homilies, as the sixty-seven on Genesis, were extemporaneous, and in many discourses are passages which were doubtless introduced into his course of thought at the moment of delivery. Every true orator, clearly, possesses this faculty.

Specimens, illustrating the qualities of Chrysostom's Discourses.

It is now time to exhibit specimens of the qualities, both commendable and censurable, which have here been ascribed to Chrysostom.

¹ Chrysostom expresses himself copiously on this point in the introduction to his first Homily on David and Saul. "A human body," he says, "that has been long disordered with a hard tumor, requires much time, and care, and skill in medicine, that the tumor may be reduced with perfect safety. So it is in respect to the soul. When we wish to eradicate from a person's soul a deeply seated disease, one day's or two day's admonition is not enough; it is necessary to admonish him repeatedly and for many days, if we wish to secure his benefit rather than our own fame and gratification. Hence, as on the subject of oaths we discussed to you many days in succession, we propose now to take the same course on the subject of anger. For this seems to me the best mode of instruction, to insist on a particular subject till we see our counsel taking effect. For he who discourses to-day on alms-giving, to-morrow on prayer, the next day on kindness, and the following day on humility, will really be able to set his hearers right in no one of these things, passing so rapidly from this subject to that, and from that to another; but he who would really reform his hearers in any particular, should not cease his admonitions and exhortations respecting it, nor pass to another subject, till he discovers his former admonitions well rooted in them."

It can hardly be necessary to notice particularly here, that this maxim of Chrysostom's can be adopted by a preacher only to a very limited extent. A preacher has to occupy the high ground of broad Christian principles, which embrace all the particular virtues and which must not be neglected for the sake of minutely considering all the details of the Christian life. So far as actual practice is concerned, Chrysostom did not adhere to his maxim, since he introduced into individual discourses matter very diversified in its character.

The commencement of the extemporaneous discourse on Alms-giving (III. 297.) happily illustrates both his facility in extemporaneous preaching, and his skill in devising attractive introductions. He was going to church on a winter's day, and saw beggars lying helpless in the streets and at the markets. This induced him to deliver a discourse on alms-giving, and to open it in the following manner :

"I have risen to discharge before you a commission just and useful, and one becoming to yourselves ; a commission, to which I have been appointed by no other than the poor who live in our city. Not, however, in consequence of their request, or their votes, or the decision of a common council, but in consequence of the most sad and affecting spectacles which met my eyes. For while passing through the market and the lanes on my way to your assembly, I saw many lying on the ground, some having lost their hands and others their eyes, and others covered with incurable ulcers and wounds, and exposing limbs which ought to be concealed on account of the putrid matter that was lying on them. And I felt that it would be extreme inhumanity in me not to appeal to your compassion in their behalf ; the more particularly as, besides what I have already said, the very season of the year urges us to notice their case. It is, indeed, always necessary to enforce the duty of charity, since we ourselves so greatly need pity from the Lord our Maker ; but it is especially necessary at the present season when the weather is cold. For in summer, the poor receive much alleviation from the season ; because they can then without hazard go without clothing, the sun's rays warming them instead, and they can with safety sleep on the bare ground and spend the night in the open air. Nor is there then so much need of shoes, nor of wine, nor of costly food ; but they are satisfied with water from the fountains, and some of them with the poorer kinds of vegetables, and others with a little dry pulse, the very season of the year furnishing them an easily prepared table.

"They have, also, another alleviation not less than this, in the opportunity of finding employment ; for men who are occupied in building, or in cultivating the earth, or in navigation, then require their services. And what fields and houses and other sources of income are to the wealthy, the bodies of the poor are to them, and all their income is from their own hands ; they have no other resource. In summer, therefore, they enjoy some comfort ; but in winter, war assails from every quarter. They are subjected to a

twofold siege; hunger within gnaws their bowels, cold without stiffens their flesh and makes it almost dead. They have, therefore, more need of food, and of thicker clothing, of houses and beds, of shoes and many other things. And what is worse than all, they have no opportunity for finding employment, the season of the year not permitting it.

"Since, then, there is a greater demand for the necessities of life, and besides this they are deprived of opportunities for laboring, no one having work for these unhappy men, come, let us, instead of employers, stretch forth the hands of merciful men, taking Paul, that real patron and benefactor of the poor, as our fellow laborer in this commission."

The preacher now passes to his text: "For Paul, when making a division of the disciples between himself and Peter, still would not resign the care of the poor; but, having said, 'They gave the right hands of fellowship to me and Barnabas, that we should go to the heathen, and they to the circumcision,' he added: 'Only they would that we should remember the poor; the same which I also was forward to do.'"

He by no means confines himself to this text, but quotes in the course of his sermon several other expressions of Paul, and most adroitly interweaves them, with explanations, into his discourse; or, to speak more exactly, these passages, taken together, form the thread on which he strings his discourse.

One would suppose, that no subject would allow of fewer irrelevant digressions than the theme of Almsgiving, and would justly expect that the whole soul of the orator would be absorbed with a topic so rich and touching. But even here, Chrysostom cannot abstain from his hurtful practice of pursuing excessively long incidental discussions. Having cited the words: Now concerning the collection for the saints, etc., he goes into a long and dry examination of the question: Whether these persons were really saints.

We return to his introductions. Truly plaintive is the commencement of the fourth discourse on the Change of Names¹ (III. 155); at the same time, it is one of the passages which show, that even a Chrysostom could not always command an audience.

"When I look over your thin assembly and observe the flock

¹ In the sermons thus entitled, Chrysostom inquires, for instance, why Saul assumed the name Paul; why the name Abram was changed into Abraham, etc. There are four sermons which bear this title.

becoming smaller at each meeting, I am both grieved and rejoiced ; rejoiced, for your sake who are present ; grieved, on their account who are absent. For you are indeed worthy of praise, in not yielding to negligence by reason of the smallness of your number ; and they are open to censure, as not being excited to a cheerful attendance by your zeal. I therefore congratulate you and commend your zeal, because their backwardness does you no injury ; them I pity and weep over, because your promptness does them no good. Nor have they listened to the prophet, who has said : I would rather have the lowest place in the house of God, than to dwell in the tents of sinners. He did not say : I would rather *dwell* in the house of my God—nor, abide—nor, enter ; but, I would rather have the lowest place. It is a privilege to me to be put even among the last : I am satisfied with this, he says, if I may be thought worthy even to stand on the threshold ; I esteem it a signal favor, if I may be numbered even among the last in the house of my God. Affection makes the common Lord to be *his* Lord peculiarly ; such is the power of love. *In the house of my God.*

“ One that loves another wishes not merely to see him that is beloved, not merely to see his house, but even his gate ; not merely his gate, but even the path to his house, and the street on which it stands. And if he may see his friend’s cloak, or even his sandal, he regards the friend himself as present. Of such a spirit were the prophets. As they did not see God, who is incorporeal, they saw the house, and by means of the house they made him present to their minds.”

As another specimen, we insert here the touching introduction with which he opens his homily on the Baptism of Christ (II. 433).

“ You are all to-day cheerful, and I alone am dejected. For when I look over this spiritual sea and behold this boundless wealth of the church, and then consider that, as soon as the festival is over, this multitude will spring away from us, I am pierced with grief that the church, having brought forth so many children, cannot enjoy them at each assembling, but only at a festival. How great would be the spiritual exultation, how great the joy, how great the glory of God, how great the spiritual profit, if on each occasion of assembling we could see the enclosures of the church thus filled ! Sailors and pilots direct all their energies to the prosecution of their voyage, that they may reach the port ; but we, through the whole sea, are tossing about, frequent-

ly engulfed in the overpowering business of life, occupied at the market, and in the halls of justice, and meeting each other here only once, or scarcely twice, in the whole year.

“Do you not know that God has erected churches in the cities, as havens along the sea, that we may flee hither from the commotion of worldly tumults and enjoy a steady calm? For here, there is no occasion to fear the severity of waves, nor the assaults of robbers, nor attacks from men in ambush, nor the violence of winds, nor the surprises of wild beasts. It is a haven free from all these things, the spiritual haven of souls. Of this you are witnesses; for should any one of you now disclose his inmost mind, he would find there great quietness; anger does not disturb, inordinate desire does not inflame, nor envy corrode, nor folly inflate, nor the love of vain glory corrupt; but all these beasts are placed under restraint, the reading of the Holy Scriptures, like some divine song, entering through each one's ears into his soul and putting to slumber all these irrational passions. What a misfortune it would be for persons who might attain to so great wisdom, not to repair with all diligence to the common mother of all, I mean the church!

“For, what employment can you mention more needful than this? and what assembling more useful? And what hindrance is there to your resorting hither? You will, doubtless, plead poverty as a hindrance to your frequenting this worthy assembly. But the plea has no force. The week has seven days: these seven days God divides between us and himself; and to himself he has not given the greater part and to us the smaller, nor indeed has he divided them by halves, taking three and giving three; but to you he has apportioned six, and left but one for himself. And not even during the whole of this day can you bear to withdraw yourself from the affairs of this life; but like those who plunder sacred property, you dare also to plunder and abuse to worldly cares the day which has been made sacred and set apart for the hearing of the sacred oracles. Why do I speak of the whole day? What the widow did as to alms, that do thou as to the time of this day; as she threw in two mites and obtained singular favor from God, so do thou spend two hours for God and thou shalt bring into thine house the gain of a thousand days. But if thou canst not bear to do this, beware lest, through unwillingness to abstain from earthly gains a small part of a day, thou lose the labors of entire years. For God, when he is treated with contempt, knows how to dissipate your accumulating gains; as once in threatening he said to the Jews, for their carelessly

falling to pay a just regard to the temple: Ye brought it into your houses, and I have blown it away, saith the Lord. (Hag. 1: 9).

"How, I pray you, if you come to us only once or twice in the year, can we teach you what is necessary to be known concerning the soul and the body, immortality, the kingdom of heaven, the condescension of God, repentance, baptism, forgiveness of sins, the creation both superior and inferior, the nature of men, angels, the crafts of demons, the wiles of the devil, good morals, doctrines, the true faith, corrupting heresies? For a Christian ought to know these things and many more than these, and to be able to give an account of them to any who may inquire. But you cannot know the most trifling part of these things, if you meet here but once, and that carelessly, out of regard to the festival, and not through piety of heart. Indeed, if one should diligently attend each meeting, he would scarcely be able to become acquainted with all these things. Many of you now present have servants and sons; and when you are about to place them with men who are to teach them some art, you at once dismiss them from your own house; and providing them with bedding, food and whatever else is needed, you make them live with this person, forbidding them to come to your house, in order that constant residence with the other person may secure to them a more exact training, and that no other cares may be allowed to interrupt them. But now, when you are purposing to learn, not a common art, but that which is greater than all, namely, how to please God and attain heaven, do you think it possible to acquire this in a negligent manner?"—

Chrysostom's introductions, however skilful, polished and striking they confessedly are, for the most part, yet almost always exceed a just length, and hold no proportion to the other parts of a discourse.¹

The specimens already presented abundantly show his perspicuity and ability to adapt himself to the popular mind. Since, however, his chief excellence consists in his perfect clearness, in his ability to present the most thorough and convincing views

¹ Complaints were sometimes made by his hearers respecting the length of his sermons, as a whole. He notices this in the second discourse on the Change of Names. Somewhat quaint is his allusion there to the young children, "who sat quiet in school till dinner time with hungry stomachs, enduring heat and thirst. Let us," he exclaims, "who are men, if we are unwilling to imitate others, at least not consent to be outdone by these children."

with entire transparency, and since this was the principal cause of his great celebrity, it seems desirable to give additional examples of these qualities. In the thirty-seventh Homily on Matthew (VII. 474.), after a copious explanation of the text (Matt. x. 7—9), he seizes the opportunity to declaim, with vehemence, against the passion of his hearers for dramatic representations, in the following manner: [He is speaking of the guilty inhabitants of Sodom, who neglected the duty of hospitality.] "They, though they committed great sins, yet lived before the law and the proclamation of grace; but we, sinning after so much care has been manifested towards us, how can we expect to be forgiven, if we show so much inhospitality, closing our doors against the needy, and even at our doors stopping our ears? still more, inattentive not only to the poor, but even to the very apostles. It is because we neglect the apostles, that we neglect the poor. For when Paul is read, and thou dost not take heed, when John preaches and thou dost not hear, wilt thou receive a beggar while thou dost not receive an apostle?"

"In order, now, that our houses may be always open to the poor, and our ears to the apostles, let us cleanse away the defilement from the ears of our souls. For as dirt and dust obstruct the ears of the flesh, so meretricious songs and worldly conversations, debts, interest-money and loans, impede the mental hearing worse than any dust; they not only close up the ear, they also pollute it. For those who talk on such matters, put even dung into your ears. And what the barbarian threatened, when he said (Is. 36: 22), Eat your own dung, etc., this likewise they make you suffer, not in language, but in fact. Yes, and much worse. For those songs are more loathsome than that language; and, what is worse, while hearing them you seem not only not to be disgusted, but you even laugh when you ought to feel abhorrence and to flee such sounds.

"If, however, these things are not worthy of abhorrence, descend into the orchestra, imitate what you applaud; rather, go walk with him who provokes that laughter. But you cannot bear to do that. Why then do you give him such honor? The very laws of the heathen pronounce such men dishonorable. But you welcome them, with the whole city, as ambassadors and military commanders are received, and invite together all the citizens that they may receive dung into their ears. Should your servant utter any vile expression in your hearing, he would receive a thousand stripes; should a son, a wife, or any person do this, you

would brand the act as a reproach; but when miscreant and worthless men call you to hear shameful speeches, you are not only not indignant, but you rejoice, and applaud them. And what parallel can there be to this irrational conduct?

"But you do not yourselves speak these shameful words! And of what advantage is that to you? Rather, how can you make it appear that you do not use such language? If you did not, you would not laugh while hearing it; nor would you run with such eagerness to a voice which could only make you blush. Tell me; do you rejoice when you hear people blaspheming? Do you not rather shudder and stop your ears? I verily believe so. But why? Because you do not yourself blaspheme. Do the same in regard to vile language. If you wish to show clearly that you are unwilling to utter vile language, do not submit to hear it. For when will you be able to be an upright man, if you live upon such language? When will you be able to endure the toils of a pure life, if you allow yourself by little and little to become dissipated by such laughter, by these songs and foul expressions? It is barely possible, that the soul should be chaste and uncorrupt even when kept from all these defilements; much less, when it is fed upon these evil communications. Do you not know, that we are extremely prone to evil? When, then, we make this our trade and business, how shall we escape the furnace? Hast thou not heard what Paul says? Rejoice in the Lord; not, in the devil.

"When shalt thou be able to hear Paul? When to have a sense of your sins, if perpetually intoxicated by this exhibition? . . . What is that tumult? what that commotion, and those Satanic shouts, and those diabolic forms? There is one, a young man, with his hair dressed behind, effeminating his nature, and endeavoring in his appearance, his figure, his dress and all things in short, to pass into the image of a delicate girl. There stands another, an aged man, on the contrary, cutting off his hair, putting on a girdle, laying aside all self-respect before laying aside his hair, ready to engage in a boxing-match, prepared to say and to do anything. Women, too, stand there addressing the people, with bare heads, forgetting the modesty of their sex and shamelessly pouring impudence and wantonness of all kinds into the minds of the hearers. The one aim is, to pluck up chastity as by the roots, to put nature to shame, to gratify the lust of the evil demon. The indecent language, and the ridiculous parade, the dressing of the head, the gait, the attire and voice, the effeminate

postures and ogling of the eyes, the flutes and pipes, and the whole dramatic apparatus, all things there, in short, are full of extreme lasciviousness. When wilt thou recover thyself, tell me, if the devil is allowed to pour out for thee so much wine of fornication and to mingle so many cups of uncleanness? There, too, are adulteries; there are prostitutes, and men indulging unnatural lusts, and youths submitting to vile abuse; all things there are full of transgression, of abomination, and shame."¹

The ardor and force of his eloquence are finely illustrated in the discourse which he delivered to his adherents, when he had been deposed from his office by the unrighteous judgment of the synod, and yielded himself to the hatred of his enemies (III. 494).

"Many are the billows, and severe the storm; but we are not afraid that we shall be overwhelmed; for we stand on a rock. Let the sea rage; it cannot loosen the rock. Let the waves lift up themselves; they cannot sink the ship of Jesus. What, I pray you, should we fear? Death? To me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. Exile? The earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof. Confiscation of goods? We brought nothing into the world; and it is certain we can carry nothing out. The frightful things of this world I can easily condemn, and laugh at its good things. I dread not poverty; I desire not wealth. I dread not death; nor do I pray for life, except for your profit. And therefore I remind you of what is passing and would encourage you in your love to me. For no one shall be able to separate us; for what God hath joined together, man cannot sunder. If concerning the wife and husband he says: Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh, so that what God hath joined man may not put asunder—if thou canst not destroy a marriage, how much more art thou unable to destroy the church!

"But thou wast war against her, though unable to injure him whom thou assailest. Thou makest me more illustrious; and destroyest thy own strength by fighting against me. It is hard for thee to kick against the sharp goads. Thou dost not blunt the goads, but woundest thy own feet. The waves do not dash in pieces the rock; but they themselves dissolve into foam. O man, there is nothing mightier than the church. Cease the

¹ Chrysostom's intimate acquaintance with the theatre dates back to his youth, when he was very fond of public exhibitions, and frequented them as much as the courts of justice.

strife, lest it make thine own strength to cease. Wage not war against heaven. If you war against a man, you may either conquer or be yourself conquered; but if you war against the church, it is impossible that you should conquer; for God is powerful above all. Do we vie with the Lord? Are we stronger than he? God has established; who will undertake to demolish? Thou art not aware of his power. He looks on the earth, and makes it tremble; he commands, and things that were shaken are again made firm. If he makes firm a city that has been shaken, much more can he make the church firm. The church is stronger than the heaven. Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my words shall not pass away. What words? Thou art Peter; and upon this rock of mine I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against her.

“If thou believe not his word, believe his deeds. How many tyrants have aimed to crush the church! how many have been the instruments for torturing Christians to death! how many furnaces! teeth of wild beasts! sharpened swords! But they prevailed not against her. Where are those who fought against her? Reduced to silence, and consigned to oblivion. But where is the church? She shines brighter than the sun. Their power is extinguished; hers is immortal. If when Christians were but few, they were not overcome, now that the world is filled with piety, how canst thou conquer? Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my words shall not pass away. Well indeed it may be so; for the church is dearer to God, than heaven itself. He did not assume the nature of heaven, but he assumed the flesh of the church. Heaven exists for the sake of the church, not the church for the sake of heaven.

“Let nothing which has taken place disquiet you. Accede to my request, that you cherish an unshaken faith. Have you not seen Peter walking on the waters and, yielding a little to doubt, about to sink, not on account of the commotion of the waters, but on account of the weakness of his faith? Did we come hither by human votes? Did man bring us hither, that man may depose us? I say these things, not as one that is frantic; far from it; nor in vain boasting; but from a wish to confirm your wavering faith. Since the city has stood firm [after the recent earthquake], the devil now wishes to shake the church. O vile, most vile devil! thou didst not prevail against the walls, and dost thou expect to shake the church? Is the church composed of walls?

The church consists in the multitude of believers. Behold, how many firm pillars, bound not with iron, but made compact with faith. I do not say that such a multitude is mightier than fire; but thou wouldst not prevail, if there were only one Christian. Thou knowest what wounds the martyrs have given thee. Often there has come forward the tender maiden, more delicate than wax; and yet she has proved more firm than rock. Thou hast lacerated her body; but thou didst not take away her faith. The nature of the flesh gave way; but the power of faith did not yield. The body was exhausted; but the mind retained a manly vigor. Her life was consumed; but her piety endured. Thou didst not prevail over one woman; and dost thou expect to prevail over so numerous a people? Dost thou not hear the Lord saying: Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them? Where there is so numerous a people united in love, is he not present? I have his pledge. Do I encourage myself in my own strength? I have his written bond. That is my staff; that is my security; that is my tranquil haven. Should the world be in commotion, I possess his written bond. To him I read it. Those words are a wall to me and a security. What are those words? I am with you always even to the end of the world. Christ is with me. Whom shall I fear? Should billows rise against me, and seas, and the wrath of rulers, all these things are lighter to me than a spider's web. And were it not on account of your affection for me, I would not refuse to go forth to-day. For I always say, Thy will, O Lord, be done; not what this one, or that, desires, but what thou wilt. This is my tower, this my immovable rock; this is my unbending staff. If God will that this thing be done, be it done. If he will that I remain here, I give him thanks. Wherever he wills, I render thanks."

With such ardor and force of language, as well as strength of faith, Chrysostom spoke in reference to his personal calamity. A short time previously he was not a victim of persecution, but the generous protector of a persecuted man, Eutropius, the emperor's eunuch and powerful favorite, who had fled into the church to save his life. Though it was this very man, who had taken from churches the right of protecting persons who sought refuge in them, and had besides in various ways opposed Chrysostom, whom at an earlier date he had particularly befriended, yet Chrysostom received him and protected him as long as it was in his power. But he also employed the opportunity to exhibit Eutro-

plus and his reverses, as a monitory example.¹ He commences in the following earnest manner (III. 454.):

"Always indeed, but particularly now is it seasonable to say: Vanity of vanities, all is vanity. Where now is the splendid decoration of the consulship? Where the brilliant lamps? Where the applauses and the dances, the banquets and the assemblies? Where are the crowns and the canopies? Where the shouts of the city, the acclamations of the circus, and the flatteries of spectators? They are all passed away. A vehement wind has torn off the leaves, and shown us the tree bare, and shaken too from its roots. Such has been the assault of the blast as to threaten its entire overthrow and the destruction of every fibre.

"Where now are the pretended friends? the drinking parties and the suppers? Where the swarm of parasites, and the wine poured forth all day, the various arts of cooks, the minions of power, whose deeds and words were all for the sake of procuring favor? All those things were a dream of the night. When day came, they disappeared. They were spring-flowers; the spring has passed away, they are all withered. They were a shadow, and are gone; smoke, and are dissipated. They were bubbles; they are burst; they were a spider's web; they are torn asunder. Therefore we sing this spiritual maxim, saying repeatedly: Vanity of vanities, all is vanity. On the walls and on garments,² on the forum and on the dwelling house, on the streets and on the doors, on the halls and, above all, on each one's inmost mind, ought this maxim to be ever inscribed, and we ought to be always meditating on it. While the frauds of business, the masks and theatrical plays, are by many regarded as truth and reality, this maxim

¹ Eutropius had been a slave, and passed many years in a most abject state of servitude. After he received his freedom, he succeeded in procuring a place in the emperor's employ, and in compassing the downfall of Rufinus, the emperor's principal minister, into whose station he was himself then introduced. He acquired immense power in the government, and made no secret of the influence which he wielded. He was promoted to the rank of patrician, and to the consulship. But his great abuse of power and his inordinate avarice, during the four years of his elevation, excited against him universal ill-will. The emperor was persuaded to sign his condemnation; and while the soldiers and people clamored for his execution, he took refuge in the church and found a temporary protection. Leaving this asylum through confidence in the assurance that his life should be spared, his honors were all publicly torn from him, his wealth was confiscated, and he was doomed to perpetual exile. But so deep was the spirit of revenge against him, that an order for his recall was obtained and he was executed.—*Tz.*

² We learn from the discourses of Asterius, that it was customary to have Scripture-pictures on garments, and words of Scripture wrought into articles of dress.

ought each one every day, at supper and at dinner, and in all companies, to repeat to his neighbor and to hear from his neighbor, Vanity of vanities, all is vanity.

"Have I not often told thee [Eutropius],¹ that wealth is a runaway? But thou wouldst not hear me. Have I not said, that it is an ungrateful servant? But thou wouldst not believe. Behold now, experience has shown thee that it is not only a runaway, not only ungrateful, but it is a murderer; for it has reduced thee to fear and trembling. Did I not say to thee, when thou didst often rebuke me for telling the truth, that I loved thee more than did thy flatterers? that I, who reproved thee, was more solicitous for thy welfare, than those who sought thy favor? Did I not add to those declarations, that 'faithful are the wounds of a friend; but the kisses of an enemy are deceitful?' If thou hadst borne the wounds I inflicted, the kisses of these men would not have brought thee death; for the wounds I occasioned tend to health, but their kisses produce incurable disease."

The following passage in which Chrysostom compares worldly things to a theatrical exhibition, is elevated in thought and for the most part also in language (I. 955).

"The rich man died and was buried; Lazarus also departed; for I would not say, died. The rich man's death was indeed a death and burial; but the poor man's death was a departure, a removal to a better world, a passing from the arena to the prize, from the sea to the haven, from the line of battle to the trophy, from toils to the crown. They both departed to the scenes of truth and reality. The theatre was closed and the masks were laid aside. For as in a theatre disguises are used at mid-day, and many appear on the stage acting a borrowed part, with masks on their faces, reciting a story of ancient times and representing deeds of other days; and one comes forward as a philosopher not a philosopher in reality, another a king though not a king, but only assuming the appearance of a king, on account of the part he is to perform, another is a physician, but has only a physician's dress, another is a slave who is really a free man, another a teacher while yet he knows not his letters—none of them are such as they appear to be, but are what they appear not. For one appears a physician, who is not a physician, or a philosopher having his hair under his mask,² or a soldier having only a soldier's dress. The aspect of the mask deceives; nature, however, the reality of

¹ Eutropius was present in the church, enjoying its protection.

² The philosophers were in the habit of having their hair cut close.

which seems to be transferred, is not belied. So long as the delighted spectators keep their seats, the masks remain; but when evening comes on and the performance is ended, and all leave the place, the masks are taken off, and he who on the stage was a king, is, out of the theatre, nothing but a brazier. The masks are laid aside, the deception vanishes, the reality appears. He who within was a free man is found, without, to be a slave; for, as I said, within is deception, without is the reality. The evening overtook them, the play was ended, the truth made its appearance.

"So it is in life and at its close. The present state of things is a theatrical show; the business of men, a play; wealth and poverty, the ruler and the subject, and such like things are representations. But when the day shall have passed, then that fearful night will have come—rather, I should say, the day will have come; for night it indeed will be to the wicked, but day to the righteous—when the theatre will be closed, the masks thrown off, when each one shall be tried and his works; not each one and his wealth, not each one and his office, not each one and his dignity, not each one and his power, but each one and his works—both noble and king, wife and husband, when the judge will demand of us our life and good deeds, not the load of dignities we bore, not the disesteem of poverty, not the tyranny of contempt. Give me deeds, even if thou wert a slave, better than those of the freeman; more manly, even if thou wert a woman, than those of a man. When the masks are thrown off, then will appear both the rich man and the poor man. And as here, when the play is ended and each of us sees him who within was a philosopher become, without, a brazier, and says, Aha! was not this man within a philosopher? without, I see he is a brazier; was not this man, within, a king? without, I see him to be some inconsiderable person; was not this man, within, a rich man? without, I see him poor; so it will be there."

The foregoing specimens amply show with what diversity, and felicity Chrysostom interweaves examples and comparisons in his discourses; indeed, how seldom he can state an abstract position, without at once elucidating it by a comparison which makes it perfectly clear to the popular mind. It may be well, notwithstanding, to present here, particularly, some of his comparisons.

In delineating the powerful operation of the gospel, he says, beautifully and aptly (II. 595.)—"As when a fire is set, the thorn-bushes gradually yield to the flame, and the fields thus become

clear, so when the tongue of Paul proclaimed the gospel and assailed the world more vehemently than fire, all things gave way, both the worship of demons and feasts, and festive assemblies, paternal customs, legalized corruptions, the wrath of the people and the threats of kings, the plots of his relatives and the machinations of false apostles. Rather indeed, as when the sun arises, the darkness is dispelled, and the wild beasts repair to their dens, robbers betake themselves to flight, murderers flee to their holds, and pirates retire from sight, invaders of tombs secrete themselves, adulterers and thieves and housebreakers, in danger of being discovered by the light of day, depart sufficiently far to elude observation, and all things are openly visible, both land and sea, the sun's rays shining on all, on streams and mountains, the country and the city; so, the gospel having made its appearance, and Paul disseminating it everywhere, error was put to flight, truth was advanced, sacrificial vapors and smoke, cymbals and timbrels, drunkenness and revelling, fornications and adulteries, and those other practices, too indecent to be mentioned, which were committed in the idols' temples, ceased and faded away, like wax melted by the fire, like chaff consumed by the flame. But the resplendent flame of truth arose clear and lofty to the very heaven, elevated even by those who sought to impede it, and augmented by those who sought to quench it. And neither did peril restrain its march and its irrepressible impulse, nor the tyranny of long established customs, nor the strength of paternal usages and laws, nor the difficulty of submitting to its discipline, nor any of the hindrances which have been mentioned."

Both the comparisons here employed are good, approaching even to sublimity, and each of them striking. Yet they are not kept entirely distinct from each other; but are so mingled in the orator's mind that he brings up anew the first, after having disposed of the second.

Our change at death he compares in the following manner (I. 936.): "When a man is about to rebuild an old and tottering house, he first sends out its occupants, then tears it down, and builds anew a more splendid one. This occasions no grief to the occupants, but rather joy. For they do not think of the demolition which they see, but of the house which is to come, though not yet seen. When God is about to do a similar work, he destroys our body and removes the soul which was dwelling in it, as from some house that he may build it anew and more splendidly and again bring the soul with greater glory into it. Let us not, there-

fore, regard the tearing down, but the splendor which is to succeed."

Immediately upon this, he compares the change of the human body at death to the melting down of a statue which had been broken in pieces for this purpose, and which comes forth again from the furnace new and splendid. The comparison is a lame one, as is frequently the case with him.

He scruples not to use in his discourses events of his own life as examples. Thus, in the thirty-eighth Homily on the Acts he makes mention of the danger to which he was exposed at Antioch, on occasion of his finding a roll inscribed with magic letters.¹ So uncommonly rich is he in this species of oratorical embellishment and illustration, that any specimen of his composition would fully prove it.

A single example (IX. 664.) must suffice to show the touching, heart-affecting character of his eloquence; since it is manifest on all his pages that he sought to speak not merely to the understanding, but also, and much more, to the heart.

"Let us, therefore, be filled with dread, as many as have not contemned riches for the sake of God; rather, as many as have not contemned riches for our own sake. For it is Paul only who generously suffered all things for Christ's sake, not for obtaining a kingdom or honors of his own, but for the affection he bore to Christ. But as to us, neither Christ, nor the cause of Christ, withdraws us from earthly things; but like serpents, or vipers, or swine, we cleave to the dust. For wherein are we better than those animals, since, though we have so many excellent examples, we are yet looking downwards, and cannot bear even for a little while to look up to heaven?"

¹ The incident occurred in his youth. The emperor Valens, noted for his suspicious and cruel disposition, was particularly severe against the practice, or the study of magic, as an art extremely favorable to conspiracies against his government or life. The slightest grounds of suspicion were sufficient cause for subjecting a person to the torture and to death. The emperor's mind had become filled with suspicions against several persons at Antioch; and he had, consequently, caused the city to be surrounded with soldiers, and strict search to be made for books of divination and magic. During that time, Chrysostom was passing, with a friend, along the Orontes, when they observed something floating on the water which they supposed to be a piece of linen. Taking it up, they discovered that it was a roll of paper; and on opening it, they found it inscribed with magic characters. At that very moment, a soldier passed by. Chrysostom's companion, at once, through fear of the soldier, concealed the roll; and they proceeded on their way, till at a favorable opportunity they threw it away. Had it been found in their possession, nothing could have saved them from the rack.—Tz.



"But God has even given to us his Son; and yet thou dost not share even bread with him who was given up for thee, who was put to death on thy account. The Father on thy account did not spare him, though he was his own Son; but thou neglectest him when pining with hunger, and that while thou art consuming his gifts, and consuming them for thyself. What can be greater wickedness than this? He was delivered upon thy account; on thy account he was slain; on thy account he goes about hungering. He gives thee of his own, that thou mightest be profited; and yet thou givest him nothing. How more unfeeling than stones, are we, who, though induced by so many motives, yet persist in this diabolic inhumanity! He did not think it enough to suffer death and the cross; but was willing to become a poor man and a stranger, a wanderer and naked, to be cast into prison and suffer sickness, that even thus he might excite thy pity. If, he says, thou dost not requite me as having suffered for thee, yet show pity to me as a poor man. If thou wilt not pity me on account of poverty, yet be persuaded for sickness' sake; suffer thyself to be influenced by a regard to me as imprisoned. But if these thoughts do not excite thy compassion, yield on account of the smallness of the request. For I do not ask anything costly, only bread, a shelter and words of consolation. But if thou still remain inflexible, yet be moved for the sake of the kingdom and of the rewards which I have promised. Do you make no account of these? Yield to the impulse of thy very nature, at beholding me naked; remember that nakedness which I endured on the cross for thee. If thou wilt not be prevailed on by this, yield to that which I suffer in the persons of the poor. I was bound on thy account; and on thy account I am now bound, that induced by my own sufferings, or by my sufferings in the persons of the poor, thou mightest be willing to show some mercy. I fasted on thy account, and again am suffering hunger for thee; I was athirst while hanging on the cross, I thirst in the persons of the poor, that I might incline thee to myself and make thee merciful, so that thou mightest secure thy salvation. On this account, though thou art indebted to me for a thousand benefits, I do not demand anything of thee as a debtor, but I would crown thee as one who has bestowed favors on me, and give thee a kingdom in recompense for these inconsiderable acts. I do not even say, Deliver me from poverty; nor, Give me of thy wealth; although I became poor for thy sake; I ask only bread, and a garment, and a slight alleviation of my famishing state. And should

I be cast into prison, I do not compel thee to strike off my chains and bring me out; but I ask one thing only, that thou wouldst look on me while bound for thy sake, and I would take it a sufficient favor and for this alone would bestow heaven on thee. Though I have loosed thee from the heaviest chains, yet it will satisfy me, if thou wilt look on me in my chains. I can indeed raise thee to a crown without these things; but I wish to be a debtor to thee, that thy crown may bring thee a feeling of confidence that thou hast labored for it. And on this account it is, that though I am able to sustain myself, I go around begging bread, and standing at thy door, stretch forth my hand to thee. For I desire to be fed by thee; since I greatly love thee. And therefore I am fond of thy table, as is usual with those who cherish love for another; and I make my boast of this and in presence of the whole world I proclaim thee, and in the audience of the universe I announce thee, as the one who has ministered to my wants.

“Though we, when poverty has made us dependent on any person, feel ashamed and conceal it, yet he, since he ardently loves us, even should we be silent, proclaims the deed with many encomiums, and is not ashamed to say that we clothed him when naked and fed him when hungry.”

This address made a deep impression on the hearers, and called forth shouts of applause. Chrysostom brought his discourse to a close by reproving them for their tumultuous approbation. “Considering all these things,” he proceeded, “let us not stop at merely uttering praises, but actually set forth to do what has been said. For of what profit are these applauses and shouts? One thing only I ask of you, the manifestation of your approval by deeds, the obedience by acts. This is my praise; this your gain. This would be more splendid in my view than a diadem.”

It has already been remarked that Chrysostom was peculiarly happy in availing himself of occasions and occurrences as grounds of instruction from the pulpit, and extremely skilful in suggesting elevated and striking thoughts from matters which would easily escape a less gifted preacher. The introductions already presented testify to this. The following (IV. 767) is a beautiful instance of his skill in this respect. During a sermon, night came on, and it was necessary to light the lamps. Many of the hearers directed their eyes to those who were performing this work, when he instantly interrupted his course of remark, and said: “Arouse yourselves; lay aside your negligence. Why do I say

this? We are discoursing on the Scriptures, and you turn away your eyes from us, directing them to the lamps and to the man who is lighting them. What slothfulness of spirit this is, to disregard us, and give your attention to him! I too am furnishing a light, that of the Scriptures; and upon our tongue there burns the lamp of instruction. This light is greater and better than that; for we do not kindle a wick filled with oil, but by exciting the desire for hearing we kindle up souls filled with piety."

He hereupon reminded his hearers of Eutychus, the young man who fell down from a window, asleep, during divine service; and then proceeded in his discourse.

An occasional address of a higher kind is the short speech, which he delivered extemporaneously on his return from exile (III. 506.). "What shall I say?" said he, when the people with affectionate urgency had compelled him to speak, "What shall I say, or how shall I address you? Blessed be God. This I said, when I departed; these words I again take up. Rather, while there [in my exile], I did not cease to use them. You remember, I set Job before you and said, The name of the Lord be blessed forever. These words I left with you as my farewell words; these I take as my words of thanksgiving: Blessed be the name of the Lord forever. The occasions are diverse, but the praise the same. Driven away, I blessed him; returning, I bless him. The occasions are opposite, but the end is one, both of winter and of summer, namely, the fertility of the field. Blessed be God, who permitted us to depart; blessed again be God, who has called us back. Blessed be God, who permits the storm; blessed be God, who dissipates the storm and makes the calm.

"These things I say, teaching you to bless God. Are you in prosperity? Bless God, and prosperity continues. Are you in adversity? Bless God, and adversity ends. Job, while rich, gave thanks; and when reduced to poverty, he glorified God. He did not then commit theft, nor allow himself to blaspheme. Times vary; but the mind should be the same. Neither should the calm unnerve the generous purpose of the pilot, nor the storm overpower him. Blessed be God, both when I was torn asunder from you, and now that I receive you again. Both come from the same Providence."

But his skill is most conspicuous in the use which, in his panegyrics, he makes of circumstances. Occurrences in the life of the man eulogized, he would arrange into one whole with so much aptness, and set forth in so edifying a light, that these discourses

of his deserved to be ranked among his best productions and were most adapted to his mental peculiarities. Want of room forbids us to give an extended view of any one of them. Reference may, however, be made to the panegyrics, on the apostle Paul and on the martyrs and saints. A short specimen is here presented from the discourse on the martyr Ignatius (II. 713.), who was an early bishop of Antioch, and whose relics were there held in special honor. Chrysostom proposes to weave for him five garlands, to which Ignatius had become entitled from the importance of his station, the elevation of those who elected him [*viz.* the apostles], the difficulties to which his times subjected him, the greatness of the city, and the ability of his predecessor. These are, in reality, the subdivisions of the first part of the discourse. In the second part, Chrysostom describes the martyr's death. Here, among other things, he says :

"A cruel war was waged against the churches, and, as when a country is devastated by unrelenting tyranny, men were torn away from the very bustle of business, accused of no crime, but because forsaking error they had entered on a course of piety, had abandoned the worship of demons, had acknowledged the true God and paid adoration to his only begotten Son. Thus in consequence of the very things for which they deserved to be crowned and admired and honored, they were subjected to punishment and incurred a thousand calamities. This was the case with all who received the faith, but much more with those who were rulers in the churches. For the devil, crafty and cunning in laying plots, expected that, if he could remove the shepherds, he should be able easily to scatter the flocks. But He who taketh the wise in their craftiness, wishing to show him that it is not men who govern the churches, but that he himself everywhere protects those who believe in him, permitted this to take place, so that, when they were put out of the way, Satan might see the interests of piety not diminished, nor the doctrine of the gospel quenched, but rather augmented, and that he himself and all who wrought for him in these matters might learn from the very events, that our cause is not a human cause, but that the system of the gospel is of heavenly origin, that it is God who everywhere guides the churches, and that it is impossible to succeed in a contest against God.

"The devil acted not only in this crafty manner, but also in another not inferior to it. For he did not permit the bishops to

be put to death in the cities in which they had exercised their office, but conveyed them to another city, and there took away their life. His desire, in this, was to deprive them of needful comfort; and his hope, to exhaust their strength by the fatigue of the journey. This he did to the blessed Ignatius. He called him from this city [Antioch] to Rome, making the course as tedious as possible, and aiming to depress his spirit both by the length of the journey and the time it should consume. Satan was not aware, that, as Jesus accompanied him, he could overcome the difficulties of the way and give a more striking proof of the power which was with him, and thus the more confirm the churches. For the cities on the way everywhere came in crowds to meet him, and encouraged the champion, and cheered him on his journey by supplying his wants and through their prayers and supplications strengthening him in his conflicts. And they, in return, received no little consolation while they saw the martyr hastening to death with so much cheerfulness; with as much, indeed, as if he were called to regal glory in heaven. Indeed, by the readiness and joy of the generous martyr, they saw that it was not death to which he was hastening, but a dismissal and a removal, an ascent to heaven.

"Thus he passed from city to city, teaching these things both by words and by conduct. And as it happened in the case of the Jews, when, having secured Paul and sent him to Rome, they thought they had sent him to death, but had really sent him as a teacher to the Jews there, so it was in the case of Ignatius, only to a far greater extent. For not only to the inhabitants of Rome, but also to all the intermediate cities, he went forth an admired teacher, persuading them to disregard the present life, to make no account of things seen, to place their affection on the future, and not to be swayed by any of the troubles of the present life. Impressing these things and more than these by his conduct, he went on his course, like a sun rising in the east and moving onward to the west. More resplendent, indeed, he was than the sun; for the sun, pursuing its course above, sheds earthly light, but Ignatius shone forth from beneath, imparting the spiritual light of instruction to souls. The sun departing to the west conceals himself and brings in night; but he, departing to the west, there shone forth more splendidly, bestowing on all among whom he passed the greatest benefits; and when he had reached the city, he taught it the true philosophy.

"God permitted him there to end his life, in order that his de-

cease might be a lesson of piety to all the inhabitants of Rome. For you [of Antioch] by the grace of God did not need any further evidence, being rooted in the faith; but the people of Rome, through the prevalence there of impiety, needed greater help. And therefore Peter, and Paul, and after them this man, all suffered martyrdom there; both that by their blood they might cleanse the city which was polluted by blood offered to idols, and that by their conduct they might give proof of the resurrection of Christ who had been crucified, and convince the inhabitants of Rome that they could, with so much readiness, disregard the present life only by fully believing that they should ascend to Jesus who had been crucified and should see him in the heavens. For the strongest proof of Christ's resurrection is, that he, having been put to death, should after death manifest so much power as to persuade living men to overlook country and family, friends and relatives, and even life itself, for the sake of professing him, and to choose stripes, and dangers, and death instead of present delights. These things were the mighty works, not of a dead person, not of one remaining in a sepulchre, but of one risen and living. For how can it be explained, that while he was alive all the apostles who were with him should, through terror and failure of courage, betray their Master and flee away, but that after he was dead, not only Peter and Paul, but also Ignatius who had never seen him nor enjoyed his society, should show such zeal in his cause, as even to give up life on his account?"

Chrysostom's faults have already been mentioned, incidentally, in connection with the specimens which have been presented. We restrict ourselves, therefore, to a few notices under this head.

He has been accused of often selecting unsuitable texts. We need only allege in confirmation of this charge, that he has three entire sermons on the words, Salute Prisca and Aquila; and that on another occasion he employs simply the words, Drink a little wine for thy stomach's sake and thine often infirmities. The choice of such texts he would justify by saying, that every word of the Holy Scriptures was divinely inspired. He had sufficient skill and ingenuity, however, to connect an instructive discourse with words so unfruitful, apparently, as those above quoted.

His ready invention of images and use of comparisons, lead him very often into the mistake of accumulating them inordinately. Who does not feel this, when, for instance, in the second discourse on the Statues (II. 24.) one and the same thing is represented under different images in very close proximity? "Once

there was nothing more worthy of respect than our city ; there is now nothing more deplorable. The people so orderly and tractable, and like a well broken and manageable steed always yielding to authority, has on a sudden so far defied restraint, as to perpetrate mischiefs which it is painful to mention. . . . Formerly, no city was happier than ours ; now, none more unpleasant. As bees buzzing about a hive, so every day the inhabitants gathered at the resorts of business, and all men congratulated us on our multitude of citizens ; but lo ! this hive is now deserted. For as smoke drives away those bees, so fear has driven away these ; and what the prophet said in bewailing the calamities of Jerusalem, we also have to say at present, The city is become as an oak stripped of its leaves, and as a garden that hath no water (Is. 1: 30.). For as a garden without irrigation exhibits trees bare of leaves and destitute of fruit, so is it now with our city. . . . All avoid the city as they would a trap ; they turn from it as from an abyss ; they hasten from it as from a fire ; and as when a house is on fire, not only those who dwell in it, but also all in the vicinity, escape with all speed, endeavoring to save themselves from the flames, so now, in expectation of the imperial anger, like a fire from above, every one hastens his escape before the fire shall overtake him, and seeks to save at least his naked body. . . . And as in the case of a besieged city, it is unsafe to pass beyond the walls, while the enemy are encamped without ; so neither to many of those who live in this city is it safe to venture abroad, or to appear in public. . . . And as, when in a wood many trees in all directions have been cut down, the sight is unpleasant, like that of a head having many bald spots, so this city, through the great diminution of its inhabitants, a few only appearing here and there, has now become an undesirable place and fills spectators with gloom."

Each of these examples and comparisons is, taken singly, beautiful and striking ; but being all clustered together in the space of a few pages, they are burdensome and fatiguing.

Chrysostom is, for the most part, happy in his selection of comparisons. Here and there, however, undignified comparisons occur. Thus he says respecting Timothy, He bore the yoke with Paul, as a steer with an ox. In another sermon, he compares an empty church to a woman not dressed, and extends the comparison even to indecency. In a similarly unbecoming manner he compares the church in his second discourse on Eutropius (III. 467.) to a virgin : " The church is called a virgin, and yet she was

formerly a harlot. Such is the wonderful power of the bridegroom, that he received her a harlot and made her a virgin. Unheard of and wonderful thing! With us, marriage puts an end to virginity; but with God, marriage restores virginity. With us, she who was a virgin is no longer so when married; with Christ, she who was a harlot becomes, when married, a virgin." Again he says: "God loves an unchaste female, that is to say, our nature; God chooses her for his bride." These comparisons occur frequently in the same sermon. Respecting the mother of the seven Maccabees he says (II. 748.), with infelicitous acuteness: "The sons were only seven martyrs. But the body of their mother being added was indeed but one body, yet she filled the space of twice seven martyrs, because she suffered martyrdom with each of them." The following most trifling witticism we also find: "Of these Maccabees, no one was the last; for the seven constituted a chorus [a circle of dancers] and in a chorus there is neither beginning nor end."

A specimen of allegory quite unduly extended occurs in the beginning of his second discourse on the fall of Eutropius (III. 461.). "Sweet is a meadow, or a garden; but much sweeter the reading of the divine Scriptures. For the flowers there fade, but here are sentiments ever blooming. There the zephyr gently blows, but here the breath of the Spirit. There a thorn-hedge is the wall, here the care of God gives protection. There the birds warble, but here the prophets utter their strains. There is delight from vision, here is profit from hearing. A garden is limited to one spot; the Scriptures are everywhere. A garden is subject to the control of seasons; but the Scriptures are filled with leaves and loaded with fruits both in winter and in summer." At this point he passes on to other comparisons. "The reading of the Scriptures is to thee as a pilot; this cordage the trials of earthly affairs do not snap asunder. . . . A few days ago, the church was besieged; an armed force came, and sent forth fire from their eyes; but the olive tree was not withered." Thus he recurs to the allegorical comparison, which he had dropped, besides having pursued it entirely too far, of the Holy Scriptures with a garden.

In fine, Chrysostom's greatest fault is a want of well adapted arrangement in his mode of presenting subjects. The custom which prevailed in his time of not regarding exact divisions even in his sermons, as distinguished from more familiar addresses, the desire, as he himself professed, "to heal many and diverse wounds" in the shortest possible time, his natural vivacity of char-

acter, and the ardor of his fancy, all, combined, led him to make those long digressions¹ and to indulge in that great prolixity, which must be acknowledged as capital faults, and which render so many of his discourses, while excellent in individual passages, yet tedious and burdensome as a whole. Still the credit accorded to him, centuries ago, of having been the greatest orator of the ancient church, deserves to remain unimpaired. Not, that the other preachers of his time, were of small account, as compared with him. On the contrary, some among them, in a general view of their excellences, stand very near him; and several of them, so far as particular good qualities are concerned, even surpass this admired master. Macarius the Great excelled him in deep religious fervor; Ephrem's fancy was more ardent and splendid; Basil the Great could boast of a purer, easier, and more polished style, and of greater order in his sermons; Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory Nyssen were his superiors in dialectics. Yet, Chrysostom towers above all these, and above all his successors in the ancient church, since the particular excellences which they possessed belonged also to him, in a less degree, it is true, but in happier combination and in proper symmetry; while at the same time he possessed many other eminent oratorical qualities, in which those contemporary preachers were, more or less, deficient. Chrysostom became the greatest orator of his time, both by the harmony which naturally existed in his fine powers of mind, and by the well proportioned and unwearied cultivation which he bestowed on them all.

¹ On this point his theory was unexceptionable, but in practice he exceeded all just limits. In his first Homily on the Obscurity of Prophecy (VI. 194.), he says very properly: "As in the case of persons not in good health, it is not proper to set a scanty and hastily prepared table, but a variety in the kinds of food is found necessary, that if one article is not taken another may be, . . . so it is often necessary to do in respect to spiritual food. Since we are weak, it is necessary to have in readiness a discourse of ample and various materials, containing comparisons, examples, arguments, well-wrought digressions, and many other such things, so that from among them a selection may be made of matter that will be profitable."

ARTICLE II.

THE FESTIVALS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH COMPARED WITH
THOSE OF OTHER ANCIENT FORMS OF RELIGION.

By Lyman Coleman, D. D., Professor in the College of New Jersey, Princeton.¹

JUSTLY to exhibit this comparison it will be necessary first to take a cursory view of those festivals which were instituted in the ancient church and have continued, with greater or less variations, until the present time. These resolve themselves into three grand divisions, in each of which there is one great festival bearing a peculiar relation to the other of the same class, as their common centre. These great festivals are Christmas, Easter and Whitsunday. Of these the first two relate to the scenes of Christ's humiliation on earth; the last to his glorious exaltation and power as displayed in the shedding forth of the Holy Spirit. Each of these feasts is preceded by preparatory rites, and followed by corresponding festivities. So that from the first of December to the Sunday of whitsuntide these successive solemnities form a connected representation of the leading events in the life of our Lord from his incarnation to his triumphant ascension. He became flesh and dwelt among us, subject to all the infirmities of our nature; he suffered and died; and arose in glorious power whereby he is able to provide for all his followers to the end of the world. These are the great truths in our Lord's history which this series of festivals commemorates. They remind us, both of the deepest humiliation and the highest exaltation of the Son of God, and represent the highest display of divine grace to man. The cycle of Christian festivals throughout illustrates historical truths of the deepest interest, and exhibits the relations of the Christian world to the great Head of the church. In both these respects they are well suited to exert a happy moral influence upon those who observe them.

Christmas commemorates the birth of Christ; God himself becoming man. This great event indeed is represented by two so-

¹ Translated from the treatise of Dr. Karl Ullmann of Heidelberg entitled, "Vergleichende Zusammenstellung des christlichen Festcyclus mit den Vorchristlichen Fes'en." Re-printed from the third edition of Creuser's Symbolik, 1843.

lemnities; the *birth* of Jesus on the twenty-fifth of December, when this Divine Being entered on his earthly existence, and became subject to all the infirmities of human nature; and the day of his *baptism* on the sixth of January, when he first manifested himself as Christ, the promised Messiah. On this occasion his divine power and glory were publicly revealed; and, for this reason, the day is styled Epiphany, the manifestation.

For this day some preparation is necessary. The advent is accordingly celebrated four successive sabbaths previous by singing, prayer, and religious instruction. Just as the whole economy of grace, as manifested in the history of the Jews and taught by all the prophets, from Enoch to John the Baptist that stern preacher of repentance, was only preparatory to the coming of our Lord, so these festive days preceding Christmas are preparatory to a suitable celebration of his advent. They are designed to call to mind the promises to the fathers, and to excite an earnest expectation and longing for the fulfilment of the same.

The observance of the birth of Christ as a religious festival began in the fourth century in the church of Rome, and subsequently in the eastern church, on the twenty-fifth of December. By this solemnity it was proclaimed how the eternal Word became flesh; and how, by becoming man, he made it possible for man himself to become like God himself. But in addition to this union between God and man, Jesus, by being born of a woman, exhibited also the tenderest of all human relations, that of parent and child. Christmas therefore is a festive celebration expressive of the happiness of the human family, and of the purest relations of domestic life. All this the ancient church recognized in its instructions on this occasion, and ancient usage has established this significant import of the day.

The infancy of Jesus is also peculiarly honored by the festivals which are observed in immediate connection with this day. Since the fourth century it has been customary to celebrate, on the twenty-sixth of December, the death of Stephen the first martyr, as standing nearest the manger of the infant Saviour. The *death* of the martyr was, according to the phraseology of the ancient church, his birth-day. This connects itself immediately with the birth of Christ who gave him strength and grace for that scene of suffering in which he yielded up his spirit and fell asleep. But the soul of the holy martyr was not lost in death; it was only born to a new and nobler state. Hence the familiar saying of the

fathers: *Heri natus est Christus in terris, ut hodie Stephanus nasceretur in coelis.*

Next followed the memorial of John, the beloved disciple, which naturally connected itself with that of the birth of Christ. He especially taught us that the Word became flesh and dwelt among us. He was also a martyr; not indeed like Stephen, but in a spiritual sense. For it was the custom of the church to reckon all martyrs who fearlessly stood up as witnesses for the truth, not counting their own lives dear unto them, though they may at length have died a natural death.

As these days commemorate those who testified their love for Christ, the one, by a long life of undeviating fidelity, and the other, by a heroic death, so another commemorates those who, in tender, unconscious childhood, yielded up their lives for the preservation of the infant Saviour. The twenty-eighth of December, Innocents' day, was set apart in memory of the innocent children who suffered death by the jealous cruelty of Herod. Thus these martyr-feasts are connected with that of the birth of Christ. This connection illustrates the deep earnestness with which the ancient church regarded the death of Christ.

But the solemnities of this occasion may also be viewed in a more cheerful light. They present a delightful emblem of a holy family, of which the holy child Jesus is the principal object of interest. In this family John the beloved disciple was also included, having been recognized, after the death of Jesus, as the son of Mary. At the manger appeared also wise men from the east, with costly gifts, doing homage to him. Angels too, in songs from heaven, announced his advent. Thus all that is endearing in female worth, and maternal tenderness, in friendship, truth and childish innocence, combined with the profound reverence of the wise men, does but exalt the more the memory of that great day, on which was born our Saviour and our heavenly king who is Christ the Lord.

Between the day of the birth of Christ and of his manifestation, there is another which commemorates an important event of his life,—his circumcision. *Festum circumcisionis et nominis Jesu.* The later fathers of the church connected with the observance of this day the festivities of the new year's day, by which means it was dishonored by many wanton and extravagant rites adopted from heathen nations. Jesus not only let himself down to all the infirmities of our nature, but was made under the Law, and sub-

mitted to all its conditions, that by fulfilling all righteousness he might magnify that law and make it honorable.

The feast of epiphany concluded the solemnities connected with that of the birth of Christ. This is an ancient oriental festival; and may have been established, through the influence of the Gnostics, as early as the second century. It was originally observed in memory of the baptism of Jesus by John the Baptist; at which time he first appeared as the Messiah, the promised deliverer of his people, and was solemnly announced, as the Son of God, by a voice from heaven and the descent of the Holy Spirit upon him in the form of a dove. But the import of this feast was modified considerably in the western church. At first it was consecrated to the memory of his public manifestation. Then, not attaching so much importance to his baptism, this church observed epiphany as commemorative of his public recognition as king of nations and Saviour of the world. This point of time they recognized in the worship of the wise men, whom they regarded as the representatives of the whole gentile world. These eastern sages were regarded, in the middle ages, as kings bearing the names of Caspur, Melchior and Balthasar. Thus, by means of many fictions and works of art, the festival became known as the day of the three kings. But in the eastern church it has uniformly been observed as a memorial of the baptism of Jesus.

In the sixth century the feast of purification or of the presentation of Christ in the temple was added to these which are connected with Christmas. The time of holding this feast, styled Candlemas, from the number of lights which were borne in procession on the occasion, was necessarily determined by that of Christmas on the twenty-fifth of December.

The solemnities of Easter stand in close connection with those of Christmas. Of the historical origin of this feast there can be no doubt. With essential variations, it sprang from the passover, the great festival of the Jews, to which it retains many striking analogies. It is the most ancient and the most significant of all the festivals of the Christian church. It commemorates the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. This momentous event, so important in the scheme of grace, is signalized, both by this great annual festival, and by the weekly observance of the Lord's day.

Easter week comprises the most important events connected with the mission of Christ on earth, and the most striking evi-

dence of God's amazing grace to man. It is based entirely on those historical facts in the life of Christ which characterize him as the Saviour of mankind,—his sufferings, death, and resurrection. The deepest sorrows here blend themselves with the most glorious triumphs.

This great festive season is preceded by a preparatory fast of forty days, the carnival, *caro vale* !

The solemnities immediately connected with Easter begin with Palm-sunday ; commemorative of our Lord's triumphant entry into Jerusalem, when the enthusiastic multitude strewed palms in the way before him. The tragedy begins with a triumphal procession ; unnatural, indeed, and inconsistent, because merely an earthly triumph ; and oh ! how unlike that of the eternal king on his entry into the city of the New Jerusalem above. The shouts of the tumultuous assembly and their loud hosannas are soon to be exchanged, by the malice of the priests, for their maledictions and phrenzied exclamations of rage. And yet the blessed Saviour, meekly submissive to his Father's will, calmly proceeds in full consciousness of all this to meet his certain death.

First of all he institutes the Lord's supper, expressive of the grace of God, and the fellowship of saints. The memory of this transaction is perpetuated by Maunday Thursday, *dies mysteriorum*, *dies natalis*—*calicis*, *dies viridum*, etc. In many churches this is connected with the washing of feet, in imitation of a similar act of our Lord. It is intended to represent the mutual love and reciprocal offices of kindness which Christians ought to exhibit one towards another.

Then follows that day of awful suffering, and of amazing grace, when Jesus died upon the cross for the sins of the world,—Good Friday. It is expressive of the surpassing love of Christ in dying for the salvation of man. But the benevolent ends of this sacrifice were accomplished by mysterious sufferings. All was darkness and gloom. The sun itself was shrouded in darkness. All nature, in sympathy with the sufferings of the great Deliverer, gave signs of woe. How much deeper then the sorrow with which the heart of man should be touched on this occasion. Hence the expressive silence and sadness with which the day is solemnized.

Saturday following was named the Great, or Holy Sabbath. On this day the Lord lay in his grave, and rested from the great work of redemption, as also on the night following. This night was also observed with peculiar solemnity, that sacred night of all nights. The church assembled in silent sadness, and passed

its mournful vigils in watching, in prayer, and in torch-light processions. In connection with this solemnity the ancient church was accustomed to foreshadow, by peculiar rites, the second coming of the Son of man.

But when the morning dawned, oh, what a morning! It was announced with the triumphant exclamation, The Lord is risen! yes, verily the Lord is risen indeed was the universal response. Easter now is fully come. Easter, that day of joy, of salvation, that royal, triumphant day; that day of light, of life and of salvation, that feast of feasts. Old things are passed away; behold all things are become new. The ancient dispensation has passed away; and the new now begins. For this reason the ancient church began the new year with this day. In like manner the Christian sabbath, the resurrection day, is not, like the Jewish, the conclusion of the seven days, but the beginning of a new week.

The conclusion of Easter was Whitsunday, *Dominica in albis*, *dies neophytorum*, etc. On this day the neophytes, candidates for church membership, were received into full communion by appropriate solemnities, after which they laid aside the white garments with which they had been clad, and in which they appeared in public on this occasion.

The cycle of Whitsunday commemorates the complete manifestation and exaltation of Jesus Christ. His earthly course is completed; he lives indeed still, but only as our risen Lord. As with the Jews the interval between the passover and pentecost was holy time, so also with Christians, the seven weeks between Easter and Whitsunday were religiously observed. It was the favorite time for solemnizing the rite of baptism. As a symbolical representation of the resurrection of Christ, all were accustomed, during this interval, to stand in prayer. The Acts of the Apostles were read and expounded, because this book particularly treats of his resurrection. None fasted during this season. Business was, as much as possible, suspended, and the time devoted to festivity as a prolonged thanksgiving. In a word, the whole was a joyous sunday, a religious holiday, a prolonged echo of the acclamations of the resurrection morning.

The last of all these days relating to our Lord's mission on earth was the Ascension, when the life of Jesus, which began in the manger ended in the glories of heaven. Then he went up on high to take his promised place at the right hand of the Fa-

ther; where, in the fulness of divine majesty, he reigns, Lord of heaven and earth.

The first act of his grace as the exalted Saviour, was the shedding forth of his Spirit on the day of pentecost. This is the significant, typical import of the day. It is the true pentecost of the church. It is the celebration of the continued working of his power in his church, by the Holy Ghost, and of the arming of his apostles with spiritual gifts for the promulgation of his gospel.

On the first of May the western church kept, not improperly, the day of all the apostles; for it was the day when they all assembled to celebrate the triumph of their Lord over the grave, and to be enlightened respecting their destiny and their duty. But at a later period this day was restricted and observed as sacred to the memory of Philip and James.

The octave of Whitsunday was, in the ancient Greek church, a feast in memory of all the holy martyrs. But in the western church it became, in the middle ages, with reference to the doctrine of the trinity, Trinity sunday. This concludes the cycle of Whitsunday; and is, of consequence, the termination of the whole round of solemnities comprising the three great cycles of festivals in the church. By the Ascension the eye of the mind was raised towards heaven; by the gift of the Spirit, on the day of pentecost, it was illuminated from on high; and now, on this day, it is turned to contemplate the greatest, the most profound of all the mysteries of heaven, the trinity of the adorable God-head.

In the interval between Christmas and Whitsunday many sacred days were interspersed, devoted to the virgin and the apostles; such as the visitation, the ascension, the birth and the conception of the virgin; and the days of Peter and Paul, of Bartholomew, of Simon and Judas, not Iscariot, and of Andrew. But it is sufficient for our purpose to designate particularly three great feasts which occur within this term of time. These are John the Baptist's day, June 24; All Saints, Nov. 1, and All Souls, Nov. 2. Nor must the feast of all the angels be forgotten. This occurred on the twenty-ninth of Sept. So that throughout the whole year there was no considerable interval of time without some religious solemnity. The whole circle of the year was crowded with days which were set apart in memory of some event more or less interesting and important to the church.

Relation of the Festivals of the Church to the Seasons of the Year.

We have hitherto treated only of historical events connected with the festivals of the church. These, beyond doubt, were the principal occasion of the institution of these holidays. Though established at different and somewhat distant intervals of time, they are presumed to have been based on the historical facts of the gospels even though this relation may not be distinctly apparent with respect to some particular festival. But these festive occasions have also a certain relation to the seasons of the year. In general they are so arranged that nature herself seems to harmonize with these manifestations of a higher spiritual life. The course of the seasons corresponds with that of these occasions, giving new interest and importance to them. They are not indeed the principal occasion of these ordinances of the church; neither on the other hand, is the harmony between them altogether accidental. It has a deeper and more intimate relation.

The nativity occurs just at the time of the winter solstice. The days are then the shortest; the sun, sinking to its lowest point in the heavens, sends forth a faint and feeble ray; and all nature seems touched with decay and death. But from this point begin the symptoms of returning life. The sun, ascending in its course, renews its strength. As if beginning itself a new life, it gives certain promise that it will again renew the whole face of nature. Just at this time the church celebrates the birth of Christ, that sun of righteousness, arising with healing in his wings.¹ Christ came in a wintry season of the moral world when all spiritual life seemed dead. But as in the natural, so in the moral world, it was only an apparent death. He arose, giving joyful evidence that the beams of truth and of love, proceeding from him, would quicken the dead to newness of life, and overspread with verdure the realms of death.

¹ This coincidence is noted by many ancient writers, particularly by Christian poets, as Aurelius Prudentius in that familiar passage:

Quid est, quod arctum circulum
Sol jam recurrens deserit?
Christusne terris nascitur,
Qui lucis anget tramitem?—*Hymn 11.*

There is a passage of similar import in Paulinus of Nola, Poematt. 118. And similar assertions of the fathers which Jablonski has collected.—Opus, T. III. p. 355 seq. ed. Te Water.

Easter occurs in the spring. It is therefore commemorative alike of a natural and a moral resurrection. As the seed sown, that was lost in the earth, now sends forth its germ under the sun's reviving rays, so man, dead in sin, puts away the corruptions of the flesh, and lives anew under the quickening influences of the Sun of Righteousness. Such are the interesting analogies between Easter and the season of the year to which it is assigned. It commemorates at once the springing of the year both in a natural and a moral sense.¹

The analogies of Whitsunday to nature are not so striking, but the comparison does not fail even here. This festival celebrates the highest exercise of power by our exalted Lord. Author of a new and spiritual creation he manifests himself to the church in his highest glory. So also in nature. That which at the nativity was only the object of hope and of desire, which at Easter was in budding promise, appears now in the strength and beauty of maturer growth, and ripening for the harvest. Whitsunday occurs while the corn in different latitudes, is yet in the ear, or in the midst of harvest. It was the commencement of the spiritual harvest of the apostles, who were themselves the first fruits of the Spirit, the beginning of that great harvest which was to be gathered from among all people upon the face of the whole earth.

Relation of the Festivals of the Christian church to those of the Jews.

Several of the festivals of the church evidently have a direct *historical* reference to those of the Jews; while both have a common relation to the spiritual and physical nature of man. Of the analogy between Easter and Whitsunday and corresponding

¹ This analogy has not escaped the notice of the ancient fathers of the church. Gregory Nazianzen in his oration upon spring, and the martyr Mamos on Easter Octave, says: *νὺν ἔαρ κοσμικὸν, ἔαρ πνευματικὸν, ἔαρ ψυχῆς, ἔαρ σώματος, ἔαρ ὁρώμενον, ἔαρ ὑόπατον*. The same thought is more clearly expressed in a hymn of Venantius Honorius on the Resurrection of Christ:

Salve festa dies, toto venerabilis ævo,
Qua Deus infernum vicit et astra tenet,
Ecce renascentis testatur gratia mundi,
Omnia cum Domino dona rediisse suo.
Namque triumphanti post tristia tartara Christo,
Undique fronde nemus, gramina flore favent,
Legibus inferni oppressis super astra meantem
Laudant rite Deum lux, polus, arva, fretum.
Qui crucifixus erat, Deus ecce per omnia regnat,
Danique creatori cuncta creata precem.

Jewish festivals there can be no doubt. And the same has been affirmed, though without sufficient reason, of Christmas by comparing it with the feast of purification.

Like the Christian festivals the three great feasts of the Jews have reference, both to the seasons of the year, and to important historical facts. The Passover relates chiefly to history; the pentecost, to the season; and the feast of tabernacles, equally to both. The origin of the passover is indicated in its name, and is familiar to all. It commemorates the fact that Jehovah, when he slew the first-born of Egypt, passed over the dwellings of the Jews and saved all their first-born alive. It celebrates also the deliverance of the people from Egyptian bondage. By this great event they became again an independent people. The nation was born again on that day. It was therefore the birth day of the children of Israel.¹ It is particularly worthy of notice that the bringing of the first fruits of the harvest was connected with the celebration of this festival after the arrival of the people in the promised land, which indicates its reference to the season of the year. It was a national thanksgiving for the blessings of the year; and only as such is it observed by modern Jews, forgetful of its historical associations.

The Pentecost, on the contrary, related originally to the season of the year. It was a festive celebration of the conclusion of harvest, by the offering of new bread and meal, and occurred fifty days after bringing the first sheaves in the second day of the passover; hence the name pentecost, from *πεντηκοστή*. The festivities of the occasion were limited to one day; but the entire interval between the passover and the pentecost was regarded as a sacred season. Though originally a feast of the seasons, it has also an historical interest with reference to the giving of the law on Sinai. Of this indeed neither the Old Testament nor Philo give any intimation; but it is recognized by the fathers, particularly by Augustin.² This historical reference however appears to have had its origin, not in the Christian church, but in Jewish tradition. The other festivals relate to some historical fact; and especially it is worthy of notice that the gift of the Spirit on the day of pentecost was attended with the exhibition of fire like the giving of the law on Sinai. To these considerations may be

¹ "Israel's Geburts—und Lebensfest."—Bähr, *Symb. des Mos.* II. 628.

² "Occiditur ovis, celebratur pascha, et, interpositis quinquaginta diebus, datur lex, ad timorem scripta digito Dei.—Epist. 55. § 16. See also *Contra Faustum*, 32. 12.

added the evidence of the rabbins, especially of Maimonides.¹ This rabbinical testimony is indeed of later date, but it may with much greater probability be referred to Jewish tradition than to an unfounded conjecture of the fathers.

The feast of tabernacles, celebrated by dwelling in booths, and by more numerous and larger offerings than any other, clearly has, like the passover, a twofold relation, to historical truth and to the season of the year. The historical reference is indicated both by the name and by the significant act of dwelling in booths, to the manner of life of the Israelites in the wilderness. The Israelites, dwelling in their settled habitations in the promised land, kept this day in joyful remembrance of the guidance of Jehovah, which brought them in safety through their pilgrimage to this promised possession. It was also a festival of thanks in honor of the vintage and the gathering in of the fruits; and was therefore called the feast of the *ingathering*.² In both respects it served to unite the people to the Lord, their guide, their protector and their provident benefactor. The sensual gratifications connected with the occasion gave place to higher and more refined enjoyments, and each found in the other a natural foundation and expression. This was also the conclusion of the series of great festivals, and as the crowning festival was styled the feast of feasts, the greatest of all feasts. The circumstance that it was a feast of thank-offerings for the fruits of the year, and celebrated, it may be, with excessive demonstrations of joy, led Plutarch to regard it as a bacchanalian festival, as might be very natural and grateful to a pagan. But this theory is justly rejected by a late writer on the festivals of the Jews.³

In all these festivals, admitting the truth of what has been said respecting the historical reference of the pentecost, we notice a twofold relation; the remembrance of great deliverances wrought of old for Israel, and a thankful recognition of divine goodness in the continued providence of God and the annual bounties of the year. They address themselves both to the sensual and spiritual nature of man, and harmonize, both in form and spirit, with the theocracy of the Old Testament.

¹ In the Tract, *More neboch*. l. 41. In the more ancient book, *Cosri*, by R. Jehudi Hallevi, pentecost is styled *memoria datæ legis*, p. 165, ed. Buxtorf. Comp. Buxtorf, *Synag.* c. 20. p. 438. According to *Pesach*. F. 68. 2, it was in memory of the giving of the law on Sinai.

² Exodus 23: 16. 34: 22.

³ *Quæst. Sympos. Lib.* 4. p. 671, 746. Wyttenbach George. *Die Jud. Feste*, p. 276.

The transfer of the first two Jewish feasts to that of Easter and Whitsunday is very apparent. Easter in the Christian church is a feast of deliverance in a sense infinitely surpassing that of the passover. It is not merely the deliverance of a nation from the power of their oppressor, but the triumph of a world over the power of death and the grave. It is deliverance from sin, and restoration to a new and heavenly life. It is not the offering of the paschal lamb, but one infinitely surpassing that made for the sins of the world; not the first fruits of the earth, which are of no account in the sight of God, but the first fruits of them that sleep in the earth. It is the Prince of Light, once dead; now coming forth in the greatness and glory of his power to renew the earth and reap an immeasurably precious harvest. Easter is also a festival in honor of spring; the springing, not of the natural, but of the moral world. The verdure which here quickens and thrives is to flourish in immortal vigor.

The Jewish and the Christian pentecost have also similar relations. The one celebrates the promulgation of the law; the other, the first remarkable communication of the Spirit for the spread of the gospel; the one, the letter of the law engraven on stone for the institution of a visible theocracy; the other, the new law of the Spirit, inscribed on the heart to establish the invisible kingdom of God; the one, a harvest-festival in the kingdom of nature; the other, in the kingdom of grace; the one ends the harvest as a joyful conclusion of the festive season of the seven weeks of harvest; the other begins the spiritual harvest with the thousands converted by Peter on this occasion. The interval between the passover and the pentecost was esteemed sacred in the Jewish church; and in the Christian, the same is religiously observed.

The feast of tabernacles has not indeed the same clear analogies to any Christian festival, but it has many points of resemblance to the Christmas holidays, both in its import and its mode of celebration. "It was a season of universal joy; all was hilarity; everything wore a holiday appearance; the varied green of the ten thousand branches of different trees; the picturesque ceremony of the water-libation, the general illumination, the sacred solemnities in and before the temple; the feast, the dance, the sacred song; the full harmony of the choral music; the bright joy that shone in every countenance, and the gratitude at harvest-home that swelled every bosom—all conspired to make these days a season of pure, deep and lively joy, which in all its ele-

ments finds no parallel among the observances of men."¹ The analogy between all this and the festivities of the christmas holidays is sufficiently obvious. Still it must be acknowledged that the observance of christmas as the nativity of Christ is ascribable rather to pagan than to Jewish influence in the Christian church.

The analogies which have been traced between Jewish and Christian festivals to say nothing of others, would not have been specified had they not been adduced by distinguished fathers and teachers in the church; manifestly indicating that the connection between the feasts of the Jews and of Christians was formerly better understood than at present.

Analogy between the festivals of the Christian church and of Pagan nations.

Inasmuch as the Christian festivals, like the Jewish from which they were in a measure derived, have a certain reference to the seasons of the year, we might naturally expect in these festivals some analogy between them and pagan festivals, which were evidently based on the seasons. Still the difference between the festivals of pagans and Jews was great, and between the former and those of the Christians it must of necessity be much greater. Ancient paganism was the religion of nature. Its festive seasons in honor of its gods must be expected to harmonize with nature in the changes of the seasons, now reviving the face of the earth, now pouring forth from her full horn the blessings of the year, and now again overspreading with decay and death the gay scenes of her own creation. Paganism contemplates the sun, the moon, the stars, and the varying seasons as they roll, exciting hope, inspiring joy, and bringing sorrow in endless succession; and but dimly descends, in the imagery of nature, the moral lessons which she conveys. Christianity, on the contrary, as a spiritual religion more intent on moral relations than on the natural order of events, contemplates, not so much the vicissitudes of nature in the revolutions of the seasons as the providence displayed in their endless roll. When in her festivals and her fasts she commemorates scenes of joy or of sorrow, these are not such as come in the ordinary course of nature, but from a higher source. The festivals of the church, however, have still a reference, though remote and secondary, to scenes in nature, and

¹ The above extract is inserted in place of original remarks more brief but of a similar import by the author.

were derived in some degree by tradition from other systems of religion. It seems proper therefore to trace the mutual relations between these and the pagan festivals of antiquity by noticing their coincidences in chronological order and a few of their most striking resemblances. These analogies have been drawn out at length by the learned,¹ so that we may with more propriety restrict ourselves to a limited comparison.

January, the portal of the year, was named from the god Janus. The first day of the month was sacred to him and to Juno; and though not a festival, was joyously celebrated by giving presents styled the *januæ* and the *strenæ*.² The second of January commemorated the return of Isis from Phœnicia, by the use of cakes made in the likeness of a hippopotamus bound in chains. The custom of giving new year's presents remains with manifold modifications until the present day. The first of January was also a triumphal feast in honor of the conquest of Jupiter over Briareus, or of the sun over winter; the festival of the return of the sun towards the summer solstice.

January sixth, the day assigned by the Greek church to the baptism and epiphany of Jesus, was, in Egypt the festival of Osiris returned, or found again.³ In this we may notice a pagan feast which was evidently transferred to the Christian church, and remains in part to this day. In the time of Chrysostom it was customary, on the night before epiphany, to draw water in a vessel and keep it as holy water. The consecration of holy water on this occasion is one of the imposing solemnities of the Greek church. The Armenians celebrate epiphany especially by the baptism of a cross, by immersion, and the Abyssinian Christians religiously bathe on this occasion and receive the benediction of their priests; which travellers have understood to be a renewal of baptismal vows.

February was the month for purification, when all impurity, physical and moral, political and religious was supposed to be put away. Juno Februæ was the goddess of purity; the meaning of februare being to cleanse, to purify. Such was the import

¹ Hospinian, De Festis Judæorum et Ethnicorum, and De Festis Christianorum Tiguri. 1592. Hamberger, Rituum quos Romana ecclesia a majoribus suis gentilibus in sua sacra transtulit, enarratio, Götting. 1751. Von Hammer, in den Wiener Jahrbh. 1818. B. 3. p. 149. Bahr, Symbol. des Moses. 2. B. 545—565.

² *Strenæ* vocamus quæ datur die religioso, omnis boni gratia.—Test. s. h. v. p. 343.

³ The connection between these two festivals is ably discussed by Jablonski, Diss. I. II. tom. III. p. 317—375, ed. Te Water.

of the month not only among the Romans, but also with the Egyptians and Persians. The latter are accustomed to prepare for themselves talismen to protect them against wild beasts, and the tutelary divinity for this month is Sapandomad, the pure and the purifier. They have also at this time a feast by torch-light processions as well as of purification, both of which are united in the Christian festival of the purification or candlemas, celebrated on the second of this month of purification, and by torch-light processions.

On the thirteenth of February the Romans celebrated the *Faunalia*, appropriately a pastoral feast and also a funeral festival, *Manibus parentatur*. During this month it was customary to put away whatever had become old; the remains of the dead which were impure were entombed anew. The family of Brutus and Cato began their funeral solemnities in December, about the time of All-souls in the Christian church.

The *luperci*, also a pastoral festival, occurred on the fifteenth of this month. This was attended with phrenzied excesses. With only a small covering upon the loins, the people ran like madmen through the streets, striking all whom they might meet with thongs of goat-skins. All distinctions of rank were disregarded, and all badges of office laid aside.

On the twentieth of February the Romans held a family festival when parents invited all their near relatives to a feast, analogous to the love-feast of the church.

March was sacred to Mars, the spouse of Venus, and the impersonation of the powers of nature. It was the opening of spring, universally celebrated as a festive occasion. There is the strongest reason to believe that the Egyptians celebrated this festival at *Papremis* with dramatic representations by the priests.

At Rome was observed on the fifteenth of March the feast of *Anna Porsenna*, which was the Roman feast of tabernacles. It was both a vernal and a political festival, commemorative of the secession of the plebeians. On this occasion the people gave themselves up to festivity and rejoicing, building for themselves booths on the Tiber and Numicius, eating and drinking. After the death of Caesar, on the Ides of March, it became associated with sorrowful recollections and was named the *parricidium*.

The feast of *Isis* was held at the beginning of March as a naval festival, while it also had a reference to spring. The Indians kept an inconsiderable feast to *Durea*, the god of nature. In

Greece and Rome were celebrated festivals to the god of wine, the dionysia, liberalia or bacchanalia.

Palm Sunday, which usually occurs in this month though of different import, corresponds with the festivals celebrated by the Indians and Athenians by bearing of branches of palms in procession. The former have also a festival in which they cover the forehead with ashes as with us on Ash Wednesday.

The festivals of this month are in honor of the reviving influence of spring, the resurrection of nature, the Easter of natural religion. The Persians celebrate at the time of the vernal equinox a great festival to Neuruz, and at the autumnal equinox another to Ormuzd; the one, in honor of the earliest springing of the year; the other, of the full maturity of harvest. The northern nations also celebrated the opening of the year by a similar festival in March and April. The name itself of Easter was doubtless derived from a feast kept by the Germans in honor of the goddess of nature and of light, Ostur, Eastr, Eastre, allied perhaps to Astarte, whom the Anglo-Saxons, from whom the Germans descended, before their conversion however to Christianity.¹

April is sacred to Venus the favorite of Mars, when the festivities of spring, begun in March, were continued. Such were the Thargelia at Athens, and subsequently the Demetrian and Eleusinian mysteries. In Rome were celebrated mysteries of Ceres, the feast of Magna Mater and the Palilia. On this festival which commemorated also the founding of Rome, among other rites significant of pastoral life, the people were accustomed to make fires of stubble and straw and in succession to leap through it as is customary on St. John's day. This custom also prevails among many people.

But the most imposing of these festivals in Rome were the Floralia, from the twenty-eighth of April to the third of May, celebrated in honor of spring and the blossoms of spring. These days were the Saturnalia of spring, and passed in wilder extrav-

¹ Apud nos (Anglos) Aprilis Eosturmonath, qui nunc pascalis mensis interpretatur, quondam a dea illorum quae Eostre vocabatur et cui in illo festa, celebrant, nomen habuit, Beda, De Ratione Temporum, c. 13. tom. II. p. 81.

With him also agrees Grimm, Deutsche Mythologie, p. 180—182, who refers to this as an illustration of the transfer of heathen representations over to Christianity. Compare Münschausen in Gräter's Bragan, VI. 21, and 38. Ideler's Chronol. I. 516. Augusti Denkwürdigkeiten, vol. 2. p. 221—224.

agance than the Lupercalia. The people universally gave themselves up to frantic joy. Every house was crowned with blossoms, the streets were strewn with roses, and every person indulged in frolic and merriment with all whom he met. Connected with these festivities were also mimic dances of a wanton, licentious character. In all which we have a type of the Roman carnival and of other festivals of the church.

In May occurred several feasts relating to demonology and the shades of the dead, such as the feast of the lares and lemures, with which also that of Summanus was connected and also those semi-annual festivals, the compitalia and larentalia. On these days the regions of the dead were supposed to stand open and all places to be haunted by the shades of the dead. The remains of this popular superstition may be seen in Germany where a vast assembly of evil spirits is supposed to hold on the night of the first of August their assembly.

In June the Romans were accustomed to hold festivals in honor of Vesta, as a personification of the principle of fire in the natural and in the moral world.¹ It was the festival of the holy fire. The Persians had at this time their festival of baptism by water and by the Spirit. On the twenty-fourth of this month the Christian church celebrates the birth of John the Baptist which perpetuates in *St. John's fire*, this ancient rite. The solemnity was assigned to this day with reference to the nativity of Christ; the one, being in the summer solstice; the other, in the winter. In him arose the sun of the New Testament, as in John set that of the Old Testament. In nativitate Christi dies, crescit, in Johannis nativitate decrescit. Profectum plane facit dies quum mundi Salvator oritur; defectum patitur, quum ultimus prophetarum generatur.²

Autumn has of course its harvest festivals. But it had also its sad as well as joyful solemnities. The Magi observed in the latter part of October a funeral feast by setting forth food for the souls of departed heroes. In the beginning of November the Egyptians commemorated the death of Osiris. In Rome the compitalia occurred. In the church the corresponding festival of All-souls is observed on the second of November.

About the middle of December occurred again a Roman carnival, the Saturnalia, when all was hilarity and joy. All distinctions of rank were forgotten, and slaves became, for the time,

¹ Nec tu aliud Vestam quam vivam intellige flammam. Ovid Fastor. VI. 291.

² Augustin, Sermo 12 in Natal. Dom.

freemen. Expensive entertainments were prepared for them at which they were served by their masters, and every child expected a present, as now at Christmas. The joy of the occasion was brightened by loosening the bonds of the criminal and allowing the prisoner to go free.

The twenty-fifth of December was memorable as the birth-day of Mithras; *dies natalis solis invicti*. The sun, that invincible conqueror, was then born anew. To this day the fathers of the church designedly assigned the observance of the nativity of Christ, the sun of righteousness, so that we can see the analogy between Christmas and the birth-day of Mithras and between the epiphany, Jan. 6, and the epiphany of Osiris, and also between this and the feast of the sun among the Greeks. At the time of the winter solstice the feast of the Egyptian Minerva, *Neith*, was probably held at Saïs. This divinity was honored as the dark invisible cause of all things, especially of light. The festival was celebrated by splendid illuminations, and was denominated, *λυξο-αία*. So that in almost all nations festivals were celebrated at each solstice by bonfires and illuminations which are perpetuated in the display of lights on Christmas eve, on St. John's day and in the illuminations of the Juel festivals of the Goths.

Remarks.

For a just view of the results of the foregoing inquiry, it will be necessary to take into consideration the design to be answered by religious festivals generally, and the character of these in different religions.

Religious festivals are peculiar to all forms of religion. They are the natural expression of a religious principle within, not the device of a priesthood nor of the founders of different forms of religion. They have their origin both in the nature of man and of religion itself. Religion is a revelation of God; made, not equally at all times and in any place, but on special occasions; which favored seasons of the manifestation of the divine Being religiously held in remembrance, become festive seasons for the cultivation of the religious spirit of man. Even pantheism, which worships the god of nature as uniformly manifested in every thing, has its special seasons for the honor of its universal divinity. Man is, naturally, variable in his religious feelings as in every emotion. He needs opportunities and occasions in which to collect his wandering thoughts, to stir up his spirit and kindle

anew the dying flame of devotion within. This necessity in man is the natural occasion of religious festivals.

But as men are known by their gods, so their religion is manifested by their festivals; between which there is a remarkable analogy and connection, as well as a manifest difference and progression. The difference results chiefly from the diversity of objects which are the subjects of these festive honors. In paganism it is nature deified. In Judaism, it is the god of nature; a national God, bestowing blessings on his peculiar people by the bounties of his providence, and by the special guidance of his people. In Christianity it is the Father of the whole human family, embracing all in his boundless benevolence, and revealed as the Holy One, the moral governor of the universe, revealed in the gospel of his Son, and proclaimed in the church established by him. The festivals of the heathen are essentially feasts of nature. Whatever historical interest they may have is subordinate or mystical. The remarkable diversity in them is ascribable to diversity of climate and an endless variety in the relations of life. They are not strictly national feasts, resulting not from the peculiar social relations of any people, but yearly festivals which have their origin in the peculiarities of the seasons and climate of certain countries. They are local and natural rather than national.

The feasts of the Jews, on the other hand, comprehend both natural and *moral* relations. From their peculiar theocracy their history is inseparably connected with their festivals, and whatever reference these may have to the seasons, it is designed to direct the mind to the God of nature who directs its endless round and is seen in their continual change. But the moral design of these festivals is especially to perpetuate a sense of the divine interposition in selecting them from the nations of the earth as a peculiar people. The feasts of the Jews accordingly are exclusively national festivals, the object of which was to excite and sustain a national and peculiar spirit among the people.

The festivals of the Christian church are purely historical. But the great events to which they relate are the most momentous that in the history of the world have ever occurred. They strike deeper into the heart and spread wider in their relations than any other scenes which have been exhibited on the theatre of this earth. They tell of the love of God. They tell of his amazing scheme of grace, to bless and save all mankind, so that all of every people and kindred and tongue have a common interest in the great events which are commemorated in the festivals of the

Christian church. They are accordingly neither local nor national, but universal. In a word, it results immediately from the nature of the different forms of religion that pagan festivals are local and national; the Jewish, strictly national; while those of the Christian church are purely moral and religious, and universal in their adaptation to man. From this characteristic difference in the nature of these festivals results a corresponding variety in the mode of celebrating them. The festivals of pagan nations are celebrated by symbols, representing the powers of nature, or in rites which represent the changes to which the world is subject in heaven and earth. They call into action natural desires and fears, which, without due restraint, lead to wild excesses. As the exhibitions of the sensual nature of man, these passions, knowing not the restraints of any divine law, may lead to any excess of riot and bacchanalian revelry.

The Jewish festivals, on the contrary, were all prescribed by law, and are themselves only a part of the national institutions of the great Lawgiver of the Jews. They are essential for the appropriate manifestation of the piety of an Israelite. They are part of a very earnest and simple faith which excludes the deities of natural religion. They have a partial relation to the laws of nature sufficient to give scope to the passions of the human heart, but these are held in check by the higher principles of a spiritual law. The moral influence of these feasts was good in bringing the people to repentance and reconciliation with God.

Christian festivals are not the result of any law, natural or divine; but of the free spirit of Christianity. They are the natural expression of a pious heart, which, though ever in grateful communion with our Lord, seizes upon those great events in his life which most forcibly illustrate the grace of God in Jesus Christ, as occasions for more refreshing communications of his Spirit. Their appropriate rites are accordingly extremely simple, consisting in singing, in prayer and the reading and exposition of the Scriptures. The joy and sorrow connected with them are purely spiritual; the one, sweetly elevating the soul to God, the other, gently subduing it into godly contrition before Him.

Now by taking into view these characteristic distinctions, in connection with the undeniable fact that much pertaining both to pagan and Jewish festivals has been transferred to those of the Christian church, we may perceive the analogy and connection between them. The latter are assigned to different seasons of the year in close conformity with the first. These analogies

may indeed have been accidental ; it is also true that two great festivals, Easter and Whitsunday, are established on historical events of which paganism knows nothing. But we must not forget that both of these have their prototype in Jewish festivals which have a distinct reference to the seasons of the year, and which, without deifying the powers of nature, seek to improve them as the means of leading the heart to nature's God. So that there is a general connection pervading all these forms of religion that unites even those Christian festivals with those of paganism and Judaism. To these also other Christian festivals have an analogy yet more striking ; such as Christmas, St. John's day, all-souls, all-saints, the apostles' day and that of the Virgin Mary. The analogies of Christmas and St. John's day, which occur in the summer and winter solstices, to the festivals of other forms of religion are particularly striking. Christmas is assigned to this period without the least historical evidence. It is indeed possible, but not at all probable, that the birth of Jesus occurred on the twenty-fifth of December. The traditions of antiquity were exceedingly discordant on this subject, and it was not until the fifth century that the Romish church decided upon the observance of this day. But the probable reasons for appointing this day in commemoration of the Saviour's birth have been already intimated.

May not the fathers of the church be presumed also to have had some reference to the festive seasons of the heathen in establishing the cycle of Christian festivals ? or were they led by their own reflections to establish them with reference to the seasons of the year ? The contrast between these and those of idolatrous nations which occurred at the same time would be the more striking, and influential in gaining converts to the Christian faith. And if the course of nature were made to illustrate the significance of a feast of the church, even though it carried the mind far beyond the limits of the natural world, the impression made by the festival would only be strengthened by the analogy. Certain it is that the ancient writers often insisted in their discourses on these analogies. Christianity rejected not the teachings of nature but sought to sanctify and give them a proper direction, by raising higher her voice of wisdom. Neither does she sunder the thread of history, but presses into the service of Christ the lessons which are drawn from the records of the past. Not indeed that the order of religious festivals was arranged with primary reference, either to any harmony, or to any contrast of them with the course

of the seasons. The life of Jesus and the great events connected with the spread of his religion were the prevailing considerations in the institution of these festivals. But it is equally certain that the relations of Jewish and pagan festivals to the analogies of nature had also an important influence in establishing that harmony which subsists between those sacred festivals in the church and the changes of the year in the revolutions of the seasons.

"These as they change are but the varied God—
Mysterious round! what skill, what force divine,
Deep felt in these appear!"

ARTICLE III.

THE SANSKRIT LANGUAGE IN ITS RELATION TO COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY.

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COMPARATIVE Philology is a recent science. The name, no doubt, is taken from Comparative Anatomy in which a system is evolved by a careful examination of the relative structures and functions of animals. This comparison of languages had never been instituted, except casually, until the present century. Von Humboldt, Bopp, Grimm (and more recently Burnouf, Lassen and others) are here the great names. By bringing laboriously together the languages with the history and character of the nations of Middle and Western Asia, Northern Africa and Europe, they have developed the most brilliant results, the central and more valuable languages of the world classifying themselves into two great families, called respectively the Shemitish and the Indo-European. From these labors and as a foundation by others, a complete revolution has been nearly accomplished in philosophical grammar, lexicography, and the methods of classical study. Memory, instead of reigning supreme, and holding firmly immense masses of heterogeneous facts, now sits at the feet of her brother Reason. Grammar, from being one of the most uninteresting of studies, is becoming delightful. The foundations are laid in human nature, and the philosophical gramma-

rian shows, or labors to show, how every branch of a verb, and every vowel-change, follows not caprice, but a natural law, and that speech instead of a farrago of contradictions, a mass of confused utterances, is the appropriate expression of the human soul every where, whose actings though sorely jarred by depravity show its original brightness, as through a veil, darkly.

Adelung estimates the whole number of languages and dialects known upon the globe at 3626. Balbi rates them at 2000. But very many of these are mere dialects; many indicate a common origin at no very remote period. By careful examination the number no doubt may be reduced to hundreds, and a very few hundred of distinct languages, especially if we exclude mere savage or outlandish idioms. But after all this reduction the question returns, Are these various modes of speech arbitrary, so that the learning of one but little facilitates the learning of another, or are they so connected as that it is by no means a prodigy, but might be an ordinary result of human industry to be acquainted with twenty or fifty languages? Comparative philology has solved this question. We will try, striving to avoid the fathomless abyss of Teutonic generalizing, and the flying cloud-land of French theorizing, to present some simple and intelligible views on this subject.

The soul of man is one. It struggles for utterance and articulate speech; the result must be, in its essence, everywhere the same. In utterance man always uses the same vocal organs. Here is another source of similarity. That is, thought and feeling must be essentially alike, the organs of expression are the same. Hence there must be, and there is, a general likeness in all articulate speech. There are, for instance, everywhere words to express existences—nouns; action gives rise to verbs, sudden emotions to interjections. Every language possesses these and a hundred other things because man is like man. But, as it has been well remarked,¹ there are two great classes of words, those which resemble external sounds, where sound is the echo of the sense, and those which struggle to express that which is peculiar to the soul, and for which there is perhaps no perfect picture in material things. The former class of words must be strikingly alike everywhere. It is in the latter that there will be the main diversity. The reason for the choice of one word here rather than another, though it cannot be considered arbitrary, is subtle, and

¹ Introd. to the Hebrew Grammar of Nordheimer.

perhaps will altogether, at least in many instances, elude our research. Then the modes of developing and connecting words are very various, and here it is that the greatest scope is given to the efforts of the comparative philologist.

The reader will observe that there is the greatest difference in the value of languages. Some are remarkably beautiful structures in themselves, will well reward the labor of examination, and their complete mastery is a mental discipline. Besides they may enshrine a noble literature. The character and history of the people whose it was or is, may be such as that it will be a matter of exceeding interest to study the nation in their speech. Or it may embody the solemn revelation of the will of the Creator to the creature. Other languages may be rude in structure, even unwritten, and there may be nothing to interest in the history of those who speak them, except that they are men. It is upon the former class, as was natural, that the philologists of our age have laid out their strength.

The Shemitish and Indo-European families include those languages which are specially interesting. The Shemitish languages are the Hebrew, Arabic, Chaldee and Syriac. With these also are to be connected the Phœnician, Punic and Samaritan. The union between them is close. Of these the Hebrew and Arabic are the most interesting.

Analogy, at first view, would lead us to suppose that the languages of India would bear a close affinity to the Shemitish, but the contrary is the fact. Oriental though they be, we must look for different analogies than those between Hebrew and Persian, Arabic and Sanscrit. This remarkable fact has given rise to the classification to which allusion has been made, and to which in consequence of the languages which it embraces, the name Indo-European has been given. This has been the field of most patient and thorough research, especially by the Germans. It appears that the cradle of this most extensive family, including the ruling nations and conquering races of mankind, was the region bordering upon the Black and Caspian seas. The reader will immediately connect this fact with the remarkable prophecy of enlargement to Japheth, and with the well-known facts in relation to the Caucasian race. But we meet with what seems the perplexing fact that the languages of India are thus apparently allied, not to those of Western Asia, but to those of Europe. And the vital point in this subject leads every one directly to the Sanscrit.

Sir William Jones makes this remark:¹ "The Sanscrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more excellently refined than either." If we must take this with much allowance, still no one can receive the testimony of the patriarch of oriental literature but with deep deference. Milman says,² "The Sanscrit is an inexhaustible subject of itself; in its grammatical structure more regular, artificial and copious than the most perfect of the Western languages; in its origin, the parent form from which the older Greek, the Latin and the Teutonic tongues seem to branch out, and develop themselves upon distinct and discernible principles." Von Humboldt in complicated German sentences thus expresses himself: "The Sanscrit language, as a later principle of interpretation, stands, as it were, at the end of a whole series of languages, and these are by no means such as belong to a course of study which for practical purposes is to a certain degree unserviceable; on the contrary, they comprehend our own mother-tongue, and that of the classical nations of antiquity, and consequently therefore the true and direct source of our best feelings, and the fairest part of our civilization itself. No language in the world, that we are acquainted with, possesses in an equal degree with the Sanscrit the secret of moulding abstract grammatical ideas into such forms, as by means of simple and closely allied sounds still leave evident traces of the root, which often of itself explains the variation of sound (inasmuch as it essentially remains the same) amid the greatest complication of form: nor has any other language, by means of its inherent euphonic amalgamation of inflection, the power of forming such accurate and well-adapted symbols for expressing the conceptions of the mind."

Such being the opinions of the most eminent scholars, we advance with interest to an examination of the questions connected with this language. Two meet us at the threshold, viz. the age of the language, and its relation to the dialects now spoken in India.

In regard to the age of Sanscrit, it may be remarked that eminent scholars differ in opinion. It would seem impossible to de-

¹ Adelung's Historical Sketch of Sanscrit Literature. Translated and indeed re-modelled by Talboys, Oxford, England, a literary bookseller. It consists of lists of Sanscrit books with occasional remarks.

² Nala and Damayanti and other poems translated from the Sanscrit by Rev. H. H. Milman, late professor of poetry at Oxford, Eng.

termine the question with accuracy, but there is an approximation towards an agreement in fixing the Vedas, the most ancient Sanscrit compositions between 1100 and 1600 years B. C.¹ One of the brightest periods of Sanscrit literature, it would appear, was the century immediately preceding the Christian era.

With respect to the relation between the Sanscrit and the present dialects of India, a diversity of opinion is also to be remarked. Mr. Colebrooke,² whose essay seems, by universal consent to be very high authority on this, as on other parts of the subject, divides the dialects of India into ten, such as Hindustani, Mahratta, etc. The two opinions are, either that Sanscrit was the basis of all these languages, the common root from which they have grown, the classic of which they are dialects—which was long the favorite opinion—or that these dialects were spoken by the people who inhabited India before those who used Sanscrit arrived, and that the latter, coming from the north-west impressed their religion, literature and language upon the conquered Indians, the language gradually mingling with all the dialects of the subdued people, and modifying each in part to its own superior and more scientific structure. We believe we are correct in stating that the latter opinion is gaining ground over the former.

Before we proceed, however, to consider the Sanscrit in a purely philological view as the basis of the Indo-European languages, we will endeavor to kindle the reader's interest by calling his attention to its literature.

It is well known that the huge system of the Hindoo religion rests upon certain sacred books written in Sanscrit. The fact of these books containing false natural science as well as false theology, is one highly auspicious to the missionary enterprise in India.

"The whole circle of Hindoo knowledge and science is divided into eighteen parts, of which the first four are the Vedas, from *Ved* or *Bed*, the law. These are regarded as an immediate revelation from heaven; and as containing the true knowledge of God, of his religion and of his worship, disposed into one harmo-

¹ Sir William Jones says 1500 B. C.; Col. Vans Kennedy 1100 or 1200 B. C.; Ritter "collected or composed" 1400 or 1600 B. C.; Colebrooke says, "revered by Hindoos for hundreds if not thousands of years."

² Colebrooke's Essay on the Sanscrit and Prakrit languages, in the seventh vol. of the Asiatic Researches. For the use of several of the volumes consulted in the preparation of this Article, the writer is indebted to the kindness of Rev. E. Burgess, missionary of the American Board to the Mahrattas.

nious composition. Next to the Vedas rank four Uparedas, which comprise the knowledge of medicine, music and other arts ; after these follow six Vedangas, which relate to pronunciation, grammar, prosody, religious rites and ceremonies, etc. ; and finally, four Upangas, which treat of logic, philosophy, jurisprudence and history. The Vedas are undoubtedly the most ancient compositions in the whole range of Sanscrit literature. Their obscurity, and the obsolete dialect in which they are written are such as to render the reading of them difficult, even to a Brahman. It was doubted for a considerable time whether the Vedas were real compositions, or whether the whole matter was not a fable. These doubts were not removed until Col. Polier obtained from Jypoor a transcript of what purported to be a complete collection of the Vedas. This is now deposited in the British museum, bound in eleven large folio volumes." They still remain for the most part, untranslated. The curious reader may find in Adelung accounts of the contents of the Vedas at more length. Sir Wm. Jones gives extracts from them in his works. The following sentence is perhaps one of the finest, and shows much cultivation at the period of the composition of the Vedas :

"What the sun and light are to this visible world, that are the supreme good and truth to the intellectual and invisible universe, and as our corporeal eyes have a distinct perception of objects enlightened by the sun, thus our souls acquire certain knowledge by meditating on the light of truth which emanates from the Being of beings ; that is the light by which alone our minds can be directed in the path to beatitude."

"The Puranas are poetical representations of Indian mythology and fabulous history. They hold an eminent rank in the religion and literature of the Hindoos. Possessing like the Vedas the credit of a divine origin, and scarcely inferior to them in sanctity, they exercise a more extensive and practical influence upon Hindoo society. They regulate their ritual, direct their faith, and supply in popular legendary tales materials for their credulity. To European scholars they recommend themselves on other accounts ; as they have been considered to contain, not only the picturesque and mythological part of Indian superstition, but the treasury of extensive and valuable historical remains. They are divided into two classes containing eighteen each." Notices of their contents may be found in Adelung. Mr. Wilson, the Sanscrit Professor at Oxford, analyzed one of them, the Vishnu Purana. Copious extracts from the Puranas have been published.

Some account of the Sanscrit poetry, we hope, will be more amusing. We extract from Milman and Adelung as translated and enlarged by Talboys :

"A history of Sanscrit poetry would be a general history of Sanscrit literature. Not only the Vedas, but even treatises on science, apparently the most awkward to reduce to a metrical form, are composed in verse ; and although in the extensive range of Sanscrit learning there are some few compositions which may be called prose, yet even the style of most of these bears so great a resemblance to the language of poetry from their being written in a kind of modulated prose, as scarcely to form an exception. The age of Sanscrit poetry, therefore, like that of all other nations, is coeval with the earliest vestige of their language.

"The classical poets of ancient India are divided into three periods. The first is that of the Vedas ; the second, that of the great Epics ; the third, that of the Drama. A fourth is mentioned, but as it is of a later date, it is not considered as belonging to the classic age. These three periods are assigned to Sanscrit poetry, not only from historical testimony but from the language and style of the compositions themselves.

"The bards of India have given to poetry nearly every form which it has assumed in the Western world ; and in each, and in all, they have excelled. Its heroic poets have been likened to Homer, and their epics dignified with the appellations of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. (Heeren's *Researches*.) In the drama, *Cālidāsa* has been designated as the Indian Shakspeare (Sir Wm. Jones, Pref. to *Sacountala*) ; Vyasa, as not unworthy of comparison with Milton ; the adventures of Nala and Damayanti, with the *Faerie Queene* of Spenser (Milman) ; the philosophic *Bhagavat Gita* reads like a noble fragment of Empedocles or Lucretius, (A. W. Von Schlegel calls it the most beautiful, and perhaps the only truly philosophical poem in any language. *Indisch. Bib.* II. 219). Their didactic, their lyric, their writers of fables, and of the lighter kinds of poetry, have all carried their art to the same high point of perfection (Heeren) ; and so nicely are their respective merits balanced, that it seems rather a matter of individual taste than of critical acumen to which class the palm should be conceded. M. Chezy, with the Hindoos themselves, gives it decidedly to the epic ; Milman to the softer, and less energetic ; A. W. Schlegel appears inclined to bestow it upon the didactic ; while, if the praise of one of the first and earliest judges of Sanscrit poetry be not lavish, it will be difficult to say how anything can excel the

descriptive. Sir Wm. Jones, of the *Season of Cálidása* (Vol. VI. 432) writes, 'Every line is exquisitely polished; every couplet exhibits an Indian landscape, always beautiful, sometimes highly colored, but never beyond nature.'

"There exist, for instance, in our European literature few pieces to be compared with the *Megha-Duta* (The Cloud-Messenger) in sentiment and beauty; and in erotic poetry the voluptuous *Jayadéra*, in his little poem on the loves of *Madhava* and *Radha*, far surpasses all elegiac poets known," etc.

The reader will not charge us with believing all this extravagance, much less with asking him to believe it, but as even a caricature bears some likeness to the original, so the unbounded eulogium of the first oriental scholars of Germany, France and England must have some basis in truth. Perhaps he would like to judge a little for himself. A number of allowances must be made, especially for differences in taste. The translations are by Milman.

It is unnecessary to give the plots, but a word or two may be quoted as to the measure. "The original verse in which the vast epics of Vyasa and Valmiki are composed is called the *Sloka*, which is thus described by Schlegel (*Indisch. Bib.* p. 36). "The oldest, most simple, and most generally adopted measure is the *Sloka*; a distich of two sixteen-syllable lines divided at the eighth syllable." The copiousness of these poems is absolutely portentous. The one from which the following rather graceful extract is taken is called *Mahábhārata*, and contains 200,000 of these Alexandrine sixteen-syllable lines. We quote from the *Vanaparvám*, the third part, of which Milman translates eighty or ninety stout pages which he calls the *Episode* of *Nala* and *Damayanti*. Here is what may be called a *Swan-extract*:

"Damayanti with her beauty—with her brilliance, brightness, grace,
Through the world's unrivalled glory—won the slender-waisted maid,
'Mid her handmaids, like the lightning—shone she with her faultless form
Like the long-eyed queen of beauty—without rival, without peer,
Never 'mid the gods immortal—never 'mid the *Yaksha* race
Nor 'mong men was maid so lovely—ever heard of, ever seen
As the soul-disturbing maiden—that disturbed the souls of gods.¹

* * * * *

"Flew away the swans rejoicing—to *Vidarbha* straight they flew;
To *Vidarbha's* stately city;—there by *Damayanti's* feet
Down with drooping plumes they settled—and she gazed upon the flock,
Wondering at their forms so graceful—where amid her maids she sat.

¹ Cf. *Aesch. Prom.* 649 sq. *Ζεὺς γὰρ ἡμέρου βέλει πρὸς σοὶ τέθλαται.*

Sportively began the damsels—all around to chase the birds ;
 Scattering flew the swans before them—all about the lovely grove.
 Lightly ran the nimble maidens—every one her bird pursued ;
 But the swan that through the forest—gentle Damayanti chased,
 Suddenly in human language—spoke to Damayanti thus :—

Here is an *elephant-extract*, from the same episode :

“ Long their journey through the forest—through the dark and awful glens,
 Then a lake of loveliest beauty—fragrant with the lotus-flowers,
 Saw those merchants, wide and pleasant—with fresh grass and shady trees ;
 Flowers and fruit bedecked its borders—where the birds melodious sang ;
 In its clear delicious waters—soul-enchanting, icy-cool,
 With their horses all o’erwearied—thought they then to plunge and bathe ;
 At the signal of the captain—entered all that pleasant grove,
 At the close of day arriving—there encamped they for the night.

When the midnight came all noiseless—came in silence deep and still,
 Wary slept the band of merchants—lo, a herd of elephants,
 Oozing moisture from their temples—came to drink the troubled stream.
 When that caravan they gazed on—with their slumbering beasts at rest,
 Forward rush they fleet and furious—mad to slay and wild with heat ;
 Irresistible the onset—of the rushing ponderous beasts
 As the peaks from some high mountain—down the valley thundering roll ;
 Strown was all the way before them—with the boughs, the trunks of trees ;
 Or they crashed to where the travellers—slumbered by the lotus-lake.”

Leaving the travellers in rather a dubious position, with the wild elephants likely to define it, we will give the reader the following. The fable is monstrous, enormous, like their jungles, gods, temples, elephants and everything else East Indian, and need not detain us. The reader has only to suppose the Ganges pouring down in a cataract where before there had been no river, and gods and men astonished, as well they might be :

“ Headlong then and prone to earth—thundering rushed the cataract down,
 Swarms of bright-hued fish came dashing—turtles, dolphins in their mirth,
 Fallen, or falling, glancing, flashing—to the many gleaming earth.
 And all the host of heaven came down—spirits and genii in amaze,
 And each forsook his heavenly throne—upon that glorious scene to gaze.
 On cars, like high-towered cities seen—with elephants and coursers rode,
 Or on swift-swinging palanquin—lay wandering each observant god.
 As met in bright divan each god—and flashed their jewelled vesture’s rays,
 The coruscating aether glowed—as with a hundred suns ablaze,
 And with the fish and dolphin’s gleamings—and scaly crocodiles and snakes,
 Glanced the air, as when fast streaming—the blue lightning shoots and breaks ;
 And in ten thousand sparkles bright—went flashing up the cloudy spray
 The snowy flocking swans less white—within its glittering mists at play.
 And headlong now poured down the flood—and now in silver circlets wound,
 Then lake-like spread all bright and broad—then gently, gently flowed around,
 Then ’neath the caverned earth descending—then spouted up the boiling tide,
 Then stream with stream harmonious blending—swell bubbling up, or smooth
 subside,” etc. etc.

They say there are millions of such lines, not indeed as good as these, for these are the best we could find, but of the same measure and metrical flow.

Besides theology and poetry, the Sanscrit literature embraces jurisprudence, mathematics, history, geography, medicine, fables, the drama, tales. But we will merely cast a brief glance at their philosophy, for the especial purpose of showing the advance made by Sanscrit thinkers in recondite matters of study, and thereby rendering more credible our statements in the philological part of this singular subject.

"It is the professed design of all the schools of Indian philosophy to teach the method by which eternal beatitude (the supreme good) may be attained, either after death or before it.

"The path by which the soul is to arrive at this supreme felicity, is science or knowledge. The discovery, and the setting forth of the means by which this knowledge may be obtained, is the object of the various treatises and commentaries which Hindoo philosophy has produced. A brilliant summary of them will be found in Victor Cousin (*Cours de la Histoire, de la philosophie du XVIII. eme Siecle*, Paris, 1829, fifth and sixth lectures) in which compiling from Colebrooke, and analyzing A. G. Schlegel's Latin version of the Bhagavat Gita, he endeavors to trace among the Hindoo philosophers the Sensualism, the Idealism, the Scepticism, the Fatalism and the Mysticism, of the ancient Grecian and modern European schools.

"In all these are enumerated six principal schools of Hindoo philosophy, first, the Mimansa," etc.¹

Instead of analyzing these six schools we give a single specimen: "True knowledge consists, according to Capila, one of their sages, in a right discrimination of the principles, perceptible and imperceptible, of the material world, from the sensitive and cognitive principle, which is the immaterial soul.

"Twenty-five of these principles are enumerated. The first, from which all the others are derived is Prakiti, nature; termed the chief one, the universal, material cause. The second principle is intelligence, or the great one, the first production of nature. And so on, to the twenty-fifth which is the soul. It (the soul) is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, unalterable, immaterial."

So far philosophy, of which the reader may study multitudinous Sanscrit books, if he will.

¹ Adelung.

We come now to the most interesting part of our subject, a notice of the great discovery of our times in philology.

To understand the basis of comparative philology, the idea conveyed in this science by the word *root* is to be clearly fixed in the mind. It is this. Every word may be reduced to an element; to an ultimate source from which it sprang. And it is in the mode in which language grows from these roots that the great difference or similarity exists among them. Bopp with A. W. Von Schlegel divides all languages into three classes: "First, languages with monosyllabic roots, without the capability of contraction, and hence without organism, without grammar. This class comprises Chinese, where all is hitherto bare root, and where the grammatical categories, and secondary relations after the main point, can only be discovered from the position of the roots in the sentence.

"Secondly, languages with monosyllabic roots which are capable of combination, and obtained their organism and grammar nearly in this way alone. The chief principle of the formation of words, in this class, appears to me to lie in the combination of verbal and pronominal roots, which together represent, as it were, body and soul. To this class belong the Sanscrit family of languages, and moreover all other languages so far as they are not comprehended under classes first and third, and have maintained themselves in a condition which renders it possible to trace back their forms of words to the simplest elements.

"Thirdly, languages with dissyllabic verbal roots, and three necessary consonants as single supporters of the fundamental meaning. This class comprehends merely the Semitic languages, and produces its grammatical forms, not simply by combination, like the second class, but by a mere internal modification of the roots. We here gladly award to the Sanscrit family of languages a great superiority over the Semitic, which we do not however find in the use of inflections as syllables *per se* devoid of meaning, but in the copiousness of these grammatical additions, which are really significative, and connected with words used isolated; in the judicious, ingenious selection and application of them, and the accurate and acute defining of various relations, which hereby becomes possible; finally in the beautiful adjustment of these additions to a harmonious whole, which bears the appearance of an organized body."

¹ Bopp's Comparative Grammar of the Sanscrit, Zend, Greek, Latin, Lithuani-

To make this plainer we present two or three other sentences from the same work.

"In the Semitic languages in decided opposition to those of the Sanscrit family, the vowels belong not to the root, but to the grammatical motion, the secondary ideas, and the mechanism of the construction of the word. A Semitic root is unpronounceable, because, in giving it vowels, an advance is made to a special grammatical form, and it then no longer possesses the simple peculiarity of a root raised above all grammar. But in the Sanscrit family of languages, if its oldest state is consulted in the languages which have continued most pure, the root appears as a circumscribed nucleus which is almost unalterable, and which surrounds itself with foreign syllables, whose origin we must investigate, and whose destination is, to express the secondary ideas of grammar which the root itself cannot express. The vowel, with this or that consonant, and sometimes without any consonant whatever, belongs to the fundamental meaning; it can be lengthened to the highest degree or raised, and this lengthening and raising with other similar modifications 'belong not to the denoting of grammatical relations, which require to be more clearly pointed out, but only to the mechanism, the symmetry of construction.'"—*Ib.* pp. 98, 9.

This Sanscrit or Indo-European family, so called, because the Sanscrit is its basis, and because it is now ascertained beyond doubt that the Sanscrit and European languages generally, are of the same construction, and that they differ essentially from the languages of Western Asia, consists of the following: I. The Sanscrit. II. The Zend, the language of Zoroaster, of the Zend-Avesta, and of the ancient fire-worshippers, which is said to be connected with Sanscrit as brother and sister, with which is to be united the modern Persian. Of the languages in the arrow-headed character we will speak presently. The ten great languages of India are thus given by Colebrooke. The northern and eastern which have the greatest affinity for Sanscrit are:

1. Sareswata, which is perhaps the proper Prakrit (though all these ten languages are sometimes called by that name).

2. Hindí the ground-work of the Hindustaní.

3. Bengali.

4. Maithila or Tirhutiya.

5. Utcala or Odradésá.

These are sometimes called the Five Gaur tribes.

an, Gothic, German and Slavonic languages. Translated principally by Lt. Eastwick, assisted by Prof. Wilson. London, 1845. Vol. I. pp. 101, 102.

The southern and western, sometimes called the Five Dravids, are :

1. Tamil.
2. Mahrátta.
3. Carnáta.
4. Telinga.
5. Guzarattí.

We have already mentioned the two theories in relation to their connection with the Sanscrit.

III. The third undoubted family of the Indo-European class is the Greek language with its dialects. IV. The Latin, with its descendants Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, the latter of which of course have other elements, also Indo-European in the main. V. The Slavonic branch, Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, Bohemian, unless Lithuanian be an intermediary between Slavonic and the tribes further west. VI. The Scandinavian.¹ VII. The Celtic, including the old Irish, Highland Scottish, Erse, etc. VIII. The Gothic or Teutonic, from which comes German and the main basis of English. IX. The Dutch with Flemish, etc. Besides these there may be other Asiatic languages north of India of the same family.² The brilliant discovery mainly due to

¹ Donaldson, *New Cratylus*, pp. 78, 9, makes the Low German include, "1. The Scandinavian languages, Icelandic, Swedish and Danish. 2. The Low German dialects, peculiarly so called, Anglo-Saxon, Frisian, Flemish and Dutch. 3. The Old Gothic." He thinks the Low German very much the more ancient in Europe. "Slavonian and Lithuanian" he "puts in the same class with the oldest Low-German dialects."

The tribes who speak Slavonian he thus enumerates: "The Russians and Rusniaks, the Bulgarians, Servians, Bosnians, Dalmatians, Croats, the Wends and Sorbs in Lusatia and Saxony, the Slovaks in Hungary, the Bohemians, Moravians, Poles and Silesians."

² The question as to how far the Tartars are Indo-European is an interesting one. Eichhoff, "*Vergleichung der Sprachen von Europa und Indien*," says in his general division of the Persian languages of the Indo-European stock, "Um sie her leben, mehr oder minder entfernt, verschiedene rohe Sprachen, das Afghanische im Reiche Kabul, das Balutschi an den Grenzen Indiens, das Kurdische bei den Gebirgsbewohnern Persiens und das bei einem Stamme des Kaukasus erhaltene Osetische, ein altes Ueberbleibsel aus der Zeit der grossen Wanderung der indischen Völker nach Europa," p. 23.

Ritter (*Erdkunde*, Berlin, Vol. VII. pp. 604 sq.) has some very interesting information on this point: He says there are six tribes or divisions of "Indo-germanischen blaüugigen Völkern," whose country is East-Turkistan, and they appear, according to him, to have ranged from the frontiers of Persia to China, one tribe of them, according to a Chinese fragment which comes through a Romish missionary, having entered into close relations with the Chinese government about the time of the Advent. This curious document is given by Ritter at length.

Bopp is that these are all essentially one, and all based as the earliest existing monument upon Sanscrit.

The proof of this is in its nature cumulative. It depends very much upon a careful observation of a thousand particulars. General statements without these lose much of their force. A summary is all we can attempt.

One source of proof has been already mentioned,—the essential difference in the structure of the three great classes of languages. It will be seen by careful examination that this is indeed radical. So that Hebrew in its main structure is almost as widely removed from Greek on the one hand as from Chinese on the other.

Another source is the wonderful similarity of words which have passed through the whole range of these languages radically unchanged. When the lapse of twenty-five centuries is considered, and the immense variety of the nations involved in the analysis, the result is astonishing. We have only room for a meagre specimen.¹ E. g.

Sanscrit.	Zend.	Greek.	Latin.	Lithuanian.	Gothic.	German.	English.
duhitār	dughdha	θυγάτηρ		duktė	duhtar		daughter
bhrātā	brāth		frater		brōthar		brother
pitar	paith	πατήρ	pater			vater	father
nāmā	nāmā		nomen		namō	name	name
chatrāras		τέτταρες	quatuor	kettari	fidvōr	vier	four
panchar		πέντε, πέμπε	quinque	penki	fünf	fünf	five
pansa		χην	anser			gans	gander, goose
jānu		γόνυ	gonu	kniu		knie	knee

Another very striking mode of proof is this: Different families of the great class of Indo-European languages have seized upon different parts of the same Sanscrit word and carried them off, so that although there may be no apparent similarity between the word in the two widely separated branches, yet by tracing each to the intermediary Sanscrit root, the identity may be established. We might compare this to two roads starting from a common point: the places reached at the end of a hundred miles are widely separated, yet by tracing each road back separately, we arrive at the common starting-point. It is to be observed that the examples given are often much more striking when we advert to the uniform laws which regulate the interchange of letters in these languages. Take some examples:

The Sanscrit for *dog* is svān, in the genitive súnas, from which comes the Greek κυνός, Latin canis. Take now the other direc-

¹ Bopp, ubi sup.

tion sván, Lithuanian szuns, German hunds, English hound, and we have the identity of canis and hound.

Cf. German schwester and Italian sorella.

Thus : Sanscrit svasr̥, Gothic svistar, Germ. schwester—sister.

Sanscrit accusative svasâram, Latin sororem, Ital. sorella.

Cf. Greek κεφαλή and German haupt—head.

Thus : Sanscrit kapāla—κεφαλή,

kapāla—caput, Gothic haubith, Old high Germ.

houpit, haupt—head.

It thus appears that in very many instances the true method for establishing a connection between words which appear diverse in the European languages is to trace both to the common root in the Sanscrit. The proof becomes complete in proportion to the number of examples.

It is not only however in the similarity of words that the Sanscrit manifests itself as the basis of the European dialects. The similarity is seen also in the grammatical structure of both. It is manifest, for example, in the case-terminations, and in the fact that they are very much made up of original pronouns annexed to the nouns. Here, however, it is necessary to attend to the grand characteristic of this class of languages as distinguished from the other two, viz. the power of the root to gather as a nucleus a structure around itself. A specimen or two of this process may not be unacceptable.

The idea of the root *sta* is "planting oneself firmly." Accordingly *sthā* in Sanscrit is "to stand." The Zend has *hi-sta-mi*, with the same meaning. In Greek we have *i-στη-μι*, the same root with the *α* softened to an *η*. The Gothic has *standa*, the old High German *stant*, present German *stand*, English *stand*, Latin *sto*, *stare*. Observe how all the formations crystallize around *sta*. E. g. in English : *staunch*, that which stands firmly ; *con-si-st-ent*, that which stands always in the same position ; *sta-n-dard*, that which stands as a rallying-point ; *stanza*, lines regularly adjusted to each other *en colonne* ; *sta-ke*, that which is planted down firmly. Open now your Greek Lexicon at the root *στα*, you find *σταδαίος*, standing upright, hence firm ; *στάθμη*, a plumb-line ; *σταθμός*, a post ; *στακτός*, that which falls drop by drop as water in a cavern which finally petrifies into a rocky pillar ; *στάλιξ* or *-λής*, a pole to which nets are fastened ; *στάμνος*, a jar which standing erect holds liquids ; *στάχυς*, a spike of grain, etc. Open your Latin dictionary : *stabilitas*, *statua*, *statutum*, *stator*, *stamen*, *status*, *stagnō*, etc. Open your German dictionary : *Staat*, a state,

that which supports everything, government; stamm, trunk of a tree; stange, a pole; starr, to be stiff, numb; stannen, to stand astonished; stave, stove; standhaft, firm, durable, etc.

In order to show the immediate change take a different root, the Sanscrit Plu or Plo, Flu or Flo, for soft P is F, and throughout the whole family there is a tendency in U and O to amalgamate. The idea here is that of flowing, overflowing. We will begin with the Greek: πλέω, to sail, to fluctuate; φλέω, to flow; φλιδάω, to overflow; φλόξ, flame which waves or undulates; φλύω, to swell, overflow with frivolous talking; πλέως, πίμπλημι, etc. idea of fulness; φλέων, φλέως, φλοῖος, φλευός, epithets of Bacchus, all expressive of the fulness of the generative powers of nature,¹ φλοῖστος, a confused, roaring, overflowing noise, etc. Turn to the Latin: Flamma, flo, to blow or cast metal; flecto, to bend or bow; flos, fluctus, fluidus, flumen, fluo, etc. German: Flacken, to flicker like a candle; flage, a quagmire; flattern, to flutter; fliehen, to fly; floss, running water; flügel, wing; fluth, flood, etc. Spanish: fláco, dejected, frail; flagnear, to slacken, grow remiss; flotar, to float; floxel, down; fluco, fringe; fluir, to flow, etc. French: Flatter, flamme, fleur, fletrir, fleurir, flotter, etc. English, the same; flow, flute, float, flood, etc.

It is hardly necessary to observe that these can by no possibility be accidental coincidences. The moment you obtain the correct root and the law of its development it can be traced more strongly or more weakly through the whole Indo-European *freundschaft*.

We do not mean to say that there are not exceptions, but they are generally such as confirm the rule. The fertile fancy of philologists will also bring forward occasionally something fanciful, far-fetched and ill-founded, but the direction of the main current of proof is clear and unequivocal.

In answer to the inquiry as to the possibility of the preservation of the very same forms of speech through thousands of years, among climes remote as spicy India, and sunny Iceland, from the torrid to the frozen zone, under every form of religion from ponderous Brahmanism to that of the wild Scandinavian, from the fervid fire-worshipper to the calm and sober Anglo-Saxon Christian, from the dominions of the Grand Mogul and the autocrat of all the Russias to republican America, we would reply that nothing is so tenacious as the modes of speech, and the traditions that live in the hearts of the people. Like the sports of child-

¹ V. Liddell and Scott's Lex. in voc. φλέω.

ren' that are handed down from generation to generation with elastic vigor, speech is something that transcends law, that interferes not with religion, that embalms the sacred associations of home.

But then this marvellous similarity of speech rests after all, upon a similarity of character in all the families of this extensive groupe, modified indeed by all the circumstances mentioned, but still the same in essence. We shall return to this point so soon as we shall have examined an element of the subject which is at this moment becoming one of deep interest. We refer to the recent decyphering of the arrow-headed characters.

This subject demands a separate and more extended investigation than we can here accord to it. All we can now do is to give a very general sketch sufficient to place in a clear light its relation to the discovery of Bopp.

At Persepolis, Babylon, Behistun or Bisitun, and other places of ancient Assyria and Persia, are found on splendid buildings, on pillars, bricks and rocks smoothed for the purpose, numerous inscriptions. They are written in a peculiar character which from its form is called wedge-shaped, or arrow-headed. This character is peculiar to these regions, and is very extensively employed. Particular arrangements, or combinations of these characters apparently belonged to different nations speaking different languages.² What is particularly remarkable about them is that they are all composed of a single character resembling an arrow-head placed sometimes vertically, sometimes horizontally or sloping at an angle, and again with its base so fixed against the base of another precisely similar, as to form a wedge. In the inscriptions at Babylon the notch in the arrow does not appear to be so perceptible, and straight lines seem to be freely introduced.³

In Fiske's Eschenburg's Manual it is stated that the first hint towards decyphering this character seems to have been obtained by Champollion from a twofold inscription upon an Egyptian ala-

¹ Blackstone's Comm.

² See for the whole subject Mr. Bartlett's pamphlet on the Progress of Ethnology, New York, 1847. As we have the best reason to know that his statements are from original sources, we have quoted freely from them, to save the necessity of going over a variety of pamphlets and periodicals published abroad.

London Quarterly Review, March 1847. It contains a sketch of the arrow-headed discoveries together with those at Nineveh. The statements are rather general.

³ Vide inscription in Fiske's Eschenburg's Manual, pl. XXXVIII. 4th edit., said to be a copy from a Babylonian brick in the Boston Athenaeum.

baster vase presenting the name of Xerxes, one part having it in the Egyptian hieroglyphics, and the other in the Persepolitan arrow-heads, and that after this Lichtenstein, Grotefend and Lassen turned their attention to the subject.¹ Mr. Bartlett and the London Quarterly Reviewer do not mention this but both begin with Grotefend as the original discoverer. It will be observed that there is nothing here like the Rosetta stone to guide the inquirer except so far as the hint mentioned above from Champollion may be well-founded. Prof. Grotefend started with the idea that the building at Persepolis which contained the inscriptions was a royal palace, and the work of one of the great monarchs of Persia. "He observed that a number of these wedges or angles, of larger or smaller size, perpendicular or horizontal, grouped together, were usually divided from each other in the Persepolitan inscriptions by a peculiar sign, and he rightly concluded that each of these groups formed a letter. These letters are read in their uniform direction from left to right."² On some of the monuments at Persepolis are inscriptions in the Pehlevi³ character, parts

¹ Fourth edit. p. 316. sect. 4. Six authorities are given to the section, but it is not distinctly indicated upon which this statement rests.

² Quart. Rev. ubi sup., note by reviewer. "In one of the works before us, Tychsen and Bp. Münter are said to have discovered this important sign." In all of Prof. Fiske's inscriptions, (four in number independently of the brick from Babylon,) the divisions of letters are made by a point like our period, except in the Persepolitan interpretation of the hieroglyphic writing on the vase read by Champollion, where there are no division-marks. It consists of but a few words. The inscriptions given by Fiske from the Zend, Pehlevi, and "a more modern character" have the same point. If these copies are correctly made, there would seem to be no great mystery about this "important sign."

³ The Persian languages are thus set forth by Rask (Ueber das Alter und die Echtheit der Zendsprache, Berlin, 1826,) as Englished by Prof. Anthon, (Indo-Germanic Analogies, appended to Greek Prosody, p. 202). "The Persian family has for its primitive type the Zend preserved in the Zend-Avesta. It was spoken by the ancient Persians, as the *Pehlevi*, another idiom intermingled with Chaldee, was spoken by the Medes and Parthians. They were written in cuneiform characters before having special alphabets. The Zend and Pehlevi were displaced about the commencement of our era by the *Parsi* a dialect of the same family. It became the dominant idiom of the empire and preserved itself pure and unaltered until the Mohammedan invasion, when from an union of the Arabic with the national idiom arose the Modern Persian. Connected with the Persian, amongst others, is the tongue of the Ossetes, in the range of Caucasus, which is said to afford indubitable traces of the great migration of Indian communities into Europe." We should like much to know the ultimate authority for this last remark. It involves a point of deep interest in more than one relation. Bopp speaks in very high terms of Rask. Comp. Gram. Pref. viii. note, particularly of his work "On the Thracian tribe of Languages," where, though he (Rask) had not then the Sanscrit, Bopp says, "he almost everywhere halts half-way towards the truth."

of which have been decyphered by De Sacy. In one of these the titles and name of a king are often repeated; these M. Grotefend thought might be repeated in the same manner in the arrow-headed character.

"In these inscriptions one groupe of characters were repeated more frequently than any other. According to the analogy of the Pehlevi inscriptions, decyphered by De Sacy, it was believed that these were the names of kings who were father and son. An examination of the bas-reliefs together with the Greek historians convinced Grotefend that he must look for the kings of the dynasty of the Achæmenides. These names could obviously not be Cyrus and Cambyzes, because the names occurring in the inscriptions do not begin with the same letter; Cyrus and Artanes were equally inapplicable, the first being too short, and the latter too long; there only remained therefore the names of Darius and Xerxes. The next step was to ascertain what their names were in the old Persian language, as they came to us through the Greek. This he obtained through the Zend of the Zend-Avesta. Xerxes turns out to be Kshershe or Ksharsha; and Darius Dareush, and king Kshe or Ksheio (shat). He thus translated two short inscriptions and formed a considerable portion of an alphabet. This was accomplished by 1833."¹

Grotefend was followed by Rask, Burnouf and Lassen who (in Europe with the materials already collected) each accomplished something. Rask discovered two characters, and Lassen in his various works "has identified at least twelve characters which had been mistaken by all his predecessors."

Major Rawlinson, an officer of the East India Company's army, next addressed himself with great zeal to this subject on the ground. He was occupied ten years. His discoveries were announced in London in a memoir, read before the Royal Asiatic Society in 1839, but were not published *in extenso* until 1846. It is an interesting fact that Rawlinson found, when after laboring for some time he received Lassen's Researches, that he had already discovered all Lassen's new characters except one. It will be observed, however, that not only an alphabet but the structure of the language was needed. This Grotefend had not, but Rawlinson obtained it through the Zend, and by means especially of "Burnouf's Commentary on the Yazna," where the Zend is investigated in its grammatical structure. Finally, he

¹ Bartlett abridged.

succeeded in translating four hundred lines of the inscription on the Behistun tablets.

These tablets are found in the midst of ancient Media not far from the modern city of Kermanshah.¹ There rises a high precipitous mountain the lower part of which is smoothed, and upon it is sculptured a figure trampling on a prostrate rebel with nine other captives fettered. With this is a Persepolitan writing in nearly 1000 lines—400 of which, as stated, Rawlinson has decyphered. It is an inscription of Darius Hystaspes, giving his genealogy, victories, and the provinces over which he reigned. He describes the manner in which he obtained the crown, and ascribes all the glory of his power to Ormuzd. It is a wonderful discovery. One fancies he can hear Herodotus rejoicing from his grave.

The Persepolitan tablets are trilingual. Professor Westergaard, a Dane, has opened to us an acquaintance with the second variety of characters. He calls it Median, the first being named old Persian. Starting with the idea that these were but translations of the first, which was fully confirmed, he proceeded to construct an alphabet. He also investigated on the ground. The additional inscriptions decyphered by him are of Xerxes. They consist of praises to Ormuzd for blessings received and to himself for the additions he made to the royal palace at Persepolis.²

Major Rawlinson has made some advance on the third class of Persepolitan characters called the Achæmenian-Babylonian. Prof. Grotefend has also devoted some attention to them.

Rawlinson makes three grand divisions of the arrow-headed characters, viz. the Persian, the Median and the Babylonian. The Babylonian he subdivides into five, viz. the primitive Babylonian, the Achæmenian-Babylonian, the Medo-Assyrian, the Assyrian, and the Elymean. Westergaard however makes only five divisions in all, viz. the three kinds on the trilingual tablets of Persia. The Persian, the Median and the one called by Rawlinson the Achæmenian-Babylonian, together with the Assyrian and Old Babylonian.³

These discoveries together with those resulting from the excavations of Layard and Botta, near the site of Nineveh, are interesting and exciting in a high degree, and may lead to remarkable results. Our object however is simply to consider them in

¹ London Quart. Review ubi sup.

² Bartlett.

³ Ib. and Quart. Review.

a philological point of view, and as connected with the place assigned by Bopp to the Sanscrit.

The old Persian as decyphered is found to exhibit close affinities both to the Sanscrit and Zend. It is entirely alphabetic. The Median, as it is called by Westergaard, contains according to him "one hundred characters of which seventy-four are syllabic, twenty-four alphabetic, and two signs of divisions between words." He does not pretend to decide upon the family-relation of this language though "he considers that it belongs to the Scythian rather than to the Japhetic class of languages, in which opinion Major Rawlinson coincides."¹

If this is dark, the darkness becomes deeper as we inquire into the remainder. Little that is distinct has yet been accomplished in these, but the world will look with deep interest for any light that can be thrown upon the Assyrian or Babylonian language.

In summing up the results it will be perceived that in regard to the language called Median, there is nothing sufficiently certain as yet developed upon which to build any firm theory, and in regard to the old Persian the affinities are clearly and decidedly with the Sanscrit and Zend. The Quarterly Review says: "the discoveries start from the later reigns of the Achæmenian kings, and only through well-grounded knowledge of the Persic form of the arrow-headed character and of the old Persic language, can slowly ascend through the intervening Median dynasties, with their peculiar alphabet, and yet imperfectly conjectured language, up into the mysteries of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires—with their still more difficult, complicated, and, it should seem, five-fold varieties of character—and their language, the descent of which, whether from the Semitic or Indian family is yet an unresolved problem."

Mr. Turner, of the New York Union Theological Seminary, who has been investigating this subject by an examination of all the recent works which have reached this country, has favored the writer with the following remarks. Mr. T. disclaims being considered an authority on the subject. Of that the reader can judge.

Mr. Turner writes as follows: "The discoveries of Lassen, Rawlinson and Westergaard do not in the least degree shake the conclusions of Bopp respecting the Sanscrit as the basis of the Indo-European languages. The latest views of Lassen and Rawlinson, as far as regards the decyphering and translating of the in-

¹ Bartlett, p. 226.

scriptions, are nearly coincident. Their principal difference of opinion may be called a theoretical one, and has respect to the relative age and position of the old Persian, the language of the inscriptions. Messrs. Burnouf and Lassen place the Zend and Vedic Sanscrit on a par, and declare that when we compare the language of the Persepolitan inscriptions with that of the Zend-Avesta, we perceive that the former bears to the latter the same relation that the Italian does to the Latin, or the modern to ancient Greek, that is to say, the old Persian has all the characteristics of a language derived from the Zend, which latter, being closely allied with the Sanscrit, bears with it the like traces of antiquity. This opinion is not acceded to by Maj. Rawlinson, who elevates the old Persian, or rather depresses the Sanscrit and Zend considerably in the scale. He places the old Persian on a par with the Vedic Sanscrit, and thus brings down the classical Sanscrit and the Zend to a much later epoch. He even goes so far as to doubt whether the Zend was ever a spoken language. Without going into an original investigation of the subject, it is very easy to account for the discrepancy between these views, and to estimate their respective value. Messrs. Burnouf and Lassen are men living in the heart of learned Europe, leaders in the new school of philology which has sprung up in the present age, and whose information, so to speak, is kept posted up to the latest date. Maj. Rawlinson, on the contrary, is not a philologist by profession, is ignorant of the German language, and is so secluded from the literary world by his position in the centre of Asia, that he cannot procure a sight of the books that most intimately concern him till years after their publication. It is thus easy to conceive that, in spite of his great learning and sagacity, and his enthusiastic devotion to the studies in which all his leisure is engaged, his writings should be tinged with the obsolete views of British scholars of the last century, and show an imperfect acquaintance with the texts now relied upon to determine the relative antiquity of languages belonging to the same stock. Taking these circumstances into consideration, we see that the views of Lassen and Burnouf in this respect are entitled to by far the greater weight.

"I give you a brief view of the language and its relations as furnished by Lassen in the sixth volume of the *Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlands*. This will enable you to form a judgment on the subject for yourself.

"*Letters.*—The vowels are the original *a, i, u* (Rawlinson finds

the diphthongs *au, ai*, etc.); no derivative vowels, *e, o*. In the consonants we find three series, viz. Surds mute and aspirated, and Sonant mute.

Surd,	{ mute	p,	t,	s,	ch,	k
	{ asp.	f,	th,	sh,	chh,	kh
Sonant,		b,	d,	z,	j,	g

The aspirated sonants *v, dh*, etc. of the Sanscrit, some of which are also found in the Zend, are wanting in the old Persian, which in this respect forms the transition to the Greek and Gothic.

"*Declensions*.—The remains of the old Persian are sufficient to show that in the time of the Achæmenides it possessed nearly the whole stock of inflexions belonging to the Asian languages. Still it is inferior in completeness to the Sanscrit and even to the Zend, and manifests a tendency to confound the Cases by rejecting certain final articulations as *t* and *n*, and also *s* after *a* and *â*. The Dual also seems to have vanished, at least in the verb. Of the eight cases of the Sanscrit and Zend, the Locative is the only one not yet found in a separate form, the Instrumental appearing to be used instead of it. The name of the Deity, *Ormuzd*, occurs in the following forms:

Nom.	Āuramazdā
Acc.	Auramazdām
Dat.	Auramazdâija
Gen.	Auramazdâhâ
Voc.	Auramazdâ

Of the Personal Pronouns we have:

	<i>Sanscr.</i>	<i>Zend.</i>	<i>Old Pers.</i>
1st Pers.	aham,	azem,	adam
3rd Pers.	sva,	hva,	hawa

The second person has not been found. Other pronouns exhibit a like correspondence.

"*Conjugations*.—From the nature of the inscriptions which consist in great measure of titles and proper names, the forms of verbs are not exhibited in such fulness as those of the nouns. Still examples are preserved of the Present, Imperfect, Aorist, Perfect and Future; besides the Indicative mode, the Imperative occurs in the Middle voice, whereas the other forms are in the Active. Only one example is found of the Optative, which mode is usually re-placed by forms of the Imperfect. The Imperfect tense of the verb *to do* will serve as a specimen of conjugation:

	<i>Sanscrit.</i>	<i>Old Pers.</i>
Sing. 1.	akrínávam,	aqunwam
3.	akrínót,	aqunus'
Plur. 1.	akrínúma,	aqumá
3.	akrínvám,	aqunwa

"Lassen considers that the *old Persian* was the language of the ancient Persians in the time of the Achæmenides, the *Zend* of the east of Persia, whence its close affinities to the language of India; and that both the old Persian and Zend descend from a common source. The *Pehlevi* shows itself as a living language only during the times of the Sassanides. It was the language of western Iran, and consists of two elements, an Iranian and an Aramean. It is the first monument that appears after the old Persian, and serves in many respects to show the mode of transition of the ancient language into the modern. It is already modern Persian in its essential characteristics. The Pâzend was a dialect parallel with the Pehlevi, but which attaches itself immediately to the Zend."

We return, in conclusion, to the point of similarity in character in the nations, who speak the Indo-European languages.

"God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant." So spake the voice of the Almighty by his servant Noah, upwards of four thousand years ago by Ararat. Comparative philology affords us another beautiful illustration of this passage. The testimony of the great German scholars is unequivocal that the Indo-European languages are by far the most powerful in the world, the natural language of the ruling race. Their mode of development from their own substance, and the manner in which they lay the strong hand upon everything in other tongues which suits their own genius, shows the spirit of the conquering and *annexing* race. How wonderful the law by which the speakers of Indo-European tongues, the Japhetan race are everywhere victorious! Commencing from the mountains of Caucasus they fill the best parts of the world. In India the Brahmans, the speakers of Sanscrit, have impressed their religion and language upon a hundred millions, whose government is Anglo-Saxon, Japhet dwelling in the tents of Shem. Northern Asia and Northern Europe are ruled by the Slavonic family proven by Bopp to be of the race of Japhet. Shem yields everywhere, except always in Arabia where Ishmael lives before God invincible in answer to the prayer of Abraham, his friend. But mark where Japhet, meets Japhet in his own fastnesses!

Proud England and proud Russia know the names of Affghanistan and Circassia! The Grecian Alexander of the Thracian family of Japhet overran Asia, and the empire of Japhetan Rome was enlarged till it became universal. The unconquered seakings of Scandinavia carried Sanscrit forms along the coasts of the frozen North, and the Gothic tribes filled Central Europe with another form of the same speech. The Vandal, the Frank and the Celt bear witness of their race in their language. And last, not least, the Anglo-Saxons are the very essence of the race, the most essentially Japhetan of all Japhet's family. And the English language, which (harmony and copiousness apart) for pure strength, may be called the noblest mode of human speech, is stretching its conquering wing from India to California.

May we not look into the vista of the dim future with two ideas struggling within us? In pursuing the study of language we may carry the torch lighted by Teutonic genius into one twilight cavern after another, and so classify tongues by some high analysis, as to teach not so much, laboriously one, or two languages, as the principles of all. And, again, may we not, as is obscurely hinted by one of the Germans, by this inductive process look to the bringing of mankind so near together in the understanding of their respective modes of speech, and in the investigation of what in language lies nearest to nature, as that a nearer approximation may be made to an universal language? The arts are bringing mankind into near physical connection, the prevalence of a pure Christianity will bring them into moral union; might we hope to bring together the elements of speech into the light of philosophy, so that this great jargon of conflicting tongues may give way to finer combinations, and we speak not with the tongues of men but of angels?

ARTICLE IV.

ZUMPT'S LATIN GRAMMAR.

A Grammar of the Latin Language, by C. G. Zumpt, Ph. D., Professor in the University, and Member of the Royal Academy of Berlin. From the ninth edition of the original, adapted to the use of English students by Leonhard Schmitz, Ph. D., late of the University of Bonn. London, 1845.

By Charles Siedhof, Ph. D., late Rector of the Gymnasium at Aurich, in the Kingdom of Hanover, now teacher of a private Classical School, Newton Centre, Ma.—[Concluded from p. 435.]

§ 622. It is here said that *contingit mihi* is frequently used with the infinitive. This is true in general, but not in regard to Cicero, who had but once used this construction, viz. in the passage quoted from pro Arch. III. Stürenburg, therefore, endeavored to correct the reading. Cf. his Latin edition, p. 45—50, and his first edition of de Officiis, preface, p. 9, 10. Yet he has returned in the German edition of the oration to the authority of the manuscripts. Also *Lambinus* thought the construction not classical. Although it is common with poets and later writers yet it is not used by any good prose writer.

§ 623. Our author has in § 600 explained the regular construction of *necesse est*; thus *necesse* should here either be stricken out, or at least it should be said, that it, as being very rare, is not to be imitated.

In the passages with *verisimile est*, *ut*, it is to be observed, that in all of them *non* is added. Further are two of a *hypothetical* nature, as the imperfect tenses, by which it is followed, show.

§ 625. The subjunctive after *necesse est* (and *oportet*) is not to be put in the same category with the accusative and infinitive, unless with some restrictions; for although the present follows those phrases, yet the imperfect is entirely against the use of Cicero. *Necesse est me facere* and *necesse est faciam* are both equally good, but *necesse erat facerem* is not good Latin; we must always say in this *me facere*.

But the expression *mihi necesse est* with the infinitive, so frequent with Cicero, ought to have been quoted. Cf. ad Fam. II. 16. 2: *mihi necesse est esse*; de Fat. IX: *homini necesse est mori*.

‡ 626. The difference between *quod* and the accusative before the infinitive is particularly clear in Cic. pro Sext. XXXVIII. 80: An haec ipsa vis est *non posse emori*? an *illa*, quod Tribunus plebis templum cruentavit? an, *quod*, quum esset ablatum, primumque resipisset, non se referri *jussit*? The first sentence expresses a general thought, both the following refer to a certain person and event.

‡ 629. There are still other different constructions which often occur, of which we only mention *si* and *cur* after *miror* and *mirum* est (as the Greek θαυμάζω *si*). Cf. Cic. pro Sext. I. 1: *miretur* potius, *si* quem—*viderit* (in the beginning of the chapter there is: *si* quis *mirabatur*, *quid* esset, *quod* —); de Senect. XI. 35: quid *mirum* igitur in senibus, *si* infirmi *sunt*. Further, de Orat. II. 13; pro Rosc. Amer. XLV. 131; *ibid.* VIII. 22; Cic. ad Famm. VII. 27. 1: *miror*, *cur* me accuses. *Si* is especially frequent with Cicero.

‡ 632. It is a very true remark of Klotz in Jahn's NN. GG. für Phil. und Pädag. 14. Jahrg. 4 Band. 3 Heft. p. 243, 258 (Review of Krebs's Antibarbarus), that according to the use of Cicero the perfect participles of the deponents, when used passively, have regularly the perfect participle of an active verb with them. This remark would be in place in a school grammar.

‡ 635. Rem. In the phrase, *domum reversus*, litteras tuas inveni, *reversus* should be stricken out as in the *highest degree rare* in writers of authority. It is only found in Caesar de B. G. VI. 42, and with Cic. Phil. VI. 4. 10: ut retractus, non *reversus* videretur. By this is our author's remark ‡ 209 at the end, that although *reversus* is often used as a participle it rarely occurs with *esse*, corrected; for *reversus* is here not a mere participle, because *esse* is omitted. Very instructive is Cic. ad Famm. VI. 6. 11: ut in eam civitatem boni viri et boni cives, nulla ignominia notati, non *revertantur*, in quam tot nefariorum scelerum condemnati *reverterunt*.

‡ 639. The use of the future participle active without *esse* is very properly ascribed to the Silver age, yet the participle of *esse*, *futurus*, should have been excepted; it is so frequent with Cicero that there is no need of reference to passages.

‡ 647. This use of the ablative absolute is to be found in a few passages as early as with Cicero. Cf. Acad. II. 11. 33: Quo enim omnia judicantur, *sublato*, reliqua se negant tollere; de Finn. II. 27. 85: *Perfecto et concluso*, neque virtutibus neque amicitias usquam locum esse —, nihil praeterea est magno opere dicendum; de Offic. II. 12. 41: *Adjuncto* vero, ut iidem etiam prudentes

haberentur, nihil erat, quod homines iis auctoribus non posse consequi se arbitrantur.

§ 651. Our author professes to have quoted all the places where *a* with a future participle passive is found in Cicero, but in this he is mistaken. Cf. pro Sext. XVIII. 41: Sed tamen et Crassus *a* consulibus meam causam *suscipiendam* esse dicebat, et —; ad Fam. XV. 4. 11: tamen admonendum potius te *a* me, quam *arandum*; ibid. III. 11. 3: de testibus—*a* suis civibus *notandis*; pro Sulla VIII. 23: Sed tamen te *a* me pro magnis causis nostrae necessitudinis monendum esse etiam atque etiam puto —; ad Fam. IX. 3: *a* me scribenda putabam.

§ 659. The construction of a substantive with *est* and the infinitive depends entirely on the double signification of *est*. *Est* is either an *adjective verb* (= exists) when it has the emphasis and the following verb must be put in the genitive of the gerund; or it is a *substantive verb* (= copula) and then it simply connects the subject to the predicate, it has no emphasis and the following verb stands in the infinitive. Without paying regard here to common connections, as officium est, we quote here (as rare) Cic. pro Caecina V. 15: nullam esse *rationem amittere* ejusmodi occasione. Acad. II. 6. 17: nec esse ullam *rationem disputare*. Ibid. II. 23. 74: nulla fuit *ratio persequi*. So with adesce. Cic. in Verr. II. 17: capit *consilium*—non adesce. But compare what our author has said in the note to § 597.

The most important phrase of this kind is *tempus est*, partly, because it occurs so very frequently with the infinitive, partly, because the difference of its meaning as used in connection with the infinitive or in connection with the gerund, is so great and manifest. *Tempus est*, with the infinitive, is regularly accompanied by *nunc* or *jam*, and means, *it is (just) now time*. So it occurs most frequently. Cf. Cic. de Orat. II. XLII. 181: *tempus est jam* de ordine argumentorum et de collocatione aliquid *discere*.

We abstain from quoting other passages, because it would be unnecessary. *Tempus est*, with the gerund, means, *there is time (enough)*. The phrase is not often used in this way. When *tempus est* corresponds with our, *there is a time*, the gerund also must be used. Cf. Cic. pro Mil. IV. 9: Atque si *tempus est* ullum jure hominis *necandi*.

Here we may remark, that if the infinitive has its own subject, this must be put in the accusative; so that *tempus est* in this case governs the accusative before the infinitive. Cf. Cic. ad Atticum IV. 5, extr.: sed jam *tempus est me ipsum a me amare*.

The genitive of the gerund in the signification of the phrase first explained, is used by Cicero by way of exception. *Acadd.* II. 48. 147: *Verum quoniam non modo nauta significat, sed etiam Favonius ipse insusurat navigandi nobis tempus esse.*

† 676. So *imperium* is put for *consules*. *Cic. pro Sext.* XI. 25: *innocentia* for *innocentes*; *Cic. de Orat.* I. 46. 202: *splendor*; *Cic. pro Ligar.* XI. 33.

† 677. *Nihil* is used, especially with the comparative, rather frequently with reference to persons. Cf. *Cic. ad Famm.* IV. 4. 2: *Victoris vitio, quo nihil erat moderatius*; *ad Famm.* XIV. 3. extr.: *mihi te carius nihil esse.*

† 678. The substantives *vir* and *homo* stand very often for demonstrative pronouns. Cf. *Cic. ad Famm.* I. 6. 14: *nosti hominis tarditatem*; *pro Sext.* XLI. 88: *tanta moderatio fuit hominis.*

Our author has taught in † 92, that the plural *animae* is used in reference to the ferocia of *one man*; here he limits *animae* to *several*. *Cic. pro Sext.* XLI. 88: *fractae erant animae hominis.* Here *animae* has not the meaning of ferocia.

† 681. *Introitus Smyrnam* by *Cic. Phil.* XI. 2. 5; *Conventus ad Marcellos, ad Pompejum*, *Cic. in Ver.* III. 18. 45; *in Capitolium adscensus, domum reditus*, *Cic. pro Sext.* XLIII. 131.

† 684. *Ciceroniana Simplicitas* has *Pliny, Historia Naturae*, Pref. † 22. But the word is not found at all in Cicero in either of its significations. He uses circumlocutions for it, as *simplex ratio*, or the Greek, *λιτότης*, e. g. *ad Famm.* VII. 26. 2: *lex sumptuaria, quae videtur λιτότητα attulisse.*

† 685. Although it is true that the neuter of the adjectives here quoted used as substantives, is not to be imitated, yet it is found occasionally even with the best writers. Cf. *Caes. de Bel. Gall.* VI. 26: *ab ejus summo*, sicut *palmae rami*, late diffunduntur; with *Cic. ad Famm.* VII. 16, init. *In equo Trojano scis esse in extremo*, which is somewhat remarkable.

† 686. Here the remarks would have been in place that we, for instance, must render, *they were the first who did this*, by *illi primi hoc fecerunt*, never with *esse* and *qui*.

† 689. Here the attention should have been particularly directed to the fact, that with Cicero also, *ut* with the superlative and a tense of *posse*, very frequently occurs. Cf. *de Finn.* V. 4. 9: *ut brevissime potuit*; *de Divin.* II. 1. 1: *ut maxime potuimus*, and in very many other places.

Drakenborch has, indeed, collected in the passage here quoted many examples from *Livy*, but by no means all, as would appear from our author.

Tantus is sometimes also by Cicero omitted before *quantus*. Cf. Cic. pro Flacco. XVI 38: *Vociferarer et, quantum maxime possem, contenderem*.

‡ 690. *Magis quam* with the positive is the more frequent use with Cicero. So it is found, e. g. Tusc. I 17. 41; de Orat. I 42. 100; Brut. LXVIII 241; ad Attic. X. 1. 4: pro Plan. XV. 37.

‡ 691. *Charles Beier*, in his remark on the passage, Cic. de Amicit. 1, here quoted, doubts whether *unus*, if not connected with a substantive, can be used for strengthening a superlative. Although Klotz (cf. page 85 and 86 of his edition) quotes Cic. pro Sext. LXVII 141: *qui unus omnium justissimus esse traditur*; yet this usage must be characterized as very rare.

Here is the place where it might have been said, that the superlative is often followed by a comparative denoting a still higher degree. Cf. Cic. ad Famm. XIV. 3. 1: *Ego autem hoc miserior sum, quam tu, quae es miserrima*; de Off. III 34, extr.: *tibique persuade te quidem mihi carissimum, sed multo fore cariorem*.

‡ 692. In Cic. pro Sext. XXVII 59, *sexcenti* is used of *very few* in opposition to the whole Roman people, so that it corresponds with our, *a handful*. Cf. Garatoni on this passage.

‡ 693. Somewhere in the following remarks on the pronouns, the attention should have been called to the fact that the demonstrative pronouns, and usually also the relative *qui*, with Cicero, stand in the same case with the substantive *numerus*, and not in the genitive plural according to our usage. *Stürenburg*, whose remark on Cic. pro Arch. XII 31. (page 185, 288) contains a rich collection of examples, knows only two exceptions of the demonstrative pronouns in Cicero, namely: de Orat. II 13. 56: *Atqui ne nunc quidem, quamquam est in re publica versatus, ex numero accepimus eorum*,—and in Vatin. XVII 41: *in illorum enim numero mavult T. Annius esse*—. Here belongs also Cic. pro Sext. III 7: *illo*—aspectu instead of *illius*.

‡ 696. At the end of this paragraph our author indicates what is very true, that Cicero is inclined to put *ipse* in the same case with the subject, although he otherwise approves the rule given by *Ernesti* concerning this word. We may consider it an exception when *ipse* is put in the same case with the object. In the first passage quoted by our author from Cic. pro Lege Man. XIII 13: *Non potest exercitum is continere imperator, qui te ipsum non continet*, the *Codex Erfurtensis* reads *ipse*, which reading, doubtless, deserves the preference. *Graevius* was al-

ready of this opinion. See Wunder in Varr. lectt. Cod. Erfurt. p. LXIX. He there tries to elicit the sense: non potest is exercitum continere imperator, qui alios quidem continet, se vero non continet, which of course would be absurd. Therefore he prefers *ipse*.

If *ipse* precedes the personal pronoun, then it must always stand in the nominative. Cf. Cic. de Finn. V. 10 28: si quis *ipse* sibi inimicus est, and immediately after inimicus *ipse* sibi putandus est.

§ 699. If a name or a word is to be repeated with an addition to it which limits or modifies the thought, there is not only in Latin et quidem, but more frequently merely et, and more rarely atque. Cf. Cic. pro Sext. XL. 86: Laudas Milonem et jure laudas; ibid. XXIV. 54: gener et Piso gener. This is so very frequent.

Our author should have mentioned here the peculiarity according to which *is* after an inserted relative sentence continues that sentence; which however only takes place with a copulative particle and then when *is* stands in another case than that in which the relative stands. Cf. Cic. Orat. II. 9: quam intuens, *is* eaque defixus, ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat, —and thus not unfrequently.

§ 701. *Ille* denotes contempt. Cic. pro Sext. XI. 26: nam alter *ille* horridus et severus (Piso) —; ibid. VIII. 20: habeo quem opponam *labi illi* atque coeno.

§ 709 and 709 b. Every careful reader will be struck with the inconsistency and contradiction, which are found in this as in nearly all other grammars, in respect to the words *quisquam* and *ullus* as distinguished from *aliquis* and *quidam*. The reason of it is that the distinction made is merely external, and not according to etymology and usage, philosophically ascertained.

Our author says:

1. *Quisquam* and *ullus* are found in negative sentences.

2. But this rule does not extend to the particles *ne* and *neve*, after which *quis* only is used. The exception, here made, is owing to the use of *quis* after conjunctions.

3. *Quisquam* and *ullus* are sometimes used after *si*, not in a negative sense, but only to increase the indefiniteness.

Nothing need be said of the inconsistency of this statement. We will only observe in respect to No. 2, that *quisquam* and *ullus* after *ne* and *neve* occur not unfrequently in Cicero; and that the author errs in supposing that only *quis*, and not *quisquam* follows *ne* and *neve*. The following examples will confirm what has now

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been said; Comp. Cic. pro Sextio XLI. 59: Ne reus adsit, ne citetur, ne quaeratur, *ne* mentionem omnino *cuiquam* iudicium aut iudiciorum facere liceat; pro leg. Man. XXIV. 69: Deinde ne hortor, ut auctore populo Romano, maneat in sententia, *neve* *cujusquam* vim aut minas pertimescas; pro Balbo V. 11: *ne* forte, quod ille in tabulas publicas retulisset, dubitasse quisquam—videretur; Tuscull. III. 84. 84: *ne ulla* unquam possit exsistere; and so in many other cases.

Caesar also uses it, de Bel. Gal. VII. 40, at the end: Iter eorum moratur atque impedit interdictique, *ne quemquam* interficiant. So the other classic writers. That this pronoun is sometimes used without a foregoing conjunction and after *dum*, the author himself has shown by examples.

As it respects the signification and use of the pronouns *quis*, *aliquis*, *quispiam* and *quisquam*, it is obvious that they are all of the same etymology; and that the shades of meaning depend wholly on the prefixes and suffixes. We will limit our remarks here to the word *quisquam*. Being compounded of *quis* and *quam*, it means literally *any one as*, i. e. *any one although*. *Quem* cannot of itself stand for a clause in Latin; therefore we must conceive of it as reduplicated (*quamquam*), in order to form a concessive particle equivalent, in sense, to a concessive clause (*although*), which stands in contrast with *quis* (*quam*); e. g. Nego hoc fecisse *quemquam*, is said in opposition to a previous assertion of some other person; thus: Nego hoc fecisse *quem*, *quam* (*quam*) affirmatur. In English the force of the expression will be best given by emphasizing the word *I*, as the subject of the sentence, thus: *I* say, no one has done it, although it has been affirmed by another.

If *quisquam* comes after *si*, the same thing is true, except that the contrast cannot be expressed by *affirmatur*, because it is not of a negative character, but by *negatur*. The sentence contains an opposition to an implied preceding negation. *Si quisquam*, *ille sapiens fuit*, means (no one is wise, but) if any one is wise, he was so. *Si quis doctus fuit* (*quam*) [*quam*] *hoc negatur*, *quem fuisse doctum*, *ille fuit*.

Whenever the clause following *ne* refers to an implied preceding affirmation, *quisquam*, and not *quis* must be used, as appears in the preceding examples. As this does not often take place with *ne*, *quis* commonly follows *ne*. If one says, *Ne quis scribat*, this is simply a command, the right of the one, and the obligation of the other being presupposed. *Ne quisquam scribat*, means, *I*

command that no one write (although another has commanded that one should write). See Stürenburg ad Cic. de Officiis. p. 213 and 214, 1st ed.

‡ 710. In the German edition, corrected in the English translation, *quisque* does indeed stand distributively after ordinals; still the translation of *quinto quoque anno*, every five years (as it stands in the German edition) may be so misunderstood as to mean, once in every five years (no matter in which of the five). Comp. Scioppius de stylo historico, p. 226: Fugit Muretum ratio, quum pro *singulis quinque annis* dicendum putat *quinto quoque anno*. Nec enim eadem utriusque dicti est sententia. Si quidem fiat, quod *quinquennio* seu *singulis quinque annis semel*, nihil necesse est, id *quinto* semper anno fieri, cum etiam *primo, secundo* aut *quocunque quinquennii* anno factum intelligitur.

‡ 710 b. *Quisque* with the superlative in the connection here specified is used only with the neuter plural. The exceptions are very few, as Cic. de Amicit. X. medio—in *optimis quibusque* (masc.) honoris certamen et gloriae. Hase, in his 362nd note on Reisig, Vorlesungen, p. 351, appears not to be aware of any exceptions.

‡ 718. It might have been mentioned here that instead of the perfect passive, a participle of the same word which precedes that of a synonymous verb is not unfrequently used. Comp. Cic. pro Rosc. Amer. XI. 32: Patrem—*jugulastis, occisum* in proscriptorum numerum retulistis; Ibid. XII. 34: Causam *explicemus* atque ante *expositam* consideremus.

‡ 722. 2. In the passage Cic. de Amicit. II. 6, *multa ejus vel provisæ prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute*, this rule is well illustrated, because the participles not only have an adjective and a genitive, that is, are used as real substantives, but they also have adverbs or are used as real participles.

‡ 723. The author still maintains that *tum—tum* are equivalent to *partim—partim*, notwithstanding Stürenburg ad pro Archia XII. pp. 164—180 has demonstrated that *tum—tum* refer only to time. Even the two examples presented by Zumpt can very easily be explained in this way.

‡ 724. Here *non—sed* might have been mentioned; e. g. Cic. pro Sextio XXVIII. 62: *Non* illi ornandum Catonem *sed* relegandum, *nec* illi committendum illud negotium, *sed* imponendum putaverunt —.

‡ 724 b. Here, after the words *sed ne—quidem*, it might have been added in a parenthesis, that *verum ne—quidem* very rarely

occurs. It is found, for example, in Cic. pro Rosc. Amer. XIX. 54: quod planum facere non modo non possis, *verum* ne coneris quidem; Cic. de R. P. IIL 30. 42.

† 736. Add after *contra*, "and still more remarkable. Cic. de Finn. II. 21. 68: sed tamen et in corpore et *extra* esse quaedam bona."

† 737. *Atque etiam*, like *atque adeo*, is used, as is well known, to indicate a climax. Cic. pro Sext. XXIV. 53: Ipso die — die dico! immo hora *atque etiam* puncto temporis. See Hand's Tursellinus I. 507. *Atque* standing alone, is used in the same way. Compare Cic. Orator XVI. 52: rem difficilem, dii immortales! *atque* omnium difficillimam.

† 738. The use here pointed out of *nec, quisquam, ullus, usquam*, instead of *ut nemo*, etc. has its exceptions even in Cicero. Cf. pro Sext. II. 3: nihilque ab eo praetermissum; in Vat. XI. 28: nihil que maximus fecit, where Orelli, however, reads *nihil* without *que*.

† 739. Frequently, after a parenthetic clause, which interrupts the sentence, the sentence is *not carried forward by a conjunction*, but is *resumed by the repetition of one or more words*. Comp. Cic. in Vat. VIII. 19: Quaero illud etiam ex te, conatusne sis, voluerisne, denique *cogitaris* (est enim res ejusmodi, ut, si tibi modo in mentem venit, nemo sit, qui te ullo cruciatu indignum putet) *cogitarisne* —; pro Sext. XIX. 42: *Haec ego quum viderem—haec quum viderem* —; pro Archia VIII. 18: *Quoties ego hunc Archiam vidi—quoties ego hunc vidi* —. Sometimes after such a parenthetic clause, the sentence proceeds without either a conjunction or a repetition, for example, Cic. pro Lege Man. II. 4 and 5: Equitibus Romanis, honestissimis viris, adferuntur ex Asia quotidie litterae,—quorum magnae res aguntur in vestris vectigalibus exerceendis occupatae —; *Bithyniae vicos exustos esse complures*.

† 743, 4. Sometimes, after *qui*, not the *same* substantive but a *synonym* of it is repeated. Comp. Cic. p. Rosc. Am. XIII. 37: Nefarium *facinus* atque ejusmodi, quo uno *maleficio* —; pro Sext. XI. 26: Erat Senatus in *aede* Concordiae, quod ipsum templum —.

In some place when treating of pleonasm, it should have been remarked that, as *εἰς μόνος* in Greek, so sometimes *unus solus* in Latin is used. Comp. Cic. p. Sext. LXII. 130: *Atque ita in his rebus unus est solus inventus* —. Ibid. XIX. 43: qui hac *una* mediana *sola*, and elsewhere not unfrequently.

† 750. On pleonasm in words expressing *thought, reflection*, etc. see Cic. pro Planc. XXVI. extr. hac *spe* decedebam, *ut—putarem*; pro Rosc. Amer. XXII. 6: ea *spe* venisse, *quod putaret*.

§ 767. This section has, indeed, been extended by a remark, in which *hic* and *ille* are considered; still it needs to be corrected and completed. The very beginning of the section in the German edition, viz. "When we use the article alone in German instead of repeating the foregoing substantive," etc. is incorrect; for what the author calls the article is not an article, but a demonstrative pronoun. In the sentence, "I read the (die) comedies of Plautus, but not those (die) of Terence, the second *die* has the emphasis, which is proof that it is not an article. The author probably was thinking of the Greek when he penned this remark. The English translator has very properly corrected this error.

With Cicero only the pronouns *hic* and *ille* are used in this way before the genitive.

If *hic* is used, the genitive is a mere *apposition*, which expresses the same thing in substance. So pro Archia XI. 28: Nullam enim virtus aliam mercedem laborum periculorumque desiderat praeter *hanc* (i. e.) laudis atque gloriae. So in the very same passage as found in Phil. V. 13. 35: Neque enim ullam mercedem tanta virtus praeter *hanc* (i. e.) laudis gloriaeque desiderat; Brut. LVIII. 211: et neptes Licinias, quas nos quidem ambas, *hanc* vero Scipionis etiam tu, Brute, credo, aliquando loquentem.

Here the case is not precisely the same as in the two preceding passages, although Scipionis is in apposition with *hanc*. In English, it would be expressed by the words, but this,—(I mean, or viz.) that of Scipio."

If *ille* is used, the genitive is also here a mere apposition, and *ille* is then either indicative of something which is observable by the senses, or of something else that is well known.

Of the first description is the passage, Phil. V. 5. 13: In foro L. Antonii statuam videmus, sicut *illam* (i. e.) Tremuli (to which I point with the finger.—It was in the forum).

Of the second description are the following passages; de Orat. III. 48. 184: Neque vero haec tam acrem curam diligentiamque desiderant, quam est *illa* poetarum; Divin. in Caecil. XI. 36: quum omnis arrogantia odiosa est, tum *illa* ingenii atque eloquentiae multo molestissima; Brut. XXI. 83: At oratio Laelii de collegiis non melior, quam de multis quam voles, Scipionis, non quo *illa* Laelii quicquam sit dulcius—; ad Fam. IX. 15. 2: Accedunt non Attici, sed salsiores quam *illis* Atticorum, sales.

Finally a pronoun is used when it is separated from the genitive by a relative clause. Comp. Cic. in Verr. Act. II. 4. 37. 61: Quae cognatio studiorum et artium propemodum non minus est con-

juncta quam *ista*, qua vos delectamini, *generis et nominis*; de Orat. II. 24. 101: dum inertiae vituperationem—contemnunt, assequuntur etiam *illam*, quam magis ipsi fugiunt, *tarditatis*.

It were better that the author had stricken out the quotation from Curtius. IX. 26, or substituted another in its place, on account of the unclassical use of the word *valet*. We have already remarked upon that under § 612. In a work of such high merit, even the smallest errors are blemishes.

§ 771. Remark. At the end it should have been said that the words *nihil aliud nisi* are connected only with a following preposition, that is, with verbs which may either govern the accusative, or be construed with *de*, though in another sense, as *dicere*, *cogitare*, *agere*, *loqui* *referre*; for with these verbs, that double construction occurs with other words than *nihil aliud nisi*. Cf. Cic. pro Reg. Deiot. VIII. 22.⁹ *De exercitu* breviter dicam, ut *caetera*.

§ 779. Inasmuch as many imagine that in the construction, *tantum abest* ut—nt there is a special elegance, and inasmuch as this form of expression is so frequently introduced in books for writing Latin, the author should have observed that with Cicero its use is comparatively rare. It is found in Cic. pro leg. Man. XXIV. 71; de Orat. XIX. 104; Tuscull. V. 5; Brut. LXXX; Phil. XI. 3; ad Att. VI. 2; ad Att. XIII. 21; de Off. I. 14; Tuscull. I. 31; de Nat. Deorr. II. 63; Tuscull. II. 2; Tuscull. V. 6; Orat. LXVIII; ad Fam. XII. 15; Lael. XIV. 61; ad Att. VII. 3.

If the addition *ab eo* is found after *tantum abest*, the construction must always be, *tantum abest ab eo, ut*.

§ 781. The example, An Scythes Anacharsis potuit, etc. is not found in Cic. de Fin. V. 32, but in Tusc. V. 32. This error has been repeated through many editions of the grammar before us. The example, as it here stands, is not well chosen; because the construction non facere poterunt must appear strange to the pupil. Orelli has properly expunged the word *facere*, which Roth had previously included in brackets.

The contrast appears especially when, in the example here given and elsewhere to be found, the same verb is used twice, once with a negative, and once without it. In English when the Latin word is repeated with a negation, we omit the verb, and employ merely the words, "but not." *Neque* is found in Cic. pro Reg. Deiot. X. 29: Quodsi saltatorum avum habuisses neque eum virum, for et non.

§ 782. The words *huc et illuc*, *ultro et citro*, *hic et illic*, are always connected, as here, by *et*, and are never without the copu-

lative conjunction, as the modern Latin writers commonly have it, after the example of the poets and of the later Roman authors.

No sentence can be closed with the conjunction *que*, whether the last word be a verb, as Reisig § 233 maintains, or not. See Cic. Orator. LXX. 233, cited by Nauck in Jahn's Neuen-Jahr-büchern, Supplement, No. 7. pp. 466—470. Still *que* is so used, though very rarely, especially in epistolary writing. Cic. ad Fam. XIV. 3. 1: nec meae miseriae magis excruciant quam tuae vestrae *que*.

§ 799. In respect to *non* in connection with *posse*, the proper explanation should have been given here. The rule commonly given, and in general correct, is that *non* must stand immediately before *posse*. Still *non* is often found before the dependent infinitive, where the sense requires it. Thus, Loqui non possum, means, "it is not possible for me to speak;" possum non loqui, it is possible for me not to speak." Comp. Cic. Tuscull. III. 28. 66: Si enim deponi potest (dolor), etiam *non suscipi potest*. Voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est; pro Cluent. XLI. 113: jam *potuit* aliquis ab initio *non sedisse*; pro Milone XXX. 81: quamquam qui *poterat* salus sua cuiquam *non probari*!—pro Fonteij. VI. 11: *Potest* igitur iudex testibus *non credere*. Cupidis et iratis et ab religione remotis non solum *potest*, sed etiam *debet* (*non credere*). It occurs so very frequently in Cicero. Strange is Cic. ad Fam. VII. 15. 2: Quod vero in C. Mattij, suavissimi doctissimique hominis, familiaritatem venisti, *non dici potest*, quam valde gaudeam.

That *nego* is regularly used for *non dico*, is correct; but not so, when *non dico* means, "I will not say." See § 724.

Perhaps it would have been well to add something more in this place respecting the position of words in certain phrases. So Klotz has often remarked in his various writings, that *eam ob rem* never occurs, though *hanc ob rem* frequently does, the ground of which may lie alone in the disagreeable sound, which would be occasioned by the elision of the syllable *am*, so constantly occurring in the conversation of the Romans. But *eamque ob rem*, which gives no harsh sound, is used.

The same critic has warned us against the use of *medius* before the preposition *in*, a favorite, but faulty form of expression with modern writers. It must always be written, *in media urbe*, etc.

So likewise *potest esse* is so common with Cicero, that deviations (*esse potest*), as Tusc. I. 46. 100, are very rare. The same is true of *necesse est esse*.

There are very many such points, which a frequent perusal of Cicero's works for some definite purpose brings to view; but we must forego the presentation of them at present, lest we transcend the limits proper for a review.

‡ 808. *Neque tamen* is, indeed, the ordinary form of expression; but there are places where *non tamen* must stand, and where *neque tamen* would be impossible. So Cic. de Fin. V. 22. 62: Quis contra in illa aetate pudorem, constantiam, etiamsi sua nihil intersit, *non tamen* diligit. *Non tamen*, where this reason does not exist, is more natural in the following passage. Cic. Acad. II. 20. 60.

We conclude with expressing the wish that the author will recognize in our remarks the high respect which we sincerely feel for him. He has effected, and still continues to effect, what few have the power to accomplish. The work contains a real treasure of the nicest observations; it well deserves the correcting hand of its distinguished author to bring it still nearer to perfection.

The translation of Schmitz is reprinted in New-York, corrected and enlarged by Professor Anthon.

ARTICLE V.

THE PREACHING BY CHRIST TO THE SPIRITS IN PRISON.— REMARKS ON 1 PETER III. 18—21.

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PART I.

Ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτωῶν ἔπαθε, δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ θεῷ, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι· ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι προσηυχέμενοι, ἀποκρίσασί ποτε, —.¹

THE Bible has often been represented as a book full of obscurities and difficulties; by infidels who wish to disprove its divine

¹ The Author has read with much interest a critical disquisition on this passage, in the American Biblical Repository for April, 1848, by the Rev. Thomas H.

origin ; by Roman Catholics who need an argument to prove the necessity of tradition, on which their system rests, and an apology for their apparently impious and paradoxical conduct in withholding a confessedly divine revelation from the unrestrained perusal of the common people and endeavoring to keep it covered by the veil of a dead language ; and by mere nominal Christians among Protestants who equally need an excuse, for their habitual neglect of a volume, which they admit to be of divine authority, and profess to regard as the ultimate rule of religious faith and moral duty. And if the Bible was really so full of obscurity and difficulty, if it was the ambiguous and unintelligible book it has been represented, neither the careless Protestant nor the cautious Catholic would be much to be blamed except for inconsistency, and even with this minor fault the infidel would not be greatly chargeable, for if he can make out his premises that the Bible is an unintelligible book, there can be little difficulty in admitting his conclusion that it is not a divine one ;—a book full of darkness cannot come from Him who “is light and in whom there is no darkness at all,” and it is certainly useless to read what it is impossible to understand.

But it is not true, that the Holy Scriptures are full of obscurities and difficulties. The Bible, generally speaking, is a very plain book. It would not be easy to find a book of its size, on its subjects, in which there is so much level to the apprehension of ordinary understandings. No person who sits down to its study, with an honest wish to apprehend its statements, will find any great difficulty in discovering what are the doctrines it unfolds, or what are the duties it enjoins. “The commandment of the Lord is pure,”¹ i. e. clear as the light of heaven, “and it enlightens the eyes.” But though the Bible is not *full* of obscurities and difficulties, there are obscurities and difficulties in it. It is with the great light of the moral, as of the natural world, the whole of its disc is not equally lustrous. There are spots in the sun ; but he must be very blind or very perverse who should, on that account maintain that the sun is not a luminous body at all ; and insist that it gives no light and that if it rays forth anything, it rays forth darkness. On the other hand he who asserts that there are no spots in the sun, and he who asserts that there are no difficul-

Skinner, D. D., and though led to considerably different results in his analysis, he thankfully acknowledges the advantage derived from the able and in one instance, so far as he knows, the original, suggestions of his predecessor.

¹ Psalm. 19: 8. “*Clarum dilucidum.*”—Rosenmüller.

ties in the Bible, equally prove that they are very superficial observers or very prejudiced judges. That in writings so ancient as the Holy Scriptures, published originally in a state of society so different from that which at present prevails, among a people whose language has long ceased to be spoken, and whose laws and customs and manners have little resemblance to ours, there should be difficulties, was naturally to be expected, and indeed this could not have been prevented without a miracle. But these obscurities attach themselves to comparatively few passages, and the difficulties to which they give origin are gradually diminishing and disappearing as the knowledge of the sacred languages, antiquities and criticism makes progress; and with regard to those which remain, there are two considerations that deserve remark; the first that in no case is there uncertainty cast on any of the leading facts or doctrines of revelation by these obscurities and difficulties, and the second, that in almost every case, though there may be particular words and phrases, the precise import or reference of which it may be difficult or impossible to determine with certainty, these passages are found notwithstanding replete with important instruction.

These remarks are applicable to the passage of Scripture to which our attention is now to be directed. The observation of the apostle Peter respecting his beloved brother Paul is applicable to himself. In his epistles "there are some things hard to be understood which the unlearned and unstable wrest to their own destruction,"¹ and this is one of them. Few passages have received a greater variety of interpretation, and he would prove more satisfactorily his self-confidence than his wisdom who should assert that *his* interpretation was undoubtedly the true one. Yet though we should not be able to determine with absolute certainty who these "spirits in prison" are, and when, and where, and how, and for what purpose Christ "went and preached" to them, and whatever opinion we may adopt as most probable on these subjects, no Christian doctrine, no Christian duty is affected by our uncertainty or by our opinion. Even were we holding, what appears to us the least probable opinion, that the words teach us that our Lord during his disembodied state went to the region of separate souls, and made a communication of some kind to its inhabitants, either to such of them as were "in safe keeping" in Paradise, or "in prison" in Gehenna; they would give no countenance to the delusive dreams either of the Roman Catholic re-

¹ 2 Peter 3: 15, 16.

specting purgatory, or of the Universalist concerning the possibility of favorably altering the condition of men after they have left the present state; they would merely mention an isolated fact nowhere else referred to in Scripture, and from which no legitimate consequence can be deduced at all inconsistent with any other portion of revealed truth; and though we should never obtain satisfactory information on the points referred to, how replete with truth and holy influence is the sentence, v. 18—22, of which one or two clauses are obscure, perhaps unintelligible,—how “profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness!” It would be very presumptuous to expect that I should be able entirely to remove difficulties which have baffled the attempts of the ablest interpreters, yet I believe that patient, careful, honest, persevering, prayerful study of any portion of God’s word is never unproductive of some good effect, and I must say, after the experience of forty years’ study of the Bible, that in enquiring into the meaning of Scripture, “darkness has often been made light before me; crooked things straight; rough places plain.”¹

The paragraph of which the subject of this *excursus* forms a part is occupied with a view of the sufferings of Christ,—(their nature, as violent, penal, vicarious, and expiatory,—their design, to bring men to God,—and their consequences more immediate and remote) considered as a source of support and consolation and hope to Christians persecuted for righteousness’ sake. It is to a portion of the consequences of Christ’s sufferings that the whole of the difficult passage before us refers.

“Christ the just one suffered for sins in the room of the unjust, that he might bring them to God;—was put to death in the flesh

¹ Those are well weighed words of the candid and learned Joachim Camerarius, a man every way worthy of being Melancthon’s friend: “Est hic unus ex iis locis sacrarum literarum, de quibus pietas religiosa quaerere amplius et dubitare quid dicatur, sine reprehensione: et de quibus diversae etiam sententiae admitti posse videantur, dummodo non detorqueatur καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, id est, religiosa de fide consensio, neque aberretur ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναλογίας τῆς πίστεως.”—Luther’s remarks, characteristic as they are, do not merit the same eulogium. “Hac tam horribili poena Petrus apostolus quoque motus videtur, ut non aliter quam fanatici loquatur talia verba, quae ne hodie quidem, a nobis intelligi possunt. 1 Pet. 3: 19, 20. Mirabile profecto iudicium, et vox paene fanatica.”—Luth. Exeg. Opp. Lett. tom. II. p. 221. I do not know that we can make any better apology for the rashness of the great reformer, than to confess with Langé, the worthy father-in-law of the learned and judicious Rambach, “virum optimum aliquid humani passum esse,” and that what he says, “ex affectu potius, quam verbis estimandum esse.”

but quickened by the Spirit, by which also he went and preached to the spirits in prison, who sometime were disobedient, and having risen from the dead he went into heaven, where he is on the right hand of God, angels and authorities and powers being made subject to him." The consequences of the penal, vicarious, expiatory sufferings of our Lord plainly divide themselves into two classes,—first, such as took place *not* in heaven, for that is all that we yet consider ourselves as warranted to say of them,—whether *on* the earth or *under* the earth—may perhaps appear in the course of our illustrations. "He was put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit, he by it went and preached to the spirits in prison who sometime were disobedient;" and secondly, such as took place in heaven: "Having risen from the dead he went into heaven and is on the right hand of God, angels and authorities and powers being made subject to him." It is to the first class of consequences,—those which took place *not* in heaven, that our attention is to be turned.

Some interpreters consider only the words rendered "put to death in the flesh but quickened by the Spirit," as descriptive of the result of our Lord's penal, vicarious, expiatory sufferings; what follows they consider as referring to something which he did in or by the same spirit by which he was quickened, on another occasion altogether, at a former period so long gone by as the antediluvian times. They interpret the words descriptive of the consequences of our Lord's sufferings for sins, in the room of sinners, thus, "He was violently put to death in his body, or in his human nature, but he was quickened, restored to life by the Spirit, i. e. either by the Holy Ghost the third person of the Holy Trinity, or by his divine nature "the Spirit of holiness" according to which he is "the Son of God," in contradistinction to his being "the Son of David according to the flesh,"—that Spirit by which he was "justified," that "Eternal Spirit through which he offered himself to God a sacrifice without spot or blemish;" and the remaining part of the statement they consider as equivalent to, "By the Holy Spirit inspiring Noah as a preacher of righteousness, or in his divine nature through Noah's instrumentality, he in the antediluvian times "went and preached"—either a pleonastic expression for *preached*, or came from heaven in his divine influence and operation,—as he came to Paradise in the cool of the day, came down to see the Tower of Babel, came down on Mount Sinai at the giving of the law,—and made known the will of God to the men of that generation who were *then* "spirits in

prison," condemned men, doomed to punishment for their sins, and kept as in a prison till the time of execution when the flood came, or who are *now* spirits in the prison of hell, kept along with the evil angels "under chains of darkness to the judgment of the great day."

The sense thus brought out of the words is self-consistent and not incompatible with any of the facts or doctrines of revelation, but this mode of interpretation seems to us liable to great and indeed insurmountable objections. The words "flesh" and "spirit" are plainly opposed to one another, the prepositions *in* and *by* are not in the original. The opposed words¹ are in the same case; they stand plainly in the same relation respectively to the words rendered "put to death" and "quicken";² and that relation should have been expressed in English by the same particle.³ If you give the rendering "put to death *in* the flesh" you must give the corresponding rendering "quicken *in* the Spirit" which would bring out the sense either "quicken *in* his human spirit or soul"—a statement to which it is difficult to attach a distinct meaning, for the soul is not mortal,—Christ's spirit did not die,—and *to continue alive* is not the meaning of the original word; or "quicken *in* his divine nature,"—a statement obviously absurd and false, as implying that he who is "the life"—the living one can be quickened either in the sense of *being restored from a state of death* or of *being endowed with a larger measure of vitality*. On the other hand if you adopt the rendering of our translators in the second clause "quicken *by* the Spirit," then you must render in accordance with it the first clause "put to death *by* the flesh." If by "the Spirit" you understand the divine nature of our Lord, by "the flesh" you must understand his human nature, which makes the expression "put to death by the flesh" an absurdity. On the other hand if you understand by "the Spirit" *the Holy Ghost*, then by "the flesh" you must understand *mankind*—put to death by men but restored to life by God the Spirit. This interpretation though giving a consistent and true sense,—the sense so

¹ Σαρκί, πνεύματι.

² Θανατωθεῖς, ζωοποιηθεῖς.

³ Wiclif is uniform in his rendering "made dede *in* fleisch, but made quyke *in* spirit—he cam *in* spirit," etc. So is Tyndale, so far as the repeated mention of *spirit* is concerned,—*"was kylled as pertayning to the flesshe: but was quickened in the sprete, in which sprete he also went,"* etc. Cranmer repeats Tyndale—as does the Geneva with some slight orthographical change. The Rhemists in the first part of the rendering are nearer the truth than any of them—*"mortified certes in flesh but quickened in spirit. In the which spirit,"* etc.

forcibly expressed in Peter's words to the Jews, "whom ye crucified,—whom *God* raised from the dead," is forbidden by the usage of the language. Then there can be no doubt that there does appear something very unnatural in introducing our Lord, in the midst of what is plainly a description of the results of his atoning sufferings, as having, in the spirit by which he was quickened, after he had been put to death, gone many centuries before in the antediluvian age to preach to an ungodly world,—and there is just as little doubt that the only meaning which the words will bear, without violence being done them, is that it was when he had been put to death in the flesh and quickened ~~in~~ ^{by} the Spirit, whatever that may mean,—he went and preached; and that "the spirits" whoever they be, were "in prison," whatever that may mean, when he preached to them. These are not all the difficulties connected with this interpretation, which may be termed the common Protestant interpretation of the passage; but they are quite sufficient to convince us that it is untenable, and to induce the apprehension that it would never have been resorted to but from its supposed necessity to destroy the shadow of support which another mode of interpretation gives to *some of the errors of Popery* which, by that "deceivableness of unrighteousness" which characterizes the system,—have been turned to great account in fettering the minds and plundering the property of the unhappy victims of that masterpiece of imposture and superstition; or to the *soul-endangering dream of Universalism*, that there are means of grace, of which those who die unforgiven, may avail themselves in the separate state, so as to avoid the natural results of their living and dying in unbelief and impenitence.

Another class of interpreters consider the whole statement before us as referring to what happened subsequent to, and consequent on our Lord's penal, vicarious, expiatory sufferings.¹

¹ A pretty full account of the diversified opinions referred to in this and the following paragraph is to be found in the third Excursus appended to the second fasciculus of Potts' Commentary on the Catholic Epistles, forming the LXth volume of the "Editio Koppiana" of the N. T. It is entitled "Variae interpretum, de descensu J. C. ad inferos, sententiae secundum temporum ordinem enumerantur, et breviter dijudicantur; nostraque interpretatio, copiosius explicatur." Bishop Horsley belongs to the more reasonable portion of this class. His defence of his view of the passage like everything he did bears the marks of power—imaginative, and ratiocinative—but like many things he did is lamentably deficient in sober thinking and conclusive argument. It is a happy thing that Priestley had other confuters, and the divinity of Christ other defenders than the Bishop of Rochester.

Some of these consider the event referred to in the words, "He went and preached to the spirits in prison," as having taken place during the interval between our Lord's death and resurrection; others as having taken place after his resurrection. The first consider the words rendered "having been put to death in the flesh but quickened by the Spirit" as equivalent to "having become dead as to his body"—a fair rendering of the words,—"but continuing alive as to his soul,"—a sense which the original words will not bear,—he in that soul went to the region of separate souls, Hades, the invisible state, and there preached to the spirits in prison who before were disobedient. The second consider the words referred to as equivalent to "being put to death in his human nature, but restored to life by his divine nature or by the Holy Ghost, he in his resurrection-body, (which they conceive was not subject to the ordinary laws of matter) in his new life, went down to the region of separate souls and there preached to the spirits in prison.

These two classes of interpreters, holding in common that our Lord went down to Hades, are considerably divided as to what was his object in going there as described or hinted at in the passage before us; one class holding that he went to hell (*Gehenna*) the place of torment, to proclaim to the fallen angels who are kept there under chains of darkness, as the "spirits in prison," (though how *they* could be disobedient in the days of Noah does not appear, and these spirits seem plainly to belong to the same class of beings as "the souls" that were saved v. 20,) to proclaim throughout that dismal region his triumph over them and their apostate chief; another class holding that he went to the place of torment to announce his triumph over the powers of darkness, and to offer salvation through his death to those human spirits who had died in their sins; a third class holding that he went to purgatory to deliver those who had been sufficiently improved by their disciplinary sufferings and to remove them to paradise; and a fourth class holding that he went to paradise, the residence of the separate spirits of good men, translating the "spirits in prison"¹—the spirits in safe keeping, to announce to them the glad tidings that the great salvation which had been the object of their faith and hope was now completed.

Each of these varieties of interpretation is attended with its own difficulties,—difficulties which appear to me insuperable.

¹ *Τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι.*

Some of them go upon principles obviously and demonstrably false, and all of them attempt to bring much out of the words which plainly is not in them. To state particularly the objections against each of them would occupy a good deal of time, and, I am afraid, would afford little satisfaction and less edification to my readers. There are however common difficulties bearing on them all which seem quite sufficient to warrant us to set them all aside, and which may be stated in a sentence or two. It seems incredible if such events, as are darkly hinted at, rather than distinctly described in these words thus interpreted, had taken place that we should have no account of them, indeed no certain allusion to them, in any other part of Scripture. It seems quite unaccountable why the separate spirits of those who had lived in the days of Noah and perished in the deluge, are specially mentioned as those among the inhabitants of the unseen world to whom the quickened Redeemer went and preached, the much greater multitude before and since that time who had gone down to the land of darkness being passed by without notice; and what will weigh much with a judicious student of Scripture, it is impossible to perceive how these events, supposing them to have taken place, were, as they are represented by the construction of the language to be, the effects of Christ's suffering for sins, in the room of sinners, and how these statements at all serve to promote the apostle's practical object which was to persuade persecuted Christians to submit patiently and cheerfully to sufferings for righteousness' sake from the consideration, exemplified in the case of our Lord, that suffering in a good cause and in a right spirit, however severe, was calculated to lead to the happiest results. No interpretation, we apprehend, can be the right one which does not correspond with the obvious construction of the passage, and with the avowed design of the writer.

Keeping these general principles steadily in view, I proceed now to state as briefly and as plainly as I can, what appears to me the probable meaning of this difficult passage,—“a passage” as Leighton says, “somewhat obscure in itself, but as it usually falls, made more so by the various fancies and contests of interpreters aiming or pretending to clear it.”

The first consequence noticed here of those penal, vicarious, expiatory sufferings which Christ the Just One endured by the appointment of his Father the righteous judge, for sins, in the room of the unjust, is that he “was put to death in the flesh.”¹ The

¹ θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί.

unjust in whose room he stood were doomed to death, and he, in bearing their sins submitted to *death*—to a violent death—to a form of violent death which by a divine appointment marked him as the victim of public justice.¹ He was with wicked hands crucified, hung on a tree,—and he that was hanged on a tree was declared to be *accursed* or to have died as a victim of sin by the hand of public justice. The idea here however seems not to be so much the violent nature of the infliction, as its effect,—the entire privation of life and consequently of power. The word seems used as in Romans 7: 4, “ye are dead.”² He became dead in the flesh,—he became bodily dead,—he died *σαρκικῶς*,—he lay an inanimate, powerless corpse in the sepulchre.

But his becoming thus bodily dead and powerless was not more certainly the effect of his penal, vicarious, expiatory sufferings, than the second circumstance here mentioned, his “being quickened in the spirit.” If this refers to his resurrection we must render it “quickened by the Spirit,”—but we have already seen that without misinterpretation it cannot be so rendered. Besides, the resurrection is expressly mentioned in the twenty-first verse in connection with the ascension to heaven. To be “quickened *in the spirit*” is to be quickened spiritually, as to be put to death in the flesh is to become dead bodily. Thus *πορὶν ἐν πνεύματι*, i. e. *πνευματικῶς*,³ waxed strong in spirit, *ἐκχαταίνοντο πνεύματι*, i. e. *πνευματικῶς*,⁴ rejoiced in spirit, *ἡγαλλιάσατο ἐν πνεύματι*, i. e. *πνευματικῶς*.⁵ The word rendered to be “quickened,” *ζωοποιεῖσθαι*, literally signifies to be made alive or living. It is used to signify the original communication of life, the restoration of life to the dead, and the communication of a large measure of life to the living. A consequence of our Lord's penal, vicarious and expiatory sufferings was that he became spiritually alive and powerful, in a sense and to a degree in which he was not previously, and in which but for these sufferings he never could have become,—full of life to communicate to dead souls,—“mighty to save.” He was thus spiritually quickened. “The Father gave him to have life in himself” that he might give eternal life to as many as the Father had given him,—to all coming to the Father through him.” “All power,” even the power of God, “was given to Him” who had been crucified in weakness, and by this power he lives and gives life. “The second

¹ Deut. 21: 23; Gal. 3: 13.

² *ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ*, not “ye have been put to death by the law.”

³ Matt. 5: 3.

⁴ Luke. 1: 80.

⁵ Luke 10: 21.

Adam" thus "became a quickening spirit." He became as it were the receptacle of life and spiritual influence, out of which men were to "receive and grace for grace." As a divine person, all life, all power necessarily adhered in his nature; but as Mediator, that spiritual life and energy which makes him powerful to save are gifts bestowed on him by the Father as rewards of his obedience to death, and as the means of gaining the ultimate object of his atoning sufferings. "He asked" of the Father this "life," and "He gave it him." It was the consequence of his penal, vicarious, expiatory sufferings. It is to this that our Lord refers when he says, "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die," or rather falling into the ground, being dead, "it abideth alone, but if it die,"—if it be dead, "it bringeth forth much fruit." Had Christ not died bodily as the victim of sin, he could not have "lived forever" as our all successful Intercessor,— "able to save to the uttermost"—forever. "I if I be lifted up," said he,—lifted upon the cross, "for this he said signifying what death he should die," "I if I should be lifted up will draw all men unto me."¹ "The captain of our salvation was perfected by his sufferings." "Because he humbled himself, God highly exalted him, and gave him" all "power over all flesh," "all power in heaven and in earth."

The spiritual life and power conferred on the Saviour as the reward of his disinterested labors in the cause of God's honor and man's salvation, was illustriously manifested in that wonderful quickening of his apostles by the communication of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, and in communicating through the instrumentality of their ministry spiritual life and all its concomitant and following blessings to multitudes of souls "dead in sin."

It is to this, I apprehend, that the apostle refers when he says *by which* or *whereby*²—by this spiritual quickening, or *wherefore* being thus spiritually quickened "he went and preached to the spirits in prison who before time were disobedient." If our general scheme of interpretation is well founded there can be no doubt as to who those spirits in prison are. They are not human spirits confined in bodies like so many prisons as a punishment for sin in some previous state of being. That is a heathenish doctrine to which Scripture rightly interpreted gives no sanction. They are sinful men righteously condemned, the slaves and captives of Satan, shackled with the fetters of sin. These are the captives to whom Messiah, "anointed by the Spirit of the Lord,"

¹ John 12: 24, 32.

² ἐν ᾧ.

—i. e. just in other words, "quickened in the Spirit," was to proclaim liberty,—the bound ones to whom he was to announce the opening of the prison. This is no uncommon mode of representing the work of the Messiah. "Thus saith the Lord God, he that created the heavens and stretched them out, he that spread forth the earth and that which cometh out of it, he that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein; I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thy hand, and will keep thee and will give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light to the Gentiles to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison-house."¹ "He said unto me, Thou art my servant, O Israel, in whom I will be glorified. Then I said, I have labored in vain, I have spent my strength for nought and in vain; yet surely my judgment is with the Lord, and my work with my God. And now, saith the Lord, that formed me from the womb to be his servant, to bring Jacob again to him, Though Israel be not gathered, yet shall I be glorious in the eyes of the Lord, and my God shall be my strength. And he said, It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a Light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth. Thus saith the Lord, the Redeemer of Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man despiseth, to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers: Kings shall see and arise, princes also shall worship because of the Lord that is faithful, and the Holy One of Israel, and he shall choose thee. Thus saith the Lord, in an acceptable time have I heard thee, and in a day of salvation have I helped thee; and I will preserve thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, to establish the earth, to cause to inherit the desolate heritages; that thou mayest say to the prisoners, Go forth; to them that are in darkness, Show yourselves; they shall feed in the ways, and their pastures shall be in all high places. They shall not hunger nor thirst; neither shall the heat nor sun smite them; for he that hath mercy on them shall lead them, even by the springs of water shall he guide them. And I will make all my mountains a way, and my high-ways shall be exalted. Behold these shall come from far; and lo, these from the north and from the west; and these from the land of Sinim."²

It is not remarkable then that guilty, depraved men should be

¹ Isaiah 42: 5, 7.

² Isaiah 49: 3—12.

represented as captives in prison, but the phrase "spirits in prison" seems a strange one,—for spiritually captive men. It is so; but the use of *it* rather than the phrase *men in prison* or *prisoners* seems to have grown out of the previous phrase "quickened in spirit," "congruens sermo," as Bengel has it. He who was quickened in spirit had to do with the spirits of men, with men as spiritual beings. This idea seems to have given a color to the whole passage; the eight persons saved from the deluge are termed "eight souls."

But then it seems as if the spirits in prison to whom our Lord, quickened in spirit, is represented as coming and preaching were the unbelieving generation who lived before the flood, "the spirits in prison who aforetime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noe." This difficulty is not a formidable one; this stumbling-block may easily be removed. "Spirits in prison" is a phrase characteristic of men in all ages. We see nothing perplexing in the statement "God sent the gospel to the Britons, who in the days of Caesar were painted savages;" the persons to whom God sent the gospel were not the same individuals who were painted savages in the days of Caesar, but they belonged to the same race; neither should we find anything perplexing in the statement, Jesus Christ came and preached to spiritually captive men who in former times and especially in the days of Noah had been hard to be convinced.¹ The reason why there is reference to the disobedience of men in former times and especially in the days of Noah will probably come out in the course of our future illustrations. The statements in v. 20 and 21 are substantially parenthetical and will be considered at greater advantage by themselves.

Having endeavored to dispose of these verbal difficulties, let us now attend to the sentiment contained in the words, 'Jesus Christ spiritually quickened came and preached to the spirits in prison, who in time past were disobedient.' The coming and preaching describe not what our Lord did *bodily*, *σαρκινῶς* or *σωματικῶς*, but what he did spiritually *πνευματικῶς*, not what he did personally, but what he did by the instrumentality of others. The apos-

¹ *Quales animi olim Noe temporibus non obtemperarunt. Loquitur, quasi iidem fuissent: et fuerunt iidem, spiritus, sive animi, non iidem in ἀνιδμῳ ut Aristoteles loquitur, sed genere.*—Grotius. It is the fashion in certain quarters to speak slightly of the great Dutchman. While mourning that the spiritual element of the interpreter was not more abundant in him, for it was not wanting, I regard Grotius as one of the first interpreters of Scripture. In two lines he often throws more light on a passage than many interpreters of high name in two pages.

the Paul has explained the meaning of the apostle Peter when in the second chapter of the epistle to the Ephesians, he represents Christ as "Having abolished in his flesh the enmity, coming and preaching peace to those who were afar off and to them who were nigh," that is, both to the Jews and to the Gentiles. Another very satisfactory commentary may be found in the gospels. "All power is given unto me," said our Saviour after being "quickened in the spirit," "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth, Go ye therefore and *teach* all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, and lo I am with you alway even to the end of the world. So then after the Lord had *thus* spoken to them, he was received into heaven, and sat on the right hand of God, and they went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them and confirming the word with signs following."¹ To the apostle Paul who was born as one out of due time, the commission was, "I send thee to the Gentiles to open their eyes, to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive the forgiveness of sins, and an inheritance among them that are sanctified by faith that is in Christ," and whatever Paul did effectually in the discharge of that commission, it was not *he* but *Christ* by him.² This then is Christ quickened in consequence of his suffering, the just one in the room of the unjust, going and preaching to the "spirits in prison."

There are two subsidiary ideas in reference to this preaching of Christ "quickened in the spirit" to the "spirits in prison" that are suggested by the words of the apostle. These are the *success* of his preaching and the *extent of that success*. These "spirits in prison" had "aforetime been disobedient." Christ had preached to them not only by Noah, but by all the prophets, for the Spirit in the prophets was the "Spirit of Christ;" but he had preached in a great measure in vain. He had to complain in reference to his preaching by his prophets, in reference to his own personal preaching previously to his "suffering the just in the room of the unjust," saying, "I have labored in vain, I have spent my strength for nought and in vain, all day long I have stretched out my hands to a stiff-necked and rebellious people,—Who hath believed our report?" But now Christ, being quickened by the

¹ Eph. 2: 13, 17. Matt. 28: 18, 19. Mark 16: 19, 20.

² Acts 26: 16—18. Rom. 15: 18.

Spirit and quickening others by the Spirit, the consequence was, "the disobedient were turned to the wisdom of the just" and the "spirits in prison" appeared "a people made ready, prepared for the Lord." The word attended by the Spirit in consequence of the shedding of the blood of the covenant, had "free course and was glorified," and "the prisoners were sent forth out of the pit wherein there was no water." "The prey was taken from the mighty; the captives of the terrible one were delivered." The sealed among the tribes of Israel were 144,000, and the converted from among the nations, "the people taken out from among the Gentiles to the name" of Jehovah was an innumerable company, "a multitude which no man could number, out of every kindred, and people, and tribe, and nation." It was not then as "in the days of Noah when few, that is eight, souls were saved." Multitudes heard and knew "the joyful sound," the shackles dropped from their limbs, and they walked at liberty, keeping God's commandments. And still does the fountain of life spring up in the quickened Redeemer's heart and well forth, giving life to the world; still does the great Deliverer prosecute his glorious work of spiritual emancipation; still is he going and preaching to the "spirits in prison," and though all have not obeyed, yet many have obeyed, many are obeying, many more will yet obey.

The connection of this increased spiritual life and vigor in Christ as the Redeemer and Saviour of men, and its blessed consequences in the extensive and effectual administration of the word of his grace, with his penal, vicarious, expiatory sufferings, is stated here, but not here only. It is often brought forward in Scripture: "Christ has redeemed men from the curse of the law, having become a curse in their room, that the blessing of Abraham,"—a free and full justification, "might come upon the Gentiles, and that men might receive the promised Spirit through believing." "It is expedient for you that I go away, for if I go not away the Comforter will not come unto you, but if I go away I will send him to you." The Spirit is given because Jesus is glorified, and Jesus is glorified for he has "finished the work which the Father had given him to do" in "laying down his life for the sheep," in "giving his flesh for the life of the world."

The connection between the atoning death of Christ and his being quickened, with his quickening men may be readily apprehended. The truth respecting it may be stated in a sentence or two. The power of dispensing divine influence formed an im-

portant part of our Lord's mediatorial reward, and it is impossible to conceive of any reward more suitable to his holy, benevolent character, and there was an obvious propriety that the work should be accomplished before the reward was conferred. The truth respecting Christ's dying, the just in the room of the unjust, is the grand instrument which the Holy Spirit employs for converting men, for quickening dead souls. This is the great subject of efficient preaching. Till the atonement was made, the revelation of it could be but obscure, for the history could not be written, till the events had taken place. It was meet that the great preacher should have a clear, full message to proclaim before he came and preached to every nation under heaven; and that the great spiritual agent should be furnished with the fittest instrumentality for performing all the moral miracles of the new creation.

The view, which we have endeavored to establish, of this much disputed passage has the advantage,—an advantage not possessed by most other expositions of it,—of preserving both the grammatical and logical connection. The words of the apostle thus explained plainly bear on his great practical object. "Be not afraid, be not ashamed of suffering in a good cause in a right spirit." No damage comes from well-doing or from suffering in well-doing. Christ in "suffering the just for the unjust that he might bring us to God," suffered for well-doing, and though his sufferings ended in his dying *bodily*, they ended also in his being spiritually quickened, and, through the effectual manifestation of the truth, becoming "the Author of eternal salvation to all who obey him." Nor is this all, even his mortal body has in consequence of these sufferings been raised from the grave, and in that body he is "gone into heaven and sat down on the right hand of God, angels and authorities and powers being made subject to him."

I am farther confirmed in this view of the passage, by observing that in one very important part of it I have the support of archbishop Leighton. In the *text* of his commentary he interprets the passage according to the usual Protestant mode of exposition, but in a note he observes, "Thus I then thought; but do now apprehend another sense as more probable, The mission of the Spirit, and preaching of the gospel by it after his resurrection; preaching to sinners and converting them according to the prophecy, which he first fulfilled in person, and after more amply in his apostles; that prophecy I mean, Isaiah lxi. The Spirit was

upon him, and was sent from him to his apostles to preach to 'spirits in prison,' to preach liberty to the captives,—*captive spirits*, and therefore called '*spirits in prison*' to illustrate the thing the more by opposition to that spirit of Christ,—the spirit of liberty setting them free; and this to show the greater efficacy of Christ's preaching than of Noah's, though he was a signal preacher of righteousness, yet only himself and his family—eight persons—were saved by him, but multitudes of all nations by the Spirit and preaching of Christ in the gospel."

I conclude with a few reflections suggested by the subject we have been considering.

How deplorable is the condition of fallen men, "spirits in prison"—"dead souls!" There is something monstrous here, for there is nothing naturally so free as *spirits*, nothing so full of life as *souls*. How deplorable to see bondage and death where there originally was nothing but liberty and life! We may be disgusted but we are not surprised at seeing a loathsome reptile crawling on the earth, but we are at once amazed and shocked when we see the bird of the sun with blinded eyes, broken pinions and soiled feathers moving awkwardly and with difficulty along the ground instead of sailing majestically through the depths of ether. Alas, what a captivity!—condemned,—waiting the hour of the execution of the sentence,—no possibility of effecting their escape,—nor man, nor angel can open the door of their prison-house. Yet are they, blessed be God, prisoners of hope. There is a Saviour and a great one, Jesus who "saves his people from their sins" and who in doing so "delivers them from the wrath to come."

How well fitted is He for performing all the functions of a deliverer! This is the second reflection suggested by our subject. He has become "perfect through sufferings." He has all the merit,—all the power both as to external event and internal influence,—all the authority, all the sympathy, that is necessary to enable him effectually to liberate the prisoners of divine justice, the captives of infernal power. He has suffered for sins, the just for the unjust; so as to become dead as the victim of human transgression; and the atonement made by these sufferings is an atonement of infinite value; and he has been spiritually quickened,—endowed with such a superabundance of life as to enable him to give eternal life to innumerable dead souls,—and endowed with an infinity of energy so that he can vanquish the enslavers, level the prison walls, and loose the fetters of innumerable spirits in prison.

Prisoners of hope, turn the eye of faith and desire towards your all accomplished Deliverer. Remember "*now* is the accepted time." Yet a little longer and ye will be prisoners more than ever, but no longer prisoners *of hope*. To borrow the earnest expostulation of a pious divine: "Oh do not destroy yourselves; you are in prison, he proclaims you liberty. Christ proclaims you liberty and will you not accept it? Think though you may be pleased with your present thralldom and prison, it reserves you (if you come not forth) to another prison which will not please you. These chains of spiritual darkness in which you now are, unless you be freed by him, will be exchanged not for freedom, but for the chains of everlasting darkness wherein the hopeless prisoners are kept to the judgment of the great day. Accept his offer of deliverance. Life, liberty, blessedness are yours,—yours forever. The Son makes "you free and ye are free indeed." The eternal life which was with the Father gives you life, and you have life, you have it abundantly."

In what a dignified light does this passage represent the ministry of divine truth! It is the work of the perfected Saviour. Having suffered to the death for sins in the room of the unjust, and having been spiritually quickened, he comes and preaches to the "spirits in prison." He preaches "peace to them that are afar off and to them who are nigh." The voice is on earth, the speaker is in heaven. "God who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke to the father by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken to us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds, who being the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the majesty on high, being made so much better than the angels, as he hath received by inheritance a more excellent name than they." He that neglecteth and despiseth the word of reconciliation despiseth not man but God,—God in Christ reconciling the world to himself,—wonderful,—most wonderful!—beseeching men to be reconciled to him. Surely we should see that "we refuse not him, speaking thus to us from heaven. Surely we should give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard,—which we now hear from him, lest at any time we let them slip, for if the word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward, How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation which at the

first began to be spoken by the Lord and was confirmed unto us by them who heard him, God also bearing witness with signs, and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost according to his own will." The exalted Redeemer is the great, the only effectual preacher. His ministers preach with effect only when he speaks and works in them and by them. It is an advice full of wisdom as well as of piety, which the good archbishop gives those who are anxious to derive saving advantage from the ministry of the word. "Ye that are for your own interest, be earnest with this Lord of life,—this fountain of Spirit,—to let forth more of it upon his messengers in these times. You would receive back the fruit of your prayers. Were ye busy this way you would find more life and refreshing sweetness in the word of life, how weak and worthless soever they were that brought it. It would descend as sweet showers upon the valleys and make them fruitful." "Brethren" for your own sakes as well as ours, "pray for us, that the word of the Lord may have free course and be glorified." His word is "quick and powerful;" it is "spirit and life;" it "converts the soul; it makes wise the simple; it rejoices the heart; it enlightens the eyes." It is as powerful now as in the primitive ages. It "brings down high imaginations" and while it emancipates the imprisoned spirit from the thralldom of depraved principle, Satanic power, and human authority, "it brings into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ." O that through his preaching many may be thus at once emancipated and made captive—freed from the fetters of earthliness and sin and bound in the chains of holy principle and divine love,—may at once cease to be "spirits in prison" and become inhabitants of that High Tower, that impregnable fortress" in which all obedient to his call are "kept by the power of God, through faith unto salvation."

In conclusion, I remark that the subject we have been considering brings before the mind in a very striking form some of the great motives and encouragements to missionary exertion. The state of the unenlightened part of mankind as "spirits in prison" calls for our sympathy, and since their imprisonment is not hopeless, it calls for our exertions to procure their emancipation. Had there been no atoning sacrifice,—no quickening Spirit,—it would have been godlike to mourn their servitude and condemnation, but it would have been madness to have attempted their deliverance. But there has been an all perfect, an infinitely valuable, atoning sacrifice offered up, Christ the just one has died

in the room of the unjust for the express purpose that enslaved, condemned men, might be brought to forgiveness and liberty by being brought to God. No legal bars lie in the way of the emancipation of the "spirits in prison," for the offered sacrifice has been accepted, the righteous Judge is well pleased with it and ready to demonstrate that he is just in justifying the ungodly who believe in Jesus. He has shown this by bringing from the dust of death and seating on his own right hand him who "gave himself a ransom for many." As there is a law satisfying atonement, so there is also a powerful quickening Spirit who gives life and liberty. He who was put to death in the flesh, is spiritually quickened by that Spirit, and having that Spirit given him without measure, he in the word of the truth of the gospel not only proclaims liberty to the captives, but by that Spirit actually breaks their fetters and gives them at once the power and the disposition to walk at liberty keeping the commandments of God. Yes, he who died the just in the room of the unjust, he, who to make atonement for sin was crucified in weakness" and "became dead in the flesh," having been "quickened in the spirit," "lives by the power of God" and has come preaching to the "spirits in prison," making the perverse, "willing in the day of his power," and bringing the "disobedient to the wisdom of the just."

The great work of the emancipation of the "spirits in prison" is not then a hopeless one. Many have been delivered. Multitudes more will be delivered. Jesus Christ has not died in vain. The life which the Father has given him to have in himself shall not remain dormant and inoperative. It was so ordained that he might be a fountain of life to spiritually dead men and might quicken whom he would. This great work of the emancipation of the "spirits in prison" is, strictly speaking, the work of the divine Deliverer. He only could make atonement. He only can give the Spirit. He has, however, most kindly and wisely so arranged the method of emancipation, that a place is afforded for the active, willing services of those whom he has delivered, in accomplishing the actual enfranchisement of their brethren who still remain "spirits in prison." The gospel which announces the atonement, and in connection with which the Spirit is given, is to be diffused not by miraculous means, not by angelic agency, but by the voluntary exertions of spiritually emancipated men. Their exertions are, as it were, the triumphal chariot in which the Redeemer "rides forth prosperously, because of truth and meekness and righteousness," taking the captivity captive, wrest-

ing his slaves from the mighty, his prey from the terrible one. We are the angels by which the everlasting gospel is to be preached to them who dwell on the earth and to every nation, and kindred and tongue and people. It is in the gospel, thus propagated, that we are to look for Him who is "quickened in the Spirit" to preach effectually to the "spirits in prison." Let then these considerations, that mankind are in a state of condemnation and spiritual slavery, that an all-perfect atoning sacrifice has been offered up, suited to them all, sufficient for them all, offered to them all,—that by that sacrifice an honorable channel has been opened for the life-giving, liberty-giving spirit,—that a plain, well accredited record has been given forth, a record fitted and intended to be the Holy Spirit's instrument of putting the individual sinner in possession of the saving results of the atonement, and of filling the heart with the energies and joys of spiritual life and liberty,—and that that record is put into *our* hands for the purpose of being universally made known, that wherever there are "spirits in prison," liberty may be proclaimed to them. Let these considerations make their due impression on us, and then instead of wearying in well doing, allowing our zeal to abate or our exertions to diminish, we shall be "steadfast and immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord," counting it a high honor that we are permitted to take a part, however humble, in carrying forward to complete accomplishment the mighty enterprise in which God makes known the depth of his wisdom, the greatness of his power, and the riches of his grace, and for which, the incarnate Son died on earth and reigns in heaven.

PART II.

—, *Ἀπειθήσασι ποτε, ὅτε ἀπαξ ἐξεδέχετο ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μακροθυμία ἐν ἡμέραις Νῶε, κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ, εἰς ἣν ὀλίγαι (τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὀκτώ) ψυχαὶ διεσώθησαν δι' ὕδατος. Ὡ, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀντίστοιχον τῶν σωζομένων βάπτισμα, (ὃν σαρκὸς ἀποθέσεις ῥύπον, ἀλλὰ συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερωτήμη εἰς θεόν, δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.*

THE Jewish Scriptures form an important and valuable portion of the volume of inspired truth. To those who lived previously to the Gospel revelation, they contained the only authentic and satisfactory account of the divine character and will, in reference

to man as a fallen creature; they were the sole trustworthy guides to truth, duty and happiness. They were accordingly highly valued by the wise and pious under the ancient economy. "The law of thy mouth," said the Psalmist,—and he expressed the common sentiment and feelings of the body of the faithful,— "The law of thy mouth is better to me than thousands of gold and silver," "more to be desired than gold, yea than much fine gold, sweeter also than honey, yea than the honey comb." "Even to us, to whom the mystery which had been kept secret from former ages and generations has been made manifest," the Jewish Scriptures are calculated to answer many important purposes. Though the Mosaic dispensation has "become old and vanished away," the writings of the prophets have not become obsolete. The pure radiance of apostolical doctrine has not extinguished the dimmer light of ancient history and prophecy; on the contrary, these, borrowing new splendor from the full risen sun of righteousness, cheer us with a brighter and warmer beam, than they ever reflected on those who but for them must have walked in darkness. In the great edifice of revealed truth, the Old Testament Scriptures are not the scaffolding which, when the building is finished, ceases to be useful and is removed as an unsightly incumbrance; they are the foundation and lower part of the fabric, forming an important constituent partition of the "building of God" and are essentially necessary not only to the beauty but also to the safety of the superstructure.

It is possible indeed to demonstrate the divinity of Christianity and the truth of New Testament doctrine and history on principles which have no direct reference to any former revelation of the divine will, but it is at the same time true that one of the most satisfactory proofs of these truths is founded on the admission of the divinity of the Jewish sacred books, and consists in the minute harmony of Old Testament prediction with the New Testament history and doctrine. "The testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy." Few exercises are better fitted at once to enlarge the information and strengthen the faith of the Christian than a careful perusal of the Old Testament Scriptures with a constant reference to *Him* who is the "end of the law"—the substance of all its shadowy ceremonies; *Him* of whom "Moses in the law, and the prophets do write."

This is, however, by no means the only way in which the Old Testament Scriptures are calculated to minister to our improvement. They contain an extensive collection of instructions

and warnings, counsels and consolations suited to mankind in every country and age. The man of piety, wherever or whenever he may live, finds in the sacred odes of David at once a perfect pattern for his devotional exercises and a fit vehicle for his devotional feelings; the maxims of Solomon are found equally suitable for the guidance of our conduct as of that of his contemporaries, and though many of the writings of the prophets bear plain marks of being *occasional* in their origin and reference, relating to events, which at the time of their publication excited general interest among the people to whom they were given, yet it is amazing how *few* the passages are which are not obviously calculated to convey instruction, universal and permanent,—fitted to all men, in all time.

Even the historical books of the Old Testament are fitted in various ways to promote the improvement of the Christian and on this account have strong claims on our attentive study. Like every true history, and indeed in a much higher degree than any other history, they convey to us in the most engaging form much information regarding the character and government of God, and respecting the state, dispositions and duty of man. They contain an account of the origin and progress of that system of divine dispensation which found its accomplishment in the redemption of mankind by the death of the incarnate Son of God—an account, without which, much of the Christian revelation would have been obscure, if not unintelligible. They suggest numerous proofs and illustrations of the characteristic principles of the Christian revelation, and thus at once enable us more fully to understand and more firmly to believe them. The minds of the writers of the New Testament were full of the facts and imagery of the earlier revelation, and they can be but very imperfectly understood,—they are constantly in danger of being misunderstood by those readers who have not acquired a somewhat similar familiarity, by carefully studying the Old Testament Scriptures.

Of the manner in which the New Testament writers employ their familiarity with the Old Testament for the illustration of the subjects which come before them, we have a striking instance in that portion of Scripture to which the attention of the reader is now to be directed.

The paragraph, of which these verses, 20 and 21, form a part, is, as was observed in the former communication, a statement of the truth with regard to the sufferings of Jesus Christ, in their

nature, design, and consequences,—a statement made for the purpose of affording instruction and support to the followers of Jesus when exposed to suffering in his cause. In the course of this statement, the apostle notices certain facts in antediluvian history recorded in the Old Testament Scriptures as bearing on the facts respecting Jesus Christ which he states, or on the object for which he states these facts. To ascertain distinctly what are the facts in antediluvian history to which the apostle refers and to show if possible what is his object in referring to them,—what bearing they have on the obvious general design of the whole paragraph,—are the two objects which I shall endeavor to gain in the remaining portion of these remarks.

The passage which is to form the subject of exposition, though not *formally*, it is plain, *substantially* parenthetical, and is contained in these words: "The spirits in prison sometime were disobedient, when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is eight, souls were saved by water. The like figure whereunto even baptism doth also now save us, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience toward God, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ."

The first thing we have to do then is to bring before our minds the facts in the history of the antediluvian world to which the apostle here refers. "The spirits in prison sometime were disobedient when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah while the ark was a preparing wherein a few, that is eight, souls were saved by water." I have already endeavored to show that the most probable meaning which has been given to the somewhat remarkable phrase "spirits in prison," is, that which considers it as a descriptive appellation of mankind in their fallen state. *Captives* and *prisoners* are figurative expressions not unfrequently used in Scripture to denote the condemned state, miserable circumstances, and degraded character of fallen men. Our Lord having obtained by his atoning death a mighty accession, in his official character, to his spiritual life and energy, went and, through the instrumentality of his apostles, preached with remarkable success to those miserable captives, those spirits in prison,—vast multitudes of them becoming obedient to his call. But it had not always been so. Communications of the divine will had often been made in former ages to fallen men, without such effects. In particular, in a very remote age, at a period preceding the general deluge, a divine message was sent to those

condemned criminals, those willing captives of Satan and of sin, those "spirits in prison,"—for although not *the same individuals* to whom our Lord "came and preached," they were *individuals of the same race* and therefore designated not improperly by the same name,—but they, with very few exceptions, despised the remarkable manifestation of divine forbearance of which they had been the subjects, they disregarded the message, and in consequence of their disobedience they were destroyed by the deluge. A very small minority were obedient and in consequence of their obedience were saved in the ark, "saved by water." These are the facts respecting the antediluvians which are either explicitly stated or necessarily implied in the words before us.

We have but detached fragments of the history of mankind previous to the deluge,—a period of nearly seventeen centuries. This we know, that at the time which our text refers to, they had with very few exceptions become decidedly irreligious and excessively depraved. The language of the sacred historian is very striking. "God saw the wickedness of man that it was great in the earth and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." "The earth was corrupt,"—*putrid*, "before God, and the earth was filled with violence, and God looked on the earth and behold it was corrupt, for all flesh had corrupted his way on the earth."

If man was thus irreligious and corrupt, it was not because he had not the means of being otherwise. If the primitive revelation through the faith of which Abel obtained salvation was forgotten, disregarded, or perverted, the fault was in man. Besides "God never left men without a witness, in that he gave them rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness." This goodness was calculated, was intended, "to lead them to repentance, to change their minds respecting God, whom they had learned to "think of as such a one as themselves." "The heavens," before the flood as well as afterwards, "declared the glory of God, and the firmament showed forth his handy-work." "The invisible things of God were from the creation of the world clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead," so that when the antediluvians, having the means of knowing God, "glorified him not as God, neither were thankful," but gave themselves up to work wickedness with all greediness, they were "without excuse."

Nor was this all. It is reasonable to suppose that during these seventeen centuries direct divine communications were made to the fallen race. It is certain that "Enoch the seventh from Adam prophesied," warning his contemporaries of the destruction which would ultimately overtake the ungodly, saying, "Behold the Lord cometh with ten thousand of his saints or holy ones, to execute judgment on all and to convince all that are ungodly among them of their ungodly deeds which they have ungodly committed, and of all the hard speeches which ungodly sinners have spoken against him." Thus had God by his Spirit striven with men for more than fifteen hundred years. "Sentence against men's evil works was not executed speedily and the hearts of men were fully set in them to do evil." Yet was he not "slack concerning his declaration as some men count slackness." 'His wrath loses nothing by sleeping. It becomes fresher by repose.' "The impenitent abusers of his patience pay interest for all the time of their forbearance in the increased weight of the judgment when it comes on them." "The end of all flesh was come before God and he was about to destroy them with," or from "the earth."

But "surely the Lord God will do nothing without revealing his secret to his servants the prophets." There was but one in all that generation to whom that name could be given. "Noah had found grace in the eyes of the Lord." Noah "by faith had become an heir of the justification by faith." He was "a just man and perfect in his generation and walked with God." This is the good report he has obtained: "THEE," said Jehovah, i. e. "*thee alone* have I seen righteous before me in this generation." As God testified his regard to Abraham by telling him of the approaching destruction of Sodom, so he showed his peculiar favor to Noah by announcing to him the coming destruction of his contemporaries. He said, "My Spirit shall not always strive with man, yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years." There shall still be an hundred and twenty years of "striving with him." It would seem that Noah was commissioned not only to build the ark, but also to announce the approaching deluge during its building, and to call men to repentance. We know that he was "a preacher of righteousness" and that he "condemned the world" by his preaching, as well as practically by his conduct, telling them of their sins, warning them of their danger.

This is the revelation of the divine will referred to in the text, and as the spirit in the prophets was the Spirit of Christ, "the

Word" from the beginning being the great revealer of God and making his revelations by his Spirit,—Christ who went in Spirit to the "spirits in prison" by his apostles, may be considered as having gone in Spirit by his servant Noah to the same class of persons. For one hundred and twenty years Noah proclaimed to a doomed world "Repent," as Jonah in after ages proclaimed to the doomed city, "Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed." Had Noah's preaching been as successful as Jonah's we have no reason to doubt that, as in that case, God, "seeing their works that they turned from their evil way, would have repented of the evil that he had said he would do to them and would not have done it." These "one hundred and twenty years" were years of peculiar trial. They were the last opportunity to be afforded to that race to escape from final ruin. They were a period during which "God's long suffering waited," i. e. God waited in the exercise of his long-suffering. It was long-suffering, it was patience which prevented the immediate infliction of the threatened vengeance, for the iniquities of that generation were full. Come the vengeance when it might, it could not come undeserved. But judgment is God's "strange work." They shall have one warning more. He is "not willing that they should perish."

There was something peculiarly striking in the warnings during the closing period of the term of forbearance. "Noah by faith being instructed by the divine oracle concerning things not yet seen, moved with fear prepared an ark." When we consider the size of the ark and the time and labor necessary for collecting the animals which were to be saved in it, (for we have no reason to think that their gathering together was entirely miraculous,) it is obvious that it must have afforded him employment for a considerable period. This was a striking proof that Noah believed his own communication. It was an appeal through the eye as well as through the ear to that wicked and rebellious generation. But they looked on with a thoughtless eye as well as listened with a careless ear. They were disobedient. Noah to the men of his generation like Lot to his sons-in-law "was as one who mocked." "They believed him not." When they saw the ark building, their sentiments probably found language in such words as these, "What does the old dotard mean, where does he intend to sail to in this strange hulk? He will find some difficulty in launching it." When he told them of the coming ruin at the end of 120 years they were likely to say, "You look far be-

fore you. Shall we perish and you alone escape? We will take our chance."

But God cannot be mocked. His established law, "whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap," will at the appointed time take effect. "He is not slack concerning" his threatenings any more than his promises "as men count slackness," though "he is long-suffering." O how long-suffering! Down to the period of the execution of his threatenings, the rebellious men of Noah's generation seem to have been saying, "Where is the declaration of his coming? All things continue as they were." "They ate and drank, they married and were given in marriage." But the season of forbearance long as it has been, has passed away. The ark is finished. Noah and his family have entered into it. "In that same day all the fountains of the great deep,"—the abyss of subterranean waters,—“were broken up,” and the "windows of heaven were opened" to discharge the immense body of water held in solution by the atmosphere. The rains continued without intermission for forty entire days, and the eruptions of subterranean waters for 160 days, until at length the inundation came to its height and covered all the high hills which were under the whole heaven, fifteen cubits upward above the highest hills. "And all flesh died that moved upon the earth both of fowl and of cattle, and of beast and of every creeping thing that creepeth on the earth,—and every man." All, all with the exception of Noah and his family had been disobedient, and all, all with that exception perish. The waters covered the enemies of God, not one of them was left."

We pronounce no judgment as to the eternal state of all the antediluvians. It is possible that some of them in a right spirit sought mercy amid the rising waters of the deluge, and if they did who dare say, who dare think, that it was refused them? Nevertheless whether we look on earth or beyond it, without doubt this day was "a day of the perdition of ungodly men."

While the great body of the "spirits in prison" in the days of Noah were disobedient and reaped the fruit of their disobedience, all were not impenitent and unbelieving. Noah was at once believing and obedient. His family were so far obedient that they availed themselves of the appointed means of deliverance. We have but too good reason to conclude that in the *best* sense of the word *all* of them were not obedient. They to the number of "eight souls," i. e. persons, Noah, his wife, his three sons and their wives entered into the ark, and were "saved by water."

"The Lord said to Noah, Come thou and all thy house," i. e. thy family, "into the ark; and Noah went in and his sons, and his wife and his sons' wives with him into the ark, and the Lord shut them in; and when the waters increased they bare up the ark, and it was lift above the earth, and when the waters prevailed and were increased greatly on the earth, the ark went on the face of the waters. And God remembered Noah and those who were in the ark with him," and after five months' floating on a shoreless ocean, the ark rested on the mountains of Ararat. After having been tenants of the strange mansion for a year and ten days, Noah and his family went forth at the command of God to take possession of a world already smiling in vegetable beauty, whose solitudes were soon again to be peopled by the various animal tribes the utter extinction of which had been in so strange a way prevented amid the general destruction.

These "few, that is eight, souls" are said to have been "saved by water." Various meanings have been attached to these words, some considering them as equivalent to "*saved amid the water*," others "*saved notwithstanding the water*," others "*saved by being conducted through the water*." The meaning that the words most naturally suggest seems the true one, they were "*saved by means of the water*." The water which destroyed those out of the ark saved those who were in it. The words of the sacred historian are the best commentary on the apostle's words. "The waters bore up the ark and it was lift up above the earth, and it went on the face of the waters." As by means of the art of navigation the ocean, which seems calculated to separate completely the inhabitants of countries distant from each other, unites them, becoming the great highway of nations,—so the waters of the deluge which were in their own nature fitted to destroy Noah and his family, by means of the ark saved them.

Such then are the facts of antediluvian history which this passage brings before us. Let us now enquire into the object of the apostle in referring to those facts and show how they gain that object. It must be acknowledged that the design of the reference is by no means self-evident or even very readily discernible. It does seem strange that in the midst of a description of the results of our Lord's penal, vicarious, expiatory sufferings, there should be introduced a statement of what took place more than two thousand years before. It is plain, however, to the careful student of the apostle Peter's writings that he was accustomed to think of the antediluvian world and the postdiluvian world as

of two orders of things which had such strong analogies of resemblance and contrast that events in the one naturally called up in his mind what may be named the corresponding events in the other. Thus in the third chapter of his second epistle he contrasts the two worlds. Of the one he says, "By the word of God, the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water, whereby the world that then was being overflowed with water perished;" and of the other he says, "The heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." In the second chapter of the same epistle we find him saying, "God who spared not the old world but saved Noah the eighth person, a preacher of righteousness, bringing in the flood on the world of the ungodly, knoweth (in this new world) how to deliver the godly out of temptation and to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished." Both worlds appeared to him peopled by fallen men, doomed to punishment, "spirits in prison;" both privileged with a divine revelation proclaiming danger and offering deliverance to these "spirits in prison;" both destined to be destroyed by a deluge as a manifestation of the divine displeasure, the first by a deluge of water, the second by a deluge of fire. Taking this view of the subject it does not seem strange that the mention of Christ "quickened in the spirit" going and preaching by his apostles to the "spirits in prison" as one of the results of his atoning sufferings, should have suggested to Peter's mind his having in his preincarnate state gone in spirit by the ministry of Noah to the same class of persons in the antediluvian world.

But what is his object in this reference? His primary object is, if we mistake not, that to which we have already alluded, to illustrate by contrast the blessed effects of our Lord's going and preaching to the spirits in prison, after that he had been quickened in spirit. When in the days of Noah he went and preached to the spirits in prison, "they were disobedient," all but universally disobedient, and "few," i. e. "eight souls were saved" out of probably many millions; but now while many are unbelieving and impenitent, still multitudes both of Jews and Gentiles have become obedient to the faith, and before he finishes his preaching to the spirits in prison much greater multitudes yet will become obedient. "All the ends of the earth shall remember and turn to the Lord, and all the kindreds of the people shall worship before him, for the kingdom is the Lord's and he is the governor among

the nations." "The kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of our Lord and his Christ, and he shall reign forever and ever." Though many shall perish in the deluge of fire, yet still the saved shall not be counted by human numbers. There will be "*nations* of the saved," and those set free by the word of God, the truth which makes free indeed, from among the spirits in prison shall be a "multitude which no man can number out of every kindred and people and tribe and nation."

A subsidiary, yet still an important, object in making the reference seems to have been to bring those truths before the mind; first, that if Christ's preaching is disregarded and disobeyed, when "quickened in spirit" he comes by the apostolic ministry, a more dreadful destruction will befall the unbelieving and impenitent, than that which overwhelmed the antediluvians who were disobedient to the revelation made by Noah; and secondly, that there is no escape from the destruction to which we are already doomed but by availing ourselves now as then of the only divinely appointed mode of deliverance." "If they who despised" the preaching of Noah who was a mere man and who does not seem even to have been a worker of miracles, "died without mercy," received in the waters of the deluge a "just recompense of reward," "of how much sorer punishment shall they be counted worthy who trample under foot the Son of God, and do despite to the Spirit" in whom he comes to them, "neglecting so great salvation which at the first began to be spoken to us by the Lord and was confirmed to us by them that heard him, God also bearing witness both with signs and wonders and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost according to his own will?"

There was no mode of escape from the deluge of water but the divinely appointed ark. It is not improbable that in the day of penal visitation various plans were resorted to. No doubt trees were climbed, mountains ascended, possibly boats of some kind or other resorted to, but all in vain. All with the exception of the eight in the ark are engulfed in the deep and wide-spreading inundation agitated with fearful tempest from the air, and heaved up into tremendous billows by internal commotions shaking the earth. And there is no mode of escape for men from the coming fiery deluge which is to destroy the wicked but in the redemption that is in Christ. There is no name given under heaven among men whereby we must be saved "but the name of Jesus." He and he only saves from the wrath to come. To them who reject him "there remains no more sacrifice for sin but a cer-

tain fearful looking for of judgment to destroy them as the adversaries of God."

It only remains now that we endeavor to ascertain the object of the apostle's reference in noticing the particular manner in which Noah and his family were saved. They were, says he, "saved by water,"—the water of the deluge was the means of their deliverance. The apostle himself has in the twenty-first verse informed us what is the point he meant to illustrate by this reference, although it must be acknowledged that it is not easy to extract a very clear and definite explanation from his words. "The like figure whereunto, even baptism, doth also now save us, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ."

It is rather remarkable that both those who deny the perpetuity of water baptism as an ordinance, like that denomination of Christians so estimable on many accounts, the Friends, and those who insist on the necessity and efficiency of water baptism for salvation if administered by properly qualified persons, like the Papists and Puseyites, seek for support to their opposite views in this passage, the one class insisting that it teaches that the baptism that saves, Christian baptism, is not that which removes external pollution, i. e. is not the application of water to the body, is not an external rite at all; the other class insisting that it teaches that baptism, which means here just what it means elsewhere, the religious rite known by that name, does save—is necessary and effectual to salvation. We shall find that the passage rightly interpreted gives no support to either of these *equally erroneous*, though by no means *equally dangerous* opinions.

It has been doubted whether the apostle meant to compare baptism with the *water of the deluge* or with the *ark*, or to compare generally the way in which Christians are saved with the way in which Noah and his family were saved, but when the words are carefully examined there is no room for those doubts. The translation of the words in our version is strictly literal from the reading adopted, but it is not very intelligible. To the question what does the expression, "*the like figure whereunto even baptism*," mean, I can give no answer. The words may be rendered with perfect accuracy "which was a type or figure of the baptism which saves us," i. e. which water of the deluge was a type of baptism which saves us. By the term "*type*" we mean *a significant resemblance*, for that it was a type in the strict sense

of the word as a *foreshowing dimly to the antediluvians of Christian baptism or its meaning*, is a principle utterly without support.

It is however right to say that there is another reading which, since the MSS. of the New Testament have been more carefully collated than they had been when our excellent version was made, has been generally preferred by the most learned and judicious scholars and which gives this rendering, "which," referring to water, "which also saves us,—baptism which is the antitype—which corresponds to, or is figuratively represented by, the water of the deluge." It is as if the apostle had said, "water saved the family of Noah and, it may be said, water also saves us;—I refer to baptism which IN THIS RESPECT resembles the waters of the deluge, both being connected by divine appointment with salvation or deliverance."

How the water of the deluge was connected with the salvation of Noah's family we have already seen; how baptism is connected with our salvation we are now to inquire. The apostle has answered the question both negatively and positively, but before entering on the consideration of his answer, it deserves remark that the very comparison shows that baptism has but an *indirect* influence on our salvation, an influence which is emblemized not by the *ark*, but by the *water* which in itself was rather fitted to destroy than to save.

Let us now hear the apostle. He first tells us how baptism does not save. It does not save as it is a "putting away of the filth of the flesh." That is the physical effect of the application of water to the body. It removes whatever soils the body and thus produces cleanliness. This is all that it can do as an external application. It does not, it cannot save us. The idea that the external rite of baptism can save, can communicate spiritual life, can justify and regenerate is equally absurd, unscriptural and mischievous. Moral effects must have moral causes. It has been justly said, "even the life of a plant or an animal, far more the life of thought, taste, affection and conscience, cannot be produced by the use of mere lifeless matter. He who should assert this would be considered as little better than a madman, but is not the statement still more irrational and unintelligible, that the life of the soul, by which it is united to God and secured of salvation, is produced by sprinkling or pouring water on an individual or by immersing him in it." A man must be "given up to strong delusion before he can believe a lie" like this.

The positive part of the apostle's answer is however the most

important part of it. Baptism saves us as it is "the answer of a good conscience towards God by the resurrection of Jesus Christ." Before entering on the exposition of this statement, which is encumbered with some verbal difficulties, it will, I am persuaded, serve a good purpose, to state in the fewest words, *to whom and to what salvation is attributed in the New Testament.* God is said to save us. "All things" in the new creation "are of him." He is the Saviour of all men especially of them who believe." We are said to be saved by "grace," by God's grace. Christ is said to save us. "All things" in the new creation "are by him." One of his most common names is "our Saviour." The *blood of Christ* is said to save us. "Redemption" is "through his blood." The *resurrection of Christ* is said to save us. "We are saved by his life." The *Holy Spirit* is said to save us. "We are saved by the renewing of the Holy Ghost." The *gospel* is said to save men. The words which Peter was to speak to Cornelius were words which were to "save him and his family." We are said to be saved by *faith*. "By grace are ye saved through faith." "Thy faith," said our Lord on numerous occasions, "hath saved thee." "He that believeth shall be saved." Men are said to be saved by *confession of the truth* in connection with faith. "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness," i. e. justification, "and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." Men are said to be saved by *baptism* in connection with faith. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved," and here "baptism saves us."

These statements are all perfectly consistent with each other, and he alone understands how sinful men are saved who sees the meaning and apprehends the consistency of these statements. Here they are in one sentence,—God in the exercise of sovereign grace saves men through the mediation of his Son who died as an atoning victim, and rose again to the possession of all power in heaven and in earth, that he might save all coming to the Father by him, who being led by the operation of the Holy Ghost to believe the gospel of salvation become personally interested in the blessings procured through the mediation of the Son; and wherever men are made really to believe the gospel, they, as the natural result of that faith and in obedience to the divine command, make a profession of that faith, the commencement of which profession is, in the case of those who in mature life are brought from a false religion to the knowledge and belief of the gospel, baptism or the "being washed with pure water."

If this statement is understood there is little difficulty in answering the question, "how does baptism save?" It is an emblematical representation of what saves us, viz. the expiating, justifying blood of Christ, and the regenerating, sanctifying influence of the Spirit, and a corresponding confession of the truth thus represented. Let us look at the apostle's answer and see if it is not substantially the same as that to which we have been led. I have stated that there are verbal difficulties. The principal of these are two, the first referring to the meaning of the word rendered "*answer*," and the other referring to the connection of the concluding clause "*by the resurrection of Jesus Christ*." The word rendered "*answer*"¹ occurs nowhere else either in the New Testament or in the Greek translation of the Old Testament. From its etymology and its use in classic writers we should say its meaning is "*question*" not "*answer*." Many interpreters suppose that there is a reference to an ancient custom of making the baptismal profession in reply to questions put by the administrator, but we have no evidence that this practice existed in the apostles' time, and supposing that it did, the fact would not account for a word meaning "*question*" being used to signify "*answer*." Others have rendered the word "*inquiry*," "*application to*," the application of a good conscience to God for salvation, the sincerely seeking salvation from God. I am persuaded that the word is here employed as equivalent to *expression, confession or declaration*.

Some interpreters connect the concluding clause with the word "save," thus "baptism saves us through the resurrection of Jesus Christ;" others with the phrase "*a good conscience towards God*;" others with the whole expression, "*answer of a good conscience towards God*." The second of these seems the most natural mode of connection. What the apostle's words bring before the mind is this: A man has a good conscience, he has obtained this good conscience by the resurrection of Jesus Christ, he makes a declaration of this good conscience in his baptism, and it is in this way, the apostle declares, that baptism saves.

"*A good conscience*" is a right and happy state of thought and feeling in reference to our relations and duties to God,—confidence in God, love to God. This is obtained by a man's conscience being sprinkled with the atoning blood of Jesus, or in other words, by his experiencing the power of Christ's atoning blood to pacify the conscience and purify the heart through the faith of the truth respecting it,—by his being transformed through

¹ ἐπερώτημα.

"the renewing of the mind" produced by the "Holy Ghost shed forth abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour."

This good conscience is said to be "by the resurrection of Jesus Christ." The resurrection of Christ is the grand proof of the divinity of his mission, the truth of his doctrine, and especially of the efficacy of his atoning sacrifice. It is truth regarding these, apprehended in its meaning and evidence under the influence of the Holy Spirit which produces the good conscience towards God. "I trust in God, seeing he has brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus; I love him who gave his Son for my offences and who raised him again for my justification."

Of this good conscience, of a mind at peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, and a heart with the love of God shed abroad in it, the converted Jew or Pagan made a profession when in obedience to the command of Christ he submitted to baptism. Thus confessing by an external act what he believed in his heart that God had raised Christ from the dead, he was saved. In this way, in this way alone can it be said that "baptism saves us."

Much ingenuity has been discovered in attempting to trace the analogy between the waters of the deluge saving Noah's family, and the water of baptism saving those who in it make an enlightened profession of a "good conscience towards God through the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ." I apprehend we are not to seek anything more than that general analogy which we have already illustrated. The following illustration is at any rate ingenious and the sentiment it conveys indubitably true and fearfully important. "The flood of waters displayed the divine indignation, and executed the threatened vengeance against the wickedness of an ungodly world while they yet bore up in safety the eight persons enclosed in the ark, so the blood of Christ shed for sin emblematically represented in baptism, while it has effected the eternal redemption and salvation of all in Him, 'the remnant according to the election of grace,' is at the same time the most dreadful manifestation of the righteous judgment of God, as well as the surest pledge of its execution against the world which lieth under the wicked one."¹

Though I do not think we have been able to clear the difficult passage we have been considering of all its obscurity, I think we have succeeded to a considerable extent, and I am sure we have made it plain enough, that what Paul says of *all* Scripture given by divine inspiration is true of this. "It is profitable for doctrine,

¹ John Walker.

for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." I shall notice only *one* very important practical conclusion to which it very directly leads us,—the folly and danger of trusting in the mere external rite of baptism or in anything that is external. Happily *we* are not taught the soul-deluding doctrine of the efficacy of the sacraments, as they are called, and of baptismal regeneration as a part of the general dogma. On the contrary *we* are taught that "the sacraments become effectual means of salvation not from any virtue in those, or in them who administer them, but only by the blessing of Christ and the working of his Spirit in them that by faith receive them," and that no baptism saves but that which is connected with "engrafting into Christ, and partaking of the benefits of the covenant of grace," and that it is an "engagement to be the Lord's."¹

But though we are thus taught, and I believe few of us would call these principles in question, yet there is a natural tendency in the human mind to rest in what is external. Let us beware then of supposing that we are *safe* because we have been baptized, whether in infancy or on our personal profession of faith. The apostle Paul's declaration respecting circumcision and Judaism is equally true of baptism and Christianity. 'He is not a true Christian who is one outwardly, neither is that saving baptism which consists merely in the application of water to the body. He is a Christian who is one inwardly, who has a good conscience towards God, and saving baptism is the washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Ghost.' Let all remember, that if they would be saved, if they would "enter in the kingdom of God," they "must be born again," "born not of water only but of the Spirit;" and let all who have profession of a good conscience remember that where there is a *good conscience* there will be a *good conversation*, and that if a "man is in Christ a new creature" he will "put off the old man who is corrupt in his deeds, and put on the new man who after Christ Jesus is renewed in knowledge and in true holiness." Professing to be saved from the fiery deluge which is coming on the unbelieving, disobedient world, by the blood of Christ represented in baptism, he will show that he is delivered from that world's power; redeemed by the same "precious blood" from the "vain conversation" received by tradition from his fathers, and freed from spiritual captivity, he will walk at liberty; brought into a new world, "all old things will pass away," and "all things will become new."

¹ Westminster Shorter Catechism.

ARTICLE VI.

LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.—COMPARISON BETWEEN THE MANDINGO, GREBO AND MPONGWE DIALECTS.

By Rev. John Leighton Wilson, American Missionary at the Gaboon river, Western Africa.

[THE following paper from the pen of Mr. Wilson is inserted, partly, on account of its intrinsic importance, and partly from its relation to the foreign missionary enterprise. It communicates a variety of facts respecting the languages of Western Africa, which will be deeply interesting, alike to the Christian and the philologist. The phenomena, adduced by Mr. Wilson, are a striking confirmation of the scientific value of Christian missions. Though an indirect and undesigned effect, it will of itself amply repay all the cost which is incurred. The missionary is, in this way, coöperating most efficiently, and without interference with his great spiritual work, with the learned scholars and philanthropists of Christendom, in extending the boundaries of knowledge and civilization. We will only add, should any apology for the insertion of this piece be needed, that there are subscribers and readers of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* at all the missionary stations of our principal Foreign Missionary Society, and at some of the stations of other societies.—Eds.]

Too little is as yet known of the numerous and diversified dialects of Africa to determine with certainty the precise number of families which they form. The Mountains of the Moon, which divide this great continent into two nearly equal portions, also form an important dividing line between two great branches of the negro race, who, it is probable, emigrated to Africa at remote periods from each other and from different parts of the old world.

In the northern half of the continent, or that part of it occupied by the black race, the number of languages is very great, the different families of which show very little if any affinity for each other; while in the southern division one great family prevails over the whole even to the Cape of Good Hope. As there is a tendency to the multiplication of dialects in all countries where there are no written standards, the above fact furnishes a presumptive argument, in favor of the opinion, that the northern portion of the continent must have been settled by the negro race at

a much earlier period than the southern ; or, that the present inhabitants of this portion of the country overran and rooted out its original occupants at no very remote period. However this may be, the languages spoken on the opposite sides of these mountains, show as conclusively, as any argument drawn from this source can, that these two families of blacks, whatever physical resemblances there may be, must have had different origins.

In the northern half of the continent, the number of dialects is incredibly great. Those spoken along the western coast, i. e. between the river Senegal and the Cameroons in the Bight of Biafra, which is no doubt the western termination of the Mountains of the Moon, may be grouped into five distinct families, the boundaries of which are not inaccurately defined by the established geographical divisions of the country.

The Mandingo, including the Jaloof, the Foulah, the Soosoo and other kindred dialects, may be regarded as forming one of these principal families. Those of the natives who speak these dialects are Mohammedans, and no doubt a less or greater number of Moorish or Arabic words has been incorporated with all of them. These dialects are spoken along the coast from Senegal to Sierra Leone, and in the interior as far as the head waters of the Niger.

From Sierra Leone or Cape Messurado to the mouth of the Niger, in what is called Upper Guinea, a distance coastwise of twelve or fifteen hundred miles, there are four distinct families, showing very little if any affinity for each other. The first extends from Basa to St. Andrews, embracing the Basa, Kru, Grebo and other dialects, all of which belong to one general family called the Mena or Mandoo language. The natives, who speak these dialects, are pagans, and though physically considered, they are one of the finest races in Africa, they are less intellectual than the generality of tribes along the coast.

From Frisco to Dick's Cove, along what is called the Ivory Coast, we have another language, usually called the Kwakwa, which possesses no traceable affinity for any other language along the coast. The inhabitants of this part of the coast are a fine, athletic race and occupy an important part of the coast in a commercial point of view, but like the tribes above and below are pagans of the lowest order.

From Dick's Cove to Badagri we have the Fanti, as called by the natives themselves *Fantypim*, which includes the Ashanti, Dahomey, Popo, Accra and other dialects. Among the dialects

of this family there is more diversity than among those of either of the preceding. The natives here discover considerable mechanical skill and much more versatility of character than the inhabitants of the Grain Coast.

On the great rivers of the Gulf of Benin, Bonny, Benin and Calibar, we find another distinct family of languages, possessing some striking peculiarities, entirely unknown to any of the dialects either west or south.

How nearly related these different families along the sea coast may be to those of Central and Northern Africa is not known. While there is a constant tendency to a multiplication of the dialects of the same family, the different families themselves have preserved their distinctive features without essential change or modification. The want of written standards accounts for the first of these facts, while the fixed habits of the natives, in opposition to the roving character of most barbarous nations, account for the other.

Crossing the Mountains of the Moon we find one great family of languages extending itself over the whole of the southern division of the continent. The dialects of this family, though they differ essentially as dialects, have too many striking affinities for each other, to allow any doubt of their having a common origin.

Many of these dialects, especially those spoken along the sea-coast, have incorporated with themselves a less or greater number of foreign words, according as the tribes have had less or more commercial intercourse with foreign nations. Those along the western coast have borrowed largely from the Portuguese—those in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope, it is probable, have borrowed from the English and Dutch—those of Mozambique have adopted many words from the Madagascar people as well as the Portuguese, with both of whom the nations have had long and extensive intercourse; while those still higher up the coast have drawn quite as freely from the Arabic. The Sooahelee language, spoken by the aboriginal inhabitants of Zanzibar, is very nearly allied to the Mpongwe, which is spoken on the western coast in very nearly the same parallel of latitude. One fifth of the words of these two dialects are either the same or so nearly so that they may easily be traced to the same root.

This great family of languages, if the Mpongwe dialect may be taken as a specimen, is remarkable for its beauty, elegance and perfectly philosophical arrangements, as well as for its almost

indefinite expansibility. In these respects, it not only differs essentially and radically from all the dialects north of the Mountains of the Moon, but they are such as may well challenge a comparison with any known language in the world.

It is impossible to ascertain from what particular stock the different dialects of the same family have sprung, nor is it important to establish this point. We have selected as the subject of comparison, one dialect from three different families, viz. Mandingo, the Grebo and the Mpongwe; as two of these are from the northern part of the continent and the other from the southern, we shall be able not only to see all the points of agreement and disagreement between the languages of those who are supposed to be separate races, but likewise how much divergence there may be in the languages of those who are supposed to have had a common origin.

The Mandingo is spoken chiefly between Senegal and the Gambia; the Grebo at Cape Palmas and in that vicinity. The distance between these two places is six or eight hundred miles. The inhabitants of these two regions have had little or no intercourse with each other and therefore may be regarded as strangers. The Mpongwe is spoken on both sides of the Gaboon, at Cape Lopez and Cape St. Catharine, in what is usually called Lower Guinea. The distance from Cape Palmas to the Gaboon is ten or twelve hundred miles, and that between the latter and Sene-Gambia is eighteen hundred or two thousand.

Our object in the following essay will be to mention all the important points in which these dialects differ from each other, as well as those in which they agree, although the latter are regarded as purely accidental and such as would be as likely to arise by comparing them with the Indian dialects of North or South America or with those of Polynesia as among themselves. The principles of the Mpongwe will be more fully developed than either of the others, not only on account of its great superiority, but because it possesses some very remarkable characteristics for an uncultivated language, and evinces a degree of skill and precision in its grammatical arrangements, that may challenge for itself a comparison with any known language whatever.

General Remarks.

Before entering into a minute analysis of the grammatical principles of these dialects, it will be important to offer a few remarks of a general nature.

The first thing that would be sure to arrest the attention of one, who has had an opportunity to study the character and habits of the people in connection with their languages, is the remarkable correspondence that will always be found between the character of the different tribes and the dialects which they respectively speak.

The Grebo tribe, physically considered, are one of the finest races in Western Africa. They are stout, well formed, and their muscular system is remarkably well developed. They stand erect, and when not under the influence of excitement, their gait is measured, manly and dignified. When engaged at work or in play, they are quick, energetic and prompt in all their bodily evolutions; they are fond of work, are capable of enduring great hardships, and, compared with most of the tribes of Western Africa, are really courageous and enterprising. But they are destitute of polish, both of mind and of manners. In their intercourse with each other, they are rude, abrupt and uncereemonious; when opposed or resisted in what is their right or due, they become obstinate, sullen and inflexible. They have much vivacity of disposition, but very little imagination. Their songs have but little of poetry, and are unmusical and monotonous; besides which they have very little literature in the form of ancestral traditions or fabulous stories. Their dialect partakes very largely of these general outlines. It is harsh, abrupt, energetic, indistinct in enunciation, meagre in point of words, abounds with inarticulate nasal and guttural sounds, possesses but few inflections and grammatical forms, and is withal exceedingly difficult of acquisition.

The Mpongwe people, on the other hand, are mild in their disposition, flexible in character, courteous in their manners, and very deferential to age and rank. But they are timid, irresolute and exceedingly averse to manual labor. They live by trade, are cunning, shrewd, calculating and somewhat polished in their manners. Their temperament is of the excitable or nervous character and they are altogether the most imaginative race of negroes I have ever known. They have inexhaustible stores of ancestral traditions and fabulous stories, some of which, if embodied in suitable language, would bear comparison with the most celebrated novels and romances that have ever been presented to the world. These general outlines of the character, habits and disposition of the people are no bad counterpart to their language. It is soft, pliant and flexible; clear and distinct in enunciation, pleasant to the ear, almost entirely free from guttural and nasal

sounds, methodical in all its grammatical forms, susceptible of great expansion, and withal very easy of acquisition.

The same correspondence might be pointed out between the Mandingo dialect and the people by whom it is spoken, but enough has been said already, to illustrate our general remark. Whether the disposition and habits of the natives have been modified by the character of their language; or whether, on the other hand, these dialects have been moulded so as to suit the disposition, character and pursuits of the people, are points that cannot easily be determined. Most probably they exert a reciprocal influence upon each other. It must not be presumed, however, that the comparative perfection of these dialects is to be regarded as an infallible criterion of the relative improvement of the different tribes. This would bespeak for the Mpongwe tribe a degree of improvement and civilization far above the others, which the actual and known condition of that people does not authorize.

One general characteristic of the Grebo, and one which establishes at the outset an essential difference between it and the other dialects, is that it is made up in a great measure of *monosyllabic words*. It has a considerable number of dissyllabic words, a few trisyllables, and a very few words of four and five syllables. But a very cursory glance over a few printed pages of Grebo will show a vast disproportion of monosyllabic words. The names of most of the objects with which they are familiar belong to this class; for example, *na*, fire; *ni*, water; *tu*, tree; *kai*, house; *ge*, farm; *yau*, sky; *bro*, earth; *nu*, rain; *twe*, axe; *fa*, knife; *kbi*, fence; *lu*, head; *kwa*, hand; *yi*, eye; *mē*, tongue; *kli*, breast; *kē*, back; *bo*, leg; *wēnh*, sun; *hni*, fish; *gi*, leopard, *nā*, rum; and so also most of the verbs in common use; as, *āi*, eat; *na*, drink; *pē*, sleep, lie down; *na*, walk; *āi*, come; *mu*, go; *hli*, speak; *la*, kill; *bi*, beat; *ya*, bring; *kba*, carry; *ni*, do; *wā*, hear,¹ etc., all of which are not only monosyllables, but most of them may be spelled with two simple letters of the Roman alphabet.

Both the Mandingo and the Mpongwe have a goodly number of auxiliary and connecting particles; but they are not sufficiently numerous to constitute a striking feature in either. In the

¹ We have adopted a more simple mode of orthography here than has been used in writing the Grebo; *h* final is used to distinguish words whose meanings are different, but whose orthography would be the same. So *nā* is used to indicate the nasal sound of the final vowel, but is omitted in the above examples, for the sake of simplicity.

Mandingo, about one fifth of the verbs are monosyllabic words, but the nouns, with very few exceptions are words of two or more syllables.

In Mpongwe, there are not more than a dozen monosyllabic nouns, and perhaps not more than two or three monosyllabic verbs, in the entire language. In relation to those enumerated above, with the exception of a single noun and verb, they are all words of two, three or four syllables.

Another observation of importance is, that there is no one word that is common to the three, or any two of these dialects,¹ except the letter *m* which is used as a contracted form of the personal pronoun *I*, in the Mpongwe and Mandingo, and the particle *ne* which is used in the sense of *is* in the Grebo and the Mpongwe, though in the latter, it is evidently a contraction of *inle* which does not always have the force of *is*. Even when some new object is presented to these people, and it is their evident intention to confer upon that object a name corresponding with the sound or some other attribute belonging to it, they do not always employ the same word; a bell in Grebo is *bikri*, in Mpongwe it is *igalinga* and in Mandingo *talango*; a saw in Mandingo is *sero*, in Grebo *griká*, and in Mpongwe *gwigasa*. When the foreign word is retained, it is differently modified to suit their dialects. A plate in Grebo is *plédé*, in Mandingo *pélo*, and in Mpongwe *péle*. Tobacco in Grebo is *tama*, in Mpongwe *tako*, in Mandingo *taba*, and in some other dialects it is *talakwa*. This discrepancy shows that there is not only a material difference in the development of the organs of speech among these different tribes, but an equal difference in their powers of discriminating sounds.

The Grebo has few or no contractions or coalescences, but the people speak with so much rapidity and their words are so completely jumbled together, that a whole clause may sometimes be mistaken for a single word, the phrase *é ya mu kra ioudé*, it has raised a bone in my breast (a figurative expression for great anger), is pronounced *yamukroure*.

The Mandingo and Mpongwe both abound with contractions, and they compound their words so as out of three or four to make but one; but in both cases, the elementary parts of each com-

¹ The writer is indebted to Mac Brair's Mandingo Grammar, for all the knowledge he possesses in relation to that language. The vocabulary embraced in that Grammar contains seven or eight hundred words, and it is upon these, and a few other specimens of Mandingo in the same volume, that his inferences and observations are drawn.

pounded word or phrase, are preserved with so much distinctness, that they can always be easily analyzed. In Mandingo the word *mbadingmuso*, sister, is made up of *mi*, my, *bado*, mother, *dingo*, child, *muso*, female; i. e. "my mother's female child." So in Mpongwe, the word *onwángioam*, my brother, is made up of *onwána*, child, *ngi*, mother, *wam*, my; and so *omantwè*, his wife, is compounded of *oma*, person, *anto*, female, *wè*, his, i. e. "his female person" for his wife; so the phrase *arombia* is compounded of *a*, he (which disappears before *a*), *are*, is, *oma*, person, *mbia*, good. These combinations though frequent in the Mpongwe, and perhaps as much so in Mandingo, are not sufficiently numerous to constitute a leading feature in either, as they do in some of the Indian dialects of North America.

There are certain words and phrases in the Grebo dialect, which it is almost impossible for a foreigner ever to acquire, so as to be understood by the natives when he uses them. The phrase *hani na nyene ne?* What is your name? is one that is extremely difficult, and not less so is the phrase *kbunè-nyini-yidu*, bad habit. The word *hmu*, five, and all the reduplicated forms into which it enters, are too completely nasal to be fairly represented by any combination of articulate sounds whatever.

In Mpongwe, on the other hand, there are not more than three or four words that are at all difficult of utterance; and there is scarcely a sentence in the language, which a foreigner may not with very little care, speak at the first trial, so as to be universally understood by the natives. It is probable that the Mandingo, in this respect, partakes of the character of the Mpongwe and not of the Grebo.

In the Grebo and Mpongwe there is a large number of words whose significations, though entirely different, have an orthography very nearly the same. In all such cases, the Grebo distinguishes between them: first, when they are monosyllables, by a certain pitch of the voice or accent; it is thus that the first and second persons of the personal pronoun *má* and *máh* are distinguished from each other; and so also the first and second persons plural *a* and *ah*.

When cases of this kind occur in dissyllabic words, the accent rests on one or the other syllable as a mark of distinction, as in the words *nyina*, day, and *nyina*, woman. The Mpongwe, on the contrary, never uses the accent, as a means of distinguishing words whose orthography is very nearly the same, but relies wholly upon the clear and distinct sounds of its vowels.

In all three dialects, almost every word terminates in a vowel sound. In Grebo *ɲ* final is employed to designate the nasal sound of the vowel; and it is possible that *ŋ* final in Mac Brair's Mandingo grammar may serve the same purpose. *M* final occurs in a very few Grebo words; and the vowel sound after *m* in certain Mpongwe words is scarcely audible. In relation to the incipient syllable, the usage is variable. In Grebo with the exception of a few of the personal pronouns, which are simple vowels, as is the case in both of the other dialects, every word commences with one or more consonants. In Mandingo, perhaps one fifth of the verbs and nouns commence with vowels; whereas in Mpongwe, at least one half of the nouns and verbs, if we take into the account the derivative parts of the verb, have vowels for their initial letters. Almost every noun in the Mandingo terminates in *o*; in the other two languages the final termination is variable. The prevalence of initial vowels in Mpongwe, accounts for the great number of contractions and coalescences which are to be met with in that language.

ORTHOGRAPHY.

The same alphabet of simple sounds has been employed in writing all three of these dialects, but it must not be inferred that the same system is equally adapted to each. The sounds in the Mandingo and Mpongwe are generally easy and natural, and are accurately represented by Mr. Pickering's system of orthography. The Grebo, on the contrary, has a great many difficult sounds that cannot accurately be represented by any combination of articulate sounds. Each vowel in this language has, besides its natural power, a corresponding long and short as well as nasal sound. The vowels in Mpongwe and Mandingo have none but their natural sounds, and such variations as are common to most European languages. The letters *v* and *z* are entirely wanting in the Mandingo and Grebo dialects, but are of more frequent use in the Mpongwe than almost any other consonants.¹

There are a good many consonant combinations, chiefly at the beginning of words, that deserve to be noticed. Some of these are common to all three of these dialects; some are peculiar to one.

¹ It may be remarked that although *v* is but once used in Grebo and *z* never, yet both of these letters are freely used in the Basa dialect which is closely allied to the Grebo.

The following are common to all three, viz. *ny* and *ng*; *ny* is a natural and easy sound and commences a large number of words in all three dialects; *ng* is found at the beginning of a good many words, especially in the Grebo and Mandingo, and in this position is very difficult of pronunciation; but in the middle of a word the letters have their natural sounds, but are never separated. *Mw*, *bw* and *ty* are common to the Grebo and Mpongwe, though the two former occur but seldom in the Mpongwe, and the first not often in the Grebo. None (of a peculiar or unusual character) are common to the Grebo and Mpongwe. The following are so common, as the incipient letters of Mpongwe words, that they mark this dialect most decidedly; and, although they seldom or never occur at the commencement of Mandingo words, they are common in the middle syllables, viz. *mb*, as in the words *mboa*, dog; *mboni*, goat; *mp* as in *mpolu*, large; *nd* as in *ndondwi*, high; *nk* as in *nkala*, town; *nj* as in *njonga*, the name of a man; *nt* as in *ntondo*, basket; *nty* as in *ntyāni*, shame; *ngw* as in *ngwe*, mother; *gw* as in *gwi*, where; *fw* and *vw* representing sounds intermediate to these component letters; *zy* as in *zyele*, is not; *nl* which represents a mixed sound of these two letters as in *ininla*, spirit. *Ng* in the middle of words is a favorite combination both with the Mandingo and Mpongwe. The following are peculiar to the Grebo and are found at the beginning of words, viz. *ml* as in *mlenē*, to swallow; *hl* as *hla*, to strike; *hli*, to speak; *hy* as in *hya* and *hyēiru*, child, children: *kh* as *khimi*, small; *kb* as in *kbinaē*, fashion, habit, etc. When *kb* is preceded by a vowel, the *k* unites itself with that and *b* has its natural sound, but when united at the beginning of a word, is very difficult of enunciation.

ETYMOLOGY.

Neither of these dialects has an article, definite or indefinite; the place of the indefinite article in the Mpongwe and Grebo, and probably in the Mandingo also, being supplied by the numeral for *one*. Thus, in Grebo, *gnebwi du ā nede*, man one lived there, for a man lived there; and in the Mpongwe *oma māri*, person one, for a person. The want of a definite article in Grebo is supplied by the personal pronoun for *he*, thus *gnebwi nā*, "person he," for the person, and by the demonstrative pronouns *nēnu*, this, and *nānā*, that. In Mpongwe this deficiency is variously supplied by the definite pronoun *yi*, and more frequently by the demonstrative pronoun for *this* and *that*, as *oma yinā*, this man, or *oma yānā*, that

man, for the man. The article, as a distinct part of speech, is perhaps wanting in all the dialects of Western Africa.

Prepositions.

Prepositions in the Grebo are not numerous. It has none to correspond with *to* when reference to place is made; thus they say, *á mu Bligi*, he is gone Bligi, and never *to* Bligi; the language wants a word to correspond with our preposition *with*; thus they say, *á hla áchai fá*, he cut himself knife, instead of with a knife.

Many prepositions in Grebo are compound words, one part of which goes before, the other follows the noun which they govern; thus, *ko ná máh*, for him to, *ko-máh* being one word. A simple uncompound preposition almost always follows the noun it governs. Another peculiarity about the Grebo preposition is, that a large number of them are verbalized and inflected like any other verbs; thus, *wo* is used in the sense of *from* or *come from*, as the case may be; and in the past tense becomes *woda*, came from; and so *hi*, by, when verbalized, means *to go by*; so *kwa*, near, when inflected, *kwada*, near to or came near.

The Mandingo prepositions like those of the Grebo, are but few, and with one exception, like them, follow the noun which they govern. Many of them are incorporated with the noun as affixes, but none of them are verbalized, like many in the Grebo.

The Mpongwe has a much larger number of prepositions than either of the others; and what forms a marked difference between it and the other two dialects, is, that its prepositions invariably go before the nouns which they govern.

Adverbs and Conjunctions.

There is nothing of special importance to be noticed in connection with these parts of speech in either language. The adverb *ye* in the Grebo frequently assumes the inflections of the verb it qualifies, whilst the verb itself remains uninflected. It sometimes incorporates itself with the personal pronoun, as *tá mu* for *té á mu*, where is he gone? There are a large number of particles in all these languages, that are indiscriminately used as prepositions, conjunctions and adverbs, so that these parts of speech are not very distinctly marked, and cannot therefore be very important in showing the analogies existing among these dialects.

Nouns.

There are no inflections in either of these languages, to distinguish gender or case; but each has an inflection to distinguish the singular from the plural number.

The gender in every case is made by coupling the word for *man* and *woman* with the noun; thus *nyare nomi*, man-cow for bull; *idâmbé nyanto*, woman-sheep for ewe. The nominative and the objective cases are always of the same form, and can be distinguished from each other by their relative position to the verb. The possessive case is formed in the Mandingo and Grebo by inserting the personal pronoun *his* between the nominative and the possessive, the nominative case always occupying the second place, *Dwè-a-yu*,¹ *Dwè*, his son, for *Dwè's*, son. In Mpongwe, the *definite pronoun*, of which we shall have occasion to speak presently, is the connecting link, but the arrangement of the two cases is directly the reverse, thus, *Onwa-wa-Dwè*, i. e. the child it of *Dwè*, the definite pronoun always agreeing with the nominative case. This is a point of important distinction between the Mpongwe and the other two dialects, the more so, as the usage on both sides is uniform and invariable.

In Grebo, the plural is formed from the singular, generally, by a change in the final vowel; thus, *hya*, child, pl. *hyè*, children; *bli*, cow, pl. *bliè*, cows, etc. Sometimes there is not only a change of the final vowel, but an additional syllable so suffixed, thus, *kai*, house, in the plural, *keyè*, houses; the plural of *yu*, child, is *iru*. Both these examples must be considered exceptions, of which however there are very few. In general, the distinction between the singular and plural of Grebo nouns, is very slight, and many nouns are the same in both numbers; thus, *blablè* a sheep, pl. *blable*, sheep; and so *wudè*, goat, pl. *wudè*, goats, etc.

In Mandingo, the plural is derived from the singular by suffixing *lu*, when the termination of the singular is in *o*; thus,

Singular.	Plural.
<i>Muso</i> (woman)	<i>Musolu</i>
<i>Yiro</i> (tree)	<i>Yirolu</i>

When the final letter of the singular is not *o*, it is changed into it; thus,

Singular.	Plural.
<i>Manea</i> (king)	<i>Mansolu</i>

¹ In Grebo *a* is the same as *é*, his, but modified for the sake of euphony.

In some cases the adjective takes the inflection of the plural, whilst the noun to which it belongs remains in the singular number; thus,

Singular.	Plural.
<i>ke bette</i> (a good man)	<i>ke betteolu</i>
<i>fane kuoiring</i> (a white cloth)	<i>fane kuoiringolu</i> .

This is a peculiarity that does not belong to either of the other dialects.

This dialect forms verbal nouns in several ways; the *noun of instrument* is formed by suffixing *rango* to the verb; thus,

<i>do</i> , work	<i>dorango</i> , a working instrument
<i>muta</i> , hold	<i>muterango</i> , a holder, peg, etc.

The noun of *agency or office* is formed from the verb by suffixing possessive pronouns for *his* or *he*; thus, from *kantá*, to keep, comes *kantala*, a keeper.

There is another verbal noun formed by suffixing *ro*; thus, from *sunya*, to steal, comes *sunyaro*, theft.

The points of resemblance between Grebo and Mandingo nouns, are, 1st, that the inflections to form the plural are always on the last syllable; and 2d, that both of them can form a noun of agency by suffixing the personal pronoun to the verb.¹ The points in which they differ are, 1st, that Mandingo nouns, generally, terminate in *o*, whereas those of the Grebo are variable; 2d, that Mandingo nouns, generally, have one well marked mode of forming the plural, and that by affixing a separate syllable; whereas in Grebo, the plural, with few exceptions, is made by changing the final vowel into another vowel, and in many cases the distinction between the two numbers is scarcely perceptible; and 3d, that the Mandingo has a much greater variety and number of derivative or verbal nouns than the Grebo. These facts in connection with those already mentioned, viz. that there are no nouns common to both, and that the greater part of the Grebo nouns are monosyllables, whilst those of the Mandingo, with scarcely a single exception, are words of two, three, four and five syllables, show that there can be little or no affinity between these two dialects.

But the Mpongwe branches off still farther, and shows conclusively, not only in relation to her nouns, but also in reference to her adjectives, pronouns, verbs and grammatical construction, as

¹ The Grebo does form a noun of agency in this way; thus, from *nu*, did, comes *nuá*, the doer; but this is not much used in the language.

will appear from the sequel, that it possesses no affinity with either.

All the changes which take place in Mpongwe nouns, except such as result from the laws of contraction and coalescence, are invariably on the *incipient syllable*.

An abstract verbal noun is derived from the verb by prefixing the letter *i*; thus,

<i>noka</i> , to lie	<i>inoka</i> , a lie
<i>jufa</i> , to steal	<i>ijufa</i> , theft
<i>sunginla</i> , to save	<i>isunginla</i> , salvation.

The noun of agency is formed by prefixing the letter *o*, which may be regarded as a sort of a relative pronoun; thus,

<i>noka</i> , to lie	<i>onoka</i> , or <i>onoki</i> , a liar
<i>sunginla</i> , to save	<i>osunginla</i> , or <i>osunginla</i> .

There are some exceptions and variations from the above rules, not important to be mentioned.

In Mpongwe there are *four* modes of forming the plural from the singular, which furnish the basis for a classification of its nouns, as well marked and as complete as a similar classification of Latin and Greek nouns.

For the sake of convenience, these classes are called *declensions*, although this term is not strictly and philosophically correct.

The *first declension* embraces all those nouns which commence their singular number with one or more consonants; and the plural is formed from the singular by prefixing *i* or *si*; thus,

Singular.	Plural.
<i>nago</i> , house	<i>inago</i> or <i>sinago</i>
<i>nyare</i> , cow	<i>inyare</i> or <i>sinare</i> .

Derivative nouns which begin with *i*, belong to the plural only of this declension.

The *second declension* comprises all those nouns which commence with the letter *e*, and form their plurals by dropping *e*. If the first consonant should be *z*, *e* is not only dropped, but *z* is changed into *y*; thus,

Singular.	Plural.
<i>egara</i> , chest	<i>gara</i> , chests
<i>edma</i> , thing	<i>ydma</i> , things
<i>ezango</i> , book	<i>yango</i> , books.

The *third declension* embraces all nouns whose incipient letter is *i*; (except the derivative nouns, which commence with *i*, and

belong to the plural of the first declension), and forms its plurals by changing *i* into *a*; thus,

Singular.	Plural.
<i>idámbe</i> , a sheep	<i>adámbe</i> , sheep
<i>ikéndé</i> , plantain	<i>akéndé</i> , plantains.

If the first consonant should be *v*, it is changed into *mp*; thus,

Singular.	Plural.
<i>ivanga</i> , law	<i>ampanga</i> , laws.

The *fourth declension* embraces such nouns as have *o* for their incipient letter, and form their plurals by changing *o* into *i*; thus,

Singular.	Plural.
<i>olamba</i> , cloth	<i>ilamba</i> , cloths
<i>omamba</i> , snake	<i>imamba</i> , snakes.

The *fifth declension* embraces such nouns as commence with *a*, and have both numbers of the same form; thus,

Singular.	Plural.
<i>angingo</i> , water	<i>angingo</i>
<i>alugu</i> , rum	<i>alugu</i> .

This *declension* may belong to the plural of the *third*.

The only irregularities which occur are in relation to the words *oma* (person) and *onwana* (child), and such words as are compounded with these; as, *omanto* (woman), the plural of which is *anto*; and *onwágiam*, the plural of which is *anwágiam*. The plural of *oma* is *aulaga*, and the plural of *onwana* is *anwana*; so it would seem that the singular of these nouns belong to the fourth, and the plural to the Fifth declension. These, however, are the only irregularities which occur in Mpongwe nouns.

This classification of Mpongwe nouns does not rest, however, entirely or chiefly on their different modes of deriving the plural from the singular number; but it is rendered much more conspicuous and necessary from the different modes in which they receive their adjectives, as will be seen presently.

Some changes take place on the final syllable of nouns, as has already been mentioned, in obedience to the laws of contraction or for the sake of euphony; the following are some of these changes, viz. *a* final followed by *y* incipient, is changed into *i*; thus *swaka yam* (my knife) becomes *swaki yam*; the same change takes place before *w* incipient; thus, *olambi wam*, and not *olamba wam*; *o* final before *y* are both superseded by *w*; thus, *ndego wam* is used for *ndego yam*, etc., etc.

Adjectives.

In relation to this part of speech, there are a few particulars in which there is some general resemblance among these dialects, not such however as would be so likely to arise from any existing affinity, as from the uncultivated state of these languages.

In the first place, this class of words are not numerous in either, but much less so in the Grebo and the Mandingo than in the Mpongwe; 2, neither have degrees of comparison; and 3, neither have inflections for number, except the Mpongwe.

The deficiency of adjectives in these languages is made up by the use of a substantive and verb; thus in Grebo, *kanu ni ná*, hunger works him, for hungry; *á ká te plande*, he has many things, for rich; and so in Mpongwe *e jágá njana*, he is sick with hunger, for he is hungry; *are nániva*, he has money, for rich, etc. A similar usage prevails in all three to express the relative qualities of things; thus in Grebo, to say "his knife is better than my knife," they would say *á fa hio na fa*, i. e. excels or passes my knife. To express the superlative degree, they would connect with the word *hio* another, viz. *pépé* which means "all" so as to make the phraseology *hio pépé*, i. e. excel all.

Their modes of counting differ. The Grebo counts up to five, and then there is a reduplicative up to ten, and then another up to twenty; after which they count by twenties up to ten twenties, which is *huba*, or two hundred. The Mpongwe and Mandingo have what may strictly be called a decimal system; each counts to ten, where there is a reduplication; eleven is ten and one, twenty is two tens; ten tens is one hundred, for which each language has a word.

The Grebo has no ordinals; the Mandingo forms its ordinals by a suffix, the Mpongwe by a prefix. In all three, the derivatives are formed simply by repeating the numerals.

Having noticed the points of difference and resemblance between these dialects, as far as they go, we proceed now, to point out some very remarkable peculiarities of the Mpongwe adjective, which are entirely unknown to the others, and perhaps are unknown to any other language in the world.

Mpongwe Adjectives.

Under this head are included adjectives of every description, viz. possessive, demonstrative, distributive, numeral and a species

of pronominal adjective, that is denominated for the sake of convenience, the definite pronoun. All of these are included under one head, because they are all governed by the same general rules of inflection.

Though they have no inflection to indicate gender or case, they have a singular and plural, and a species of *declensional inflection* by which they accommodate themselves to nouns of all declensions; thus, the same adjective has one form for a noun of the first declension, another for a noun of the second declension, etc. This will be better understood by an example; thus,

1. DEC. { Sing. *nyare mpolu*, a large cow
Plur. *inyare impolu*, large cows.
2. DEC. { Sing. *eyara evolu*, a large chest
Plur. *gara volu*, large chests.
3. DEC. { Sing. *idámbe ivolu*, a large sheep
Plur. *idámbe ampolu*, large sheep.
4. DEC. { Sing. *omamba ompolu*, a large snake
Plur. *imamba impolu*, large snakes.

Here then, without anything that can be denominated case or gender, we have as many as seven different forms for the adjective *large*, viz. *mpolu*, *impolu*, *evolu*, *volu*, *ivolu*, *ampolu*, and *ompolu*, in the use of which the natives are governed by the strictest and most uniform principles of grammar.

Adjectives again are to be divided into *three distinct classes*, not according to the classification of our grammars, into demonstrative, possessive, distributive, etc., but according to the peculiar mode which each adopts of being inflected through the declensions. Before entering into a description of these different classes, it is necessary to give some explanation of the definite pronoun.

Definite Pronoun. This particle, *yi*, *ya*, or *yo* (it assumes these different vowels according to rules that will be mentioned presently), is a part of speech peculiar to the Mpongwe, but is so intimately interwoven with the whole structure of the language, and is used for such a variety of purposes, that it is difficult to assign it a place under any of the established divisions of speech. It partakes of the nature of the personal pronoun; is used as a relative pronoun and points out its antecedent with admirable precision; and serves as a connecting link between the nominative and the possessive cases. These different forms of it incorporate themselves with the initial vowel of all verbs of the past tense; they serve as an auxiliary in forming the infinitive mood; some-

times they exercise the function of a preposition ; they serve to indicate the nominative to the verb when it is preceded by more than one ; they incorporate themselves with all adjectives whose incipient syllable commences with a vowel, and are indispensable to the inflection of the great mass of adjectives in the language ; they form the incipient syllable of all ordinal numbers and are used in various other ways, too numerous to be mentioned. This pronoun is inflected through the different declensions like any other adjective ; indeed it is the basis of the two principal classes of adjectives, without which, they cannot be inflected. This may be better understood by an example ; thus,

1. DEC. { Sing. *nyare yi re*, the cow it is there
Plur. *inyare si re*, the cows they are there.
2. DEC. { Sing. *egare zi re*, the chest it is, etc.
Plur. *gare yi re*, " " "
3. DEC. { Sing. *idámbe nyi re*, the sheep, etc.
Plur. *adámbe mi re*, " "
4. DEC. { Sing. *omamba wi re*, the snake it, etc.
Plur. *imamba yi re*, " "

All the parts, singular and plural, being *yi, si, zi, nyi, mi, wi*. If it is united to a word, no matter whether it be a noun, adjective, or verb, that commences with a vowel, it drops its own vowel, and incorporates itself with the following word, in the same manner as the French article with a noun which commences with a vowel or a silent *h*. The vowel is superseded by *a* before certain consonants, but under what particular circumstances is not known. When it takes *o* it is either in the objective case, or it is a nominative possessing something of a demonstrative character ; thus, *ininla nyi denda mpani mbe, nyo be juwa*, i. e. "the soul that sins, it (the very same) shall die," etc. It differs from adjectives and nouns, but agrees with personal pronouns in having an objective case.

Having now explained the nature and office of this somewhat anomalous particle, which makes a marked, if not a radical difference between this and the other two dialects, we may complete the classification of adjectives.

The *first class* of adjectives embraces all those which receive the definite pronoun as a prefix, which they may do in two ways, 1. when the ground-form commencing with a vowel, incorporates the prefix with itself without forming an additional syllable ; thus, *'am* is the ground-form for *my* but is never used by itself ; by receiving the prefix it becomes *y'am, s'am, z'am*, etc. ; and 2. when

the ground-form commences with a consonant and receives the prefix as an additional syllable; thus, *ngulu*, strong; *yingula*, *singulu*, according to the number and declension of the noun to which it belongs. Before the word *tenatena*, red, and some other words, the vowel of the prefix is *a*, as *yatenatena*, etc.

The *second class* embraces those adjectives whose initial changes are analogous to those that are produced on the incipient syllables of so many nouns in the different declensions successively; i. e. they assume, reject or change their initial vowel according as nouns of the different declensions would. The word *mpolu* belongs to this class; and the example already given under the head of the inflection of adjectives generally, will explain the characteristic just mentioned.

The *third class* embrace such adjectives as combine both of the above peculiarities in their own inflections; this occurs in the words *enge*, much, and *ango*, little; neither of which is ever used by itself. With nouns of the first declension it is *nyenge*, pl. *sin-yenge*; in the second declension it is *ezenge*, pl. *yenge*; in the third, *inyenge*, pl. *amange*; and in the fourth it is *onyenge*, pl. *imienge*, etc.

The ordinal numbers are derived from the cardinal, by simply prefixing the definite pronoun, all of which, as well as the cardinal numbers themselves, are to be arranged under the different classes of adjectives according to their incipient syllables respectively.

Pronouns.

Personal Pronouns. All three of these dialects have a large number of personal pronouns, resulting from contracted forms of the same word, forms to express objects of importance or diminutiveness, emphasis, etc., in which there are some peculiarities for each one. Neither has any forms to express gender; and, with the exception of an objective form of the first person singular in the Grebo, they have no case.

The Grebo has a form of the third person singular and plural for insignificant objects.

The following is a list of the personal pronouns in each.

GREBO PERSONAL PRONOUNS.

Singular.	Plural.
1st Pers. <i>mā</i> , I	<i>ā</i> or <i>ānu</i> , we
2d Pers. <i>māh</i> , you	<i>āh</i> or <i>ānuu</i> , ye
3d Pers. <i>ā</i> , <i>nā</i> , dim. <i>ē</i> and <i>nē</i> , he, she, it	<i>oh</i> , <i>no</i> , <i>eh</i> and <i>ne</i> , thy.

They are declined thus :

First Pers. singular.		First Pers. plural.	
Nom.	<i>nd</i> , I	<i>d</i> and <i>amu</i> , we	
Poss.	<i>nd</i> and <i>nd</i> , my	<i>d</i> , our	
Obj.	<i>nd</i> , <i>mu</i> , <i>mi</i> , me	<i>am</i> and <i>amu</i> , us.	
Second Pers. singular.		Second Pers. plural.	
Nom.	<i>ndh</i> , you	<i>dh</i> and <i>ahmu</i> , ye	
Poss.	<i>ndh</i> and <i>ndh</i> , your	<i>dh</i> , your	
Obj.	<i>ndh</i> , <i>nd</i> , you	<i>ahmu</i> , you.	
Third Pers. singular.		Third Pers. plural.	
Nom.	<i>d</i> and <i>nd</i> , he, she, or it	<i>oh</i> and <i>no</i> , thy	
Poss.	<i>d</i> , <i>nd</i> , his, her, its	<i>oh</i> and <i>no</i> , their	
Obj.	<i>nd</i> , him, her, it	<i>no</i> , them.	
Third Pers. dim. Sing.		Third Pers. plural.	
Nom.	<i>ih</i> and <i>nd</i> , he, she, or it	<i>oh</i> and <i>ne</i> , they	
Poss.	<i>ih</i> , his, her, its	<i>oh</i> and <i>ne</i> , their	
Obj.	<i>nd</i> , him, her, it	<i>ne</i> , them.	

NOTE. The first and second persons, both singular and plural, are not distinguished from each other except by intonation, which is marked in writing by *h* final.

The following are the pronouns personal of the Mandingo, viz.

1. Pers. singular, *nte* (cont. forms), *n*, *m*, I, me
2. " " *ite* " " *i*, thou
3. " " *ate* " " *a*, he, she, it.
1. Pers. plural, *ntolu*, *ntelu* (sometimes *n*), we, us
2. " " *allolu*, or *allelu*, cont. *al*, ye, you
3. " " *itolu*, or *itelu*, " *y*, thy, them.

The nominative and objective cases are always the same ; the possessive case, which belongs properly to possessive pronouns, is formed by suffixing *la* to the personal pronouns ; thus,

1. *ntela* (cont. forms), *na*, my
2. *itela* " " *ila*, thy
3. *atela* " " *aka*, his, her, etc.

The following are Mpongwe personal pronouns :

1. Pers. singular, *mie*, *mi*, *m'* (emphatic) *miē*, I, me
2. " " *o*, *d*, *awē*, you
3. " " *e*, *ē* (in combination *a*), *yē*, *ayē*, he, she, it, him.
1. Pers. plural, *azuwē*, *az'wē*, *'zuwe*, we, us
2. " " *anuwe*, *'nuwe*, ye, you
3. " " *wao*, *wa*, they, them.

The possessive pronouns are formed by prefixing the definite pronouns; which see under the head of *Adjectives*.

á and *ɛ* are used both as nominative and objective cases, only however when they are incorporated with the final syllable of the verb.

Relative Pronouns.

The Grebo has a relative pronoun, singular and plural; as, *nyá* (who), pl. *nyo* (who), which neither of the others has; but both these have more than one word for this purpose. *O* is the ordinary relative pronoun in Mpongwe, *mande*, when a question is asked. In Mandingo, *man*, *many*, or *men*.

All three dialects form a reflective pronoun by suffixing a syllable; in Grebo it is *dui*, from which comes *ádui* (himself); in Mandingo, the suffix is *fang* or *dung*; as, *m'fang* (myself); in Mpongwe, it is *mě*; as, *miemě* (myself), *ayēmě* (himself), etc.

Verbs.

There are but few points of resemblance among the verbs of these three dialects. Neither has any inflections to indicate the person or the number, i. e. the first, second and third persons, singular and plural, are of the same form.

The second person plural of the imperative mood in Mpongwe verbs, has a form different from the singular, which is almost the only exception to the above principle that is worthy of notice. Another circumstance common to all is that they use conjunctions, and other auxiliary particles, to express the various shades of meaning of the different tenses and moods; and some of these particles are the same in two or more of them, which cannot justly be regarded in any other light than an accidental circumstance.

Grebo verbs are exceedingly meagre in point of inflections. They have an indicative, an imperative, and an infinitive mood. The subjunctive mood is little else than the indicative, having the conjunction *ne* (if) placed before it; and the potential mood is likewise dependent upon auxiliary particles.

Tense is well defined in Grebo verbs, perhaps much more minutely than in either of the other two dialects. With the aid of auxiliary particles, there are as many as *thirteen tenses*; viz. the present, indefinite past, imperfect indefinite past, the past tense of to-day, the imperfect past tense of to-day, the past tense of yesterday, the imperfect past tense of yesterday, the past tense of time previous to

yesterday, the imperfect tense of time previous to yesterday, the indefinite future tense, the future tense of to-day, the future tense of to-morrow, the future tense of time subsequent to to-morrow. This remarkable minuteness in defining the precise time of an event or action, is not effected, however, by changes wrought upon the radical word, but by the use of auxiliary particles, which are seldom used except in this capacity. There is not, strictly speaking, any future tense; the only way by which they can express future action, is by employing the verb *minio* or *mi* (to go), as an auxiliary, and the infinitive mood; thus, to say, "I will do it," they say, *mi ni numu*, i. e. "I go it to do." And so *mi ni numu*, "I am going it to do, presently, or some future part of the day." And in all these cases, the auxiliary verb receives the inflections, whilst the infinitive mood of the principal verb remains unchanged. No Grebo verb is capable, of itself, of more than twelve or fifteen different forms; for all the accessory ideas or shades of meaning, it is indebted to the use of auxiliary particles, many of which are inflected instead of itself.

It has a passive voice, which is made by affixing the letter *ɛ* to the active form; but it is never used, when it can be avoided by circumlocution. Instead of saying *he was killed*, they would say, *he* or *they* or *somebody killed him*. Instead of saying, *he was killed in war*, they would say, *war killed him*. The want of passive verbs characterizes the Mandingo, the Basa, the Fantee, the Acra, and perhaps all the dialects of Northern Africa. The particles *na* (is) and *mána* (was) are the only parts of a substantive verb used in the Grebo. A reciprocal form is produced by a reduplication of the incipient syllable.

Mandingo Verb.

The Mandingo verb possesses but little more completeness or system than the Grebo. It seems to be equally dependent upon auxiliary particles, and, like the Grebo, but not to the same extent, it defines the time of an action with considerable minuteness. The radical or ground form is capable of but few inflections, even less than the Grebo. It has a causative form, which is made by the aid of a suffix, which the Grebo has not; but on the other hand, it wants a reciprocal form, which the Grebo has. It differs essentially from the Grebo, in its not being under the necessity of employing the verb *to go* or *come*, to aid in expressing a future tense. It is said to possess seven tenses and four moods, but strictly speaking, there are, perhaps, not more than three moods,

the conditional being expressed by aid of conjunctive particles. It uses a greater variety of particles in the sense of substantive verbs.

Mpongwe Verb.

The Mpongwe verb has *four moods*, the indicative, the imperative, the conditional or subjunctive, and what may be denominated the *conjunctive mood*. By the aid of auxiliary particles, it forms a potential and an infinitive mood.

The conjunctive mood has only one form, and is used as the second verb in a sentence, where the two verbs would otherwise be joined by a copulative conjunction. Although not inflected itself, it is joined with verbs of all moods, tenses, and persons.

The conditional mood has a form of its own, but uses conjunctive particles as auxiliaries at the same time. Different conjunctive particles are used with the different tenses.

The imperative mood is derived from the present of the indicative, by the change of its initial consonant into its reciprocal consonant; thus, *tōnda*, to love; *rōnda*, love thou; *denda*, to do; *lenda*, do thou. These changes will be noticed more fully presently.

The potential mood is made, like the subjunctive, by the aid of auxiliary particles.

The tenses in Mpongwe are a present, past or historical, perfect past, and future. The perfect past tense, which represents the completeness of an action, is formed from the present tense by prefixing *a* and by changing *a* final into *i*; thus, *tōnda*, to love; *atōndi*, did love. The past or historical tense is derived from the imperative by prefixing *a* and changing *a* final into *i*; thus, *rōnda*, love; *arōndi*, have loved, etc. The future tense is formed by the aid of the auxiliary particle *be*; as, *mi be tōnda*, I am going to love. It must be carefully noted, however, that this same combination of words, if the nominative follows, expresses past time; thus, *ne be tōnda Anyambia Ebreham*, i. e. God loved Abraham. When it is future, the nominative goes before the verb in the order of construction. When an action is immediately to take place, the present tense is used as a future; thus, *mi bia*, I am coming immediately; but, *mi be bia*, I am coming after a while, or at some indefinite future time.

The passive voice is formed from the active, simply by changing *a* final into *o*; thus, *mi tōnda*, I love; *mi tōndo*, I am loved. In the historical and perfect past tense, which terminate in *i*,

o is simply adjoined; thus, *arōndi*, have loved; *arōndio*, to have been loved. This passive form, which is so simple in itself, may be found in every mood and tense which properly belongs to the active.

There is another feature in the Mpongwe verb, equally simple and remarkable; there is a negative for every affirmative form of the verb, and this is distinguished from the affirmative by an intonation on the first or principal vowel of the verb, which is characterized in writing by the use of an italic letter. The negative form belongs to the passive as well as the active voice; thus,

ACT.	{ Affir. <i>mi tōnda</i> , I love
	{ Neg. <i>mi tōnda</i> , I do not love.
PASS.	{ Affir. <i>mi tōnda</i> , I am loved
	{ Neg. <i>mi tōnda</i> , I am not loved.

Having now treated of the moods and tenses of Mpongwe verbs, of which there is nothing remarkable, except the very simple manner in which the passive voice is formed from the active, and the equally simple process by which the negative form is distinguished from the affirmative, we proceed now to point out another characteristic of Mpongwe verbs, which is wholly unknown to other dialects, and which certainly constitutes a most wonderful feature in this.

All the verbs in the language, with the exception, perhaps, of ten or a dozen, may be regarded as *regular verbs*, inasmuch as they are all governed by the same fixed principles of inflection; they are such as are of two or more syllables, the final letter of which is always *a*, and the incipient consonant of which must be *b*, *d*, *f* (which is closely allied to *fw*), *j*, *k*, *p*, *s*, *t*, and *sh*, each of which has its reciprocal consonant, into which it is invariably changed to form the imperative mood and such of the oblique tenses of the verb as are derived from it. Such verbs as commence with *m* or *n*, which have no reciprocal consonants, retain these two letters throughout all their inflections; but, in other respects, are perfectly regular. The following example will illustrate what we mean by the change of these consonants into their reciprocal letters; thus, the invariable reciprocal letter of *b* is *v* or *w*; so the imperative is derived from the present of the indicative, in all verbs which commence with *b*, by changing *b* into *w* or *v*; thus, *mi bōnga*, I take; Imp. *wōnga*, take; after the same manner, and with invariable uniformity, *d* is changed into *l*, *f* into *v* or *fw* into *wv*, *j* into *y*, *k* into *g*, *p* into *v*, *s* into *z*, *sh* into *xy*, *t* into *r*; thus,

<i>mi bōnga</i> , I take	<i>wōnga</i> , take thou
<i>mi denda</i> , I do	<i>lenda</i> , do thou
<i>mi foema</i> , I err	<i>vuema</i> , err thou
<i>mi jona</i> , I kill	<i>yona</i> , kill thou
<i>mi kamba</i> , I speak	<i>gamba</i> , speak
<i>mi panga</i> , I make	<i>vanga</i> , make
<i>mi songa</i> , I follow	<i>xonga</i> , follow
<i>mi tōnda</i> , I love	<i>rōnda</i> , love
<i>mi xunguna</i> , I help	<i>xxunguna</i> , help thou
<i>mi sheva</i> , I play	<i>zyeva</i> , play, etc.

Having now explained what a regular verb is, we proceed a step further, to explain what may be denominated the different *conjugations* of every regular verb.

Every regular verb in the language may be said to have as many as five simple conjugations, and as many as six compound conjugations.

These conjugations are, 1st, the radical conjugation *kamba*, I speak; 2d, the causative, which is derived from the radical by changing a final into *iza*; thus, *kamba*, to speak; *kambiza*, to cause to speak; the 3d, frequentative or habitual conjugation, which implies habitual action, is derived from the radical by suffixing *ga*; thus, *kamba*, to speak; *kambaga*, to speak habitually; 4th, the relative conjugation, which implies performing an action for or to some one, is derived from the radical by suffixing *na*; thus, from *kamba*, to speak, comes *kambana* or *kambina*, to speak to or with some one; and 5th, the indefinite, which is derived from the radical by suffixing the imperative to the present of the Indicative; thus, from *kamba* comes *kambagamba*, to speak at random.

By combining these simple derivative conjugations, as many as six compound conjugations may be formed. Thus, by uniting the habitual and the causative, we get *kambizaga*, i. e. to cause to talk habitually, etc. The following table will exhibit all these conjugations; thus,

Simple Conjugations.

Radical,	<i>mi kamba</i> , I talk
Frequentative,	<i>kambaga</i> , to talk habitually
Causative,	<i>kambiza</i> , to cause to talk
Relative,	<i>kambina</i> , to talk to, or with some one
Indefinite,	<i>kambagamba</i> , to talk at random.

Compound Conjugations.

<i>kambizaga</i> , to cause to talk habitually
<i>kambinaga</i> , to talk habitually with some one
<i>kambinaza</i> , to cause to talk with some one

kambagambaga, to talk at random habitually
kambagambiza, to cause some one to talk at random
kambagambina, to talk with some one at random.

These compound tenses might be still further multiplied, by combining three or more of the simple conjugations into one; thus, *kambinazaga*, to cause to speak with some one habitually, but such extended combinations are seldom used.

Now, in relation to the above simple and compound forms of the verb, each one of them has, according to principles already mentioned, not only an affirmative active and negative active voice, but also an affirmative and negative passive voice, each one of which is inflected through all the moods and tenses according to the same rules as the radical conjugation, thus giving to the verb a variety and a number of inflections that is surpassed by no language in the world. The number of different forms into which every regular verb may be wrought, not including those which require auxiliary particles, is upwards of two hundred, which must appear astonishingly great when it is remembered that the verb is not inflected on account of person or number. The whole number of tenses or shades of meaning, which an Mpongwe verb may be made to express, with the aid of its auxiliary particles, is between twelve and fifteen hundred. It is not pretended that any one Mpongwe verb is habitually or frequently used in all of these varied and almost interminable ramifications; for this would imply a degree of mental activity to which no native tribe in Africa has attained; but we mean to assert that some parts of every conjugation are less or more frequently, and that the most remote ramification may, at any time be used and convey a precise idea to the mind of the native, even had it been the first time he had ever heard it so used.

It is further important to mention, that the natives do not always confine themselves rigidly to the idiom which is implied by the character of the verb; that is, instead of using these complicated combinations, they may express their same ideas by the use of two or more independent words; thus, instead of saying *e kambizè*, he caused him to speak, they may say *e pangè e kamba*, i. e. he makes him to talk.

It will be borne in mind too, that, although the inflections of the Mpongwe verb are exceedingly complicated, it preserves a most marked method, and, by committing to memory a few very simple principles, every part may easily be traced up to its root.

It has been remarked that the Mandingo has no passive voice,

and that the Grebo, if it really has one, seldom uses it. The Mpongwe, on the other hand, uses the passive voice much more freely than the active; and it may be said with truth, that it never uses an active verb when it can use a passive one. The great partiality which is felt for the use of the passive voice, leads to a species of idiom which is very remarkable indeed. For example, they would be much more likely to say *mi tōndo n'an-laga*, I am loved by people, than to say *anlaga wi tōnda mie*, the people like me; so *mi tōndo ndz*, I am loved by him, in preference to *e tōnda mie*; they say *e bōngo n'ahugu*, i. e. "he is taken or overcome by rum," for, he is drunk; *e nya inyama si jono ndz*, i. e. he eats the venison which is killed by him, instead of, which he killed; *olōngā w'inya wi tōndo ne reri yē*, i. e. the kind of food that is liked by his father, instead of that which his father likes. The phrase, "your coming to this house," is expressed thus, *ibia s'ibio zuwe*, literally, "the coming which is *comed* by you;" and again, the death which we die in this world, is thus rendered, *ijwaa si-jwaa zuwe ntye yindā*, i. e. "the death which is *died* by us in this world."

Syntax.

But these dialects do not differ from each other less in their construction, or the mode of arranging their words in sentences, than they do in their etymological principles. This will be better understood, however, by arranging a few sentences together with an interlineation of English.

FAMILIAR PHRASES.

Mandingo, *Ilafita munnela?* What do you want?

Grebo, *dēh ida?* " " "

Mpongwe, *o bel' ande?* " " "

Mand. *Ibeta minto?* Where are you going?

Grebo, *Tē miē?*

Mpong. *o kēnda gwā?*

Mand. *Atata minto le?* Where is he gone?

Grebo, *Tā muē?*

Mpong. *Akēnda gwā?*

Mand. *Iko di?* or *dile?* What do you say?

Grebo, *ā hē dē?*

Mpong. *o buia sē or okamba sē?*

Mand. *Ni a ke nola*, I cannot do it.

Grebo.

Mpong. *mī agetizi denda mo.*

- Mand. *Abe bungo kono*, he is in the house.
 Grebo, *á ne kai biyo*,
 Mpong. *are go nago*,
 Mand. *nkonkota, konko le benna*, I am hungry.
 Grebo, *kansu ni mu*, hunger works me.
 Mpong. *mi jéǵá njana*, I am sick with hunger.
 Mand. *Imuso be mintole?* Where is your wife?
 Grebo, *Té net nah nyima?*
 Mpong. *omacanta uá, wi re gwi?*
 Mand. *Nye ding sabba otto*, I have three children.
 Grebo, *Má ká iro táká*,
 Mpong. *Mi are anawana araro*.
 Mand. *Ate ma mo batte lati*, he is a good man.
 Grebo, *ka nyebwi*, good person.
 Mpong. *omá mbia or arombia*, he is a good person.
 Mand. *Néru nge kúna le fá*, we killed a bird.
 Grebo, *á la niblo*,
 Mpong. *Azaw' e ayoni nyéni*.
 Mand. *Nbulo man si*, I have no time.
 Grebo, *Ye ti ká*.
 Mpong. *mi anyele egombe*.
 Mand. *Ntotu motu be balo koiring*, our people are white.
 Grebo.
 Mpong. *anlaga wazyo wi re pupu*.

All these dialects are poor in point of words; the Grebo much more so than the Mpongwe; there are no corresponding words for rich, hungry, happy, etc. The word *púá* signifies to squeeze, defraud, cheat, etc. The word *lie* (se) in Grebo signifies to tell a falsehood, to mistake, etc. All terms which belong to the Christian religion, science, government, etc. are wanting. Again there are terms in these languages for which there are no corresponding words in English, the names of trees, grasses, birds, fish, their social economy, systems of idolatry and fables.

ARTICLE VII.

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

OXFORD is, in some respects, the most picturesque and peculiar city in Europe. Standing on a gentle eminence, it has a marked advantage over Cambridge, the site of the latter being perfectly flat. The public buildings, too, in Cambridge, are concentrated to a much greater extent than in Oxford on a single street. The eastern university has, however, one structure, with which the banks of the Isis have nothing to compare—King's College chapel,

—“ that immense
And glorious work of fine intelligence.”
“ They dreamed not of a perishable home
Who thus could build.”—

In Oxford, the public edifices are scattered in every part of a city, containing 25,000 inhabitants. The college buildings are situated, with few exceptions, around open courts or quadrangles larger or smaller. One of the colleges has four of these quadrangles; two others, three each. The whole number is about forty. In most of these edifices, taken singly, there is little architectural beauty or magnificence. A great proportion of the buildings are but two stories in height, built of brick and stuccoed. Yet viewed as a whole, with all their towers and spires, with churches and other edifices intermingled, the effect is very impressive. The fretted pinnacles and lofty spire of St. Mary's church, the domes of the Radcliffe Library and the Theatre, the beautiful Martyrs' memorial cross, the massive tower of Merton College chapel, the unadorned but finely proportioned Magdalen tower, together with many other towers, steeples, turrets and cupolas, some of them partly hidden by the trees, afford a prospect of unmatched interest. Who can estimate the effects, on the heart and mind of a susceptible youth, of those piles, venerable with the moss and stains of ten centuries, before whose mullioned windows and along whose foot-worn halls, have walked Wiclif, Wolsey, Jewel, Usher, Butler, Hampden, Selden, Locke, Addison, Johnson, Chatham, Wesley, Whitefield and others of the greatest names in history? Whose soul would not be kindled and exalted amid such scenes, where some of the noblest treasures of art

and antiquity are collected, hallowed by the genius and learning and religion of a thousand years !

One of the best points of observation is on the east, at the Magdalen bridge, which spans the Cherwell on the London road. Immediately in front are

“ The stream-like windings of that glorious street,”

with all its quaint, varied and most suggestive architecture. On the right, resting upon or near High-street, are Magdalen College with its fine gateway, St. Edmund's Hall, Queen's and All Soul's Colleges, the lofty spire of St. Mary's Church, the lesser one of All Saints' Church, the prospect terminating with St. Martin's Church. On the left is the botanic garden, and beyond are University College and St. Mary's Hall, while further back of this wide and winding street, on either hand, are many other objects in this most striking panorama.

But to obtain a good view of Oxford, it is not necessary to enter the city. The spectator may take his stand in Christ Church meadow on the south. He may step upon the “ Broad Walk,” first made by Wolsey, and pass a quarter of a mile under a bow-er of lofty elms, whose branches interlace, till he comes to the margin of the Cherwell. “ Turning to the right and southward, he may follow it, in its windings and dallying eddies, beneath the grassy banks and about the little wooded isle, in which it affects coy reluctance to marriage with the Isis, till at last, bending to meet the renowned river in its fresh youth, the Cherwell adds fulness and perfection to the rejoicing stream.” “ The meadow, containing fifty good acres, always beautiful, is, in early Spring, preeminently so ; in the glory of the Summer months, the leafy screen shuts out gables, pinnacles, spires, towers ; in Spring, the half-opened leaves permit to be seen, between stems and branches, the architectural features of the south face of Oxford ; and goodly, indeed, are they to look upon through that transparent veil.”¹

Christ Church, to which this meadow belongs, is the largest and richest of the colleges. It stands on the site of St. Frides-wide's priory and some inns which were built for the use of students, it is said, in the eighth century. The college owes its establishment to Wolsey and Henry VIII. The latter added to it the abbey of Osney, which was the cathedral of the see of Oxford, making Christ Church a collegiate church. The Hall is 115

¹ Oxford Protestant Magazine, May, 1847.

feet in length, 40 in breadth and 50 in height, the roof ornamented with nearly 300 coats of arms and other decorations. It is used as a refectory, and is adorned with 110 portraits. The chapel is very quaint and antique. On each side of the Choir are massive Saxon pillars; the roof is of stone-work. The sacramental plate was found in the ruins of Osney abbey. This choir is said to have been, in A. D. 730, a church for nuns. In the centre of the large north window in the west transept is represented the murder of archbishop Becket. In the Dormitory are many curious monuments and relics. Over the tomb of St. Frideswide is a beautiful Gothic shrine. On the monument to Robert Burton, author of the *Anatomy of Melancholy*, is his bust, a calculation of his nativity, and the following inscription written by himself: "Paucis notus, paucioribus ignotus, hic jacet Democritus Junior, cui vitam dedit, et mortem, Melancholia. Obiit VIII. Id. Jan. A. C. MDCXXXIX." In the Peckwater quadrangle is the Library, 161 feet in length, containing 12 busts and 295 paintings. Some of these are fine specimens of art, from the Dutch, Flemish and Italian masters, none, however, ranking in the first class. The collection of books, coins, prints, *Mss.* etc. is large and valuable. In the list of graduates of this college are Atterbury, South, Lyttleton, Bolingbroke, Sidney, Locke, William Penn, Ben Jonson, Canning and Peel.

All Souls, perhaps, comes next to Christ Church in its aristocratic reputation. It was founded by archbishop Chichele, in 1437. It is styled in the charter, "The college of the souls of all the faithful people deceased of Oxford." In the old quadrangle is a dial, contrived by Sir Christopher Wren, when fellow of the college, which, by the help of two half rays, and one whole one for every hour, shows to a minute what is the time. In the chapel is a marble statue of William Blackstone, also a fellow of the college, and professor of Common Law, represented as sitting in his robes, his right hand on a volume of his *Commentary*, his left holding *Magna Charta*. In the hall are about thirty portraits of eminent persons. The Library is a noble room, 200 feet long, 39½ broad and 40 in height. It has two ranges of book-cases, one above the other, supported by Doric and Ionic pillars. Over the upper book-cases, are placed alternately, bronze-vases and busts. The library is said to contain more than 40,000 volumes. Young, author of the *Night Thoughts*, and bishop Heber were members of this college.

Balliol college, situated on Broad-street, has some interesting

reminiscences. In the city-ditch, now the site of the houses on the opposite side of the street, Ridley and Latimer suffered martyrdom by fire, Oct. 16, 1555, and Cranmer, March 21 of the following year. They were confined sometime in Bocardo prison, which was over the north-gate and crossed Corn-market street, adjoining the tower of St. Michael's Church. Cranmer is said to have ascended the top of the tower in which he was confined to witness the execution of his companions, where he kneeled down and prayed to God to strengthen their faith. Near Balliol College on the west is the church of St. Mary Magdalene, originally built, it is supposed, before the Norman conquest. In 1940, there was attached to the north side of this church an aisle, called the "Martyrs' aisle." In the wall the identical door of the Bocardo prison is inserted. In the sunk panels of the buttresses, the armorial bearings of Cranmer, Ridley and Latimer, with those of their respective sees, are introduced, together with the initials of their names and various emblematic devices, e. g. the hand of Cranmer in the flames, an open Bible, the palm of triumph crossed by the fire-brand of torture, etc.¹ At the north end of the churchyard, another honorary monument has been erected, in the form of the memorial crosses erected by Edward I. to his queen Eleanor, and also like the one at Godesberg near Bonn, and also the elegant Gothic spire, the "beautiful fountain," Schöner Brunnen, at Nuremberg. The height is 73 feet, the form is a hexagon. It has rich decorations of niches, canopies, pediments, buttresses and pinnacles. The stone is a finely crystallized magnesian limestone, selected by Prof. Buckland. The figures of the martyred prelates were carved by Henry Weeks. On the three intermediate sides of the hexagon are the following symbols on shields, viz. the crown of thorns and the crown of glory—the sacramental cup and an open Bible—two crossed palm-branches and two crossed fire-brands. The whole structure is very appropriate and of exceeding beauty. The following is the inscription on the north face of the basement: To the glory of God, and in grateful commemoration of his servants, Thomas Cranmer, Nicholas Ridley, Hugh Latimer, prelates of the church of England, who, near this spot, yielded their bodies to be burned; bearing witness to the sacred truths which they had affirmed and maintained against the errors of the church of Rome; and rejoicing

¹ It is a singular circumstance, that two clergymen, recently officiating in this Martyrs' church, have become Roman Catholics, Rev. Robert A. Coffin, perpetual curate, 1844, and Rev. Charles H. Collyns, assistant curate.

that to them it was given not only to believe in Christ, but also to suffer for his sake. This monument was erected by public subscription in the year of our Lord God, 1841.

Wiclif was master of Balliol College in 1361. He was a member of Merton College. He dwelt near the spot where now stands the east gate of Christ Church, called Canterbury Gate. Dr. Pusey resides in the south-west corner of the great quadrangle of Christ Church. Bishop Butler was educated at Oriel, which has become distinguished as the leading Oxford college in the Tractarian controversy.¹ Dr. Samuel Johnson was member of Pembroke in 1738. His study was the top room over the gate-way. In 1732, George Whitefield, when eighteen years of age, was entered as servitor at this college. He took the degree of B. A. in 1736. John Wesley was a student of Christ Church and subsequently a fellow of Lincoln. His father, Samuel Wesley, was a member of Exeter College. Among the members of Magdalen College were Cardinal Wolsey, Fox the martyrologist and John Hampden. The latter, by a strange coincidence, was associated with Laud, then president of St. John's College, to write congratulatory poems on the marriage of the elector Palatine to the princess Elizabeth.²

The buildings and establishments belonging to the *university* are the Radcliffe Library, The Schools containing a part of the Bodleian Library, The Clarendon, The Theatre, The Ashmolean Museum, The University Galleries, The Radcliffe Infirmary, The New University Printing Office, and The Observatory.

The Radcliffe Library was completed in 1749 from a bequest of Dr. Radcliffe, who left £40,000 for that purpose and a fund for a librarian and other purposes. The books are principally in natural history and medicine. The rooms are enriched with busts, vases, portraits, a collection of 1000 Corsi marbles, etc.

The Bodleian Library was founded in 1602 by Sir Thomas Bodley; it occupies many large rooms, and is constantly increasing, having the right of a copy of every work printed in the king-

¹ Eight of its members, seven of them clergymen, have followed Mr. Newman in his adhesion to the Romish church. Mr. N.'s lodgings were a narrow suite of rooms at the top of the stairs, on the south side of the quadrangle.

² Prince Rupert, the son of this marriage, led the king's forces in that skirmish, June 18, 1643, in which Hampden was mortally wounded. Two hundred years from that day a monument was erected in Chalgrove Field, Oxfordshire, a few paces from the fatal spot, in reverence to the memory of Hampden, with an inscription by Lord Nugent.

dem, an annual income of £2000 for the purchase of books, works of art, etc. It has Selden's library of 8000 volumes, 1300 Mss. given by Laud, the Oppenheim library rich in Rabbinical literature, a large collection of Oriental Mss., 50,000 dissertations by members of foreign universities, prints, medals, coins, etc. The whole number of volumes is not known, at least different authorities vary greatly. M. Balbi, after canvassing different estimates in 1835, gives the whole number as about 200,000 books and 25,000 Mss. The German Conversations Lexicon states, that the library, according to some, contains 250,000 volumes, according to others, 500,000. The Oxford local authorities make the total amount 400,000. No books are allowed to be taken from this library. The rooms seem to be quite insufficient and insecure for so vast a treasure. It is said that the copy-right is sometimes hardly esteemed a privilege, as it introduces an immense amount of trash.

The building called the Schools was completed early in the 17th century. It contains in the west side a part of the Bodleian library and the Picture gallery (which has many pictures, busts, statues, models of ancient buildings, etc.); on the north-east is the part used for the public examination of the students of all the colleges and halls, before taking a degree; and in the centre of the east side is a tower, in which are kept the muniments and registers of the university. The Clarendon was formerly the University Printing Office. It is now used for the meetings of the heads of colleges, lecture rooms, a museum for mineralogy, etc. The Theatre was erected at the sole expense of Archbishop Sheldon, in 1664, at a cost of £15,000. It was designed and built by Wren, after the model of the theatre of Marcellus at Rome. It will contain more than 3000 persons. The roof rests solely on the external walls. The annual convocation of the university is held in this room, called the "Commemoration of Benefactors." Honorary degrees are sometimes conferred here. At the commemoration in 1814 some of the allied sovereigns were present. The contents of the Ashmolean museum, founded by Elias Ashmole, are classified according to the plan of Paley's Natural Theology. The museum is quite miscellaneous and not of great value. The university Galleries, or the Taylor Institution, erected from the bequests of Sir Robert Taylor and Rev. Dr. Randolph, now contain Chantrey's monumental and other figures and busts; Lawrence's collection of the drawings of Raphael and Michael Angelo, 190 in number; some paintings; the Pomfret statues, and the Arundel

marbles. It is also intended to furnish a foundation for the "teaching and improving of the European languages." The Printing office, erected in 1826, has a front of 250 feet in length. On the south side, Bibles, and Common Prayer Books are printed; on the north side, classical works.

We subjoin a list of the University professors :

R. D. Hampden, D. D.,	Regius Prof. of Divinity,
J. Phillimore, D. C. L.,	" " Civil Law,
J. Kidd, D. M.,	" " Medicine and Anatomy,
E. B. Pusey, D. D.,	" " Hebrew,
T. Gaisford, D. D.,	" " Greek,
C. A. Ogilvie, D. D.,	" " Pastoral Theology,
R. Hussey, B. D.,	" " Ecclesiastical History,
G. Faussett, D. D.,	Margaret Prof. of Divinity,
G. L. Cooke, B. D.,	Prof. of Natural Philosophy,
B. Powell, M. A.,	Savilian Prof. of Geometry,
W. F. Donkin, M. A.,	" " Astronomy,
H. G. Liddell, M. A.,	Prof. of Moral Philosophy,
E. Cardwell, D. D.,	Camden Prof. of Ancient History,
W. Crotch, Mus. D.,	Prof. of Music,
S. Reay, B. D.,	Land's Prof. of Arabic,
C. G. B. Daubeny, D. M.,	Prof. of Botany and Chemistry,
J. Garbett, M. A.,	Prof. of Poetry,
J. A. Cramer, D. D.,	Prof. of Modern Hist. and Mod. Languages,
W. E. Buckley, M. A.,	Prof. of Anglo-Saxon,
J. A. Ogle, D. M.,	Prof. of Clinical Medicine,
J. D. Macbride, D. C. L.,	lecturer in Arabic,
N. W. Senior, D. C. L.,	Prof. of Political Economy,
H. H. Wilson, M. A.,	Boden Prof. of Sanscrit,
R. Walker, M. A.,	reader in Experimental Philosophy,
Wm. Buckland, D. D.,	Prof. of Mineralogy and Geology,
R. Michell, B. D.,	lecturer in Logic.

The professors and lecturers have certain salaries allowed them on some foundation, and are in consequence required to deliver lectures annually, on such subjects as the founders may have appointed in their charters or wills. The first five regius professorships were founded by Henry VIII, with a yearly salary of £40. The remaining support of the professors is derived from various canonries, masterships, etc. Some of these professorships are mere sinecures. The attendance upon the lectures is, we believe, voluntary, so far as any university statute is concerned. The professors as such have very little authority in managing the concerns of the university. Some of them are non-residents; e. g. Dr. Buckland resides at London, being dean of Westminster. Most of the subjects of the lectures are regarded with little favor

at the university, an acquaintance with them not being necessary for a degree or for the higher honors. Several of the professors, it will be seen, are presidents of colleges and halls.

The business of the university, in its corporate capacity, is managed in two distinct assemblies, called the house of congregation and the house of convocation. The former consists wholly of what are called regents, i. e. all doctors and masters of arts during the first year from their taking their degree, and also all doctors of every faculty resident in the university, all heads of colleges and halls, all professors and public lecturers, the masters of the schools, the public examiners, the deans and censors of colleges, and all other masters of arts during the second year from their receiving their degree. The business is principally confined to the passing of dispensations, the granting of degrees, etc. The house of convocation consists both of regents and non-regents, with certain limitations. It is empowered to investigate and determine every subject connected with the honor, interest or credit of the university. In both these meetings, the chancellor or vice-chancellor singly, and the two proctors (the peace-officers) jointly, possess the power of an absolute negative. The real influence and authority of the university is, however, lodged with the *Hebdomadal Board*, i. e. the vice-chancellor, heads of colleges and halls, and the proctors, without whose sanction nothing can be proposed in convocation, the latter having merely the privilege, under Laud's statutes, of accepting a proposition of the Board in the strictest verbal and literal accuracy of its terms, or to reject them altogether.¹

The following table gives the summary of the number of students at the different colleges. The first column denotes the total number on the books of each college, and the second, the number of those who are members of convocation. The Heads of colleges are subjoined. Different titles are used in various establishments, e. g. provost, master, dean, etc.

Christ Church,	954	522	T. Gaisford, D. D.	1831
Brazenose,	425	230	R. Harrington, D. D.	1842
Exeter,	407	204	J. L. Richards, D. D.	1838
Oriel,	338	177	E. Hawkins, D. D.	1826
Balliol,	309	147	R. Jenkyns, D. D.	1819

¹ During the present year, 1847, a system of moderate reform in the examinations was proposed by Dr. Jeune, master of Pembroke, conciliatory and interfering little with existing arrangements. But, after having been discussed and modified, it was rejected by the Board.

Wadham,	306	138	B. P. Symons, D. D.	1831
St. John's,	300	154	P. Wynter, D. D.	1828
Trinity,	287	154	J. Ingram, D. D.	1824
Queen's,	275	155	J. Fox, D. D.	1827
Worcester,	272	139	R. L. Cotton, D. D.	1839
University,	253	119	F. C. Plumtree, D. D.	1836
Magdalen Hall,	214	85	J. D. Macbride, D. C. L.	1813
Lincoln,	190	95	J. Radford, D. D.	1824
Magdalen,	184	143	M. J. Routh, D. D.	1791
Pembroke,	172	90	F. Jeune, D. C. L.	1844
Merton,	164	90	R. Marsham, D. C. L.	1826
New,	158	83	D. Williams, D. C. L.	1840
Jesus,	137	60	H. Foulkes, D. D.	1817
Corpus,	133	90	J. Norris, D. D.	1843
All Souls',	113	85	L. Sneyd, M. A.	1827
St. Edmund Hall,	108	58	W. Thompson, M. A.	1843
St. Mary Hall,	85	24	R. D. Hampden, D. D.	1833
New Inn Hall,	75	11	J. A. Cramer, D. D.	1831
St. Alban Hall,	22	6	E. Cardwell, D. D.	1831

The five halls are not incorporated bodies, but enjoy the same privileges as the colleges. The chancellor is the visitor of them all. The colleges and halls are endowed by their founders and others with estates and benefices, out of whose revenue, as well as from other resources, the heads and senior and junior members *on the foundation* receive an income, and the expenses of the colleges are defrayed. The senior members are called, at most of the colleges, fellows. Members, *not on the foundation*, called Independent members, reside entirely at their own expense. Thus Christ Church, the wealthiest college, supports on its foundation its dean, eight canons, eight chaplains, an organist, eight singing men, eight choristers, and 101 fellows, called here students. Dr. Pusey is one of the canons. The chaplains perform divine service. Prayers are read in the chapels belonging to each college twice a day, and every member is expected to attend a certain number of services during the week. The head of each college is assisted in the government by the senior members on the foundation. The pecuniary business is entrusted to one or more treasurers, called bursars. Fellows on marrying vacate their places. The heads of colleges and halls and the canons of Christ Church have the privilege of marrying. Their houses or lodgings are in, or attached to, their establishments. Independent members are sometimes married, but in that case never reside within the walls. Magdalen and New Inn Halls are the usual resort of married undergraduates. Some are admitted to Worcester College. When a candidate exceeds nineteen or

twenty years of age, it is usual to enter a hall instead of a college. When he desires to be matriculated, he addresses himself to the head of the college or hall, to which he wishes to belong, stating his age and place of education, and giving a reference to some competent person, usually a clergyman, as to character and conduct. If his references are satisfactory, he is informed *at what time* it will be convenient to admit him. In some colleges admission is offered at a distance of from one year to three years from the period of application; but this is shortened in favor of such as come peculiarly recommended. The matriculation fees vary according to the rank of the party. The son of a clergyman or gentleman pays £2 10; of an esquire, £3 10; of a baronet, etc. in proportion. There must also be a deposit, "caution money," of from £25 to £45, returnable, in some cases with deductions, when the name is removed from the books. The necessary charges for commoners, including tuition, room-rent, board, etc. vary from £75 to £100. The average total expenditures of commoners may be stated at about £160 to £180, not including private tuition which is not generally necessary. The annual expenditure of some undergraduates does not exceed £120. Each student has a bed-room and one or two sitting-rooms, furnished at his own expense, for which, if not on the foundation, he pays rent to the college. Each college and hall has a refectory, in which the whole of the society assembles to dine.

During the ten years from 1819 to 1829, the number of matriculations at Oxford averaged 416 per annum, and in one year, 1824, the number rose to 444. From 1829 to 1839, the matriculations averaged only 385, and from 1839 to 1845, their number was 407 per annum. Some of the larger colleges, e. g. Christ Church, are always crowded with students; in some of the smaller colleges, there is still accommodation for additional students.

At the end of every term there is a kind of repetition examination in the different colleges, termed, "Collections."

"Responsions," or as they are colloquially termed, the "Little-go," occur about the spring or summer of the second year of residence in Oxford. In this first and *comparatively* easy university examination, one Greek and one Latin book are taken up by each student, e. g. the second half of Herodotus, or four plays of Sophocles; and for more advanced students, four plays of Æschylus, or Aristophanes, or half of Thucydides. In Latin a part of Livy, Horace and of Tacitus's Annals will suffice. This examination in the classics is confined solely to construing and grammar. Latin

composition, consisting of the translation of an easy passage of English, is required. Among the unsuccessful candidates, a large proportion fail here. The first three parts of Aldrich's Logic form the remaining subject of this examination, for which, if desired, may be substituted the first three books of Euclid. From six to twelve or more questions on paper are given in Logic referring to different parts of Aldrich, and the student is expected to answer them in writing. If any of these are omitted, or scantily answered, they are put again, *visà voce*, in an easier form. About eight candidates are examined every day during this examination, and a day seldom passes without one at least failing (technically, *is plucked*). There are three "Little-go" examinations during the year, the average number of candidates varies from 130 to 210 on each occasion, and the examinations are usually continued three weeks or a month. Students who have failed twice are, in some colleges, expected to remove into a hall or institution without fellowship; e. g. at Balliol, one failure is generally sufficient to disqualify a young man, while at Brasenose three failures are usually allowed before removal is insisted upon.

The Public Examination for degrees, technically termed, "the Great-go," occurs soon after the student enters the fourth year of residence, and consists of exercises in the elements of religion, including the Gospels in Greek, the classics, rhetoric, moral philosophy, logic and Latin composition; to which one, who is seeking honors, adds mathematics and natural philosophy. Aldrich's logic, including some acquaintance with Whateley's, is usually a leading subject. Four books of Euclid may be substituted for logic, but this is not often done. One Latin and two Greek books are required for the ordinary degree. The second decade of Livy is very commonly selected. Half of either of the Greek historians will suffice for an historical book; four Greek tragedies usually form the second classical work. Oral examination in ancient history forms a part of the examination. The student who wishes to excel in Aristotle, must have made himself acquainted with the various explanations of obscure passages in the Nichomachean Ethics. A knowledge both of the ethics and rhetoric is necessary for obtaining a place in the first or second class. Aldrich's logic must be thoroughly known, and an acquaintance with the theory of syllogisms must be sought in Aristotle's Organon. One dialogue of Plato, e. g. the Gorgias, may be taken up. None of the writings of Cicero meet with much encouragement.

Butler's Analogy, with three of his sermons, is a popular book.

Dr. Hampden first introduced this work when he was examiner in 1829. Paley is much underrated. Next to Aristotle, Thucydides is regarded as of special importance. The other works in history which are used are Herodotus and either Livy or Tacitus. Only a limited range of historical knowledge is required, e. g. the details of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, and the early annals of Rome. Demosthenes and the other great orators of Greece are rarely studied at Oxford. *Scholarship* means an acquaintance with the Greek tragedies and poetry, and classical verse and prose composition. Æschylus is a great favorite with the higher examiners. Latin poetry for the schools includes Horace, Terence and Juvenal. Translations from English into Latin are required of all university students. A correct style of translating from English into Greek is regarded as of great importance, together with a knowledge of Greek accentuation.

A certain amount of theological knowledge is absolutely necessary for success, whether the candidates are trying for the honors of a class, or are contented with an ordinary degree; no difference in the amount of "divinity" is observable in either case, and no allowance is made for preëminent success in the classical or philosophical parts of the examination. Every student begins the divinity examination by receiving from the examiners a portion of the Four Gospels to construe; questions may then be put to him respecting the events implied or referred to in the text and context. This may lead to some doctrinal passage which bears on one of the Thirty Nine Articles, and the candidate is required to repeat that article by heart, and to confirm it by the quotation of other texts. Hence there is occasionally a digression to some period of the Old Testament history, the Levitical law, types, prophecies, etc. Generally speaking, the amount of divinity required for a B. A. degree at Oxford includes an acquaintance with the histories of the Old and New Testaments, an ability to construe the Greek text of the four gospels, to repeat by rote any one or more of the Thirty Nine Articles, and to quote the texts usually cited in proof of them.¹

There are also certain prizes, exhibitions, etc. which furnish an additional stimulant.

¹ Most of the facts quoted above in relation to the examinations are condensed from an article by James Heywood, F. R. S. and published in the Journal of the London Statistical Society. For some additional statements we are indebted to the Oxford Protestant Magazine. The Class List, of those who passed a successful examination, Easter-term, 1847, contains forty-nine names, four in the first class, twelve in the second, nineteen in the third, and fourteen in the fourth.

From the above statements in regard to the course of instruction at Oxford, we may safely make the following inferences and remarks :

1. Within the narrow, circumscribed limits which are set up, there must be much close and thorough study. Those who are willing to submit to the examinations are compelled to master the subjects in hand ; the details must be lodged in the memory at least. Especially is this the case when the honors of the university are sought. The strongest, earthly motives are brought to bear. There are the rival feelings which are transferred to the university from the various preparatory schools. The competition of different colleges is not small. The disgrace of degradation by a failure, is a powerful stimulant. Then the honor of being published throughout the kingdom as successful on a fiercely contested arena is ever before the eyes. The prize, though often found to be ashes in the grasp, is splendid and alluring till gained. This conclusion, to which we should come *à priori*, is verified in the experience of Henry Kirk White, Henry Martyn, and many others, at the English universities.

2. The two great subjects of study at Oxford—the scholastic logic in the works of Aristotle and the poetry of the Greeks, especially the laws of accent, versification, etc. are not to be lightly depreciated. It has been too common in Scotland and in this country to adopt views somewhat one-sided and ill-considered, in relation to the great Stagirite. His logic is one of the best means in the whole circle of sciences for disciplining the mental faculties. The mind is trained by a close study of the scholastic system to a nicety of discrimination, to a perspicacity of insight, to a steadiness of aim, which no other pursuit, perhaps, can confer.

In the multifarious and distracting studies and recreations, with which the student of the present day is tempted to waste his talents, it would be eminently serviceable if a little time were devoted to the hard discipline imparted by such treatises as the Nicomachean Ethics. The ability to make clear distinctions, to separate truth from error, even with microscopic accuracy, none but the superficial will despise. The power, too, of writing Greek and Latin verses, in the true spirit of the classics, is not a mere idle accomplishment. Some of the compositions in the Oxford Anthologia are not soulless imitations of the model, or a verbal copying of the phrases of Ovid or Pindar. They are fresh and beautiful poems, where the spirit of the classics is seized and admirably preserved. This power, also, implies a nice training

of the ear, a mastery of the subtle laws of harmony, a perception of the beauty of thought as well as of diction. Well would it be for our American schools, if more time were devoted to those methods and laws of speech in which the Greeks so much excelled, and which we, in our ignorance, so generally condemn. The discipline would not be without its use in the management and mastery of our mother tongue.

3. The most marked peculiarity in the Oxford studies is the want of a comprehensive view of the fields of knowledge and a scientific adjustment of their relative claims. There is little order or systematic arrangement about them. No master has fitted them to the various wants of the youthful mind, or to the changing states of society. They seem to have come down as a fixed inheritance, a kind of heir-loom from the long centuries past. Everything else has changed, but Oxford is fast moored. New and wonderful sciences have been created, but Oxford teaches as she did when Wolsey or Laud ruled the king's counsels. Dynasties have crumbled in pieces, but the iron rule of the Peripatetic remains. Of a wise conservatism, no one can rightfully complain. A reverential regard for antiquity is eminently in keeping at Oxford. Against all rash innovations, the very stones of her venerable piles would cry out. But is it not obvious, that by resisting every improvement, by rigidly adhering to a course of discipline which might have been the best in the 14th century, she is putting at hazard all which she now holds dear and running the risk of a radical and sudden change in her whole system? The true policy of a collegiate institution in any country is to retain what the wisdom of ages has proved to be beneficial, and also to adapt her discipline and instructions to the changing states of society.

4. The surprising neglect of mathematical studies. "To follow scientific study," says Prof. Powell, "is purely optional, and the average of those who evince any degree of acquaintance with it is about one in eleven or twelve." A voluntary mathematical examination takes place in Oxford twice in every year after the degree-examination. The average of the mathematical classmen for the six years ending in 1845, was twenty-six per annum. The number for 1846 and 1847 fell below that average. Formerly the public preparatory schools were said to be in fault. But Rugby, under the late Dr. Arnold, and Eton, so far as the influence of the head-master, Dr. Hawtrey, can assist, have adopted an improved system. An acquaintance with mathematics is not now positive-

ly required for graduation. Euclid is generally exchanged for logic. This neglect of mathematical study is the more reprehensible from the fact that a considerable number of the undergraduates of Oxford are the sons of wealthy landed proprietors and merchants, who may subsequently find themselves at the head of extensive estates, mines, rail-ways, canals, etc. where an acquaintance with some branches of mathematics would seem to be more useful than Aristotle's Logic!

5. The entire circle of natural sciences is excluded from the required course of discipline at Oxford.¹ Astronomy even is classed with chemistry and geology, and is jealously excluded. The university possesses, indeed, an observatory, but its records, so far as we know, exhibit no discoveries. One of its colleges, Merton, numbers among its graduates, Dr. Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of blood; Queen's College has the name of Dr. Edmund Halley. A few other persons who have adorned the ranks of science, may have passed through the halls of the university; they cannot be said to have been *nurtured* there. Dr. Buckland, so eminent and enthusiastic in the natural sciences, lectures regularly at Oxford, but he has not been able to make his doctrines take root. No science or branch of literature can, indeed, find votaries, which is not required for the attainment of honors. A reform must first be effected in the system of examination. This cannot come, however, from a board, the large majority of whose members are strongly opposed to any innovation.

6. The position of biblical and theological studies at Oxford is very anomalous. Those, who are supposed to have mastered Thucydides and Aristotle, are examined in the Greek of the Four Gospels, and must commit to memory the Thirty Nine Articles, in the manner of a Sunday School scholar! Those, who are to fill the office of a country justice and those who are entering into holy orders, and who may become bishops, must possess the same amount of theological knowledge. Hence, we are not surprised to find it stated, that nearly one third of the candidates for the degree of B. A. are unsuccessful, especially on account of their ignorance of the subject of divinity. The statutes require too much or too little. For those who are about to enter the scenes of active life, the requisition is disproportionately large; for the candidate for the church it is very meagre. Small as it is, how-

¹ This circumstance gave rather a ludicrous aspect to the repeated meetings of the British Association at Oxford, unless that body acts on the principle of holding its convocations where there is the greatest need of light.

ever, it is all, we believe, which is required of him who is about to assume the work of the ministry. In a former age, when nearly all the learning which existed was in the possession of clergymen, the arrangement might be well enough. But now nothing could be more inefficient and inappropriate. The examination for degrees ought to take place at an earlier day—all the students being required to exhibit an acquaintance with the principles of Christianity. Those intended for the church might then be induced to spend two or three years in the proper professional studies. As it is, theology is not studied as a science; the Hebrew language does not make a part of the required course. The knowledge which is not demanded for obtaining a degree is picked up at hap-hazard.¹ Some by personal energy and a sense of duty supply the deficiency. Many, it is to be feared, enter very ill-furnished upon their sacred work.

A portion of the hostility to salutary reform which is felt at Oxford is doubtless, to be ascribed, to the Tractarian or Papal tendencies which exist there.² A Romanizing spirit is not friendly to the cultivation of a generous and comprehensive literature. It clings tenaciously to the past. It would build its altars as far as possible from the stir of modern society. It seeks not so much to do good to men, as to enjoy quiet meditation, and dream away its days in some of those old cloisters, which would need but little transformation to be again the abode of abbots and friars. It has much more sympathy with canon law, scholastic science, and even with portions of Greek literature, than with a manly theology, or with those sciences which it is fond of calling profane.

¹ Oxford possesses in her Bodleian Library stores of oriental Mss. inestimably rich. What is she doing, and what has she done, since Pocock died, for the general cause of biblical learning?

² The list of Oxford seceders to Rome published in July, 1847, was fifty-seven, all but fifteen, clergymen. Two of these, Mr. Seager and Mr. Morris were assistant Hebrew lecturers to Dr. Pusey. One is the son of the late bishop Ryder; one was a curate of Rev. R. Wilberforce, another of Rev. H. Wilberforce. The famous Tract, No. 90, was openly defended by five hundred members of Convocation. The number of tutors, deans and lecturers who signed the address to the proctors in favor of Tract 90, was seventy-six. Near Nuneham, about four miles from Oxford, a mansion has been taken for an "Anglo-Catholic" brotherhood, first established in Ireland by Mr. Sewell of Exeter College. Here a Tractarian press is to be established, at which the Bible is to be printed, with notes by Messrs. Pusey, Marriott, Keble and Williams.

ARTICLE VIII.

WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY.

By William H. Wells, M. A., Andover.

A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language.
By Joseph E. Worcester, LL. D. Boston: Wilkins, Carter, & Co. 1847.

It is now more than twenty years since Dr. Worcester commenced his labors as a lexicographer. He first appeared before the public as editor of "Johnson's Dictionary, improved by Todd, and abridged by Chalmers, with Walker's Pronouncing Dictionary combined." His octavo abridgment of Webster's American Dictionary was issued in 1829.

In 1830, Dr. Worcester published his "Comprehensive Pronouncing and Explanatory Dictionary of the English Language." This work was received with very general favor, and fully established the claims of the author to a place in the first rank of lexicographers.

The "Universal and Critical Dictionary" is based, in some degree, upon Todd's edition of Johnson's Dictionary, and Walker's Critical Pronouncing Dictionary; but the compiler has added about 27,000 words to the number found in Johnson and Todd, and most of the definitions derived from Johnson and others have been greatly modified and improved.

It is deserving of notice, that Dr. Worcester has been most successful in presenting those branches of the subject which have been handled less satisfactorily by Dr. Webster. Webster's *definitions* must still be regarded as standing unrivalled; but in treating of the *orthography* and *pronunciation* of words, the Universal and Critical Dictionary is far in advance of every other work that has hitherto appeared.

The best English standard of pronunciation, at the present time, is the Dictionary of B. H. Smart. In the pronunciation of words, Worcester agrees more nearly with Smart than with any other author; and we think his departures from Smart are almost invariably sustained by the usage of the best speakers.

With regard to words of doubtful or disputed pronunciation, the authorities for the different modes are given; so that the Diction-

ary shows in what manner the words are pronounced by the most eminent orthoëpists. Many words of this class are also accompanied with critical remarks.

No part of the work before us is deserving of higher commendation than the author's *analysis of sounds*. Many of the errors in pronunciation which are so prominent in the Dictionary of Dr. Webster, have sprung legitimately from his defective view of the elementary sounds of the language. Thus, the sound of *a* in *care*, *rare*, etc., which is properly a distinct element, is given by Webster as identical with *a* in *fate*. The absurdity of this pronunciation may be readily shown by uttering in immediate succession the words *fate*, *hale*, *care*, giving to *a* in *care* the same sound as in the words *fate* and *hale*.

A similar error occurs in Webster's pronunciation of the words *glass*, *grass*, *last*, etc., in which he gives to the vowel the grave sound, as in *father*. Walker, on the other hand, gives it the short sound, as in *man*. Worcester makes this sound a separate element, intermediate between the grave and the short sound. It is true, that words of this class were pronounced with the grave sound in the time of George the Third, and the short sound may, perhaps, be adopted in the reign of George the Sixth; but good speakers of the present day employ the intermediate sound given by Worcester.

The Pronouncing Dictionary of Walker has had an extensive circulation; but it is now almost entirely superseded in England by later and more accurate works, and its influence in this country is rapidly waning. It is superfluous to say, that a dictionary which requires the words *took*, *book*, *look*, etc., to be pronounced with the close sound of the diphthong, as in *pool*, *tool*, *food*, and the words *bench*, *drench*, *inch*, etc., to be pronounced as if written *bensh*, *drensh*, *insh*, etc., cannot safely be relied on as a *standard*.

In giving the *orthography* of words, Worcester has wisely avoided the extremes of both Webster and Walker, and furnished a work that accords more nearly with the best usage of the language than any other dictionary in use.

A copious vocabulary of words of doubtful or various orthography is given, and many words of this class are accompanied with critical remarks in the body of the work. We select the following, which occurs under the word *Judgment*: —

“The following words, *abridgment*, *acknowledgment*, and *judgment*, are to be found, with the orthography here given, in the English dictionaries which preceded the publication of Mr. Todd's improved edition of Dr.

Johnson's Dictionary. Todd altered Johnson's orthography of these words, by the insertion of an *e*, thus, *abridgement*, *acknowledgement*, *judgement*. * * * The English dictionaries of Jameson and Smart, which have appeared since the publication of Todd's edition of Johnson, also retain the *e*. * * * Many respectable writers now insert the *e* in these words. The omission of it, however, has been hitherto, and still continues to be, the prevailing usage; but it is, perhaps, not very improbable that the usage may yet be changed, and the more consistent orthography be generally adopted."

The *grammatical forms and inflections of words* are given more fully by Worcester than by any previous author. His Dictionary also contains numerous *technical terms*, relating to the arts and sciences, and such *words and phrases from foreign languages* as are often met with in English books.

The whole work embraces, in its several vocabularies, nearly 100,000 words.

ARTICLE IX.

SELECT BIBLICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

PROFESSOR Hengstenberg of Berlin writes as follows, in respect to his Christology. "Although the German edition has been out of print for a long time, still I am sure that no new edition will appear within several years. For, after the completion of my commentary on the Psalms, I have thrown myself, with the greatest zeal, upon the Revelation of St. John. But if I should give a new edition, it would contain no important change; the greatest would be in the treatment of the Messianic Psalms. In my Article on Balaam (Numbers 24th chapter), I have arrived at a different conclusion from that in the Christology." We learn that the publisher of Dr. Keith's translation of this able and important work, intends to print an abridged edition, in one large volume, under the editorial care of Rev. Prof. Packard of Alexandria, D. C.

We learn that the geographer, Dr. Ritter of Berlin, expects to spend the coming winter in visiting the peninsula of Sinai, Syria, etc.

The veteran classical scholar and teacher, Frederic Jacobs, died at Gotha, on the 30th of March, 1847. He was born at Gotha, Oct. 6, 1764. From 1790 to 1807 he was teacher in the gymnasium in that city, and from 1807 to 1813, professor in the Lyceum in Munich and member of the Academy of Sciences. From 1813 to his death, he was head libra-

rian of the ducal library at Gotha. His writings are very numerous, some of them are exceedingly attractive, and are filled with valuable thoughts. His style is genial and happy, and his devotion to classical pursuits most enthusiastic. He united, in a degree which is very uncommon in German classical authors, a pure taste with profound knowledge. The 7th vol. of his *Miscellaneous Writings* (8 Bde, 1822—45), contains his autobiography. Several very delightful articles from his pen may be found in the "*Classical Studies*," a volume published a few years ago by Gould, Kendall & Lincoln of Boston.

Dr. Hug, who lately deceased at Freiburg in the Breisgau, had prepared for the press the 4th ed. of his *Introduction to the New Testament*. While the leading features of the earlier editions are scrupulously retained, it has received important corrections and additions. The work has enjoyed an extensive and deserved popularity, both among Protestants and Catholics. The author was a candid and considerate member of the Catholic communion, and like Dr. Jahn of Vienna, acceptable to all parties. The guiding principle of the *Introduction* is the historical, which alone can lead to true results in a production of this nature. It is to be published by Cotta of Stuttgart, at about \$3.50.

The *Psalms*, according to the original text, metrically translated and interpreted by J. G. Vaihinger. Cotta, Stuttgart, 3 Thlr. The qualities necessary in a translator and interpreter of the *Psalter*, the author remarks, are acuteness of understanding, sound judgment, vivid imagination, susceptibility of emotion, and purity and warmth of religious life, without which no one can penetrate the depths of divine revelation. These high qualities are possessed by the author himself in a good degree, as an able reviewer thinks in a late No. of the *Jena Allgem. Litt. Zeit.* In an *Introduction* of sixty-five pages, Vaihinger discusses the nature and peculiarities of Hebrew poetry, the origin and development of the Hebrew lyric, the rhythm and strophe, the origin and conclusion of the *Psalter*, superscriptions, etc., history and theological exposition of the *Psalm*, translation and commentary, value of the *Psalter* and adds testimonies to its worth. The spirit of Vaihinger may be learned from the following sentence: "Without the supposition of a special revelation in the Old Testament, that is, of such a relation of God to the Israelitish people, to its patriarchs and prophets, as cannot be conceived from a mere human development of this people, but which points to a peculiar action of the Divine Spirit among them, it is as impossible to come to a clear insight into the history of the nation as it is to a true comprehension of Christianity, which still manifestly has its roots in the institutions and promises of the Old Testament." — The 3d vol. of Ewald's *History of the Israelites* has been published. — The *Grammar of Modern Persian*, by Mirza Moham-

med Ibrahim, professor of Arabic and Persian in the East India college at Haileybury, near London, has been translated into German, in part re-edited and accompanied with notes, by Dr. H. L. Fleischer of Leipsic. Dr. F. is a leading man in the German Oriental Society, and one of the most distinguished scholars in Arabic and the cognate languages. — The following is the title of a specimen of a new edition of the Heb. Cod. by Prof. Theile, published at Leipsic: “*Liber Geneseos, in usum Scholarum academicarum cum brevi notarum Masorethicarum explicatione.*” — Dr. A. Heilegstedt has prepared the first part of Vol. IV. of Maurer’s Commentary on the Old Test. It contains the book of Job in a vol. of 311 pages, price \$1.25. The 2d part, containing Ecclesiastes and the Canticles, completing the O. Test., is nearly ready. — The first *livraison* of Vol. I. of the second ed. of the *Consensus* of Hariri, collated with the *Man.* and augmented by historical and explanatory notes, has just been published in Paris, under the editorial care of Reinaud and Derenbourg. The popularity of this oriental poem is owing, in addition to its intrinsic excellence, to the invaluable labors of De Sacy and to the genial German translation by the poet F. Rückert. The repeated editions of this translation show in what estimation it is held. It has called forth the criticism of a learned Arab, Nasif Efendi el-Yasidschi of Beirût, who has happily corrected some things from his acquaintance with his vernacular speech. An edition of this literary curiosity is expected from von Mehren, a pupil of Prof. Fleischer. De Sacy’s ed. of the *Consensus* was long since exhausted. Reinaud, who succeeded De Sacy in the special school of oriental languages at Paris, undertook this second edition, with the assistance of Derenbourg. Explanatory notes in French are added to De Sacy’s commentary, which is wholly in Arabic. The entire work will be included in two volumes. — Among the distinguished Jews of the Middle Ages was Jehadi ben Solomon, called el-Charisi, who flourished in the first half of the 13th century, in Moorish Spain, probably in Granada. He travelled in many countries, and was led to pay special attention to the condition of Hebrew poetry. Some of the leading Jews in Spain, who were ignorant of Arabic, requested him to translate into Hebrew the *Consensus* of Hariri, whose fame had in a short time penetrated into all the Moslem countries. This he accomplished with great ability, under the title *ספר שירי חריזי*. The third *Consensus* is communicated by De Sacy in the Hariri. When he returned home, Charisi gave the results of his numerous observations in a poetical work, which is formally connected with the poem of Hariri, but is really an independent and original production. He shows great talent in delineating all the aspects of human life, comic and tragic, and a perfect mastery of the Hebrew language. He is a strongly orthodox Jew, but has a high regard for art and science.

One of the poems is in Hebrew, Chaldee, and Arabic. The whole work is termed *Tahkemoni* (תַּחְמוֹנִי 2 Sam. 23: 6). It is divided into fifty *gates* (שַׁעַר). It was printed in Constantinople in 1546, again in 1568, and at Amsterdam in 1729. These editions were very negligently printed, and were without the vowels, except in the verse. A new edition has just appeared under very favorable auspices, at Berlin, under the charge of Dr. Kämpf, a learned Jew. It is based on a very correct Ms. of A. D. 1361, about fifty years after the death of the author. The whole is supplied with vowels, with notes in which parallel places from the Bible and the Talmud are quoted, and with a translation, introduction, etc. Price in Germany, 1 Thlr. 10 Ngr.

Monument de Ninive découvert et décrit par M. P. E. Botta, mesuré et dessiné par M. E. Flandin. Livr. I—X. Paris, 1847. Imp. fol. à 20 Fr. This work is published by order of the government, under the direction of a commission of the Institute. Botta, a nephew of the well known Italian historian, and French consul in Mosul, began his researches in 1843. Between four and five hours N. E. of Mosul, at the village of Khursabad, lying on the little river Khauser, his excavations were rewarded by the discovery of a large palace. The entire village was purchased by the French government, the palace was laid open, drawings of the bas-reliefs and copies of the inscriptions were taken, and such bas-reliefs and figures as could be removed, were taken to Paris, where they are to be placed in the Louvre. The palace contains 15 halls or galleries, several of them being from 100 to 115 feet long, but not above 13 feet high. No window has been discovered; light must have been admitted from above. All the walls, within and without, are covered with bas-reliefs. In the inner galleries the bas-reliefs are, for the most part, divided into two series, each $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet high; between the two are arrow-headed inscriptions. The design of the building is not apparent; it seems not to have been a necropolis or a temple; it might have been a villa or hall of one of the Assyrian monarchs, where he wished to leave a record of his warlike deeds. The age of the edifice is yet only a matter of conjecture. Flandin is inclined to place it at the second period of the Assyrian dynasty, whose kings are made known to us in the Bible, and who finally overthrew the Jewish kingdom. The drawings of Flandin and the copies of the inscriptions by Botta, are now publishing by the French government. The ten numbers already issued, contain twenty-two tables of bas-reliefs and twenty-two of inscriptions. — The Englishman Layard has excavated a structure, similar to that at Khursabad, at Nimrud, six hours below Mosul, near what is supposed to be the site of ancient Larissa. The hill or mound is ten times larger than the one discovered by Botta, being 1800 feet long, 900 broad, and from 60 to 70 high. Here are the ruins of a palace, and a great

number of colossal monoliths, presenting the figures of men and animals.

Major Rawlinson thinks that the inscriptions found in the district of Van, were written in a language related to the Armenian and Turkish, and mentions that he has found in them the names of the historical kings of Armenia.

Later accounts from Mr. Layard state: "I have penetrated into the eighth chamber, and have found four pair of winged oxen of gigantic size. Among the bas-reliefs is one which represents a mountainous country; another has mountains covered with pines and firs; a third, vineyards; on a fourth is a sea-horse, and in the distance the sea covered with numerous vessels, etc. Mr. Rawlinson is making considerable progress in reading the arrow-headed inscriptions."

Prof. Wüstenfeld of Göttingen has published the *Mustarik of Jakût of Hamât*, a selection made by the author himself from his great geographical lexicon, one of the most important geographical works which is found in Arabic literature, but which has been hitherto known only by some extracts made by Frähn. It was one of the main sources of information used by Golius, Schultens, Abulfeda, Firuzabadi and others.

The new edition of Stephens's *Greek Lexicon*, publishing at Paris, has reached the 8th *fasciculus* of Vol. V. *Ἰλιϋ—Ἰλύσιος*. — Prof. Süpffe has published at Karlsruhe a school-edition of *Virgil—Historical and philological lectures*, delivered in the university of Bonn by B. G. Niebuhr, edited by M. Niebuhr, Vol. I., containing "the East to the battle of Salamis," Greece to the time of Pericles." — A *Manual Dictionary of the Latin Language* is to be published by Prof. R. Klotz of Leipsic, one of the leading classical scholars in Germany, in fifteen numbers; 8 Thlr. The first number is published—from A. to Aestimo. — A new edition of Frederic Jacobs's Greek elementary book for beginners has been published, under the care of Prof. Classen. — A new life of Melancthon by K. F. Ledderhose has appeared at Heidelberg, 339 S. 20 Ngr. — "The Travels of Joseph Rueseger in Europe, Asia, and Africa, in the years 1835—1841, undertaken with special reference to natural history," have been published at Stuttgart, with maps, plans, drawings, etc., at 31 Thlr. 15 Ngr. "What a great and manifold picture," says the *Leipsic Repertorium*, "of the manners and customs of man, of important lands and river-districts in these notions, compressed so kernel-like, of one, who bade defiance to the greatest hardships, the most fearful hazards, the most dangerous maladies, in order to fulfil the duty which he had undertaken, and accomplish his earnest labors in behalf of science!" — Dr. Mahn of Berlin, from whom a *Grammar and Dictionary of the Basque language* has been expected, has turned his attention to the Provençal literature, and has published the first

part of the "Works of the Troubadours in the Provençal language with a grammar and dictionary." It contains 277 poems by twenty poets. The plan embraces a complete collection of all the known works of the Troubadours, in chronological order. — Pietro Matrara has found in the Vatican library an inedited work of John Tzetzes on Homer.

The first section of Ersch and Grüber's Universal Encyclopædia of Science and Art, extending from A to G, is edited by Grüber; the second, from H to N, by A. G. Hoffmann; the last, from O to Z, by M. H. E. Meier. Among the articles in the last five parts published, are Ferdinand the Catholic, by Strunberg; Festivals of the Jews, by Fink; Fichte, by Bachmann; Ficinus, by Bähr; Isocrates, by Weissenborn; Isaphan, by Fischer; Ancient Geography and History of Italy, by Schirlitz; Medioeval and Modern Italy, by Sander; Duty and its Laws, by Erdmann; Pharoos, by Daniel; Pharsalia, battle, by Eckermann; Philips, emperors and kings, by Flathe, etc. — The concluding part of the 3d edition of Wiener's Bible Dictionary is promised at the end of the year. The two vols. will cost, in Germany, about \$6. — The 16th volume of Otto von Gerlach's Selections from Luther's Works, has appeared. Price of each vol. about 10 Sgr.

The number of students in the university of Jena in the beginning of 1847 was 411; of whom 107 were in the department of theology, 132 in law, 54 in medicine, and the remainder in philosophy; 173 were students from abroad. The attendance at the winter-semester, 1847, of the universities below, was as follows:

Bonn, 644	Göttingen, 609	Jena, 411
Breslau, 738	Griefswald, 192	Kiel, 191
Erlangen, 364	Halle, 725	Königsberg, 325
Giessen, 535	Heidelberg, 955	Leipsic, 901
		Marburg, 242

The following list of the authors that are read in the two upper classes of the Dresden *gymnasium*, will give an idea of the nature of the studies pursued there, as *contrasted* with those which are required at our colleges. In the second class, Cicero's Orations and Letters, Livy, Sallust, Virgil's Eclogues and *Æneid*, Terence, Tibullus, Plutarch's Lives, Xenophon, Homer's *Iliad*; in the first class, Cicero's Rhetorical and Philosophical Orations, Livy, Tacitus, Horace, the less difficult Dialogues of Plato, Demosthenes, or some other of the Attic orators, Herodotus, and the easier portions of the tragedians.

Dr. Dorner of Königsberg has become ordinary professor of theology in the university of Bonn, and Dr. Köllner of Göttingen ordinary pro-

fessor of theology at Giessen. Prof. Preller of Jena has been appointed head-librarian of the ducal library at Weimar, vacant by the death of Jacoba. Dr. Urlichs of Bonn, who has taken so active a part in the Roman topography question, has gone to Griefswald as professor of archaeology. Dr. Hundeshagen, professor extraordinarius at Berne, and author of the late important work on Protestantism, has been invited to Heidelberg as professor ordinarius of theology and teacher of New Testament Exegesis. Dr. Fleck of Leipsic has become ordinary professor of theology at Giessen. Dr. Otto Jahn, ordinary professor at Griefswald, has become professor of archaeology at Leipsic university. S. T. Fearon has been named professor of Chinese at King's College, London. Dr. Hawkins, provost of Oriel College, Oxford, friend and correspondent of Dr. Arnold, has taken the chair of New Testament Interpretation. The distinguished theologian, Dr. Nitzsch of Bonn, has been invited to become a member of the theological faculty in the university of Berlin.

A very valuable collection of works in American literature, especially in jurisprudence, has recently been purchased and deposited in the British Museum. Mr. L. A. Prevost, a Chinese scholar, is making a catalogue of Dr. Morrison's Chinese works, in that Museum. A reprint of Prof. Stuart's commentary on the Apocalypse, has been published at Glasgow, in one volume, at half the price at which the American edition is sold there. Mr. Elliott's work is a great favorite with the numerous churchmen who adopt millenarian views. The sale of it is chiefly confined to them. Dr. Kitto's new journal will commence with the beginning of the next year. Mr. Clark's proposal to publish a similar periodical at Edinburgh, is abandoned. Sharon Turner, the well known historian of the Anglo-Saxons, died in London, Feb. 19, 1847, aged 79. His *History of England* is comprised in 8 volumes. Dr. H. Tattam has published an English translation of "the ancient Coptic version of the Book of Job the Just," in 184 pp. A new and literal translation of Aristotle's treatise on Rhetoric, from the text of Bekker, has been published at Oxford. The Nicomachean Ethics has also been translated by Rev. D. P. Chase. A Lexicon to *Æschylus*, containing a critical explanation of the more difficult passages in the Seven Tragedies, by Rev. W. Linwood, is in the press. Niebuhr's *Lectures* on the History of Rome, from the earliest times to the first Punic war, are in the process of translation by Dr. Schmitz.

Partly in compliance with the request of some friends abroad, we shall from time to time give a short list of the more important publications in Biblical, Theological and Classical Literature in the United States. We begin with a list of some works published within the past two years:

The Earlier Prophecies of Isaiah, 8vo. by Joseph Addison Alexander, Professor in the Theol. Sem., Princeton.

By the same author, **The Later Prophecies of Isaiah**, 8vo. pp. 502.

Hebrew Grammar of Gesenius as edited by Rödiger translated, with additions and also a **Hebrew Chrestomathy** by M. Stuart, 8vo. pp. 360.

Exercises in Hebrew Grammar and Selections from the Greek Scriptures to be translated into Hebrew, with Notes, Hebrew Phrases and references to approved works in Greek and Hebrew Philology, by H. B. Hackett, Prof. of Biblical Literature in Newton Theol. Institution, 12mo. pp. 115.

Critical History and Defence of the Old Testament Canon, by M. Stuart, 12mo. pp. 452.

Princeton Theological Essays, second series, including the **Contributions of the late Albert Dod**, D. D., 8vo. pp. 612.

Miscellanies by M. Stuart, including a reprint of the **Letters to Dr. Channing**, 12mo. pp. 370.

An Elementary Grammar of the Greek Language, containing a series of Greek and English Exercises for translation, with the requisite vocabularies, by Dr. Raphael Kühner, of Hanover, Germany, translated by S. H. Taylor, principal of Phillips Academy, Andover, 12mo. pp. 355. Fourth edition.

A Grammar of the Greek Language by A. Crosby, Professor of Greek in Dartmouth College. Third edition, 12mo.

Greek Tables, by the same author.

Xenophon's Anabasis, with an Index of Citations, by the same.

Zumpt's School Latin Grammar, 8vo., and **Zumpt's Latin Grammar**, 12mo. translated by Dr. Schmitz, and edited by Dr. Anthon.

The Germania and Agricola of Caius Cornelius Tacitus, with Notes, for the use of Colleges, by W. S. Tyler, Professor of Greek and Latin, Amherst College, 12mo. pp. 181.

A History of Rome, from the earliest times to the death of Commodus, A. D. 192, by Dr. Leonhard Schmitz, rector of the High School of Edinburgh. Andover, 1847, 12mo. pp. 456.

The oration of Demosthenes on the Crown, with Notes, by J. T. Champin, Professor of Greek and Latin in Waterville College. Second edition, 1847, 8vo.

The Panegyricus of Isocrates, from the text of Bremi, with English Notes, by C. C. Felton, M. A. Professor of Greek Literature in Harvard University, 1847, 12mo. pp. 124.

Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates, with Notes. Based chiefly on the edition of Kühner. By R. D. C. Robbins, Librarian, Andover Theol. Seminary. 12mo. pp. 416. 1847.

The Cyropaedia of Xenophon, with Notes by J. O. Owen; 12mo., pp. 574.

Selections from the first five books of Livy, together with the twenty-first and twenty-second books entire, chiefly from the text of Alschefski, with English Notes for Schools and Colleges, by J. L. Lincoln, professor of Latin in Brown University; one volume 12mo.

The following works are in press or in an advanced state of preparation:

Notes on the Prophet Isaiah, a revised and abridged edition, by Albert Barnes; 2 vols. 12mo.

Hahn's Hebrew Bible, new and complete stereotype edition, being a fac-simile of the Leipsic edition, 1 vol. 8vo.

The Middle Kingdom, a work on China, by S. Wells Williams, many years a resident in China, 1 vol. 8vo., illustrated with engravings and a map.

The Clouds of Aristophanes, by Prof. Felton, a new edition.

The Birds of Aristophanes, with English Notes by the same.

American Archaeological Researches: an Inquiry into the Origin and Purposes of the Aboriginal Monuments and Remains of the Mississippi valley, by E. G. Squier and E. H. Davis. This work, embracing the results of the examination of more than two hundred mounds, will constitute the first publication of the Smithsonian Institute.

Thucydides, with English Notes, by J. O. Owen.

ERRATA.

Nov. 1846, Vol. III. p. 776, line 19, for *Servis*, read *Jervis*; l. 25, for *Cambridge*, read *Edinburgh*; p. 778, l. 13, for *tower*, read *town*; l. 38, for *Pillars*, read *Pillans*; p. 782, l. 26, del. comma after *Hesse*; May 1847, p. 276. l. 30, for *their*, read *these*; p. 280, l. 1, for *nearly*, read *neatly*; p. 286, l. 17, for *a consent of*, read *a consent and*; p. 291, l. 1, for *repeated*, read *repealed*; p. 293, l. 1, for *any*, read *my*; p. 296, l. 5, for *invidious* (twice), read *insidious*; p. 297, l. 1, for *other*, read *judicial precept*; p. 302, l. 6, for *this or some*, read *also for any*; p. 320, l. 31, for *connection*, read *command*; Aug. 1847, p. 437, l. 17, for *making*, read *raking*; note 2, l. 1, for *on*, read *ou*; p. 448, l. 34, for *demoralized*, read *demonized*; p. 458, note, for *Lacca*, (thrice) read *Laeca*; p. 460, l. 32, for *invasion*, read *inversion*; p. 467, note, l. 7, for *cette*, read *celle*; p. 540, l. 10, for *May*, read *Way*; p. 556, l. 30, after *describes*, insert *it*; p. 559, l. 4, after *that*, insert *in*; l. 5, before *often*, insert *is*; l. 30, for *strangely*, read *strongly*; p. 562, l. 22, for *rational*, read *national*; p. 564, l. 23, for *cause*, read *course*; p. 569, l. 25, for *past*, read *first*; p. 576, l. 16, for *Consequenzwacheri*, read *Consequenzmacherei*; p. 579, l. 21, for *in*, read *is*; p. 580, l. 19, for *bold*, read *bald*; p. 773, l. 32, for *ten*, read *eight*; p. 774, l. 2, before *a thousand*, insert *nearly*.

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